



**Monday, 23 November 1953,  
at 10.30 a.m.**

**New York**

**C O N T E N T S**

Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations (*continued*).... 249

**Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).**

**Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations (A/2485/Rev.1 and A/2485/Add.1) (*continued*)**

[Item 73]\*

1. Mr. ROBLES TOLEDANO (Dominican Republic) said that the armaments race and the increased danger of war had been brought about by the mutual fears which existed between the great Powers. In order to increase the juridical security of States, men had felt that measures should be taken to achieve disarmament and that the old adage *si vis pacem, para bellum* should be replaced by another: *si vis pacem, para pacem*. But it was clear that peace depended not only on material but also on spiritual disarmament. The failure of all attempts to achieve disarmament must be attributed to the régime existing in the Soviet Union, which was based on armed might and the will to dominate. In the USSR and the satellite countries, particularly Poland, persons professing the Catholic religion were daily subjected to persecution. Such coercive methods had been condemned by President Trujillo and President Eisenhower, and also by Mr. John Foster Dulles who, in the General Assembly (434th plenary meeting), had expressed the hope that the Soviet leaders would, before it was too late, recognize that love of country and the sense of human dignity always survived.

2. If peace was to be strengthened, the worship of force for purposes of domination must be eliminated.

3. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) said that before international tension could be reduced, States must give evidence of mutual goodwill. The USSR had always endeavoured to strengthen international peace and security, to prevent war and to settle international disputes by peaceful methods. However, the rulers of the Western Powers, particularly the United States, refused to co-operate in the reduction of international tension and continued to promote the armaments race, to build up aggressive military alliances and to extend their network of military bases. On 16 April 1953 President Eisenhower had alleged that the United States was prepared to play its part in the reduction

of international tension. But United States policy was in flagrant contradiction to that statement.

4. It was regrettable that at a time when an armistice had been concluded in Korea, the ruling circles of the United States should be seeking to prevent the peaceful settlement of international problems by such actions as the denial of the right of the People's Republic of China to be represented in the United Nations. As had been pointed out by some western European newspapers, the unrealistic nature of United States policy was due to the fact that certain circles in the United States feared a reduction in international tension and a strengthening of peace.

5. By contrast, Mr. Molotov, the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, had stated on 13 November that the Soviet Union believed the convening of a conference of foreign ministers might contribute to a reduction of international tension. He had thus refuted the falsehood contained in the note of 16 November of the three western Powers, to the effect that the USSR had taken a negative position towards such a conference.

6. The calling of a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the five Powers would certainly be a step favourable to the development of peace and security. But there were circles which wished to prevent such a conference and were imposing unacceptable preliminary conditions in order to lay the blame for failure on the Soviet Union.

7. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/2485/Rev.1) would make it possible to put an end to the armaments race and the cold war and would promote the re-establishment of normal relations between States. In order to achieve that end it was obviously necessary that the parties concerned should give proof of goodwill. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, however, made constant allegations concerning a threat from the Soviet Union, which they used as a pretext for refusing to consider the USSR proposals, for continuing their propaganda of hatred and justifying their enormous expenditure on armaments. Thus the *U.S. News & World Report* of 2 October 1953 had contained a statement to the effect that if people were frightened enough, they would be unlikely to object to paying heavier taxes. It was well known that such a campaign of fear was being actively pursued in the United States, and that air-raid practices were held daily. Yet the western military authorities had themselves admitted that the USSR was not engaged in war preparations and that an attack from that quarter appeared unlikely. The peoples of the world knew that the USSR was pursuing a policy of peace and had no aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, the United States was organizing espionage groups in the peoples' democracies, and through the "Voice of America" and

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

"Free Europe" was guilty of direct interference in the domestic affairs of such States. Accordingly, the General Assembly, in the interests of peace, should endorse the USSR proposals condemning war propaganda.

8. It was known that between 1948 and 1952 the strength of the American armed forces had risen from 1,500,000 to 3,988,000 men. In the same period, the United States air force had been doubled and its navy more than doubled. With United States assistance, the armed forces of the western Powers had been increased considerably and had reached a strength of 3,300,000 men. The United States was spending 74 per cent of its budget for military purposes, the United Kingdom 42 per cent and France 37 per cent. It was thus plain that the armaments race had reached gigantic proportions in the western countries, to the detriment of the peoples' standard of living. Furthermore, weapons of mass destruction were becoming more and more terrible. It was therefore indispensable that the General Assembly should take practical steps for the prohibition of such weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

9. At previous sessions the USSR had already proposed measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, in conjunction with strict international control of that prohibition. But the ruling circles of the United States had opposed the prohibition of atomic weapons and as early as 1946 had presented proposals inspired by the celebrated Baruch plan. That plan was designed to place international control of the atomic weapon in the hands of the United States, to the prejudice of the economic independence and sovereignty of other States. The author of the plan himself had said that the United States could not agree to the Soviet proposal for a convention prohibiting the use of the atomic weapon, and had added that the United States should oppose any measure which would include atomic energy in the plans for general disarmament. If the United States continued to advocate the Baruch plan and to reject the realistic proposals submitted by the USSR, it must be concluded that United States policy was opposed to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and therefore constituted a serious threat to the peace.

10. As the newspaper *Le Monde* had noted on 3 April 1953, there was a war party in the United States that preferred atomic disaster to any *modus vivendi* necessitating concessions. Thus Senator Styles Bridges had even gone so far as to say that if atomic weapons could save a single American life, they should be used. General Van Fleet also had stated that atomic weapons should be used in Korea if the armistice conditions were not observed. Thus the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction was a matter of urgency if a new war was to be prevented.

11. The United States had placed another serious obstacle in the way of any restoration of international confidence by spreading its network of military bases throughout the world, and in particular in the areas close to the USSR and the peoples' republics. In doing so it had undermined the independence of States on whose territory those bases were situated and had added to the possible causes of war. There were American soldiers in almost every western country;

a force of 1,500,000 American soldiers was stationed abroad for an indefinite period, and of this number 500,000 were in Europe.

12. The establishment of the network of bases referred to had nothing to do with the defence of the NATO States. The bases were being developed purely for aggression against the USSR and the peoples' republics. Thus the *New York Herald Tribune* of 14 July 1953 had reported that the United States Secretary of the Air Force had expressed his satisfaction with the present chain of air bases, which stretched from Japan to Scandinavia and would permit the American air force to drop atom bombs on any country. The military bases the United States had acquired in Spain, in full agreement with the fascist government of that country, were further proof of the aggressive nature of United States policy. The Greek representative had claimed (671st meeting) that the agreement between his country and the United States, granting the latter air and naval bases, was in conformity with Article 52 of the Charter. Article 52 referred to regional arrangements; but obviously NATO could not be regarded as regional in that sense, since it included States which were separated by the Atlantic Ocean or which were as distant from each other as Turkey from Norway. The Greek representative had cited the work of Goodrich and Hambro in support of his case, but it was common knowledge that those two authors had deliberately obscured the concept of regional arrangements.

13. The more evident the intention of the leaders of the United States to turn Western Germany into a new fortress threatening the peace of Europe became, the more clearly were the peoples of the States on whose territories United States bases were established manifesting their opposition to the construction of those bases.

14. The United States, United Kingdom and French Governments had proposed the calling of a conference of Foreign Ministers of the great Powers on the question of Germany, subject, however, to conditions which made it impossible for the conference to meet. It was clear that the western Powers were not interested in the unification of Germany in accordance with the standards of peace and democracy, as decided at Potsdam. The creation of the European Defence Community would make the unification of Germany impossible, and hence any negotiations by the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers would be doomed to failure so long as the three western Powers continued to be bound by their obligations towards the European Defence Community. At Potsdam the great Powers had undertaken not to tolerate any renaissance of German militarism, and had declared their intention to encourage the formation of a unified, peace-loving and democratic Germany. Yet the West was currently engaged in a policy of dividing and remilitarizing Germany.

15. It was a matter of vital importance to Germany's neighbours that that country should be a peace-loving and democratic State. Czechoslovakia could therefore not remain indifferent to the danger arising out of the western Powers' desire to rebuild a militarist and *revanchiste* Germany. The policy of the division of Germany was a threat to the peace of Europe. No people, least of all the German people, could tolerate such a situation.

16. On 14 October 1953, a conference had been held at Prague to seek a solution to the problem of a democratic and peaceful unification of Germany. The representatives of Czechoslovakia had confirmed that their Government wanted to live at peace with the German people, citing as evidence the co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. By contrast, Chancellor Adenauer, on his own admission, wanted to achieve the unification of Germany by force. The peoples of Europe were therefore observing with alarm the current attempts of the ruling circles of the United States to bring Western Germany into NATO. The remilitarization of Western Germany and the development of the network of military bases in Europe constituted threats to the peace and security of Europe.

17. The peoples of the world were following the discussions in the General Assembly and watching the sincere efforts made by the USSR and the peace-loving countries to put an end to the cold war and the armaments race and to restore normal relations between States. Accordingly, the USSR, in conformity with their wishes, had submitted a draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1) designed to avert the threat of a new war and to reduce international tension. It had been claimed by some that the USSR proposals were not new. In reply to that it needed merely be pointed out that the peoples were not looking for novelty but for peace, and that the USSR proposals corresponded to their interests. Their adoption by the United Nations would add to the authority of the Organization and would strengthen trust between nations. Accordingly, the Czechoslovak delegation supported them unreservedly.

18. Mr. LLÖYD (United Kingdom) said that the title of the item before the Committee was impressive, and that the USSR representative considered it the most important item on the agenda. He thought that might have been so had the USSR proposals contained any new plan for reducing international tension.

19. The United Kingdom delegation did not question the merits of the first paragraph of the preamble of the USSR draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1) and felt strongly that good use should be made of the situation created by the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

20. The ideas contained in the second paragraph of the preamble had been incorporated in the resolution on disarmament (A/C.1/L.88) adopted at the 669th meeting, in terms acceptable to the majority. The United Kingdom delegation preferred those terms to the ones used in the USSR proposal, although it did not think that there was much difference between them as to substance.

21. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part were virtually identical with the corresponding proposals which had been referred for study to the Disarmament Commission under resolution 504 (VI). The proposals were therefore still before the Commission. The adoption of the two paragraphs in question would have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing tension. Real progress might perhaps be made if the USSR would permit the Disarmament Commission to examine the problems involved in the establishment of strict international control of disarmament including the abolition of atomic weapons. So far the Disarmament Commission had not been able to begin the

discussion of the practical problems involved in the establishment of an international control organ.

22. Paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution seemed to go back on the wording of the fourth of the USSR amendments (A/C.1/L.75/Rev.3) submitted by the USSR during the debate on disarmament. That amendment seemed to be more flexible than the text now submitted by the USSR.

23. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union delegation would not press for a vote to be taken on texts practically identical with those which had already been rejected. If, however, a vote was taken, the United Kingdom delegation would have to vote against the paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part in question for the reasons which had already been explained.

24. As regards paragraph 3 of the operative part, the establishment by mutual agreement of military bases on the territory of an allied State could surely not undermine the sovereignty and independence of a State. The question whether such bases were a threat to peace depended upon the purpose for which they were built—whether they had been established for offensive or defensive purposes. The USSR seemed always to direct its propaganda against the type of armaments in which it was weaker or against facilities of which it had no need. That applied to the issue of military bases and also to the dissociation of atomic weapons from conventional weapons. The great land mass of the Soviet Union enabled it to move its forces in all directions for offensive as well as defensive purposes. The situation of the United Kingdom, with its small area, was entirely different; its security depended upon its having defensive facilities far from its own shores. The banning of bases in foreign countries would not harm the Soviet Union, but it would gravely impair the collective security of the free world. Accordingly, the United Kingdom delegation would vote against paragraph 3 of the operative part.

25. As regards paragraph 4 of the operative part, the United Kingdom fully agreed with the principle it set forth. The United Kingdom Press, which was free, sometimes abused that privilege. On the other hand, a government was not responsible for what was written in the Press, when the Press was free. However that might be, it would be a splendid thing if there were a return to more courteous manners in the Press and in international debates. But in the business of stopping vicious propaganda, example was better than precept. In his speech the USSR representative had clearly indicated that the expression "a number of countries" referred to the United Kingdom and its allies. That insinuation could not be accepted, and the United Kingdom delegation would therefore vote against that paragraph. In that connexion it should be recalled that resolution 110 (II) covered the matter, which had also been dealt with in resolutions 290 (IV) and 381 (V). There was nothing in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution which improved upon those previous General Assembly resolutions.

26. In his speech the USSR representative had spoken of his country's fears and suspicions. Mr. Lloyd sometimes felt, however, that the world would be nearer mutual understanding if the USSR acknowledged that similar fears and suspicions existed on the other side. As for relations between the United States



and the United Kingdom which, according to the USSR representative, were going from bad to worse, the fact was that the friendship and unity of purpose between the United States and United Kingdom Governments was as strong today as it had been in the past.

27. The concern expressed by the USSR representative at the food supply in the United Kingdom would be easily allayed if he visited the United Kingdom for a meeting of the proposed sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission. His concern was all the more surprising when it was recalled that rumours had reached the outside world of dissatisfaction in a certain country with an economy concentrated on heavy industry at the expense of agriculture.

28. The conference at Bermuda, which the USSR representative had also attacked, was not directed against anyone or any country; it was merely a normal and friendly meeting between the leaders of friendly States, and it was impossible to understand why the USSR should take umbrage at it. The United Kingdom had no objection to Mr. Mao Tse-tung's visiting Moscow to discuss matters with Mr. Malenkov.

29. So far, the General Assembly's eighth session had not made any real progress. But, while the situation had not improved it did not appear to have become worse; the balance had not been upset. Experience had shown that there was no simple solution to the problems facing the world. Hope must lie not in the adoption of high-sounding resolutions, but in painstaking and persevering work aimed at solving problems one by one and at courageously seeking new formulas, undaunted by failure or disappointment.

30. Mr. COTE (Canada) doubted whether the USSR accusation that international tension was caused by the western Powers was taken seriously even in the countries of the Soviet bloc.

31. Both the debate on disarmament and the recent debate on the easing of international tension had been the more discouraging because the USSR and the other members of the Soviet bloc had maintained their rigid attitude. While other representatives had shown an open mind in the attempt to find compromise solutions, the representatives of the Soviet bloc had merely repeated what they had been saying for years.

32. If the Soviet Government was genuinely interested in the relaxation of world tension and in progress towards the prohibition of the atomic weapon, it must deal with the substance of the question of safeguards and control, and not merely denounce the proposals of others. He hoped that when the Disarmament Commission met and when the private talks suggested by the Assembly took place, attempts at achieving a compromise would not be brushed aside contemptuously as they had been during the present debate.

33. The Communists' habit of distorting reality and their blindness to facts had been manifested when the USSR representative had stated that the armaments race was rapidly leading to inflation, and in the same breath had said that reactionary circles were forced to increase international tension for fear of a depression.

34. Communist society was incapable of understanding the spiritual values of other peoples, and therefore, perhaps unwittingly, had in recent years administered shocks to the rest of mankind which had contributed

not a little to increasing international tension. The Canadian Government found it difficult to believe that the USSR Government and those associated with it sincerely wished to reduce international tension when at the same time they encouraged religious persecution within their own borders. That was particularly the case in Poland, where there had been trials of high church dignitaries which had offended the western peoples' sense of justice. He mentioned those facts not in order to provoke an acrimonious debate but solely because he felt that Soviet leaders did not appreciate how other peoples judged their behaviour in such matters. One function of the Assembly should be to provide an opportunity for both sides to make it clear to each other what, in their opinion, increased international tension.

35. Mr. DOMINGUEZ CAMPORA (Uruguay) stressed that disarmament was contingent upon security, and that, without security, there could be no disarmament. Security was the crux of the question before the Committee; it was the guarantee of peace. But peace itself must be founded upon a legal order, which was born of freedom and must in turn be freedom's guardian. But freedom meant little to the starving. Hence the law must guarantee freedom without want and welfare without slavery. That was the situation in the western democracies, which tried to relieve human suffering by methods based on justice. Peace must be founded on the application of that legal order, both domestically and internationally. Those who attacked it and advocated violent solutions were plotting against peace.

36. Under the Charter, an Organization had been set up the purpose of which was to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the principle of collective security. The effectiveness of the system depended on the conduct and the goodwill of the Member States. Collective action by Members was taken for the purpose of upholding the law; it was directed against aggressors who, by violating the law, committed an international crime. As was clearly indicated in the documents of the San Francisco Conference, that concept excluded neutrality, which was incompatible with membership in the United Nations. Everything possible must be done, under the Charter, to broaden the scope of international law and to make the work of the United Nations more effective. Thus, in parts of the world where United Nations action was hampered by the vagueness of certain provisions of the Charter, that defect could quite justifiably be remedied by setting up regional institutions.

37. There was a certain tendency to allow the political aspects of some provision of the Charter to override legal provisions. Some countries deliberately tried to prevent all legal control by taking refuge in the thesis of national sovereignty, which enabled them to engage in activities that the Assembly would censure if it were able to discuss them. In some cases, the United Nations had thus been condemned to passivity and silence. In his delegation's view, no sphere was outside the scope of legal international control, whatever the arguments of those who invoked Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Whenever the question of domestic jurisdiction arose, it must be decided on the basis of international law. It was for the United Nations to decide whether a question was within the

domestic jurisdiction of a State or within the scope of international law. Acceptance of that principle by all Member States would strengthen the United Nations and peace by substituting for the thesis of absolute national sovereignty the doctrine of mutual respect and of the sovereignty of international law.

38. The misuse of the right of veto had, more than any other factor, contributed to subverting the international system. Where the interests of those who enjoyed that privilege were not in accord with those of the rest of the world, an international situation arose which was contrary to the principle of law. When it was exercised illegally, the veto paralysed the entire system of collective security. That was why Article 52 of the Charter, which enabled Member States to overcome those difficulties while adhering to the principles of the United Nations, had had to be invoked.

39. The basic factor in the present international situation was the dynamic doctrine and philosophy applied by a powerful State in the political field. In that doctrine and in that philosophy, violence, hatred and class struggle were regarded as an essential part of an historic evolution. Yet they were the negation of security and peace. As long as that doctrine, that philosophy and that policy prevailed, it would be impossible to bring about the desired atmosphere of international confidence and the cause of peace would hang in the balance.

40. Member States must, above all, remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the Charter and must apply

common sense as well as determination in the construction of a system of collective security. Violence was the great enemy. Force must be at the service of international law, and Member States must be the champions of justice and of human dignity in its highest sense.

41. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland), availing himself of his right of reply, denied the Dominican and Canadian representatives' accusation that his Government was guilty of religious persecution. No one was persecuted for his religious beliefs in Poland; the Polish Constitution granted absolute freedom of religion and safeguarded the observance of all religious practices. The State had aided in the reconstruction of churches destroyed during the war. The persons brought before the courts had been prosecuted solely because they had engaged in activities contrary to the interests of the State. Certain representatives of the church had engaged in such activities with the direct assistance of ruling circles of the United States and with the support of the Vatican. Moreover, their activities had been condemned by most believers and by the majority of the priesthood. The arguments used in that connexion by the representative of the Dominican Republic did nothing to advance the cause of disarmament.

42. The CHAIRMAN read out the list of speakers and stated that the next meeting would be held on Tuesday, 24 November, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.