



Thursday, 12 November 1953,
 at 10.40 a.m.

New York

C O N T E N T S

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Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2444, A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.74/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.75) (*continued*)

[Item 23]*

1. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that the USSR delegation had for many years past submitted proposals on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons within the framework of the Soviet Union's efforts to strengthen international peace and security. Every year the USSR delegation and the delegations of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland and Czechoslovakia had tried to persuade the United Nations to take practical steps to reach a satisfactory solution. No progress had, however, been achieved, in spite of their efforts. The Disarmament Commission had met with no success, and the United Nations had shown that it was incapable of reaching the decisions which were absolutely necessary for the effective reduction of armaments and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

2. The United Kingdom and United States representatives' claim that the Disarmament Commission's failure was the lack of co-operation on the part of the USSR was obviously untrue. When the Disarmament Commission was set up the Ukrainian delegation had pointed out that resolution 502 (VI) was a bad start because, instead of taking for its objective the regulation and reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, it concentrated on the disclosure of information, thus reflecting the aggressive desire of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to gather data on the armed forces of other States and to defer the question of the reduction of armaments indefinitely.

3. Moreover, the three western Powers represented on the Disarmament Commission had submitted a plan (DC/10 and DC/12) restricting the Commission's work to the disclosure of military information. Such disclosure was, furthermore, to have been effected progressively, information on weapons of mass destruction

being kept till the last. That plan, which even contemplated the possibility of obtaining such information by aerial surveys, had naturally not been accepted by the USSR delegation. Besides, as regards the prohibition of atomic weapons, it had added nothing to the famous Baruch plan, which itself had made no provision for the prohibition of such weapons or for an effective system of control therefore. The sole aim of that plan had been to enable United States monopolies to control the sources of atomic energy and the factories producing nuclear energy. Had it been adopted, the economic life of States would have depended entirely on the United States of America, and their sovereignty would have disappeared. Many of those who had defended the Baruch plan in the past now recognized that there was nothing to be said for it. Nevertheless, the United States, United Kingdom and French representatives continued to cling to it, thus opposing all progress in the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. The USSR delegation to the Disarmament Commission had obviously been unable to support the so-called disarmament plan submitted by the western Powers, which in fact merely concealed the United States' intention to intensify the armaments race. It had submitted a working plan (DC/4/Rev.1) based on unequivocal premises which the western Powers had been unable to refute, but they had simply rejected the plan. It was therefore evident that it was the United States and its partners and not the Soviet Union which had prevented the adoption of practical measures and had diverted the Disarmament Commission from its task, by placing the accent on the problem of the disclosure of military information, in the interests of the United States and NATO.

5. At the Assembly's present session the USSR had submitted a draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1) for the regulation and the reduction of armaments. The adoption of this draft's proposals would have had a momentous effect as regards the strengthening of international peace and security. Certain representatives had, however, questioned the advantage of a General Assembly decision on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The representative of Ecuador had stated, in particular, that it would be a purely legislative formal act of a general nature and devoid of any guarantee. He had apparently forgotten that the USSR draft resolution furnished guarantees, since it envisaged prohibition accompanied by an effective system of control for prohibition. Moreover, the USSR representative had explained (658th meeting) at length what he meant by simultaneous prohibition and control. The right of control would exist from the moment prohibition was decreed. Some had stated in that connexion that a system of control should be established first, while others had thought that a moral commitment

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

was not an adequate guarantee. Such objections were invalid, because even if an obligation might be violated the fact remained that in the brief period between the time prohibition was decreed and the coming into force of the control system the undertaking not to use weapons of mass destructions would be an important factor.

6. Moreover, if the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction were not put first, there would be no reason, even if a system of control were set up, for not continuing to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The Peruvian representative had suggested that the first step should be to institute and put into effect a system of control and that the possibility of prohibiting weapons of mass destruction should be considered afterwards. Any such proposal was plainly nonsensical. A farmer did not buy his cows or ploughshare before he had acquired his farm. The USSR, in its anxiety to avert the dangers of threatening peace and security and to do justice to the desire of the millions for the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, would continue its efforts to achieve that end.

7. The United States representative, in an attempt to impute to the Soviet Union the responsibility for the Disarmament Commission's failure, had mentioned President Eisenhower's speech of 16 April 1953 and the statement Mr. Dulles had delivered at the 434th plenary meeting on 17 September 1953. *Pravda* had made it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union had not been averse to the proposals put forward by the President of the United States for the reduction of armaments, although it had pointed out that those proposals were of too general a nature and did not, therefore, help to advance matters. Moreover, President Eisenhower had apparently implied that the United States favoured disarmament while the USSR was resisting it. That was untrue. Mr. Dulles had not made any concrete proposal such as might have shown that the United States was ready to reconsider its position. He had merely put on record certain nebulous affirmations which had no connexion with the problem of the reduction of armaments and did not differ from the United States plan for the progressive disclosure of information. Mr. Lodge, in the First Committee (660th meeting), had acknowledged that the United States while allegedly favouring disarmament, all the while was increasing its armaments. The Egyptian representative's remark (661st meeting) that it was impossible simultaneously to preach disarmament and to continue the armaments race was extremely pertinent in that connexion. As the United States had not abandoned the hope that a new war might be unleashed, no reliance could be placed on the statements of its representatives, according to whom that country's desire was to persevere in its efforts to reach agreement on a vast disarmament programme. As Mr. Molotov had stated at the first session of the General Assembly (42nd plenary meeting), the peoples had reason to suspect the sincerity of those who made declarations in favour of peace while continuing the armaments race.

8. The Ukrainian delegation held that the statements of the western Powers in favour of disarmament could not be insulated from their policy of increasing their armaments. The fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1) was designed to give the impression that the Assembly was adopting concrete measures for the reduction of armaments. It could not, however, pro-

duce results. It was therefore unacceptable and that was why the USSR had submitted certain amendments (A/C.1/L.75).

9. After reading the USSR amendments, he pointed out that if adopted they would result in the elimination of the fundamental defect in the Disarmament Commission's work by enabling it to reach decisions on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The instructions to the Disarmament Commission in those amendments were clear and avoided any untoward delay by requesting the Commission to submit proposals to the Security Council not later than 1 March 1954. That was why the Ukrainian delegation supported those amendments.

10. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) noted that many delegations had hoped that the easing of international tension in the spring of 1953 would make it possible to end the dead-lock in the Disarmament Commission. Unfortunately, the opportunity had not been seized and the hopes had not materialized. As the great Powers had not changed their attitude, it had been impossible to make any progress. It was evident that progress towards the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons would eliminate a source of tension and would likewise reduce the burden of armaments. As President Eisenhower had pointed out in his speech in April 1953, broad vistas of plenty and progress would be opened up for all mankind if atomic energy were harnessed to peaceful purposes. Moreover, that would automatically eliminate the dangers which now resulted from the secrecy surrounding discoveries in that field.

11. While the threat of atomic weapons was daily becoming more and more a nightmare to mankind, the Disarmament Commission had held only one purely formal meeting. The smaller Powers, like Yugoslavia, which had no weapons of mass destruction, would none the less be annihilated by them if they were used. They were, therefore, bound to take part in the search for a solution which could be found along two different, although parallel, paths. An attempt, on the one hand, should be made to improve the international climate by striving for a solution of all the problems that had led to the present tension and, on the other, to break the existing dead-lock in the disarmament problem.

12. From a more general point of view, democratic relations must be established between nations, such as would ensure co-operation on the basis of sovereign equality. Unfortunately, there were at present, disturbing symptoms that the efforts to establish a system of collective security against aggression were viewed by some as merely the manifestation of a clash between two blocs of States. The efforts of the peace-loving nations to prevent aggression must not be placed in jeopardy. The smaller Powers threatened no one. Their position depended largely on the willingness of the great Powers to contribute to the settlement of the various international problems, including the question of disarmament.

13. It was equally important that problems of a local nature should not be allowed, as a result of unilateral decisions to aggravate international relations. On the other hand, the tendency to deal with all international problems step by step should be encouraged. Progress in disarmament would obviously depend to a very large degree on the readiness of the great Powers, both

severally and jointly, to achieve a settlement on Korea, Germany, Austria and other issues. Moreover, there was no doubt that if the problem of disarmament were approached with a desire to harmonize the different points of view, the settlement of international problems would be facilitated.

14. The danger of aggression in the world was currently assuming very definite forms. Henceforth, the free and peaceful development of small nations could be safeguarded only by a system of collective security, if they were not to have to rely on the military might of one great Power or another. It was, therefore, natural that the smaller nations should enter into regional defence agreements, but those regional arrangements must obviously not be allowed to degenerate into instruments of expansionist policy. Any progress made towards collective security and diminution of international tension would have a favourable effect on the disarmament issue. A new start must be made to deal with that subject but without discarding the points on which agreement had already been reached, such as the Disarmament Commission's terms of reference and certain aspects of the question of the control of atomic energy. Nor should the technical results already achieved be jettisoned, but an effort must be made to disentangle the basic elements of the problem from the paraphernalia of propaganda, so that the issue could be approached in a more constructive manner.

15. It was in that spirit that the Yugoslav delegation would study the various draft resolutions. It welcomed the expression in the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1) of a desire to ease the general atmosphere, although it regretted that the sponsors had been unable to submit a rather more substantial text. The new text of the fourth paragraph of the preamble accorded better with the United Nations' efforts to establish a fund to assist under-developed areas. The clause urging the Powers principally concerned to intensify their efforts to find a solution was certainly opportune. In that connexion, the French representative's suggestions (662nd meeting) on the timing of the various phases of disclosure, inspection, reduction and prohibition would undoubtedly prove useful.

16. The Disarmament Commission might now be justifiably expected to take at least a first step. If it were again to present next year nothing but a record of failure, legitimate doubt might certainly be felt as to its further utility. When the Disarmament Commission had taken the initial steps, it would be possible to consider as a further step the convening of a general disarmament conference. In any event, what was essential was to cease turning in the same vicious circle. Any decrease in international tension, no matter how slight, would benefit the whole world.

17. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), analysing the Disarmament Commission's brief report (DC/32) and General Assembly resolution 704 (VII), said that the failure of the work of the Disarmament Commission was due to the terms of resolution 502 (VI) under which the Commission was established. Instead of striving to secure a reduction of armaments, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of an effective system of control over that prohibition, paragraph 5 of the operative part of the resolution directed the Committee to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of military infor-

mation as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme. Hence, the purpose of the resolution was to drop the reduction of armaments in favour of the disclosure of information, and thereby to ensure that the United States was given complete information on the armaments of other States without providing in return any information on its stockpile of atomic weapons.

18. In the Disarmament Commission the United States, United Kingdom and French representatives had opposed specific USSR proposals designed to avert the threat of a new war and to strengthen international peace and security.

19. The Disarmament Commission had not examined the concrete USSR proposal that had been referred to it by General Assembly resolution 504 (VI). The representatives of the western Powers had sabotaged the work of the Commission by trying to legalize the armaments race and to enable the United States to continue to stockpile atomic weapons.

20. From the outset of the Disarmament Commission's work two opposite tendencies had been apparent. The United States, proceeding on the basis of paragraph 5 of the operative part of resolution 502 (VI), had imposed on the Commission a plan of work based on the disclosure of military information, in order to prevent consideration of the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The USSR, on the other hand, had submitted concrete proposals calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the reduction of armaments, the submission of military information, prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons, the establishment of an international control body under the Security Council and the institution of a system of inspection on a continuing basis without interference in the internal affairs of States. The first objectives of those proposals were the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of armaments of the great Powers, because those aspects of the problem were the most urgent and far-reaching.

21. It should be noted that the USSR had made substantial modifications in its original proposals. The representatives of the western Powers had claimed that the USSR proposals were not new and that the USSR had displayed no spirit of co-operation. But the fact that the proposals had previously been submitted to the General Assembly did not affect their importance or their value, since the problem had not yet been solved. It was also false that the USSR had shown no spirit of co-operation; it had submitted concrete proposals for the reduction of the armaments of the five great Powers and for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction on several occasions. And there was no ground for the allegation that the USSR proposal provided for no safeguards, since the proposal called for the establishment of a strict system of international control.

22. On the other hand, the United States, United Kingdom and French representatives had made no disarmament proposals for a number of years, but had steered the discussion into a blind alley. They had opposed the USSR proposals for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, asserting that such a prohibition would be a mere scrap of paper. They had even retrogressed from their previous position, since in 1946 they had voted, with the USSR, in favour of

resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946, which called for prohibition of atomic weapons. Since that time, they had always refrained from mentioning that prohibition.

23. The United States representative, while claiming to support disarmament, expressed reservations, and said that disarmament could not be carried out without safeguards. In that connexion Mr. Kiselyov recalled that representative's statement at the 660th meeting on 9 November 1953. In reality the United States delegation was endeavouring to prevent any decision on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. He was trying to prove that the USSR was responsible for the Disarmament Commission's failure to make any progress in its work. The truth was, however, that the USSR had proposed the immediate and simultaneous solution of all the problems pending: the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the establishment of strict international control over that prohibition, the substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces, the submission of information on all armaments and armed forces and the verification of such information. It was the United States that wished to separate those questions artificially by demanding that all States should present information on their conventional armaments, while refusing, under such pretexts as alleged lack of confidence, the need for safeguards, and the like, to support either the prohibition of atomic weapons or the reduction of armaments. Some United States newspapers had been constrained to admit the realism of the USSR proposals; for example, *The Washington Post* of 9 August 1953 had said that the United States and the other western Powers should be realistic and try to understand the Soviet point of view if they sincerely desired to reach an agreement.

24. The Ecuadorian representative, who had slandered the USSR, had said on 9 November that a declaration prohibiting atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb could not be adopted without the establishment of effective control over the production of those weapons (660th meeting). He must know that the USSR had proposed that prohibition and control should enter into force simultaneously, and that the international control organ should be empowered to carry out inspection on a continuing basis, without interfering in the internal affairs of States.

25. The revised text of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1) contributed nothing to the solution of the problem. The second paragraph of its preamble referred to confidence and safeguards, but was silent on the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the institution of strict control over the observance of that prohibition. To conceal from public opinion the fact that they did not wish to deal with those questions the sponsors of the draft resolution, headed by the United States, had made no reference to the real tasks of the Disarmament Commission. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR therefore regarded the draft resolution as inadequate and unacceptable.

26. With respect to the USSR amendments (A/C.1/L.75), the first two having to do with the first and second paragraphs of the preamble expressed the USSR's conviction that the strengthening of international peace and security demanded the removal of atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb from national

arsenals; which could be achieved only by a General Assembly decision unconditionally prohibiting such weapons of mass destruction. The wording proposed in the USSR amendment for paragraph 2 of the operative part of the fourteen-Power draft resolution provided for genuine reduction of armaments by the five great Powers. Its adoption would benefit all States and all peoples of the world since it would make millions of men available for peaceful work and would permit a substantial reduction of the military expenditures that now weighed so heavily on all nations. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would therefore vote in favour of the amendments. The General Assembly should direct the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the hydrogen bomb and other weapons of mass destruction and the simultaneous institution of a strict system of international control with a view to the observance of that prohibition. The Commission should submit those proposals to the Security Council not later than 1 March 1954.

27. Mr. PIRACHA (Pakistan) observed that agreement among the great Powers was an essential condition for disarmament. Such an agreement must be urgently sought if the threat of war was to be removed and the peoples of the world enabled to work out their destiny in peace.

28. The chief obstacles to the maintenance of peace, as the head of the Pakistani delegation had said at the sixth session of the General Assembly (343rd plenary meeting), were fear of the designs of others and suspicion of their motives. Until those obstacles were removed, proposals however promising emanating from one side were likely to be viewed by the other as manoeuvres to be counteracted by increasing stock-piles of armaments. Before any effective disarmament could take place, before any atomic control or prohibition could be established, the mutual confidence which was still lacking must be created. Without that prerequisite the Disarmament Commission could not achieve any progress.

29. The Pakistani delegation, which had served for two years on the Commission and was about to yield its seat to its successor, could not but admit its disappointment, indeed frustration, at the bleak record of that body. Some might question the desirability of its continuance. Nevertheless, the Pakistani delegation was convinced that the Commission should continue as a forum where proposals might be submitted and discussed and where, with a change in the political climate, serious work might begin. It was in that spirit that the Pakistani delegation had joined others in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1. It shared the hope expressed in the Disarmament Commission's last report that recent international events would create a more propitious atmosphere for the achievement of the Commission's task. An opportunity now existed for all concerned to review their basic positions and consider whether at least the first foundations of an agreement could not be laid. In view of the far-reaching developments taking place in the field of armaments, as well as on the political scene, it would be imprudent not to take advantage of the opportunity. It was to be hoped that the report submitted by the Disarmament Commission next year would not be entirely negative. While it was true that the re-establishment of international confidence and

disarmament were closely interrelated, the restoration of a cordial political climate was of primary importance if the ice was to be broken in the field of disarmament.

30. The under-developed countries had a particular stake in disarmament, the representatives of Ecuador, Peru and Colombia had already emphasized (660th meeting) that the economic development of those countries was as important for a peaceful world as disarmament itself. Since the end of the Second World War, many countries had joined in a co-operative effort to help the under-developed countries to help themselves. But the adoption of the declaration contained in the resolution at present before the Second Committee (A/C.2/L.204) would mean that disarmament would further augment the resources of an already existing fund, and would thus widen substantially the scope of its activities for the development of under-developed countries. That was why the Pakistani delegation had no misgivings in supporting the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the fourteen-Power proposal. The adoption of that paragraph in no way limited or modified the idea of a fund existing independently of disarmament. In that connexion, it might be observed, the Pakistani representative in the Second Committee had said (269th meeting) that he welcomed the commitment made by the United States to support a fund of that nature from a portion of the savings achieved from disarmament, and that the draft resolution before the Second Committee gave the promise of an almost unlimited expansion of an existing fund's activities in an improved political climate.

31. If private meetings of the great Powers two years ago had resulted in some progress, as the representatives of the USSR and the United Kingdom had indicated (658th meeting), it should be useful to continue the same procedure now. The Pakistani delegation, however, would not press that suggestion and would be content to see the great Powers meet together in private talks, leaving it to them to determine the manner and the timing.

32. The Pakistani delegation had joined others in sponsoring the fourteen-Power draft resolution in the hope that the future of the Disarmament Commission would be brighter than its past. The survival of mankind was at stake, and the awful responsibility in the matter rested with the great Powers. Earlier in the year there had been talk of meeting in a tunnel of friendship. Pakistan was willing to respond, provided there was light in that tunnel; and in the tunnel of international friendship the torchbearers were the great Powers.

33. Mr. ARZE QUIROGA (Bolivia) recalled the statement made by the United States Secretary of State at the present session (434th plenary meeting) regarding the gravity of the problem created by the existence of nuclear weapons powerful enough to erase all life from the face of the earth. Man's role had changed: from the lord of creation he had become an agent of destruction. In the *New York Herald Tribune* of 5 October 1953, Mr. Walter Lippmann had alluded to a simile used by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, comparing the armaments race to the situation of two scorpions enclosed in a bottle, each one able to kill the other but only at the risk of its own life. That simile should not be applied to international life; given diplomatic initiative, fatalism could be defeated and the problems of disarmament attacked in a spirit of hope! It was the duty of the great Powers, particularly, to show

whether man could find a solution based on reason and understanding.

34. There appeared to be agreement on one point: that the cause of rearmament and progress in weapons of mass extermination was mistrust between the great Powers. Treaties between nations came into existence amidst the most contradictory human passions; they were far from perfect, although man persisted in his attempt to establish law and justice.

35. Mistrust bred fatalism and war-like intentions. It assumed the proportion of persecution mania. It drove peoples to disregard any compromise, to such an extent that they failed to agree even on matters of secondary importance. It induced a tendency to settle every difference by violence. Lies and perfidy became daily expedients, and ultimately agreements became valueless. Mistrust thus created a distorted picture of the facts, and led to the policy of arms and the abuse of power. To conquer the evil, the free world must search its conscience and explore every diplomatic avenue.

36. In that connexion, the Bolivian delegation wished to support the proposals submitted at the 662nd meeting by the French representative, who had shown subtle skill in bringing out the possibilities of conciliation perceptible on comparison of the fourteen-Power draft resolution with the amendments submitted by the USSR, India and Canada. Although the debate had revealed a certain degree of antagonism, there was no great divergence in the general approach of the problem. Summarizing the salient points of the French proposal the Bolivian representative said that it offered some possibility of compromise settlement of the problem. He would vote on the various draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee in accordance with the position he had just outlined.

37. The CHAIRMAN said that the Indian representative was unable to appear at the current meeting, but had agreed to speak when the Committee came to discuss the draft resolutions separately. He would consequently call on those members who wished to speak in reply.

38. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) thought that the Czechoslovak representative had made an unfair allusion to Peru when, in seeking to correct a statement by the Peruvian representative concerning the change in government which had taken place in Czechoslovakia, he had affirmed that Peru was a vassal State of the United States. Peru, like all the other States of Latin America, had always striven to develop a national conscience and an individual culture, and had acquired its independence by force of arms. At San Francisco, the Latin-American countries had strenuously opposed the veto and the attribution of excessive authority to the great Powers. In any event, he would like to see the Czechoslovak representative disagree with any Soviet Union proposal.

39. Turning to the debate on disarmament, he considered that there had been a retrogression since the Paris negotiations. Surveying the progress made at that time, he observed that the very wide terms of reference assigned to the Disarmament Commission on its establishment had justified the hope that its work would be undertaken in a propitious atmosphere. For all its efforts, however, the Disarmament Commission had not reached any agreement. Yet, as could be seen

from the fourteen-Power draft resolution and the USSR amendment there was still general agreement that the Commission should continue in existence. Its terms of reference had to be very broad, since the disarmament problem had legal and technical, as well as political, aspects.

40. It was necessary to avoid placing the slightest obstacle in the Commission's way, to be optimistic, and to disregard differences of opinion. Accordingly, the Peruvian delegation agreed with what had been said by the Bolivian representative on the very important statement made the day previously by the representative of France.

41. In the amendments submitted by the USSR, it was noticeable that the concept of prohibition was repeatedly stressed. Prohibition was obviously the ultimate object of the system of control. The representatives of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR had declared that control would be only a means of espionage. The truth of the matter was that if an international control organ were set up, both the Soviet Union and those States allied to it would be represented.

42. The duty of the Committee was to find that minimum of common ground which would enable the Disarmament Commission to begin its task. The Soviet

Union demanded control and prohibition simultaneously. It was questionable whether that demand involved such a profound difference of approach as some seemed to believe. The idea of prohibition was acceptable to all. For that reason the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.74/Rev.1) should presumably be acceptable to the USSR. Thus completed, the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1) might receive general support. It was to be hoped that the Disarmament Commission would one day receive a mandate unanimously approved by the Members of the United Nations. The Commission must be given the widest possible powers, to enable it to find the technical formulae whereby it could restore to the world that atmosphere of confidence which was indispensable for any fruitful work.

43. In concluding, the Peruvian representative noted that the most important part of the Indian amendment applied to paragraph 1 of the operative part of the fourteen-Power proposal; and he thought that a happy formula had been found which avoided interference with the proposal now before the Second Committee. On the other hand, the proposal to delete the word "small" in the fifth operative paragraph was capable of varied interpretation, and he was consequently unable to support it.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.