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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations (*continued*)

[Item 69]\*

GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the attempt made by certain delegations to avoid consideration of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) had failed. The initiative taken by the Soviet Union had compelled members of the Committee to state their points of view and even to submit draft resolutions. But, as the Bolivian representative had said (375th meeting), they had done so for fear of arousing the indignation of peace-loving peoples if the USSR draft declaration were dismissed outright. The only object of the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596) was therefore to hide from world public opinion the majority's reluctance to agree to the Soviet Union's peace proposals. The Netherlands representative (375th meeting) had gone even further by emphasizing that the First Committee should dispel the impression that the USSR was the sole peace-loving nation. The spokesmen of the Anglo-American bloc had been obliged to take certain measures on the spot in order to disguise the evidence of the lack of goodwill on the part of the States which formed that bloc.

2. Some speakers had tried to discredit the proposals of the USSR as well as its foreign policy. The United States representative had stated (377th meeting) that the proposals had been submitted at the very time when the USSR had incited armed aggression. Such an irresponsible and provocative statement was absolutely unsubstantiated. By contrast, the evidence of United States aggression in Korea submitted to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the First Committee, had not been refuted. The Anglo-American bloc had even refused to hear the representatives of North Korea which would have been a right and proper step to take.

The organizers of aggression in Korea had violated Japan's post-war status by using Japanese troops for their schemes. In that connexion, the USSR delegation supported the justified protest made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Korea on 14 October 1950, which had been circulated as a document (S/1849) to Members of the United Nations. As Mr. Austin was unable to rebut the charge that the United States had committed an act of aggression against North Korea, he had insinuated that Generalissimo Stalin's telegram of 12 October 1950 to the Prime Minister of North Korea proved that the USSR had set itself up as the supporter of the aggressor. Irrefutable facts showed that the allegations of the United States representative were slanderous and hypocritical.

3. Some representatives had claimed that the General Assembly had already adopted a resolution (110 (II)), on 3 November 1947, the contents of which were similar to that of paragraph 1 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution, and that the proposal contained in that paragraph was therefore unnecessary. That was incorrect. Although the resolution adopted in 1947 referred to the condemnation of war propaganda it had been inadequate and had, indeed, never been respected. The United States' Press continued to suggest that war against the USSR and the people's democracies was necessary. In those circumstances, the 1947 resolution ought to be supplemented by a clause under which persons responsible for war propaganda would be liable to penalties. That was one of the aims of the new USSR proposal.

4. The United States representative (377th meeting), as well as the representatives of the United Kingdom (376th meeting) and Australia (374th meeting) had alleged that the USSR had failed to give effect to the General Assembly resolution of 3 November 1947, in that, immediately after its adoption, the USSR had aroused in its people an unprecedented enmity against the Western world. But surely it was not being argued that it was unlawful to comment on the respect exhibited by the West for slavery and capitalist culture

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

and surely it was not forbidden to discuss the gangster-worship of the United States' Press and cinema, with its baneful influence on youth. It was strange that Mr. Austin did not understand that such a critical attitude towards Western culture had no connexion with war propaganda. Worship of foreign culture obviously prevented the development of national culture, and only a critical attitude towards foreign civilizations would lead to the development of national culture and thus contribute to the spiritual development of world culture. It was absurd to claim that the development of national culture was a hostile act towards foreign peoples.

5. In 1947 the USSR delegation had exposed the war-mongers and had submitted a draft resolution which had been adopted over the strong protests of the United States representative. In view of the present expansion of war propaganda in a measure which was dangerous to peace, there was fresh need to confirm and strengthen the General Assembly resolution of 3 November 1947 on the lines indicated by paragraph 1 of the operative part of the new USSR draft resolution. The representatives of the United States and Australia had said that the actions of the Soviet Union belied their repeated peace proposals. But that was a similar charge to the one brought by Mr. Austin against the national culture of the Soviet Union. Anybody who took the trouble to look around would soon see in which camp the war-mongers were to be found.

6. Mr. Vyshinsky then referred to a statement made by Mr. Walsh, member of the Armed Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives, who had not hesitated to say that the time would come when the United States would drown the USSR in a flood of atomic bombs. Then again, Mr. Nance, President of the University of Tampa, Florida, was of the opinion that preparations should be made for total war, to be waged according to the law of the jungle, in which poison gas, atomic weapons, bacteriological warfare and intercontinental rockets would be employed and neither churches nor hospitals nor universities would be spared. Mr. Cannon, Chairman of the House of Representatives' Appropriations Committee, also favoured an atomic attack, apparently forgetting that bombs would be answered by bombs. Lastly, Mr. Carey, Secretary of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), expressed the view that in a future war the United States would be allied with the fascists against the communists. It might be thought that all those statements came from fools or madmen were it not known, unfortunately, that the United States had already placed fascist generals in charge of Western Germany in order to crush the communists. It was clear that the United Nations could not maintain its dignity and its prestige if it did not raise its powerful voice against such war-mongering.

7. Mr. Spender, the Australian representative, had claimed that at the conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Moscow in 1947, the USSR had not wished to reach agreement with the other States. Presumably Mr. Spender was unaware, or pretended to be unaware, of the fact that it was precisely at that conference that important agreement had been unanimously reached on the basis of Anglo-American proposals regarding the political, economic, financial and legal unity of Germany, the extension of the powers of the Central German Government and the measures to be taken to de-

nazify and demilitarize the country. Mr. Spender had also forgotten that it was after that conference that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had caused the dismemberment of Germany in order to use the Western zone for aggressive purposes.

8. Mr. Spender had also made a slanderous statement against the USSR in connexion with Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade and the Austrian treaty. Mr. Siroky (378th meeting) had already refuted those libels in so far as Czechoslovakia was concerned. With regard to the Berlin question, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that, in Paris in 1948, the USSR had agreed to the solution proposed by the six non-permanent members of the Security Council, under the presidency of Mr. Bramuglia, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine, but that United States pressure, which had again been noticeable in connexion with the question of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had been brought to bear on the representatives of the six Powers and it had been impossible to reach an agreement in spite of the efforts made by the Soviet Union.

9. The conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Paris in May-June 1949 had, contrary to Mr. Spender's assertions, reached conclusions on a considerable number of important questions concerning Germany and Austria. The conference had settled a series of measures which should have been applied by all in good faith. But neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had desired at that time to settle the Berlin question; in fact, it was then that a railwaymen's strike had broken out in Berlin, backed by Anglo-American money. Thus, in 1947, 1948 and 1949, the USSR had tried to find a basis for agreement and therefore the USSR could not honestly be accused of not pursuing a peaceful policy and of following, as Mr. Spender wrongly claimed, a few proposals adopted by communist organizations at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928.

10. With regard to the Austrian treaty, an agreement had been reached, despite many difficulties, at the conference of Foreign Ministers held in Paris in 1949. A *communiqué* which had been unanimously adopted by the four Powers had laid down the measures to be taken. Nevertheless, the question was still outstanding, because, in the Western zone, denazification had not been carried out. The Austrian Government itself included some former fascists, and in addition, the country was being steadily remilitarized. Moreover, the example of the Italian Peace Treaty was hardly encouraging. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had not respected that Treaty's provisions relating to the Free Territory of Trieste and the appointment of a Governor. All the candidates nominated by the USSR for the post of Governor, even those who, at one time, had been proposed by the Anglo-American bloc, had been rejected by the majority of the Security Council members, doubtless so that the Anglo-American troops should not have to be withdrawn. There was accordingly no guarantee that the Western Powers would not act similarly in regard to Austria. It was for that reason that the USSR representative at the conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers on Austria had requested in September 1950 that, be-

fore new agreements were concluded, the problem of Trieste should be settled and the decision put into effect.

11. At the Paris conference in 1949, the USSR delegation had proposed that the question of concluding a peace treaty with Japan should be considered. The icy silence with which that proposal had been greeted clearly showed that it was not the USSR which should be accused of not respecting its obligations.

12. Moreover, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, in rejecting paragraph 1 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution, made no reference to paragraph 2, which provided for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control. Mr. Austin (277th meeting) confined himself to a statement that the United States plan contained effective safeguards.

13. Under the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan all atomic resources, all atomic energy undertakings, key undertakings in the atomic industry which were the foundation of the chemical and metallurgical industries and scientific research work were to be transferred, in their entirety, to the so-called international control commission. It was true, that, according to that plan, States possessing atomic energy would retain the right to use that energy for so-called non-dangerous purposes. But it was laid down that the commission would decide what was dangerous and what was not; it would also determine the quantity of atomic energy that each State might use for peaceful purposes. Hence, the international control body would utilize and distribute atomic materials at its discretion.

14. No great erudition was required to realize that that was tantamount to preventing all independent utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Under the United States plan, atomic energy was to be distributed in proportion to the national resources in that field, which meant, *inter alia*, that the USSR which, owing to the inadequacy of its other sources of energy needed the help of atomic energy more than the United States for the development of its peace-time industries, would be limited to a quantity less than its actual needs. Thus, the international control body might be able artificially to retard the economic development of a country. That was exactly what was implied in the report of the American Committee on Social and Political Implications of Atomic Energy, the chairman of which was Professor James Frank, published on 1 May 1946 in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and later submitted to the United States Secretary of War. According to that report, to limit the use of atomic energy by fixing uranium quotas would make it impossible to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. That being so, a plan which would be harmful to a country's economy and prevent the raising of the standard of living of its people was quite unacceptable.

15. The aim of the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan was to make it possible to utilize atomic energy for military purposes, in the exclusive interest of the United States monopolies in their aspirations to hegemony. Obviously, the only serious obstacle to that policy was the maintenance of the principle of sovereignty. Contrary to what had been stated, the idea of national sovereignty was neither mediaeval nor obsolete.

It was, in the final analysis, the only real safeguard of the independence of peoples and States.

16. Those supporting the United States' control plan had asserted that the control body would be international in character and composed of competent men. It would be the majority, however, who would determine that competence. Furthermore, it was stated that recruitment should, whenever possible, be carried out on the basis of equitable geographical representation and, of course, the majority could always say that that was not possible.

17. Whereas the function of such an international control body should be to ensure that atomic energy should not be used for military purposes, the United States plan contemplated that it would take over all atomic energy and everything related to it. The plan betrayed the expansionist intentions of its sponsors—intentions which were at the root of their campaign against the sovereignty of States. Mr. Younger, United Kingdom representative, argued that the USSR should not champion a rigid sovereignty. It was a fact that any international agreement involved a limitation of sovereignty, but the real issue was how far it was possible to go in that direction. In any case, it could not go so far as to reduce sovereignty to naught, as the United States delegation would like to do.

18. Mr. Austin asserted that the proposals contained in the USSR draft resolution were devoid of meaning, but he had not put forward any arguments in support of his contention. What was certain was that neither the United States plan nor the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597) provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The six-Power draft resolution was simply to the effect that each nation should accept international control of atomic energy by the United Nations, as contemplated by the General Assembly. It did not prohibit the use of the atomic weapon; it merely said that measures to that end should be taken. But, in reality, for the past three years no effective measures had been taken. If effective prohibition was wanted, it should first be so ordered.

19. There had been a time when the USSR had considered that the prohibition of the atomic weapon should be preceded by a control system. It was then objected that prohibition without a control system was dangerous. The USSR, realizing that the objection was partly justified, had then made a step forward and had admitted that the control system and the prohibition should enter into force simultaneously. The majority had at once retreated and had alleged that the establishment of control should precede the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. In the circumstances, the intentions of the majority became suspect; it was obvious that the majority had no intention of prohibiting the production of atomic weapons.

20. It was impossible not to entertain some doubts concerning the sincerity of the authors of the United States plan, in view of the letter of 16 March 1946, signed by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Vannevar Bush, Mr. James B. Conant, Mr. McCloy and General Groves, consultants to the State Department working under a committee on atomic energy, which said that the United States would not cease the production of atomic bombs, even if the international control body were set up, or rather,



that the prohibition would not come into force until decreed by the United States Government, in the light of the international situation, in accordance with constitutional procedure, which came to exactly the same thing. International control would be stultified if the United States declared in advance that it would not submit to control until it saw fit to do so. Any reference to international control under those conditions was idle talk.

21. The United States representative had also opposed the principle of periodic inspections contemplated by the USSR plan. Detailed plans had been submitted by the USSR delegation on 11 August and 5 September 1947.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in his statement of 23 October 1950 (372nd meeting), the USSR representative had given additional explanations which indicated that a satisfactory solution to that problem could be found.

22. Mr. Spender's knowledge of atomic matters notwithstanding, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that an Australian scientist, Professor Oliphant had stated that it would be difficult to find any justification whatsoever for the use of the atomic bomb; its use, from a moral point of view, constituted a crime. The American Physical Society, at its meeting in Colombia University declared that no State had the right to use the atomic weapon since it was not a weapon of war but a method of mass destruction, which was incompatible with the principles and ethics of Christian civilization. Furthermore, Mr. G. Bailey, the Director of the British National Peace Council, considered that control of atomic energy could only be carried out on the basis of the USSR proposals. The secretary of the Atomic Scientists Association of Great Britain, had stated that, contrary to the general belief, the USSR proposals would result in the prohibition of atomic weapons and would ensure the establishment of effective international control.

23. The truth in regard to atomic energy was simple and there could be no two opinions on the respective value of the proposals that had been submitted. Truth could not be judged by the votes of members; the vote of the peoples of the world would constitute the judgment of history. That vote would be cast in favour of the USSR proposal, which prohibited the use of atomic energy for military purposes and which served to promote its development for peaceful ends.

24. Among the objections raised by some representatives to the proposals contained in the USSR draft resolution on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, was the allegation that the signatories of the Stockholm Peace Appeal had been tricked. The truth of the matter was that those men and women refused to be regarded as cannon fodder and that neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the Committee on Un-American Activities nor third-degree methods could break the spirit of those who, in their fight for peace and against war-mongers, were assured of final victory. The bitterness of the language used showed in itself that the blow had struck home.

25. Then it was childishly argued that tanks, and not atomic bombs, were the most fearful weapons. If that were so, the persons who held that view should logically

propose a ban on tanks. The USSR had always proposed the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction and all "blind" weapons, such as the atomic bomb, which caused indiscriminate destruction and above all threatened civilian populations. Tanks were covered by another provision in the USSR draft resolution; that idea however did not meet with the approval of the majority either, which said that a balance of forces had to be established first and that the defence potential of the North Atlantic Powers should not be prejudiced, forgetting that the USSR proposal was concerned with the five great Powers, and not with the other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Anglo-American bloc was seeking to obtain a crushing superiority, under the pretext of the balance of power, as Hitler had done in the past. The emulators of Hitler should never forget that it was he who finally was crushed.

26. Mr. Spender, in particular, had distorted the meaning of one of the arguments used by the USSR delegation, which had been based on a comparison between the budgets of one country at different times, and not on a comparison between the budgets of different countries. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Baranovsky (379th meeting) had clearly shown that the military budgets of the Truman Government were higher than those of his thirty-two predecessors. By contrast, it was a fact that the USSR military budget, duly examined by the legislature, represented 32.6, 23.6, 19.6 and 18.5 per cent of the budget in 1940, 1946, 1949 and 1950, respectively. Those facts completely answered Mr. Spender who had said that he did not know what the armed forces of the Soviet Union were but had asserted that their might was terrifying.

27. Guesswork was unnecessary in the case of the United States, since Mr. Truman himself had stated, in presenting in 1949 the 1950 budget, that it exceeded all peace-time records. That was easy to believe, especially in view of the fact that since that time the expenditure on armaments had tripled and the pre-war figures now had to be multiplied by fifty. United States experts themselves stated that their country was carrying on a race for atomic armaments—which explained certain cynical threats—that they now had an atom bomb which was lighter but more powerful than that which had been used against Japan, and that their navy, air force and shipbuilding potential were the greatest in the world. Mr. Vyshinsky suggested that the military strength described was not so low that it could not be reduced by one-third. Yet, the USSR was accused of having four million men under arms and of refusing to furnish any military information.

28. Under the suggestion made by the Syrian representative (376th meeting) the requirements of each State would be the determining factor. If that proposal were adopted, Mr. Vyshinsky wondered if the requirements would be determined by length of frontiers, and, if so, if the frontiers of the United States would be regarded as extending to Kyu-Shu and Taiwan (Formosa) and hence if an army of at least nine million men would be needed by the United States. Obviously, the same principles could not be applied to the navy, air force and land armies and, naturally, any disarmament plan presupposed technical studies. The USSR was fully aware of that, and if the Western Powers wished to obtain information on the forces of the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Third Year, Special Supplement*, pages 25 and 27.



Union, they would be better advised, instead of resorting to espionage, to accept the USSR principle of a one-third reduction of all armaments, for, having thus proved that their thirst for information was not prompted by base motives, the USSR solemnly undertook to supply any information which might be desired and to extend every facility for detailed verification. Such a constructive attitude was more valuable than all the verbal attacks against the Stockholm Peace Appeal, the levity of the Netherlands representative (375th meeting), who had tried to introduce an atmosphere into the First Committee more in keeping with a fair-ground, of the supreme absurdity of combining loud boasts of United States military might with a peevish refusal to accept a proposal which would deprive the North Atlantic army of its powers of defence.

29. The fact that the aggressive policy of United States ruling circles was in full swing was clearly proved by data relating not only to armaments and military appropriations, but also to strategic bases. There were, for instance, the 99-year leases granted by the Philippines in 1947, bases acquired in Taiwan (Formosa), in contravention of international law—for only the legitimate Government of China could confer any authority over part of its national territory—bases at Okinawa and Surabaya, Spanish and Portuguese bases, bases in the Middle East, Atlantic bases and Arctic bases, the purpose of which, according to the plans drawn up by General Spaatz in 1947, was to attack USSR centres by using the shortest routes.

30. In order to divert attention from those aggressive plans, certain delegations had resorted to interpretations which revealed either great malice or incredible ignorance. Mr. Austin, for example, had referred (377th meeting) to a two-year old article in the USSR *Literary Gazette* and to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, held twenty-two years ago, in his attempt to prove that the USSR press was preaching war and that the doctrine of the régime made no distinction between a state of war and a state of peace. Even apart from the fact that neither articles in the *Literary Gazette* nor the activities of the Comintern committed the USSR it was surprising that Mr. Austin should quote such old texts and should dig up arguments which had already been put forward in the Committee on 12 October 1948 (157th meeting).

31. Mr. Austin had also quoted (377th meeting) a speech made by Generalissimo Stalin, on 9 February 1946, but that had served him no better: relying on secretaries, he had drawn conclusions which in no way resembled those of the author. Generalissimo Stalin had recalled the Leninist principle of the unjust war and the just war; a just war was a war waged by a people against foreign aggression or capitalist slavery, or, in the case of a country under colonial rule, for its liberation. Thus, in the past, the northern states of the United States had struggled against the slave-owning South, and thus, on 6 November 1941, when the Hitlerites were thirty kilometres from Moscow and were prepared to launch a new attack, Stalin condemned fascist aggression and, welcoming the great Anglo-American-Soviet coalition, recalled the Leninist distinction between wars of aggression and wars of liberation. In the case of a liberating war, only a traitor could shirk his duty by pleading the horrors of war, as was the case of

the pseudo-pacificists whom Stalin censured in his letter to Maxim Gorki in 1930. The Soviet Union people, on the contrary, when fighting against aggression, had shed their blood for their own liberty and for that of so many of the peoples which were now represented in the United Nations. Only a person devoid of all culture could fail to understand the Leninist concept of the just war; the concept was also embodied in the Charter, which required the United Nations to take up arms if need arose in the name of the sacred principle of legitimate defence against an invader, a conqueror or an aggressor.

32. Mr. Austin had been guilty of another misrepresentation when he alleged that Stalin had declared, on 9 February 1946, that the Second World War had been due to the monopolistic capitalist system of the West, and that the speech had marked the cessation of the former policy of co-operation with the Allies. While it was true that all wars were the inevitable result of disputes and discords between capitalist countries, and that the initial phase of the last war was not entirely independent of that origin, Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946 was intended precisely to show that generally speaking the Second World War, unlike the first, had assumed the character of an anti-fascist, liberating war for the restoration of the democratic freedoms destroyed in certain countries, and that the entry of the Soviet Union in the fight had naturally only strengthened that character. Stalin had clearly stated in his speech that, based on the war of liberation against the fascist invader, an anti-fascist coalition had been built which was finally to overwhelm the Axis; and he had explained that while the war did originate from internal quarrels between capitalist States, the task, in view of the destruction of bourgeois democratic freedoms combined with barbarous aggression, had been to band together in an anti-fascist war of liberation.

33. It was therefore a falsification of history to allege that the speech of 9 February 1946 had attributed all responsibility for the war to the Western Powers and that it represented a turn in international politics and the rejection by the Soviet Union of the policy of friendly co-operation with its war-time allies.

34. For lack of valid objections, the only arguments which members had been able to oppose to the peace pact proposed in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution was that it was all included in the Charter. Yet, the six-Power draft resolution and the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596) were open to the same objections. Actually, however, the fact that a certain provision was contained in the Charter did not mean that it needed no reaffirmation. With regard to the actual substance of the proposals which involved the five Powers, it was undeniable that the unleashing of war or the strengthening of peace depended on those Powers. While, therefore, it was true that the smallest countries had made a very valuable contribution in the recent conflict, the great Powers had very special responsibilities.

35. Nothing stood in the way of the adoption of measures for the restoration of confidence. Once that had been done, the peoples, noting that for all their differences the great Powers had agreed not to attack each other, would be able to sleep in peace, free from the nightmare of the atomic bomb.

36. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that, serving for the first time on the United States delegation, he had reacted as any American citizen would have done. It was one thing to read in the summary records of the meetings that he belonged to a country dominated by capitalists and criminal warmongers and another to hear it said, particularly when twenty-five years' experience as a journalist and a politician had provided him with convincing proof of the emptiness of those accusations.

37. The statements made by USSR representatives were remarkable in many respects, and particularly for their singular habit of heaping insults on the United States while proclaiming the intention of reaching an understanding with that country.

38. It was meaningless to allege that the United States foreign policy was based on force when it was remembered that in 1945 the United States had not only demobilized but actually disintegrated its armed forces, thus facilitating an extent of territorial expansion by the Soviet Union which had no precedent in history.

39. The accusation that the United Nations forces in Korea included Japanese units were utterly unfounded. Nor was there any truth at all in the reference to atomic horrors made by the Soviet-Polish chorus, for they had omitted all mention of soldiers impaled on enemy bayonets or crushed by tanks, sailors whose ships were sunk by submarine attacks or the horrors of concentration camps and slavery which prevailed in a police State.

40. Just as idle and deceptive—as statistics so easily could be—were figures adduced concerning United States military appropriations, when those figures related only to the federal budget, and not to the *per capita* income of the population. The truth was that the military expenditure of the United States and of the Soviet Union were respectively 5 per cent and 14 per cent of the *per capita* income of the population. Even if the military preparations by the Western Powers reached a much higher level than had been anticipated, they would never constitute an aggressive threat to the Soviet Union.

41. The USSR representatives had alleged that the Berlin railway strike of May and June 1949 had been inspired by the United States. If that incident were investigated, its cause would be found to be the fact that the 16,000 strikers could not continue to live in the Western zone while being paid in East German marks. It was quite natural, of course, that the Soviet Union, which prohibited strikes, should have attributed all responsibility for that strike to the United States, which had in fact helped to reach a solution of the dispute by proposing a formula which guaranteed to the workers payment in West German marks.

42. Another case in which the allegations of certain delegations were diametrically opposed to the truth was the reference to the attitude of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America to the Stockholm Peace Appeal. Mr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, a spokesman of that organization, had in fact said that the Council had officially declared the Stockholm Peace Appeal to be a propaganda manoeuvre rather than a genuine peace proposal.

43. The representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland had alleged that the United States was monopolistic, whereas in fact its economic foundation was based on competition and all monopolies were illegal. Although certain Americans, following a quite natural human tendency, tried to eliminate competition, that was illegal and punishable by law, under an economic system which was "competitive" rather than "capitalistic".

44. The United States had its good and its bad points, but what counted was its incessant struggle for advancement which had already borne fruit.

45. If certain delegations were composed only of liars and cynics, their statements could be dismissed as deliberate distortions of the truths; but it seemed that those representatives actually believed what they were saying. The other day a Polish representative had triumphantly flourished an American magazine on which he had based his case. In Poland no articles appeared without the permission of the government, but in the United States the owner of a newspaper, its editor-in-chief and the author of an article each had his own opinion, which often differed from that of the reader.

46. The representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, *Politburo* countries where power was concentrated in the hands of a dozen men, made the same mistake when they were unable to understand that in the United States power was not centralized and no one dominated the country.

47. Whether the fear of some delegations arose from their own false idea of the West or whether they were afraid of their own people, that fear could only be a bad counsellor. When Mr. Molotov had stayed with Mr. Churchill, he had kept his revolver in his bedroom. The leaders of the free peoples, on the contrary, although fear was not always unknown to them, refused to take it as their guide.

48. The policy of the Soviet Union, the adoption of which would be fatal to the world, was equally bad for its own nationals. Everyone needed friends, but the USSR Government, although it might sometimes derive a certain tactical advantage from the mystery surrounding its decisions, had discouraged by its rebuffs many delegations which, in the sincerity of their idealism, would have been glad to come to some working agreement with the people of the Soviet Union.

49. It was possible that the tactics of the Soviet Union were to remain in the United Nations in order to undermine the Organization to the advantage of another type of world government. However, the predominating impression was a mixture of conspiracy and childishness which might serve the interests of the ruling classes but would in the end inevitably prove harmful to the peoples of the Soviet Union and of other countries under similar conditions.

50. Mr. Lodge was confident that the present situation would not last much longer, for the peoples of the free world, now aroused, would in a peaceful and orderly way, create, in a few years, a world in which disputes would be settled by negotiation rather than by the use of force.

51. The day would come, it was hoped, when religion in the Soviet Union would no longer be oppressed, when the peoples of that country would be able to use their creative energies freely and communicate with the other peoples of the world, and when the rest of Europe would cease to be terrorized by the armed might of the USSR.

52. There was no need for governments to be afraid, for the United States had not sought out the position of a great Power, which had been thrust upon it, and would only use that power to co-operate with the other peace-loving nations in the establishment of permanent peace. The people of the United States, whose ancestors had fled from tyranny would, in spite of the dictators, bring to mankind relief from its sufferings.

53. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands) was glad of the opportunity afforded by the widening of the scope of the discussion to discuss the question from a new angle. The Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/598) deserved careful consideration.

54. In accordance with the wishes of several delegations, conversations had taken place between the delegations of the six Powers and the delegation of Bolivia, which had pointed out several gaps in the draft resolution (A/C.1/597) and had shown a most praiseworthy spirit of co-operation. Subsequently the two texts had been merged, and the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/597/Rev.1) would be submitted in the name of seven delegations, Bolivia being now among its sponsors.

55. In the new text, the third paragraph in the preamble would read: "*Condemning* the intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of forcibly changing its legally established government". That paragraph was taken from the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596), of which it had been one of the essential points.

56. The fourth paragraph of the preamble, which replaced the original third paragraph of document A/C.1/597, instead of beginning with the words "*Solemnly* reaffirming . . ." would start with "*Solemnly* reaffirms . . .". In the same paragraph, the words "in the interests of a foreign Power" would be added in order to make clear the meaning of the words "fomenting civil strife".

57. The sponsors of the revised draft resolution had also felt that the shortest possible title would be the best and had agreed on the words "Peace through deeds".

58. The Netherlands delegation appealed to all the members of the First Committee to keep in mind that their discussions were held for the benefit of the whole world. It was important to make the stand of the United Nations on peace and aggression very clear and to avoid excessive reference to previous resolutions or using confused language; they should speak out clearly and simply.

59. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico) said that he would examine certain aspects of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597) which did not appear in the other texts before the Committee.

60. The agenda item under consideration had already been partly examined during the discussion of "United action for peace" and the First Committee had adopted two draft resolutions (A/C.1/596/Rev.1 and A/C.1/585/Rev.2) which provided a partial solution to the problem.

61. International aggression, which was the gravest threat to peace, was the most violent manifestation of a State's interference in affairs which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of another State and the most flagrant violation of the right of peoples to self-determination.

62. Now that the First Committee had before it the item relating to the threat of a new war, it should face the danger caused by the growing tendency of some governments to violate, as others had done in the past, the sacred principle of the territorial integrity and political independence of other States.

63. Mexico had always protested against such acts wherever they were committed and had elevated to a legal and political principle the maxim of Juarez, "Peace is respect for the rights of others". When aggression had been committed against Ethiopia, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Mexico had condemned the imperialist expansionism of the guilty régimes.

64. Through its domestic legislation Mexico also prohibited interventionism. Under an article introduced in the Mexican Penal Code in November 1941, a sentence of imprisonment would be imposed on any Mexican or alien who carried out any form of political propaganda among aliens or Mexicans by disseminating theories, programmes or directives emanating from foreign governments and likely to disturb public order or affect the sovereignty of the State.

65. In the Pan-American system, respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of other States and non-intervention were basic and inseparable principles.

66. The Mexican delegation therefore was gratified to see those obligations, already laid down in the Charter, reaffirmed in the six-Power draft resolution, now combined with that of Bolivia. Thus, if all Members remembered the obligations they had contracted on signing the Charter, the United Nations would be able to achieve its objective.

67. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the list of speakers was closed.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.