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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 21 October 1991, at 3 p.m.

<u>President:</u>	Mr. SHIHABI	(Saudi Arabia)
<u>later:</u>	Mr. OUDOVENKO (Vice-President)	(Ukraine)
<u>later:</u>	Mr. SHIHABI (President)	(Saudi Arabia)

- Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency [14]
 - (a) Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency
 - (b) Draft resolution

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The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 14

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:

- (a) NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE AGENCY (A/46/353)
- (b) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/46/L.10)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed at 5 p.m. today.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): I therefore request those representatives wishing to inscribe their names on the list of speakers to do so as soon as possible.

I now invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to present the report of the Agency for the year 1990.

Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)): It is my privilege to present the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency for 1990 to the General Assembly and to describe the activities of the Agency up to the present moment.

I think it is true to say that at no time have the wheels of the Agency machinery spun faster than during the year that has passed since I last reported to the Assembly in October 1990.

I propose to report today on our activities under six different headings: first, the Agency's work in Iraq on the basis of Security Council resolutions; second, the lessons learned from Iraq and the progress in the non-proliferation regime; third, the Agency's work in the field of nuclear safety; fourth, environment, development and energy; fifth, the transfer of

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nuclear techniques for development; and sixth, the role of the IAEA in the medium term.

In resolution 687 (1991) the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to undertake three tasks: to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities; to develop a plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of nuclear-related items which Iraq was not permitted to retain; and to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations in the nuclear sphere under the Security Council resolutions.

The tasks thus laid upon the Agency have proved to be much larger, more complex and more dramatic than first expected. Even though the Agency is operating the world's first on-site inspection system and is able to draw on decades of experience in the field of nuclear inspections and to utilize many inspectors of its own as well as expertise, equipment and laboratories of its own, the work is very exacting.

Iraq is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and has pledged under that Treaty not to develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. It has also pledged under a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to place all its nuclear material under safeguards. To the regret and shock of the world community, Iraq has been found not to have respected these pledges. The Board of Governors of the IAEA has twice declared Iraq in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and the General Conference of the IAEA last month condemned Iraq's non-compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

In performing the tasks laid upon it, the Agency has the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission which has been set up by the

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Secretary-General as requested by the Security Council and which, on the basis of information made available to it by Member States, designates sites for nuclear inspection in addition to such sites as have been declared by Iraq. The Commission, which in the fields of biological and chemical weapons and missiles has tasks similar to those entrusted to the Agency under Security Council resolution 687 (1991), also provides the Agency with logistics and some expertise.

Iraq expressly accepted resolution 687 (1991) and thereby obtained a cease-fire ending the armed action authorized by the Security Council. Had Iraq disclosed the whole of its nuclear programme within the time specified by the Council, the inspection task laid upon the IAEA would still have been large but not so difficult. As it is, Iraq has reluctantly made disclosures, and then only when enough evidence had become available through inspections to allow conclusions about the existence of previously undeclared activities. This, indeed, is a painful and laborious way of having the programmes disclosed. Moreover, as no one feels confident that everything has been revealed, close future monitoring is a necessity to preclude new surprises.

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As of now, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has sent seven inspection teams which have spent over 2,000 person-days altogether on mission. Our Action Team in Vienna has devoted many person-months directing the activities, and large numbers of samples have been taken and analysed in the Agency's own laboratories.

What has been disclosed through the missions sent by the IAEA has stunned the world: vast undeclared and unknown programmes in the billion-dollar range for the enrichment of uranium and, recently, documentary evidence of an advanced nuclear weapons development programme. The seventh team sent by the IAEA, which has just concluded its mission, affirms in its report the existence of and gives information about the scientific and technical programme for weapons development, although Iraq asserts that no political decision was taken to make a nuclear bomb.

The immediate further tasks before the IAEA in Iraq are to remove quantities of highly enriched uranium fuel which were under safeguards and to plan for the destruction or neutralization of nuclear-related items which Iraq is not allowed to retain. Lastly, the Agency is to organize and maintain future ongoing monitoring as a check against any possible revival of the clandestine programme. The Agency plan in this regard was approved recently in Security Council resolution 715 (1991).

How is it that the large nuclear programme that has been mapped by half a dozen inspection teams sent by the IAEA escaped the Agency's regular Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) inspections in past years? What lessons are we to draw in order to avoid any further surprises of this kind?

The first lesson is the crucial importance of information. The safeguard system is expected to discover the diversion of a significant quantity of

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nuclear material in installations which are under safeguards, but no inspectorate can comb through the territory of a State in blind search of nuclear installations and material that should have been declared and placed under safeguards. If the State itself fails to declare nuclear installations - as Iraq did - the inspectorate must learn through other sources where to look. The nuclear inspection teams sent to Iraq this year have been provided such information by Member States, through the Special Commission, designating suspected sites for inspection.

The second lesson is the importance of the unequivocal right of inspectors to go anywhere unimpeded and the third lesson is the value of powerful support when this right of access is not respected. Resolution 687 (1991) and the Security Council provide these two elements.

What we can learn from these lessons is that the ability of the regular IAEA inspections under the Non-Proliferation, Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties to uncover possible undeclared nuclear installations and material would increase drastically if the IAEA were to be routinely provided with relevant information available to Member States through, for example, satellites.

The right to perform so-called special inspections, which exists under IAEA NPT-type safeguards agreements to perform so-called "special inspections" - and which has so far been used only with regard to declared installations - might then be used to request inspection of undeclared installations and material which, it is reasonably believed, should have been declared. If such a request were to be rejected, the Board of Governors of the IAEA might submit the matter to the Security Council. In this manner a procedure would be in place to uphold obligations under non-proliferation

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treaties and safeguards agreements. Within the IAEA, discussions about a procedure of this kind have already begun.

Some additional comments are warranted on this matter. First, the further nuclear disarmament advances among nuclear-weapon States and the closer non-proliferation commitments approach universality, the more important full compliance with the non-proliferation commitments becomes. Secondly, it may be assumed that the very existence of a verification system with more teeth would have a certain deterrent effect on potential violators. Thirdly, although another case like Iraq may not occur again in a world moving towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation - whether under global or regional treaties - the eventuality cannot be excluded and effective procedures must be in place to meet it.

The defiance of the non-proliferation Treaty by one State should not lead us to overlook the fact that significant progress has recently been made in the field of non-proliferation. Argentina and Brazil agreed to open up their nuclear sectors to each other and are in the process of concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. South Africa has adhered to the NPT and concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Several other States in southern Africa have, likewise, recently joined the NPT, making the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free African continent seem attainable.

I should also mention that Lithuania has acceded to the Treaty, and the Ukraine has declared its intention to do the same. This means that many nuclear installations not previously covered by IAEA safeguards will, in the future, be safeguarded. In addition, China and France have made it clear that

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they will adhere to the NPT, thus including among the Parties to the Treaty all declared nuclear-weapon States.

In the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone, although a difficult objective, is on everyone's agenda and could be a realistic possibility with the convening of a peace conference. There is already recognition among the States of the region that in a zone with such a legacy of fear and suspicion there is a need for a comprehensive verification regime.

Concepts such as mutual inspection between the parties and challenge inspections are already being discussed as important features of such a regime. Last month, the General Conference of the IAEA decided by consensus to request the Director General of the Agency

"to take such measures as are necessary to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and in particular to prepare a model agreement taking into account the views of the States in the region, as a necessary step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone."

While it is obvious that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East will have to be negotiated between the parties, technical input provided by the Agency, with its broad experience of verification measures, could be a useful contribution to the negotiating process.

Considering all these facts, it does not seem too daring, in the present international climate, to aim at and hope for both accelerated nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States and universal commitment to non-proliferation on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States by 1995, when the extension of the NPT is to be examined. This, in my view, should be our ambition.

(Mr. Blix, IAEA)

Next I should like to make some comments on the activities of the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety. Anti-nuclear critics of the Agency sometimes urge that the Agency should not "promote" the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Maybe this criticism is based on a misunderstanding. The principal means through which the IAEA "promotes" nuclear energy are international measures to strengthen the safety in the operation of nuclear power plants and in the disposal of radioactive waste. This type of "promotion", one would think, should be acceptable to all.

Although the operators and owners of nuclear plants and the authorities of the States in which they are located carry the responsibility for the safety of the plants, there is more and more international cooperation, harmonization and even legislation relating to nuclear safety. The IAEA is the centre of many of these activities.

The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was subjected within months to an international inquiry at the IAEA in Vienna to enable nuclear scientists and engineers from all over the world to understand the causes and the course of the accident. Since then the Agency has assisted Soviet, Ukrainian and Belarusian institutions in organizing a permanent international research centre in the Chernobyl area, where scientific institutes from all over the world can undertake joint research.

At the request of the Soviet Government the Agency has also helped in the last two years to organize an international assessment of the radiological and health consequences of the accident. Together with six other international organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Commission of the European Communities, the Agency sent nearly 40 technical missions involving

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about 200 independent experts to the areas affected by the Chernobyl accident to obtain data for scientifically based conclusions on these controversial matters. Thousands of people were examined and thousands of samples of food, soil and water were analysed.

(Mr. Blix, IAEA)

An international scientific committee, headed by Professor Itsuzo Shigematsu, Director of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima, Japan, was responsible for the working plan and for the report, which was the subject of discussion at a conference in Vienna in May this year. Although the psychological consequences of the accident were found to be grave - with much anxiety, fear and lack of confidence in authorities - and although the general health situation showed deficiencies, significant differences were not found in the health of people living in villages with relatively high radiation contamination and those living in villages with low contamination. This conclusion is not accepted by everyone and it is at variance with the images that some of the media have transmitted, but it is consistent with prior, more limited, reports by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), WHO and the League of Red Cross Societies. Follow-up studies are needed of many people who took part in the clean-up operations and of people who were evacuated. Long-term national and international studies of the health of the population and of the areas most affected by the accident are organized and will eventually give the world a full and hopefully final picture of the health and environmental consequences of the accident.

The study undertaken in 1990 and 1991 left no doubt about the very difficult social and economic situation of the people living in the area affected by the Chernobyl accident, and the IAEA supports the work undertaken by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Chernobyl established following consideration of the consequences of the accident by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly last year.

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The developments in Eastern and Central Europe, including the Soviet Union, have led to a strong interest - not only within the countries of the region but also internationally - in examining and upgrading nuclear power safety in the region. The Agency is intensely engaged as a focal point for and as an instrument of efforts in this regard. A special project was set up to examine the safety of the oldest type of Soviet-designed reactors, the WWER 440/230. Some reactors of this type were closed in Germany following the reunification of the country. Particular attention has been given to the reactors of this type at Kozloduy in Bulgaria. Following a report by the IAEA that the safety of this plant was unsatisfactory, broad international efforts, involving the Commission of the European Communities as well as individual European countries, the United States and others, were initiated.

Recently the Soviet Union proposed that the IAEA should undertake another special project, namely, examining safety questions relating to the RBMK-type, or Chernobyl type, of reactor. I am confident that the Agency can bring together nuclear experts to analyse, assess and advise on the safety problems of this type of reactor which is found in the Russian Federation, in the Ukraine and in Lithuania.

The Chernobyl accident in 1986 triggered a broad IAEA programme aimed at the gradual creation of an international nuclear safety regime. Basic principles of nuclear safety have been worked out, nuclear safety standards have been updated and many new services using international experts have been offered to member States - often against payment by them. This year a special conference of government policy-makers in the field of nuclear safety met in

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Vienna and charted the next leg of the journey to an international nuclear-safety regime.

Among the many proposals from the Conference was one aimed at the elaboration of a binding framework convention on nuclear safety. While individual countries will no doubt continue to assert their exclusive responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations on their territories - and indeed nothing should be done to relieve them of that responsibility - a framework convention, in my judgement, may mark the beginning of a recognition that some standards and rules in the field of nuclear safety must be defined internationally and must be made mandatory, for instance, those relating to basic principles of nuclear safety, incident reporting and the transboundary movement of radioactive waste. The range of rules and standards included in a framework convention may be limited at the beginning and may expand as experience is gained. They would be based on the awareness that it is unacceptable to the international community that nuclear safety is substandard anywhere in the world.

In response to a request by the General Assembly following the so-called Brundtland report a few years ago, the IAEA surveyed its programmes and reported on the extent to which they were relevant to the subject of environment and development. A follow-up of this survey is being prepared in time for the United Nations Conference in Rio next year. A large number of the Agency's development cooperation programmes, especially in agriculture and industry, are directly beneficial not only for development but also for the environment. For instance, nuclear techniques frequently offer the best means of monitoring the presence and concentration of pollutants. The IAEA's Marine Laboratory in Monaco, which has much experience in monitoring pollution in the

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Persian Gulf and possesses an important database from this work, is now playing an important role in the international efforts regarding the Gulf. Continued emphasis on environmental monitoring and protection is being maintained in our programme.

Most interesting - but also most controversial - is the question of the potential importance of nuclear power to help reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide which result from the burning of all fossil fuels and which are believed to contribute to global warming.

The summit meetings of industrialized States have repeatedly recognized that:

"nuclear energy can play a significant role in reducing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions".

Such a role is so far vehemently opposed by various anti-nuclear groups which usually recommend energy saving and a wider use of renewable sources of energy. The adequacy of these methods to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is doubted by others. No consensus has yet emerged.

There is no intergovernmental organization which deals with all sources of energy and which is capable of studying and comparing the health and environmental impacts of various sources and uses of energy. Therefore a number of organizations, including the IAEA, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Commission of the European Communities decided to organize a joint comparative study of the environmental and health effects of different energy systems for electricity generation and of the prospects of increasing efficiency in energy use or of forgoing energy services. The study was discussed last May in Helsinki at a Senior Expert Symposium. Several of the important conclusions reached at the

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Symposium have been submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Rio Conference. Among these I might mention: first, that the global demand for electricity will continue to increase, subject only to constraints on economic growth; secondly, that efficiency improvements have a substantial potential to reduce environmental impacts and should be pursued vigorously - however, such improvements will not eliminate the need for new plants to meet the growing demand; and, thirdly, that nuclear power is the most likely non-fossil source that can be deployed on a large scale and with costs competitive with fossil fuels for base-load generation. Nuclear energy has therefore the potential to make a significant contribution towards a reduction in carbon emissions but its social acceptability remains in question.

The possible greenhouse effect and the ways that are open to the world to counter it are among the most important topics on the global agenda. It is desirable that dispassionate studies should be made as input to this discussion. The conclusions of the Helsinki Symposium are intended to constitute such input.

A few developing countries are successfully making use of nuclear power and this source of energy is of potential future interest in the developing world especially where there is a lack of indigenous sources of energy or a need to desalinate sea water. However, the primary interest of most developing countries in the IAEA lies in non-power-related nuclear techniques - in medicine, agriculture and industry. Let me mention only two examples among many to give an idea of the type of technical cooperation activities that are currently pursued in the field of nuclear energy.

(Mr. Blix, IAEA)

The sterilization of insects through the irradiation of pupae has proved to be a very effective way to eradicate some insect pests. When released in overwhelming numbers in a particular zone, sterilized males mate with fertile females, and no offspring are produced. This technique - the so-called sterile male technique - has been championed by IAEA. In a large programme led by the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Agency recently helped to eradicate the new world screwworm in Libya with the help of this technique. In 1990 over 12,000 livestock were found infested with this lethal pest in Libya. This year - 1991 - only six cases were recorded, and since April not one single case. It is certainly a relief that this pest, which might have spread and affected livestock and wildlife in the whole African continent, has been eradicated - and this without an extensive use of chemical pesticides.

A second current example of how the Agency helps to transfer a nuclear technique relates to the removal of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from flue gases in coal power stations. Through the use of electron beams, those gases are transformed into fertilizers. In April this year a pilot plant, installed at a thermal power station in Warsaw, started up. It is the largest demonstration plant of its kind in the world. Approximately 90 per cent of the sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in flue gases can be removed by two electron beam machines of 50 kilowatts each. This project will show how promising the technique may be in cleaning up exhaust gases from commercial power stations, incineration plants and other industrial plants.

I should like to make a few comments summing up the Agency's principal tasks in the medium term. The central task of the Agency has always been to contribute to the taming of nuclear power: to promote nuclear arms control and confidence in such control by safeguards verification and to promote the

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peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the transfer of technology and by cooperation.

In today's international climate new challenges and opportunities arise, and IAEA and other intergovernmental organizations must adapt their programmes to meet these challenges.

Effective verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is becoming increasingly needed for regional and global confidence and for nuclear disarmament. In a new international order a much strengthened safeguards system is required to give assurance that non-proliferation pledges are respected - whether globally or in nuclear-weapon-free zones - and perhaps one day also to verify that nuclear material released through nuclear disarmament and transferred to peaceful uses continues to be used for peaceful purposes.

An international nuclear safety regime must evolve to give confidence that the safety of nuclear operations and of nuclear waste disposal is high everywhere in the world. The Agency is the natural birthplace for such a regime, which is also required if nuclear power is to become a viable option to meet a substantial part of the world's future energy needs.

The Agency must, further, increasingly assist developing countries in making use of nuclear techniques in their efforts to catch up with the industrialized countries. To take a few examples: they can use irradiation techniques to produce new useful mutants of many plants; they can employ nuclear techniques for medical diagnosis and for combating cancer; and they can adopt nuclear techniques for non-destructive testing to achieve quality control in the industrial sphere.

(Mr. Blix, IAEA)

In addressing squarely new issues concerning safeguards, nuclear safety and the transfer of technology, IAEA is adapting to face the problems of a continuously changing world.

Regrettably, a political readiness to identify and meet new challenges is not enough to achieve results. Adequate resources in personnel and money are also crucial. I shall conclude with a brief comment on each of these two matters.

If during the past seven years the Agency has been able to deliver an increased programme with a zero real growth budget and to respond promptly to unforeseen important tasks, it is in great part due to the enthusiasm, dynamism and versatility of our staff. The way in which we recruit and remunerate staff is important for our ability to accomplish our objective. We pursue in the Agency a policy of staff rotation. The majority of professional staff serve five to seven years. This has enabled us to have a continuous inflow of fresh talent and a corresponding outflow into the national nuclear communities of professionals who know how the Agency's functions can best be used by their countries. We have every intention of continuing this policy, but I must report that we find it increasingly difficult to attract highly technical specialists in some sectors of our work. The pay and conditions of service offered by the United Nations Common System are no longer attractive to many specialists. If we are to remain highly effective, a way must be found to allow for some flexibility in the conditions of employment of professional staff.

As to financial resources, let me say that it cannot be a rational order for major contributors, who eventually do pay their dues, to do this so late in the budgetary year that the international organizations that receive the

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dues - including IAEA - are perennially on the brink of economic disaster. Nor can it be a rational order to be so wedded to the concept of zero budgetary growth that vital international needs are inadequately looked after.

A new international order must have effective international organizations. This requires effective cooperation between Member States, skilled and motivated Secretariat staff and adequate and timely financing.

Lastly, I should like to express in this forum the thanks of IAEA to the Government of Austria, which is an excellent host to all the international organizations located in Vienna.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): I now call on the representative of Argentina, who will introduce the draft resolution in document A/46/L.10.

Mr. CHIARADIA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like, at the outset, to express the appreciation of the delegation of Argentina to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, for his wide-ranging statement on the Agency's work in 1990. That statement and the annual report of IAEA confirm his dedication and efficiency, as well as the high technical calibre of that body, entrusted with carrying out a weighty task on behalf of the international community.

My Government would like to stress its ongoing commitment to the work and objectives of the Agency, with a view to taking maximum advantage of the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in keeping with the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Argentina continues to be open to establishing and developing close ties of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are convinced of the

(Mr. Chiaradia, Argentina)

need to make available to all people the benefits flowing from such uses, free of restrictions and discrimination, provided that appropriate guarantees are given that the technologies, facilities and materials transferred will be used exclusively to those ends.

(Mr. Chiaradia, Argentina)

The Government of Argentina is fully committed to a policy restricting its nuclear development exclusively for peaceful purposes. It is precisely in that spirit that on 28 November last year in the border city of Fox de Iguazu our nation's President, Mr. Carlos Menem, jointly with the President of the Federal Republic of Brazil, Mr. Fernando Collor de Mello, issued a declaration on a common Argentine-Brazilian nuclear policy laying down three successive steps, interrelated but independent of one another, to ensure total transparency for our respective nuclear activities, namely: the establishment of a Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in all installations; the negotiation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a Joint Safeguards Agreement; and the adoption of measures conducive to updating and improving of the Tlatelolco Treaty with a view to the full entry into force of this international instrument for the two States.

By now the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials is being fully implemented and, moreover, it has been given an appropriate juridical framework to guarantee its credibility internationally and its durability by way of the signing, on 18 July last in the City of Guadalajara, Mexico, of an agreement on the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, which is now going through the parliamentary ratification process in the two countries. Similarly, significant progress has been made in working out a comprehensive joint safeguards agreement with the Agency.

We are firmly convinced that these measures, together with the previous technical cooperation agreements between the two Governments arrived at over the past decade, will provide the international community the broadest possible guarantees as to the purposes of their respective nuclear development.

(Mr. Chiaradia, Argentina)

Argentina has repeatedly stressed the importance it ascribes to the effectiveness and credibility of the Agency's safeguards system. This is borne out by the 12 safeguards agreements currently in force between the Government of Argentina and the Agency and by the fact that my Government and that of Brazil have agreed to entrust to the Agency the auditing of their Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.

In this respect, we urge the secretariat to redouble its efforts to become even more reliable by way of an in-depth rationalization of its approach to implementation and not by the mere addition of verification measures, with the consequent additional costs such measures would entail.

We should like also to express our satisfaction with the work being done by the Standing Commission on Liability for Nuclear Damage, which has made significant strides in standard evaluation and treatment of various issues with a view ultimately to amending the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, to which our country is a party and whose universal accession we have constantly sought to promote.

Similarly, we take the opportunity to hail the holding of the International Conference on Nuclear Safety, which concluded recently. In our view, the Conference produced a consistent body of conclusions which, together with the new recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, can serve as a guide for the future action of the Agency in the matter. Expanding its activities in the area of nuclear safety would be justified, as we see it, to the extent that it shows caution and prudence and proceeds in a planned and progressive way.

It is obvious that there is consensus in the sense of moving towards devising international safety criteria; however, there remain doubts as to the

(Mr. Chiaradia, Argentina)

advisability of establishing prescriptive international norms by way of an international convention.*

We should like especially to highlight the strides made by the IAEA with regard to food and agriculture, as well as in the biological and physical sciences.

This year Argentina is presiding over the Governing Board of the IAEA; it once again reaffirms its readiness to support the Agency as it carries out its important work in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In conclusion, I have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/46/L.10 on the 1990 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the Bahamas, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Myanmar, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and my own country, Argentina.

In general terms, the draft resolution follows the format and text of past resolutions adopted on the item by the General Assembly, with the incorporation of an addition in the sixth preambular paragraph and the inclusion of a new paragraph 4, the texts of which were arrived at in informal consultations held among the delegations concerned both in Vienna and in New York.

The sponsors trust that it will be adopted with the maximum possible support.

* Mr. Gudovenko (Ukraine), Vice President, took the Chair.

Mr. KRAYCHANKA (Belarus) (interpretation from Russian): I must admit that it is with mixed emotions that I come to the rostrum to make a statement on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the one hand, contemporary life would be unthinkable without the existence of such an important organization as the IAEA. This is convincingly demonstrated by the significant role it plays and by the number of tasks it carries out, as evidenced by its report submitted to the General Assembly at this forty-sixth session and by the constructive statement of Mr. Blix, the Agency's Director General. On the other hand, the Agency's activities in a new historical period in the world's development need further improvement.

Two extraordinary events - Chernobyl and the actions of Iraq - although completely different in nature, clearly demonstrate that need. The international discussions of these events have virtually coincided in time, and this has not merely been an accident of history but has been the result of a certain logic that has resoundingly indicated the need for change. Indeed, events in the Gulf have revealed the inadequacy of the existing IAEA's safeguards regime, under which regular inspections are carried out.

(Mr. Kraychanko, Belarus)

The consequences of Chernobyl demonstrated that the Agency's existing functional role was inadequate for the task of eliminating the consequences of a nuclear disaster.

In our view, IAEA is akin to a vital life-support system on a spacecraft. Such a system is absolutely essential. However, the increasing number and complexity of activities on the spacecraft require improvement of the system. The world is now so complex that the present-day framework of IAEA, determined at an earlier stage by its member States, has become outdated. This is not at all the fault of IAEA itself or the result of omission on its part. It is the objective course of developments. However, it is the duty of the Agency at this time to make a qualitative leap forward to respond fully to the challenges of the times, to ensure that the ongoing processes of renewal and reform taking place in other international organizations do not leave this uniquely significant forum on the sidelines, removed from the mainstream processes.

Let us recall that in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s IAEA significantly widened and deepened the scope of its functions, as compared with those which had been originally laid down in its Statute in the 1950s. That was the response of States to the pressing challenges of that time. Now we are approaching a stage where qualitatively new development is necessary in the Agency. In that connection, we welcome this recent statement by Mr. Blix at the IAEA General Conference. "It is clear that the time is ripe for adjustment and change". We sincerely welcome also the following remark made by Mr. Blix in his statement to the General Assembly:

(Mr. Kravchanko, Belarus)

"Follow-up studies are needed of many people who took part in the clean-up operations and of people who were evacuated. ... [These studies] will eventually give the world a full and, hopefully, final picture of the health and environmental consequences of the accident."

(supra., p. 11)

We see this as a very real change in the position of IAEA. The Republic of Belarus shares the view of the Director General of the Agency regarding the necessity of expanding the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear energy and safety and also in the improvement of the safeguards system. At the same time, Belarus is convinced that it would be inadequate to confine ourselves to this. The reforming of IAEA must go further. The new role of the Agency must be expanded beyond the bounds of the two spheres of its activity I have mentioned so as to encompass the following three spheres: first, helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; secondly, ensuring the maximally safe development of nuclear power; and, thirdly, eliminating the consequences of nuclear accidents. Those three spheres of activity are equal in importance and should receive equal degrees of concentration of efforts.

In particular, in the field of promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the time is clearly ripe for more intrusive inspections, with full and timely access to installations, under the agreements in regard to the non-proliferation safeguards. Perhaps such inspections would be special in nature and additional to the regular ones. Possibly they would become normal procedure. In appropriate cases direct support from the Security Council in this regard would be necessary. We are convinced that, as a result of large-scale initiatives in the nuclear disarmament field, taken in the past

(Mr. Kravchanka, Belarus)

several weeks favourable conditions have been created for the adoption of various measures to narrow the existence of nuclear weapons to the maximum extent.

In the sphere of ensuring the safety of nuclear power, all the activities of the Agency should be placed within an international framework, or an umbrella-type convention on nuclear safety. The idea of drafting such a convention is actively supported by Belarus. Protocols to be adopted on the basis of such a convention could then ensure that all specific obligations are covered.

The timeliness of this aspect is increasing, especially in connection with the problem of the ageing of a number of nuclear-power stations. In some countries - for instance, in the United States, as is well known - the periods for the safe operation of many nuclear-power stations will be expiring in the near future. Taking decisions on their future is a major and complex safety problem, going beyond national boundaries.

The Republic of Belarus is observing with keen interest the processes concerning the safe development of nuclear power. The fact that close to the borders of my Republic there exist four nuclear-power stations - including the one still functioning at Chernobyl and the Rovno nuclear-power stations, in the south; the Smolensk nuclear power station, in the east; and the one in Ignalina, in the north-west of the Republic - indicates that our national interests in ensuring nuclear and radiation safety depend to a considerable extent on the safe functioning of these and other nuclear-power stations in neighbouring and other European States. Any nuclear disasters in Europe, or in any other part of the Earth, could create an additional threat to the

(Mr. Kravchanka, Belarus)

health, life and future of the Belarusian people or to the environment of the Republic, which has been declared a zone of ecological disaster.

Finally, in regard to the third sphere, eliminating the consequences of nuclear accidents, let us face the truth. As long as nuclear-power stations exist, are built and are growing older, the probability and danger of nuclear accidents cannot be excluded. Assertions to the contrary can be taken seriously only by naive persons.

Nuclear accidents at atomic-power stations are almost daily occurrences. It may be objected that these are minor accidents. However, I believe it will be agreed that if minor incidents are possible it is quite likely that large-scale accidents can follow.

(Mr. Kravchanka, Belarus)

Further evidence of this was the recent fire at one of the still-operational blocks at the Chernobyl nuclear-power station, which occurred in spite of the extremely strict safety measures undertaken at the station after the catastrophe of 1986. That accident caused serious anxiety among the people, Government and Parliament of my Republic. Within a few hours the site was visited by a Belarusian delegation headed by Mr. I Smoliar, Chairman of the Chernobyl Standing Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, and Mr. Kenik. The Parliament of the Republic, after analysing the delegation's report, decided that it was necessary to have an agreement regulating all questions relating to the future operation of the Chernobyl station.

If the international Organization is to deal with matters relating to promotion of the development of nuclear powers, it must be ready - within its terms of reference, and not as an exception - to join Governments in concentrated efforts to overcome the consequences of accidents at nuclear-power installations. This is ordinary human logic and is fully in accord with the enormous task of everyone in this Hall - indeed, everyone in this building: the task of securing a safe and fulfilled life for mankind. That is why, in the post-Chernobyl situation, we proceed, not on the basis of average estimates and concepts of collective risk, but on the basis of regional and local peculiarities and of the need to protect the rights of every individual at risk.

The basic work of IAEA in this area could be geared towards perfecting the legal progress. The Agency's speedy completion of two international conventions in 1986, in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe, was an important experience. In particular, it would be in the interests of

(Mr. Kravchanka, Belarus)

all States to produce without delay an international legal instrument on the provision of urgent assistance in the case of a radiological emergency - an instrument that would provide machinery for the speedy mobilization of the efforts of the whole world community to deal with the consequences of nuclear accidents. Clearly, it is also expedient that appropriate obligations to render all necessary long-term assistance be worked out.

In addition, serious efforts must be made to perfect the regime of the 1977 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.

It cannot be said that IAEA is doing nothing to undo the consequences of nuclear accidents. Belarus is very grateful for the start that has been made in a number of research programmes in this direction.

We were glad to hear Mr. Blix refer to willingness to cooperate with the World Health Organization and other bodies and to continue to study the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in areas not covered by the original experts. I refer to the international Chernobyl project and to the decisions of the General Conference of the Agency at its thirty-fifth session on the need to develop specific measures to solve problems flowing from the report of the international advisory committee on the results of the project. No doubt, programmes will need to be expanded.

It is also beyond doubt that the priorities in allocating the Agency's budgetary resources must be reassessed. In this connection, I should like to underscore the Agency's need to make provision for substantial increases in the 1993-1994 budgetary allocations for the Chernobyl subprogrammes and for the necessary inclusion of the question of Chernobyl in the Agency's medium-term plan.

(Mr. Kravchanka, Belarus)

But this is not the main problem: the main problem is that all these programmes are adopted on a special basis - an ad hoc basis - whereas, it is our deep conviction, this type of activity should be undertaken on an equal footing with other major aspects of IAEA activity.

We are saying this so emphatically today because, to a large extent, the Belarusian people has been left to fight by itself the Chernobyl disaster that has befallen it. There is a Spanish saying about screaming from the mouth of one's wounds. Our people are indeed screaming from the mouth of their wound - and this is not the first time.

I shall not go into detail concerning the catastrophic consequences of Chernobyl. Alas, these have become a part of our daily life, making it almost surreal. I am sure that the consequences are well known to representatives. I want to point out, however, that, according to the latest statistics, the number of cases of thyroid-gland cancer among Belarusian children in the areas affected was 22 times greater in 1991 than in the pre-Chernobyl period, and in Belarus as a whole there was a sevenfold increase. A comparison will show that the rate of cancer of the thyroid among children in Belarus is four times higher than the highest world levels - I emphasize "the highest world levels" - and that in the worst-affected area of the Republic, Gomel, the factor is nine. Every individual will be aware of the horrible significance of these figures.

However, we are trying to rise above our national pain. While suggesting serious reform of the functions and activities of IAEA, we want to ensure that the international community will protect not only our children but also the future children of other nations. We are concerned that the Agency should get a breath of fresh air so that it might proceed to a new stage of development.

(Mr. Kravchanka, Belarus)

The creation of IAEA was the expression of the aspiration of the international community to subordinate the achievements in science and technology to the interests of peace and the progress of man. Today, we appeal to the world community to engage in joint efforts to transform IAEA of the 1960s and 1970s into an international forum of the twenty-first century.

Before concluding my statement I wish to take this opportunity to draw attention to an important declaration adopted recently by the Supreme Soviet of Belarus on the principles of the external political activity of the Republic. On the basis of constitutional law - the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus - and of the decree of the Supreme Soviet on ensuring the political and economic independence of the Republic, the legislature of my country confirmed its commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as international obligations assumed by the Republic under international treaties, including the International Covenants on Human Rights.

(Mr. Kravchenko, Belarus)

The Supreme Soviet of Belarus has declared the Republic's readiness to accede to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to undertake the obligations falling under the instruments included in the CSCE process.

In the same declaration, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic requested the leaders of the parliaments of States members of the CSCE to admit the Republic as a full-fledged member of that Conference, and proposed that negotiations begin on eliminating nuclear weapons and declaring the European continent a nuclear-free zone.

In its foreign policy activities, the Government of Belarus will proceed on the basis of those objectives. One of the priorities of those activities is the continuation and deepening of cooperation with the international community in supporting programmes to minimize the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

Mr. VAN SCHAIK (Netherlands): I shall speak on behalf of the European Community and its member States.

I should first of all like to express the appreciation of the European Community and its member States to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, and his staff for their outstanding contribution to the work of the Agency. Recent developments in the world have shown that there is an increasingly important role for the Agency to play in promoting and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology and in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community has an important stake in the continued effectiveness of the Agency's work in these fields.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

On two issues the Agency's work has been particularly prominent - namely, nuclear safety, especially safety of nuclear-power generation; and non-proliferation and safeguards.

On the issue of nuclear safety, the Nuclear Safety Conference, held in Vienna at the beginning of September this year, produced a number of promising results, some of which were taken up by the General Conference. The European Community and its member States, which took the initiative for this Conference, particularly welcome in this context the adoption of a resolution on measures to strengthen international cooperation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection. The resolution recognizes the value of following a step-by-step approach to a framework convention for the promotion of an international safety regime. It invites the Director General to prepare an outline of the possible elements for such a convention for the Board's consideration by February 1992 at the latest.

We also welcome the results of the International Chernobyl Project, which have been published recently. The Project has examined the assessments of the radiological and health situation in areas of the USSR affected by the Chernobyl accident, and provides guidelines for follow-up projects. The Twelve will make every effort to contribute to these projects also. A recent example of such cooperation is the IAEA Project for the Safety of Older Reactors. We have participated actively in expert missions and studies on the safety of VVER 440-230 reactors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Following an appeal by the Bulgarian Government, the Community and several of its member States, together with the Bulgarian Government, the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), decided to provide immediate financial and technical assistance to improve safety conditions in Kozloduy.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Regarding the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, I am pleased to announce that all 12 member States of the Community have acceded to the Convention. The European Community and its member States welcome the adoption of a resolution by the thirty-fifth General Conference requesting the Director General to report regularly on the status of the Convention, in particular with a view to preparing for a review conference of the Convention to be held in 1992.

With regard to the second issue - non-proliferation and safeguards - the accession of more States to the non-proliferation Treaty is indeed good news. With France's decision to accede, all States members of the European Community will be parties to the Treaty. We commend the five African States - Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - that have taken the decision to become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, and we trust more States in Africa will accede. In particular, South Africa's ratification and subsequent signing of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the agreement's immediate entry into force on the first day of the thirty-fifth General Conference will contribute substantially to the prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free Africa. Furthermore, Albania's decision to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and China's announcement of such a decision illustrate even more how universal the objective of non-proliferation has become. Argentina and Brazil are close to agreeing on the text of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has accepted the text of a safeguards agreement with the Agency. However, the Twelve expressed concern during the General Conference over the long delays in the signing, entry into force and implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Democratic

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

People's Republic of Korea and the Agency. It should be borne in mind that the conclusion of a safeguards agreement was already long overdue.

The adoption of a resolution by the thirty-fifth General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East is seen by the European Community and its member States as an important breakthrough towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

The European Community and its member States are greatly concerned over the Director General's report based on the inspection reports of the six nuclear inspection missions to Iraq. Each successive mission to Iraq has made it increasingly clear that the international concern about Iraq's nuclear ambitions was well-founded.

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

Not only has Iraq violated its safeguards agreement with the Agency; it has also wilfully disregarded its commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty by actively pursuing the nuclear weapons option and building a very substantial enrichment and weaponizing programme. On several occasions, notably during the sixth inspection mission, Iraq violated the provisions concerning the privileges and immunities of the inspectors.

The violation of Iraq's safeguards agreement has shown the urgent need for taking measures to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. The work undertaken by the Agency in analysing and developing concrete steps for improving the system are to be commended. The Twelve have proposed to the thirty-fifth General Conference as a first step, and as a matter of priority, that it take a set of relatively straightforward measures that could be implemented immediately. These measures should include: (1) an obligation for States to declare any new facilities to the Agency at least 180 days before construction work begins; (2) an obligation to declare civilian nuclear materials, including uranium ore concentrate - yellow cake - produced in the territory of a State; (3) effective use by the Agency of special inspections, including the use of such inspections in relation to undeclared nuclear facilities; (4) establishment by the IAEA of a universal register of exports and imports of sensitive nuclear equipment; (5) at the discretion of the Agency, verification that (a) such equipment is actually located in a safeguarded facility and that (b) all nuclear materials processed in that facility are effectively safeguarded; and (6) an obligation to notify the Board of Governors of any application for exemption under the terms of articles 36 and 37 of INFCIRC/153, before accepting such an application.

(Mr. Van Echaik, Netherlands)

We look forward to further examination of this issue and hope that a number of conclusive decisions can be taken soon.

We also want to mention briefly the effects that the emergence of States in Central and Eastern Europe will have on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Twelve trust that emerging States will fully abide by the international obligations deriving from the former parental State-structures, in a way that will maintain or even enhance the international norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We recognize the Agency's vital contribution to making the benefits of nuclear technology available to all regions of the world. The European Community and its member States support the Agency's efforts in this direction, particularly in bringing technical expertise to bear on safety problems. In an ever-growing number of countries, nuclear technology has become an important element in economic development. The IAEA programme for scientific and technical cooperation is an important dimension of the Agency. We have always attributed a high priority to these activities and the importance we attach to them is amply reflected by the steady increase of resources over the past 10 years. I would like to emphasize, with reference to my earlier remarks on safeguards, that improvement of the safeguards system would facilitate more enhanced forms of assistance and cooperation.

The choice of nuclear energy is an important element in the energy strategy of several Member States. At the same time, Governments and public opinion worldwide have become more and more aware of how energy production affects health, safety and the environment. The statement made a few moments ago by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belarus was also very relevant on this point. Governments are faced with the difficult task of reconciling

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

environmental challenges, security of supply and economic competitiveness. In this respect, the Twelve take note of the outcome of the Helsinki Symposium on Electricity and the Environment.

Given the challenges it has faced this past year, it is appropriate that the Agency is now engaged in the process of preparing a medium-term plan. The main difficulty in preparing such a plan will be the establishment of priorities among the competing interests of Member States. The executive summary of the draft plan prepared by the Agency has gone a long way in that direction. The European Community and its member States support the main thrust of the summary, although a thorough exchange of views between member States will be needed before the medium-term plan can be adopted.

Let me conclude by stating the firm wish of the European Community and its member States that the close cooperation which exists at present between them and the Agency should continue to develop successfully.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I shall begin by conveying, on behalf of the Pakistan delegation, our sincere felicitations to Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his lucid and important statement on the activities of the Agency for 1990. We commend Mr. Blix and his colleagues for their exemplary dedication and commitment to the work of the Agency and to its objectives and responsibilities. Pakistan has always attached utmost importance to the work and the aims of the IAEA, and particularly to the assistance provided by the Agency to Member States, including Pakistan, in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This has made an invaluable contribution to our developmental efforts.

Most developing countries suffer from an acute energy crisis and need to harness all energy resources, both in conventional and nuclear energy, in

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

order to overcome their crippling energy shortages and to escape from poverty and underdevelopment. The assistance provided to the developing countries by the Agency in assessing the role of nuclear power in their national energy plans has been commendable. The introduction of nuclear techniques in the fields of food and agriculture, medicine and physical sciences has made an extremely useful contribution to their efforts to attain socio-economic development.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

Pakistan greatly appreciates the continuing efforts of IAEA to help strengthen the infrastructure for the planning, establishment and safe operation of nuclear-power projects in the developing countries through intraregional and international training courses and technical cooperation projects.

The Agency's efforts in promoting nuclear safety world-wide are commendable. The Agency provides a forum for the international exchange of ideas on safety issues and many other diverse areas related to nuclear energy. The nuclear-safety colloquium held every year since 1985 during the General Conference provides a rare opportunity to review and exchange ideas on current safety issues and future programmes. Pakistan recommends that this event, which has proved its usefulness, should be continued on a regular basis.

Similarly, the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme, which was initiated by the Agency in 1983 to assist national authorities regularly in the review of operating nuclear power plants, has proved to offer a unique opportunity for everyone to benefit from the expertise and experience of others.

The Agency is playing an increasingly important role in nuclear-power-plant safety through the expansion of its nuclear-safety programme. The activities in this area have been greatly influenced by the Chernobyl incident. The Radiation Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) programme of the Agency, which is designed to promote adequate radiation-protection practices, would prove beneficial not only for regulatory bodies but also for radiation-management groups and plant workers.

The Incident Reporting System (IAEA-IRS), which is designed to derive benefit from the experience of others through the feedback of information, is

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

expected to enhance safety and reliability. The systematic reporting and evaluation of safety-related events may prove to be helpful in the identification of design modifications and the development of improved operational procedures. Ever since its inception, Pakistan has been actively participating in this programme.

Pakistan is greatly appreciative of the efforts being made by the Agency to extend the Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams Services to all member States. In our view, these missions would definitely contribute to the improvement of the operational safety of nuclear power plants.

We welcome the Agency's initiatives in the field of safety and radiological protection. Pakistan has already acceded to two safety conventions, namely the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

Pakistan has actively sought to promote an international agreement prohibiting attacks against all nuclear facilities. Pakistan has concluded an agreement with India not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. We believe that such agreements would enhance nuclear safety. However, the growing tendency to use nuclear safety issues for restricting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology is regrettable and should be avoided.

Pakistan has always adhered to and will continue to lend its fullest support to the Agency safeguards. Pakistan has time and again reaffirmed at the highest level its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In an effort to keep the world free from the scourge of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has been calling for the prohibition of

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

nuclear testing. Pakistan has in addition made several proposals to India to keep our own region free of nuclear weapons.

Our proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly since 1974. As recently as 6 June 1991, the Prime Minister of Pakistan made an important proposal designed to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister's proposal calls for consultations by the United States, the Soviet Union and China with India and Pakistan to ensure nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia.

We are encouraged by the positive response to the Prime Minister's proposal by many countries and hope that India will also respond positively. This proposal genuinely reflects our desire to ensure that nuclear weapons do not enter our region and undermine our peace and security.

We believe that a proper balance should be maintained between the funds allocated for technical assistance and those provided for safeguards. The amounts allocated for technical assistance do not correspond to the urgent need of the developing countries for the expansion of their nuclear-energy programmes. This trend has to be arrested and a higher percentage of the budget provided for technical assistance. Moreover, as in the case of nuclear safeguards, the technical assistance activities of IAEA should also be financed through predictable and assured sources of funding.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate Pakistan's total commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is our earnest and sincere hope that the Agency, in keeping with its charter and mandate, will assign top priority to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This has become all the more important, as developing countries are

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

confronted with increasing resistance from some States in their efforts to obtain technology for the development and advancement of their peaceful-nuclear-energy programmes.

The General Assembly, in resolution 32/50, has categorically affirmed that

"All States have the right, in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality, to develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs". (resolution 32/50, para. 1 (b))

The resolution also clearly states that

"All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy". (resolution 32/50, para. 1 (c))

Pakistan believes that all States Members of the United Nations should abide by these principles in order to check and reverse the negative trends impeding cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In recent years, nuclear-reactor accidents have underlined the essential need for the proper maintenance and repair of nuclear reactors. Yet in certain cases, essential spare parts are not being provided for reactors even when they are under Agency safeguards. This situation is totally unjustified and requires urgent redress. We call upon the supplier States to provide full maintenance coverage for the reactors provided by them.

Finally, Pakistan is pleased to join in support of the draft resolution (A/46/L.10) on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. HOHENFELLNER (Austria): First I should like to express Austria's appreciation of the work of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the whole Secretariat during a particularly difficult year. The exemplary manner in which Director General Hans Blix is conducting the work merits our gratitude and respect. The Agency which is more than ever the focus of world-wide interest will continue to need our support in carrying out its important tasks.

In my statement today I shall concentrate on two main issues: improving the safeguards regime; and providing a safety system.

The nuclear safeguards regime is recognized more and more widely as an essential feature of a stable and peaceful world order. After the relevant declarations of France and China in the course of the past year an important expectation of the original Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is about to be realized. The basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is being widened and the system based on it will be strengthened.

We also welcome the decision of Argentina and Brazil to establish an international safeguards system on the basis of a bilateral treaty and to sign an agreement with the IAEA for its implementation.

A further important development is the accession of South Africa to the Non-Proliferation Treaty followed by the signing of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This agreement has already come into force.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty regime needs a safeguards system to be credible and we appeal to Non-Proliferation Treaty members which have not yet done so to conclude safeguards agreements as they are obliged to do.

(Mr. Hohenfellner, Austria)

We express our hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will sign and implement its agreement with the IAEA in the near future as a follow-up consistent with the steps it has already taken.

We also appeal to all States that are not yet members of the non-proliferation regime to assist in the global effort to curb the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons by joining.

The failure of Iraq to comply with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA was a violation of international law and a breach of international confidence. It has also given rise to criticism regarding the efficiency of the existing safeguards system. Constructive criticism is always welcome but it would be a mistake - although logical - to think that the inadequacy of a safeguards system implies that international safeguards systems cannot work. As the events of the past year have demonstrated the international community needs improved systems to ensure that international obligations are fulfilled.

We wish to express our appreciation to the Director General and his staff for the excellent work they have done in implementing the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Let me now come to the important development during the last year in the field of nuclear safety. The members of the IAEA are aware that Austria, by national legislation based on a referendum, has forgone the option of using nuclear fission energy for the purpose of electricity production. The Austrian Government would like this national decision and the reasons that led to it to be studied and our example followed by other States, especially by our neighbours. Both in bilateral discussions and in multilateral forums this Austrian position has been made perfectly clear.

(Mr. Hohenfellner, Austria)

But we are aware that with respect to this question the international community is a pluralistic society. In this situation it is logical for any country, whether or not it has nuclear power plants, to be interested in ensuring that nuclear power plants are as safe as possible.

The International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power, held in Vienna at the beginning of September 1991, laid down a good foundation on which the competent organs of the IAEA can begin to build a sound structure. Its architecture will have to be designed in close cooperation between member States and the Secretariat, between policy makers and experts. We hope that an international nuclear-safety convention will be the outcome of this effort.

We are convinced that the tasks of the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety will grow, and I wish to refer particularly to those tasks arising from the problems created by technically obsolete and ageing power reactors.

Technical assistance and cooperation is another important element of the Agency's programme. The predominant portion of requests from member States relates to non-power applications of nuclear technologies, notably in the field of public health, agriculture and mining.

Briefly outlined, the activities of the IAEA span from the NPT regime to insect and pest control, but they have a common aim: the benefit of mankind.

Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland): The enlightening statement by Dr. Hans Blix on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1990 provides us with a suitable opportunity to commend the indispensable role played by the IAEA in promoting international cooperation in the field of the peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

Poland welcomes recent positive developments in the field of non-proliferation, such as the declarations by France and China on their accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is difficult to overestimate the significance of such accession for the future of the non-proliferation regime. It is also with satisfaction that my country notes the adherence to the NPT of the Republic of South Africa. It means that a first stone for the foundation of a nuclear-free zone in Africa has been laid down. We also hope that the standard NPT-type agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will soon enter into force. Those are heartening events.*

At the same time, as the Gulf crisis has shown, continuing efforts are needed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The principle of full-scope safeguards should be adopted by all nuclear exporters as a precondition for all transfers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to other countries.

In this connection my country supports the idea of special inspection under the NPT safeguards agreements. We may expect the inspectors to have full access to relevant information and to any location, without the right of refusal.

Another important issue that deserves our attention is the IAEA's strategy for the future in nuclear safety. At the beginning of September this year the International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power was concluded

* The President returned to the Chair.

(Mr. Mrogliewica, Poland)

in Vienna. This Conference helped to agree on the agenda for nuclear safety work in the next decade. My delegation expresses the confidence that, according to the Conference's decision, a suitable group of experts will be set up to establish safety criteria for the design and use of future reactors. But the most significant result of the Conference is the idea of working out a framework convention on nuclear safety to ensure the commitment of the parties to the strengthening of nuclear safety at every stage, including the safe disposal of nuclear waste.

Technology transfer is also an indispensable element of the peaceful and safe development of nuclear energy. Poland is of the view that no member State should be denied the Agency's technological assistance provided that it is delivered in compliance with the IAEA statute.

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

It seems appropriate to stress that the issue of technology transfer should incorporate necessary assistance to countries that are considering committing themselves to nuclear power. It is therefore necessary to develop mechanisms for sponsoring nuclear power where it is economically and ecologically superior to other energy options.

One of the many useful activities of the Agency is the search for a solution to the problem of transboundary consequences of major nuclear accidents under the aspect of international liability. Poland welcomes the progress made in the Standing Committee on liability for Nuclear Damage towards the establishment of a new comprehensive and universal regime in this area. Such a regime might be established through an extensive revision of the relevant Vienna Convention. Poland believes that ongoing work to establish a new regime of international liability for nuclear damage is indeed one of the most important activities of the Agency.

Poland's commitment to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, motivated by lofty considerations of international peace and security, development needs and safety requirements, is a profound one. My country highly appreciates the Agency's activity with regard to preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear power industry and other areas such as food preservation, medicine and environmental protection.

Our appreciation of the Agency's activities and recognition of its central role in international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy will find due reflection in our support for the draft resolution before us.

Mr. SARDENBERG (Brazil): As Brazil has the double privilege of being a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

Agency (IAEA) and of having had a Brazilian representative, Mr. José Luis de Santana Carvalho, preside over the thirty-fifth General Conference of that organisation, it is with particular pleasure that I express my delegation's appreciation for the report that has been submitted by the Agency to the General Assembly. Moreover, a word of recognition must go to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, for his skill and dedication in the performance of his mandate.

Let me start by stressing the importance the Government of Brazil attaches to the work of the Agency in all its fields. Based on its threefold vocation - namely, the promotion and overseeing of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the provision of services in the area of nuclear safety and radiological protection and the advancement of a safeguards verification system - the Agency's history speaks of valuable achievements in its efforts to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, as defined in its statute.

Brazil believes that the Agency's capability of further advancing its objectives lies, to a great extent, in its ability to strike and maintain the necessary and appropriate balance among the various spheres of its work.

On many occasions, Brazil, like many other countries, has profited from the Agency's experience and competence. Last year, an IAEA mission was sent to assist the Government of Brazil on the problem of waste disposal resulting from the radiological emergency that occurred in Goiânia in 1987. This assistance proved to be a contribution of particular importance in our efforts to find a suitable and definitive solution to such a serious matter.

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

Likewise, throughout the years, Brazil has gained much from IAEA technical cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. More recently, we have also pursued a more active role in sharing our experience with other countries, notably in Latin America, through the Technical Cooperation Programme and the Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL), both highly commendable and successful initiatives.

In November 1990 at the border city of Foz do Iguacu, President Fernando Collor of Brazil and President Carlos Menem of Argentina signed a landmark document, the Declaration of Common Nuclear Policy, in which both countries reaffirmed their commitment to the exclusively peaceful purposes of their nuclear energy programmes. In addition, as the representative of Argentina has mentioned, the Declaration provided for the adoption of three additional and consecutive steps to be taken in that regard: the establishment of a Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), which applies to all nuclear activities in the two countries; the negotiation with the Agency of a comprehensive Joint Safeguards Agreement, based on and covering the same ground as the SCCC; and the adoption of measures conducive to the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including the improvement and updating of some of its clauses.

With a view to taking the first of those steps, Brazil and Argentina signed on 18 July 1991, at the Mexican city of Guadalajara, a bilateral agreement on the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, which provides for the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

As stated by President Collor at the signing ceremony:

"The agreement goes far beyond the sphere of bilateral relations [between Argentina and Brazil]. For its dimension and significance the agreement has a life of its own: it translates and gives substance to our commitment to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and it provides for transparent procedures through which that commitment will be made clear to the international community."

Moreover, as an expression of their determination to expedite the implementation of the initiative, Brazil and Argentina took the decision to engage immediately on the second phase stipulated by the Fox do Iguacu Declaration. Hence, both countries entered into negotiations with the Agency, and I am pleased to report that the sixth negotiating meeting between Argentina, Brazil and the Agency is scheduled to start today in Rio de Janeiro. We look forward to an early conclusion and signing of a safeguards agreement.

In Brazil we are convinced that growing mutual confidence and increased scientific and technological interchange in the field of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy may contribute to the never-ending endeavour of fostering human well-being. Needless to say, the International Atomic Energy Agency has a pivotal role to play in this regard, and Brazil stands ready to do its share.

Mr. HOU Zhilong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): We have listened carefully to the statement made by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), introducing the 1990 annual report of the Agency. Over the past year, IAEA has carried out many important activities and achieved many positive results. It has also played its due role in implementing Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the subsequent resolution 707 (1991). We highly praise what the Agency has done over the past year. We should also like to express our appreciation for the contribution made by Mr. Blix.

China has always closely followed the work of IAEA and attached importance to developing relations with the Agency. In the past year China has actively supported and participated in the work of the Technical Committee on design requirements of advanced water reactors and on uranium provinces in the Asia-Pacific region. China has hosted and financed six regional training courses and Technical Committee meetings. We continue to use our nuclear facilities and research bases to train scientists and technicians from the developing countries, particularly the Asia-Pacific countries. It has also sent experts in different fields to other developing countries to provide technical services. In carrying out technical assistance and cooperative projects, China has been actively exploring ways and means to raise the implementation rate and has enhanced project evaluation and management. Nuclear safety and radiation protection are important aspects of our cooperation with the Agency. We believe that, as measures for international cooperation in nuclear safety and radiation protection continue to strengthen, the cooperative relationship between China and the Agency in nuclear safety will expand further. China's voluntary submission of some of its civilian

(Mr. Hou Zhilong, China)

nuclear facilities to the Agency's safeguards is an indication of the full-fledged development of its relations with the Agency. We support the Agency's efforts to raise the effectiveness of safeguards.

Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as enlarging nuclear energy's contribution to mankind is one of the two objectives of the Agency's activities set forth in the IAEA Statute. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate and just right and in the interest of all countries. Since the 1980s many developing countries have begun to engage in the development and utilization of nuclear energy and to call for international cooperation in this field. This is fully justified and reasonable. More extensive and in-depth international exchanges and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will, without any doubt, contribute to the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy in these countries. However, the current state of international cooperation is far from satisfactory, and many difficulties and problems still exist.

We consider it necessary, in carrying out international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for countries concerned to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including nuclear explosive devices. These are the prerequisites of nuclear cooperation. However, this should not hamper or restrict international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, thereby compromising the legitimate rights and interests of countries, particularly the developing countries, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Chinese Government has always followed a positive, prudent and responsible policy with regard to international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. China adheres to three basic principles in its nuclear

(Mr. Hou Zhitong, China)

export. These are: its exclusive use for peaceful purposes, acceptance of the IAEA safeguards, and non-transfer to third countries without China's prior consent.

China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It does not advocate, encourage or engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor does it assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is one of the most universal international treaties in the field of arms control and disarmament. The Treaty has played an important role in preventing nuclear proliferation and therefore is conducive to the maintenance of world peace and stability. Taken as a whole, the non-proliferation Treaty is of positive significance. We support the three major objectives of the Treaty - that is to say, preventing nuclear proliferation, promoting nuclear disarmament, and facilitating international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Last year the Chinese Government sent its observer to the Fourth Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. In August this year China declared its decision in principle to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. China will, as always, actively engage in international cooperation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Looking to the future, the Agency faces opportunities and challenges. We are confident that as long as all parties strictly abide by the statute and adhere to the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and consultation on an equal footing, the International Atomic Energy Agency will, with the active participation of all its member States, fulfil the onerous tasks entrusted to it by our times and achieve the objectives set out in its statute. China is ready, together with other member States, to continue to make its due

(Mr. Hou Zhitong, China)

contribution to the thriving and ever-expanding cause of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the world.

The Chinese delegation supports draft resolution A/46/L.10.

Mr. PADILLA (United States of America): On behalf of the United States, my delegation wishes to express its strong support for the draft resolution before the General Assembly today regarding the 1990 annual report submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As my Government has often stated, IAEA is an organization of critical importance to the international community, including the United States. As demonstrated in its report to the General Assembly, the Agency continues to play a vital role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in fostering international peace and security.

We should also like to commend Director General Hans Blix and the IAEA secretariat for the diligence and commitment they have demonstrated in carrying out the Agency's statutory responsibilities, most recently in regard to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraq. These are the qualities which have contributed so significantly to the Agency's success.

(Mr. Padilla, United States)

The decade of the 1990s began with rapid and breathtaking change. It is from this historical backdrop - from the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the iron curtain across Eastern and Central Europe and the failure of the August coup attempt in the Soviet Union, to efforts to dismantle apartheid in South Africa and the concerted efforts of the world community to block Iraqi aggression - that the United Nations and the entire United Nations system, including IAEA, have had to redefine the meaning of international cooperation and consider anew the best way to bring it about.

Amidst all these changes, IAEA has maintained a solid record of achievement in its vital role of fostering international peace and security, by promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through the application of international safeguards and the facilitation of technical cooperation. Throughout the years, IAEA has consistently served the interests of its members and the world community in a variety of ways.

The foundation of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy rests with IAEA's extensive, effective and unique system of safeguards, which provide assurances that transfers of nuclear technology and information will not be diverted for military purposes and thereby undermine international peace and stability. In the absence of the IAEA's safeguards system, suspicion rather than trust would probably characterize international nuclear trade. This, in turn, would likely lead to a climate of tension rather than cooperation among States and place severe constraints on international nuclear cooperation and trade.

As a result of the Gulf war, IAEA was called upon to assist in the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991), to

(Mr. Padilla, United States)

inspect, sequester and destroy Iraqi nuclear-weapon-related capabilities, materials and equipment. IAEA has responded resourcefully and effectively to the challenges involved in fulfilling such a task. Despite frustrating and sometimes even hazardous conditions, Agency inspectors have shown courage and commitment in refusing to be diverted from their goal. The case of Iraq has given new impetus to international efforts to strengthen and expand the Agency's safeguards system to ensure adherence to non-proliferation commitments, especially in fulfilling obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

At the same time as Iraq was challenging the global norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation, other nations took concrete steps to preserve it. The United States has welcomed the accession of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, as well as the commitments of France and the People's Republic of China to accede to the Treaty. We also look forward to the early conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with Argentina and Brazil. We welcome the fact that a safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. However, that country has yet to carry out its obligations to sign and ratify the agreement and bring it into force, as required by its obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Agency provides technical assistance tailored to the specific needs of its member States, whether the ultimate goal is energy production, improvement of food and agricultural productivity or improvement of medical techniques. Assistance is geared towards helping member States achieve self-reliance in nuclear science and technology.

(Mr. Padilla, United States)

The 1990 IAEA annual report makes clear the extent of the Agency's activities which benefit the developing world. IAEA has assisted countries in all aspects of nuclear-power planning and development, from the exploration and mining of uranium resources to the production of nuclear reactor materials, to the safe disposal of nuclear wastes.

Yet, as extensive as the Agency's nuclear-power programme is, requests for assistance in the non-nuclear-power technologies represent over 70 per cent of all IAEA requests for technical cooperation. For example, in agriculture, the IAEA implements a variety of programmes to improve crop and animal production. It has also assisted countries in developing food irradiation facilities to protect and preserve scarce food resources. In medicine, IAEA continues to work with member States to identify better methods for diagnosing and treating cancer, as part of its overall programme devoted to radiotherapy and dosimetry.

Clearly it is impossible in this forum to detail IAEA's many technical cooperation initiatives. Suffice it to say that the IAEA's work touches in a very positive way the lives of many across the globe. It is also important to note, of course, that grant aid for technical cooperation grew by about 6 per cent from 1989 to 1990 - ignoring accounting distortions caused by devaluations of non-convertible currencies - while the regular budget continued to show no real growth. This is due to steady increases over the past few years in the voluntary contributions which supply the grants for technical assistance.

In reflecting upon the Agency's accomplishments in nuclear safety and radiological protection, we note with particular interest the project for international assistance in assessing the safety of older nuclear reactors,

(Mr. Padilla, United States)

which focuses on the Soviet-designed VVER-440/230 reactors. This project will provide an important contribution to international efforts to improve the operating safety of these reactors.

During 1990 IAEA sponsored the International Chernobyl project. The project was initiated at the request of the USSR, to conduct an assessment of the current state of the health and environmental effects of the Chernobyl accident in the three affected Republics and to evaluate the protective measures taken. Fact-finding missions visited the affected areas and prepared preliminary reports under the auspices of an international advisory committee. We believe the conclusions and recommendations of this assessment provide a very useful contribution to international efforts to understand these effects. We look forward to a careful international review of the full report, which has just been published.

The adoption by last year's General Conference of the code of practice on transboundary movements of radioactive waste marked the completion of several years of intensive discussion of these issues. We eagerly await the widespread adoption of the code, followed by an ongoing evaluation of its effectiveness.

Additionally, the Agency welcomed the convening of the International Conference on Nuclear Power in September of 1991 to provide an opportunity for the international community to define the nuclear safety agenda for the next decade. The Conference reaffirmed the vital necessity of continuing to promote the highest level of nuclear safety world wide and of strengthening international cooperation in nuclear safety and radiological protection. We

(Mr. Padilla, United States)

look forward to the prompt development of well-considered, step-by-step measures to implement that meeting's important recommendations.

My Government wishes to commend IAEA for its invaluable contribution to international peace and security. The United States pledges its continuing support for the work of IAEA.

Mr. I Ali (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): The delegation of Iraq wishes to refer to some issues pertaining to the report presented by Dr. Blix, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the observations of other delegations, with a view to putting the facts in a proper, objective context.

First, Iraq has fully and definitively revealed all aspects of its nuclear programme. All information, documents and equipment relating to that programme have been delivered to the inspection teams.

Secondly, Iraq has cooperated fully with the inspection teams. It has facilitated their entry to all sites to which they requested entry. Iraq maintained that the inspection teams must point out which sites they wished to visit, and said that they could do so without prior notice. Indeed, the leaders of the inspection teams declared that they had received the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities.

Thirdly, the so-called breach by Iraq of the safeguards agreement is no more than a purely technical matter which has been grossly exaggerated far beyond its real size and exploited for well-known political purposes. Enrichment experimentation takes place in many laboratories in the world. This includes experiments on laser technology and centrifugal forces, as in the cases of Japan, Canada and Australia. The Agency is not informed of such experiments. This is a fact the Agency itself cannot deny.

Fourthly, all redress measures under the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Iraq have been carried out fully and meticulously. It must be stated here that the implementation of the safeguards agreement should apply to all States according to one single criterion. I should like to mention just one example of the multiplicity of criteria and of the discrimination in the

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

treatment of States. In 1981, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 487 (1981), which requested Israel to place all its installations under the safeguards regime. What has happened with regard to the implementation of that resolution? I shall tell the Assembly: it was shelved, not implemented. It may not have escaped anyone that no mention of these facts has been made by the Director General of the Agency this year, or in any previous year. Similarly, the United States of America and its allies have not spoken of this matter or referred to it - even remotely. I do hope that the representatives of the United States and of its allies have acquainted themselves with the report on page 1 of the New York Times of 20 October 1991 on the huge nuclear arsenal possessed by Israel. What credibility does the Agency now have? What is the credibility of the United States and its allies, who claim to support the non-proliferation Treaty? The United States and its allies have provided Israel with very large quantities of equipment and nuclear technology, without the Agency's knowledge. Thus, they have enabled Israel to develop nuclear weapons - indeed, to become the only State in the region that possesses such weapons today. Are Members prepared to condemn the United States and its allies for this irresponsible behaviour?

Fifthly, all nuclear activities have ceased since the beginning of the war of aggression against Iraq on 16 January 1991. Iraq decided to abandon its nuclear programme following its acceptance of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It has carried out widespread destruction of its equipment, components and installations, as well as documents concerning the nuclear programme in Iraq. Furthermore, all the cadres who were engaged in the nuclear programme have been moved over to the reconstruction of the

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infrastructures of the country which have been destroyed by the war. Others now pursue non-nuclear activities, as university lecturers, environmental researchers, specialists in soil desalination, and so forth. For this reason, any talk of an ongoing nuclear programme in Iraq is illusory nonsense. Such allegations are being made with the purpose of distorting the image of Iraq and justifying aggression against the country. How could a nuclear programme be maintained without any nuclear materials, without laboratories, without equipment or anything else? These are claims that have no foundation in reality.

Sixthly, the attempts by some inspection teams, clearly supported by the United States and its allies - indeed, under the direct orders of the United States - to distort the facts, exaggerate and create problems are obviously only a means of perpetuating the activities of those teams in Iraq. These are dishonest attempts that have no relation with the implementation of Security Council resolutions. They are intended as false pretexts to justify continuing interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, to steal Iraqi technological information and hand over that information to Iraq's enemies and the enemies of the Arab nation. All this is in direct contradiction of the IAEA's commitment regarding the confidentiality of information. This is a matter that must be dealt with in depth, so that the world may be made aware of the direction in which this Agency is being steered. It is being transformed gradually into an organ of technical and scientific espionage, through its activities as a body that monitors armaments. The statute of the Agency has become a mere historical document, unrelated to the Agency's

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current activities. The Agency has contributed to the creation of pretexts for hampering any effort aimed at lifting the siege that is causing famine in Iraq, and is being exploited in achieving inhumane political objectives. This contradicts its real task which is to put atomic energy in the service of man.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

In conclusion, the delegation of Iraq wishes to recall that, over the past few years, Iraq joined in the consensus adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions relating to the International Atomic Energy Agency report, and point out that it did so because it was desirous to see concerted efforts by the international community to ensure the performance by the Agency of the tasks for which it was created and to intensify its activities in the areas of technical assistance, nuclear safety and all efforts aimed at promoting confidence in the role of nuclear energy in the service of mankind. This year, however, we find that the sponsors of draft resolution A/46/L.10 have inserted a new element for which we find no justification in operative paragraph 4 of that draft resolution. Therefore and in keeping with the comments I made at the beginning of my statement, it will be very difficult for the Iraqi delegation to accept such a paragraph in the draft resolution.

Mr. MORRIS (Australia): The Australian delegation would like to express its appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his detailed and comprehensive statement and for the report he has introduced on the operations of the IAEA.

As a founding member of the Agency, Australia has long been a strong supporter of the IAEA, and as a Vice-Chairman of its Board of Governors we heartily endorse the efforts of the Agency to strengthen its safeguards system and to improve the effectiveness of its nuclear safety and nuclear cooperation programmes.

The Gulf war underlined the dangers for international security when a State seeks to acquire capabilities in weapons of mass destruction. It demonstrated the importance of efforts to discourage proliferation. It showed

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

that the only long-term means to eliminate these weapons is through effective multilateral institutions of the sort represented by the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, the discovery of the extent of Iraq's violations of its obligations under the NPT also sent a sobering message that the international community will have to make that system even more effective.

We need to see clearly the enormity of Iraq's unrepentant violation of its obligation in the context of the Treaty's importance. The NPT and the IAEA's safeguards system are vital for international security. Without them the world could well be caught up in a vicious cycle of suspicion and nuclear armament. The NPT has been an extraordinarily successful arms control treaty and confidence-building measure. It continues to build up momentum towards universal adherence. Australia applauds warmly the long-awaited decision by France, China and South Africa to join the Treaty, and the decisions, too, of Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The accession to the Treaty of all five permanent members of the Security Council will be of the utmost importance in view of the political influence of the permanent five and their role in nuclear trade. We also welcome the statements of intent of the Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to accede to the Treaty.

The finding of the Agency's Board of Governors at an extraordinary session that Iraq had breached its non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement is the first and only such case in the history of the Treaty. At last month's IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Member States overwhelmingly adopted a resolution, of which Australia was a sponsor, condemning Iraq and

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

demanding that it comply immediately with all of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The international community must also deter other States that might contemplate developing a clandestine nuclear programme like Iraq's. The most effective way to do this is by strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system on which the regime depends.

At the recent IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, proposed a series of concrete and practical steps to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. These included the strict adherence by members of the NPT to their safeguards obligations; provision to the IAEA of information on new nuclear facilities at the earliest possible time; universal reporting to the IAEA of nuclear material and equipment transfers; unequivocal right of access by the IAEA to suspect sites through greater use of provisions for special inspections; tightened nuclear supply and export controls; and the adoption by all nuclear suppliers of full-scope safeguards as a condition for new nuclear policy. In this regard Australia is pleased that France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Switzerland have now decided to adopt that standard.

I would like now to amplify a little on a couple of the steps proposed by Senator Evans.

First, with respect to safeguards Australia is most concerned about the time it is taking to have NPT safeguards applied in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korea has operated for some time an unsafeguarded reactor and has, reportedly, been building other nuclear facilities. It is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the history of the NPT to have persisted

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

in operating an unsafeguarded facility after accession to the Treaty. It has thus left open the question of whether it is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. At its General Conference in September the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency. In welcoming this agreement the Board of Governors looked forward to the early signature, ratification and full implementation of the agreement. Accordingly, Australia calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with this resolution without delay.

In this regard, I must say that Australia remains concerned that in its recent statements the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to attach conditionality with regard to signature and implementation of its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. This is completely unacceptable when set against the commitment it made when it freely acceded to the Treaty. Its attitude can only serve to reinforce suspicions other countries have of its intentions.

In order to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, clearly we must strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. Non-nuclear-weapon States which operate unsafeguarded facilities inevitably generate suspicions about their nuclear intentions. The way is open to them to end that suspicion by accepting international legal obligations not to develop nuclear weapons.

IAEA safeguards are an essential part of the framework of international security. They are of crucial importance for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and for trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a major supplier of uranium to the nuclear energy programmes of

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

many IAEA member States, Australia has a particular interest in the effective application of safeguards.

Australia was very pleased that the resolution on the strengthening of safeguards that we introduced at the IAEA General Conference was adopted by consensus. It provided a clear indication of the importance placed on this issue by IAEA member States. Australia looks forward to working actively with other countries and with the IAEA secretariat to implement the resolution promptly.

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

The Director General has pointed out that the case of Iraq shows that Agency inspectors can uncover clandestine nuclear activities if three major conditions are fulfilled. These are that member countries provide intelligence information, that the Agency have an unequivocal right to inspect sites at short notice, and that the United Nations Security Council support such inspections. Australia agrees fully with these conditions.

Australia would like to commend the Agency for its execution of the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council under resolution 687 (1991). The Director General and his staff are to be commended for the professionalism that they have shown. The activities in respect of Iraq have been more demanding and arduous than any previous inspection task, and Australia has been pleased to contribute by providing expert personnel for the Agency's inspection teams. Operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/46/L.10, which Australia has submitted together with a broad range of other sponsors, reflects this satisfaction.

Before concluding, I should also like to refer to Australia's support for the Agency's technical cooperation programme. This constitutes fulfilment of our obligation under the non-proliferation Treaty to assist developing countries to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. Over the past year, Australia has been host to and has funded two IAEA training courses. We have provided training for 30 IAEA fellows in fields such as radiation protection and nuclear medicine. Australian scientists also undertook about 30 expert missions for IAEA technical assistance projects. Australia will contribute more than 1 million Australian dollars to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund for 1992. We will also continue to contribute extra funding for technical cooperation,

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particularly in support of the Agency's Regional Cooperative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific.

Finally, I would note that IAEA has a vital role to play through its technical work in nuclear safety. This is not a matter that can be left for individual States alone. The international community as a whole has a common interest in the highest safety standards for nuclear plants.

The past year has reminded those of us who had forgotten or had become complacent of the dangers of a world in which nuclear weapons proliferate. The forgetful and the complacent have now realized, once again, the crucial need for the nuclear non-proliferation regime to work well. We need to act to ensure that the non-proliferation regime responds to the rapid pace of change. But we need also to ensure universal acceptance of the basic fact that any international agreement, even one so manifestly in the common interest as the NPT, will work only when we all fulfil our obligations under it.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.