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SECOND COMMITTEE, 1377th MEETING

Friday, 8 October 1971, at 10.50 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Narciso G. REYES (Philippines).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Brito (Brazil), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

GENERAL STATEMENTS *(continued)*

and

AGENDA ITEM 12

Report of the Economic and Social Council [chapters III to VII, VIII (sections A to E), IX to XIV, XXI and XXII] *(continued)* (A/8403)

1. Mr. HOEUR LAY INN (Khmer Republic) said that his delegation appreciated the introductory statement made by the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs at the Committee's 1369th meeting, and endorsed the draft recommendations in the note by the Secretary-General (A/C.2/264), on the report of the Economic and Social Council, in particular those relating to Council resolution 1621 A (LI).

2. The Khmer people were Buddhists and were convinced that peace, security and hard work would enable them to advance their country from its underdeveloped state. They had therefore made a great effort to improve their well-being along the lines recommended by such United Nations bodies as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Khmer Republic was primarily an agricultural country. Since 1960, the 35,000 hectares of rubber plantations owned by foreign companies had been expanded by 50,000 hectares planted by rural families. Up to the end of 1970, the rice harvests had been sufficient to allow an annual export of 100,000 to 350,000 tons. Total earnings from rubber and rice exports had been approximately $80 million a year, enough to cover necessary imports. Tourism had also been a major source of earnings, centring around Angkor park. UNDP advice had been followed in the exploitation of tourist resources, and the number of foreign visitors had risen from 18,000 in 1960 to 60,000 in 1969. Industries had been established to process local raw materials, in keeping with the programme of UNIDO; prior to the present foreign aggression, there had been 3,000 small, medium-sized and large industrial enterprises. Under the terms of legislation and an agreement, the French Elf-Erap company was exploring the country's continental shelf for petroleum.

3. Where trade was concerned, the two main objectives of UNDP had been borne in mind. By 1969 all economic activities in the primary sector, 75 per cent of those in the secondary sector and 50 per cent of those in the tertiary sector had been liberalized, in order to encourage the mobilization of national and foreign capital. To promote the efficient utilization of investments, a law had been passed in March 1970 completely liberalizing banking and insurance, and many commercial and industrial State enterprises had been either de-nationalized or wound up. On the international level, the national currency, the riel, had been devalued from 35 to the United States dollar to 55.54, in order to make Khmer prices competitive on the world market.

4. All of the measures he had described had enabled the Government to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems of unemployment and low living standards. But suddenly, the results of those efforts had been wiped out by foreign aggression. Since 29 March 1970 Viet-Cong and North Viet-Namese hordes had been conducting a war to exterminate the Khmer nation and annex its territory, committing acts of genocide in the pursuit of their goals. Four northern provinces had been occupied, and the enemy was employing the bulk of its troops to destroy public, cultural and religious institutions as well as private housing. The death and devastation indulged in by the invaders had caused an influx of refugees from the north which had increased the population of Phnom-Penh, the capital, from 700,000 to 1.8 million, creating not only a refugee but also an unemployment problem.

5. However, as the Khmer Minister of State in charge of Foreign Affairs had recently stated in his address to the 1956th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the enemy's main effort was directed against the country's infrastructure. All of the rubber processing plants in the occupied area had been destroyed, and elsewhere attacks had been directed against channels of communication and transport, factories and industrial concerns of all types, even those established with foreign aid from China, France, the Soviet Union, the United States and Yugoslavia. The part-French refinery at Kompong Som had been bombed and put out of commission, as had large fuel depots close to the capital. More than 200 metal or concrete bridges with a total length of some 5,000 metres had been destroyed. The food supply of the over-populated capital was inadequate, and prices had increased. Rice production had been dangerously reduced, and to avoid famine it had been necessary to rescind international sales contracts and draw on export stocks. Tourism was now non-existent after enemy occupation of the Angkor complex, and the worst was to be feared, since the invading troops were ignoring the appeals made by the Secretary-General and by the

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to avoid in their operations the monuments which constituted a part of mankind's cultural heritage. The unlikelihood of such appeals being heeded was shown by the fact that the North Viet-Namese and Viet-Cong imperialists had already belied the optimism expressed in paragraph 40 of the Introduction to the report of the Secretary-General (A/8401/Add.1 and Corr.1) by attacking the construction site for the UNDP-financed Prek Thnot dam project, in which 12 countries were participating.

6. The Khmer Republic's current financial situation was that of a country at war. The strength of the army had been increased from 35,000 to 220,000 and the budget, normally 6,000 million riels, had been inflated in the current year to three times that figure. The Finance Minister was currently visiting friendly capitals with a view to creating an exchange stabilization fund.

7. Whatever the Viet-Namese and the Viet-Cong might do, the Khmer Republic would not yield. Thanks to the generous aid of understanding peoples, it had been able to halt the enemy and take the offensive. In spite of its gratitude, however, it must acknowledge that vast damage had already been done. As long as the aggression against it continued, its economic and social growth would be partly delayed because of the sacrifices which must be made to ensure survival and victory. Nevertheless, his Government had not turned its back on the future. The seventh general assembly of the Asian Parliamentarians Union had been invited to meet at Phnom-Penh in November 1971 to consider close co-operation in the economic, technological and social fields and to discuss problems relating to world peace. During the same month, a group of experts from the Asian Development Centre would also be visiting the Khmer Republic. However, in spite of the will of its people, the Government feared that it might have to disappoint the hopes of the Economic and Social Council with regard to the Second Development Decade. His delegation therefore wished to appeal for international co-operation in the vast programme of assistance and reconstruction which would have to be implemented after the cessation of hostilities.

8. Mr. LAGOS (Chile) said that discussion of the monetary crisis had tended to obscure the profound and far-reaching changes which had taken place between rich and poor countries in the past 25 years. The current crisis should be discussed in the context of the increasing gap between developed and developing countries, which was the key to the growing discontent of a large part of mankind. Between 1950 and 1970 the gross product of the world had increased by 2.7 times; however, from 1950 to 1968 the *per capita* growth rate in gross national product of the developing countries had been only 2.5 per cent, whereas that of the developed countries had been 3.3 per cent. Even more striking was the fact that during the First United Nations Development Decade the *per capita* growth rate in the rich countries had been more than double that in the poor countries.

9. That concentration of development in the already developed countries was confirmed by the rate of expansion of world trade; between 1948 and 1968 the average annual increase in the exports of the richer countries had been 7.9 per cent, whereas for the poorer countries it had been only 4.8 per cent. The share of the developing countries in world trade had thus fallen from 32 per cent in 1948 to 21 per cent in 1968. The position of Latin America was even worse: its share had fallen from 12 per cent to 6 per cent over the same period. What increase there had been in trade had been principally among the developed countries, and the developing countries had gained no benefit from it.

10. Capital investment, too, reflected the deteriorating situation of the poorer countries. It had long been maintained that one way of breaking out of the vicious circle of poverty, in which low *per capita* income was combined with high consumption, resulting in a low level of savings and investment, was through the influx of foreign capital. Whatever the merits of that argument might be, the fact remained that over the preceding 20 years the influx of foreign capital had slowed: in 1958, 55 per cent of investments by the United States, the most important exporter of capital, had been in developing countries, while in 1968 that figure had fallen to 40 per cent.

11. On all three counts, therefore, the situation of the developing countries was now worse than it had been 20 years before. Those countries had placed high hopes in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. However, a year after the adoption of that resolution many of the reservations made by the developed countries had been maintained, and no time-limits had been set for its implementation. For that reason, his delegation fully supported the comments of the representative of India at the 1376th meeting.

12. Nevertheless, the above analysis did not take into account the different situations existing both within the developed market-economy countries as a group and within the developing countries. Priority should be given to studying a definition of the least developed among the developing countries, in order that they could be given preferential treatment, as was the case among the members of the Andean Pact.

13. The only economic indicator for which the situation of the developing countries had improved was, paradoxically, participation in international currency and gold reserves. Between 1949 and 1969 the total world reserves had increased by 39 per cent, whereas the reserves of the developing countries had increased by 88 per cent. Their joint share in the total had increased over the same period from 15 per cent to 21 per cent. Unless compensatory measures were adopted, the current monetary crisis might jeopardize the improvement in their situation. The immediate cause of that crisis had been the decision by the United States Government to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold, impose a 10 per cent import surcharge and reduce foreign aid by 10 per cent. However, there were many other contributory factors, beginning with the basic weakness of the Bretton Woods agreements, which in practice meant the existence of a single international currency, the dollar, and to a lesser extent the Swiss franc. Consequently, the dollar was the reserve currency, and its supply depended on the currency surplus which the other countries were able to accumulate in terms of the United States balance of payments. That had been the situation up

to 1958, when the rest of the world had accumulated a surplus of $10,000 million. Since then other currencies had become convertible, but the United States balance of payments deficit had continued, as a result of the arms race, the war in South-East Asia and heavy United States investments in Europe, Canada and Japan.

14. The developing countries were in no way responsible for that situation, but the measures now being adopted affected them directly. Moreover, the unilateral steps which had been taken were a violation of international commitments against which his Government protested strongly. Its protest had been shared by the other Governments of Latin America at a recent meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for Latin American Co-ordination. It was worth recalling that when, faced with situations similar to those which now faced the powerful nations, the smaller and weaker countries had attempted to break the international rules of the game laid down by the developed countries, drastic and effective sanctions had immediately been applied against them. As his Government had pointed out at the meeting of the *Ad hoc* Committee, a system using the national currencies of developed countries as reserves, had inherent in it a certain instability. The developing countries had manifested their support for the separation of international monetary reserves from the national currency of any State; international reserves could not be dependent on the health of the balance of payments of the powerful nations. In restructuring the monetary system, the developed countries must avoid restrictive measures affecting the exports of developing countries. Changes must be made not within a small and privileged circle of rich countries, but on a world scale. The poor countries had a legal and moral right to be present when decisions were taken; one fifth of the world's reserves belonged to them, and it was their duty to be present when the new order was constructed.

15. In 1970 the election in Chile of a Government pledged to construct a socialist society had been the outcome and crystallization of a long period of struggle and experiment that had led the Chilean people to break with the past and embark upon a new and ambitious path. At the end of the last decade Chile had reached a crossroads in its development and history. Between 1960 and 1970 the annual gross national product had grown at the rate of 1.8 per cent while inflation had increased by an average of 28 per cent in the same period. The working classes had borne the brunt of anti-inflationary efforts and had experienced steadily increasing unemployment. On the other hand, the privileged sectors, whose income had risen during that period, had set a pattern of consumption which meant that only the services industries had expanded rapidly. In 1968, 1 per cent of the population enjoyed 10 per cent of the national income; the concentration of wealth and property in the hands of a minority was a salient feature of the Chilean economy.

16. Meanwhile, the traditional domination by foreign capital of Chile's natural resources was being extended to the manufacturing sector; some 40 of the country's largest enterprises were entirely under foreign control, and it was clear that the process of industrialization which had been intended to promote Chile's economic independence had in fact become a new and insidious form of imperialism.

17. By the end of the 1960s the Chilean economy was one of the most stagnant in Latin America, with a high unemployment rate, the highest *per capita* foreign debt and social tensions of every kind.

18. The new Government's first objective was the creation of three economic sectors, a social-property sector comprising all monopolistic enterprises which the Government considered necessary for its development strategy, a mixed sector and a private sector. Its second objective was to bring about a distribution of income that would meet the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the population, and its third objective was to accelerate and intensify agrarian reform. Those objectives were being achieved as rapidly as possible under the Chilean legal system. The National Congress, in which the Government was in a minority, had unanimously approved the nationalization of the copper industry, and, pending that, the President of the Republic had availed himself of his constitutional right and decreed that earnings from the industries to be nationalized over and above 12 per cent per annum should be considered as excess profits. That percentage was far higher than the profits obtained in its over-all international operations by the Anaconda Company and the Kennecott Copper Corporation between 1955 and 1970. It was also higher than the earnings of North American investors in the mining sector in such developed areas as western Europe and Canada.

19. In those circumstances, the figure of 12 per cent could not be described as arbitrary. Moreover, General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) had proclaimed the right of States to exploit freely their natural resources, and his Government was convinced that coercive measures against States which claimed economic sovereignty constituted an act of aggression unacceptable to the international community.

20. In addition to the nationalization of the copper industry, there had been marked progress in the area of social property. The participation of the working population had grown from 51 per cent to 60 per cent, and unemployment had fallen from 8.3 per cent in March 1971 to 4.8 per cent in September 1971. The industrial sector's growth had tripled over the previous year and copper production had risen by 10 per cent despite the upheaval created by the nationalization process. The Government had undertaken the construction of 70,000 dwellings, which was a project unprecedented in the history of Chile. All those statistics showed that Chile was a country in search of a new destiny.

21. Finally, his country hoped for the support and understanding of the international community. It had no wish to discourage foreign capital investment; on the contrary, it was anxious to redefine bases for investment consistent with the fundamental interests of the Chilean people.

Mr. Reyes (Philippines) took the Chair.

22. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya) recalled that at the 1779th meeting of the fifty-first session of the Economic and Social Council his delegation had warned the international community about the dangers inherent in the current international monetary situation and had pleaded for

co-ordinated action that would benefit both developed and developing countries. It firmly believed that unilateral, unco-ordinated action would not provide the solution. The situation was so bleak that it was absolutely imperative to find a solution that would harmonize the different parameters of the world economy. The economic interdependence brought about by scientific and technological advancement was such that the countries of the world could not develop in isolation. Science and technology were showing the need for rapid regional economic integration, and for concerted planning and action to harmonize activities in international trade, shipping, the application of science and technology to development, the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, human and social development, and the improvement of the human environment.

23. Economic and social ills respected no national boundaries and demonstrated the urgency for international co-operation in the context of the Second Development Decade. Ways and means of ensuring the success of the Decade had been discussed at the fifty-first session of the Economic and Social Council which had made a recommendation to the General Assembly concerning review and appraisal of the Decade and the criteria for assessing the degree of economic and social development of various countries. In the interests of an expeditious implementation of the Strategy, those areas where international action would be required should be identified forthwith and clear directives issued to organizations and bodies within the United Nations system. Such directives would prove of great value to the institutions of member countries likely to be involved in the implementation exercise.

24. The African continent had placed its faith in international action and co-operation and the Conference of Ministers of the Economic Commission for Africa had therefore adopted resolution 218 (X) entitled "Africa's strategy for development in the 1970s". The Africans regarded it as an essential part of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade and intended to use it to reduce the dual nature of their economies, to modernize them and integrate them, physically, organizationally and in terms of African social, economic and psychological dynamics. They also intended to use the Strategy as a guide towards the diversification of their economies for rapid growth in order to derive the benefits arising from the application of science and technology to development. With regard to trade, the African countries proposed to generate structural changes by using trade as a vehicle for transforming their economies from a traditional, almost exclusively primary-producing basis, to a dynamic combination of agriculture and manufacturing industries that would provide foreign exchange earnings for financing development. The African countries would insist on an international commodity policy likely to secure remunerative and equitable stable prices for their primary commodities and on access to more markets in developed countries for them. Co-operation with other developing countries would be necessary, and agreement would have to be reached on international action to facilitate the diversification and expansion of trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures produced by African countries. Furthermore, Africa would require external assistance commensurate with its special needs such as the rapid transfer of technology as well as greater regional and continental economic co-operation and integration within Africa.

25. His delegation supported unreservedly any measures which would strengthen the co-ordinating and decision-making function of the Economic and Social Council and was convinced that the measures agreed at the fifty-first session of the Council would go far towards improving the organization of its work if given the most positive interpretation by the Secretariat and States Members of the United Nations.

26. The International Development Strategy had set new tasks for the Economic and Social Council and other United Nations bodies and agencies. If the goals and objectives of the Decade were to be realized, United Nations bodies must step up their functional contributions and cultivate interagency co-ordination and concerted action, and his delegation therefore supported the proposal to create a committee to deal with matters relating to science and technology and review and appraisal.

27. Mr. ARVESEN (Norway) said that the Nordic Governments fully recognized the urgent need for an early return to a viable international monetary system and were ready to assist in reaching mutually acceptable solutions. They believed that a reform of the structural and institutional framework of the old system was required and that in a modified international payments system priority should be given to a speedy return to effective par values, or official exchange rates, with agreed intervention margins accepted by all industrial countries. Such a realignment would be part of a package deal which would also include the elimination of the surcharge imposed by the United States of America. The surcharge could bring about an escalation of protectionism and retaliation in world trade which would be particularly harmful to developing countries and small industrial countries highly dependent on foreign trade which had in no way contributed to the current imbalance in the world economy.

28. The trend towards protectionism created by the current monetary crisis should be reversed as soon as possible. The International Development Strategy was based on the principles of dynamic liberalization and expansion of world trade and a rational international division of labour. Accordingly, his Government had implemented the generalized system of tariff preferences on imports from developing countries as specified in paragraph (32) of the Strategy. That system of preferences primarily favoured developing countries which had already reached a certain level of development. Consequently, greater attention must be paid as a matter of urgency to the special problems confronting the least developed among the developing countries. In the context of Economic and Social Council resolution 1628 (LI) the General Assembly should take up the question of identification of the least developed among the developing countries. Norway had also voted in favour of Council resolution 1601 (LI) and his delegation was ready to continue its support for the strengthening of regional and subregional advisory services in the General Assembly. His Government attached great importance to the question of specific measures in favour of the least developed countries and agreed that the

question should be given particular attention at the forthcoming third session of UNCTAD to be held in Santiago.

29. His delegation also believed that vigorous efforts must be made, both nationally and internationally to cope with problems of unemployment and underemployment in the context of a unified approach to development planning. The unemployment problem of today, and in coming decades, in some countries was and would be a consequence of the population explosion, and measures aimed at solving the unemployment problem would have only a limited effect unless policies to decrease the rate of population growth to a reasonable level were also implemented.

30. With regard to the need for structural changes and innovations within the United Nations, his Government recognized that the Economic and Social Council did not adequately represent the total United Nations Membership. It favoured an enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and hoped that the so-called "package" resolution (Council resolution 1621 (LI)) would serve as a useful basis for the Assembly's deliberations and decisions. However, any institutional machinery eventually agreed upon on the basis of that resolution would indeed have limited significance unless Governments were ready to consider themselves morally and politically committed to implementing the policy measures of the Strategy.

31. Mr. OHIAMI (Togo) said that ever since Togo had attained its political independence, it had been striving resolutely to achieve economic independence. The first five-year plan (1965-1970) had laid a sound basis through improved administrative and structural organization. Effective management of public financing had buoyed the confidence of national cadres, which recognized the need for a concerted national development effort. The gross national product had registered a 7 per cent annual increase from 1966 to 1970, exceeding the plan's target of 5.3 per cent. During the same period, the population had increased 2.75 per cent annually, and the budget had increased 25 per cent. Since 1968, its balance of payments had registered a surplus.

32. Agricultural production, which was the basis of the Togolese economy, had increased 9 per cent annually since 1966, and fishing had risen 71 per cent in four years. Foreign trade had increased 27.1 per cent, and the transport facilities for industrialization were under construction. The objectives of the second five-year plan (1971-1975) were to pursue economic independence, ensure the rational operation of the entire State machinery, particularly that concerned with development; increase national production by maintaining at least the 7 per cent rate of increase in gross national product, and reduce regional disparities to ensure harmonious national development. To attain those goals, Togo planned to encourage the development of small and medium-sized national enterprises. The biggest investments were anticipated for industry, followed by agriculture and education. National income was expected to triple by 1985, and literacy, to reach 90 per cent. The population itself was expected to number 3 million.

33. The deteriorating international economic situation, which had engendered a decrease in the prices of Togo's commodities and had imposed other restrictions on its development was threatening its fledgling economy. He joined other representatives in expressing the hope that the system established to replace the outmoded Bretton Woods agreements would take due account of the interests of the countries of the third world.

34. He regretted that certain wealthy countries continued to make demagogic promises rather than assist the developing countries in attaining the objectives outlined in the International Development Strategy. It was particularly ironic that the wealthiest country in the world had recently announced a 10 per cent cut in aid to the developing countries. Unless such attitudes changed, it was doubtful that the target set by the Strategy, whereby developed countries would transfer a minimum net amount of 1 per cent of their gross national products to the developing countries, would be met.

35. Togo's long-standing faith in the United Nations prompted it to express the hope that the current General Assembly and the third session of UNCTAD would be able to find a satisfactory solution to the most pressing problems of the third world. In particular, it was necessary to bring about a stabilization in the prices of the commodities of the developing countries—cocoa, for example—through international agreements, and to remedy the effects of the monetary crisis. The developed countries must translate into action the commitments they had made in the Strategy.

36. His delegation welcomed the steps taken thus far to identify the least developed among the developing countries. Programmes on their behalf should be launched as a matter of urgency; it would be pointless to get bogged down in the procedure of identifying those countries.

37. Mr. ARUEDE (Nigeria) said that, following the adoption of the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade, the Conference of Ministers of the Economic Commission for Africa had in February 1971 adopted a strategy which addressed itself to the particular needs of the African region. They had done so because Africa was the most handicapped and the most poorly developed part of the world, as was confirmed by the fact that 16 of the 25 countries identified by the Committee for Development Planning as the least developed among the developing countries were in Africa. African economies were still largely rural and almost exclusively producers of primary products, which represented 80 to 90 per cent of their total exports. The assurance of a steady and massive influx of foreign exchange was required if their economies were to undergo structural changes and develop a dynamic combination of agricultural and manufacturing industries. To that end, the African strategy had recognized that, in addition to the traditional exports of primary commodities, African countries would have to seek a growing export trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures.

38. Unfortunately, during the first year of the Second Development Decade the prices of primary commodities had continued to drop or to fluctuate unfavourably, resulting in a diminution of the foreign exchange reserves of the African countries, a development which, together with

inflationary tendencies in the developed countries, had modified the terms of trade increasingly to the disadvantage of the developing countries, particularly the least developed among them. The share of Africa in total external aid had declined progressively during the 1960s from approximately 35 per cent to approximately 20 per cent.

39. African countries also confronted a mounting burden of debt-servicing, which in 1968 had reached 6.4 per cent of their total exports of primary commodities. Debt-servicing accounted for as much as 24 per cent of total exports for at least one African country, and for the majority, the percentage ranged between 10 and 20 per cent. Industrialization was still in its infancy in Africa and heavy borrowing was a relatively recent phenomenon. As heavier borrowing became necessary in the foreseeable future, the burden could be expected to rise further and to consume greater proportions of current export earnings. An UNCTAD study projected that the proportion might well reach 22 per cent on the average by 1975.

40. In the light of the foregoing considerations, his delegation could only regret the recent disturbances in international financial and trade relations precipitated by the unilateral actions of a number of advanced Western countries and the growing tendencies towards protectionism, which might be aggravated unless wide-ranging consultations were undertaken soon to restore stability. The developing countries must be involved in those negotiations and their interests must be taken into account.

41. His delegation was also dismayed at the aid cuts introduced by the United States. Those cuts jeopardized the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade, while the sums involved could have but a minimal effect on the United States balance of payments deficit. The developing countries were aware that a policy of maximum self-reliance was the only valid basis for their advancement. Nevertheless, it was time that the wealthier members of the international community translated their moral obligation to assist the developing countries into meaningful policies in order that the objectives of the Second Development Decade might be attained. He paid a tribute to the Nordic countries, Canada and other States which had continued to manifest their belief in international co-operation in the form of concrete actions, and to the Government of the United Kingdom for the encouraging announcements made recently by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the 1944th plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

42. His delegation would support the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council that the General Assembly should take steps to increase the membership of the Council from 27 to 54. The Council stood to gain in the long run from increased participation by Member States in its work. Observer participation was not the best solution, for unless a country was a full-fledged member of a United Nations body, various reasons, including limited staff, prevented missions from persuading Governments to ensure representation. Furthermore, there was room for negotiation in the General Assembly on the question of the distribution of the additional seats on the Council.

43. His delegation welcomed the Council's move to streamline its methods of work and documentation and expressed the hope that it would thus be better able to cope with its increased responsibilities during the Second Development Decade.

44. His country was firmly devoted to regional co-operation for development and had joined with five other Governments in sponsoring a highway link between east and west Africa. He appealed to the international community to support the proposed project as and when necessary. The highway link would make a major contribution to the more rapid development of intra-African trade, which was a major objective of the Second Development Decade.

45. Lastly, he welcomed the expectations expressed by the representatives of a number of socialist countries that their trade relations with the developing countries would increase substantially in the coming years.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF MR. RAMON VILLEDA MORALES, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HONDURAS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

46. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on behalf of the Committee, extended his condolences to the people and Government of Honduras on the death of Mr. Ramón Villeda Morales, Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations.

47. Mrs. COLMANT (Honduras) thanked the Chairman and said that she would convey his condolences to the bereaved family and to the Honduran people.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.