

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.88
7 December 1962
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Friday, 7 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. ISKIRLIEV

Burma:

U TUN SKEIN

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU

ATO H. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCIGLI OTTELEI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. H. FLORESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. IACOBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. STAHL

Mr. F. KELLIN

Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEL

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. J. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare open the eighty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to inform the Conference that the two co-Chairmen have circulated a draft report to the General Assembly on the progress of negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The representative of Mexico has asked to speak on a point of order. I therefore give him the floor.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I have asked to speak, not in order to make a statement on behalf of the Mexican delegation, but to read a declaration which the eight non-aligned delegations have drawn up jointly and which I have been asked to submit to you on their behalf.

This statement was drafted in English and reads as follows:

"The suggestions and observations made in the past few days by the non-aligned delegations regarding a test ban have been offered in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) (ENDC/63).

"These suggestions and observations must not be construed as individual interpretations of the eight-nation memorandum now endorsed by the General Assembly without a dissident vote.

"The eight delegations in this respect still abide by the statement (ENDC/PV.24, pp. 5 et seq.) made on their behalf by the representative of Ethiopia on 19 April last".

(Continued in Spanish)

I should like now to raise another question, also on behalf of the representatives of the eight Powers. We should like the report to the General Assembly to include, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), paragraph 7, a brief summary of the suggestions and observations made by the delegations in question with a view to assisting the Committee in complying with the terms of the General Assembly resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We shall now resume our work, and I call on the first speaker, the representative of Brazil.

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO (Brazil) (translation from French): I should like first to welcome Their Excellencies Tun Shein and Kurka, representatives of Burma and Czechoslovakia, whose presence among us will certainly contribute to the success of our work.

(Mr. Assumpção de Araújo, Brazil)

The Brazilian delegation has given very close attention to the important statements made at our Conference since it resumed its work, and would like to state its views briefly on the question before us, the suspension of nuclear tests.

We are now so close to the time-limit set for us by the United Nations General Assembly that there seem good grounds for anxiety. There still appears to be a long way to go to reconcile the views of the opposing parties. On 3 December last (ENDC/PV.86) our co-Chairmen went over the history of the negotiations which had taken place during the recess at the meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests, and we have to admit that the results are scarcely satisfactory.

However, we need not lose all hope. We should be encouraged by the progress, modest though it is, which has been achieved during the last few months. The many problems raised by the suspension of nuclear tests have gradually been brought down to the question of underground explosions, as everybody seems now to admit that no control system is needed for tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Moreover, the developments in the international situation have created an atmosphere which is much more favourable than before, not only to the actual discontinuance of explosions but also to the negotiation of at least a provisional agreement on a test ban. The discontinuance of tests is a matter of the highest importance to us, as the head of the Brazilian delegation stated at the opening of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"We are convinced that our possibilities for progress in the field of general and complete disarmament are very slim if we do not succeed at least in reaching agreement on the more direct question of a nuclear cease-fire."

(A/PV.1125 (provisional), p.11).

The seventeenth session of the General Assembly gave great prominence to this question, and this is all the more important as our Conference must now be guided in its work by resolution 1762 (XVII) (ENDC/63).

In this resolution, the General Assembly which is here only expressing world public opinion, condemns all tests of nuclear weapons and requests the Powers concerned:

- to cease their tests in any form whatsoever immediately and not later than 1 January 1963;

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- to reach an agreement on cessation of tests by 1 January 1963, if possible in all environments, or at least in those environments where control is not necessary. (In this latter case they should also conclude a provisional agreement suspending underground tests);
- to conclude as soon as possible a final treaty prohibiting nuclear explosions in all environments.

As we have already seen, the suspension of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water does not depend on any particular machinery, but only on the goodwill of the nuclear Powers and on their proper understanding of their real interests and of the interests of the whole world. The Conference's role in this field is therefore essentially to bring the voice of world public opinion to the ears of these Powers.

The case is different when we are dealing with underground tests, a question which raises not only political but technical difficulties. The eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) represents an attempt to escape from the deadlock reached by the negotiations. Unfortunately, as we stressed in the United Nations General Assembly on 20 September 1962, the eight countries:

"...follow with concern the effort towards a logical construction through which the representatives of the two major blocs seek to give different interpretations to the suggestions put forward with the avowed purpose of reaching agreement."

(A/PV.1125 (provisional), p.11)

The memorandum now endorsed by the General Assembly, which describes it as a sound, adequate and fair basis for negotiations (ENDC/63 - A/RES/1762 (XVII), p.2), stresses that possibilities exist for establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. A commission of scientists would examine the data provided by observation posts and in the case of suspicious events could be asked to investigate on the spot. The parties to the treaty would be free to determine their line of action on the basis of the reports made by the international commission. These are the data available to us as a guide to our work during its third stage.

I should now like to define the attitude of the Brazilian delegation on the various points with which we are concerned.

In the first place, Brazil cannot admit the legitimacy of any nuclear tests whatsoever, nor does it recognize the right of any Power to carry out such experiments in any circumstances. We protested when the Soviet Union resumed its experiments in October last year; we protested again (see ENDC/PV.28, pp.11 and 12) when the United

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States announced last March that it intended to carry out a new series of tests, and we protested yet again (ENDC/PV.67, pp. 23 and 24) when the Soviet Union embarked on its last series of experiments. In Brazil's opinion, all nuclear tests, no matter by whom they are conducted, are to be condemned. The first operative paragraph of resolution 1762 A, which condemns all nuclear weapon tests, is very timely in that it gives our views the backing of the United Nations General Assembly.

Secondly, Brazil desires the complete and permanent abolition of nuclear tests in all environments, and does not forget that this Conference's final aim is the conclusion of a general treaty prohibiting all tests for all time. However, the present difficulties show us that this ideal aim cannot be attained until many considerable obstacles have been overcome.

Thirdly, Brazil cannot raise any objection to temporary or partial solutions, provided that these represent real progress and are not mere tactical or polemical manoeuvres within the framework of the cold war.

Fourthly, the General Assembly in asking the nuclear Powers to cease their tests immediately and not later than 1 January 1963 (resolution 1762 A (XVII), paragraph 2) can therefore count on our support. As we pointed out in the First Committee on 1 November last:

"... It does not seem to us that the fact of a favourable response to that appeal implies for the nuclear Powers the establishment of an indeterminate and uncontrolled moratorium, as some appear to believe. Indeed, the whole context of the draft resolution calls for immediate negotiations with a view to reaching agreements which would obviously be controlled... The immediate cessation of tests, if it were accepted, would be but a first step, with a beneficial psychological effect designed to facilitate these negotiations." (A/C.1/PV.1262, pp. 12 and 13-15)

Fifthly, Brazil also considers that so long as the negotiations for a general treaty on a test ban were going on it would be wrong to reject the idea of a limited moratorium under which the nuclear Powers would agree to suspend their experiments and would also agree on the question of effective control of this suspension. Naturally we shall welcome any agreement the nuclear Powers may make on the duration of the moratorium and on the nature and degree of control necessary.

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Sixthly, the Brazilian delegation is ready in this same realistic spirit to accept partial solutions, and since its first statement on 16 May 1962 it has been asking the nuclear Powers why they did not seriously examine the possibility of suspending tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, where there no longer seems to be any insurmountable disagreement in regard to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of control. Resolution 1762 A (XVII), paragraph 6, contains a provision to the same effect, although it links the proposed agreement to an interim arrangement suspending underground tests, on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals submitted to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

Seventhly, so far as concerns underground tests, we hope that the difference between the two blocs will steadily diminish. The possibility of extending the field of agreement to a definite category of underground tests could be considered immediately, since it seems that the detection and identification of explosions above a certain power no longer raises an insurmountable problem. As technology progressed, the threshold could be gradually reduced until they were brought to the point where only very low power explosions of a practically negligible military value escaped identification. This point seems to us an extremely important one, since such a formula would enable us largely to eliminate the present differences which mainly concern the question of control.

Eighthly, all this of course does not mean that Brazil is an advocate of an uncontrolled moratorium or of control established without previous agreement. What we have said both in the United Nations General Assembly and at this Conference, as well as our proposal for the creation of a technical committee for the scientific study of the problem (ENDC/PV.39, p.20) have, I hope, made our position perfectly clear. It is moreover, I repeat, in harmony with the eight-nation memorandum and the recent resolution 1762 (XVII).

In regard to these last questions, we have examined with much interest the suggestions made here by various delegations, particularly those of Sweden, India and Mexico. Mr. Padilla Nervo has offered us some interesting suggestions about the essential provisions which might be included in the interim or final agreement which is our target (ENDC/PV.85, pp. 35 and 36). Mr. Edberg has mentioned in particular that it should be possible to set up a scientific commission without waiting for the final drafting and implementation of a complete agreement (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 17 and 18). One of the advantages of such an interim international scientific commission would be to clear

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up the still very debatable question of the value of detection and identification by existing national systems. Such a system fits very well into the framework of the eight-nation memorandum, and Mr. Lall quite rightly insisted on the fresh importance acquired by this document (ENDC/PV.85, p.22), since it forms the only basis of negotiation recommended by the United Nations General Assembly, although other bases, which we should be careful not to reject, might also be found.

The Swedish formula deserves our full support and is moreover fully in harmony with the ideas expressed by Brazil at the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and at this Conference. Brazil, in fact, has always considered that control is both a political and technical process, and if this latter aspect is neglected, the political aspect will suffer. On 18 May 1962 Mr. de Mello Franco said here:

"We think it would be advisable to set up, under the auspices of the Conference, a specialized technical body to study control problems and to submit suggestions on the subject in due course." (ENDC/PV.39, p.20)

This proposal was repeated on 12 June in the following terms:

"In our view, the political aspect of control merges with the actual negotiation of the disarmament treaty and is thus necessarily an essential issue at this Conference; but the technical aspect of control can, and to a certain extent even must, be the subject of scientific studies parallel to the work of this Conference, though they can, of course, be carried out under its auspices and supervision."

(ENDC/PV.54, p.23)

At the opening of the general discussion at the General Assembly's seventeenth session on 20 September last, the head of the Brazilian delegation said:

"... we are more and more convinced that political negotiations on disarmament simply cannot continue to be carried out in a technical vacuum." (A/PV.1125, (provisional), p. 12)

We therefore support the Swedish delegation's suggestion which might indeed be combined with other proposals. It seems to us an eminently practical one. We might, for example, envisage a system within the framework of resolution 1762 A(XVII), paragraph 6, whereby the nuclear Powers would agree to suspend their tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and would adopt a limited moratorium - six months for example - in connexion with underground tests. During this time the scientific commission would decide on the nature and degree of control really necessary for a permanent ban on this type of explosion.

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The delegations of the eight nations have done, and will continue to do, everything in their power to facilitate negotiations between the nuclear Powers.

It is now for the nuclear Powers to take a decision and to show that "spirit of mutual understanding and concession" called for by General Assembly resolution 1762 A. Either they will persist in their present stubborn attitudes rejecting United Nations resolutions, disappointing the hopes of the entire world, alienating most of the peoples, or else they will recognise that the differences separating them on this issue are far from being essential, that wise compromise solutions cannot be a threat to the requirements of their sovereignty and their security and that to continue the armaments race involves a much more serious risk than to suspend tests. General Assembly resolution 1762 moreover calls on these Powers to reach agreement "bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind" and not their ill-considered defence interests.

Naturally past experience does not justify too optimistic a view, and that is why, I repeat, we are ready to welcome any constructive proposal from whatever source it may come, whatever its nature, even a provisional or partial one. The same applies to the question of disarmament, where Brazil prefers not to wait for a final treaty before taking a decision in favour of the creation of nuclear-free zones in some regions of the world, particularly Latin America.

The two questions indeed are closely related, and if we do not succeed in reaching agreement on the nuclear tests issue, at once so limited and so serious, we shall have to admit that discussions on general and complete disarmament are useless, Utopian and vain.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I should like to state our position on the question under discussion and the possibilities for its solution, and I should also like to make a few remarks on certain arguments which have been put forward in the course of our discussions.

In the statement I made on 28 November (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 24-30) I have already had an opportunity to confirm that we fully share the position of those delegations which are striving for an earliest possible agreement on the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. In this connexion, I also pointed out the need to arrive at a fundamental and final solution of this problem and not to be satisfied with partial or half-way measures which could not ensure the final cessation of nuclear weapon tests, but, on the contrary, would leave the door open for continuing the nuclear armaments race.

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This position of ours is in full accord with the views of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations as expressed in the repeatedly quoted resolution 1762 A(XVII), adopted at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (ENDC/63).

This resolution contains three main requests: first, it calls for an immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests and not later than 1 January 1963; secondly, it calls for the continuation of negotiations with a view to achieving an appropriate agreement; thirdly, it endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28) as a basis for negotiation.

We fully support these requests contained in this resolution, including the appeal contained in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963. However, in this connexion I should like to dwell briefly on one question to which the representative of the United States devoted considerable attention in his statement on 5 December (ENDC/PV.87, pp. 35 et s.). I refer to the relationship between paragraph 2 and paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A(XVII). In his brilliant speech, the representative of the United States accused the representatives of the socialist countries of trying to over-emphasise or increase the importance of paragraph 2 to the detriment of paragraph 6, and of wishing to prove thereby that the purpose of the resolution was to provide for a moratorium as from 1 January 1963.

For the sake of accuracy, I should like to add that of course Mr. Dean did not use such defective words as "socialist delegations" or "delegations of the socialist countries"; he used the expression delegations of the "Soviet bloc". This is only for the sake of accuracy.

I should like to say that in this case the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, is directing the barb of his arguments to the wrong quarter. As is well known, resolution 1762 A(XVII) was not sponsored by the Soviet Union or by other socialist countries but by a large group of thirty-seven non-aligned States. Consequently, their interpretation of the resolution should be decisive in this question. Permit me therefore, Mr. Chairman, to quote some brief extracts from the statements of representatives of the non-aligned countries at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly in which they dealt precisely with the relationship between paragraph 2 of the resolution and paragraph 4 of the Canadian delegation's amendment (A/C.1/L.313 and Rev.1 and 2), the greater part of which was subsequently included in the present operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A(XVII).

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Considerable attention was given to this question, for instance by the representative of Iraq who said, among other things, the following. As I have not got the Russian text, I will quote the statement of the representative of Iraq in English. I would ask the representative of the United Kingdom to forgive my Brooklyn accent as I have not been able so far to acquire an Oxford accent.

The representative of Iraq said:

(continued in English)

"We studied very carefully the statement of the representative of Canada yesterday in order to find the exact meaning of the new additional paragraph which he proposed, particularly in relation to paragraph 2 which he does not propose to amend. Paragraph 2, in the view of many, if not all, of the sponsors of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution is the key paragraph of the whole draft resolution. The sponsors of the resolution attach the greatest importance to the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963. As the representative of India stated yesterday, this is the central fact which emerged from the whole debate in the First Committee this year." (A/C.1/PV.1262, pp.47-50)

(continued in Russian)

The representative of Ethiopia made a similar statement at the same meeting. I shall quote this again in English:

(continued in English)

"As far as I am concerned, I do not see any connexion between amendment 4 and the old operative paragraph 2. The cut-off date must stand as it is." (ibid.,p.66)

(continued in Russian)

I could quote several other statements of representatives who sponsored this draft resolution. But I think that the quotations I have already given illustrate quite clearly the views of the sponsors of resolution 1762A and undoubtedly of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations regarding the appeal in paragraph 2 of the resolution. The gist of this appeal, in our opinion, is that as from 1 January 1963 all tests should cease, whether an appropriate agreement has been concluded by that date or not. Its purpose is precisely to achieve an actual cessation of nuclear tests even before an agreement has been reached, so as to create the most favourable climate for a final solution of the question. This appeal, which in our view reflects the opinion of the overwhelming majority of States members of the United Nations, has our full support.

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We are in complete agreement with the further provision in resolution 1762A, which again endorses the memorandum of the non-aligned countries of 16 April 1962 as a reliable basis for negotiations on the final cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. I shall return to this question later.

In the course of the discussions in this Committee, it has been stressed repeatedly that at the present time there are favourable conditions for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. I believe that there are grounds for such an assessment of the present stage of our negotiations. There is a consensus of opinion that the time has come to cease all nuclear weapon tests. This, at least, is the conclusion which can be drawn from all the statements of various representatives in this Committee. The positions of the two sides have come much closer together and this has been particularly emphasized in the messages recently exchanged between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy.

An agreed opinion has also been reached regarding the possibility of accurately detecting and identifying tests conducted in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, without establishing any international control system and without obligatory on-site inspection.

However, tests conducted underground still remain an open question since the delegations of the Western Powers continue to uphold their point of view that these tests cannot be distinguished with certainty from natural seismic events. This appears now to be the main obstacle standing in the way of a final solution of the question.

In our view, in the present stage of scientific and technical development, the question of detecting and identifying underground tests cannot be regarded as insoluble. We believe that in this connexion a positive role could be played by the application of the idea of automatic seismic stations which have already been mentioned several times in our discussions. Consequently, there should be nothing to prevent a final cessation of underground tests as well, provided all parties show a willingness to reach agreement.

We cannot omit mentioning the fact that in view of the uncompromising position taken up by the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, in November 1961, expressed its willingness to agree to prohibit tests in the air, in outer space and under water, provided negotiations for the prohibition of underground tests continued and that during these negotiations all States would refrain from conducting underground tests,

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until a mutually acceptable agreement on their final cessation was reached (ENDC/11, p.5). However this step of the Soviet Union did not meet with support on the part of the Western nuclear Powers.

In this connexion, I cannot but draw attention to the persistent and systematic efforts of our Western colleagues who, on the one hand, try in every possible way to lay the responsibility for the present difficulties in the negotiations on the socialist countries and particularly on the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, they try to pose as the most zealous advocates of an immediate and comprehensive solution of the question of nuclear tests. In this respect the statement of the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, at our meeting on 5 December (ENDC/PV.87, pp.30 et s.) was most significant.

Our Western colleagues continue to assert that the points of view of the two sides have been brought closer together only as a result of the flexible attitude of the West, whereas the position of the socialist delegations has remained unchanged. At our meeting on 5 December, Mr. Dean made truly amazing efforts in trying to prove that the Western Powers are prepared to accept any of the four alternative solutions to the question of nuclear tests, whereas the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are "closing the door" to agreement in all four cases.

Let us take a look at the facts and compare the so-called "alternative proposals" of the representative of the United States with the basis for our negotiations, which has been re-confirmed unequivocally in resolution 1762A (XVII), that is, with the memorandum of the non-aligned countries. As the first and second alternatives, the representative of the United States cited once again the well-known proposals of the Western Powers of 27 August, one for the prohibition of all types of tests under international control (ENDC/58), including compulsory on-site inspection, and the other a partial solution of this problem (ENDC/59) which, as I have said before, would permit the nuclear Powers to continue underground nuclear tests.

Actually, the representative of the United States is falsely accusing the socialist delegations of "closing the door" to agreement. We have already had occasion in the past to prove to you that your draft treaties of 27 August cannot serve as a basis for an agreement, because they are an expression of your previous, out-dated position to which you still obstinately cling. Your proposal regarding the cessation of all tests is in contradiction with the eight-nation memorandum, because it is based on international control with obligatory on-site inspection and you know that on such a basis no agreement is possible. The second proposal is also unacceptable, because it would provide an opportunity of continuing the nuclear armaments race and this, too,

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is contrary not only to the spirit but also to the letter of the memorandum of the non-aligned countries, as well as to resolution 1762 (XVII).

The position adopted by the Western Powers in their proposals of 27 August may be summarized as follows: either the cessation of all tests, naturally on the basis of the conditions of the Western Powers, which means including international control and obligatory on-site inspection with all the risks of espionage involved for the socialist countries, or else a partial solution which would enable the Western Powers to gain unilateral military advantages in the field of underground tests, in which they are interested, being anxious to improve certain types of nuclear weapons. And this is what you call "meeting the other side"?

What has become of the memorandum of the non-aligned states which you assert is "included" in your proposals? There is no trace of it there. I think it is appropriate to recall that, whereas the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries immediately accepted the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a compromise basis for negotiations, the Western Powers refused to do this and it was only under certain pressure that they finally accepted it as "one of the bases" for discussion.

But in submitting their proposals of 27 August, they have thereby rejected this memorandum, and it has ceased to be for them even "one of the bases" for negotiations.

The representative of the United States sees a third alternative agreement in a so-called interim solution, which several representatives have referred to here. Let us assume for a moment that our main task at present is not to reach agreement on the complete, final and immediate cessation of all types of nuclear tests, but rather to arrive at some sort of interim solution. An interim solution, whatever its nature, if it is to overcome the existing difficulties, cannot include the principle of obligatory on-site inspection. There is no need for me to repeat again that it is precisely this demand for obligatory on-site inspection that is the main obstacle in the path to agreement. Consequently, the point of an interim solution should be to avoid this obstacle. It has already been said here, and we fully agree, that the demand for obligatory on-site inspection in connexion with an interim solution is devoid of any kind of logic; that it does not help towards overcoming the existing obstacles, but merely relegates to the background the conclusion of a final agreement on the permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

Moreover, it must be emphasized once again that in its proposal of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11), the Soviet Union also proposed an interim solution, namely, the

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cessation of underground tests until agreement is reached on a final solution. I think, therefore, that in his statement the representative of the United States is knocking on an open door.

But I must say that the very limit in the statement of our United States colleague was, one may say, his fourth alternative which he mentioned as being the actual memorandum of the non-aligned countries. The representative of the United States tried to prove that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had not in fact accepted the principles of the eight-nation memorandum. On the other hand, Mr. Dean stated that "the memorandum played an important part in the development of the United States - United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty proposal". (ENDC/PV.87, p.33).

But the facts in this case are so well known that it would really be a waste of time to show the utter flimsiness of these arguments of Mr. Dean. Permit me, in this connexion, to quote from the First Report of the Committee to the United Nations Disarmament Commission - which, as is well known, was approved also by the delegation of the United States. Section V, paragraph 2 of this document, which refers to the non-aligned countries having submitted their memorandum on 16 April, reads as follows:

"In its statement of April 19, 1962 (ENDC/32) the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to consider the proposals set out in the Memorandum as a basis for further negotiations. The United Kingdom and the United States accepted the Joint Memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations." (ENDC/42, p.4)

Thus the facts show who accepted the memorandum. The Western Powers never in fact accepted the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a new compromise basis for negotiation. I repeat - a new compromise basis for negotiation, which opens up possibilities of making progress. They stuck to their former positions, which are still preventing agreement from being achieved.

Therefore, if anyone ought to reconsider or think over his course of "irresponsible action" (ENDC/PV.87, p.38) - this is, of course, a very strong word - I would tell Mr. Dean that he ought to turn his attention to his own ranks. That would be something useful and would be in keeping with the desire of the peoples that the question of the cessation of tests should be settled once and for all.

The course of the debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and resolution 1762 (XVII) have confirmed us even more in our conviction which we have expressed on several occasions, that in the present circumstances the most suitable basis for reaching agreement on a comprehensive and final solution of this question is the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962.

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Therefore, we can only agree with the words of the representative of India, Mr. Lall, to the effect that neither resolution 1762 (XVII) nor any other resolution has endorsed any other basis for negotiation, and that it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that we must move forward on the basis of this memorandum (ENDC/PV.85, p.22).

The positive aspect of this memorandum, which envisages in paragraphs 1 and 6 the final cessation of all tests, is precisely the fact that it was put forward as a compromise platform with a view to overcoming the existing differences in the positions of the nuclear Powers.

We hold the view that the only right way is to keep to the compromise basis of the memorandum of the non-aligned States; that this is the way which can lead us to our goal. Otherwise, any retreat from this compromise gist of the memorandum would not only not facilitate the solution of the problem, but, on the contrary, would destroy the acceptable compromise basis on which agreement could be reached. Therefore it would mean not a step forward, but, on the contrary, a step backwards.

In conclusion, I should like to make one more remark. It is about the way in which the Western press and radio report our work, and, finally, about the fact that in some of the statements which we have heard here, one can observe a common tendency, namely, to create even now around our negotiations a psychosis of failure and to blame the Soviet Union for this failure, as a result of which it will be impossible, so they say, to reach agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

We ask: what is this propaganda campaign needed for? Can it possibly create a favourable atmosphere for the work of our Committee? Certainly not, we all know that perfectly well. Or is this campaign intended to serve as a psychological preparation for the continuation of nuclear tests after 1 January 1963? If this were really so, it should cause us serious anxiety.

However, we wish to look ahead with optimism and to believe that in the course of further patient negotiations, especially between the representatives of the nuclear Powers, we shall finally succeed in finding a mutually acceptable basis for agreement. Our optimism is to a great extent based also on the fact which has been repeatedly emphasized here that the positions of the nuclear Powers have come much closer together, despite the fact that certain problems still remain unsolved.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, I should like to draw your attention to certain facts which we have recently learnt about from the press. I refer, of course, to the joint declaration of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the economic and social

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consequences of disarmament (A/C.2/L.702/Rev.1), unanimously endorsed by the Second Committee at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (A/C.2/SR.862 (provisional), p.11). I have also in mind statements made by representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States in the Political Committee regarding an agreement on co-operation in certain fields of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes (A/C.1/PV.1292, p.37).

It seems to me that these reports can only encourage us in our efforts. For this reason I should not like to associate myself with the rather pessimistic conclusion of the representative of the United States that all doors to agreement have been shut. We have before us the compromise formula of the eight-nation memorandum, which was endorsed by the General Assembly as a sound, adequate and fair basis for further negotiations.

One of the nuclear Powers - the Soviet Union - has accepted this memorandum as a basis for negotiations. In our opinion, it would be unreasonable not to utilize to the fullest extent all the possibilities offered by this memorandum in order to do away with the last obstacles, and thus bring about the conditions for a mutually acceptable agreement.

M. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French) At the meeting of 3 December, the Italian delegation made a preliminary statement of its views on the current discussions (ENDC/PV.86, pp.35-39). Today I should like to return to the question at issue and to examine it in greater detail, drawing upon the important and interesting statements which we heard at our eighty-sixth and eighty-seventh meetings.

First of all, I should like to refer once more to the proposal put forward by the United States and United Kingdom delegations on 27 August 1962, for a draft treaty prohibiting tests which produce radioactive fallout (ENDC/59). As you know, my delegation, while desiring an agreement prohibiting all tests, attaches the greatest importance to this proposal, because if it were accepted a very grave danger to mankind would be eliminated, and because an agreement not involving control should be easy to implement. Unfortunately, this proposal has not been accepted. On the contrary, the Soviet delegation, supported by the other socialist delegations, has shown most determined opposition to such an agreement. It would even seem that the Soviet Union is not susceptible to those humanitarian considerations which militate in favour of the immediate prohibition of tests producing radioactive fallout. The Soviet Union representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, speaking on 3 December (ENDC/PV.86, pp. 25-35) gave a long list of reasons for concluding an agreement on the cessation

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of nuclear tests. He did not even mention the danger from radioactive fallout, as if this terrible threat to human genetics did not exist.

The other socialist delegations also glossed over this question which I consider on the contrary to be the most important of all. Moreover, they endeavoured to support their negative attitude by adducing the views of certain non-aligned States. However, everyone who has been following our discussions knows very well that the appeal for an agreement prohibiting at least the most dangerous tests came originally from the delegations of these same non-aligned States.

I should like to remind you of the statement made in this Committee by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, concerning tests which produce radioactive fallout.

"As the Foreign Minister of Canada said here on 24 July: 'All this testing is sheer madness, polluting the air human beings must breathe, endangering the lives of generations yet unborn and possibly leading to the destruction of civilisation' (ENDC/PV.60, p.26).

"In short, all nuclear tests are nothing short of aggression against humanity. With the possible exception of the smallest underground tests, whose military value seems doubtful, nuclear tests have a habit of announcing themselves. If, with that tremendous advantage, we are unable to put an end to nuclear tests for ever, it is difficult to see how we can hope to make any progress ...". (ENDC/PV.65, pp. 14 and 15).

I quote Mr. Barrington because last Wednesday you, Mr. Chairman, speaking as representative of Bulgaria, cited in particular the attitude of the Burmese delegation (ENDC/PV.87, pp. 23-24), but I could also quote clear affirmations by the other non-aligned delegations in favour of the agreement in question. Moreover, when my delegation proposed the conclusion of a partial treaty on 15 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.70, p.20), we did so specifically in order to support and to reinforce the wishes of the non-aligned delegations.

I said on 3 December that my delegation did not find the arguments of the socialist delegations against the conclusion of a partial treaty convincing (ENDC/PV.86, p.36).

I note incidentally that the Polish representative stated at the same meeting (ibid., p.39) that I had said that I did not regard as convincing the Soviet Union's arguments "in favour of stopping tests in all environments" which is not the same thing. It is the arguments against a partial treaty which I do not find convincing.

I remain of the opinion, Mr. Chairman, in spite of the efforts made by Mr. Tsarapkin on 3 December (ENDC/PV.86, pp. 25-35), - efforts which were supported by your statement Mr. Chairman (ENDC/PV.87, pp.22 et seq.), and by the Romanian representative's statement (ibid., pp. 39 et seq.).

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If I am not mistaken, the socialist delegations explain their attitude on the following grounds. Firstly, a partial treaty would legalise the continuation of underground tests. This assertion on the part of the socialist delegations amounts to saying that the present state of affairs, where there is no agreement, legalises all tests. From a legal point of view this statement is absolutely without foundation. The existence of an agreement in one field cannot legalise anything in another field where there is no agreement. Obviously in the second field the original de facto situation remains unchanged. At all events, if we cannot conclude even a limited agreement, the arms race will be extended in all environments, including the atmosphere, with the testing of weapons far more deadly and more terrible than those which can be tested in caves.

Secondly, the socialist representatives say that, if underground tests continue, other States may feel justified in carrying out tests in all environments. It seems to me quite evident that the present situation, in which there is no agreement, is far more dangerous, and that, in contrast, even a partial agreement would act as an effective brake on those countries which were intending to initiate tests.

Thirdly, the Soviet delegation went on to assert that, even if a limited agreement were concluded, the arms race would continue and that consequently our concern for the health of the human race was misplaced and tendentious.

Mr. Tsarapkin asked:

"What heredity will there be after tens or hundreds of millions of people have been annihilated as a result of nuclear war?" (ENDC/PV.86, p.52).

In reply I should like to point out to Mr. Tsarapkin that this danger is fortunately hypothetical, and that we know that our Governments in their wisdom will do everything possible to avoid it. On the other hand, the genetic damage caused by tests in the atmosphere constitutes a real and present danger, existing in peace time and often threatening populations which are not even involved in military alliances. These are human beings, living peaceably in their own countries, who, even without there being a war, are exposed to mortal dangers.

Fourthly, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"(A partial treaty) would result in definite military advantages to the side which had made underground explosions one of its main methods of testing nuclear weapons." (ibid. p. 28)

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That is a point worthy of consideration. It is quite possible that the United States, conscious of the genetic dangers of explosions in the atmosphere, has made efforts to limit atmospheric tests by carrying out more costly experiments which produce no radioactive fallout, whereas the Soviet Union has preferred to set off large and dangerous explosions in the atmosphere. If that is true, the fact remains that the Soviet delegation is rejecting a humanitarian treaty for strictly military reasons which will hardly appeal to those populations which have been exposed to radioactive fallout from 50 megaton bombs.

However, for us in this Conference, the point raised by Mr. Tsarapkin is not to be ignored. It seems to me that the Soviet delegation, in alleging a supposed Soviet inferiority in underground tests, is invoking the principle of equilibrium in armaments which has been accepted as a guide for our negotiations. But I should like to know, in that case, why the Soviet Union, while invoking the principle of equilibrium, at the same time rejects the principle of control, another of the basic principles of disarmament. If the Soviet delegation, instead of declaring without any scientific proof that control is outdated, were to accept the necessary investigation of underground tests in the same way as it invokes the principle of equilibrium for its own tests, the problem of a limited agreement would not arise, since we should be able, as we earnestly desire, to conclude an agreement prohibiting all tests. But the Soviet Union is blocking the way to a partial agreement by demanding the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, and then blocking the way to a comprehensive treaty by rejecting compulsory inspection.

The Soviet delegation declares that it has done a great deal to accommodate itself to the Western viewpoint, that the differences have been reduced and that it is now the turn of the Western Powers to make concessions.

These Powers, on the contrary, to quote Mr. Tsarapkin, "stick to their old positions". What is the present position of the Soviet delegation? Mr. Tsarapkin told us this in his statement on 3 December. I quote:

"In the course of the work of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union ... announced ... its readiness to sign immediately an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, at the same time including in such an agreement an undertaking to continue negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests and an undertaking not to conduct such tests while negotiations

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are proceeding and until agreement is reached on the prohibition of underground nuclear explosions." (ibid., p. 30)

Now let us see what was the position of the Soviet Union at the beginning of our Conference. I quote the Soviet Government's memorandum of 15 March 1962.

"... the proposals made by the USSR Government on 28 November 1961 ... provide for the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space ... through the national detection systems of States ... and that a moratorium should be imposed upon (underground) explosions until an appropriate control system has been developed ..." (ENDC/3, p. 14)

I should like to ask the socialist delegations, and particularly our colleague from Czechoslovakia who spoke this morning, to explain what is the difference between these two documents. What is the difference between the position of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) and that which the Soviet delegation, desirous of meeting the Western Powers, and in complete conformity with the overwhelming desire of the General Assembly to put an end to all tests, put before the General Assembly of the United Nations? (A/C.1/FV.1246, pp. 48 et seq)

I should like to know what concessions the Soviet Union has made on the question of tests during nine months of negotiations, what has been done to reduce the differences and to what extent the Soviet Union has taken into consideration, I will not say the requirements of the Western delegations, but the efforts of goodwill made by the delegations of the non-aligned States.

The Soviet delegation will perhaps reply that it has accepted the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) as the basis for negotiations. The Czech representative explained to us once more this morning the difference between the expressions "the basis" and "one of the bases". That is not new, but everyone recognized the genuine and practical value of affirming "the basis". As I pointed out last Monday, (ENDC/FV.88, pp. 36 and 37) when the proposals of certain non-aligned delegations began setting the Conference on the way to a concrete elaboration of the memorandum, the Soviet delegation replied, in substance, that such proposals were dangerous and did not help to solve our problems. Does this really represent an acceptance of the memorandum as the basis for negotiations?

I should like now to concentrate upon the proposals I have just mentioned. I think they can be classified in two groups. The first consists of the proposals which aim at finding a concrete formula for the application of an agreement. This

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category includes in my opinion: (a) the Indian proposal (ENDC/PV.85, p.24) to establish a quota of international on-site inspections,^{1/} while recognizing that, in order to carry out these inspections, the co-operation of the inspected countries is required: (b) the Mexican proposal that, if a request for inspection is refused, the parties to the treaty should regain full liberty of action (ibid., p.36). These proposals appear to be applicable either to a comprehensive treaty or to a temporary agreement of limited duration. I find these proposals very constructive because they tend to establish the mandatory character of the inspections without which no investigation would be of any value and the treaty would not afford sufficient guarantees.

The second group of proposals aims at reaching a temporary agreement on under-ground tests while prohibiting completely those tests which produce radioactive fallout. In other words, these proposals attempt to implement the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Naturally the Italian delegation will support the conclusion of a temporary agreement if that will render possible the immediate cessation of all tests, but only on condition that this agreement is clear and safe and affords all the necessary guarantees.

It may indeed prove easier to conclude an agreement of limited duration than a comprehensive treaty, so as to allow the parties to study how the inspection and executive organs work before committing themselves irrevocably. I should only like to point out that such an agreement, concluded at a time when confidence has yet to be re-established, must be attended by serious and concrete guarantees. If there is some possibility of reducing these guarantees, the process of adjustment will become easier as confidence is re-established and the techniques of detection are improved.

The application of a temporary agreement involves the problem of the executive organ. The memorandum, without going into details, recommends us to appoint independent experts, who, if possible, should not be nationals of the nuclear Powers.

The Anglo-American draft treaty (ENDC/58) suggests the appointment of experts representing Governments. Personally I think that in such a temporary system, an attempt should be made to combine both scientists and government representatives.

^{1/} For the correct version of the Indian proposal see the statement by the representative of India on p.31 below.

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My suggestion is as follows. Firstly, let a group of independent scientists be appointed as the Swedish delegation has suggested (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 17 and 18). Secondly, let this group report to the Eighteen-Nation Committee which should be provided with certain executive powers.

To sum up, I think that in practice the Conference should do two things. Firstly it should study and elaborate those concrete proposals which have been put forward concerning inspection, because such proposals can be extremely useful in the preparation of a provisional agreement, or even of a final agreement. Secondly, it should set up immediately a group of technicians which could help us in our technical work and could eventually be transformed into an executive organ continuing to co-operate with the Eighteen-Nation Committee if, as we hope, at least a provisional agreement is forthcoming.

It is to be hoped that the Soviet delegation, which until now has shown such a rigid and negative attitude, will consider these proposals and will agree to the creation of such a group of experts. For my part, I believe it is our definite duty to continue undiscouraged the elaboration of an agreement within the framework of the memorandum, with the firm hope that the sense of responsibility which the Soviet Government has shown on other occasions will finally prevail in the field of disarmament also.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): It was the intention of my delegation to make a statement this morning on the subject of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. I regret to state, however, that owing to the unavoidable absence of my leader, Mr. Mbu, as a result of the London fog, my delegation cannot make its statement this morning as planned.

With permission, therefore, we would reserve our right to speak on this subject -- the cessation of nuclear weapon tests -- on Monday, 10 December. As it will be our first intervention on this subject since the important deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly, and as my delegation has always been prepared to accord the highest priority and attaches the greatest importance to this subject, we should like to request that our statement on Monday be added to the other documents which are to be attached as an annex to the report submitted by us on Monday to the United Nations General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The representative of Nigeria will have an opportunity to speak next Monday. The Secretariat notes the Nigerian delegation's request that this statement should be annexed to our report to the General Assembly.

Mr. El-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): On 28 November last Mr. Hassan had occasion to express our delegation's satisfaction and hope -- our satisfaction because of the moderate tone of the statements with which the nuclear Powers opened this new round of talks in Geneva, and our hope that this Committee would be able, as requested, to report real progress in its work to the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 33 and 34). We hoped to report that the nuclear Powers were about to conclude the agreements and to make the arrangements requested by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1762 A (XVII) (ENDC/63).

We had good reason to be hopeful. During our recess we had witnessed that more difficult, if not necessarily more serious, problems had been solved by the nuclear Powers. Apparently there had existed the will to solve those problems: the way to solve them was found. It is not with satisfaction that we speak today. It is certain now that our report on 10 December will not be the report of progress we had hoped it would be. We have before us the letter which the two co-Chairmen propose to send to the General Assembly. I think that that letter proves what I have said.

We have listened most attentively to the statements made in this Committee and we have read the verbatim records of the recent meetings of the three-Power Sub-Committee. We were very grateful to Mr. Dean for the résumé he gave us of the work of the Sub-Committee during the recess (ENDC/PV.86, pp. 15 et seq.). We noted that Mr. Tsarapkin took exception to parts of that résumé (*ibid.*, pp. 25 et seq.). After all that our conclusion was easy and obvious. We are very far from achieving the goals which are defined in the operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII), and which are an expression of the hopes of the majority of the peoples of the world, including the peoples of the nuclear Powers themselves.

Had we, as a non-aligned nation, considered our task in this Committee to be that of a mediator or honest broker, our delegation for one would have been tempted, in the light of this conclusion, to announce that we had lost hope and that, in losing hope, we had lost our raison d'être, our reason for being in this conference

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room. However, we realize that we are entrusted with another duty. There is a fact that cannot be repeated too many times. It is that, together with the four nuclear States — and one of them is unfortunately not present here — we live on this planet too. We have the right to remind the nuclear Powers of this fact and to demand of them to stop their tests, which many in this conference room have labeled as actual aggression against mankind. We cannot do much more, but we cannot do less. We have to go on repeating this again and again.

On 16 April 1962 the eight non-aligned countries in this Committee commended to the consideration of the nuclear Powers a few suggestions and ideas. Those eight nations invited the nuclear Powers to agree on the basis of those suggestions and ideas or, as Mr. Castro of Brazil had occasion to say, on any other basis mutually agreeable to them. The eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) is still valid. It still stands as it was presented, without revision or addition. It was not intended to be, and indeed it cannot be made to be, a weapon in the hands of any party. In our opinion, the only change this memorandum went through was its transformation from a memorandum of eight nations to a memorandum of eighty nations — the nations which, on 6 November 1962, voted its endorsement in the present United Nations General Assembly.

On the basis of the suggestions and ideas offered in that document, on the basis of the General Assembly directives contained in its recent resolution mentioned above, and after having listened most attentively and appreciatively to all the statements made in this Committee, the United Arab Republic delegation believes that the one stumbling block which is obstructing agreement can be removed only if both sides resolve to carry it away together instead of each one standing off and arguing that it is up to the other one to move it out of the way. The "failure psychosis" referred to by the representative of Czechoslovakia (supra, p.18) will not be defeated except in this way. This block is well known. To achieve the cessation of all tests — and my delegation is of the opinion that they are all dangerous and harmful and that they all must be finally stopped — the two nuclear parties need to be assured that no clandestine tests can be conducted. In the three above-ground environments there apparently exists no difficulty in ascertaining this. In the field of underground tests, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom tell us repeatedly that they know no way to ascertain this except by on-site inspection. They concede, however, that science has made and is making every day new strides in the field of remote detection and verification of earth tremors. We

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now have the text, circulated at the request of the United Kingdom delegation, of the statement made in London in September by six prominent scientists -- three from the United States and three from the Soviet Union. The statement clearly says that those scientists

"... have tried to develop new ideas and to formulate concrete suggestions which may facilitate our reaching a general and complete test ban agreement in a short time." (ENDC/66, p.1)

Using as a basis the proposal contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries regarding the utilization of a world-wide network of standardized seismic stations, manned by nationals of the host country, which would provide an international scientific commission with seismic records, they suggest the use of tamper-proof automatic recording stations, now known as the "black boxes" -- a system which they state would "provide a minimal interference with the host country (ibid.) The international scientific commission, they thought, would "need to request very few on-site inspections". (ibid., p.2)

In earlier statements the delegation of the United Arab Republic has spoken of the practical arrangements which should facilitate agreement on any really necessary on-site inspection. On those occasions we quoted the statement made here on 17 August by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, to the effect that the Soviet Union did not exclude the possibility of inviting on-site inspection in certain concrete cases (ENDC/PV.71, p.43). On 15 August (ENDC/PV.70, p.24) and again on 5 September our delegation proposed that the two co-Chairmen should

"... agree on the modalities and mechanics of on-site inspection in practical and concrete cases." (ENDC/PV.81 p. 45)

We said that it might be

"... necessary and practical now to turn to the task of trying to define a little more clearly the conditions, mechanical attributes and modalities of inspection in such concrete cases." (ibid.)

We further proposed that

"Among such practical subjects to be reviewed, our co-Chairmen may wish to give effect to Mr. Edberg's proposal (ENDC/PV.77, p.32), supported by Mr. Barrington on 3 September (ENDC/PV.78, p.8), to discuss the possibility of establishing the international commission envisaged in the joint memorandum, as well as its functions and attributes." (ibid.)

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The eight-nation memorandum further mentions that measures of verification in loco should be the subject of consultation. We submit that the area of difference is now even narrower than when the memorandum was signed. We submit that if the necessary political decision is taken by both sides our diplomatic efforts will succeed. We also submit that without that political decision no diplomatic effort will succeed.

The representatives of the nuclear Powers have been gallantly defending their respective positions in our meetings during the last two weeks, and no doubt they could go on defending those positions and standing by them with the greatest tenacity and ability as long as it might seem necessary for them to do so. As long as they stick to their gallant stand, however, there will be no move towards agreement. There can be no success. On the other hand, when -- and only when -- the nuclear capitals take the necessary decision, the great abilities of their representatives here will move us quickly towards total and agreeable agreement.

We believe that it would not be useless to submit here for the consideration of the principal parties concerned our present thoughts. We believe that once the necessary political decisions have been taken the two parties will be able, first, to reach an agreement to cease immediately tests in all three above-ground environments provided that they make arrangements to stop underground tests for a mutually agreeable duration; and, secondly, to agree on the establishment by the United Nations, or any of its agencies, of a provisional international scientific commission, which would avail itself of the services of the existing nationally manned observation posts and of all new technical developments in this field, including the suggested automatic recording stations now known as "black boxes". The scientific commission should be given specific terms of reference and powers on which the nuclear parties must agree, including the right to request verification, on the spot, of the nature of any suspicious significant seismic event. Such requests should be seriously and promptly considered by the State concerned, which might give the commission convincing reasons for declining to issue the requested invitation. Should the State concerned fail to give such convincing reasons and to issue the requested invitation, the international scientific commission should communicate that fact, together with its assessment of the given event, to the second party and to the United Nations. Such a communication would free the State or States concerned from the heavy moral obligations undertaken by all parties upon the conclusion and signing of such an agreement.

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While the provisional arrangement remained in force for the mutually agreed duration, both nuclear parties would continue their negotiations for the conclusion of a permanent agreement to ban underground tests. It is hoped that before the end of the mutually agreed duration, improvements, not only in the scientific field but also in the political-psychological atmosphere, would make on-site inspection really unnecessary.

What would happen if the suggested provisional arrangement ended in failure because of the non-cooperation of one of the parties? What would happen when one party freed the other from its obligations? That question may well be asked. Our answer is simple: we would revert, unfortunately, to the regrettable situation in which we are now, but not to one that would be worse.

Almost at the time when we were leaving this hall after our last meeting, on Wednesday, without much hope of agreement being reached between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other, the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York was unanimously approving a declaration made jointly by the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, urging all nations to plan for the economic and social adjustments that would follow world disarmament (A/C.2/SR.862 (provisional), p.11). That declaration called upon the governments of all States to multiply their efforts for "a prompt achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (A/C.2/L.702/Rev.1, p.2). We are told that a wave of applause swept the conference room. There was no need to take a vote, agreement was unanimous. In another room, on the same day, Mr. Adlai Stevenson of the United States and Mr. Morozov of the Soviet Union announced in the First Committee the formal agreement of their governments on peaceful uses of outer space (A/C.1/PV.1292, p.37). These events happened only the day before yesterday in New York on the East River. What is wrong with Geneva and Lake Lemán?

We are confident that once such agreements for the banning of nuclear weapon tests are signed they will be respected by their signatories. The necessary climate of mutual trust will be gradually brought about; there will be no cause for the present mutual distrust. It is our conviction -- not only our wishful thinking -- that the nations of the world, including the nuclear Powers, will then be liberated from the fear which today breeds suspicions, necessitates water-tight precautions and thus hinders our progress towards the total banning of these terrible nuclear

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weapons. The world will be relieved of one of its greatest present worries. General and complete disarmament will then be nearer our reach. Our children may well have a brave new world to build and to enjoy.

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to clear up one small matter now. I am looking at page 42 of the provisional verbatim record of the eighty-fifth meeting which contains part of the record of the statement which I made on 30 November. The staff of the Secretariat and my own delegation tell me that they checked some of this statement against the tape recording which was made and found that there was on that page a slight error which might be of a material character. I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to that error. I will read what I am reported to have said:

"Could not all the States concerned agree to a certain quota of inspections per annum? Of course that quota could only be fixed in the first instance for the first year, because instruments might improve and other factors might arise which would justify a revision of the stated quota of inspections." (ENDC/PV.85 (provisional), p.42)

The tape recording shows that what I actually said was not "quota of inspections" but "quota of invitations" in the first instance. Also at the end I said "a revision of the stated quota of invitations." That is a point which I believe will be clarified by a revision of the record which will be issued by the Secretariat (see ENDC/PV.85, p.24), but I thought I should bring it out because frequently that part of my statement is referred to.

While I have the floor, may I add a few words. We have now heard statements from almost all the members of **this** Committee on this matter. We have of course heard that our colleague from Nigeria will make a statement on Monday, we shall look forward to hearing that and we shall do so with the greatest of interest.

I should like to take this opportunity to say that it is now for those directly concerned to consider the many observations and suggestions which have been offered in this room. We would express the hope that both sides might again study all the suggestions which have been made and do so not in a theoretical spirit and not regarding these suggestions as legalistic formulations which clearly they are not intended to be, but as pragmatic observations which might and, I believe, could, help in finding a way out. Indeed, the important thing now and the one that is incumbent upon us is to find a way out. We appeal to the two sides; we urge them

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to reach agreement in this matter in whatever way they can find mutually acceptable and not to use any observations, suggestions or proposals — including the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) — as obstacles to agreement. None of these possible ways out has been offered in the spirit of the "cold war". I would say to the two sides, "Please do not take them this way". We would ask them in any case to take action that will now result in the stopping of tests on a basis that will endure.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

First of all, I should like to make a correction to today's statement by the representative of Italy (supra, p.19 et seq.). He built up his statement in such a way that it could be taken to mean that the Soviet Union is in favour of the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. This is a gross untruth. The Soviet Union categorically demands the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments without exception: in the atmosphere, under water, underground and in outer space.

Now for a second remark in connexion with today's statement by the representative of Italy. He said that, strictly speaking, he did not see any difference between the present position of the Soviet Union on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the position which is laid down in the Soviet Union's proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11). I would advise the representative of Italy to read the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961 through to the end, and then he will see an extremely substantial difference from the present Soviet proposals. I can help Mr. Cavalletti. In article 3 of the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 questions of control over nuclear weapon tests were regarded as a constituent part of control over compliance with an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Today we do not insist on such a connexion.

I shall now pass on to my main statement.

In the course of the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee in Geneva it has become apparent that there are as yet no signs of the readiness of the Western Powers to seek agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

As the last meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee showed very clearly, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom are trying to reduce the whole work of the Committee to sterile propagandistic polemics. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative is doing his utmost to exacerbate the discussion and to increase the tension in the atmosphere of the negotiations. We have no desire to take that path,

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but nevertheless we cannot disregard the distortions of the position of the Soviet Union which the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, and the United States representative, Mr. Dean, have indulged in.

At the meeting on 5 December, Sir Michael Wright tried to depict the position of the Western Powers on the question of the cessation of tests in the most attractive light. He told us all sorts of things. He spoke about the readiness of the Western Powers to meet the Soviet Union and about the large number of alternative solutions to the question of the cessation of tests - as many as four alternatives (ENDC/PV.87, p.13). The attempt of the United Kingdom representative to embellish the position of the Western Powers looked as though he was trying to paint the skin of an apple in bright attractive tones when the inside was worm-eaten. What, in fact, did the United Kingdom representative propose to us and what was the real meaning of his proposals? We shall examine all these four alternatives one by one.

The United Kingdom representative's first alternative consisted of an appeal to the Soviet Union to prove how underground events can be identified by national detection systems. If the Soviet Union were to prove this, the Western Powers would be prepared to sign a permanent and comprehensive treaty without inspection by 1 January 1963. This is obviously a false approach to the question on the part of the United Kingdom representative. This approach was needed by the Western Powers as a means of providing a technical cover for their rejection of a comprehensive agreement based on the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions. The falsity of this approach to the question lies in the fact that the proposal to use national means of detection for the purposes of controlling an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests does not need any special proofs. It has won its right to existence by advances in scientific and technical thought, which have been confirmed in the appropriate theoretical research of many scientists both in the United States and in the Soviet Union and in many other countries. Moreover, the value and efficacy of national means of detection has been verified and demonstrated by the recording of nuclear explosions over many years in all environments, including underground. It is particularly strange to hear doubts in this respect from the United States, which in the course of the last ten or twelve years has often informed the world of nuclear explosions carried out by other countries in various environments and recorded by the United States' national means of detection. The artificial nature of these doubts is obvious. This proposal by the United Kingdom representative also has another aspect. Without binding the Western Powers to any agreement, even

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in principle, and leaving the question in an unresolved state, he would like to involve the sides in technical disputes. Actually, this would mean running away from a comprehensive agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests for all time.

Both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in the Three-Power Sub-Committee the representatives of the Western Powers are making use of all the means at their disposal to cover up this retreat. These means are mainly of a technical nature. And this is quite understandable, since it is easiest of all to obscure the political aspect of the matter in the eyes of the whole world by references to science or technology. It is for this reason that we hear wearying demands on the part of the Western Powers that before a political agreement is concluded the technical experts of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should meet and decide whether or not national means of detection are adequate for the identification of all seismic events.

The outcome of such a meeting of experts can be foreseen in advance, especially if one bears in mind that the official representatives of the Western Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, have repeatedly stated here that, in the opinion of their scientists, national means of detection are inadequate for effective control and must be supplemented by an international control system and compulsory on-site inspection of unidentified seismic events. Given this attitude of the official Western representatives and their experts to the proposal for the use of national means of detection for the purposes of control, it is easy to imagine what would be the result of a meeting of experts. The official Western experts would not be satisfied with anything less than an international control system and compulsory on-site inspection. It goes without saying that such a meeting of experts would be bogged down in endless disputes, technical doubts and speculations and that it would end in deadlock and the departure of the experts without having agreed anything.

It is precisely this prospect, this outcome of a meeting of experts that seems highly desirable to the Western Powers, so that, by pleading lack of agreement among the experts on the technical aspects of control, they can refuse a political agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests that is of paramount importance at this point in history. This is the real danger of this manoeuvre on the part of the Western Powers. We do not want the negotiations to have such an outcome. We are altogether against the attempts of our Western partners in the negotiations to evade their responsibility, to avoid concluding a political agreement, by shifting responsibility for this matter to the technical experts.

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We propose that the discussion of technical details should be deferred until such time as we have agreed between ourselves on the fundamental, basic principles that should underlie a final agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We insist on such an approach to our negotiations on behalf of the success of our cause. The dismal experience of the past has taught us a lot in this respect. We can, for example, recall the meeting of Soviet, United States and United Kingdom scientists to examine the so-called United States new seismic data.

This meeting of experts took place here in Geneva in November and December 1959. At that time the Soviet scientists revealed the flimsiness, erroneousness and, in some cases, deliberate tendentiousness of the conclusions arrived at by the United States scientists. This meeting developed into interminable arguments and, in the end, no agreement was reached. It is true that, some time later, events confirmed the correctness and validity of the opinions expressed by the Soviet scientists, but at the time, in December 1959, the fact that disagreements had arisen at this meeting of Soviet and United States experts and that agreement had not been reached, was used by President Eisenhower of the United States as a pretext for taking his decision of 29 December 1959 that the United States would no longer be bound by its pledge in regard to the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests.

This decision of the Government of the United States, like the subsequent actions of France, a United States ally in the NATO military bloc, which began to carry out nuclear weapon tests in February 1960, was the initial link in the chain of subsequent events, a kind of catalyst that accelerated the nuclear arms race.

We could also refer to other technical meetings. We have learnt a lot from these experiences. We do not intend to allow a smoke-screen of technical studies to be used as cover by those who wish to evade a solution of the political question of banning all nuclear weapon tests.

The essence of the second alternative put forward by the United Kingdom representative is that the Soviet Union should accept the demand of the Western Powers for compulsory inspection, which would be formulated as an inspection quota. It is clear that this alternative is unacceptable. We have already explained this many times and I shall not dwell on it further.

The third alternative put forward by the United Kingdom representative is that we should conclude a permanent agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, but that with respect to underground

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nuclear explosions we should restrict ourselves to what is called an interim agreement, which could be annulled by the Western Powers at any time and which would thus open the way for them to resume nuclear weapon tests.

As in regard to all his other proposals, in explaining his third alternative, Sir Michael Wright does not say everything. Nevertheless, it follows quite clearly from the statements of representatives of the Western Powers that even an interim agreement must provide for inspection. The logic of the representatives of the Western Powers is astonishing. What they are saying is that if the demand for inspection on which the Western Powers are insisting is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, then in view of the fact that this demand prevents us from reaching agreement on a permanent and comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, let us in this case conclude an interim agreement, but also with compulsory inspection. It is clear that this proposal is not serious.

Far from being a step forward, Sir Michael Wright's third alternative is a definite step backward. In fact, a proposal for an interim agreement of this kind takes the negotiations back to the time when, at the very beginning of the negotiations in 1958, the Western Powers proposed the conclusion of just such an interim agreement, limited to a short period, with international control and inspection.

What Sir Michael Wright's fourth and last alternative amounts to is that the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests by the Western Powers should be sanctioned internationally. We shall not comment on this proposal. The answer to it has already been given with the utmost clarity and in the most outspoken manner by the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations, who, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, called decisively for the banning of all nuclear weapon tests without exception and rejected the proposal of the Western Powers for a so-called partial treaty.

All these four alternatives put forward by Sir Michael Wright lead, either directly or indirectly, to an international system of control and compulsory on-site inspection and cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for agreement. Sir Michael Wright is well aware of this. Nevertheless, the fact that he thought it possible to put forward these alternatives shows the complete lack of intention of the Western Powers to conduct serious negotiations with the object of reaching an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis.

Unlike Sir Michael Wright, Mr. Dean was less generous in his alternatives. He reiterates from meeting to meeting that an agreement can be concluded only on the basis

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of the two United States-United Kingdom drafts put forward in August 1962 (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59). This means that the United States continues to demand the establishment of an international control system and compulsory inspection and continues to threaten the world with the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

As you see, the Western Powers still maintain their old position, which precludes the possibility of agreement. This is how the matter stands in reality. It is in vain that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom try to make out that their alternatives are new proposals. Even though Mr. Dean asserts that the United States and the United Kingdom took into account the principles of the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) in their proposals of 27 August, this is not in accordance with the facts. Basically, namely on the question of international inspection, as well as on other questions, the United States and the United Kingdom continue, as in the past, to maintain their old positions, which prevent the reaching of agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Why do the United States and the United Kingdom refuse to enter into a comprehensive agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests for all time, on the basis of the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions for control purposes? Because an agreement based on the use of national means of detection for control purposes, that is without an international network of control posts, does not give the Western Powers legal possibilities of sending foreign agents into the Soviet Union. Why has the United States, in fact, not accepted the proposals contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States? Because this memorandum proposes that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be reached on the basis of the use for control purposes of national means of detecting nuclear explosions rather than an international control system. That is one thing.

The second thing in the memorandum that was unacceptable to the Western Powers was that it actually rejected the idea of compulsory on-site inspection. It rejected this "idée fixe" of the Western Powers.

These compromise proposals of the non-aligned countries are rejected by the Western Powers for the reason, that they do not give them the possibility of sending foreign agents into the territory of the Soviet Union.

The representatives of the Western Powers have told us that the United States and the United Kingdom will not take into consideration and will not comply with paragraph 2

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of resolution 1762 A (XVII), which was adopted almost unanimously by the General Assembly on 6 November 1962 (ENDC/63). In this paragraph the General Assembly directs a fervent appeal to the nuclear Powers to cease all nuclear weapon tests not later than 1 January 1963.

Why do the United States and the United Kingdom openly oppose their policy on this question to this resolution of the United Nations General Assembly? Again for the same reason, that this paragraph of the resolution does not afford them the possibility of sending foreign agents into the territory of the Soviet Union, and without this the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests does not interest them. And they have stated that they will not comply with this paragraph in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, but will continue to test nuclear weapons underground. Why have the United States and the United Kingdom virtually rejected the Soviet proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations for control purposes? They told us at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 5 December (ENDC/PV.87) and at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on 6 December (ENDC/SC.1/PV.47) that the proposal for automatic seismic stations could only be considered in conjunction with international control, only in conjunction with the right of compulsory inspection. This approach to the question on the part of the Western Powers implies in fact their rejection of this Soviet proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations for control purposes.

Why have they been in such a hurry to act in this way towards the Soviet proposal? Again for the same reason, that it does not ensure satisfaction of their demand for the establishment of an international control system on the territory of the Soviet Union and does not ensure satisfaction of their demand for the right to send inspection teams into the territory of the Soviet Union on an obligatory basis.

We note, therefore, that in the last eight months of negotiations the Western Powers have not moved from their former position. They have not renounced their unacceptable and impracticable demand for the establishment of international control and on-site inspection.

In contrast to the uncompromising position of the Western Powers, which affords no possibility of reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has taken a number of steps aimed at speeding up the solution of this vitally important problem.

First, the Soviet Union has agreed (ENDC/PV.24, pp.7-11) to take as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests the proposal put forward

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by the eight non-aligned States in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962. This memorandum speaks of an agreement on a compromise basis, since the provisions contained in it take into account to some extent both the position of the Western Powers and the position of the Soviet Union. After the recess, the Soviet Union again confirmed its readiness to seek for a solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests on the compromise basis contained in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/FV.86, p. 53).

Secondly, the Soviet Union, striving for the earliest cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and going forward to meet the wishes of the Western Powers, appealed in the General Assembly (A/C.1/FV.1246, pp. 48 et seq) for the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, this agreement to include the obligation of the parties to continue negotiations on an agreement for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests as well and the obligation to refrain from conducting such tests while the negotiations are in progress and until an agreement has been reached on the prohibition of underground explosions.

This proposal, on the one hand, took into consideration the proposal of the Western Powers to conclude a partial agreement immediately and, on the other hand, it takes into account the universal demand which was expressed in General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) that no more nuclear weapon tests should be conducted anywhere by anyone. The positive aspect of this Soviet proposal is obvious. It enables a favourable atmosphere to be created for the speedy and final solution of the question of ceasing nuclear tests.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to cease all nuclear tests from 1 January 1963, as requested by resolution 1762 A (XVII) of the General Assembly, provided, of course, that this General Assembly resolution is complied with by the Western Powers as well. Attempts have been made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the Western Delegations to give an arbitrary interpretation to the appeal of the General Assembly for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests from 1 January 1963. These attempts were refuted by a number of representatives, who cited the clear and unequivocal statements of the author of the proposal, the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo. We shall not continue this discussion since it is beyond dispute that the request of the General Assembly is that all nuclear explosions should cease unconditionally not later than 1 January 1963, whatever the state of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by that time.

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The leader of the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, Mrs. Supeni, when submitting the draft resolution on behalf of the delegations of thirty-seven States and speaking of the meaning and significance of paragraph 2 of the resolution, stated

"In case agreement cannot be reached by 1 January, paragraph 2 of the draft resolution requests the nuclear Powers to please stop their tests"

(A/C.1/PV.1253, p.18).

That is the meaning given to this paragraph by the thirty-seven non-aligned States. It was also with this meaning that the paragraph was approved by the General Assembly.

Fourthly, in going forward to meet the Western Powers so as to make it easier to reach a final agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Union took a new and significant step immediately after the recess in the Committee's work. It proposed that for the purpose of control over underground nuclear explosions use should also be made of automatic seismic stations which would serve as a supplement to existing national detection systems. It can only be regretted that the Western Powers have not attached the importance it deserves to this significant new Soviet proposal which would ensure the possibility of solving the question of the cessation of nuclear tests.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from the position of the Western Powers. They reject, in fact, everything reasonable and mutually acceptable that would increase the efficiency of control. They are not interested in any other forms of control which can really ensure the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, but only in compulsory inspection which opens up wide opportunities for espionage and intelligence. It was no mere chance, therefore, that, as soon as we put forward our proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations, the Western Powers hastened to scuttle this reasonable proposal by tacking on to it the heavy weight of unacceptable proposals for inspection and the establishment of international control posts.

What is happening here? This is what is happening: as soon as the Soviet Union takes a step to meet the Western Powers and proposes measures aimed at providing them with additional guarantees of effective control, they immediately start criticizing these proposals as inadequate, merely because they do not provide for compulsory inspection. By acting in this way the Western Powers slam the door to agreement.

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We consider that the existing national systems of detection are fully adequate for control purposes. In our view there is no need for additional means of control.

It is only the Western Powers who express doubt about the effectiveness of national means of detection. Why is it, then, that when, in endeavouring to remove your fears, we go forward to meet you and propose the use of automatic seismic stations as an additional guarantee, you reject a businesslike examination of this proposal of ours and, in fact, as I have shown earlier, reject it by linking it to compulsory inspection?

The use for control purposes of the idea put forward at the Pugwash Conference (ENDC/66) opens up great possibilities for overcoming the remaining differences and concluding a final agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

This, however, is something that United States and United Kingdom political leaders do not wish to recognize, although it is widely recognized in scientific circles throughout the world.

In this connexion it is appropriate to refer to a recently published letter by the eminent British scientist and philosopher, Bertrand Russell, Bertrand Russell, of course, is not a seismologist, but it is well-known that he has extensive connexions with many scientists throughout the world, and is very much interested in the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. In his letter published in the "New York Times" of 5 December Bertrand Russell wrote:

"It is important for Americans to realise that their scientists and Russian scientists have already agreed upon the viability of this arrangement.

It is important to recognize that the seismographic station of Harvard University has vigorously declared its confidence in the Pugwash proposal.

..... "No on-site inspection could give greater security, no on-site inspection is safe against paranoia. Without the urgent desire to end this threat to future generations, nothing can be done... It is essential that we understand that the pretext for failure to agree has been removed.

"The 'black box' will show beyond doubt any potential violation of a very small kind. Those larger can be detected without it."

The Soviet Government has made the utmost efforts to facilitate the reaching of an agreement that would end all nuclear weapon tests once and for all. We call upon our Western partners to think over the situation that has developed in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and to reconsider their negative position which is preventing agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

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If we act with awareness of the great responsibility resting on the nuclear Powers, the path to agreement will be open. A speedy and radical solution of the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests of any type, any yield and in any environment can be facilitated by the four possibilities, the four methods of solving the problem which I have just enumerated.

This is the path that will lead us to a speedy settlement of all outstanding questions regarding the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will continue with unflagging energy to strive for a mutually acceptable solution of the question of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. At the same time the Soviet Union considers that from 1 January 1963 all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, should be stopped de facto. In this connexion the General Assembly took almost unanimously its decision which is recorded in paragraph 2 of resolution 1762 A (XVII). This resolution should be implemented. All the nuclear Powers should implement it unconditionally.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do this. It is now for the Western Powers to act. The matter depends on them. We therefore ask the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom whether they, for their part, are prepared to state here that the Western nuclear Powers will implement this resolution of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to point out to the members of the Committee that we have reached the hour when we generally close the debate and allow delegations to exercise the right of reply if they so wish.

If the Committee wishes to continue the debate, I shall call on the last speaker, the representative of the United States of America. Then we shall go on to the right of reply. However, if the United States representative is willing to forego his right to speak at this morning's meeting and if nobody wants to exercise his right of reply we could adjourn the meeting.

The representative of Italy is asking to speak - on a point of order I believe.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I shall be very brief, but I should like to reply to Mr. Tsarapkin's statement of this morning.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I have just said that we could go on to the right of reply at the end of the debate.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

I ask the Committee whether it agrees to break off the debate now and to resume it on Monday or whether it prefers to continue. We have still to hear the United States representative and I should like to know his opinion on this point.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): We have one other important piece of business also: the report of the Committee. As representatives know, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) we are supposed to report to the General Assembly by 10 December. There is before the Committee the draft of a report submitted for the consideration of the Committee by the two co-Chairmen.* There have also been some other suggestions made this morning with respect to that report. My remarks, if the Committee wishes to listen to them, will be very brief -- I think they will not take more than three or four minutes -- but I think that before we adjourn today we ought to give consideration to that report. Otherwise we shall not be able to report to the General Assembly by 10 December.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The United States representative thinks that three or four minutes will be enough for him to make his comments. If there are no objections, the Committee will agree to hear him.

Before calling on the United States representative, I should like to point out to the Committee that we have before us a draft report to the General Assembly. However, as suggestions and proposals have been made this morning by certain non-aligned Powers, I think that perhaps that the two co-Chairmen should do further work on this draft report; we could then return on Monday to this question and discuss it more coherently, for if the co-Chairmen do not study the comments made by the non-aligned countries it will be more difficult for us to reach agreement on this question.

Do the Committee and the co-Chairmen agree that this question should be postponed till Monday morning, as we shall still have time then to report to the General Assembly?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): With great respect, I think we should be in default if we did not agree upon this report of the two co-Chairmen today. I would therefore suggest that we have an afternoon meeting in order to conclude this matter. It seems to me that we ought not to be in default in our report to the

* Subsequently circulated as document ENDC/68.

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General Assembly. I am afraid it will be misunderstood there if we do not present our report in time for it to be circulated to the Members of the General Assembly by 10 December, as required by resolution 1762 A (XVII).

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Are there any other suggestions about this question which concerns the order of our work?

Mr. El-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): I have a very short suggestion to make on the report, which I hope can be accepted immediately by the two co-Chairmen and also by all the non-aligned countries.

On page 2 of the draft report which we have before us I suggest that we add, after the words "the Conference", four lines from the end of the draft report:

"At the request of certain non-aligned delegations, short precisions of their positions, as they themselves have prepared them, are attached to this letter as Addendum 1 (or Addendum 2) to this report."

It is obvious that the letter would have attached to it all the verbatim records of these meetings. From our experience in the General Assembly, to have about 400 pages circulated to the Members to be read and discussed in one day is really self-defeating. Perhaps, therefore, the two co-Chairmen would be agreeable to circulating the few pages of the draft put before us this morning and sending them as addendum 1 or addendum 2 to this letter. I cannot see any reason why they should object to that. If they would agree, this matter would be disposed of. I hope that my colleagues from the non-aligned countries will also accept this suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As you see, we have another suggestion made by the representative of the United Arab Republic that we should attach to the report by way of addendum the summaries which the various representatives of the non-aligned countries have made of their suggestions and proposals in connexion with this letter. This addendum would contain a summary of their opinions but would not represent the Committee's report.

Are there any suggestions or ideas on this point and on the proposal made by the United States representative to have a meeting this afternoon to deal with the report which we have to send to the General Assembly?

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I wanted to make some remarks after hearing the opinion of the co-Chairmen on the suggestion which I

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made on behalf of the eight Powers that a summary of observations and suggestions drawn up by each of them should be included in the report (supra, p 5), but we have not yet heard the opinion of the co-Chairmen on this suggestion. If they could give us their views now, I would then make some comments.

For my part, I see no objection to our meeting this afternoon, as I think you have just suggested, Mr. Chairman, to discuss solely the question of the report, if that is - as I understood it - Mr. Dean's suggestion.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): We of course want to resolve this matter. It is one which is agreeable to everybody concerned. The suggestion of the representative of the United Arab Republic, however, does raise some difficulties which might require discussion, and I do want to make my statement today. As I have said, it is very brief. I would therefore like to renew my suggestion of an afternoon meeting in order that I may make my statement and also in order that we may have more time for considering and agreeing upon this report.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The situation is thus as follows: after the comments made on the positions of the different parties and particularly taking into account the proposal made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, one of the co-Chairmen, namely the United States representative, has asked if he may make his statement and inform us of his attitude to the various suggestions for annexing further texts to the Eighteen-Nation Committee's report to the General Assembly. We thus have a definite proposal for a meeting this afternoon. Are there any observations on this point, which concerns the organization of our work? Since I hear no objection to this proposal I consider that the Committee has decided to meet this afternoon at 4 p.m.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I think that representatives who desire to exercise their right of reply should wait till this afternoon to do so unless they prefer to speak now.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I shall be very brief. I think that we ought to devote this afternoon's meeting to the study of the report.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I should merely like to read a passage from the verbatim record of 3 December when Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The cessation of nuclear tests is important not only as a step towards slackening the nuclear arms race and as a measure which would, to some extent, slow down the further development of weapons of mass destruction. The importance of an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests lies also in the fact that such an agreement would facilitate the solution of our main problem - general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.86, p.26)

I fully subscribe to all that but as you see, the danger of radioactive fallout for the health of humanity is not even mentioned in the long list of arguments in favour of the test ban. I had concluded from this that the Soviet delegation was not very sensitive to this danger which, in the Italian delegation's opinion, is the most important one. After the statement made this morning by Mr. Tsarapkin, I note that this is not so, and I hope that this will enable him later on to make an effort to accept the partial agreement.

In regard to the other comment made by Mr. Tsarapkin in connexion with the differences between the Soviet Union's attitude in November 1961 and its attitude today, I also note that this resides only in the fact that if a system of test control acceptable to the Soviet Union were found, the latter would be ready to implement it at once without waiting for the signing of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Nine months of negotiations have added up to this one result, as the Soviet delegation itself confirms.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare the meeting closed, and we shall meet again this afternoon.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-eighth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarabanov, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, India and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 7 December 1962, at 4 p.m."