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## FIFTH SESSION

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*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

**Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations (*continued*)**

[Item 69]\*

**GENERAL DISCUSSION (*concluded*)**

1. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) recalled that his delegation had already taken part in discussion of the questions which at the present time were troubling the conscience of mankind. It had already indicated what were the relevant basic principles and what practical measures should be taken.

2. It would no doubt have been better to give separate consideration to such problems as atomic energy, the reduction of armaments, war propaganda, the events in the Pacific and aggression, which had held the attention of the Organization since its establishment. However that might be, the principles of the Charter must always be kept in mind. It was not enough merely to reaffirm those principles; they should be loyally and unreservedly applied, for they were the essential guarantee of a lasting peace.

3. The various draft resolutions all referred to the problem of atomic weapons. While it was to be hoped that one day a way would be found out of the impasse to which prolonged negotiations had led, it was necessary to be realistic and not to isolate a particular aspect of a very complex question by imagining that a mere proclamation would be enough to make every difficulty disappear. In reality, the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons could not be considered apart from the present political tension, which was itself the result of a disregard of the provisions of the Charter condemning aggression. If the United Nations succeeded in coping with all acts of aggression, the difficulties with regard to atomic energy would disappear. It followed that the Israeli delegation could not support the USSR draft resolution, which condemned, not aggression itself, but

only the use of the atomic bomb; that might give the impression that the use of other means of destruction was more moral than the use of atomic weapons.

4. The draft resolution originally submitted by Bolivia (A/C.1/596) condemned the use of atomic weapons as instruments of aggression. The Israeli delegation joined in that general condemnation, for it also regarded aggression as the gravest of all crimes, whatever weapons were used in committing it.

5. The revised joint draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) affirmed the need for effective international control of atomic energy, as approved by the General Assembly. For its part, the Israeli delegation was of the opinion that all the possibilities had not been exhausted. That delegation had stated the preceding year that methods on which the atomic Powers might be able to reach agreement were the only methods likely to yield effective results, and today it still considered that those Powers should continue their negotiations.

6. The USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) also raised the question of war propaganda, but it was impossible to condemn any particular country without an impartial investigation and *a fortiori* to adopt a wording that might lead to confusion. Moreover, the only thing to be done was to invite all the Members of the United Nations to act in conformity with the resolution previously adopted by the General Assembly (110 (II)).

7. The Israeli delegation supported the provisions relating to the condemnation of incitement to civil war when it was a foreign Power which was guilty of such incitement. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) the wording "by a foreign Power" would therefore be preferable to "in the interest of a foreign Power". However, the expression of sympathy for one of the parties to a civil conflict did not amount to incitement to civil war; there must be real intervention, a point which the text in its present form did not make sufficiently clear. In the

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

light of the General Assembly's new functions enabling it to intervene in cases of aggression, it was necessary to be most careful to avoid too wide and arbitrary a definition of what constituted aggression.

8. The USSR draft resolution recommended the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. But the five great Powers had already concluded such a pact when they signed the Charter. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the "primary responsibility" conferred upon the five permanent members of the Security Council by the Charter was exercised on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations. It was the universal responsibility of all Members of the United Nations to combine their efforts for peace. It was because the delegation of Israel envisaged the peace-making functions of the United Nations in the totality of its membership that it had reservations with regard to that paragraph of the USSR draft resolution. Moreover, as the Committee had just recommended negotiations between the five great Powers in a resolution approved a week earlier (371st meeting), the results of those conversations should not be prejudiced by a decision that they should end in the conclusion of a formal pact rather than in a revival of co-operation.

9. The Israeli delegation was entirely in sympathy with the progressive spirit of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/598), certain aspects of which should perhaps be given closer study. In any event, the text underlined some of the most important causes of the prevailing world unrest, and pointed out the course to be followed if threats to the peace were to be met.

10. Those were the considerations which would guide the delegation of Israel in voting on the various draft resolutions.

11. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) said that, as regards atomic weapons, the basic principle must be effective international control under United Nations supervision, a principle which the General Assembly had already approved. Otherwise, prohibition of atomic weapons would remain a dead letter and would benefit unscrupulous States at the expense of those which respected their obligations.

12. Moreover, the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) was unacceptable because it did not recognize the fact that war propaganda also existed when a government advocated the overthrow of a foreign régime which it disliked.

13. Finally, with respect to the reduction of armaments, it was important that a certain balance should first be re-established between the armaments of the different groups of States. The reduction of armaments should not be a blind process which would still further weaken States which were already insufficiently armed, to the advantage of those which had formerly had military superiority.

14. It should be made clear that the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) was not an attempt to restrict condemnation of the principle of intervention to cases representing forcible attempts to overthrow a legally established government. The representative of Ecuador considered that it should be clearly understood that the paragraph in

question did not constitute a restrictive interpretation of the principle of non-intervention. That question was very important to all of Latin America. Likewise, the words "in the interest of a foreign Power" should be deleted from the fourth paragraph, as the Egyptian delegation had proposed (A/C.1/605).

15. The words "legally established government" might lead to confusion at the present stage of international legislation. It would therefore be better to condemn all intervention in the affairs of a foreign government, even if that government had been illegally established. It would be another matter if the legality or illegality of a government had been previously decided by international agreement and it could be definitely stated that the government was incompatible with such agreements; or if, once the aggressive attitude of a government had been demonstrated, collective international action were taken to change or modify whatever was contrary to such international agreements or the common interest.

16. The delegation of Ecuador would therefore be prepared to accept any text which did not restrict the principle of non-intervention consistently upheld by the Latin-American States. Unless the present text was altered in accordance with those observations, however, or unless the sponsors of the draft resolution at least confirmed that they had not intended to make it in any way restrictive, the delegation of Ecuador would be forced to abstain from voting on the paragraph.

17. In other respects, the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/595/Rev.1) represented an effort to prevent any aggression, to establish control of armaments, particularly atomic energy, and to make possible increased sincerity in international relations, where words rather than acts were too often considered sufficient. The Ecuadorian delegation would therefore vote in favour of the seven-Power draft resolution and of the draft previously submitted by the Chilean delegation (A/C.1/603), which Ecuador also approved.

18. Mr. DIEZ DE MEDINA (Bolivia), referring to the Ecuadorian representative's inquiry, said that he was happy to state that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) had in no way intended to restrict the general condemnation of all intervention. In the circumstances, however, a resolution of a general character, on a problem which gave rise to some divergence of opinion even among Latin-American States, was not appropriate. Although it might be desirable later to adopt a special resolution setting forth the attitude of the United Nations on that important problem, the present discussion bore only upon one form of intervention which was particularly dangerous to peace. As the representative of Ecuador had himself stated, a reference to one particular crime did not indicate acquiescence in all others.

19. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) noted that, in the opinion of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1), approval of the text could not be interpreted as limiting the scope of the general principle of non-intervention. His delegation was entirely satisfied on that point.

20. The CHAIRMAN declared closed the general discussion on item 69 of the Assembly's agenda.

VOTING ON THE USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION  
(A/C.1/595)

21. The CHAIRMAN announced that the First Committee would deal first with the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595).

22. Next, the delegations of Bolivia, France, Lebanon, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) to which amendments (A/C.1/605) had been proposed by the delegation of Egypt.

23. The delegations of India, Greece and Chile had each submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/598, A/C.1/602 and A/C.1/603, respectively).

24. Finally, the CHAIRMAN said that, since no delegation had asked to speak, the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) would be put to the vote.

25. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that the different paragraphs of the preamble and of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution should be voted on separately.

26. Mr. COULSON (United Kingdom) said that, although certain paragraphs of the USSR draft resolution might be acceptable in themselves, his delegation would vote against the individual paragraphs in view of the fact that it intended to vote against the draft resolution as a whole. The procedure of inserting apparently innocuous texts in a context which made them unacceptable was a well-known tactic.

27. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) indicated that, like the representative of the United Kingdom, he could accept some paragraphs of the USSR draft resolution if taken out of their context. Nevertheless, since they were elements of a text which was not acceptable to the delegation of Australia, he would vote against the individual paragraphs, as well as against the text as a whole.

28. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first paragraph of the preamble.

*The first paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 25 votes to 13, with 15 abstentions.*

29. Mr. VALENZUELA (Chile) requested that the second paragraph of the preamble should be divided into two parts, the first ending with the words "will to peace".

30. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said there was no justification whatsoever for separating the two parts of the sentence, which were closely linked. Such a procedure would be quite artificial and the USSR delegation opposed it.

31. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question whether the second paragraph of the preamble should be voted upon as a whole or in two parts.

*The proposal to divide the paragraph was adopted by 14 votes to 8, with 30 abstentions.*

32. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of the second paragraph of the preamble up to and including the words "will to peace".

*The first part of the second paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 23 votes to 16, with 16 abstentions.*

33. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second part of the second paragraph of the preamble.

*The second part of the second paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 43 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.*

34. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third paragraph of the preamble.

*The third paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 29 votes to 6, with 21 abstentions.*

35. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

*The fourth paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 35 votes to 12, with 9 abstentions.*

36. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first paragraph of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution.

*The first paragraph of the operative part was rejected by 38 votes to 7, with 12 abstentions.*

37. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that the two parts of the second paragraph of the operative part and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the third paragraph should be put to the vote separately.

38. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of the second paragraph of the operative part.

*The first part of the second paragraph of the operative part was rejected by 32 votes to 9, with 14 abstentions.*

39. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second part of the second paragraph of the operative part.

*The second part of the second paragraph of the operative part was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 18 abstentions.*

40. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first sentence and sub-paragraph (a) of the third paragraph of the operative part.

*The first sentence and sub-paragraph (a) of the third paragraph of the operative part were rejected by 33 votes to 11, with 11 abstentions.*

41. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first sentence and sub-paragraph (b) of the third paragraph of the operative part.

*The first sentence and sub-paragraph (b) of the third paragraph of the operative part were rejected by 41 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.*

VOTING ON THE SEVEN-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION  
(A/C.1/597/Rev.1)

42. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read amendments to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) which were being submitted jointly by his delegation and the delegations of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-

public. The purpose of those amendments was to make the draft resolution clearer and to fill certain gaps, particularly regarding the principle of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict control of atomic energy. The amendments also introduced the principle of the regulation and reduction of armaments and of armed forces, which the United Nations had been discussing without success since 1946. Lastly, they reintroduced the principle of condemning war propaganda in any form, a principle which had figured in the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596), and had been deleted from the revised seven-Power draft (A/C.1/597/Rev.1).

43. The attitude of the USSR to the seven-Power draft resolution would depend upon the reception given to those amendments.

44. Mr. JARVIE (Union of South Africa) said that his delegation had voted against the USSR draft and against each of its clauses, but would support the joint seven-Power draft resolution as a whole.

45. With regard to paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, he pointed out that his government supported the principle of control of the use of atomic energy for purposes of warfare and was ready to co-operate in such control. However, as a producer of uranium, the Union of South Africa had carefully to examine the question before giving any undertaking, in order to be quite clear as to the economic consequences of such control. Whilst desiring to co-operate with other governments, the Union of South Africa therefore made a reservation on that point.

46. Mr. PEARSON (Canada), citing rule 119 of the Assembly's rules of procedure, was astonished that the USSR delegation should have submitted important amendments to the seven-Power draft resolution orally and at the last moment. Perhaps the amendments reproduced part of the USSR draft resolution which the Committee had just rejected. If so, rule 122 of the rules of procedure should be applied and the amendments should be re-examined only if a two-thirds majority of the Committee so decided.

47. The CHAIRMAN stated that the First Committee could not take the appropriate decision on the USSR amendments until they had been distributed in the form of a First Committee document.

48. GHALEB Bey (Egypt) said that his delegation had submitted amendments (A/C.1/605) to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1).

49. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) pointed out that the authors of the joint draft resolution ought to have time to examine the various amendments just submitted. He therefore proposed the adjournment of the meeting.

50. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) considered that the request of the Netherlands representative for adjournment of the meeting was premature. It would have been better to have continued to study the seven-Power draft resolution and the amendments to it, so that the co-sponsors could, if necessary, submit a revised text to the Committee in the light of suggestions which would undoubtedly be made in the course of the discussion.

51. The representative of Syria was surprised that the joint seven-Power draft resolution did not mention the prohibition of atomic weapons. Obviously, international control was contemplated, but it was generally known that the establishment of such control would take a long time. The question was whether, in the meantime, atomic weapons could or could not be used for military purposes. It was equally strange that the draft resolution contained no reference to other weapons of mass destruction.

52. There was another omission from the joint seven-Power draft resolution. In its revised form, it condemned aggression perpetrated by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power. That new wording was not enough to quiet the apprehensions previously expressed on the point. There were many ways of fomenting civil strife which nevertheless could not always be considered to be acts of aggression. Dumping, for instance, was designed to upset a given country's national industry. In that sense, it caused strife between factory owners and workers, in the interest of a foreign Power. But it was doubtful whether that could be called fomenting civil strife. There might be cases of obvious fomenting of civil strife, which could be classed as aggression, but there were many more cases where no such definite accusation could be made.

53. It would be better, therefore, if the authors of the draft resolution refrained from using vague terms, liable to make the situation still more dangerous than it was.

54. The CHAIRMAN put the proposal to adjourn the meeting to the vote.

*The proposal was adopted by 43 votes to 7, with 3 abstentions.*

*The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.*