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**Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).**

**Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the Government of the Union of Burma (A/2468, A/C.1/L.69, A/C.1/L.70, A/C.1/L.71) (continued)**  
[Item 25]\*

1. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the statement of the representative of Burma and the documents available to the Committee made it clear that the negotiations in Bangkok had not yielded any affirmative results and that General Assembly resolution 707 (VII) had consequently not been implemented. The Kuomintang clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek and those who protected him were responsible for the fact that the Kuomintang bands had not been disarmed and withdrawn from Burma. The Joint Military Committee composed of representatives of the United States, Thailand, Burma and the Kuomintang had failed to achieve any affirmative results; indeed, the obstructionist tactics of the Kuomintang representatives in it had foredoomed it to failure. Quoting the terms of a preliminary agreement, as reported by the Press on 30 May 1953, he noted that even that agreement, which was couched in very general terms, had angered the Kuomintang generals. A so-called delegation of "jungle" generals invited to Bangkok by the committee had reportedly declared, on its arrival, that the troops of General Li Mi were not prepared to withdraw from Burma and had termed the General Assembly resolution calling for such withdrawal as irregular and unreasonable. On the following day, 30 June 1953, in answer to that statement, the head of the Burmese delegation to the committee had declared that if Li Mi's troops were not evacuated from Burma on the basis of the resolution, the Burmese forces would press their fight against them to the point of their destruction. On 16 July 1953, a Press report from Taipeh stated that Li Mi had told Chiang Kai-shek that he would never issue an order for the evacuation of the soldiers under his command from northern Burma, but at the same time had recognized that Chiang Kai-shek was his commander. The continuing presence of Kuomintang bands in Burma thus

could only be accounted for by a deal between the Kuomintang clique and General Li Mi. The Kuomintang bandits in Burma, indeed, demanded that Chiang Kai-shek and the United States should legitimize their depredations, arrange for a cease fire between themselves and the Burmese army, and secure as a demarcation line the Salween River. Following the Burmese Government's rejection of that impudent demand, the Kuomintang generals had resorted to the tactics of obstruction.

2. The representative of the Kuomintang, in his statement to the Joint Military Committee, had attempted to represent the bandit Li Mi as a hero. The representative had reported that the Kuomintang had persuaded approximately 2,000 men to accept evacuation to Taiwan (Formosa) and had declared that it was beyond the power of his so-called Government to effect a complete evacuation on the grounds that it did not have full control over the Kuomintang troops and that the greater part of the latter consisted of local inhabitants of various border areas between China and Burma. The proposal for a make-believe repatriation, Mr. Kiselyov declared, was designed to strengthen the position of the Kuomintang on the occasion of the consideration of that question by the General Assembly. Even that proposal, however, was subject to the reservation that only those willing to be repatriated would be transferred to Taiwan. Since orders were not a matter for discussion in an army, that reservation was designed to frustrate evacuation altogether.

3. The refusal of Li Mi and his generals to withdraw their troops from Burma showed that those bands would remain on Burmese territory, on the pretext that they were waging a struggle against the Chinese Communists, although in reality they were nothing but bandits and opium traders. In the circumstances, there could only be sympathy for the fully justified indignation of the Burmese people and of world public opinion against the régime of terror instituted by the Kuomintang troops in the part of Burma they occupied. The depredations of those bands involved not only Burmese villages but also Burmese cities. In that connexion, he cited various reports in the Press concerning the activities of the bands, which had also endeavoured to corrupt the local population by means of opium.

4. The situation made it only too clear that the time had come to put an end to the crimes being committed against the Burmese people by the bankrupt Kuomintang clique. The activity of the Kuomintang troops in Burmese territory constituted aggression, which had taken the form of a refusal by the Kuomintang clique in Taiwan to order its generals to submit to disarming and internment in accordance with international law. In that connexion, Mr. Kiselyov recalled that irrefutable evidence of Chiang Kai-shek's direct control of the

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Kuomintang troops in Burma had been submitted by the Burmese delegation at the seventh and current sessions of the General Assembly. In that connexion, he cited from various documents submitted by the Burmese delegation, which made it quite clear that the Kuomintang troops in Burma were equipped, controlled and trained by the Kuomintang clique in Formosa. Mr. Kiselyov quoted from an article dated 12 May 1953, in the United States periodical *The Reporter*, giving details of the supplies and equipment furnished to the troops in Burma, and stated that if the Chinese Nationalist forces which were openly intervening in the internal affairs of Burma were deprived of supplies and disciplined military cadres, the task of the Burmese Government would be considerably facilitated.

5. An unedifying role was played in the whole affair by the Government of Thailand, which allowed passage through its territory of armaments and equipment for the Kuomintang bands in Burma. Noting that his delegation had pointed that out at the seventh session, he observed that it was no accident that the Kuomintang representative in the Committee should thank the Government of Thailand for its services.

6. The attempts of the Burmese Government to secure through diplomatic channels the withdrawal or internment of the Kuomintang troops had, unfortunately, not led so far to any favourable results. It was incumbent upon the General Assembly to take concrete measures to put an end to the indubitable aggression of the Kuomintang in Burma. The continued toleration of Chiang Kai-shek and his generals by certain countries had aroused legitimate and world-wide criticism, since such conduct constituted an obstacle to the progress of the Burmese people and had served to aggravate the situation in the Far East. There had been further proof that the Kuomintang clique was visibly provoking a new war and that it was the most evil enemy of peace and of the security of peoples. Cessation of assistance and of deliveries of arms and equipment to the Kuomintang would make it impossible for them to maintain themselves in Burmese territory and to continue their hostile acts directed against a Member State of the United Nations, acts that were contrary to the Charter.

7. Mr. LUCET (France), recalling his delegation's part in the efforts made at the seventh session to find a just and equitable solution to the problem, stated that France could not fail to note that the free and independent State of Laos, with which it was associated in the framework of the French Union, was directly on the border of the trouble zone. In supporting the Assembly's resolution (707 (VII)), his delegation had wished to show its understanding of the irritation felt by the Burmese Government at the presence on Burmese soil of the troops of General Li Mi, which constituted an infringement on the territorial integrity of Burma as well as a serious threat to the domestic tranquillity of that country. Recognizing the international character of that deplorable situation, his delegation was sympathetic to a young State which, in difficult circumstances, was striving to maintain its sovereignty and to consolidate its democratic and economic progress.

8. It must be recognized that substantial progress had been made towards the solution of the problem since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution.

The United States representative, in the letter addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/L.71), had referred to the *communiqué* issued in Bangkok on 29 October by the Joint Military Committee. According to it, 2,000 of the foreign troops on Burmese territory would be evacuated, the Government of the Republic of China would refuse to recognize those failing to agree to be evacuated, and that Government would furnish no supplies to those declining repatriation. His delegation was happy to join other delegations in thanking the Governments of the United States and Thailand for their help in bringing about those encouraging results.

9. Referring to the statements made by the representative of China and by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs on 8 October 1953, Mr. Lucet paid tribute to the personal efforts exerted by Mr. Tsiang. However, it was obvious that the Chinese Government could not abdicate all responsibility in the matter. He recognized that in official statements from Formosa orders had been given to the troops involved to heed the views of the United Nations; but those statements indicated that Chiang Kai-shek and his ministers continued to exert some influence on those troops. As had been pointed out by the representative of New Zealand (654th meeting), there had been no word of any personal orders by Chiang Kai-shek to those who used or abused his name, although such an appeal would clearly have a most felicitous effect. It had also been pointed out that the troops involved obviously had resources much beyond the proceeds of opium smuggling or the sale of local ores. His delegation was willing to believe that the Chinese Government had ceased to encourage the sending of subsidies, victuals and arms to General Li Mi's soldiers, but considered that an appeal from Formosa to the numerous and wealthy Chinese colonies in the bordering States, asking them to heed the terms of the United Nations resolution, would probably do much to reduce the resources of the forces involved.

10. The situation was nevertheless quite encouraging, and the Chinese Government should be thanked for the efforts it had made, despite many difficulties, in reaching the decisive stage marked by the *communiqué* of 29 October 1953 (A/C.1/L.71). His delegation was even more aware of the fact that the Burmese Government was unable to declare itself satisfied as long as hostile troops remained in its territory.

11. The resolution of 23 April 1953 (707 (VII)) remained valid, and, in view of the substantial improvement in the situation, there was no need to strengthen it or to contemplate the condemnation of the Government of the Republic of China as an aggressor. The complete liberation of Burma from foreign troops should be realized gradually under international control but without constraint. In that connexion, he welcomed the statement of the United States representative (654th meeting) regarding continued consultations with the parties concerned. The matter should continue to receive the vigilant attention of the General Assembly.

12. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia), recalling the position taken by his delegation at the seventh session, stated that its views had undergone no change. It still felt very strongly that the presence of the Kuomintang troops on Burmese soil, their depredation against the Burmese population, and their hostilities, often in conjunction with other rebel elements, against the armed forces of the Union of Burma, constituted a serious

violation of the territorial integrity of a Member State, and a constant obstacle to its efforts towards consolidation and progress. The situation arising from the flagrant Kuomintang aggression was fraught with the gravest danger for peace and security, particularly because of the strain it placed on Burma's relations with neighbouring States. Mr. Popovic observed that any lingering doubts as to responsibility of the Kuomintang authorities in Formosa must have been finally dispelled by the overwhelming evidence submitted. His delegation had never had such doubts and had never concealed its profound sympathy for the valiant Burmese nation, victim of the aggression.

13. His delegation had supported what had been the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.44/Rev.2) in the hope that, although couched in very restrained and cautious terms, such an overwhelming expression of the Assembly's views would carry enough moral weight to bring about a fundamental change in the situation. It had done so with misgivings, however, and would have supported the stronger and more explicit Burmese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.42) had that proposal been put to the vote.

14. Events had only confirmed those misgivings. While it would be unfair to say that nothing had been done, the Joint Military Committee set up in Bangkok encountered at the outset the blunt refusal of the Kuomintang generals to leave Burmese territory and the evasive tactics of the representative of the Formosa authorities on the committee. Meanwhile, according to *The Times* of London of 19 September 1953, the clandestine airlift had continued to provide the Kuomintang forces with more formidable weapons than anything that the Burmese army possessed. That situation had finally compelled the Burmese representatives to withdraw from the Joint Military Committee. Only when the General Assembly was about to take the matter up again, with the probability of adopting a stiffer course of action, had the Kuomintang representative apparently had a change of heart. The implication drawn by Mr. Tsiang and certain other representatives from the optimistic statement issued by the committee on 29 October 1953 (A/C.1/L.71) was that everything had been more or less settled and that the whole affair had in consequence ceased to be a source of concern to the United Nations. Such optimism appeared at least premature. Only if the General Assembly resolution had really been implemented would there be cause for congratulation. But no claim was made that even a single member of the invading forces had been withdrawn from Burmese soil. There was only the promise that some of them would soon be withdrawn. Even if that promise was taken at face value, which it was admittedly difficult to do, in view of the Kuomintang's past record in that respect, five-sixths of the forces operating in Burmese territory would remain. Since they were to be "disavowed", according to the statement, it was clear that they were to remain and continue their hostilities and aggression on a very slightly reduced scale. The fact that the number of troops involved in the aggression might become somewhat smaller and might be under different command did not in any way alter the fact of aggression or affect the gravity of the situation. Nor, for that matter, would any disavowal lessen the degree of responsibility of the authorities on Formosa for the aggression against Burma. In any case, for quite some time, those authorities, despite abundant and conclusive evidence to the contrary, had been

disclaiming any responsibility for those troops. In view of those disavowals his delegation might be forgiven if it lent no greater credence to future disavowals. Indeed, the measure of influence the Taipeh Government was able to exert over its troops in Burma appeared to be in direct ratio to the degree of pressure brought to bear upon it. A mild resolution had brought some 2,000 troops under that influence, and a stronger one might well have increased the number.

15. In the circumstances, the General Assembly must clearly see to it that the authorities on Formosa were not permitted to make a mockery of its unanimous will. It must ensure that aid to the invading troops should cease forthwith and that they be withdrawn speedily and effectively. It must make sure that the extraordinary patience and forbearance of the Burmese people, their scrupulous adherence to United Nations principles and procedures, and their faith in the Charter should not go unrewarded; otherwise there would be little incentive for small and independent nations to turn to the Organization in their hour of need.

16. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) said that the unfortunate and intolerable situation in Burma was an instance of the penalty that small nations, owing to military weakness, generally had to pay for having as neighbours powerful States who would utilize their resources without consideration or compensation. Thus, as the Chinese representative himself had admitted, the disarmament and internment of 30,000 Chinese troops had been accomplished in Indo-China because the Government of that country had had the power to enforce such conditions. In Burma, disarmament and internment had been evaded because the Burmese Government had not been sufficiently strong. Realizing that its ultimate hope must lie in collective action of the United Nations, the Burmese Government had appealed to the latter for assistance against the aggressor. It was disappointing that the only result of the resolution of 23 April 1953, adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, had been a promise by the Chinese Nationalist Government to evacuate 2,000 of its 12,000 guerillas from Burma. In view of the Chinese representative's statement that his Government exercised very little control over these guerrillas, the Burmese must treat with a degree of scepticism all pledges of the Chinese Nationalist Government regarding the withdrawal of 2,000 guerrillas. And, in view of the Chinese representative's account of the difficulty with which the agreement to evacuate those 2,000 guerillas had been extracted from the guerilla leaders, it was no wonder that the Burmese Government viewed the assurances with great misgivings, particularly in the light of the Chinese representative's statement that his Government had lost all control over the forces. Moreover, as had been pointed out, General Li Mi had reportedly declared that his men would fight on, regardless of the pressure of the Chinese Nationalist Government and other external pressure forcing them to leave Burmese territory and return to Formosa. Only time could show which of those two conflicting statements would be believed. Despite the praiseworthy endeavours of the Chinese Government and its representative, it appeared that the Chinese Nationalist Government could not or dared not control the force which it had created in Burma.

17. Even assuming the successful evacuation of the 2,000 guerillas, it was by no means clear that the hard



core of the guerilla forces would have been liquidated, particularly in view of the statements of General Li Mi and his followers. Despite those doubts, the Burmese Government had expressed its gratitude to the United States and Thailand for their efforts and would not hinder the evacuation of these 2,000 guerillas, although it did not accept that withdrawal as a solution and would hold the Chinese Government in Formosa responsible for the evacuation of the remainder of the troops. The views of the Burmese must be shared by every delegation that had supported the General Assembly resolution 707 (VII). Nothing could release Taipei from the responsibility for evacuating or disarming and interning the guerillas, a responsibility of its own creation. Pointing out that the disarming and internment of 30,000 troops in Indo-China must have been ordered and sanctioned by the Chinese Government in Formosa, Mr. Cooper said that the argument of the Chinese representative in the case of Burma was unacceptable. It would have been justifiable if the Chinese Government, although claiming lack of control of the troops, had issued orders to General Li Mi and his forces to surrender their arms and submit to internment. There was no record of such orders. If such orders had been given, while they would not have relieved the Chinese Government of direct responsibility, they would at least have exonerated it from any complicity in the actions of its generals in Burma and would have demonstrated its peaceful intentions towards the Burmese Government. The Chinese Nationalist Government had not done what it could have done with a modicum of exertion.

18. In conclusion, Mr. Cooper expressed appreciation of the endeavours of the Governments of the United States and Thailand, as well as of the new attitude assumed by the Chinese Government. The delegation of Liberia welcomed the assurance that the guerillas refusing repatriation would be disavowed.

19. Mr. NAJAR (Israel) said that his delegation's views on the matter had not changed since the question had been debated at the seventh session. He intervened only to comment on the substantial developments that had supervened since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution on this question. Whether the changes that had taken place should be regarded as favourable depended upon the attitude of the Government of Formosa and the development of the debates in the General Assembly.

20. Recalling the position taken by the delegation of China at the seventh session (605th meeting) in response to the Burmese charges, Mr. Najar observed that the picture of the situation given by the representative of China a few days before (653rd meeting) was entirely different. Undertakings declared to be impossible six months before had been solemnly assumed. The commitments undertaken by the Government of Formosa regarding the men of General Li Mi's army represented a substantial change in the situation. The words of appreciation expressed in that regard to the United States and Thailand were well deserved. However, the optimistic picture of the results achieved might give way to pessimism in the light of the Government of Formosa's declaration that it had completely lost control of the balance of the Nationalist Chinese forces illegally in occupation of Burmese territory. Referring to the statement of 8 October 1953 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government

of China (A/C.1/L.69), he noted that, whereas a direct and close link between Li Mi and the Formosa Government had been proved and recognized, the General Assembly was being asked to give recognition to the fact that that link had been cut and that, thereby, the Formosa Government's responsibility had come to an end. Mr. Najar asked what would be the situation of the Government of the Union of Burma, which deserved the warmest support, if that course were followed. The Burmese Government would still be faced with an army of 10,000 trained and equipped men on part of its territory. That army, resolved to find supplies on the scene, would be quite prepared to engage in all sorts of military operations both inside and outside Burma, regardless of the grave complications that might ensue, and would be resolved to interfere in Burma's internal affairs. The Government of Burma would therefore have to engage, on its own territory, in a real war of liberation against an army which, although reduced, would theoretically have been detached from its origins. Such a state of affairs could not be represented as constituting progress as compared to the situation prevailing in April last.

21. The General Assembly and its Members could exert efforts to prevent such a regrettable development. The undertakings assumed had undeniably resulted from the pressure applied by the Organization. While he did not wish to minimize the efforts made by the Formosa Government or the difficulties which it would encounter, those difficulties were minor when compared with those facing the Burmese Government in its own territory and with the dangers to international peace and security implicit in the situation. It would be both unfair and inadmissible to relieve the Government of Formosa, which bore the basic responsibility for the situation, of that responsibility. That Government was far from having exhausted the possibilities open to it, and the General Assembly was entitled to ask it to make new efforts to achieve more substantial results. The Government of Formosa should reconsider its attitude. That Government should urgently reflect on the situation and, above all, take the necessary action to restore peace in Burma. If that was not done, the Organization and its Members could only state more precisely and more actively their views on the responsibility and liability involved.

22. Mr. COTE (Canada) said that in the debate held at the seventh session on the question his delegation had maintained (610th meeting) that the presence in Burma of approximately 12,000 Chinese Nationalist forces under General Li Mi's command had placed the Burmese Government in an intolerable position. The Canadian delegation had expressed its sympathy with the Burmese Government's predicament and had expressed the hope that the Nationalist Government of China would cause the eventual withdrawal of those forces from Burma. It had been the belief of his delegation at that time that the Burmese Government would not press for a formal condemnation of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and that a solution could be found by negotiation between the interested parties.

23. On that occasion the representative of the Union of Burma had not opposed the modification of his original proposal and he had exhibited thereby a restraint which the Canadian delegation had hoped would lead to the peaceful solution of the problem. It was a matter of considerable concern to the Ca-

nadian delegation when the representative of Burma had informed the Committee that no solution had yet been reached, that the Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma continued to receive supplies from Formosa through Thailand, and that their evacuation was not in sight.

24. The Canadian delegation, on the other hand, was happy to note that, due to the efforts of the United States and Thailand, assurances had been given regarding the evacuation of some 2,000 troops and their families, and that the Burmese Government had decided to suspend its operations against the foreign troops until 15 November.

25. The Canadian delegation agreed with the representative of the Union of Burma that the partial evacuation of troops did not constitute a final solution, and that the Republic of China could not disclaim further responsibility. The Canadian delegation was of the opinion that it was a moral duty of that Government to disarm the remaining forces.

26. The problem before the Committee was how to deal effectively with an intolerable situation which could threaten the peace of the whole area. His delegation believed that genuine preliminary steps were being taken at the present time, and it noted with satisfaction the continuing interest of the United States Government in finding a satisfactory solution. Because of the present developments, the Canadian delegation felt that it would be appropriate for the Committee to note that the position taken by the General Assembly at the seventh session still stood. The Committee could note that effective preliminary steps were being taken, emphasize the necessity of finding a solution satisfactory to Burma, and express the hope that Burma would be able to report to the Assembly at an early date that General Assembly resolution 707 (VII) had been satisfactorily implemented.

27. Mr. CHAMANDI (Yemen) said that after the General Assembly at its seventh session had adopted unanimously a resolution on the question, it had been the hope that, through the good offices of some of the big Powers and the sincere co-operation of Nationalist China, the danger of that intolerable situation would be eliminated before it got out of hand. Unfortunately, however, the problem had been only partially solved. Although his delegation heartily welcomed the decision to evacuate some 2,000 soldiers from Burma, it could not help wondering what measures would be taken with regard to the remaining 10,000. It was the sincere hope of the Yemen delegation that every effort would be made to persuade the remaining troops to follow the example of those who had consented to be evacuated, until complete evacuation was assured. While appreciating the efforts that had already been made, his delegation could not help associating itself with the representative of Burma in considering that no decisive and satisfactory solution has been found as yet. The Yemen delegation hoped that the Committee would take the necessary measures for the final solution of the problem.

28. Mr. ABDEL-RAZEK (Egypt) stated that a great role of mediation had been played by the Governments of the United States and Thailand. In spite of the great difficulties met with by the mediators because of the attitude of General Li Mi, an agreement had been arrived at between the Chinese Government and the Chinese forces in Burma with regard to their

evacuation. The Egyptian delegation hoped that the partial evacuation would be the first step towards the complete evacuation of all Chinese troops.

29. A very clear statement made by the representative of China left no doubt that his Government would continue to exert all its efforts to bring that matter to a happy conclusion and afford complete satisfaction to the Government of Burma.

30. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that the question before the Committee concerned the sovereignty and territorial independence of a Member of the United Nations and it also related to the maintenance of international peace and security. The question was being considered for the second time by the General Assembly and it was now necessary for the Assembly to take steps to halt the attack upon the sovereignty of Burma.

31. The Burmese delegation had offered numerous documents and proofs which constituted ample evidence that the Chiang Kai-shek band in Burma got its supplies and orders from abroad. That band was occupying a portion of Burma, violating its frontiers and terrorizing and murdering its people. That had been the situation since 1950, when, following the defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek forces by the victorious Chinese revolution, the remnants of the Kuomintang troops had crossed the Burmese frontiers. In violation of the established principles of international law, those troops had refused to lay down their arms, and had resisted the attempts of the Burmese Government to intern them.

32. Since that time, a number of border provinces of Burma had been under the control of those armed bands which had received help from the Taiwan clique, strengthened their ranks numerically, and increased their military equipment. Their presence in Burma constituted a danger not only to Burma, but also to peace in that whole region.

33. In accordance with the resolution adopted at the seventh session of the General Assembly (707 (VII)), the interested parties and the United States engaged in negotiation in May 1953 in order to determine the conditions for evacuation of those troops. The report presented by the Burmese Government on 31 August 1953 (A/2468), however, showed that the Kuomintang bands were determined to remain in Burma and continue their criminal activities. The promises regarding the evacuation did not in reality affect the situation. In the first place, those promises referred to the evacuation of some 2,000 of a total of 12,000. In the second phase, experience had proved that there was no guarantee that even the partial evacuation would be carried out. In that respect, the Committee should recall that General Li Mi, in an interview published in the magazine *Time* of 18 May 1953, had stated that rather than evacuate, they could still turn into bandits and plunder to stay alive.

34. It was no secret that the Kuomintang bands in Burma received their orders, directives, equipment and men from Taiwan. On the other hand, it was well known, the Kuomintang clique in turn received its instructions from the Command of the United States Forces in the Far East. The delegation of Burma had presented ample proof regarding the direct relation between the Kuomintang bands and the centres located in Taiwan. There could be no doubt that the role

played by the Kuomintang régime in directing the aggressive activity of its bands on the territory of Burma was linked with the whole activity of that puppet régime, organized by the leading circles of the United States which threatened peace and security in the Far East. The Kuomintang detachments in Burma had the task of maintaining a trouble spot in Southeast Asia in the hope of provoking a flare-up by an aggression against the People's Republic of China, an aggression for which the Chiang Kai-shek régime had been making preparations for a number of years, with the knowledge and support of the Government of the United States.

35. The Island of Taiwan had been converted into a centre for diversionist activities and espionage and its agents were active in every country in the Far East. It was their activities in the prisoner-of-war camps in Korea which were hampering the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice. The Kuomintang bands in Burma were only part of a huge network of centres of aggression threatening peaceful relations in the Far East.

36. Other Kuomintang units were engaged in similar activities at sea in the Far East. Recent Press dispatches had reported that a number of ships flying the British flag had been apprehended by Kuomintang military contingents. On 4 October 1953, the Polish merchant ship *Praca* had been seized illegally by a Kuomintang warship and its crew arrested. The Polish Government had proof that it was two military aircraft, one of which bore the markings of the United States Air Force, which had informed the Kuomintang pirate vessel of the location of the Polish ship. Such attacks constituted not only an infringement of the right of freedom of the seas but could also give rise to grave international conflicts.

37. Knowing that it was the United States Government which bore the responsibility for the actions and even for the existence of the Kuomintang clique at Taiwan and with proof of the participation of United States aircraft in the attack on the Polish vessel, the Polish Government had sent a note of protest to the United States Government and it would not rest until the ship and its crew had been returned.

38. Mr. CAREY (United States) stated that the Polish representative had levelled a number of grave accusations against his Government. It was not his purpose to deal with those accusations or to attempt to refute them, but simply to state categorically that the United States Government was in no way involved in aiding the activities of the foreign forces on Burmese soil. His delegation would emphatically reiterate its position: it deplored their continued presence in Burma, and it was monstrous to suggest that the United States would even for one moment consider giving them aid or support.

39. He wished to remind the Committee that the role of the United States in dealing with this problem had consistently been to extend its good offices in a sincere effort to arrive at a solution. This had been done, first, at the request of the two parties directly concerned, and, more recently, in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution adopted at the seventh session. After the agreement had been drafted in Bangkok on 22 June 1953, a succession of difficulties had arisen on account of reservations and qualifications which had to be satisfied before the parties were fully prepared to engage in

this joint effort, and it was largely through the continuing efforts of the United States Government that those difficulties had been finally overcome.

40. By the combined efforts of Burma, China, Thailand and the United States a substantial measure of progress had been achieved in line with the spirit of the General Assembly resolution, and it was in that connexion that the representative of the United States would like to bring to the attention of the Committee some further details. The United States Government considered the agreement reached to be a substantial implementation of resolution 707 (VII) and, though his Government regretted the continued presence of unwanted foreign forces on Burmese soil, it considered that it was not in the power of other governments to secure the "complete evacuation" of all those troops by peaceful means.

41. In the interval which had elapsed since the Press statement issued by the Joint Military Committee in Bangkok on 29 October 1953 (A/C.1/L.71) a number of developments bearing on the forthcoming evacuation of foreign troops from Burma had taken place. Mr. Carey said that, in response to the question which had been raised in the Committee earlier as to whether the announced plan would actually be carried out, his delegation wished to offer the following information. On 28 October 1953 officials of the United States Embassy in Bangkok entered into a contract for the airlift to Taipeh of the troops who were being evacuated from North Burma. The contract provided for the non-stop flight of those foreign troops from Lampang to Taipeh at a rate of approximately 200 a day. Each plane would carry approximately fifty evacuees. The airlift would continue until such time as the evacuation committee was satisfied that all of the foreign troops and their dependants who had been persuaded to evacuate had in fact departed. The cost of the evacuation would be defrayed by the United States, China and Thailand. The first of those evacuees would be expected to arrive at Takhileik on 7 November. Four hundred evacuees would be expected on that date, a minimum of 150 on 8 November, at least 100 on 9 November, another 100 on 10 November and additional numbers thereafter until approximately 2,000 would have been evacuated. The Thai representative on the Joint Military Committee had stated that his country would be prepared to receive the groups on the dates indicated and the United States members of the evacuation committee had arrived in Bangkok on 30 October.

42. The Burmese Government had accepted the evacuation plan in principle and had given assurances of full co-operation in facilitating the evacuation. In that connexion, a Burmese observer group had proceeded to Bangkok on 1 November and was expected to accompany the Joint Military Committee and the United States, Thai, and Chinese evacuation teams to the north of Thailand on 4 November. The United States delegation would like to state that it had just received word that the above-mentioned groups had actually left Bangkok at 8:30 a.m., local time, that very day.

43. The first staging point would be at Takhileik, a small village on the Thai-Burmese border. There the troops would be disarmed under the supervision of the military control teams operating under the direction of the Joint Evacuation Committee. The troops would

then cross the border to Mae Sai in Thailand and be taken to another staging point at Mae Chan. From there they would be transported by truck and bus to Lampang to board planes for Taipeh. All arrangements for handling the troops after their entrance into Thailand would be carefully directed by the Government of Thailand.

44. In conclusion, Mr. Carey wished to say once again that the President of the United States himself was interested in the question, and that the interest of his Government in the problem would not cease with the present evacuation of troops and their dependants.

After they had left Burmese soil, his Government would hope to be able again to consult with the interested parties regarding any further action, and he could assure the members of the Committee that as long as the countries directly concerned continued to find the efforts of the United States Government helpful, it would stand ready and willing to render whatever service it could.

45. The CHAIRMAN declared the list of speakers closed.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.