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Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

**The question of Morocco (A/2406 and Add.1,  
A/C.1/L.60, A/C.1/L.61) (*concluded*)**

[Item 57]\*

1. Mr. NÚÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) stated that, while the Cuban delegation thought the General Assembly competent to consider the Moroccan question, it did not think that that competence could be extended to abrogation of the treaties between France and Morocco. The thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.60) gave the impression that the treaties in question had no real value, and thus infringed the principle of the domestic competence of both Morocco and France and was contrary to the relations between the two countries. The General Assembly should not adopt any resolutions even in the form of recommendations, which might put it in a difficult position. World public opinion would not distinguish between decision and recommendation. Hence, the Cuban delegation would be unable to vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.60.

2. The Cuban delegation would vote for the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia (A/C.1/L.61) if the fourth paragraph were deleted. It would also vote for any draft similar to resolution 612 (VII), for the final solution of the Moroccan problem depended on patience and mutual understanding.

3. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) considered that the representative of Lebanon had been mistaken in describing him as an opponent. They both had the same ends in view: the real interests of the Moroccan people and of France, ensuring international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the wish to see the authority and stature of the United Nations enhanced. He had already made that point in his statement to the Security Council on 10 April 1952 on the Tunisian question<sup>1</sup>.

4. The United Kingdom delegation fully agreed with some of the views expressed by some of the authors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.60: for example, those of the representative of Syria, who had stated that when the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, applied they were overriding. The United Kingdom delegation also fully shared the Lebanese representative's opinion that, when a question was essentially one of domestic jurisdiction, consideration of it by the United Nations

would constitute an anti-constitutional intervention in the sense of Article 2, paragraph 7.

5. However, the arguments put forward to suggest that Article 2, paragraph 7, did not apply to the Moroccan question were not very convincing. It had not actually been contested that Morocco was a Non-Self-Governing Territory. But to argue that the questions arising out of the interpretations of the Treaty of Fez were international because the treaty was international was to disregard the contents of the treaty itself. That agreement, concluded between two Powers, gave one of them the exclusive right to represent the other externally. The application of the treaty must therefore be regarded as being the exclusive domestic concern of the two States.

6. Nor did the existence of the Act of Algeciras make the Moroccan question international because, first, the signatories to the Act had not submitted any dispute to the United Nations, and, secondly, the representative of France on the Security Council had stated in September (623rd meeting) that all the signatories to the Act had expressly accepted the provisions of the Treaty of Fez and that statement had never been denied. It had been alleged that France had not complied with the provisions of the Treaty of Fez, and that consequently the treaty could be regarded as at an end at the option of the other party. But it could not possibly be agreed that the First Committee was entitled to deal with the Moroccan question on the assumption that the Treaty no longer existed. The Committee was not a court and could not therefore pass judgment on that point. Indeed, although the responsibilities assumed by the signatories to the Charter were far-reaching, they were balanced by certain limitations. No purpose would be served by trying to concert the high ideals of the United Nations into defined obligations governed by some definite time schedule. That could only lead to disillusionment.

7. The United Kingdom delegation considered that the thirteen-Power draft resolution implied so clear an intention to intervene that it constituted a particularly flagrant infringement of domestic jurisdiction. As for the Bolivian draft resolution, its fourth paragraph passed an improper judgment on French policy in Morocco.

8. The United Kingdom delegation would vote against resolution A/C.1/L.60 and would also vote against the fourth paragraph of the Bolivian draft resolution.

9. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) recalled that his delegation, together with other delegations, had sponsored resolution 612 (VII). The thirteen-Power draft resolution was similar to the former one, but its wording constituted an intervention in French domestic affairs. Hence, the Ecuadorian delegation would be unable to vote for it.

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Seventh Year*, 575th meeting.

10. With regard to the Bolivian draft resolution which repeated resolution 612 (VII), it did not seem necessary to recall the existence of the latter for it to continue to be valid.

11. In his brilliant statement, Mr. Malik, the representative of Lebanon, had made it clear that the main purpose of the African-Asian group in defending Moroccan nationalist aspirations was to bring the matter to the attention of world public opinion (637th meeting). That had now been achieved. Moreover, Mr. Malik had added very realistically that that goal could not be reached by means of resolutions, however strong their wording. An appropriate solution would be achieved through intelligence and diplomacy. What was being done therefore was to prepare world public opinion, win more sympathy for the peoples concerned and see whether a peaceful solution could be attained.

12. The Ecuadorian delegation thought that the Lebanese representative's arguments confirmed its view that resolution 612 (VII) was sufficient to create an atmosphere favourable to the settlement of the Moroccan question. His delegation would therefore vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/L.60 and A/C.1/L.61.

13. Mr. FRANCO Y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) stated that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.60. The fourth paragraph of the Bolivian draft (A/C.1/L.61) seemed unacceptable. The delegation of the Dominican Republic considered that the most important thing was that resolutions 611 (VII) and 612 (VII) should continue in operation and that, consequently, it would be neither necessary nor useful to adopt new texts.

14. Mr. DOMINGUEZ CAMPORA (Uruguay) said that his delegation would vote for the Bolivian draft resolution in order to express its traditional support of the two principles at stake, that of the General Assembly's competence and that of the self-determination of peoples.

15. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) considered that if there was a real danger in the tendency of the small countries to extend the competence conferred on the Assembly by the Charter, as the United Kingdom representative had said, there was an opposite danger in the tendency of the great Powers to restrict that competence as much as possible.

16. The Ecuadorian representative had made use of the arguments set forth by the Lebanese delegation in order to reach opposite conclusions. In reality there was no fundamental difference of opinion between the two delegations: the delegation of Ecuador believed that it was inexpedient to adopt a new resolution since the present problem could not be solved by the mere adoption of an additional resolution, while the delegation of Lebanon thought that the fact that a resolution could not by itself solve a question did not mean that it was useless. On the contrary, as resolution 612 (VII) had not borne fruit, it was a matter of urgency to adopt one with a different wording. His own statement clearly showed that the fifteen Powers had not asked for the question to be placed on the agenda for the sole purpose of having it discussed. Their aim was in fact to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem by using draft resolution A/C.1/L.60 as one of the means to that end.

17. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) pointed out that the Assembly could not take specific action. Only the Security Council could do that, unless it was paralyzed. Nor could the Assembly set itself up as a court and take decisions about alleged violations of treaties. That was a matter solely for judicial decision. On the question of competence in general, the Peruvian delegation abided by the position it had taken at San Francisco. The question whether a matter fell within international or domestic jurisdiction should, in the absence of any prior agreement between the parties, be settled juridically by the international judicial authority and not by an international political authority. It should, however, be understood that, unless States as a whole accepted the principle that domestic competence should be defined on the basis of international law, each State retained the right to define it unilaterally. Otherwise States would not be on an equal footing in the matter, since some would agree to the definition of national competence by the international authority and others would reserve the right to define it unilaterally. However, the Assembly had a moral responsibility which would justify it in adopting conciliatory recommendations in order to maintain peace and to promote the self-determination of peoples. Those principles had inspired resolution 612 (VII). Furthermore, it had been said during the debate that in virtue of Article 14 of the Charter the General Assembly could discuss any problem, of whatever origin. Lastly, all delegations certainly seemed to have expressed the wish to see negotiations take place as soon as possible between France and Morocco in order to ensure the independence of the Moroccan State while strengthening friendly relations between the two countries.

18. Hence it followed that the Peruvian delegation could not vote for the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.60). The measures it proposed went beyond the Assembly's powers and even beyond its moral jurisdiction, the only jurisdiction which the United Nations could assume or invoke within the very strict bounds of its legal system.

19. As to the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.61), the Peruvian delegation could not vote for it if the fourth paragraph, in which France was indirectly indicted, was retained.

20. Mr. MAZA (Chile) pointed out that his delegation had voted for resolution 612 (VII) and also for the inclusion of the question of Morocco in the Security Council's agenda. During the debate in the First Committee the most divergent views had been expressed. It had even been claimed that Article 14 of the Charter empowered the Assembly to recommend the revision of international treaties, which was clearly contrary to the Preamble of the Charter and the views expressed on the subject during the debates on the subject at San Francisco. The General Assembly's right to make suggestions or recommendations did not empower it to arrogate to itself the right to revise international treaties.

21. As to the draft resolutions submitted, Mr. Maza recalled that the General Assembly had adopted a decision for which Chile had voted. He felt that there was no need to adopt a new resolution which would amount to a vote of censure on France. It was obvious that France had not had time fully to implement the resolution previously adopted.

22. Mr. PEREZ PEROZO (Venezuela) said that his delegation would vote for the Bolivian draft

resolution, which was likely to create an atmosphere favourable to a friendly and peaceful settlement of the Moroccan dispute. Less than a year before, in December 1952, the General Assembly had adopted a similar text. Despite the varying interpretations of subsequent events in Morocco, there was every reason to hope that the question could be settled favourably.

23. The Bolivian draft resolution was really a new appeal for the settlement of the question of Morocco in the atmosphere of goodwill referred to in resolution 612 (VII). If, however, the Member States were asked to vote separately on the fourth paragraph, as had been requested, the Venezuelan delegation would abstain from voting as the need for the paragraph seemed doubtful.

24. Mr. ARZE QUIROGA (Bolivia) thanked the delegations which had lent their support to the Bolivian draft resolution. At the seventh session a large majority had supported the Brazilian draft resolution which, too, had met with resistance based on the principle of domestic jurisdiction. The resolution had nevertheless been adopted (612 (VII)), thanks chiefly to the support of all the Latin-American delegations. Some of those delegations did not seem to favour the public repetition in a new document of the wish they had expressed the previous year.

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY AFGHANISTAN, BURMA, EGYPT, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, LEBANON, PAKISTAN, PHILIPPINES, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA AND YEMEN (A/C.1/L.60)

25. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the thirteen Powers (A/C.1/L.60).

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Panama, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan.

*Against:* Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway.

*Abstaining:* Sweden, Thailand, Argentina, Bolivia, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Greece, Mexico.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 28 votes to 22, with 9 abstentions.*

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY BOLIVIA (A/C.1/L.61) AND AMENDMENTS THERETO

26. Mr. RAJAN (India) announced that his delegation, in conjunction with the delegations of Burma and Indonesia, was moving a series of amendments (A/C.1/L.62) to the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.61), namely: first, that the third paragraph as amended should read: "*Considering that the motives*

and objectives of that resolution had and continue to have the merit of recognizing the necessity for the development of the free political institutions of the people of Morocco". The paragraph in this form would be a more adequate expression of the intentions of resolution 612 (VII) and the spirit in which it was adopted by the Assembly.

27. The fourth paragraph as amended would read: "*Considering that the fact that this item is included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its eighth session indicates that those objectives have not yet been fulfilled*".

28. The delegations of India, Burma and Indonesia also proposed the addition to the preamble of a fifth paragraph, worded as follows: "*Recognizing the right of the people of Morocco to complete self-determination in conformity with the Charter*". Reference to a basic right of the Moroccan people and a right, moreover, that was assured to them under the Charter would help to give the Bolivian draft resolution both substance and an unambiguous purpose.

29. Finally, the operative paragraph of the draft resolution would be amended to read: "*Renews its appeal for the reduction of tension in Morocco and urges that the right of the people of Morocco to free democratic political institutions be ensured*".

30. Mr. Rajan stressed the fact that the amendments proposed sought no change in the fundamental objectives of the Bolivian draft resolution but merely sought to give those objectives greater precision and solidity. Without those changes the Bolivian draft resolution could not contribute effectively to the peaceful realization of the Moroccan people's right to self-determination. The most it could be said to do was to express the confidence that that right would be implemented in due course. Recent events in Morocco had done nothing to justify the confidence reposed in France by the General Assembly the previous year, and to reaffirm that sentiment in the face of events would be both ineffective and unreal. For those reasons, if the amendments proposed to the Bolivian draft resolution were not adopted the Indian delegation would be unable to support it.

31. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) supported the amendments proposed by the three Powers. Their effect would be to introduce minimum modifications which, in all fairness, had to be conceded. The first amendment was purely one of form while the second introduced a change which should not constitute an insuperable difficulty for those who had abstained from voting on the thirteen-Power draft resolution or for the convinced supporters of the Bolivian draft. The third amendment merely affirmed the loyalty of the Member States to the Charter and their respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. The operative part, as amended, was the most moderate statement that could be made in that stage of the development of the problem.

32. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) stated that his delegation supported the amendments submitted by the three Powers (A/C.1/L.62). It would vote for the Bolivian text so amended.

33. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) said that his delegation did not approve the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the original text of the Bolivian draft resolution. He would not commit himself on the



amendments submitted by the three Powers until he had the text of them before him.

34. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the meeting should be suspended for a few minutes to enable the amendments just submitted to be reproduced and circulated.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and resumed at 5 p.m.*

35. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) said that he had been instructed to vote for the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.61), with the exception of the fourth paragraph. He therefore asked for a vote in parts on the draft resolution. He would be compelled to abstain from voting on the three-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.62) as he had not received instructions concerning them.

36. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) suggested that the words: "of Morocco" should be added after the words: "Having considered the question" in the first paragraph of the Bolivian draft resolution.

37. Mr. ARZE QUIROGA (Bolivia) accepted the Iranian representative's suggestion and pointed out that the second paragraph of the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia should be translated into French as follows: "*Rappelant la résolution...*".

38. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first two paragraphs of the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.61) with the suggested modifications.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The paragraphs were adopted by 40 votes to 9, with 9 abstentions.*

39. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first of the amendments submitted by the three Powers (A/C.1/L.62), affecting the third paragraph of the draft resolution.

*The amendment was adopted by 33 votes to 15, with 10 abstentions.*

40. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third paragraph of the Bolivian draft resolution, as amended.

*The paragraph as amended was adopted by 34 votes to 17, with 5 abstentions.*

41. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second of the three-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.62), affecting the fourth paragraph of the Bolivian draft resolution.

*The amendment was adopted by 30 votes to 18, with 9 abstentions.*

42. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth paragraph as amended.

*The paragraph as amended was adopted by 31 votes to 21, with 7 abstentions.*

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third of the three-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.62), proposing the addition of a fifth paragraph to the preamble of the draft resolution, reading: "Recognizing the right of the people of Morocco to complete self-determination in conformity with the Charter".

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Australia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina.

*Against:* Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Turkey.

*The amendment was adopted by 36 votes to 13, with 9 abstentions.*

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth of the three-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.62) to the operative paragraph of the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.61).

*The amendment was adopted by 30 votes to 18, with 9 abstentions.*

45. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amended draft resolution as a whole.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Pakistan, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Norway.

*Against:* Panama, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

*Abstaining:* Paraguay, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, El Salvador, Greece, Israel.

*The amended draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 31 votes to 18, with 9 abstentions.*

46. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) stated that his delegation's vote on the three-Power amendments, and on the third amendment in particular, should be considered in the context of the resolution as a whole.

47. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) recalled that he had already explained why his delegation could not vote for the thirteen-Power draft resolution. The Bolivian draft resolution showed comparative moderation and was of a less interventional nature. Nevertheless, in view of the sensitiveness of feelings in Morocco, his delegation had felt that it would be wiser not to launch a second appeal ten months after the previous one. It had therefore not been able to give its support to the draft resolution, and even less so to the three-Power amendments.

48. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) recalled that his delegation had viewed the Bolivian draft resolution with some favour, although it had been unable to approve its fourth paragraph. The three-Power amendments to the draft resolution completely altered the situation. The amendments to the third and fourth paragraphs of the draft resolution attached a false interpretation to the resolution adopted the previous year. Moreover, the other amendments involved a direct interference in the affairs of France and Morocco, contrary to the provisions of the Charter. That was why the New Zealand delegation had voted against them.

49. Mr. MAZA (Chile) drew attention to the fact that he had mistakenly voted in favour of the first two paragraphs of the Bolivian draft resolution.

50. Mr. NAVAS (Panama) said that he had voted against the Bolivian draft resolution and the three-Power amendments after having voted against the thirteen-Power draft resolution also. His delegation had abstained from taking part in the discussions because it had felt that the proposals submitted offered no satisfactory solution; moreover, all the arguments had been advanced in the course of the debate.

51. A resolution that was constructive but coercive in character was not in harmony with the letter and spirit of the Charter. If it was passive it would be not only useless but dangerous, because it would solve nothing and might have dangerous repercussions on the prestige of the United Nations. In point of fact, the Assembly could discuss the question but was not empowered to settle it.

52. His delegation was convinced that the Moroccan people should regain complete independence and free-

dom and that it was in France's interest to promote such a development. He regretted, but understood, the absence of the French delegation.

53. Mr. CHAUVET (Haiti) recalled that, when explaining the reasons why his delegation would vote against the thirteen-Power draft resolution, he had mentioned that the United Nations was not competent in the matter (638th meeting). Moreover, he had expressed the view that, so long as General Assembly resolution 612 (VII) had not had any effect, no other resolution that departed, even if only indirectly, from the earlier one could gain his delegation's approval. The effect of the Bolivian draft resolution as amended by the three Powers was indirectly to impair the value of the treaties between France and Morocco. That was the main reason for his delegation's vote against the draft resolution.

54. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) pointed out that the unexpected submission of the three-Power amendments had compelled him to abstain from voting on most of the provisions of the Bolivian draft resolution. He had voted against the draft resolution as a whole because its spirit had been considerably changed by the amendments.

55. Mr. KYROU (Greece) stated that his delegation was in favour of almost all the amendments submitted by the three Powers and of almost all the provisions of the Bolivian draft resolution. It had voted against the fourth paragraph for the reasons given by the New Zealand representative. As that paragraph had been adopted, his delegation had been obliged to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.