



Friday, 11 November 1955,  
at 10.30 a.m.

**New York**

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**Chairman:** Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

**AGENDA ITEM 19**

**The Korean question (A/2641, A/2941 and Add.1, A/2947, A/C.1/769, A/C.1/L.144) (*continued*):**

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;**
- (b) Reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea;**
- (c) Problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war**

1. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) agreed with the view expressed by the Uruguayan representative (784th meeting) that the First Committee was not a court of law and was therefore under no legal obligation whatever to hear the other party. That did not, however, mean that North Korea had no opportunity, if it so wished, to make known its point of view, either directly or indirectly, to the First Committee, which would undoubtedly give it its careful consideration.

2. It might well be asked, moreover, to what extent North Korea actually was the other party. It had been the policy of that great Eurasian Power the USSR that had brought about the existing state of affairs. The USSR was now taking part in the discussions and would therefore be in a position to present the views of North Korea at the same time as it put forward its own.

3. In seeking a solution to the problem raised by the proposal that the representative of North Korea should be invited to attend the debates on the Korean question, the duties laid upon the United Nations by the Charter itself should be considered. Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter provided that the United Nations, as the representative of a universal system of law, was morally responsible for ensuring that States which were not Members of the United Nations acted in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as might be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

4. Furthermore, though Article 35, paragraph 2, could not be applied literally to the matter at issue, it nevertheless indicated that a State which was not a Member of the United Nations might be permitted to speak at the United Nations only if it had previously accepted the obligations arising out of the Charter. By virtue of the moral authority conferred upon it, the United Nations was entitled to ask North Korea to observe certain rules, but it would appear out of the question to invite its Government, which had disregarded the moral authority of the United Nations, to appear at the rostrum, without accepting any obligation, and to use it, as it undoubtedly would, for propaganda purposes. Moreover, a discussion on those lines would merely aggravate the situation and might harm the "spirit of Geneva".

5. Mr. ARENALES CATALAN (Guatemala) said, with reference to the statement made at the 784th meeting by the Indian representative, that while it was correct that the problem of the unification of Korea implied that there were two opposed parties, it was also true that it was the First Committee's duty at present to discuss, not the unification problem itself, but the policy that the General Assembly should adopt on the subject. Hence, it did not seem necessary to contemplate inviting a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at present. It might be that there would be some ground for an invitation of that kind in the future, when the question of reunification was under discussion.

6. On the other hand, South Korea, which was an ally of the United Nations, was entitled to certain privileges and to some consideration. The Guatemalan delegation would therefore support the proposal of the United States (784th meeting) to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea, but would oppose any motion to invite a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that connexion, he supported the statements made at the 784th meeting by certain delegations, including those of Peru, Iraq and Greece.

7. Mr. BLAUSTEIN (United States of America) pointed out that sub-item (a) of the agenda item had previously been the entire item, under which all aspects of the Korean question had so far been debated. The United States delegation considered that sub-items (b) and (c) were covered by sub-item (a), and assumed that they had been included in the agenda at the request of the Indian Government (A/2941 and Add.1) to show that Government's special concern with those two aspects of the Korean question. The United States had not been informed of the matters that the Indian delegation might wish to discuss in connexion with the operations of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, but many aspects of its operations were of vital importance for the Republic of Korea. If such matters were to be discussed under sub-item (b), the right of a representative of the Republic of Korea to state his Government's views should not be denied. The same applied to sub-item (c), which had also been pro-

posed by the Indian Government and which might give rise to a debate affecting the interests of the Republic of Korea.

8. It was out of the question to place the Republic of Korea, which had fought at the side of the United Nations, on an equal footing with North Korea, which, by its aggressive acts, had caused the loss of too many lives among the United Nations forces and which still continued to repudiate the Organization's authority.

9. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) regretted that the debate had taken a turn which did little to favour a settlement. It was unfortunate that the United States representative, in an attempt to stir up bad feelings and hatred, had used words like "aggressor", which dated back to the "cold war". Such an attitude showed that the United States delegation had not the slightest intention of helping to solve the problem under study.

10. The legal arguments adduced by the representative of Peru merely served to show how difficult he found it to justify his attitude. The Articles of the Charter he had quoted did not apply to the question at issue. In fact, nothing in the Charter or in the General Assembly's rules of procedure related to the invitation of non-member States to take part in Assembly debates.

11. There were however, certain precedents, for example, when the General Assembly had discussed the German elections and the Indonesian question. It was not only a legal principle but also a rule of fair play to hear both parties to a dispute. Moreover, to state that another country could be the spokesman of a Government which was not represented in the Committee was unacceptable. If that were so, it might be argued, for example, that the representative of Peru could also be the spokesman of South Korea. Such a procedure was obviously inconceivable.

12. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia) said that, as in previous years, his delegation would support the proposal to invite representatives of the two Korean Governments. An invitation to a Government to take part in such a discussion was not a reward for good conduct, but merely a measure designed to allow the Committee to understand the problem better. The representation of South and North Korea would not only be in conformity with the past practice of the United Nations, but also would be the logical consequence of the representation of North Korea in the political and military negotiations.

13. The belief that the United Nations would jeopardize its prestige was tantamount to admitting that the Korean problem could be solved only outside the Organization, at Panmunjom, Geneva or elsewhere. On the contrary, it was through the co-operation and agreement of the political representatives of the two Korean Governments that the United Nations could reach a satisfactory settlement. For that reason the Indonesian delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Syria (A/C.1/L.144) and amended by India (784th meeting).

14. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was somewhat at a loss to understand the arguments put forward by the Indian representative in support of his last amendment. The discussion was on the general item entitled "The Korean question". Certain representatives preferred perhaps to speak successively on each of the sub-items under that heading, while others would take them up simultaneously. When the draft resolutions came up for discussion, it was for the Committee to decide whether they should be ex-

amined separately or together. It seemed undesirable to prejudice that question by adopting the Indian amendment.

15. If the Committee decided to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea, he should be able to take part in the discussion, without right of vote, on all aspects of the problem. It would be unreasonable to restrict his rights.

16. For those and previously stated reasons, the United Kingdom delegation would vote in favour of the United States proposal, which set out the invitation in simple and unambiguous terms.

17. On the other hand, the wording of the Syrian draft resolution, quite apart from the dubious proposition that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be invited to attend the debate, contained several controversial points. The meaning of the phrase "parties concerned", for example, was not clear. It would not be feasible to amend the draft. It would be better to vote first on the simple and clear proposal of the United States; the United Kingdom would support that proposal and the United States motion for priority.

18. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was surprised that the representative of Peru should have stated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might send written communications, but could not be invited to state its views orally in the Committee. As Mr. Belaúnde had had no arguments in support of his thesis, he had confined himself to repeating that the representatives of North Korea would engage in propaganda. Of course, any statement by South Korea would have been quite another matter. Such an attitude was neither impartial nor calculated to enhance the prestige and authority of the Organization.

19. On the other hand, the unilateral consideration of the question would most certainly be harmful to the authority and prestige of the United Nations. The part of the Secretary-General's annual report (A/2911 and Corr.1) which dealt with the successes of the United Nations had refrained from including among them the fact that the representatives of North Korea had not been invited to participate in the debate on the Korean question. Indeed, the history of the question during the past few years had demonstrated that such an attitude had harmed the prestige of the Organization.

20. Mr. Belaúnde had also said that the USSR would speak for North Korea; that principle might be extended a long way, and any representative, for instance, the representative of the United States, might have been said to have made a statement on behalf of Peru.

21. The Charter conferred upon every State the right of making its views known. The Security Council had respected that principle. However much the new "spirit of Geneva" was invoked, if the First Committee clung to the old method of trying to settle the Korean question without hearing North Korea, it would itself be preventing the settlement of that question.

22. The Soviet delegation accordingly urged the Committee to reject the United States motion to give priority to its proposal, since that motion was contrary to the rules of procedure and to established practice.

23. As for the heavy losses suffered by the foreign interventionists at the hands of the North Korean forces, mention should also be made of the casualties inflicted on the peaceful population of North Korea by bombing and American napalm.

24. Mr. MENON (India) said that it was with regret that his delegation had submitted the amendment under discussion. It had done so with the purpose of promoting agreement between the parties concerned and conscious of its duty toward the United Nations and its own Government. India deeply deplored the acrimonious debate, which it had not foreseen.

25. The question, not only of attendance, but of participation of one or other, or both, of the parties concerned, during the discussion of the general question of the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, was quite separate from that of their participation in the discussion of the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, or of the problems raised by the Commission's work in Korea. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission had been set up under circumstances quite different from those attendant upon the establishment of the United Nations Command, the organ responsible for the conduct of operations in Korea. If the reports<sup>1</sup> of the neutral Nations Repatriation Commission were to be discussed, they should be discussed by the General Assembly, without the participation of only one of the parties concerned. That was all the more true in that the reports contained both majority and minority opinions, and comments on the conduct of both North and South Korean prisoners.

26. The Commission had worked under great difficulties, at the request of the United Nations. Leaving aside the indifference to the Commission shown by the General Assembly, the Government of India thought that the action which had just been taken showed a complete disregard for the services it had rendered. The United States representative had alleged that the question had already been discussed. That was by no means the case. There was an essential difference between the general political debate on the Korean question, under the heading of unification and rehabilitation of Korea on the one hand, and the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on the other.

27. That last item had been put on the agenda at the ninth session, and then withdrawn, only to be included again at the present session. Perhaps it should be taken off the agenda again. The fact that the three items were grouped under one heading did not make them one question.

28. With regard to sub-item (b) in particular, the Indian delegation did not think that a speaker could or should be prevented from deviating from the subject; it only thought that discussion of that item by an organ whose membership extended beyond that of the First Committee would be illegal and undesirable, and that furthermore, such an attitude would be unfriendly to the Government of India, which had rendered such valuable services in the matter.

29. With regard to the comment made by the United States representative to the effect that the Government of India had not informed the United States of its intention of requesting that the item should be included in the agenda, he explained that India, as a sovereign nation, had been under no obligation to do so, however friendly its relations with the United States.

30. If the Committee was going to reject the amendment, it would be placing India in a difficult position in the future. If that amendment were adopted, that would

be in a way a confirmation of the special status of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The various items on the agenda should be examined separately, as they had been at the previous session.

31. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Syria) referring to the comments made by the United Kingdom representative, who had complained that the text of the Syrian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.144) was ambiguous, said that his delegation was prepared to accept any constructive suggestion designed to render the text clearer. The draft resolution was not intended to imply recognition or denial of recognition of either party. If that had proved a difficulty to some delegations, his delegation was quite prepared to amend the text as suggested.

32. Furthermore, it should be made quite clear that there were no ulterior motives underlying the words "parties concerned". They referred only to North and South Korea. Agreement could easily be reached on the drafting of that phrase. Similarly, in the operative part, where the text read "Decides to invite the Republic of Korea", the names used by the two Governments might be amended as desired. Only the substance mattered.

33. He was not moving any amendments to his draft resolution, but simply making suggestions in a spirit of conciliation. His delegation would accept any amendments inspired by a concern for what was just and fair.

34. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) said that his objection to the Syrian draft resolution had been to the operative part and referred to the substance of the decision. Attractive as the Syrian representative's offer to discuss the drafting of his resolution had been, it would be valueless unless he would agree to delete the words "Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

35. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) wanted to correct a statement made by the representative of Poland: Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter referred to both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

36. He had not said that any delegation could speak for another. But it was a fact that the Soviet Union had always spoken for North Korea in the United Nations.

37. Finally, contrary to Mr. Malik's assertion, he had not said that South Korea would use the United Nations for propaganda purposes, but that if any delegation came to the General Assembly without first undertaking to respect its authority, that delegation would be embarking on a piece of propaganda.

38. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) thought that the Peruvian representative was mistaken in referring to Article 35, paragraph 2, which dealt with the obligations to be undertaken in the case of a dispute brought to the attention of the United Nations by a non-member State. In the case at issue, there was no dispute between two parties and no problem had been brought to the attention of the Organization by a non-member State.

39. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that he had not attributed to the Peruvian representative any statement concerning propaganda conducted by South Korea. He had merely recalled a remark by Mr. Belaúnde about North Korea and he had added that, if some representatives were pleased by South Korean propaganda, they would be much less pleased to hear factual statements by the representatives of North Korea.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 18, document A/2641.



40. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the United States representative's motion that his draft resolution should be put to the vote first.

*The motion was adopted by 38 votes to 14, with 6 abstentions.*

41. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that, in order to facilitate a compromise, he would submit an amendment to the United States proposal, to the effect that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should also be invited.

42. Mr. BLAUSTEIN (United States of America) considered that the Polish amendment was out of order, since the voting was already in progress.

43. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) pointed out that the Chairman had not yet called for a vote on the Indian and United States texts. In United Nations practice, voting was not an action taken *en bloc* and it was always possible to submit an amendment, even when a vote had been taken on another amendment. An amendment was all the more in order after a vote had been taken on a motion for priority.

44. The CHAIRMAN said that, although there might be some doubt about the whole procedural question, the voting on the United States proposal had not really begun. He could therefore put the Polish amendment to the vote.

45. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey) asked whether the Syrian representative wished to withdraw his draft resolution, which was similar to the Polish amendment.

46. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Syria) said he would not withdraw his draft resolution, which was not identical with the Polish amendment.

47. At the request of the CHAIRMAN, Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) specified that his amendment consisted in replacing the words "a representative" by the phrase "representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and".

48. The CHAIRMAN ruled that that text constituted an absolutely new proposal and that he could not accept it in the form of an amendment to the United States proposal.

49. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) asked the Chairman to reconsider his decision. Although the Chair could rule on procedural matters, the ruling that had just been handed down involved the substance of the question.

50. Moreover, an amendment which the Iraqi representative had submitted at the 784th meeting to the Syrian draft resolution had not been ruled out of order.

51. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Polish amendment completely altered the purport of the United States proposal. He therefore maintained his ruling, but pointed out that it could be challenged.

52. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that, at previous sessions, the General Assembly had always voted on all amendments, without any rulings from the Chair. He would not challenge the Chairman's ruling, since the preceding vote clearly showed what the results would be. Nevertheless, he considered the ruling to be hasty and unfounded.

53. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Iraqi representative had withdrawn his amendment, but that in any case he himself had considered it to be out of order.

54. He put to the vote the Indian amendment, to the effect that the words "this item" should be replaced by "the Korean question, sub-item (a)".

*The amendment was rejected by 27 votes to 10, with 21 abstentions.*

55. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the United States proposal that a representative of the Republic of Korea should be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the item.

*The proposal was adopted by 44 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions.*

56. The CHAIRMAN asked the Syrian representative if he wished his draft resolution (A/C.1/L.144) to be put to the vote in its entirety, in view of the fact that the Republic of Korea had already been invited.

57. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Syria) requested a roll-call vote on his draft resolution<sup>2</sup> in its entirety.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Peru, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Indonesia.

*Against:* Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay.

*Abstaining:* Sweden, Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 34 votes to 14, with 10 abstentions.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Limb, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.*

58. Mr. MENON (India) moved the adjournment of sub-item (b), reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea.

59. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom), explaining his vote on the Indian amendment, said that, in his opinion, the representative of the Republic of Korea should be invited to participate in the discussion of the Korean question as a whole. Nevertheless, he could not remain indifferent to one point in the speech of the Indian representative, which in effect was an appeal from one to another member of the Commonwealth—a unique association in which each member was free to pursue its own policy, while bound to the others by ties of community. It was because of that statement that he had abstained and not voted against the Indian amendment.

<sup>2</sup> The draft resolution submitted by Syria (A/C.1/L.144) read as follows:

"The First Committee,

"Noting the importance of the Korean question,

"Recognizing that it is necessary to hear the views of the parties concerned,

"Decides to invite the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to send their representatives in order to state their views on the item under discussion."



60. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that the presence of the Republic of Korea in the United Nations should be regarded as natural, since the Republic in fact represented the United Nations. So far as the other party was concerned, nothing had happened to alter the fact that it had been branded as an aggressor. It would have been appropriate to invite it on two conditions only: if its presence had been felt to be necessary, or if it had undertaken to respect the United Nations and its resolutions. Since neither of these conditions had been fulfilled, the Iraqi delegation, with all due respect to the Indian representative, had been obliged to abstain from voting.

61. Mr. MENON (India) endorsed the United Kingdom representative's feeling that all the members of the Commonwealth were absolutely free to vote and speak as they wished, but that there was a community of interest among them. He was glad that, even in a matter where the United Kingdom representative held views contrary to his own, he had not cast a vote against the Indian delegation. Generally speaking, the number of abstentions had been significant.

62. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that his delegation recognized the merits of the Indian amendment, but had abstained from voting on it because it referred to the discriminatory proposal submitted by the United States.

63. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) said that his delegation never voted for or against a delegation or a person, but always on grounds of principle.

64. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had voted against the United States proposal because, it led the Committee along a well-trodden path. The United States and its followers did not want the General Assembly to study the Korean question objectively or to seek a fair solution of the problem.

65. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) asked for an explanation of the Indian motion for the adjournment of sub-item (b).

66. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) asked whether the Chairman intended to allow the Committee to discuss the three aspects of the Korean questions concurrently. If that was not so, the Indian representative's motion might be somewhat premature.

67. The CHAIRMAN said he had thought that the Committee would consider the Korean question as a whole.

68. He asked the Indian representative if he wished the discussion of sub-item (b) to be postponed until after sub-items (a) and (c) had been considered.

69. Mr. MENON (India) explained that the purpose of his motion was that sub-item (b) should not be discussed at the tenth session.

70. The CHAIRMAN put the Indian motion to the vote.

*The motion was adopted by 27 votes to none, with 29 abstentions.*

71. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to proceed with the general debate.

72. Mr. BLAUSTEIN (United States of America) noted that, although there had been no renewal of aggression in Korea, no progress had been made towards reunification of a country divided through the intransigence of the Powers, which exercised military and political control in the North. Yet the will of the Korean

people had been affirmed in honest elections, in the presence of United Nations observers, and in the heroic struggle fought in the defence of Korea; that will coincided with the objective formulated by the General Assembly in different resolutions since 1947.

73. Unfortunately, the masters of North Korea refused to make way for representatives democratically chosen in honest elections, who alone would be capable of solving the Korean problem. As long as a régime which feared liberty denied to the Korean people the exercise of its elementary right, United Nations supervision was necessary to safeguard that right.

74. Regarding the proposals for the unification of Korea, the fifteen nations which, in response to the United Nations appeal, had repelled Communist aggression had submitted a report<sup>3</sup> to the General Assembly on the results of the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in the spring of 1954. As the Communist camp had been anxious to challenge the competence of the United Nations rather than reach agreement on the unification of the country, the fifteen Powers, in concert with the Republic of Korea, had issued a declaration proclaiming two principles for a settlement compatible with the objectives of the United Nations. Those two principles which the General Assembly had noted and approved in its resolution 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954—namely, the United Nations' right to repel aggression and to extend its good offices in Korea, and United Nations supervision of free elections in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea—had not been accepted by the Communists in the course of the past year. They had contented themselves with proposing either limited meetings between groups in North and South Korea on questions of trade and travel, or a large-scale conference on Asian problems.

75. In those circumstances, neither the Republic of Korea nor the Members of the United Nations which had given it aid, nor yet the General Assembly could seriously examine propaganda proposals intended merely to sow dissension so as to undermine the results of the United Nations' collective action and to jeopardize the fate of the Korean people. He did not see that any new element capable of creating agreement had emerged.

76. In the second place, the Armistice Agreement,<sup>4</sup> which had not been intended to remain in force indefinitely, would, in the absence of a solution providing for peaceful unification, probably have to continue to serve as the official basis of agreements with the Communists.

77. The Communists had violated the Agreement in many respects, particularly by introducing combat personnel and *matériel* into Korea. Quoting paragraph 13 (c) and (d) of the Agreement, he pointed out that personnel and *matériel* could enter only by certain ports and that corresponding reports should be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which would operate through neutral nations inspection teams. The Communist camp had submitted only an insignificant proportion of the reports required, it had obstructed supervision by the Neutral Commission and had illegally introduced 400 to 500 airplanes, including 300 jet planes. The United Nations Command had protested, and, for its

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 17, document A/2786.*

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079.*

part, had continued to abide scrupulously by the Armistice Agreement.

78. The Communists had introduced considerable reinforcements of planes, tanks and heavy artillery into North Korea, yet they declared that they had withdrawn 486,000 men, i.e., 30 per cent of the total Communist strength and 55 per cent of the Chinese personnel. But the inadequacy of the reports submitted to the Supervisory Commission and the difficulties put in the way of the inspection teams made verification of that claim and the execution of the Neutral Commission's task itself impossible.

79. The United Nations Command, for its part, had withdrawn a much larger proportion of non-Korean troops, withdrawals which had been reported and verified by the Supervisory Commission. Non-Korean strength had been reduced by 80 per cent, since the armistice had come into effect, while Chinese strength had been reduced by only 55 per cent. The forces of the Republic of Korea had been increased from 540,000 to 650,000, which was entirely consistent with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover, their equipment had been supplied from stocks of United Nations troops who had since been repatriated or from replacements of those stocks, in strict accordance with the Agreement.

80. The strength of the Republic of Korea would probably have to be maintained at a high level, because renewed Communist aggression was possible, which for the present, the following factors tended to prevent: the experience of the Communists at the time of the Security Council resolutions of 1950, the action undertaken by the Members of the United Nations in the name of collective security and by the General Assembly when the Chinese Communists had intervened, and finally the joint declaration of those Members of the United Nations who had participated in the collective action.

81. Turning to the report (A/2947) of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), he pointed out that that Commission had been created by General Assembly resolution 376 (V) at a time when the reunification of Korea had seemed imminent as a result of the collapse of the North Korean army. In spite of the prolongation of the fighting which had resulted from the intervention of Communist China, the United Nations had hoped that UNCURK would hasten the reunification of Korea. Unfortunately, Communist intransigence had prevented the fulfilment of that hope.

82. That Commission had performed a useful function in its representation of the United Nations in Korea, and the United States believed that it should continue with its terms of reference unaltered. However, in view of the limited range of what it might currently expect to accomplish in working towards the goal of unification, the Commission had decided to set up a committee of four members, all of whom would be permanently stationed in Korea, while the other three members would be available for work on the preparation of the report and for any meetings convened by the Chairman. His

delegation considered that arrangement eminently reasonable.

83. The Indian representative, in his explanatory memorandum (A/2941/Add.1), had expressed the desire that the General Assembly should consider the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and adopt a definite arrangement.

84. Although that Commission had ceased to exist more than a year earlier, it was fitting that the Committee should express its appreciation of its work and particularly of the outstanding service of the Indian authorities, which had had the difficult task of caring for the prisoners in their camps in Korea. President Eisenhower, in a letter<sup>5</sup> dated 19 February 1954 to Mr. Nehru had said that the tact, fairness and firmness shown by the Indian staff and by Lieutenant-General Thimayya and Major-General Thorat had done much to reassure the prisoners who were demoralized by months of captivity.

85. Unfortunately, there still remained in India some eighty-two ex-prisoners who wished to avail themselves of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement relating to prisoners of war which permitted them to go to neutral countries. The Brazilian Government had made a generous offer in that connexion, and his delegation hoped that the ex-prisoners could soon return to peaceful pursuits.

86. He then turned to the critical problem which had been the subject of General Assembly resolution 906 (X) in the preceding year: the detention by the North Korean and the Chinese Communist authorities of captured and other personnel. Those authorities had refused to account for such personnel, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Thanks to the expression of concern of the General Assembly and the skill and tireless efforts of the Secretary-General and others, certain United States airmen had already been released. However, there were still tens of thousands of people who were entitled under the Armistice Agreement to be permitted to proceed to the Republic of Korea. Most of the persons detained in Communist territory were Koreans, many of whom were being exploited in forced labour camps. It was known that at one time there had been about 24,000 military personnel and at least 17,000 civilians, including prominent officials of the Republic of Korea captured at Seoul in 1950. In addition, there were a number of Irish, French, German, United States and other civilians who were known to have been alive at one time in Communist custody and one stateless refugee who desired to rejoin her family in South Korea. The United States urged that the Communists should take early steps to account for those unfortunate people and to release those still alive.

87. The United Nations, which had always striven for the establishment of a united, free, independent and democratic Korea, should live up to its fine traditions.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 19*, para. 75.