



**Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**

**DOCUMENT A/6700/REV.1**

**Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**

**Chapters I-IV\*\***

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Part III contains chapters XII to XXIV:

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XV. Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands	XXIV. Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations and related questions
XVI. Niue and the Tokelau Islands	
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XVIII. Guam and American Samoa	
XIX. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	
XX. Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and Trust Territory of New Guinea	

\*\*The present version of chapters I to IV is a consolidation of the text of the following documents as they appeared in mimeographed form: A/6700 (part I), dated 5 December 1967; A/6700 (part II), dated 2 October 1967; A/6700/Add.1 and Corr.1, dated 27 September and 12 October 1967; and A/6700/Add.2, dated 31 October 1967. For a check list of relevant documents, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 23.

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## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

5 December 1967

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith to the General Assembly, in accordance with resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This report covers the work of the Special Committee during 1967.

The report of the Special Committee concerning the "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination" which was the subject of operative paragraph 20 of the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution has previously been circulated in document A/6868 and Add.1.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) JOHN W. S. MALECELA  
Chairman

His Excellency U Thant  
Secretary-General  
United Nations  
New York

## CHAPTER I\*

## ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

## A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The General Assembly, at its fifteenth session, by resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly considered the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration and adopted resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, by which it established a Special Committee of seventeen members to examine the application of the Declaration, to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration and to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session. The Special Committee was directed "to carry out its task by employment of all means which it will have at its disposal within the framework of the procedures and modalities which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its functions".

3. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,<sup>1</sup> adopted resolution 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, by which it enlarged the Special Committee by the addition of seven new members. It invited the Special Committee "to continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence".

4. At the same session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on the question of South West Africa, requested the Special Committee to discharge *mutatis mutandis* the tasks assigned to the Special Committee for South West Africa by resolution 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961. By resolution 1806 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, the General Assembly decided to dissolve the Special Committee for South West Africa.

5. The General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,<sup>2</sup> adopted resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963. In this resolution, it requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and total application of the Declaration to all Territories which have not yet attained independence, and to report to the General Assembly not later than at its nineteenth session".

6. At the same session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 on the question of South West Africa, requested the Special Committee to continue its efforts with a view to dis-

charging the tasks assigned to it by resolution 1805 (XVII).

7. The General Assembly at the same session, by resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, decided to dissolve the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations. It also requested the Special Committee to take this information fully into account in examining the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration in each of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and to undertake any special study and prepare any special report it might consider necessary.

8. At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly was unable to consider the report of the Special Committee on its work during 1964.<sup>3</sup> The Special Committee, however, continued to discharge its mandate during 1965 in the context of the declaration made by the President at the 1330th plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, on 18 February 1965, to the effect that the General Assembly should for its own official records note that reports relating, *inter alia*, to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had in fact been received and that those bodies which had continuing responsibilities such as the Special Committee should continue to function, subject to the agreed budgetary limits for 1965.

9. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, following its consideration of the reports of the Special Committee,<sup>4</sup> adopted resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965. In this resolution it requested the Special Committee "to continue to perform its task and to continue to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which have not yet attained independence".

10. The General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,<sup>5</sup> adopted resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

11. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted a number of other resolutions assigning certain specific tasks to the Special Committee. Among these were the following resolutions concerning the items indicated:

<sup>3</sup> At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2005 (XIX) on 18 February 1965, authorizing supervision by the United Nations of the elections which were to be held in the Cook Islands in April 1965.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8, document A/5800/Rev.1; *ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1.

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700 (part I). The list of delegations in annex III to that document appears at the end of the present report as an annex.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Eighteenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1.

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Adopted on</i>	<i>Item</i>
2134 (XXI)	29 September 1966	Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland
2138 (XXI)	22 October 1966	Southern Rhodesia
2144 (XXI)	26 October 1966	Violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of <i>apartheid</i> , in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and Territories
2145 (XXI)	27 October 1966	South West Africa
2146 (XXI)	27 October 1966	Petitions concerning South West Africa
2151 (XXI)	17 November 1966	Southern Rhodesia
2183 (XXI)	12 December 1966	Aden
2184 (XXI)	12 December 1966	Territories under Portuguese administration
2185 (XXI)	12 December 1966	Fiji
2200 (XXI)	16 December 1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
2202 (XXI)	16 December 1966	Policies of <i>apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa
2226 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Trust Territory of Nauru
2227 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea
2228 (XXI)	20 December 1966	French Somaliland
2229 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Ifni and Spanish Sahara
2230 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Equatorial Guinea
2231 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Gibraltar
2232 (XXI)	20 December 1966	American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands
2233 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations
2234 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories
2235 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Consolidation and integration of the special educational and training programmes for South West Africa, the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration and the educational and training programme for South Africans
2236 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa
2237 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration
2238 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Oman
2239 (XXI)	20 December 1966	Pattern of conferences

12. At the 1500th plenary meeting, on 20 December 1966, the President of the General Assembly announced the nomination of Finland to fill the vacancy created by the withdrawal of Denmark from the membership of the Special Committee. The Special Committee therefore is composed of the following twenty-four members:

Afghanistan	Iran
Australia	Iraq
Bulgaria	Italy
Chile	Ivory Coast
Ethiopia	Madagascar
Finland	Mali
India	Poland

Sierra Leone	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Syria	
United Republic of Tanzania	United States of America
Tunisia	Uruguay
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Venezuela
	Yugoslavia

13. This report covers the work of the Special Committee for the period 9 February 1967 to 5 December 1967 during which it held 89 plenary meetings, including thirty-two meetings away from Headquarters. In the same period its working group and sub-committees held over 100 meetings.



## B. OPENING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S MEETINGS IN 1967

14. The first meeting of the Special Committee in 1967 (484th meeting), held on 9 February, was opened by the Secretary-General.

### *Opening statement by the Secretary-General*

15. The Secretary-General said he was very glad to have the opportunity of being present at the opening meeting of the session of the Special Committee. It gave him much pleasure to extend a warm welcome to all the representatives, and in particular to the representative of Finland, the newest member of the Committee.

16. As members would recall, he had had occasion to make the following remarks in the introduction to his last annual report on the work of the Organization:

"The extent to which decolonization has progressed in the last few years serves only to underline the anomaly of the fact that several million people are still subject to colonial rule—and, worse still, that most of these live under régimes which offer them no hope of an early and peaceful emancipation. It must be admitted that, while the United Nations has been in the forefront of support for the principle of self-determination, and while it has done much to encourage and at times to assist the emergence of dependent peoples, it has so far failed to provide or facilitate effective solutions to the several difficult and serious colonial problems which remain."<sup>6</sup>

17. It had been with great interest that he had noted during the debate in the General Assembly at its twenty-first session concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that that assessment corresponded with the views of the majority of the Members. A large number of Members had observed, as he himself had done, that the failure of the United Nations in regard to the problems referred to had not been due to lack of concern or effort. Rather, as they had pointed out, that failure had been principally due to the non-compliance of certain administering Powers with the relevant United Nations resolutions, and to the reluctance of some others to extend their full co-operation in giving effect to those resolutions.

18. That, then, was the context in which the General Assembly, in its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, had requested the Special Committee to continue to perform its tasks and to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which had not yet attained independence. In amplification of that mandate, the General Assembly had invited the Committee, whenever it considered it proper and appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory, to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to make any concrete suggestions to the Security Council which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures regarding developments in dependent Territories which might threaten international peace and security.

19. The increasing concern of the United Nations at the delay in the implementation of the Declaration, as also the wide consensus existing among Members with regard to questions of decolonization, had been equally

manifest in the proceedings of the Fourth Committee during the twenty-first session. Impelled by that concern, the Fourth Committee, as it had done during the twentieth session, had given separate attention not only to the more serious and difficult colonial problems but also to many other individual questions, the special character of which required careful examination. In consequence, it had become possible for the Assembly, on the recommendation of that Committee, to adopt a number of specific resolutions which, taking account of the peculiarities of each situation, outlined in concrete terms the measures and procedures required in particular Territories for the attainment of the objectives laid down in the Charter and in the Declaration.

20. It went without saying that the work of the Special Committee in that regard would include following up and supervising the implementation of those resolutions, reviewing the situation in each Territory, carrying out other tasks as requested by the Assembly, and, in the light of developments, recommending further measures as appropriate for the speedy application of the Declaration. In addition, there were a number of specific points arising from other resolutions of the General Assembly and from previous decisions taken by the Committee itself to which members would wish to give attention in establishing the Committee's programme of work for the year. That programme of work would undoubtedly be strenuous; furthermore, many of the problems which the Committee was called upon to examine had themselves increased both in difficulty and gravity.

21. The question of Southern Rhodesia, the universal and serious concern regarding which was registered in the resolutions recently adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, was one of those problems. When it took up that question, the Special Committee would, he was sure, be guided, as it had been in the past, by the need to secure rapid and positive movement towards a solution in keeping with the aspirations of the people of the Territory.

22. Concerning South West Africa, members were of course aware that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa was examining the practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence. As the Secretary-General had stated elsewhere, the question of South West Africa also remained the concern of the Special Committee within the context of the implementation of the Declaration, and would no doubt receive the attention of the Committee as appropriate.

23. With regard to the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, no progress could be recorded in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Considering that the need to enable the peoples of those Territories to exercise fully and in freedom their right to self-determination and independence was more imperative than ever, he was certain that the question would be the subject of further examination by the Special Committee.

24. On Aden, his consultations in regard to the appointment of a special mission, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), were still in progress. It was his confident hope that the work of the proposed mission would be of assistance to the Special Committee and the General Assembly in

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6301/Add.1), p. 11.

enabling the people of Aden to attain independence in conditions of peace and harmony.

25. The emphasis placed by the General Assembly on the importance of sending a special mission to Aden was, in his judgement, a reflection of the widely held conviction that the United Nations could play an increasingly useful role in bringing dependent Territories to independence. It was in line with that conviction that stress was laid, in the General Assembly's resolutions on Fiji and on Territories in the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, on the sending of visiting missions. In that connexion, it would be pertinent to reiterate that, especially with respect to the small Territories, visiting missions had an indisputable value; they were a means of securing adequate information on conditions in the Territories and on the views, wishes and aspirations of their inhabitants.

26. As a further indication of the role envisaged for the United Nations by the majority of Members, it was also noteworthy that on French Somaliland, Ifni and Spanish Sahara and Equatorial Guinea the relevant General Assembly resolutions called for various forms of participation by the United Nations in the processes involved in the exercise by the inhabitants of those Territories of their right to self-determination. He was in communication with the administering Powers concerned regarding the discharge of the mandate entrusted to him by the General Assembly in those resolutions, and he would of course report to the Special Committee and the General Assembly on developments in that regard.

27. In conclusion, he wished to express to the Special Committee his best wishes for the success of its work and the earnest hope that the necessary co-operation would be made available by the administering Powers. He was as conscious of the magnitude and difficulty of the tasks facing the Committee in 1967 as he was convinced of their importance. He was, however, confident that the Committee's work during the year would represent a further positive contribution towards the realization by dependent peoples of their aspirations to freedom and independence.

#### *Election of officers*

28. At its 484th meeting, on 9 February 1967, the Special Committee unanimously elected the following officers:

#### *Chairman:*

Mr. John W. S. Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania)

#### *Vice-Chairmen:*

Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (Iraq) and

Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela)

#### *Reporteur:*

Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary (Iran)

#### *Statement by the Chairman*

29. The Chairman said that he considered his election an indirect tribute to Mr. Julius Nyerere and to the Government and People of Tanzania for the vigorous struggle which they had never ceased to wage against colonialism.

30. Recalling that the task of decolonization was still unfinished, as a large part of the human race, particu-

larly in Africa, was still subjected to merciless oppression, he pointed out that that situation was due to the non-co-operation of certain colonial Powers. Portugal, in particular, remained adamant, while the practice of cruelty and massacre was being intensified against the African people of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The South African racists also were persisting in their brutal suppression of the aspirations of the people of South West Africa. Although the question of South West Africa had that year been referred more particularly to an *Ad Hoc* Committee established by the General Assembly, it still remained within the realm of the Special Committee. It was therefore to be hoped that the latter would maintain its vigilance on the problem and give the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa its fullest co-operation.

31. In Southern Rhodesia, the situation could only be described as tragic, because the issue at stake was the possible establishment in Africa of another *apartheid* régime. The way in which the United Kingdom Government had reacted to the situation in Southern Rhodesia was regrettable, especially as more than a year had passed since the unilateral declaration of independence and no concerted effort had been made by the United Kingdom Government to put down the rebellion. The Tanzanian delegation wished to reiterate that the proposed sanctions would never work in Southern Rhodesia. The whole question of Southern Rhodesia had to be approached realistically, because the Smith régime would never fall without the use of force. For the Africans, it was a question not of the white racists' power of resistance but of the moral obligations the United Nations had towards 4 million Africans. That moral consideration should supersede all other considerations and, in particular, all kinds of relationships, whether economic or military.

32. The situation in Aden seemed to be the reverse of that in Southern Rhodesia, and he hoped that the members of the Committee would give that question the full attention it deserved.

33. In the case of the Territories administered by Spain, the Committee had witnessed a new departure in its work, namely, an invitation by Spain to visit one of the Territories administered by it. The results had so far been encouraging. In particular, that new trend had encouraged the General Assembly to call for more of that co-operation between the Special Committee and the administering Powers. He therefore took that opportunity to appeal to those Powers to agree to the sending of visiting missions to the various colonies—for example, to the numerous islands in the Caribbean. He personally was convinced that the process of decolonization would as a result be considerably accelerated.

34. In 1965 at Addis Ababa, Mr. Coulibaly, then Chairman of the Special Committee, had appealed to the Security Council to meet in Africa. He himself wished to renew that appeal and ask the Council seriously to consider meeting in Africa during 1967 to examine the many African problems, especially the Rhodesian problem. It would be more advantageous for that important organ of peace to meet near the roots of the trouble if it was to help Africa avoid becoming the scene of bitter conflict.

35. He wished to pay a tribute to Ambassador Collier, the outgoing Chairman, whose untiring devotion to the cause of decolonization would never be forgotten. After expressing his appreciation to the representatives of Chile and Iraq, the outgoing Vice-

President and Rapporteur, respectively, and to the Danish delegation, which was no longer a member of the Committee, and after welcoming the representative of Finland and the new Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, he said that he would endeavour—in particular, by organizing as many consultations as possible at all levels—to achieve the widest possible agreement within the Committee in order to solve the grave problems still remaining.

### C. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

36. The Special Committee discussed the organization of its work for the year at its 484th to 487th meetings.

37. *The Chairman* recalled that the Special Committee had decided to hold two sessions in 1967, the first ending on 31 May and the second lasting from 17 July to 25 August. In order to assist the Committee, he wished to make some suggestions that might be referred to the Working Group for consideration, together with the views expressed by members.

38. Regarding the scope of its work, the Committee might wish, in addition to the assignments referred to it by the General Assembly in the relevant resolutions, to consider on its own initiative some problems of special interest. Referring in particular to operative paragraphs 12 and 20 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) and operative paragraph 1 (b) of Assembly resolution 2160 (XXI), he mentioned two matters on which the Committee might decide to undertake a study. These were "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination" and the role of military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration. It was pursuant to a recommendation of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 1134 (f)) that the General Assembly had decided to include in the agenda of its twenty-second session an item concerning the activities of foreign economic interests in colonial Territories.

39. The Working Group should be constituted and might be requested to submit recommendations without delay, regarding the order of priority of items to be considered in plenary meeting, bearing in mind the views expressed by members and taking into consideration the nature of recent developments in the various Territories, especially in the Caribbean area.

40. It might also be desirable for the Working Group to consider recommending that the Special Committee should maintain Sub-Committees I, II and III and request them to begin their work immediately. In addition to their existing terms of reference, the Special Committee might ask them to carry out the specific duties assigned by the General Assembly concerning the items referred to them. Any special studies which the Special Committee might decide to undertake could probably be referred to Sub-Committee I. The Sub-Committees might also be requested to submit specific recommendations without delay regarding the sending of visiting missions to the Territories with which they were concerned.

41. Any visiting missions that the Special Committee might dispatch to the various Territories should be sent before the third week of April 1967, whether the Territories were those studied by sub-committees or those which the Special Committee had discussed in plenary meeting the previous year. In either case account should be taken of the forthcoming special session of the Assembly, the decision previously taken by the Special Committee regarding its programme of meetings, and the further series of meetings which it might hold in Africa shortly.

42. For some of the missions, namely those to be sent to Aden, Equatorial Guinea, Spanish Sahara and French Somaliland, consultations were called for between the Secretary-General and the administering Powers and, as appropriate, with the Special Committee. It was to be hoped that the Secretary-General would report to the Special Committee on those matters at an early date.

43. The Special Committee would also have to decide on the establishment or prolongation of various sub-committees. Regarding Fiji, the Chairman would make the necessary arrangements for the appointment of a sub-committee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). He intended to begin appropriate consultations with the administering Power and to make an announcement as early as possible.

44. Concerning Aden, the Special Committee might wish to maintain the existing Sub-Committee and to request it to keep the situation in that Territory under continuous review. On Oman, the Special Committee could consider whether to set up a sub-committee to examine the situation in the Territory on the basis of General Assembly resolution 2238 (XXI) and to submit recommendations to the Special Committee.

45. The Chairman recalled the possibility of the Special Committee holding another series of meetings in Africa in 1967. There were indications that invitations might be extended by some Governments, and the Special Committee would no doubt wish to refer them to the Working Group for its consideration.

46. Finally, referring to resolution 2202 (XXI), in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to organize as soon as possible an international conference or seminar on the problems of *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa, he observed that the Special Committee would be called upon to express its views on certain matters relating to the organization of the proposed seminar and the participation of the Special Committee itself. The Working Group might also be requested to submit recommendations thereon.

47. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, at the outset of another year, the Special Committee should devote a certain amount of time to taking stock of what had been achieved and analysing the problems and tasks facing it. The continuation of colonialism was a challenge to all the freedom-loving and peace-loving forces of the world. Human freedom was indivisible, and colonialism was the enemy of freedom. Today, the threat to freedom and peace represented by colonialism was more serious than ever. In Africa, especially the southern part of Africa, colonialism was taking on a particularly dangerous form. It was manifested in the illegal régimes of the racist white minority in Southern Rhodesia, the prophets of *apartheid* in South Africa and South West Africa and the Portuguese aggressors in Mozambique

and Angola. Those forces, which in their turn were tools of international imperialism, represented a threat not only to peace in southern Africa but also to international peace and security in general.

48. Although their activities had been condemned by the freedom-loving peoples of the world and in countless United Nations resolutions, the Portuguese colonialists continued to flout the basic principles of the Organization and persisted in their criminal war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea. It was able to do so only because of the hypocritical attitude of its military allies which, while professing allegiance to the principles of freedom and peace, supplied Portugal with weapons. Meanwhile, their nationals exploited the resources of the Territories. Foreign financial monopolies, in order to safeguard their super-profits, co-operated with the Portuguese in impeding the attainment of independence by the Territories. Although those monopolies might be private undertakings, the Western countries where they originated, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, profited indirectly from the sweat and blood of the African peoples. Exports from the Territories helped to reinforce the economic structures of the industrialized nations of the West. Some of the financial monopolies were making direct cash contributions, amounting to millions of escudos, toward the Portuguese war effort in Angola and Mozambique, and thus contributing to the crime against humanity being perpetrated by the Portuguese aggressors. The legitimate rights of the African peoples to freedom and independence were being denied and a threat to international peace and security was being perpetuated, particularly as the Portuguese imperialists were aiding and encouraging the illegal racist white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

49. The continuation of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was another source of danger for peace, security and freedom in southern Africa. The racist minority, having obtained control of the Territory by means of the notorious 1961 Constitution, which had been imposed by the United Kingdom against the wishes of the people, remained in power, and the current situation in Southern Rhodesia was simply a prolongation of colonialism. Despite eloquent statements by representatives of the administering Power, all measures which would have put an end to the racist régime had been frustrated, and responsibility for the continued sufferings of the African people of Zimbabwe lay with the United Kingdom Government. Although the heroic people of Zimbabwe, who were in the front line of the struggle against the forces of colonialism and racism, must play the main role in bringing about their liberation, the United Nations could do its part to help them achieve their goal. Part of the Committee's task during 1967 should be to study all the different elements of the Southern Rhodesian situation.

50. It was true that resolutions had been adopted calling for selective mandatory sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime. His delegation had always maintained that sanctions as proposed by the United Kingdom would not be effective. To put an end to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, force must be used, the racist minority must be isolated from its Portuguese and South African allies and the so-called rebellion must be crushed. As the Secretary-General had noted in his opening address, the failure of the Organization to resolve colonial problems had been due mainly to the non-compliance of certain administering Powers with

relevant United Nations resolutions and the reluctance of others to co-operate fully with the United Nations. His delegation also fully supported the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should undertake a study of the role of foreign interests in impeding the attainment of independence by the peoples of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese domination and other colonial Territories. The activities of such financial interests were co-ordinated with those of the colonial Powers and formed part of a plan to establish neo-colonialism in the Territories concerned.

51. In South West Africa, the Pretoria régime was resorting to neo-fascist methods in suppressing the people. Although the question of South West Africa was under study by the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa, his delegation considered that the Special Committee must still undertake the task of making an over-all analysis of the situation in that Territory and formulate its own recommendations which could be adopted in conjunction with those that might be submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

52. His delegation welcomed the proposal in General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI) for a seminar on the problems of *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa. In its view, *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonialism were all aspects of a single system. The Committee should consider the possibility of creating an *ad hoc* sub-committee to propose guidelines for that undertaking. He also hoped that the Chairman would, without delay, enter into consultations with the Secretary-General regarding the venue and other arrangements for the seminar.

53. He fully supported the Chairman's suggestions regarding those various matters. He would also like to suggest that the Office of Public Information should devote more attention to the dissemination of information concerning developments in colonial Territories.

54. Turning to the immediate question of the organization of the Special Committee's work, he supported the Chairman's view that certain recent developments called for urgent action. The announcement by the United Kingdom of preparations to convert the British colonies in the Caribbean into what were termed "associated States" was highly disturbing. The United Kingdom had not kept the United Nations fully informed of its intentions regarding the Territories concerned. The Committee should take into account the urgency of the situation and consider whether a mission should be sent to the area.

55. The colonial Powers had so far failed to implement the General Assembly resolutions on the dismantling of military bases in colonial Territories. He strongly supported the suggestion that a special study should be devoted to the question.

56. His delegation had always favoured the sending of visiting missions to colonial Territories. To secure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Committee must be given facilities for visiting such Territories and appraising itself of the situation there. He welcomed the co-operation shown by the Spanish Government in that regard. The decision of the United Kingdom Government finally to agree to a mission to Aden was welcome. He hoped that the Committee would seek still more co-operation from the administering Powers in that respect.

57. His delegation would support a proposal for the Committee to hold some meetings in Africa during 1967.

58. The representative of *Syria* fully agreed with the Chairman that the Committee should pursue the study of specific aspects of colonialism with a view to helping the Assembly implement resolution 1514 (XV). The decision of the Assembly in resolution 2189 (XXI) to include in the agenda of its twenty-second session an item concerning the activities of foreign economic and other interests in colonial Territories was particularly important, and the Sub-Committee which dealt with such activities should resume its useful work without delay.

59. Almost all United Nations resolutions relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories emphasized the need to dismantle military bases established by the colonial Powers against the wishes of the people. The independence of such Territories could never be genuine until such sources of overt or covert coercion disappeared. The administering Powers, however, when they actually acknowledged that such bases existed, described them as small and benign military installations or as staging posts for port facilities. In view of the situation, the question of military bases should be studied by a special sub-committee.

60. The Sub-Committee on Aden should keep the situation in that Territory under constant review; it seemed that no real improvements had taken place since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) and that the administering Power was still determined to consolidate its grip on the Territory. Similarly, the United Kingdom's complete disregard of United Nations resolutions on Oman meant that the situation in that Territory was deteriorating; it was therefore urgently necessary for a sub-committee on Oman to be established, particularly since oil exploitation was about to begin in that Territory.

61. The change in the composition of the Sub-Committee on Petitions might perhaps be accompanied by a clarification of the terms of reference of that body. In his view, the Sub-Committee had full competence to scrutinize petitions and the status of petitioners. It was inconceivable that the Sub-Committee should serve any purpose contrary to that of the Special Committee, namely, decolonization.

62. In conclusion, his delegation strongly supported sending visiting missions to Non-Self-Governing Territories, organizing seminars on specific items and holding a further series of meetings in Africa. The Special Committee's visits to Africa were now a well-established tradition, and the Syrian people and Government would be most grateful if the Special Committee decided to accept their invitation to visit Damascus. He agreed that the Special Committee should visit Africa during the first part of its session although he felt that the Chairman and the Working Group should make specific recommendations on the time-table for the visit.

63. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation fully agreed with the Secretary-General and the Chairman that in 1967 the Committee should make new efforts to secure immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It should make full use of the right granted to it by the General Assembly to recommend dates for the independence of colonial Territories, it should make recommendations to the Security Council to help it

settle situations in dependent Territories threatening international peace and security and it should give attention to the situation of the so-called small colonial Territories. His delegation also agreed with the Secretary-General that the failures of the United Nations in decolonization were not its fault, but were due to the unwillingness of the colonial Powers to carry out the Declaration, to their opposition to other United Nations resolutions and to their determination to maintain colonial domination in their own economic and strategic interests. The Committee should therefore make a special point of reviewing the application of resolutions already adopted by the United Nations.

64. His delegation fully supported the Chairman's statement on the tasks facing the Committee in 1967 and the organization of its work. It agreed that the Commission should concentrate on the decolonization of Africa, keeping a watch on the course of events in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa and on imperialist and colonialism manoeuvres and making appropriate recommendations where necessary. That did not mean, however, that it should neglect other matters, such as the decisions taken by the General Assembly on Aden, Oman and other small colonial Territories, or, in general, any resolutions designed to help the struggle of colonial peoples for their rights, freedom and independence. Such resolutions included the General Assembly's appeals to Member and non-member States, especially the NATO Powers, and to the specialized agencies and their member States not to grant any aid, whether military, economic, financial or other, to Portugal, South Africa or Southern Rhodesia until they renounced their policy of racial discrimination and colonial supremacy. The Committee should consider as soon as possible the question of compliance by IBRD and IMF with the General Assembly's recommendation that no loans be granted to South Africa or Portugal. The Committee did not know how those various resolutions were being applied. The Secretariat should be asked to provide it with information showing which countries were complying with the resolutions and which were not and what diplomatic, economic and other ties countries maintained with the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The whole world would then know where those régimes got their support.

65. His delegation supported the Chairman's proposal that the Committee should consider the consequences of the activities of international monopolies in South West Africa, the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia and other colonial Territories. The Committee had prepared reports on the activities of monopolies in South West Africa, Angola and Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, but they had not included the latest data and had not contained information on other colonial Territories. It was therefore most desirable that a general report on the subject should be submitted to the General Assembly. The Soviet Union also agreed with the Chairman's proposal to consider military and related activities of the colonial Powers in dependent Territories. Such activities were becoming more and more important. The colonial Powers not only had not dismantled their military bases and installations in colonial Territories, as recommended by the General Assembly, but were taking steps to expand them. Such behaviour was an obstacle to self-determination and created a threat that the Territories might be used for aggression against independent States and for the suppression of independence movements. The colonial-



ists claimed that their military bases were no obstacle to independence, but the way they used their military bases on Guam and Ascension Island, in Aden and elsewhere showed that claim to be false. The Committee should supply the General Assembly with material showing the true nature of colonial military activity in dependent Territories.

66. His delegation supported the Chairman's proposal that missions should visit small colonial Territories to study the local situation and determine the wishes of the people regarding their future. The Committee should not permit neo-colonialist decisions on such Territories and should prevent the colonial Powers from absorbing them under the guise of "association" or "integration". Such missions would also help to reveal the effects of the presence of military bases and the nature of military action taken to suppress independence movements. His delegation also agreed with the Chairman's proposal that the question of an international conference or seminar on *apartheid* should be entrusted to a working group and with his proposals concerning the work of the sub-committees.

67. In 1966 the Committee had not been able to take a decision on the Cuban proposal to include the question of Puerto Rico in its agenda. Further delay would be inadmissible; the Committee should take a decision on the substance of the matter in 1967. Another question to which the Committee should give attention was the General Assembly's recommendation that all United Nations channels should be used to publicize United Nations activities in the field of decolonization, the struggle of oppressed peoples to win freedom and the reasons preventing implementation of the Declaration. The situation at present was not satisfactory. Accomplices of the colonialists used their influence to prevent publicity about the achievements of the United Nations and to whitewash the policy of the colonial Powers. The Committee should study the matter thoroughly and recommend improvements.

68. At its twentieth and twenty-first sessions the General Assembly had taken a number of important decisions in which it had recognized the legality of the struggle of colonial peoples for freedom and independence, had declared colonialism, *apartheid* and racism to be crimes against mankind and had condemned the policy of the colonial Powers. Those resolutions had given substantial political support to the peoples in question. In their struggle to eliminate colonialism their own efforts and the support given them by the many States opposing imperialism and colonialism were of vital importance. At the same time, the United Nations and particularly the Special Committee, could play a useful role. The forces of imperialism and colonialism did not want to surrender their positions in the remaining colonial Territories and resorted to various cunning devices to maintain their domination. It was the duty of the United Nations to unmask the colonialists' plots, protect the interests of enslaved peoples and do everything possible to assist them in their struggle. The Soviet Union, which had gone through a great revolution to secure equality and end the exploitation of man by man, would continue to give full support to peoples oppressed by imperialism and colonialism.

69. The representative of *India* said that since the establishment of the Special Committee only thirteen former colonies had been restored to freedom and independence—hardly a satisfactory record. Moreover, the Special Committee could not really consider

that it alone had been responsible for the independence of those thirteen territories. However, while not spectacular, its work was essential if only because it served as a constant reminder to the colonial Powers that it was their sacred obligation to transfer power to the true representatives of the people and to allow the people to determine their own future in accordance with their own wishes. The Special Committee also provided a forum which enabled those suffering under the colonial yoke to voice their grievances and obtain moral support.

70. He endorsed the suggestions which the Chairman had made at the previous meeting regarding the organization of the Special Committee's work and hoped that the Committee as a whole would accept them so that it could take up its substantive work as soon as possible. He agreed that the working Group should be established without delay and that Sub-Committees I, II and III should be maintained. While it was true that Mauritius would very probably become independent during 1967, he felt that Sub-Committee I should be maintained, since it had achieved some sort of expertise in economic matters; it would therefore be appropriate if the item on the activities of foreign economic and other interests in colonial Territories, which the General Assembly was to discuss at its twenty-second session, were assigned to that sub-committee.

71. He agreed with the comments made by the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* concerning the Office of Public Information. While the Office had been doing useful work in the field of decolonization, he felt that it could do still more. He had been surprised to learn during the Special Committee's visit to Africa in 1966 that the Prime Minister of Mauritius had been unaware of where the Special Committee was to hold its meetings, since he had been led to believe that the Committee's programme had been well publicized in advance.

72. He endorsed the suggestion made by the representative of *Syria* that the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee on Petitions should be defined more clearly. He fully agreed with the Secretary-General that visiting missions had an indisputable value, especially in the case of small Territories, because they were a means of securing adequate information on conditions in the Territories and on the wishes of their inhabitants. His delegation's views on the question of holding meetings in Africa remained unchanged.

73. The representative of *Poland* said that at each session of the Special Committee members were reminded that the task of decolonization was still incomplete. However, he was deeply convinced that the process of liberation of colonial peoples could not be stopped or reversed and that, with the help of all progressive forces, such peoples would finally free themselves and regain their rightful place among sovereign nations. Naturally, the decisive role would be played by the people themselves; however, the tempo of decolonization had to be speeded up and conditions had to be created so that decolonization could take place without unnecessary bloodshed and misery. To that end, the United Nations, and in particular the Special Committee, had an outstanding role to play. All avenues should be explored and all means used to exert pressure on the colonial Powers trying to counteract and halt the process of liberation.

74. He had been particularly interested by the suggestions made by the Chairman. Certainly, the Special

Committee should concentrate on the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. It was therefore advisable for the work of the Committee to be organized so as to ensure that developments in Non-Self-Governing Territories could be followed up and, if necessary, action taken. In his view, the most effective method would be to create an adequate number of permanent or *ad hoc* sub-committees to examine particular problems or Territories. Attention had been drawn to the problem of the small Territories. In view of all the difficulties deriving from the geographical location, size and limited economic potential of such Territories, it was all the more necessary to ensure that proper recommendations were made for their future development. Visiting missions could be particularly useful in that respect and the Committee should therefore repeat its appeal to administering Powers to allow such missions to visit the Territories under their administration.

75. General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) had made it clear that the establishment of military bases and installations in colonial Territories was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In addition, General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) had requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories, and to refrain from establishing new ones and from using those that still existed to interfere with the liberation of the peoples in colonial Territories in the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence. He therefore fully supported the proposal that the Committee should undertake a study of the military activities and arrangements of the colonial Powers which might be impeding the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). Also of great importance was the proposal that the Committee should undertake a study on the activities of foreign economic and other interests impeding the implementation of that resolution in colonial Territories. With all its accumulated knowledge and experience, the Committee could and should produce a comprehensive report for the next session of the General Assembly.

76. In conclusion, he hoped that the views expressed in the Special Committee would be taken into account by the Working Group; the Working Group should be able to examine during the present session those matters which had not been taken up at the previous session.

77. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that his delegation agreed with the ideas and suggestions concerning the Committee's work advanced by the Chairman and the Secretary-General in their statements. The Committee's work would also be facilitated by the decisions taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

78. While it was true that decolonization was proceeding only slowly, the reason was not that the Committee had neglected its work. The slowness of the pace was actually due to the fierce opposition of those who sought to safeguard their own interests, sometimes at the cost of the blood of patriots and the sweat of oppressed peoples. The responsibility of the administering Powers had been emphasized also by the Secretary-General. In those circumstances, the Committee must ensure that its activities were more and more closely associated with the struggle of the colonial peoples themselves. In particular, it must continue vigorously to combat the colonialist policies of certain

States and certain organizations which rendered assistance to the colonialists and the policies of those who, by their attitudes, encouraged the arbitrary actions of racist minorities.

79. One of the ways in which the Committee could draw nearer to the oppressed peoples would be to hold a session in Africa in 1967, in accordance with a practice already established. Meetings in Africa would give the Committee an opportunity to increase its awareness of the tragedy of the colonized peoples, and at the same time to make a detailed study of the progress achieved and of the continuing obstacles to the implementation of United Nations decisions on such important questions as Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa.

80. His delegation also supported the proposal that the Security Council should be requested likewise to hold a session on African soil. Such a session would be especially useful, in that its results could be coupled with those of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on South West Africa.

81. Nothing must be left undone to foil the schemes of the colonial Powers, and with that end in view his delegation believed that the Special Committee, at the present stage of its work, should set itself the primary goal of taking measures to compel those Powers to facilitate the implementation of the decisions taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and, very recently, by the Security Council.

82. In view of the fact that at the twenty-first session the General Assembly had devoted particular attention to conditions in the smaller colonial Territories and the dearth of information about them, his delegation shared the view that visiting missions should be sent to those Territories for the purpose of establishing direct contact with the local inhabitants and their representatives.

83. The Committee should also undertake a study of the activities of foreign economic interests in South West Africa, the Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia, and in all the Territories under colonial domination, and submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly.

84. The question of military bases in colonial Territories should also be studied by the Committee, which should determine to what extent such bases had an adverse effect on the outcome of the liberation struggle of the peoples of those Territories and should make recommendations on the subject. In particular, the Special Committee could establish direct contact with international organizations and the specialized agencies, requesting them to supply it with information concerning measures taken or envisaged to implement United Nations recommendations on the cessation of economic, financial and technical aid to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and to various Powers which were seeking to strengthen their domination over certain Territories. In that connexion, stress must be laid on the great importance of implementation by the specialized agencies of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence.

85. Under General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI), the Committee was to take an active part in the preparation and organization of a conference or seminar on the problems of *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa. In that connexion, his delegation wished to underline the importance of publicizing the struggle being waged by the

national liberation movements and the constructive action being taken in the regions liberated by revolutionary movements, and also the role which the United Nations, and in particular the Committee, might play in that respect. It supported the proposals made by the representative of India concerning the part which the United Nations Office of Public Information should take in giving world-wide publicity to the struggle of the colonial peoples. A large section of the Press sought to conceal the truth from world opinion. It would therefore be proper for the Office of Public Information to become more active in the dissemination of information on the peoples' struggle for national liberation and on the sessions of the Special Committee and other bodies dealing with the question. It might be helpful if the Chairman or one of the other officers of the Committee were to contact the Office of Public Information with a view to making the necessary arrangements.

86. The representative of *Venezuela* observed that, as the Committee advanced towards the elimination of colonialism, it encountered increasingly complex problems, particularly in combating certain colonial practices which were an affront to the most elementary principles of universal morality.

87. His delegation had noted with great interest the Chairman's suggestions regarding the organization of the Committee's work. The dispatch of visiting missions was a practice which his delegation had always favoured. The question of the United Nations presence in French Somaliland called for a special comment, namely, that some degree of priority should be given to it, as a referendum was to be held in the Territory on 19 March 1967.

88. Visiting missions were an essential factor in the Committee's work and provided it with information of the highest importance on developments in the Territories with which it was concerned. While not wishing to attach more importance to one visiting mission than to the rest, he felt that the mission to Aden called for special mention. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the question of dispatching such a mission had been raised as a matter of urgency, owing to the political disturbances which had occurred in the Territory and the repressive measures which had been taken. It was disquieting to note that, more than a month after the Assembly had concluded its work, it had still not been possible to appoint the visiting mission and its dispatch would apparently have to be further delayed. He hoped that the Chairman could report on the status of the consultations and on any obstacles to the dispatch of a mission which, in his delegation's opinion, should be in the Territory already.

89. With regard to the visiting missions to other Territories, he shared the Chairman's hope that they would be dispatched as soon as possible, so that the information needed for the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its next session could be collected in good time.

90. With respect to the order in which the different Territories should be considered, his delegation thought that, if the Committee was unable to act immediately on the General Assembly's recommendations to it regarding the larger Territories, such as Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa, it could profitably begin a consideration of the smaller Territories of which it had not yet been able to make a thorough study.

91. His delegation agreed with the suggestion that the existing sub-committees should be maintained and that they must start their work as soon as possible. The Sub-Committees and the Working Group played an essential part in the work of the Committee.

92. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the members of the Committee were becoming increasingly aware of the difficulties of applying to small Territories the same methods as were used in the consideration of larger Territories. His delegation sincerely believed that those methods needed to be reviewed and that the Committee, in studying the situation in those Territories, should be guided by the aspirations of their people. It was because of the small size and remoteness of some Territories that their people appeared to be hesitant about their own future. The Committee should not place itself in the position of appearing to impose a status which the peoples of the smaller Territories might be reluctant to choose. They nevertheless had the right to determine their political status and their choice must be an educated one.

93. His delegation supported the Chairman's proposal that the three regional Sub-Committees which had been in operation the previous year should be reconstituted. It suggested that each sub-committee should continue to be responsible for serving a specific region and that the studies required by the Special Committee should be allocated to the three sub-committees on that geographical basis.

94. On another matter which had been the subject of proposals, his delegation firmly believed that travel by the Committee should be limited to such travel, in connexion with meetings away from Headquarters and the possible dispatch of missions, as represented the best means of accomplishing the tasks for which it was responsible. It would be strongly opposed to travel which would not only waste the limited funds of the United Nations but might jeopardize the Special Committee's reputation by suggesting that its work was not of the serious nature expected of it. His delegation would express its views on the question of travel when specific proposals were submitted to the Special Committee. For the present it urged representatives to take a careful and selective approach to that question.

95. Turning to another matter, he said that, since Puerto Rico had been mentioned, he was obliged to repeat his Government's position, which was that the Territory was a self-governing one whose status had been confirmed by the General Assembly and that there was therefore no reason for the Special Committee to deal with it.

96. In conclusion, he said that the problems which the Special Committee would have to tackle were not new. The fact that they had already been under attack for several years should not, however, give rise to any pessimism. The United Nations could, in fact, feel satisfied with the steps taken in 1966, such as the establishment of a Special Committee to deal with South West Africa, the adoption of a programme of mandatory sanctions with a view to ending the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia and the agreement on sending a United Nations mission to Aden.

97. His delegation was prepared to contribute in every possible manner to resolving the problems before the Committee. It believed that peoples everywhere were entitled to govern themselves in an atmos-



phere of social justice and political and economic freedom. Moreover, the United States believed that it was in its national interest to promote the application of the principles of freedom and self-determination, since the manner in which existing tensions were handled at the international level significantly affected the long-term prospects for world stability and peace.

98. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that his delegation wished to reiterate its disappointment at the fact that the Committee had been unable to achieve more since it was established. When its work began, it was dealing with about sixty Territories, of which it still had fifty-two left. Although that state of affairs was not the fault of the Committee, but of the administering Powers which had not applied all the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the Committee should nevertheless seek to increase the pace of attaining self-determination.

99. The Chairman had spoken of visiting missions. It was by means of such missions that the peoples of the various Territories, and the administering Powers concerned, could present their case fully to the Special Committee. A number of administering Powers, including Spain and the United Kingdom, had agreed to the sending of missions to the Territories administered by them and others should be urged to follow their example. His delegation would also like to know what progress had been made in the implementation of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly concerning Aden. It urged administering Powers in general, and Australia, Spain, the United States, France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, in particular, to co-operate with the Secretary-General, so that the Committee might know what missions could proceed during the current session and so that missions would have sufficient time available to report to it in July.

100. The Chairman had suggested that Sub-Committee I might deal with an item which was on the agenda for the twenty-second session of the General Assembly entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination". His delegation agreed with that suggestion, as Sub-Committee I was familiar with the subject and that material would enable it to expand the scope of the work it had already done on Rhodesia.

101. Similarly, a study of the role of military bases in impeding progress towards self-determination and independence might be undertaken either by a special group or by a sub-committee whose work programme was less heavy than the others. His delegation left it to the Chairman to choose the sub-committee concerned.

102. His delegation would like visiting missions to be sent to the smaller Territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean, to which the Special Committee had not given sufficient attention in 1966, and would like the sub-committees concerned to begin their study of those Territories at an early date. The problems peculiar to them were acute and the Committee should devote as much attention to them as to the Territories in southern Africa.

103. On the subject of South West Africa, which had also been mentioned, his delegation believed that,

even if some aspects of the Special Committee's work were being considered specifically by other United Nations bodies, the Committee should also keep them under review.

104. He drew the Committee's attention to operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which concerned the list of Territories referred to in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He thought that the Committee should attempt to decide in 1967 which Territories to include in its agenda. With regard to operative paragraph 14 of the same resolution, he pointed out that some members had always resisted any attempt by the Committee to make suggestions to the Security Council, stating that it was not within the Committee's province to do so. He hoped that, as a result of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), the Committee would no longer be impeded in respect of such action and would be better able to help the Security Council and the Secretary-General than it had been in the past.

105. It was always difficult to decide on priorities, but the order should be determined in the light of the visits which the Committee would either make itself or entrust to missions, the interests of the peoples of the Territories and recent developments there. While the questions of southern Africa and Aden were, of course, particularly important, the smaller Territories should also be borne in mind.

106. Finally, the Committee should try during the current session to carry out all the tasks specifically entrusted to it by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

107. The representative of *Italy* supported most of the remarks made by the Chairman at the opening meeting, especially those concerning the importance of the work of the Sub-Committees, at least in the first stage of the Committee's work. He felt that the results achieved by sub-committees in previous years had been excellent.

108. In 90 per cent of the cases, the slow progress of the various Territories towards self-determination and independence was not necessarily due to ill-will on the part of the administering Power, but rather to built-in factors, such as political or ethnic divisions, economic difficulties and the small size or sparse populations of certain Territories. The Committee must therefore devote its attention to that specific and, in some cases, very difficult problem. It must request the co-operation of the administering Powers, but must also be ready to give them advice and guidance.

109. He agreed with the Polish representative that the Committee must guide the Territories in their progress towards self-determination and independence by showing them the best way to obtain genuine freedom from colonial rule, which meant helping them to solve their political and constitutional problems and to obtain the economic assistance they needed if they were not to become the prey of a new imperialism.

110. With regard to visiting missions, he suggested that the Committee should abandon the method of asking the administering Powers to grant a general consent to the sending of missions to Territories under their administration. It would be better if, whenever the Committee judged it necessary to send a mission to a specific Territory, the Chairman were to hold informal consultations with the administering Power and report the result of his negotiations to the Committee.

111. With respect to the planned session in Africa or the Middle East, he believed that it was too early to take any decision even of a general nature. Once the Committee had received invitations from Member States, it would be able to decide whether it was possible to visit each of the inviting countries without the journey becoming too long, too expensive or too taxing for members of the Committee. Moreover, to avoid any appearance of discourtesy, it should be made clear in advance that it might be impossible for the Committee to accept all the invitations extended to it.

112. He did not regard the holding of a session away from Headquarters as a sort of climax to the Committee's work. If the Committee took that view, it might fail to realize the urgency of the work it had to do at Headquarters. He hoped that most of that work would be concluded before 31 May so that the summer session might be devoted to a very limited number of items and to the adoption of the report to the General Assembly.

113. In conclusion, he assured the Chairman of his delegation's continuing devotion to the cause of decolonization and of its support for him in his new functions.

114. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* stated in answer to the United States representative's statement concerning Puerto Rico, that in his delegation's view Puerto Rico was indeed a colonial Territory. Its people should therefore have the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations.

115. The representative of *Madagascar* said that in view of the importance the United Nations attached to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it was regrettable that certain Powers were refusing to respect the principles of the Charter and were doing nothing to facilitate the implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

116. In view of the effectiveness of the work done during the previous session by the sub-committees and *ad hoc* committees of the Special Committee, he would agree that such committees should be maintained. He welcomed the fact that some Powers had agreed to allow missions to visit the Territories under their administration, and hoped that before such missions left for the smaller Territories the information services of the United Nations would keep the Committee informed of political developments there. In conclusion, his delegation favoured holding another series of meetings in Africa in 1967.

117. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that there were still no grounds for optimism regarding a settlement of colonial problems in conformity with General Assembly resolutions and in a manner which would satisfy the legitimate interests of the peoples concerned. Regrettably, many Territories were still deprived of the fundamental right to freedom and independence. Moreover, the peoples of colonial Territories, like the United Nations itself, were faced with the organized resistance of the colonial Powers and their allies, which were attempting by means of pressure and intervention not only to impede the process of decolonization but also to expand their political, economic and strategic positions. That was especially true of southern Africa, where racism, colonial wars and other forms of repression were preventing the indigenous peoples from achieving freedom and independence.

118. He thanked the Secretary-General for the great interest he had shown in the problems of decolonization. He fully supported the Chairman's suggestions regarding the organization of the Committee's work; however, he felt that African colonial problems warranted special attention. A study of the activities of foreign monopolies and other economic interests in colonial Territories would no doubt bring to light the reasons why such monopolies were preventing the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and would be of great assistance to the Assembly when it considered that question at its twenty-second session.

119. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, his delegation had suggested that the Special Committee might consider the possibility of summarizing its studies on the Portuguese colonies in a single document which would be translated into various languages, including Portuguese, and be widely circulated in order to mobilize world public opinion with a view to finding a solution to the problems of those colonies. Another important colonial issue which should be reviewed by the Special Committee was the question of Aden.

120. His delegation had devoted special attention to the question of the small Territories, and had always supported the dispatch of visiting missions to examine the situation prevailing in such Territories. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the Yugoslav delegation had suggested that the Special Committee might consider the possibility of convening a conference, under United Nations auspices, of representatives of the small Territories. Such a conference would enable representatives of the people of those Territories to describe their problems and propose appropriate solutions, on the basis of which the United Nations would be able to work out a broad action programme.

121. The military bases established in some Non-Self-Governing Territories against the will of the peoples concerned were a serious obstacle to the liberation of the colonial peoples and a means of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Since the General Assembly, at both its twentieth and twenty-first sessions, had requested the dismantling of such bases, his delegation supported the suggestion that the question of military bases should be given special attention by the Committee. On the question of holding another series of meetings in Africa, his delegation's views remained unchanged.

122. The representative of *Iran* said that the eradication of colonialism was an immense task, which was bound to take time. However, steady progress was being made towards that goal, and at the same time the Committee was helping to lay the foundations for new nations. The Committee should seek inspiration for its tasks by maintaining direct contacts with the peoples involved. It could thus derive confidence from the support of those peoples, while they in turn would be encouraged by the knowledge that they were not alone in their struggle for freedom and justice.

123. It was in that light that he viewed the questions relating to visiting missions, the establishment of a United Nations presence to supervise the exercise of self-determination in particular Territories, and the holding of meetings in Africa. The Committee had already received a certain measure of co-operation from some of the administering Powers, and he welcomed the policy pursued by the Spanish Government in that

respect, as also the change in the United Kingdom's attitude regarding the dispatch of a mission to Aden. He hoped that a similar attitude would be shown by all administering Powers with regard to other Territories, such as Fiji and the Territories in the Caribbean.

124. The dissemination of information, a matter which had been raised by other speakers, was also an instrument for focusing attention on the plight of subjugated peoples. However, he did not share the view that the Office of Public Information had been remiss in the performance of its duties; it had acquitted itself well in 1966 and he was confident that it would do even better in 1967.

125. The Committee should devote a major share of its attention to problems which concerned international peace and security in addition to the right to self-determination and independence, particularly the questions of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Portuguese Territories and Aden. Despite the Security Council's decision to apply economic sanctions against the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia, no progress had yet been achieved towards returning that Territory to its rightful owners, the Zimbabwe people. The Committee should also feel free to take up the question of South West Africa when it deemed it appropriate, although that question was currently under consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese domination, he hoped that the Committee would be able to offer new proposals for stronger action by the General Assembly to overcome Portugal's intransigence. On the question of Aden, he shared the anxiety expressed by other speakers. He sincerely hoped that the special mission called for by the General Assembly in resolution 2183 (XXI) would be appointed soon, so that it could proceed to the Territory without further delay.

126. With regard to the question of small Territories, he considered that the sub-committees should begin work without delay, in order to be able to give those Territories the attention they deserved. On that and other matters, he supported the suggestions made by the Chairman.

127. The representative of *Australia* said that although there were some quite deep philosophical differences within the Committee, he thought that there was an identity of aims among members. At the time of the drafting of the United Nations Charter, the Australian delegation had been among the most zealous in supporting the inclusion of the provisions concerning Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories. The aims of members of the Special Committee regarding independence, self-determination and the protection of the rights of the peoples of the Territories were the same, and while there might be differences in approach, it was the Committee's task to harmonize those differences to promote the common goal.

128. He recalled that the Chairman had referred to General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and suggested that the Committee might make a study of activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding the progress of colonial Territories to independence. A report to the General Assembly on the results of such a study could constitute a really important document, and he would suggest that for that reason the Committee should be careful in sifting the evidence brought before it. What was required was a sound economic study based on hard facts and

statistics, not a polemical document. He also hoped that controversial doctrinaire views would not be injected into the report. His delegation, for example, saw no reason why foreign economic investment in certain forms should not be in the interests of the people of dependent Territories. The Committee should not allow preconceived views on such matters to colour its judgements. The only consideration should be the interests of the people of the Territories and the matter in which they themselves interpreted those interests.

129. He had some reservations about the Chairman's suggestion that all special studies should be referred to Sub-Committee I; experience suggested that detailed studies could best be carried out by a Sub-Committee which devoted its attention to a particular region. He would support what had been said by the representatives of India and Syria regarding the Sub-Committee on Petitions. During 1966, the Sub-Committee's work had not proceeded in an altogether satisfactory manner. The Sub-Committee had been unable to devote adequate time to the consideration of petitions, and there had sometimes been inexplicable delays between the Sub-Committee's approval of a petition for circulation and its actual circulation to the Special Committee. In at least two instances, petitions which might have altered the course of a debate had been delayed and had not been before the Special Committee at the time of its decision on the Territory concerned.

130. He agreed with the view that visiting missions could be of value, but they were impossible without the full co-operation of the administering Power. The administering Power was responsible for the Territories which it administered, and its decision as to the acceptability of a mission must necessarily be governed by many factors. The wishes and interests of the people of the Territory must also be a paramount consideration.

131. There were circumstances in which visiting missions could be very helpful; the proposed mission to South Arabia might have a great influence in helping the people of that area to reach independence, which they were about to attain in any case, with a minimum loss of life. On the other hand, unwelcome visits could antagonize the people of a Territory and make it difficult for the administering Power to bring them to full self-determination.

132. With regard to the possibilities of meetings of the Special Committee in Africa, he would suggest that the Committee should try to arrange its programme on a practical basis. He realized that it was difficult to refuse invitations, but he thought that the paramount consideration should be the practical usefulness of visiting a particular city. By keeping its aims within practical bounds, the Committee would be fulfilling the responsibility it shared with other organs of the United Nations to keep down costs.

133. The representative of *Tunisia* said the Committee's work was helped by the fact that its responsibilities had been clearly defined in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and would also be helped by the advice the Secretary-General had offered at the beginning of the session. However, the time had come for the Committee to ask itself whether it had really made any progress, and whether it should continue to repeat what it had done in previous years. It had proclaimed the rights of subject peoples and condemned the atrocious conduct of the colonialists, but

that had not stopped the colonial Powers from perpetrating their crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the Committee should not despair. The colonial Powers had become so used to the Committee's discussions and resolutions that they no longer took the trouble to vote against the latter in the General Assembly. They merely abstained, which was damaging to the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations and insulting, in particular, to the Special Committee. If the Committee was to fail, it would mean the failure of the Organization as a whole and of its Members, who adopted resolutions that they were powerless to apply.

134. The Committee must make concrete and effective proposals to the General Assembly for hastening the achievement of independence and national sovereignty by the dependent Territories. He wished to make a number of suggestions on how that could be achieved. First, although private consultations such as those the Chairman had already held regarding the organization of work with many delegations, including that of Tunisia, were an acceptable procedure, they could be fruitful only if all delegations were consulted. Secondly, the influence of foreign financial groups in the prolongation of colonial domination was a very important and complex question. The Committee should ask the Secretariat to provide it with the necessary documentation, and if necessary with the services of experts, to assist it in dealing with what was in some ways a highly technical problem. Thirdly, he agreed that it was advisable to send visiting missions, but they must be properly prepared, and must not be sent without the prior consent of the administering Powers. They must also be assured of complete freedom of action once they were on the spot. If those conditions could not be met, it would be better not to send any missions; the Committee would have to examine each case on its merits. Fourthly, although experience had shown that meetings away from Headquarters could be fruitful, their number should be kept to a minimum, for they involved serious practical problems for small delegations. It would be best to select one or two countries in which the Committee could make a fairly prolonged stay.

135. The representative of *Mali* said that the results achieved since the adoption of the historic Declaration set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were not encouraging. Although the Committee had done its work conscientiously, it had to recognize that the administering Powers refused to co-operate fully with it and with the General Assembly. By denying freedom and independence to millions, those Powers openly violated the Charter. The Committee had always denounced such violations and would continue to do so as long as the administering Powers persisted in disregarding the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Secretary-General had referred to the increasing concern of Member States over the refusal of the colonial Powers to apply the resolutions of the General Assembly and over their covert support of the colonialists in Southern Rhodesia and the fascist régimes of Portugal and South Africa. The Special Committee must continue to draw public attention to the dangerous situation prevailing in the Territories of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific Islands which had not yet attained independence. United Nations information services should give priority to colonial questions, and should use all the media of communication, including radio, to inform the peace-loving peoples of the reme-

dies for colonialism proposed by the United Nations and emphasize the enormous responsibility which the administering Powers took upon themselves in hesitating to honour their obligations to the peoples under their administration.

136. The Committee might well ask itself why the administering Powers were so unco-operative. In his view, it was entirely because they wished to hold on to the substantial advantages, including purely military and strategic advantages, which they derived from the shameless exploitation of the subject peoples and their natural resources. For that reason, the Committee should give attention to the economic and military aspects of colonialism. It was encouraging that the General Assembly had decided, in resolution 2189 (XXI), to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-second session an item entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination as well as in all other Territories under colonial domination". The discussion of that item would show the public how the colonial Powers systematically pillaged the colonized countries under the cloak of their civilizing mission. He supported the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should discuss that subject.

137. He also supported the other suggestions put forward by the Chairman. It was the Committee's responsibility to follow up the application of General Assembly resolutions, and the dispatch of visiting missions, particularly to small Territories, would help the Committee to follow developments in such Territories and obtain first-hand information. His delegation felt that it was bound by the decision already taken that part of the Committee's session should be held in Africa; he would comment further on that point at the appropriate time. He supported the maintenance of the sub-committees, which had done excellent work over the previous year. Lastly, he expressed the hope that the Committee would be able to complete its work in time; that would enable it to obtain more co-operation from the administering Powers, thus ensuring the speedy application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

#### *Decisions*

138. At the conclusion of the debate on the organization of its work, the Special Committee, at its 487th meeting, requested the Working Group to consider and submit recommendations regarding the Committee's programme of work for the current year, including the order of priority for the consideration of items. In doing so, it requested the Working Group to take into account the various tasks assigned to the Committee in the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session as well as the tasks envisaged by the Committee itself for 1967, an outline of which is contained in the note by the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/L.366). Further, the Special Committee requested the Working Group to take into consideration the views expressed during its debate on the organization of work (A/AC.109/SR.484 to SR.487), and the possibility of the Committee holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters during the year.

139. On the basis of the recommendation contained in the twenty-sixth report of the Working Group



(A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1) the Special Committee, at its 488th meeting, decided to maintain Sub-Committees I, II and III and requested them to carry out, in addition to their existing terms of reference, the specific tasks assigned by the General Assembly in its resolutions concerning the Territories referred to them. The Special Committee also authorized the Sub-Committees to submit specific recommendations without delay regarding the sending of visiting missions to Territories with which they are concerned.

140. At the same meeting, the Special Committee decided to undertake special studies concerning the following items and referred them to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report:

(a) Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese administration as well as in all other Territories under colonial domination;

(b) Military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration in Territories under their administration.

141. At its 507th meeting, the Special Committee, by adopting the twenty-eighth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.385), decided that: (i) it should accept in principle the invitations extended to it by the Governments of Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Iraq, Morocco, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Zambia to hold meetings at their respective capitals, with an expression of its deep appreciation (A/AC.109/221, 222, 224, 226-228, 230 and 232); and (ii) it should avail itself this year of the invitations received from the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, and it should inform the Governments of Ethiopia, Morocco and Mauritania that, subject to their convenience, it would prefer to take advantage of their invitations at a future date. Subsequent decisions by the Special Committee concerning its meetings held away from Headquarters are set out in chapter II of the present report.

142. At its 498th, 509th and 543rd meetings, the Special Committee took various decisions concerning its programme of work for 1967 including the order of priority for the consideration of the items before it, on the basis of the recommendations contained in the twenty-seventh, twenty-ninth and thirty-second reports of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.380, L.391 and L.418). These decisions are reflected in section E of this chapter.

#### D. MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND ITS WORKING GROUP AND SUB-COMMITTEES

##### *Special Committee*

143. The Special Committee held 89 meetings during 1967, as follows:

##### *First session:*

484th to 510th meetings, 9 February to 19 April 1967, United Nations Headquarters  
511th to 518th meetings, 29 May to 1 June 1967, Kinshasa  
519th to 528th meetings, 3 June to 9 June 1967, Kitwe  
529th to 542nd meetings, 12 June to 21 June 1967, Dar es Salaam

##### *Second session:*

543rd to 572nd meetings, 22 August to 5 December 1967, United Nations Headquarters.

##### *Working Group*

144. The Special Committee, at its 486th meeting, decided to enlarge the Working Group by the addition of one member. Pursuant to this decision, the Special Committee approved the nomination of Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Italy and Mali to be members of the Working Group, in addition to the four officers of the Special Committee, namely, Mr. John Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania), Chairman, Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (Iraq) and Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela) Vice-Chairmen and Mr. Mohsen Esfandiari (Iran), Rapporteur.

145. During the period covered by the present report, the Working Group held thirteen meetings and submitted eight reports.<sup>7</sup>

##### *Sub-Committee on Petitions*

146. The Special Committee, at its 487th meeting, decided to continue the Sub-Committee on Petitions with the same membership as in 1966, except for the replacement of Venezuela by Chile. The Sub-Committee on Petitions therefore consisted of the following members:

Australia	Poland
Chile	Syria
India	Tunisia
Madagascar	

147. At its 96th meeting, on 16 February 1967, the Sub-Committee on Petitions elected Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria) as its Chairman and, at its 97th meeting, on 21 February 1967, Mr. Raymond Raelina (Madagascar) as its Vice-Chairman.

148. The Sub-Committee on Petitions held twenty-six meetings and submitted twenty five reports to the Special Committee.<sup>8</sup> The Sub-Committee on Petitions considered, during the period, a total of 479 communications, 427 of which it decided to circulate as petitions. The petitions circulated by the Sub-Committee are listed in the chapters of the present report dealing with the Territories to which they refer. These petitions included thirty-six requests for hearing, which it recommended to the Special Committee for approval. A list of petitioners heard by the Special Committee is given in annex I.

##### *Sub-Committee I*

149. At its 489th meeting, the Special Committee nominated Finland to fill the vacancy in Sub-Committee I created by the withdrawal of Denmark from membership of the Special Committee. The composition of Sub-Committee I was therefore as follows:

Ethiopia	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Finland	United Republic of Tanzania
Mali	Yugoslavia
Syria	
Tunisia	

<sup>7</sup> A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1, L.380, L.385, L.391, L.392, L.410, L.418/Rev.1 and L.432/Rev.1.

<sup>8</sup> A/AC.109/L.367, L.369, L.375, L.376, L.382, L.389, L.390, L.396, L.399, L.402-406, L.408, L.409 and Corr.1, L.421, L.425, L.426, L.430, L.435, L.436 and Corr.1, L.438, L.440 and L.441.

150. At its 33rd meeting, on 1 March 1967, Sub-Committee I elected Miss Kongit Sinigiorgis (Ethiopia) Chairman and Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria) Rapporteur.

151. Sub-Committee I held fourteen meetings and submitted three reports to the Special Committee covering its consideration of the following items which had been referred to it for consideration (see para. 140 above):

(a) Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/L.498);

(b) Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination (A/AC.109/L.434);

(c) Military activities by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration (A/AC.109/L.433).

152. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of the reports of the Sub-Committee relating to item (a) is contained in chapter XIV of the present report. Its consideration of item (b) is contained in document A/6868 and Add.1, while its consideration of item (c) is contained in section I of the present chapter.

#### *Sub-Committee II*

153. At its 489th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee II with the same membership as in 1966. The composition of Sub-Committee II was therefore as follows:

Afghanistan	Iraq
Australia	Poland
Chile	Sierra Leone
India	United States of America

154. At its 56th meeting, on 23 February 1967, Sub-Committee II elected Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) Chairman and Mr. G. E. O. Williams (Sierra Leone) Rapporteur.

155. Sub-Committee II held fourteen meetings and submitted reports on the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:

(a) Question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/L.395 and Corr. 1);

(b) Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.1);

(c) New Hebrides (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.2);

(d) Guam and American Samoa (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.3);

(e) Niue and Tokelau Islands (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.4);

(f) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.5);

(g) Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (A/AC.109/L.395/Add.6).

156. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Sub-Committee's report relating to specific Territories are contained in chapters XV to XXII of the present report. Its consideration of the Special Committee's report on the question of sending visiting missions is contained in section F of the present chapter.

#### *Sub-Committee III*

157. At its 489th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee III with the same membership as in 1966. The composition of Sub-Committee III therefore was as follows:

Bulgaria	Madagascar
Iran	Uruguay
Italy	Venezuela
Ivory Coast	

158. At its 60th meeting, on 23 February 1967, Sub-Committee III elected Mr. Mohsen S. Esfandiary (Iran) Chairman and Mr. G. I. Carresquero (Venezuela) Rapporteur.

159. Sub-Committee III held thirty-nine meetings and submitted a report dealing with the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:

(a) Question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/L.401/Rev.1);

(b) United States Virgin Islands (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.1);

(c) British Virgin Islands (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.2);

(d) Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.3);

(e) Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos and Cayman Islands (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.4);

(f) Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (A/AC.109/L.401/Add.4).

160. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Sub-Committee's report relating to specific Territories are contained in chapter XXIII of the present report. Its consideration of the Sub-Committee's report on the question of sending visiting missions is contained in section F of the present chapter.

#### **E. CONSIDERATION OF TERRITORIES**

161. During the period covered by this report, the Special Committee considered the following Territories:

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
Aden . . . . .	490, 492, 493, 499, 504, 508, 543, 567, 571 (United Nations Headquarters)
French Somaliland . . . . .	499, 500, 502, 503, 506, 508 (United Nations Headquarters) 537, 538 (Dar es Salaam) 557, 559 (United Nations Headquarters)
Uni and Spanish Sahara . . . . .	508, 547, 548, 552, 559, 560 (United Nations Headquarters)

TABLE (continued)

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
Territories under Portuguese administration .....	513-518 (Kinshasa) 524, 526 (Kitwe) 532-534, 538-541 (Dar es Salaam)
Southern Rhodesia .....	522, 523, 525, 527, 528 (Kitwe) 536 (Dar es Salaam)
South West Africa .....	524-526 (Kitwe) 535, 537, 539 (Dar es Salaam) 554, 556, 557 (United Nations Headquarters)
Gibraltar .....	543-550, 570 (United Nations Headquarters)
Fiji .....	546, 555, 558, 560, 561 (United Nations Headquarters)
Equatorial Guinea .....	551-554, 556, 557, 564 (United Nations Headquarters)
Swaziland .....	561, 568, 569 (United Nations Headquarters)
Oman .....	564 (United Nations Headquarters)
<i>Territories referred to Sub-Committee I</i>	
Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena ....	535-539 (Dar es Salaam)
<i>Territories referred to Sub-Committee II</i>	
Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands .....	562
New Hebrides .....	562
American Samoa and Guam .....	562, 563
Niue and the Tokelau Islands .....	562, 563, 564
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands ...	562, 564
Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands .....	564
Brunei and Hong Kong .....	569
<i>Territories referred to Sub-Committee III</i>	
United States Virgin Islands .....	564
British Virgin Islands .....	565
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent .....	489-497, 500, 501, 504-506, 565
Bermuda, Bahamas, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos and Cayman Islands .....	565
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) .....	565
British Honduras .....	548

162. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Territories listed above and its conclusions and recommendations thereon are given in chapters III to XXIII of the present report.

163. At the 569th meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee, on behalf of the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee II informed the Committee that, owing to the limited time available to it, Sub-Committee II had decided at its 67th meeting to postpone its consideration of the Territories of Brunei and Hong Kong. At the same meeting, following statements by the representatives of the USSR, Poland and Bulgaria,<sup>9</sup> the Special Committee agreed to take note of the above-mentioned decision. Information concerning these two Territories is given in chapters XXI and XXII of the present report.

<sup>9</sup> The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and Poland stated that since the question of Hong Kong was directly related to the People's Republic of China, the United Nations and its organs, including the Special Committee, could not consider this matter until the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China were restored in the United Nations.

164. Sub-Committee III was unable to consider British Honduras owing to lack of time. Information on this Territory is contained in chapter XXIII of the present report.

#### F. QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING GROUPS TO TERRITORIES

165. In operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly approved "the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1967, including the sending of visiting missions and the possibility of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters, and requests the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to be sent to the Territories under their administration".

166. In approving the twenty-sixth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.368/Rev.1), the Special Committee at its 488th meeting, on 20 February 1967, requested its Sub-Committees I, II and III to submit without delay specific recommendations to the Special Committee regarding the sending of visiting groups in relation to Territories with which they are concerned.

167. At the 565th meeting, on 6 October, the Special Committee considered the reports submitted by Sub-Committees II and III concerning the question of sending visiting groups to the Territories referred to them (A/AC.109/L.395 and Corr.1 and A/AC.109/L.401/Rev.1, see annex II).

168. At the same meeting, the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia reaffirmed the positions of their Governments with regard to the sending of visiting groups, as recorded in the reports of the sub-committees.

169. At the same meeting, the Special Committee approved the sections of the reports of Sub-Committees II and III relating to this question, and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the record.

170. The conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committees are set out below:

#### *Conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II*

"The Sub-Committee notes that most of the administering Powers continue to maintain their same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee II.

"The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date. The detailed recommendations regarding the Territories to be visited and other modalities will be decided upon at a later stage."

#### *Conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee III*

"Recalling paragraphs five of General Assembly resolutions 2232 (XXI) and 2189 (XXI), the Sub-Committee notes with regret that the administering Powers, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, continue to maintain the same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee III.

"The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date."

#### **G. QUESTION OF THE LIST OF TERRITORIES TO WHICH THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IS APPLICABLE**

171. At its 471st meeting, on 10 October 1966, the Special Committee approved the proposals contained in the 25th report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.338) which read as follows:

"10. Following an exchange of views on various suggestions, the Working Group agreed that the question of the inclusion of these Territories, namely Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago, [in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable] required further detailed study and that, in view of the lack of time at this session, it should make such a study at an early date during the next session of the Special Committee. It further agreed that, at that time, it would also consider any other Territories which might be included in the list of 'all other Territories which have not yet attained independence'."

172. In operative paragraph 4 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly approved "the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee for the year 1967 with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies".

173. At its 509th and 510th meetings, on 17 and 19 April, the Special Committee considered a report submitted by the Working Group concerning the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable. The relevant paragraph of this report (A/AC.109/L.392) reads as follows:

"2. After discussion, the Working Group agreed, by consensus, to refer to the Special Committee the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable. The representative of Italy reserved the position of his delegation regarding this decision."

174. At the conclusion of its consideration of this question (see paras. 178 to 256 below), the Special Committee, at its 510th meeting, adopted a proposal made by the representative of Syria to adjourn *sine die* the debate on the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable. This proposal was adopted by 19 votes to 8, with one abstention.

175. At the same meeting, the Special Committee also decided to defer consideration of the question of the inclusion of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable.

176. At the 564th meeting, the Special Committee, by approving the 33rd report of the Working Group, decided to continue consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable at its next session.

177. The views of members on the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable, as expressed at the 509th and 510th meetings, are set out below.

#### *Views of members*

178. The representative of the United States of America said that the problem raised by the Working Group's report was purely procedural and the facts were clear. For a number of years the United States had transmitted information on Puerto Rico, as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, under Article 73 e of the Charter. In the 1948 general elections the people of Puerto Rico had voted unequivocally, by a vote of almost 6 to 1 for the party favouring commonwealth status over the party favouring independence, to become a commonwealth, or free state, associated with the United States, and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had come into force on 25 July 1952.

179. Since Puerto Rico had thereby achieved full self-government, the Government of the United States had concluded that it would no longer be appropriate to submit information on it under Article 73 e of the Charter and had duly informed the United Nations of that decision. Full documentation had been sent to the General Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which had discussed the question and approved a resolution noting that the people of Puerto Rico had achieved a new constitutional status after expressing their will in a free and demo-



cratic way and that the Commonwealth could be considered as falling outside the scope of Article 73 e of the Charter. On 27 November 1953, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 748 (VIII), which took favourable note of the conclusions of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and explicitly recognized that the people of Puerto Rico had effectively exercised their right to self-determination and had been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identified the status of self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous political entity. It had furthermore stated that it was considered appropriate that the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter should cease.

180. Since the General Assembly itself had found that Puerto Rico was no longer a colonial or Non-Self-Governing Territory but a self-governing Territory with a constitutional and international status chosen by the people themselves, it was difficult to understand how a subsidiary body of the General Assembly established to implement a declaration pertaining to colonial Territories could inscribe Puerto Rico on its agenda. To claim that Puerto Rico was a colonial Territory falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee would be to suggest that the latter was in a position to act counter to its parent body's findings and would expose any General Assembly decision to subsequent challenge by a subsidiary body. The question was one of the utmost importance since a proposal to inscribe Puerto Rico on the Committee's agenda would not only violate the basic rules and provisions of the United Nations Charter, but also constitute interference in a matter of direct concern to the United States and all its citizens, including those in Puerto Rico. About that, there should be no misunderstanding.

181. The status of Puerto Rico as an associated Commonwealth had been freely chosen in democratic elections based on universal adult suffrage and had been confirmed by the General Assembly. The United States delegation therefore formally proposed that Puerto Rico should not be included in the list of Territories to be considered by the Special Committee. This proposal was subsequently reworded to read as follows:

"Having regard to the thirtieth report of the Working Group and recalling General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII), Puerto Rico should not be considered by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

182. The representative of *Uruguay* said that in considering the problem which had been referred to it by the Working Group, the Committee must first decide whether it was competent to pass judgement on the present status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. He would approach the question from the point of view of law, bearing in mind the importance of applying the law faithfully if the political, economic, humanitarian and social purposes of the United Nations were to be served and the interests of the people of Puerto Rico safeguarded.

183. The Special Committee was a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, established under resolution 1654 (XVI), to examine the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution

1514 (XV)). Its powers were set forth in operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of that resolution. At the seventeenth session, in operative paragraph 8 of resolution 1810 (XVII), the Special Committee had been invited to continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all Territories which had not yet attained independence and to propose specific measures in that regard. It was clear from those provisions that the Committee was to concern itself exclusively with Territories which had not yet attained independence—an expression which was also found in paragraph 5 of the Declaration itself.

184. In 1953, by resolution 748 (VIII), the Assembly had decided that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico fell outside the category of colonial Territories which had not attained independence. The resolution in question contained a number of findings regarding the new political and constitutional status of Puerto Rico, but he would not go into them since they were outside the competence of the Special Committee. The fact remained, however, that the General Assembly had taken a decision on the matter. The competent principal organ had adopted a resolution, in the exercise of its characteristic powers under the Charter, eight years prior to the establishment of the Special Committee. To question the validity of the General Assembly's decision and attempt to revoke it would be a most serious violation of the legal order of the United Nations, and the Special Committee should therefore limit itself to stating its lack of competence in the matter.

185. A few days previously, at the 29th meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights, the representative of Poland had rightly maintained that the existence of an earlier General Assembly resolution on the point in dispute left the subsidiary organ in question no say in the matter. It had been pointed out that the General Assembly had already decided to make Russian a working language of the Conference and that the Preparatory Committee had no competence to question that decision. That thesis had been accepted. The Special Committee now confronted an identical situation, except that what was in question was not the exclusion of a language, but the inclusion of a Territory in a particular list. The subordinate organ clearly lacked power to modify the decision of its parent body.

186. He now wished to deal with a possible objection. The Working Group, in order to justify the referral of the question to the plenary Special Committee, had referred in document A/AC.109/L.392 to paragraph 10 of its twenty-fifth report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. I, para. 265). In the paragraph referred to, the Working Group had stated its view that the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago required further detailed study. That statement, however, in no way suggested a claim of competence in a matter which had been decided years earlier by the General Assembly. The Working Group had simply postponed the matter in view of its complexity, without taking any position on the Committee's competence to take a decision on the matter.

187. Any decision by the Committee to include Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to be considered would be null and void and give rise to a conflict of powers with the General Assembly. He realized that decolonization was a most important political duty and that appeals to legal arguments were unwelcome to

those who were deeply concerned for the freedom of peoples. Many essentially political goals were sought by the United Nations, but it was in the interests of all that its actions should conform to legal norms. No one would have faith in a world organization which disobeyed its own rules and encouraged conflicts among its own organs.

188. In the light of those considerations, Uruguay would support a motion to the effect that the Committee had no competence in the matter, and, as a corollary, would vote for the non-inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories which had not yet attained independence.

189. With regard to the Comoro Archipelago, he suggested that the matter should be taken up at a later date, in view of the complexity of the special factors involved.

190. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* recalled that his delegation had already expressed its position on the question of Puerto Rico in the Special Committee in October 1965 and October 1966 and had demonstrated that the proposal to include the question in the Committee's agenda was well founded. His delegation had based its position on the fact that, notwithstanding United States statements to the contrary, the people of Puerto Rico were being deprived of the opportunity of exercising their inalienable right to self-determination and that island continued to be a colonial Territory. His delegation continued to hold that view. United States representatives in various United Nations bodies sought to cast doubt on the Organization's competence to consider the question of Puerto Rico by claiming that the people of the Territory had allegedly been given the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination, that, as a result of the adoption of a new Constitution, Puerto Rico had become a fully self-governing State, and that that had been confirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 748 (VIII). Another argument, advanced by the Uruguayan and other delegations, was that since the Special Committee was a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, it could consider the question only on the basis of a relevant General Assembly resolution. In the Soviet delegation's view, both those arguments were invalid, since from the procedural and substantive points of view, the problem of Puerto Rico came within the competence of the Special Committee.

191. With regard to the procedural aspect, he recalled that the Special Committee had taken up the problem in 1965 and 1966 and that in its report to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly it had said that its Working Group had decided that the question of the inclusion of the Territories, i.e., Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago, required further study and that because of lack of time the Group would carry out that study at the beginning of its next session. As members were aware, in its resolution 2189 (XXI) the General Assembly had approved the Special Committee's report and the programme of work proposed for 1967. Thus, it was clear that the General Assembly had unequivocally entrusted the Special Committee and its Working Group with the task of studying the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda. It was also clear that such a study should be carried out at the beginning of the Special Committee's current session. Two conclusions could therefore be drawn up from the above-mentioned decisions: first, the Committee was empowered to

consider the question and to decide for itself whether or not to include it in its agenda, and, secondly, it had been given a clear direction to consider the question at the beginning of its current session. Thus, the argument that the Committee could not consider the question until it received instructions from the General Assembly to do so could not withstand scrutiny, for it had already received such instructions.

192. The Declaration of the Cairo Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries had, *inter alia*, condemned the manifestation of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Latin America. In particular, that Declaration had drawn the attention of the Special Committee to the question of Puerto Rico and had called upon the Committee to consider the situation in that Territory in the light of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It was clear that the large number of States which had participated in the Conference had been of the view that Puerto Rico was nothing more than a colony and that the General Assembly resolution in question was applicable to it.

193. With respect to the substantive aspect of the problem, it was also clear that the Special Committee was fully entitled to consider the question of Puerto Rico. The assertion by United States representatives that the people of Puerto Rico had been given an opportunity in the referendum of 1951 to choose between independence, statehood in the United States, and associated status in the form of a commonwealth, was in flagrant contradiction with the facts. An analysis of the relevant documents and the present situation in the Territory showed that the people had not been given the opportunity of deciding the question of their future and that Puerto Rico continued to be a dependent Territory. For example, the official responsible for recording the results of elections in the Territory had said on 18 March 1965 that his department had no documents indicating that a referendum had been conducted in Puerto Rico in which the people had been offered three options—*independence, statehood, or commonwealth status*. That statement clearly showed that the people of Puerto Rico had not been given an opportunity to decide on their future status. Secondly, in seeking to avoid responsibility for preparing its colony for genuine self-government, the United States had imposed the colonial status of commonwealth upon Puerto Rico by Public Law 600, adopted by the United States Congress on 3 July 1950. With a view to creating the impression that Puerto Rico had become self-governing, not as a result of the unilateral action of a colonial Power but in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Territory, the Law had provided that it would be adopted in the form of an agreement subject to approval at a referendum by a qualified majority of Puerto Ricans and that, after the referendum, a constitutional convention would be held to prepare a draft constitution. The Law had empowered the President of the United States to consider the question whether the constitution thus adopted was in accordance with the provisions of United States law and with the United States Constitution. In the event of an affirmative decision, the new constitution would be submitted to the Congress for approval. The resolution adopted on 3 July 1952 by both Houses of the United States Congress had approved the Constitution of Puerto Rico subject to certain changes in that document. As a result, the Constitution had included a provision to the effect that any amendment or revision of the Constitution must be consistent with the above-

mentioned United States Congress resolution, with the relevant provisions of the United States Constitution, with the Federal Relations Act and with Public Law No. 600. It was thus clear that the United States Congress in which Puerto Rico was not represented, continued to exercise legal control over that Territory.

194. The Uruguayan representative had sought to prove that the Special Committee was not competent to consider the question of Puerto Rico and that the Committee would be undermining the very basis of the United Nations if it discussed the merits of General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII). The Soviet delegation could not agree that the fact that a resolution had been adopted meant that it could not be discussed. To accept that argument would mean that the "Uniting for Peace" resolution was a basic United Nations document, although it had been adopted in violation of the Charter and all the principles of the United Nations and had been forced on the Organization by the United States at a time when it had enjoyed an automatic majority in the General Assembly. Referring to resolution 748 (VIII) he said that the General Assembly had in essence adopted the point of view of the colonial Power, namely the United States. In manufacturing its nefarious commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States had trampled on the principle of the equality of rights which was embodied in the Charter. The Committee should be guided by the Charter rather than by the above-mentioned resolution, which was contrary to the basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

195. With regard to the conclusions of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, he wishes to point out that there had been no unanimity in the Committee regarding the new constitutional status of the Territory. In particular, the Indian representative had said that Puerto Rico did not possess all the attributes of a fully independent or self-governing State. Furthermore, the resolution adopted by the Committee had been based on information submitted by the United States. In resolution 748 (VIII) the General Assembly had expressed the opinion "that it stems from the documentation provided that the association of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with the United States of America has been established as a mutually agreed association" and had considered it appropriate that the transmission of information on Puerto Rico under Article 73 e of the Charter should cease. In essence, the General Assembly had adopted the point of view of the administering Power, i.e. that relations between dependent Territories and the States responsible for those Territories were an internal matter and that only the colonial Power could decide whether a Territory was self-governing or not. In taking that decision and recognizing thereby that the United States was no longer responsible for the Territory, the General Assembly had failed to carry out one of its most important functions under the Charter, namely that laid down in Article 13 of initiating studies and making recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the realization of human rights. One of the most important of those rights was the right of peoples to self-determination. In the Soviet delegation's view, the Committee should not be bound by a resolution which had been adopted in violation of the provisions of the Charter.

196. Under the Charter all States Members of the United Nations had an obligation to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. By creating the "Commonwealth" of Puerto Rico, the

United States had retained its privileged position; thus it had flagrantly violated the principle of equal rights and self-determination. The United States continued to be responsible for Puerto Rico's foreign affairs and defence, the most important prerogatives of an independent State.

197. Puerto Rico was represented in the United States Congress only by a Resident Commissioner, who did not have the right to vote, although that body determined questions directly affecting the Territory. While the Constitution provided that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was a court of last instance, its decisions could be appealed from to a United States court. The Puerto Rican people had been deprived of the possibility of managing their own affairs. The United States Congress retained exclusive jurisdiction over military service, the declaration of war, customs, currency, shipping, air transport, external relations, citizenship, status of aliens, wages and labour legislation, stationing of armed forces, and so forth. United States monopolies continued to be the masters of the Territory's economy. Moreover, as the United Kingdom newspaper, *The Guardian*, had pointed out on 6 August 1965, one of the most important factors restricting the independence of Puerto Rico was the existence in the Territory of a large number of military bases. Thus, the referendum held in Puerto Rico in 1951 in order to serve as a "showcase" concealing the colonialist policy of the United States had been conducted in an atmosphere of political and economic domination by the United States, and United States imperialism had sacrificed the aspirations of the Puerto Rican people to its own economic and military purposes. The colonial status of Puerto Rico could not be concealed even in the official circles of the United States. In 1952, a United States Congressman had described the so-called constitution of Puerto Rico as a weak, insignificant colonial statute. In May 1963, a former Attorney General of Puerto Rico had called Public Law 600 a farce that left intact the structure of the colonial administration. In 1964, Luther Hodges, the former Secretary of Commerce, had said that in granting Commonwealth status to Puerto Rico in 1952, Congress had not intended to alter the status of the Territory as a "Possession" of the United States. It was clear that the statements of United States representatives to the effect that the people of Puerto Rico had exercised their right of self-determination and that the island had become a self-governing Territory were without any foundation whatever and were merely aimed at deceiving ill-informed public opinion.

198. The Puerto Rican Constitution, which had been dictated by the United States, was completely at variance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The very fact that the United States Government planned to hold a plebiscite in July of the current year showed that it could no longer maintain the fiction that the present status of Puerto Rico was in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Like the referendum of 1951, the planned plebiscite would be conducted under the control of the executive bodies of the colonial Power, in an atmosphere of repression and persecution, and under conditions of military occupation. The United States Government had not even promised to recognize the results of the plebiscite.

199. Puerto Rico came within the third category of Territories listed in paragraph 5 of the General Assem-

bly's Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), and it was the duty of the Special Committee to include the question in its agenda.

200. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation rejected the contention that the Committee was not competent to discuss the inclusion of Puerto Rico in its agenda. The General Assembly, in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2189 (XXI), had approved "the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies", and had approved its report containing a reference to the Working Group's twenty-fifth report, in which it had stated its view that the question of the inclusion of certain Territories, including Puerto Rico, required further study, and that such study should take place early in the 1967 session. The General Assembly had clearly approved that decision, and the Special Committee's competence to consider the matter was thus confirmed. That decision by the General Assembly must prevail over any earlier decision inconsistent with it. Each session of the General Assembly was sovereign and the decisions of later sessions had precedence over those of earlier sessions. Thus the Committee was legally empowered to take up the question of Puerto Rico.

201. His delegation strongly supported the inclusion of the question of the colonial Territory of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda. In taking that stand it could derive support from the Declaration of the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.<sup>10</sup> The anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces represented at that Conference had deemed it their duty to proclaim the right of Puerto Rico to independence. In resolution 1514 (XV), the General Assembly had laid down that immediate steps must be taken in all Territories which had not yet attained independence to transfer power to the people. Puerto Rico was a colonial Territory and was not independent. The representative of the Soviet Union had given a list of some of the matters which still remained in the hands of the administering Power. In such circumstances, Puerto Rico was clearly still a colony, and came within the purview of resolution 1514 (XV) and of the present Committee.

202. He recalled that in the case of the Cook Islands a decision had been taken that the administering Power should cease to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter. It had been stipulated, however, that the people of the Cook Islands had the right to avail themselves of their option under resolution 1514 (XV) at any time they wished. In so doing, the General Assembly had confirmed that the Declaration was applicable as long as a Territory did not enjoy complete independence. The same was true with respect to Puerto Rico. The question of Puerto Rico should therefore be included in the agenda so that it could be fully studied.

203. He also supported the inclusion of the question of the Comoro Archipelago in the Committee's agenda, particularly as the administering Power concerned, in connexion with another Territory, had refused to co-operate with the United Nations, with the result that a serious situation had arisen.

204. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that, as a member of the Working Group, his delegation had, in view of the importance of the matter, supported the suggestion that the question of the inclusion of Puerto

Rico in the agenda of the Special Committee should be referred to the plenary meeting.

205. As the representatives of the USSR and Tanzania had pointed out, the General Assembly, by adopting the reports of the Special Committee for 1965 and 1966, and by approving the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee for 1967 with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applied (resolution 2189 (XXI), operative paragraph 4), had authorized the Special Committee to discuss the question. In addition, many requests had been received asking for the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda.

206. His delegation's position was based on the terms of reference of the Special Committee under resolution 1514 (XV), and subsequent resolutions relating to its implementation, and was in conformity with his country's fundamental policy of defending the sacred right of dependent peoples to self-determination and freedom and of supporting them in their struggle. Under paragraph 5 of the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), the Special Committee had been given a clear mandate to deal with all colonial Territories, including Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories and all other Territories which had not yet attained independence, as in the case of Puerto Rico. The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in October 1964, had drawn the attention of the Special Committee to the case of Puerto Rico and had called upon it to consider the situation in the light of resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee was fully qualified to discuss the question of Puerto Rico since the latter was still a dependent Territory, to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable. That resolution was the *raison d'être* of the Committee and all criteria for deciding whether a Territory was dependent or not must be based on it.

207. If it was true that the people of Puerto Rico had indeed exercised their right to self-determination and had attained self-government, it was difficult to see why a so-called plebiscite was to be held in July 1967. The main reason was obviously to give the impression that the people were being consulted, while the present situation of virtual colonialism was maintained. The plebiscite would offer the apparent alternatives of statehood in the United States or independence but the United States Congress would not commit itself in advance to abiding by the results. The plebiscite was clearly an attempt by the United States to evade its international responsibilities and postpone once again the solution of the colonial problem of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico must be included in the list of Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable and the Special Committee should discuss in detail all the political, economic, social and other conditions prevailing in the Territory.

208. The representative of *Syria* said that his delegation's position was based on three principles. The first was that each session of the General Assembly was master of its own business. If that was not so, many errors would be perpetuated. Even the history of the United Nations was not without instances of tragedies resulting from falsifications of the will of the majority. Truth was never decided by the number of votes. Secondly, as a non-aligned country, Syria was bound by the decisions of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which had called upon the Special Committee to consider, in



the light of resolution 1514 (XV), the situation in Puerto Rico and other Territories. Thirdly, there had been a significant change in the composition and political alignment of the United Nations since 1953, when resolution 748 (VIII) had been adopted. Of the forty-six countries which had attended the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, twenty-seven had not been Members of the United Nations in 1953, and that was more than the number of those States which had voted in favour of resolution 748 (VIII) since the result had been 26 in favour, 16 against and 18 abstentions. The fact that the result of the vote in the Fourth Committee, before the question had been referred to the General Assembly, had been 22 in favour, 18 against and 19 abstentions, appeared to indicate that the United States delegation had exerted pressure on some Members in order to gain four additional votes.

209. He pointed out that operative paragraph 9 of resolution 748 (VIII) stated that due regard should be paid to the political advancement of the people of Puerto Rico and to the will of the Puerto Rican and American peoples in the conduct of their relations and also in the eventuality that either might desire any change in the terms of their association. He hoped that some progress had been made since 1953, but, in his view, the will of the people could only be ascertained when they enjoyed political sovereignty and previous speakers had already referred to the rights of which the people of Puerto Rico were deprived.

210. The United States representative had said that it had been the people of Puerto Rico who had decided in favour of their present status. Other countries, including Syria, which had suffered under colonialism, had seen Governments set up and deposed, the will of the people falsified and parts of their countries ceded. In Puerto Rico, only 34 per cent of the population entitled to vote had in fact voted in favour of the present status, while 6 per cent had voted against and 60 per cent had abstained. Furthermore, no alternatives had been offered. That did not indicate that the people of Puerto Rico had been given the opportunity to express their will freely.

211. The only resolution which should guide the Special Committee was resolution 1514 (XV), in particular paragraph 5 of the Declaration, which fully confirmed operative paragraph 9 of resolution 748 (VIII). If the United States was convinced that it had right on its side, it should not try to prevent the Special Committee from considering the matter. He therefore fully supported the inclusion in the Special Committee's agenda of the two Territories of Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago.

212. The representative of the *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* fully agreed with the objections expressed by the United States representative to the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the Committee's agenda. It was solely for the administering Power concerned to decide when a Territory under its formal administration had ceased to be non-self-governing within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. That was his Government's basic position. In resolution 748 (VIII), however, the General Assembly itself had recognized the new status of Puerto Rico as that of an autonomous political entity and had declared it appropriate that the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter should cease. He shared the view expressed by the representative of Uruguay that it was not for the Special Committee to question or seek

to reverse a clear, unequivocal and specific decision taken by the General Assembly itself. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican people had repeatedly been asked to express their views about their present and future status. Since 1952, support for the political parties favouring independence had declined to 21,000 in 1964, whereas the two main parties which supported Puerto Rico's present status had in 1964 obtained 479,000 and 277,000 votes respectively. It was therefore clear that Puerto Rico was not a Non-Self-Governing or colonial Territory and that the Committee was not competent to discuss it.

213. Similar considerations applied to the Comoro Islands. The former administering power, France, had informed the United Nations in March 1959 that the Territory had achieved full autonomy and that consequently Chapter XI of the Charter no longer applied. It had also supplied a considerable amount of documentary evidence in support of its decision, which had not been questioned by any formal or other United Nations decision at the time or since.

214. If it was once admitted that new Territories could be added to the Committee's already extensive list, even for the purpose of discussing whether they should be discussed, there would be no end to the controversies raised. If the Committee was to adopt a completely unrestricted view of what constituted a Territory which had not yet attained independence, the list might be endless, especially if the Committee reopened the subject of Territories whose decolonization had already been officially endorsed by the United Nations. His delegation fully supported the United States proposal.

215. The representative of *Italy* said that the reservations of his delegation, mentioned in the thirtieth report of the Working Group, related both to competence and methods. On the question of competence, his delegation strongly believed that the Special Committee did not have the power or authority to decide that a Territory had not yet attained independence within the meaning of operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) or to inscribe it on its agenda. During the five years of its existence, the Special Committee had not added a single Territory to its original list without a previous decision by the General Assembly. A decision of such magnitude which was tantamount to defining the status of a territory and involved legal and practical consequences could not be left to a subsidiary body of the General Assembly such as the Special Committee. The Special Committee was even less competent to discuss Territories which had already been the subject of a General Assembly resolution, such as Puerto Rico, or had been removed from the list of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and the implicit consent of the General Assembly, such as the Comoro Islands.

216. He agreed that in approving the reports of the Special Committee, the General Assembly had implicitly approved each part of the Committee's work, including the decision to postpone until 1967 a procedural debate as to whether a number of items should or should not be inscribed in the agenda. The General Assembly could not, however, express an opinion in advance on a decision which the Special Committee had not yet taken. The reasoning of the USSR and Tanzanian representatives on that point could therefore not be regarded as acceptable.

217. Similarly, his delegation could not be associated with another argument advanced, namely that a change in the membership of the United Nations made earlier

resolutions valueless and obsolete. To accept such an idea would deal a serious blow to the United Nations. The General Assembly could, of course, revise or reconsider an earlier resolution, but unless and until that was done, the resolution stood and could not be ignored without violating the spirit and letter of the Charter.

218. On the question of methods, under operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) the Special Committee had special responsibilities in the drawing up of the list of Territories which had not yet achieved independence. As his delegation had repeatedly maintained in the past, such responsibilities should be discharged by the Working Group which should study the relevant criteria and principles for submission to the General Assembly.

219. His delegation had therefore had serious reservations concerning the discussion of the question in the plenary meeting without previous exhaustive consideration by the Working Group. Consequently, his delegation would oppose the inclusion of any Territory not considered within the context of a comprehensive study of the more general problem of the list of the Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) applied. His delegation therefore supported the United States proposal.

220. The representative of *Poland* said that his delegation's position with respect to the status of Puerto Rico had been fully explained at the eighth session of the General Assembly and remained unchanged. Despite some changes in the political status of the Territory, there had been no justification for removing Puerto Rico from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, as Puerto Rico had not yet attained the stage of full self-government and independence within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. The United States Congress reserved the right to pass legislation on economic, social and educational matters affecting Puerto Rico, while the Puerto Rico legislature could enact such legislation only within considerable limitations. The people of Puerto Rico could not at its will change the constitutional status of the Territory; under the Federal Relations Act, the prior agreement of the United States Congress was required. Moreover, the United States Congress could at any time amend the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act. On the basis of those facts, his delegation had opposed the adoption of resolution 748 (VIII), which had in any case been adopted only by a very slim majority.

221. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) stipulated quite clearly that the colonial system should be abolished in all Territories, irrespective of whether or not a given Territory strictly fell into one of the two categories of a Non-Self-Governing or a Trust Territory. It should not be so interpreted as to delay the process of decolonization or to deny the enjoyment of "complete independence and freedom". The people of Puerto Rico did not yet enjoy "complete independence and freedom" and, consequently, the question of Puerto Rico still came under the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and, as such, could and should be discussed by the Special Committee.

222. United Nations work in similar cases had shown that the Organization had endeavoured to elaborate basic principles to ensure that what had happened in the case of Puerto Rico should not apply in the case of other Territories. That was exemplified by General Assembly resolution 2064 (XX) on the question of the Cook Islands. Although elections had been held in the Cook Islands under United Nations supervision and the

Constitution guaranteed the people a right to withdraw unilaterally from its association with New Zealand, the General Assembly had considered itself in duty bound to include in its resolution operative paragraph 6 in which it "reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations, under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to assist the people of Cook Islands in the eventual achievement of full independence, if they so wish, at a future date". That resolution proved that United Nations responsibility in colonial cases did not cease automatically when the administering Power was absolved of its obligation to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter. Even though the United States Government had been absolved from that obligation in respect of Puerto Rico, the process of self-determination had not been completed in that Territory, and the United Nations still had responsibilities towards the Territory and its people.

223. The Special Committee had been instructed by the General Assembly to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which had not yet attained independence. It was therefore the duty of the Committee to discuss the request contained in the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and the request contained in the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba (A/AC.109/144) that the question of Puerto Rico and that of the Comoro Islands be included in the agenda of the Special Committee. His delegation also shared the view expressed by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Tanzania and Bulgaria that the Special Committee had already received a specific mandate from the General Assembly to study the problem of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) were applicable, inasmuch as the General Assembly at its twenty-first session had approved the report of the Special Committee covering its work in 1966, which explicitly stated that the Committee intended to study that question.

224. Guided by the principles of anti-colonialism and the rights of all colonial and non-self-governing peoples to complete independence and freedom, his delegation firmly supported the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the agenda of the Special Committee.

225. The representative of *Australia* said that he had been surprised by the discussion of the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico and of the Comoro Archipelago in the list of Territories to which the Declaration was applicable. He fully agreed with the representative of Uruguay that Member States must be guided in the matter by their obligations under the Charter.

226. Article 73 of the Charter was quite explicit concerning the obligations of Member States with regard to Non-Self-Governing Territories. At the twenty-third meeting of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, the USSR representative had stressed the need to adhere to the provisions of the Charter. The basic obligations of Member States were regulated by the Charter, which could not be changed, especially by extraneous meetings of some Members. The Charter had international treaty status and nothing could countermand its clear provisions. He would point out that his Government had played an instrumental part at the San Francisco Conference in drafting the Charter provisions relating to the rights of dependent peoples to self-government and independence and had

also played a responsible role in the decolonization operations of the last twenty years.

227. The resolutions of the General Assembly had great persuasive force, but could not amend the Charter. The present discussion raised the whole issue of the relation of General Assembly resolutions to the Charter. Under Article 73 of the Charter, the United Nations had the obligation to develop self-government in dependent Territories. By resolution 748 (VIII), the General Assembly had recognized that the people of Puerto Rico had expressed their will "in a free and democratic way" and had "effectively exercised their right to self-determination" and that the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter were, therefore, no longer applicable to that Territory. The United Nations function in relation to that Territory had ended with its achievement of self-government. Article 10 of the Charter provided that the General Assembly might discuss any question which came within the scope of the Charter, but the question of the self-government of Puerto Rico no longer came within the scope of Member States' obligations under the Charter. The contention that General Assembly resolution 748 (VIII) was invalid because it had been adopted fourteen years previously, when the number of Member States was less than at present, was untenable.

228. Again, much had been said about the power of the General Assembly and the sovereign nature of each separate session of the Assembly. That did not affect the fundamental and paramount status of the Charter. Resolutions on self-government differed from others, which might be varied or amended. A resolution accepting that certain provisions of the Charter had been fulfilled and stating that a particular people had asserted its right to self-determination could not be revoked so that the Territory concerned was demoted again to colonial status.

229. He had noted recently a tendency of certain Member States to wish to force complete independence on States which did not want it. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) declared the right of all peoples freely to determine their political status. For the United Nations to insist on independence as the only solution for all Territories would be limiting the right of peoples to make a free choice. General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) set forth the various options which were open to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories when exercising that right of free choice. There was a tendency among certain States to regard the alternatives to independence as "second-class" solutions, as had been apparent in the debate on the Caribbean Territories, in whose case principles V, VI and VII of the annex to resolution 1541 (XV) had been applied.

230. The United States had clearly discharged its Charter obligations with regard to Puerto Rico, and that territory was no longer a Non-Self-Governing Territory and subject to consideration by the General Assembly or the Special Committee. He was surprised and perturbed that the question had been raised, and his delegation would definitely support the United States motion.

231. The representative of the *United States of America*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that in view of the number of delegations which wished to speak in the debate, her delegation was willing to postpone the vote on its motion until the Committee's next meeting. In replying to the false allegations which had been made by the USSR representative and others, she would keep her statement on a procedural basis and

not go into the substance of the matter, as the USSR representative had inappropriately done.

232. The allegation that the attainment of commonwealth status had made no significant change in Puerto Rico's position and that it was still under the authority of the United States Congress had no basis in fact. Congresswoman Bolton, as the United States delegate to the eighth session of the General Assembly, had stated clearly the full significance of the new status in the Fourth Committee in 1953. Mrs. Bolton had explained that there was now a bilateral contract of association between the United States and Puerto Rico, which had been established by a juridical decision based on the common consent of the Puerto Rican people. Previously, the Territory had been under the full authority of the United States Congress in all government matters, by virtue of an Organic Act which only Congress had the right to change. The new Constitution had been chosen by the people, which alone had the authority to alter it.

233. The USSR representative had questioned the act of self-determination of the people of Puerto Rico. In the elections, the people of the Territory had been given a clear choice between the alternative options: commonwealth status, statehood, and independence. The first option had been chosen by an overwhelming majority of the people, and that choice had been reiterated in a series of free elections since. Moreover, while the number of votes for parties in favour of commonwealth status had steadily increased, the number of votes for those in favour of independence had steadily dwindled, and in 1964, as indicated by the results of the most recent elections, 58.5 per cent of the population had voted for commonwealth status, 34.3 per cent for statehood and only 2.7 per cent for independence.

234. The USSR representative had made frequent reference to the fact that the laws passed by the United States Congress applied in Puerto Rico and that the Federal Government had authority in some areas of Puerto Rican affairs. Those statements showed a failure to understand the nature of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. As Congresswoman Bolton had said at the eighth session of the General Assembly, Puerto Rico had agreed under its contract of association with the United States that the United States Government should have in respect of Puerto Rico the same functions that it had in respect of the states of the Union. That in no way detracted from the status of full self-government. The Resident Commissioner for Puerto Rico had said in his statement at the 348th meeting of the Fourth Committee in October 1953 that, as in the case of the forty-eight states of the Union, the United States Congress had no power to enact legislation relating to the domestic affairs of Puerto Rico, but only on matters relating to external policy. The authority of Congress in respect of Puerto Rico was subject to the same constitutional restrictions as in the case of the federal states.

235. Moreover, the Puerto Rican people could change its present status whenever it wished. The senior United States representative at the eighth session of the General Assembly had stated at the 459th plenary meeting on 27 November 1953 that he had been authorized to say on behalf of the President of the United States that if, at any time, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico adopted a resolution in favour of more complete or even absolute independence, he would immediately recommend to Congress that such independence should be granted. The Puerto Rican people was

thus free to choose its own status, and repeated elections had shown that the majority of the people in the Territory were in favour of commonwealth status or statehood, while the independence party had received little support.

236. In conclusion, she stressed that, since the General Assembly had recognized, in 1953, that the Puerto Rican people had exercised its right to self-determination and achieved self-government, the Territory was no longer a matter for consideration by the Committee.

237. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, recalled the United States representative's statement that the allegation that the attainment of commonwealth status had made no significant change in Puerto Rico's position had no basis in fact. She had referred to a statement made by Congresswoman Bolton at the eighth session of the General Assembly to the effect that there was a bilateral contract of association between the United States and Puerto Rico, which could not be altered except by mutual consent. The Soviet delegation had adduced facts to show that there had been virtually no change of any significance in the structure of Puerto Rico. Those facts had not been refuted by the United States representative.

238. The USSR delegation had said that Public Law 600, adopted by the United States Congress on 3 July 1950, had not repealed the Organic Act of 2 March 1917 and that the former colonial régime had continued in force. Although the new colonial structure was described in the so-called Constitution as an "Associated Free State" or "Commonwealth", in reality Puerto Rico was not a politically independent State. It was not free and the association itself was based on unequal conditions. Puerto Rico continued to be a colonial dependency of the United States. Section 4 of Public Law 600 stated:

"Except as provided in section 5 of this Act, the Act . . . approved 2 March 1917, as amended, is hereby continued in force and effect and may hereafter be cited as the 'Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act'."

Section 5 provided for the repeal of many sections of the earlier act but all of them related to local administration. The powers of the so-called Constitutional Convention authorized by Public Law 600 had thus been limited by that Law, which had fully maintained in force the Organic Act of 1917 and on the basis of which the United States Congress retained complete control over Puerto Rico. Furthermore, under the so-called Federal Relations Act, Puerto Rico was regarded as a "possession" of the United States. The first paragraph of that Act stated that its provisions applied to Puerto Rico and the neighbouring islands, which belonged to the United States.

239. In addition, Public Law 600, like the "Constitution" of Puerto Rico, could be amended, suspended or repealed by the United States Congress. Those facts fully refuted the statement of Congresswoman Bolton. It was clear that, since the United States Congress had acted unilaterally, the United States and Puerto Rico had never entered into a mutually agreed association. In no provision of Public Law 600 did the United States Congress renounce sovereignty over Puerto Rico or recognize Puerto Rican sovereignty. From the moment of the establishment of the colonial régime by the United States, there had never been any negotiations between the United States and Puerto Rico as a

sovereign State. When Public Law 600 had been adopted, the United States House and Senate Committees on Territorial and Insular Affairs had emphasized that the existing political, economic and social relations between the United States and Puerto Rico would remain unchanged. That showed that Puerto Rico continued to be a United States colony, that the United States had not renounced its sovereignty over Puerto Rico, that the United States could unilaterally alter the present structure of government in Puerto Rico and that Public Law 600 had not granted the Territory a full measure of self-government.

240. The United States representative had also referred to a statement by the senior United States representative at the eighth session of the General Assembly to the effect that if, at any time, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico adopted a resolution in favour of more complete or even absolute independence, such a request would be favourably considered by the United States Congress. But that promise had not been kept. In 1959, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico had adopted a joint resolution requesting the United States Congress to grant the Territory a greater measure of self-government. The Congress had refused to consider that request. Again, in November 1962, the Puerto Rican Assembly had adopted resolution No. 1 requesting the United States to settle the final political status of Puerto Rico on the basis of giving the island the right to sovereignty. That request, too, had been ignored by the United States Congress. At present, the United States was attempting to force a colonial plebiscite on the Puerto Rican people with a view to avoiding its international responsibility and postponing a definitive decision on the question of sovereignty.

241. The United States representative had referred to elections that had been held in the Territory in 1948, but the Soviet delegation's point was that the people of Puerto Rico had not been given the right to choose, or an opportunity to decide on the future political status of the Territory.

242. He read out the text of a letter he had just received that had been addressed to the United States representative by members of the Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico, the Government party, expressing shock at the inaccurate statements which that representative had made in the Special Committee and which were a complete distortion of historical facts. The members went on to say that they had voted for the Popular Democratic Party on the assurance that local elections were not of a plebiscitary character and that their votes could never be interpreted as precluding further examination by the United Nations of the Territory's political problem. They added that their votes had been cast to foster the struggle for recognition of Puerto Rican sovereignty and to elaborate a true association with the United States. The obstinacy of the United States had made such an association impossible since that Government sought to maintain a colonial relationship. They urged the United States delegation, in the name of United States prestige and the moral force which the United Nations represented, to withdraw its opposition to the inclusion of the question of Puerto Rico in the Special Committee's agenda.

243. In his statement, the Australian representative had presented himself in the role of defender of the interests of the colonial peoples and had boasted about



the part played by Australia in the drafting of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. The Soviet delegation would point out, however, that the fact that the word "independence" was associated with the word "self-government" in the definition of the Trusteeship System was not due to the efforts of the Australian delegation. The word "independence" and some other progressive provisions had been included in the Charter at the demand of the Soviet delegation. If the Australian representative's statements concerning his delegation's role in the drafting of the Charter were true, the Soviet delegation wondered why, twenty years after the adoption of the Charter and the establishment of the Trusteeship System, Australia had not granted independence to its Trust Territories and refused to fix the date for the granting of such independence. Like other colonial Powers, Australia adopted a reactionary policy in the Committee with regard to matters concerning decolonization and voted against all progressive decisions in the United Nations. With regard to the slanderous attacks made by the Australian representative against the Soviet Union's policy, he would point out that the Soviet Union did not have the experience of repressing and persecuting people struggling for independence that the colonialists, including the Australian colonialists, had. The shameful participation of Australia in the Viet-Nameese war, which had been unleashed by United States aggressors, was an example of the Australian Government's policy towards people who were defending their right to self-determination and independence.

244. In his view, the colonialists were presenting themselves as the champions of the self-determination and independence of peoples. However, whenever the peoples waged a struggle to defend their right to be free and independent, the colonialists always used the most modern weapons, tanks, aircraft and the like to suppress the desires of the peoples for freedom and independence, to deprive them of their right to self-determination, and to prevent them from deciding their own future. The sole purpose of the Australian representative's statement was to divert the Committee from considering the pressing political problem of Puerto Rico, which called for immediate solution.

245. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the statement of the Soviet representative had reiterated a large number of the quite baseless allegations which he had made in the past. She had already submitted detailed figures showing the genuine nature of Puerto Rico's self-determination. The United States delegation was not ready to take advice on the subject from the Soviet Union, and she thought it might be interesting for the Committee to investigate the extent to which the various nations and peoples of the Soviet Union had expressed their desires at any point regarding their association with the USSR, and the extent to which they were free, as the people of Puerto Rico were free, to dissolve the association.

246. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation regarded the question under consideration from two aspects: whether General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable in the case of Puerto Rico and whether the Special Committee was competent to include the question of Puerto Rico in its agenda. With regard to the first aspect, the Iraqi delegation continued to believe that resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable, since that resolution spoke of three kinds of Territories: Non-Self-Governing Territories, Trust Ter-

ritories, and Territories which had not yet attained independence. No one claimed that Puerto Rico was an independent State. The General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV) many years after resolution 748 (VIII) and he was sure that the sponsors of resolution 1514 (XV) had been aware of previous resolutions, such as resolution 748 (VIII), concerning Territories not yet independent.

247. As to the second aspect, it had been pointed out in the Committee that in adopting resolution 2189 (XXI) the previous year, the General Assembly had approved the "action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee with respect to the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies" and had also approved the Committee's report containing a reference to the Working Group's twenty-fifth report, in which it had expressed the view that the question of the inclusion of certain Territories, including Puerto Rico, required further study, and that such study should take place early in the 1967 session. Nevertheless, he did not think that the General Assembly had taken a clear-cut position on the Special Committee's competence to consider the matter. In his delegation's opinion, it was not for the Special Committee to take any decision whether or not the item should be included in its agenda.

248. In those circumstances, he wondered why the United States representative was proposing that a decision should be taken by the Committee excluding the discussion of Puerto Rico.

249. The representative of *Venezuela* observed that his delegation had already expressed its position on the question in the Working Group and that it had stated its opposition to the inclusion of the item in the agenda. It was not for the Special Committee to consider the question of Puerto Rico. That was a matter which fell within the competence of the General Assembly itself and that body had already taken a decision on the question by adopting resolution 748 (VIII), which the Special Committee could not disregard.

250. The representative of *Australia* said that, despite the Soviet Union representative's assertions regarding his country's position as the defender of the interests of colonial peoples, the fact was that, of all the major Powers, the Soviet Union alone had declined to submit information on Territories—in some cases previously independent nations—which it had acquired following the Second World War.

251. The Soviet Union representative had referred to "peoples struggling for their independence". He recalled that Australia had gone to the assistance of Poland when it had been the victim of aggression in 1939; Australia had had no pact with the aggressor. Later, his country had gone to the assistance of the Federation of Malaya.

252. He only wished to state—since the Soviet Union representative had raised the question of Viet-Nam—that Australia believed that, in supporting the people of Viet-Nam in resisting aggression, it was acting in a manner fully in accord with the principles of the United Nations.

253. The representative of *Syria* proposed that the debate on the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable should be adjourned *sine die*.

254. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* supported the Syrian motion. Although his delegation was convinced that Puerto Rico was a colo-

nial Territory for the purposes of resolution 1514 (XV), since it was neither an independent State nor part of another State—as had been confirmed by a ruling of the United States Supreme Court—he believed that further consultations were required before the Committee took a decision.

255. The representative of the *United States of America* opposed the Syrian motion. She thought that the procedural motion submitted at the previous meeting by her delegation had been adequately discussed and that delegations had had time to reach a position on it. In any event, if the Committee decided to adjourn the debate, her delegation would interpret such a decision as indicating that it was the Committee's will that Puerto Rico should not be considered by it. It would be her understanding that the adoption of a motion to adjourn the debate *sine die* would preclude further consideration of the issue.

256. The representative of *Australia* also opposed the motion for adjournment of the debate. The question at issue was clear and had been fully discussed; moreover, in view of its possible implications, the Committee had a duty to take a position on it as soon as possible.

#### H. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) AND 2248 (S-V) AND PERTINENT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE: REQUESTS ADDRESSED TO SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

257. At the 569th meeting, on 30 October 1967, the Chairman drew the attention of the Special Committee to a decision taken by the General Assembly at its 1583rd plenary meeting, on 6 October 1967, to include the following item in the agenda of the twenty-second session and to allocate it to the Fourth Committee for consideration and report:

"97. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations."

258. The Chairman also drew attention to a note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/276) concerning the action taken by the specialized agencies and international institutions in response to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee. In that note reference was made to another note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.417) relating to the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations in response to the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) and General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). Reference was also made to the report by the Secretary-General on his consultations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development<sup>11</sup> pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966. Also of relevance to

this question was the statement made at the 487th meeting, on 15 February 1967, by the director in charge of the New York Office of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization concerning the implementation by that organization of pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/SR.487).

259. At the 570th meeting, the Special Committee decided to draw the attention of the General Assembly, in connexion with its consideration of the item referred to above, to the information contained in the relevant report of the Secretary-General and the notes by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/276 and A/AC.109/L.417).<sup>12</sup>

#### I. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER MATTERS

##### *Implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967)*

260. At its 541st meeting, held in Dar es Salaam on 20 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967) (A/AC.109/252). Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter II of the present report.

##### *Co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States*

261. The Special Committee during its 1967 session maintained close co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. During the Committee's meetings in Dar es Salaam, the Organization of African Unity was represented by an official of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, who at the 531st meeting made a statement on behalf of that Organization.

262. At its 543rd meeting, the Special Committee decided to circulate a communication dated 23 June 1967, concerning the question of Aden, addressed to the Secretary-General from the permanent observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations (A/AC.109/256).

263. In a letter dated 13 June 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee, having regard to operative paragraphs 11 and 13 thereof, transmitted the text of a resolution concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248), adopted by the Special Committee at its 528th meeting, to the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. Further, in another letter dated 20 June 1967, the Chairman, having regard to operative paragraph 11 thereof, transmitted to him the text of a resolution concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251).

##### *Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 c of the Charter*

264. In accordance with its mandate as set out in General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 De-

<sup>11</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/6825.*

<sup>12</sup> The note by the Secretariat concerning the assistance to refugees from the Portuguese Territories mentioned above is appended as annex I to chapter V of the present report. The note by the Secretariat concerning the action taken by the specialized agencies and international institutions is appended as annex III of the present chapter.

ember 1963, the Special Committee considered, at its 557th to 559th meetings, on 12 and 13 September 1967, the question of information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter XXIV of the present report.

*Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination*

265. Having regard to the decision taken by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 20 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the Special Committee decided to undertake a study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination.

266. At its 488th meeting, the Special Committee referred this item to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report. Sub-Committee I, accordingly, submitted its report to the Special Committee on 29 September 1967 (A/AC.109/L.434). The Special Committee's report to the General Assembly on this question is contained in document A/6868 and Add.1.

*Military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration in Territories under their administration*

267. The Special Committee decided at its 488th meeting to undertake a study of the role of the military activities and arrangements by the colonial Powers which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration in Territories under their administration. It also decided to refer this item to Sub-Committee I for consideration.

268. In paragraph 14 of its report to the Special Committee (see annex IV) Sub-Committee I stated that "Owing to the refusal of the administering Powers to co-operate and in view of the lack of time and information available, the Sub-Committee decided to continue its consideration of this item at its next session".

269. At its 568th meeting, the Special Committee endorsed this decision and agreed that, subject to any decision which the General Assembly might take at its twenty-second session, it would continue consideration of the item at its next session, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the records. These reservations are set out below.

270. The representative of the *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* said that his Government's views, which were fully set out in paragraph 11 of the report, made it necessary for his delegation to reserve its position on the adoption of the report.

271. The representative of the *United States of America* said that her delegation had expressed certain reservations on the question under discussion and wished to reserve its position.

272. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation wished to express reservations on both the substance and the method of the report. The Italian delegation had already stated that a broad consensus had never been achieved on the highly controversial question of military bases: for example, forty-six Member States had not supported General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). That question was only a part of the general problem of disarmament and almost all Member States were in agreement that it must be considered in conjunction with other disarmament problems, as was clear from their adoption of General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI), in which the Assembly had referred the question to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It would be inappropriate for the Committee to formulate conclusions on the matter while the Eighteen-Nation Committee was considering the problem. The procedure whereby the Sub-Committee felt justified in proceeding to a general condemnation of Member States on the inadequate basis of an exchange of letters with a few Member States could serve only to cast doubt on the seriousness of its work. The Italian delegation was unable to support the report. It thought that paragraph 13 should be deleted, as should the words "owing to the refusal of the administering Powers to co-operate" in paragraph 14, but it would not make a formal proposal to that effect.

273. The representative of *Australia* reaffirmed his delegation's strong reservations, which appeared in the report.

274. The representative of *Finland* recalled that his delegation had reserved its position on paragraph 13 in Sub-Committee I, since it considered that the question of military bases was a matter of conflict between the great Powers. That reservation, which had been made in accordance with Finland's policy of neutrality, was still valid.

275. The representative of *Madagascar* maintained the reservations which his delegation had expressed in the Committee and elsewhere.

276. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* recalled that his delegation had entered formal reservations on the question of military bases during the Committee's meetings in Africa, since his Government considered that the question was a domestic problem and that it was for colonial Territories themselves to negotiate the maintenance or withdrawal of military bases with the administering Power as they approached independence. The Ivory Coast also felt that the Committee was not the appropriate forum for a final decision on the question of military bases. These reservations remained valid.

277. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation, which had already stated its position on the question of military bases, would abstain in the vote on the relevant paragraph.

278. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation would not enter any reservations on the report, since it contained no specific conclusions or recommendations regarding the military activities of colonial Powers in the Territories under their administration. That did not mean, however, that his delegation had in any way altered its position.

279. The representative of *Iran* reaffirmed his delegation's view that the question of military bases was distinct from the question of colonialism and must be decided by the people of the Territory concerned.

*International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa*

280. On 21 February the Secretary-General requested the advice of the Special Committee concerning the various aspects of the organization of the international conference or seminar envisaged in operative paragraph 6 (a) of General Assembly resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 on the problems of *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa. In a letter dated 20 April 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee, in response to that request, transmitted a report containing proposals concerning the organization of the international conference or seminar which the Special Committee had, by consensus, agreed to adopt at its 509th meeting, on 17 April 1967 (A/AC.109/236).<sup>13</sup>

281. Following an invitation by the Government of the Republic of Zambia, the Secretary-General organized the International Seminar on *Apartheid*, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa, which took place from 25 July to 4 August 1967 in Kitwe, Zambia. The Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. John W. S. Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania) presided over the International Seminar as its Chairman.

282. On 29 September 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly the report of the International Seminar (A/6818 and Corr.1) in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution.

*Dissemination of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and publicity for the work of the Special Committee*

283. In operative paragraph 18 of resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly requested "the Secretary-General to promote, through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations, the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the colonial peoples". In operative paragraph 13 of its resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/252), the Special Committee requested "the Secretary-General to promote the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee, including in particular, the preparation, in consultation with the Special Committee, of publications covering the work of the Committee at its current session away from Headquarters, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by colonial peoples".

284. At the 569th meeting, on 23 October 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee conveyed to the Committee information which he had received from the Secretariat, relating to the measures taken and envisaged by the Office of Public Information to promote the publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee.

285. At the 570th meeting, on 30 October, following statements made by the representatives of Finland, the USSR, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Syria, India and Yugoslavia, the Chairman undertook to convey the views expressed and the suggestions offered by members

concerning this matter to the Office of Public Information.

*Matters relating to the small Territories*

286. By operative paragraph 16 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, the General Assembly invited "the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the population of those Territories to exercise fully the right to self-determination and independence".

287. In requesting its Sub-Committees I, II and III to carry out the tasks assigned to them, the Special Committee called their attention to the above-mentioned provision of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). Further, in arriving at its conclusions and recommendations concerning the small Territories, details of which are contained in the relevant chapters of the present report, the Special Committee took that provision into consideration.

288. In this connexion, the Special Committee decided to defer consideration of a proposal contained in paragraph 286 of the report of Sub-Committee III, to the effect that the Secretary-General should be asked to initiate a study of the feasibility of arrangements under which small territories which may wish to be fully self-governing might be enabled to have available to them the status of a sovereign entity associated with the United Nations. Reservations concerning that proposal were expressed by the representatives of Madagascar, the United Kingdom and the United States.

*Deadline for the accession of Territories to independence*

289. By operative paragraph 15 of its resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly invited "the Special Committee, whenever it considers it proper and appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people and the provisions of the Declaration".

290. In requesting its Sub-Committees I, II and III to carry out the tasks assigned to them, the Special Committee called their attention to the above-mentioned provision of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). Further in its consideration of specific territories, the Special Committee took that provision into consideration.

*Pattern of conferences*

291. By its resolution 2116 (XX) concerning the pattern of conferences, the General Assembly decided, *inter alia*, "that a fixed pattern of conferences to govern the places and dates of the meetings of United Nations bodies shall come into force on 1 January 1966 for a further period of three years". By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to submit to the General Assembly each year a basic programme of conferences for the following year, established in conformity with the present pattern and after consultation, as appropriate, with the organs concerned". It also urged "all organs of the United Nations... to review their working methods and also the frequency and length of sessions in the light of the present resolution, the growing volume of meetings, the resulting strain on available resources and the difficulty of ensuring the effective participation of members".

<sup>13</sup> See also document A/6667 and Add.1-4.

292. In operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 2239 (XXI) on the same subject, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to draw up in August of each year, for submission to the General Assembly . . . the provisional calendar of meetings and conferences planned by the entire United Nations family of organizations for the two following calendar years". In operative paragraph 9 of this resolution, the Assembly recommended that "all competent organs of the United Nations, including subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, should bear in mind that proposals involving new meetings and conferences would be subject to the recommendations of the Committee on Conferences and to final approval by the Assembly".

293. By adopting the 33rd report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.432/Rev.1), the Special Committee at its 564th meeting, on 27 September, decided, subject to any decision which the General Assembly might take at its twenty-second session, to hold two sessions in 1968, the first from the second week of February to the end of June and the second from Thursday, 1 August to Friday, 30 August. This programme would not preclude the holding of extra-session meetings on an emergency basis if developments in any dependent Territory so warranted. Further, the first session would include such meetings away from Headquarters as the Special Committee may decide to hold in 1968. During its second session, the Special Committee would take up the reports of any visiting groups it may dispatch to Territories.

294. As regards the provisional calendar of meetings in 1969, the Special Committee decided to adopt, on a tentative basis, the same programme as that planned for 1968.

#### J. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS BODIES

##### *Security Council*

295. The General Assembly, in operative paragraph 14 of its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, requested "the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of development in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations".

##### *(a) Southern Rhodesia*

296. In paragraph 1 of its consensus of 6 June 1967, concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted at its 523rd meeting held in Kitwe, Zambia, the Special Committee decided "to transmit to the President of the Security Council the records of its debates on the question of Southern Rhodesia, including the testimony submitted by the petitioners, following the conclusion of its consideration of that question". The text of the consensus, together with the records of the debate on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 16 June 1967.<sup>14</sup>

297. By operative paragraph 12 of its resolution of 9 June 1967 (A/AC.109/248), the Special Committee recommended to the Security Council, "in accordance with its decision contained in resolution 232 (1966)

of 16 December 1966, and, in particular, paragraph 1 thereof to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 13 June 1967.<sup>15</sup>

##### *(b) Territories under Portuguese administration*

298. In operative paragraph 7 of its resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/251), the Special Committee drew "the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that border its colonies". In operative paragraph 8 of the same resolution, the Special Committee urgently recommended that "the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning this question, particularly resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965 and those of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.<sup>16</sup>

##### *(c) Colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967)*

299. In operative paragraph 4 of its resolution of 20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/252), the Special Committee recommended "once again that the Security Council make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against Portugal, South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.<sup>17</sup>

##### *Trusteeship Council*

300. In accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which requested the Trusteeship Council to assist the Special Committee in its work, the President of the Trusteeship Council, by letter dated 30 June 1967 (A/AC.109/255) addressed to the Chairman, informed the Special Committee that the Council at its thirty-fourth session examined conditions in the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Nauru and New Guinea. The letter stated that the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, as well as the observations of the members of the Trusteeship Council, representing their individual opinions only, were contained in its report to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands<sup>18</sup> and in its report to the General Assembly on Nauru and New Guinea.<sup>19</sup>

##### *Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa*

301. The Bureau of the Special Committee maintained close contact with the Bureau of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa as regards matters

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/8005.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/8023.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/8024.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/8020.

<sup>19</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/6704).

<sup>14</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8006.



of common interest relating to the work of the two Committees. The two Committees co-operated in the formulation of proposals for submission to the Secretary-General regarding the various aspects of the organization of the International Seminar on *Apartheid*, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa which took place in Kitwe, Zambia in July/August 1967.

#### *Specialized agencies*

302. Collaboration of the specialized agencies with the Special Committee has been maintained by the

<i>Resolution adopted on</i>	<i>Territories concerned</i>	<i>Relevant paragraphs</i>
1 June 1967 (consensus)	Territories under Portuguese administration	third paragraph
9 June 1967 (A/AC.109/248)	Southern Rhodesia	operative paragraph 13
20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/251)	Territories under Portuguese administration	operative paragraphs 10, 11, 13
20 June 1967 (A/AC.109/252)	Colonial Territories considered during the meetings away from Headquarters (1967)	operative paragraphs 8, 12

304. The text of the consensus and resolutions was transmitted by the Secretary-General to the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as to the international institutions concerned for their attention. The substantive parts of the replies received from these organizations concerning the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions were reproduced and made available to the Special Committee in document A/AC.109/276 (see section H above), which is appended to the present chapter as annex III.

#### *United Nations Special Mission on Aden*

305. In a note dated 23 February 1967,<sup>20</sup> the Secretary-General announced that following consultations with the Special Committee and the administering Power pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), he had appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden with the following composition: Mr. Manuel Perez Guerrero of Venezuela, Chairman; Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, and Mr. Moussa Leo Keita of Mali.

306. At the 567th meeting of the Special Committee, on 13 October, the Chairman drew attention to a letter dated 12 October 1967 addressed to him by the Secretary-General, appended to which was a letter of the same date from the Chairman of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden (A/AC.109/277) indicating when the Mission expected to submit its report.

307. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of the report of the Mission is contained in chapter VI of the present report.

#### *United Nations Council for South West Africa*

308. Having regard to its own mandate, the Special Committee has closely followed the work of the United Nations Council for South West Africa. By letter dated 12 September 1967, the Chairman of the Special Committee transmitted to the President of the Council for South West Africa the text of a resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/271) adopted by the Committee at its 557th meeting on the same date.

presence of representatives of the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization at meetings of the Special Committee.

303. During the period covered by the report, the Special Committee adopted the following consensus and resolutions which contained appeals or requests addressed to international institutions, including the specialized agencies:

#### K. REVIEW OF WORK<sup>21</sup>

309. In its resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue to perform its tasks and to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence. The Assembly also requested the Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories, to recommend whenever it considered it proper and appropriate, a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory, and to make any concrete suggestions which might assist the Security Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter regarding developments in the colonial Territories which may threaten international peace and security.

310. At the outset of its work during 1967 the Special Committee was aware that some constitutional progress had taken place in a few of the colonial Territories to which the Declaration applies, and Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Barbados, to which it had given close consideration in previous years, had acceded to independence during the latter part of 1966. However, many members observed that these developments served only to intensify their regret at the continued delay in the complete and effective implementation of the Declaration. They noted that although more than six years had passed since the adoption of that Declaration, many Territories remained under colonial rule, some of them with little prospect of emancipation in the near future. Indeed, in disregard of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, the administering Powers had persisted in their denial of the right of the people of these Territories to self-determination and had in some instances extended the application of their harshly repressive policies. Many Members viewed this state of affairs as a serious threat to international peace and security. In this connexion special concern was expressed regarding the situation in the colonial Territories in southern Africa where the authorities concerned, acting in collaboration with one another and supported by foreign economic and other interests, continued flagrantly to stifle the legitimate aspirations

<sup>21</sup> The views or reservations of individual members on matters reviewed in this section are set out in the relevant chapters of the present report (see chapters II to XXIII).

of the indigenous inhabitants to freedom and independence.

311. It was in this context that the Special Committee engaged in the discharge of its mandate during 1967. In the course of its work it re-examined the implementation of the Declaration and of General Assembly resolutions relating to the various colonial Territories and in the light of developments formulated recommendations for the application of further measures as appropriate. In addition to carrying out a number of specific tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly or arising from its own previous decisions, the Committee also undertook a study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese administration and in all other Territories under colonial administration, on the basis of which it submitted conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly. Moreover, having regard to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), 2160 (XXI), and 2232 (XXI), the Committee initiated a study of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which might be impeding the implementation of the Declaration.

312. This programme of work proved to be strenuous; adding to its weight was the necessity of keeping the situation in certain of the colonial Territories under continuous review. What was more, many of the problems which the Special Committee was called upon to examine had increased both in difficulty and in gravity. Nevertheless by holding meetings continuously from February to November, except for one short recess, the Committee was able to give adequate consideration to all but a few items on its agenda.

313. As envisaged in its last report to the General Assembly, the Special Committee held a further series of meetings away from Headquarters during May and June this year. These meetings took place at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam, at the invitation of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania respectively. The Committee also accepted in principle similar invitations extended by five other Member Governments but it agreed to take advantage of them at a future date. As was anticipated by several Members the session away from Headquarters once again facilitated the appearance before it of representatives of national liberation movements wishing to express their views and to acquaint the Committee with the progress of their struggle. Further, the Committee was enabled to acquire more direct knowledge than would otherwise have been available to it of the realities of the situation in several colonial Territories, particularly those in southern Africa, and thus to strengthen its own capacity to assist the people in their efforts to achieve freedom and independence. The Committee was also enabled to assess the extent to which the provisions of previous United Nations resolutions had been implemented and to recommend such additional measures as were necessary for the attainment of the desired objectives.

314. The Special Committee devoted considerable attention to the question of Southern Rhodesia, recent developments regarding which had given cause for general and increasing concern. Following its unsuccessful talks in December 1966 with the illegal racist minority régime, the United Kingdom Government had indicated that it was withdrawing all previous proposals

for a constitutional settlement and that it would not submit to the United Kingdom Parliament any settlement involving independence before majority rule. However, most members urged that any future consultations concerning the future of the Territory should be carried out with the representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime. The majority of members also expressed the conviction that in order to succeed in bringing about the downfall of the illegal régime, the sanctions currently in force must be made comprehensive and mandatory, and must be backed by the use of force on the part of the administering Power. The Committee accordingly called upon the United Kingdom to take immediately all the necessary measures to this end and to transfer power to the people of the Territory without delay, in accordance with the Declaration, and on the basis of elections conducted on the "one-man one-vote principle". The Committee also condemned the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal in continuing to support the illegal régime, and recommended to the Security Council to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter for the implementation of its own previous decisions. Finally the Committee requested all States to give moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia and appealed to the specialized agencies to extend assistance to the refugees from the Territory.

315. With regard to South West Africa, the Special Committee noted that following the termination of South Africa's mandate by the General Assembly in its resolution 2145 (XXI), the question had been under consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee established under that resolution. The Special Committee also noted that having examined the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the General Assembly by resolution 2248 (S-V) set up a United Nations Council for South West Africa with the responsibility, *inter alia*, of administering the Territory until it attains independence as envisaged by June 1968. At the same time, the question remained the concern of the Special Committee within the context of the implementation of the Declaration, and accordingly received its attention. Meanwhile the South African Government not only repudiated the validity of the above-mentioned resolutions, but also took measures to alter the status of Ovamboland, an integral part of South West Africa, by the establishment of so-called self-government aimed at consolidating the system of *apartheid* and fragmenting the Territory in furtherance of South African domination. Having reviewed these developments the Committee condemned as illegal, and contrary to the relevant General Assembly resolutions, as well as a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the measures taken and proposed by the South African Government with respect to Ovamboland and reaffirmed the territorial integrity of South West Africa, as also the inalienable right of the people to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration. Subsequently, the Committee also condemned the illegal arrest by the South African authorities of thirty-seven Africans from South West Africa in flagrant violation of its international status, demanded their immediate release, and called upon those authorities to cease all illegal acts in the Territory.

316. As regards the Territories under Portuguese administration, the administering Power continued to deny the people the right to self-determination on the

pretext of the legal fiction that these Territories were overseas provinces of metropolitan Portugal. Continuing to avail itself of military and other assistance from some States, it intensified its repressive activities and military operations against the African population of the Territories. In addition, Portugal continued to violate the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and the export of African workers to South Africa. At the same time the Special Committee received information, which it noted with satisfaction, regarding the progress of the struggle of the national liberation movements in these Territories and about their efforts to rehabilitate the liberated areas and to promote the material and social welfare of the people. The great and urgent need of these movements for assistance, particularly in the field of education and health was the subject of a request by the Committee to the specialized agencies and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Committee also appealed to all States to grant the peoples of the Territories the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights. Further, the Committee recommended that the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions as well as those of the General Assembly concerning this question. Finally, it addressed an urgent appeal to all States and to the specialized agencies to refrain from extending assistance to Portugal as long as it continued its present policies in the Territories.

317. As a result of the special study it undertook concerning the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination, the Special Committee noted the dominant and increasing role played in the economic life of the Territories, particularly those in southern Africa, by international economic and financial interests. In the opinion of the Committee the activities of these interests constitute a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration in the above-named and in other colonial Territories. The Committee noted that these interests, with the encouragement of the colonial Powers, were ruthlessly exploiting the human and natural resources of the Territories for the largest possible profits. The colonial Powers which enjoy a share in these profits were in their turn impelled to devote greater effort to the perpetuation of the existing situation and to the suppression of the indigenous people. The Committee also found that the countries having the largest economic interests in the colonial Territories in southern Africa were those providing moral and material support to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia in its defiance of international sanctions, to the Portuguese Government in the maintenance of its colonial attitudes and to the South African Government in its expansion of *apartheid* policies throughout southern Africa.

318. In the light of these findings, the Special Committee recommended *inter alia* that the administering Powers concerned should be condemned for depriving the colonial peoples of their inalienable right to the ownership and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Territories. Those Powers should also be condemned for their active support of foreign economic and other interests which exploited the human and material resources of the Territories without regard

to the welfare of the indigenous peoples or their need for technical economic development. Further, the Committee emphasized that, so long as the people were denied full participation in a government of their own choice, concessions and other discriminatory measures by the colonial Powers in favour of these interests were a violation of Article 73 of the Charter which affirms that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory are paramount. In addition the Committee expressed grave concern about the assistance given by foreign economic and other interests to the administering Powers which enabled them to continue their colonial domination. Finally the Committee appealed to the Governments whose nationals own and operate enterprises in the colonial Territories, particularly in southern Africa, to put an end to their activities.

319. Another matter which was closely followed by the Special Committee was the question of Aden. During February 1967 the Committee was informed by the Secretary-General that following the necessary consultations, he had appointed a special mission in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including the establishment of a central caretaker government in the Territory. While the Committee was awaiting the submission of the report of the Special Mission on Aden, it was announced by the administering Power that the Territory would accede to independence by the end of November 1967. In order to enable the Fourth Committee to consider the report of the Special Mission, which became available during mid-November 1967, prior to the accession of the Territory to independence, the Committee decided to take note of the report and to transmit it to the General Assembly. At the same time the Chairman on behalf of the Committee expressed the confident hope that the Territory would become independent in conditions of peace and harmony.

320. In addition the Special Committee examined recent developments regarding Swaziland, which was expected to become independent during September 1968. Following this examination, the Committee called upon the administering Power to assure its accession to independence without delay and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people. It also requested the administering Power to take all appropriate action to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence and to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of the international policies of the racist régime in South Africa. Moreover, the Committee requested the administering Power to take the necessary steps to bring about the economic independence of the Territory vis-à-vis South Africa, and in particular to give full effect to the recommendations previously approved by the Assembly to that end.

321. The delay in the implementation of the Declaration in several other Territories was also a matter of concern to the Special Committee. Regarding Equatorial Guinea, it was the desire of the Committee that the Territory should accede to independence as a single territorial entity not later than 1968. The Committee however noted that following a regrettable delay the proposed constitutional conference had recently been scheduled to take place during October/November 1967. On Ifni the Committee expressed the hope that the dialogue between the Governments of Spain and Morocco would be pursued in accordance



with the relevant General Assembly resolutions. As to Spanish Sahara, the Committee observed that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) had not been implemented, but owing to lack of time it was unable to give the question the full consideration warranted by its complexity. With regard to French Somaliland the Committee, convinced that the inalienable right of the people to self-determination and independence was beyond question and concerned that the process of decolonization should proceed with greater speed and in conditions of peace and harmony, urged that the referendum scheduled to be held during March 1967 should be conducted in a just and democratic manner under a United Nations presence.

322. As regards Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, the Special Committee urged the administering Power to transfer power to representative organs which should be elected by the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage, to return to Mauritius and Seychelles the islands detached from them in violation of their territorial integrity and to desist from establishing military installations therein. Subsequently it was announced that Mauritius would accede to independence during March 1968. On the question of Fiji, the Special Committee reaffirmed its view that the administering Power should expedite the process of decolonization by holding elections on the "one-man, one-vote" principle and by fixing an early date for independence. Concerning Gibraltar, the Committee considered that the referendum envisaged by the administering Power was in contradiction to the relevant General Assembly resolutions and invited the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain to resume the negotiations called for by these resolutions.

323. As requested by the General Assembly, the Special Committee paid particular attention to the small Territories with a view to enabling their populations to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence. With regard to a large number of the small Territories, the Special Committee recognized that their size and population as well as their geographical location and limited resources presented peculiar problems requiring special attention. At the same time, the Committee was firmly of the opinion that the provisions of the Declaration were fully applicable to them. Accordingly, it requested the administering Powers responsible for these Territories to ensure that the peoples concerned were enabled, in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the possibilities open to them in keeping with the Declaration, to express their wishes without delay concerning the future of their countries. The Committee also stressed the urgent need for measures to strengthen the economic infrastructure of these Territories and to promote their social and economic development for the purpose of fostering federations. In a few of these Territories, the Committee was deeply concerned by reports pointing to preparations for their use for military purposes.

324. The Special Committee once again underlined the indisputable value of sending visiting missions to the small Territories as a means of securing adequate information regarding conditions in these Territories and as to the views, wishes and aspirations of the people. Accordingly the Committee once again requested the administering Powers to extend their full co-operation by permitting access to the Territories under their administration. The Committee noted with regret that the responses of most of the administering Powers concerned to this request were either negative or qualified

in character. The Committee, therefore, considered that the General Assembly should again urge them to reconsider their attitudes in view of the vital importance to its work of the sending of visiting missions to the small Territories. In the same connexion the Committee expressed a belief in the desirability of a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise by the people concerned of their right to self-determination.

#### L. FUTURE WORK

325. In view of the large number of Territories remaining under colonial rule, the Special Committee believes that the General Assembly will wish it to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence. Subject, therefore, to any further directives that the General Assembly might give at its twenty-second session it is the intention of the Committee in 1968 to continue to examine the situation in each of these Territories, including those Territories to which owing to lack of time it was unable to give adequate consideration during 1967, with a view to assisting in the speedy and effective application of the Declaration. In particular, the Committee will review developments concerning each Territory, examine the extent of compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and recommend any additional measures which may be appropriate to achieve the objectives of the Declaration.

326. In this task the Special Committee will continue to be guided by the provisions of operative paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI). In these paragraphs the General Assembly requested the Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations. The General Assembly also invited the Committee, whenever it considers it proper and appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people and the provisions of the Declaration. Further, the General Assembly invited the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully the right to self-determination and independence.

327. In addition the Special Committee proposes to continue its examination of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination. The Committee also expects to complete the study which it initiated during 1967 of military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration which may be impeding the implementation of the Declaration. Moreover the Committee will continue its consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies.

328. In the section of this chapter concerning visiting missions and in the chapters of the present report

relating to the small Territories, the Special Committee has set out recommendations with regard to the sending of visiting missions, to which it attaches special importance, and the establishment of a United Nations presence in connexion with the exercise by the peoples concerned of the right to self-determination. It is the intention of the Special Committee to pursue these recommendations during 1968 and to continue to seek the co-operation of the administering Powers in that endeavour. In particular the Committee proposes, subject to any decision the General Assembly might take in that regard, to dispatch visiting missions to the Territories in the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, and to certain of the Territories in Africa.

329. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2239 (XXI) concerning the pattern of conferences, the Special Committee has already approved a tentative programme of meetings for 1968 as well as a provisional time-table for 1969. Further, in the context of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which authorized the Special Committee to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions, the Committee many consider during 1968 the question of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters.

330. In order to enable it to carry out the tasks envisaged above, the Special Committee suggests that the General Assembly may wish to endorse the foregoing proposals when it concludes its examination of the question of the implementation of the Declaration at its twenty-second session. In addition the Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly should

renew its appeal to the administering Powers to take all necessary steps for the implementation of the Declaration and the relevant United Nations resolutions. The General Assembly should also urge the administering Powers to co-operate with the Committee by facilitating visits to Territories in accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Special Committee or with any other decisions in that connexion which the Committee may find it appropriate to adopt in 1968. The Assembly should also request the administering Powers to co-operate with the Secretary-General in promoting the large scale dissemination of the Declaration and of information on the work of the United Nations and in particular of the Special Committee in the implementation of the Declaration.

331. Further, the Special Committee recommends that in approving the programme of work outlined above, the Assembly should also make adequate financial provision to cover the activities of the Committee during 1968; the sending of visiting missions as envisaged in paragraph 328 above, will in the estimation of the Committee give rise to expenditure of the order of \$80,000, and a series of meetings away from Headquarters, should the Committee decide to hold one as indicated in paragraph 329 above, will result in expenditure of about \$160,000. Finally the Assembly should request the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Special Committee with all the facilities and personnel necessary for the discharge of its mandate.

#### M. APPROVAL OF THE REPORT

332. The Special Committee approved the present report, as a whole, at its 572nd meeting, on 5 December 1967.

### ANNEX I

#### List of petitioners heard by the Special Committee in 1967

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
British Honduras .....	Mr. Philip Goldson, Leader of the Opposition in British Honduras (A/AC.109/PET.696) .....	548
Equatorial Guinea .....	Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga and Mr. Rafael Evita, members of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/AC.109/PET.702/Add.1) .....	552
French Somaliland .....	Mr. Abdillahi Wabery, Vice-President of the Parti du Mouvement Populaire (PMP) and Secretary-General of the Central Committee for Deportees from French Somaliland, Mr. Abdulrahman Ahmed Hassan Gabot, Vice-President of the United National Front of French Somaliland and former member of the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland, and Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf, member of the Central Committee of the PMP and former Secretary of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the PMP and Union démocratique Afar (A/AC.109/PET.616/Add.1) .....	508
	Mr. Abdillahi Wabery and Mr. Abdillahi Youssouf (A/AC.109/PET.691) .....	537
Grenada .....	Mr. M. A. Caesar (on behalf of Mr. E. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada) (A/AC.109/PET.573) .....	489
	Mr. M. A. Caesar (A/AC.109/PET.580/Add.2) .....	493
Mauritius .....	Mr. Teekaram Sibsurun, Secretary-General, Mauritius People's Progressive Party (MPPP) (A/AC.109/PET.689) .....	535
South West Africa .....	Mr. Solomon Mifuma, chief representative in Zambia, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.3) .....	524
	Mr. T. T. Letlaka, member of the National Executive Committee, Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) (A/AC.109/PET.680) .....	524, 525, 526
	Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Director, and Mr. Jacob Kuhangwa, Secretary-General, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.4) .....	535
	Mr. G. H. Geingob, representative in the United States of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.5) ...	554

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
Southern Rhodesia .....	Mr. T. G. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.681) .....	521, 522
	Mr. Herbert Chitepo, National Chairman, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.1) .....	523
	Rev. Bernard M. Zulu (A/AC.109/PET.687) .....	523
	Mr. L. P. Chihota, chief representative, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.2) .....	536
Territories under Portuguese administration		
Angola .....	Mr. Holden Roberto, President, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), and Mr. Emmanuel Kounzika, Vice-President (A/AC.109/PET.656) .....	513, 514
	Mr. Lara Lucio, Executive Secretary, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650 and Add.1) .....	515, 516
	Mr. A. P. Matondo, President, Partido Progressista Angolano (PPA) (A/AC.109/PET.651) .....	516
	Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.654) .....	516
	Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA) (A/AC.109/PET.652) .....	517
	Mr. François Lele, General Chairman, Nto-Bako Angola Party (A/AC.109/PET.644/Add.1) .....	517
	Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.653) .....	517
	Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector-General, Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO) (A/AC.109/PET.655) .....	517
	Mr. Emmanuel Tulengala, National Secretary, and Mr. Jacob Jacques Zimeni, President, Cartel des Nationalistes angolais (CNA) (A/AC.109/PET.663) .....	517
	Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, Confédération des Syndicats libres angolais (CSLA) (A/AC.109/PET.664) .....	518
	Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (A/AC.109/PET. 679) .....	524
	Mr. Agostinho Neto, President, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.2) .....	526
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea ..	Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional de Guiné dita Portuguesa (FLING) (A/AC.109/PET.662) .....	518
Mozambique .....	Mr. P. J. Gumane, President, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) (A/AC.109/PET.686) .....	526
	Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, Mr. Laurenço Mutaca, Secretary of Finance, and Mr. Mariano Matsinhe, Organizing Secretary, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) .....	532, 534

## ANNEX II

## Visiting Missions

## Reports of Sub-Committees II and III: visiting missions

## A. REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE II

[A/AC.109/L.395]

Rapporteur: Mr. G. E. O. WILLIAMS (Sierra Leone)

## Introduction

1. At its 488th meeting on 20 February 1967, the Special Committee decided to continue Sub-Committee II with the same membership as in the previous year.

2. At its 56th meeting on 23 March 1967, Sub-Committee II elected Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) as Chairman and Mr. G.E.O. Williams (Sierra Leone) as Rapporteur.

3. At the same meeting, the Sub-Committee decided first to consider the question of visiting missions to the Territories referred to it, and then take up the Territories in the following order: Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn, Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, American Samoa, Guam, Niue, Tokelau Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Trust Territory of Nauru, the Trust Territory of New Guinea, Papua, Brunei and Hong Kong.

## Consideration by the Sub-Committee

4. The Sub-Committee considered the question of visiting missions at its 57th to 62nd meetings held on 14, 23 and 29 March, and 5, 14 and 21 April 1967.

5. In accordance with a decision taken by the Sub-Committee, the Chairman sent letters to the delegations of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland asking if their Governments were prepared to receive visiting missions in the Territories under their administration.

6. The representative of *New Zealand* in his reply recalled the terms of the reply tendered the Sub-Committee in answer to the same request eight months ago and affirmed that this remained the view of the New Zealand Government. In that reply he had observed that it had been New Zealand's consistently held view that United Nations visiting missions may often have a constructive role to play in the development of Non-Self-Governing Territories and particularly in verifying, on behalf of the international community, acts of self-determination. He had further noted that the people of the Tokelau Islands and Niue would probably wish to exercise their right to self-determination in the relatively near future.

7. The reply went on to say that, since in present circumstances it would seem to be paying undue attention to two of the smallest Non-Self-Governing Territories were a mission to be sent exclusively to these islands, the New Zealand Government felt—and this continued to be its view—that it would be appropriate for a United Nations mission to visit the Tokelau and Niue at this stage only if such a visit were to form part of a more comprehensive tour of the area.

8. The representative of the *United Kingdom* in his reply stated that its position remained as set out in Sir Roger Jackling's letter of 26 May 1966 to the Chairman of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/171). The question of visiting missions raised difficult problems of principle for the United Kingdom Government and the representative of the United Kingdom was unable, therefore, to say anything that might encourage the Special Committee to expect any change in his Government's previous attitude to the question, as frequently explained to the Special Committee and its Sub-Committees. The United Kingdom delegation would naturally be prepared to transmit to the United Kingdom Government, and seek instructions on, any specific request or suggestion for a visit to a particular Territory that the Committee might consider it appropriate to put forward. This could not, however, be taken as implying any commitment that the United Kingdom Government would be able to respond to such a request.

9. The representative of *Australia*, in his reply, stated that visiting missions from the Trusteeship Council made an extensive visit to the Australian Territories every three years. In accordance with this practice, a Trusteeship Council mission would visit these Territories early next year. In addition to the information available in the record of the findings of the Trusteeship Council and of its visiting missions, the Australian Government provided supplementary information on the Territories for which it was responsible in accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. In these circumstances, the Australian Government believed that a visit to the Australian Territories by the Special Committee would not be warranted.

10. The representative of the *United States of America*, in his reply, stated that the position of his Government with regard to visiting missions to the United States Territories on the Sub-Committee's agenda remained as communicated to the Sub-Committee last year. The United States continued to be of the view that United Nations visiting missions to these Territories were not warranted at the present time, and if such missions were to be proposed for this year, the United States Government would in all likelihood not be in a position to accept such a proposal.

11. The representative of *Poland* noted that, as had been recommended, communications had been sent to the representatives of the administering Powers requesting that a visiting mission be allowed to go to the Territories administered by them. His delegation appreciated the positive reply received by the Chairman from the New Zealand Government and hoped that other administering Powers would follow New Zealand's example, since a visit by a mission was the only means of obtaining first-hand information on developments in the Territories and ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants.

12. The representative of *India* stated that her own delegation believed that the Sub-Committee should visit the Territories covered by its agenda, in order to obtain first-hand information on the situation there. In that connexion, she appreciated the positive reply of the New Zealand Government to the Sub-Committee's request, although she hoped that it would withdraw the condition it had placed on its agreement to a visiting mission. She also hoped that the other administering Powers would reply favourably at an early date.

13. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation, which in 1966 had called for a visiting mission to be sent to the Territories under consideration, urgently reiterated that request. A visit by a mission would also be in the interests of the administering Powers, which should agree to it, as requested in General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966. Unfortunately, the replies received to date from those Powers had been far from satisfactory. The Sub-

Committee should not be content with statements that the situation in the Territories was continually improving.

14. The representative of *Chile* said that his delegation had noted with interest the reply of the New Zealand delegation concerning visiting missions. It constituted a first step, and the Chilean delegation welcomed the spirit of co-operation which New Zealand had shown in the matter. It would be encouraging if the other administering Powers concerned would follow that example and so enable the Sub-Committee to keep abreast of constitutional developments in the Territories under their administration. The Chilean delegation believed that small Territories, precisely because they were small, should be given special attention. No effort should be spared to help them exercise the right of self-determination and accede to independence in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

15. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that his delegation attached great importance to the sending of visiting missions to Territories under colonial domination, since that was the only way of knowing exactly what was taking place there. His delegation welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown in that regard by New Zealand, but regretted the fact that the United Kingdom was persisting in its negative attitude. He asked the United Kingdom delegation to reconsider its position. It was difficult to understand why an administering Power should fear the dispatch of a mission to a Territory if it was administering that Territory in conformity with the principles laid down by the United Nations. The Afghan delegation also hoped that a satisfactory decision would be received from the administering Power which had not yet given its reply concerning visiting missions.

16. The representative of *Sierra Leone* regretted that certain administering Powers refused to authorize the dispatch of visiting missions to Territories under their administration. They should realize that such visiting missions were more useful to the population of those Territories and to themselves than to the Special Committee, because direct contacts gave the Committee a better understanding of the situation in the Territories as it was described by the administering Powers in their statements in the United Nations. He therefore hoped that the administering Powers concerned would reconsider their position.

#### *Conclusions of the Sub-Committee*

17. The Sub-Committee notes that most of the administering Powers continue to maintain their same negative attitude towards the acceptance of visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee II.

#### *Recommendations of the Sub-Committee*

18. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should strongly urge the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to these Territories at an early date. The detailed recommendations regarding the Territories to be visited and other modalities will be decided upon at a later stage.

#### B. PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 16 OF THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE III

##### *Question of Visiting Missions*

[For the Sub-Committee's report, see the annex to chapter XXIII below.]

#### ANNEX III

**Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2151 (XXI), 2184 (XXI), 2189 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee: requests addressed to specialized agencies and international institutions**

##### **Note by the Secretariat**

##### INTRODUCTION

1. In the course of the past year, both the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and the Special Committee ad-

ressed requests to specialized agencies and international institutions asking them, *inter alia*, to (a) give assistance, or increase the assistance which they were already giving to refugees from Southern Rhodesia and Territories under Portuguese administration, and (b) withhold assistance of any kind from the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and from the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination.

2. In each case, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution or consensus to a number of specialized agencies and other international institutions concerned, drawing their attention to the relevant operative paragraphs.

3. In addition, pursuant to a request contained in operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, the Secretary-General entered into consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the results of which are set forth in a report by the Secretary-General.<sup>a</sup>

4. In the following sections, the Secretariat has reproduced the texts of the request addressed to specialized agencies and international institutions and the replies, other than formal acknowledgements, which have been received to date.

## I. REQUESTS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

### A. Texts of the requests

5. At its 1468th plenary meeting, on 17 November 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2151 (XXI) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, operative paragraph 11 of which read as follows:

"11. *Requests* the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia."

6. At its 1490th plenary meeting, on 12 December 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, operative paragraphs 9 to 11 of which read as follows:

"9. *Appeals once again* to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in order to secure its compliance with General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and with the present resolution;

"11. *Expresses its appreciation* to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the aid they have extended so far, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering owing to military operations."

7. At its 1492nd plenary meeting, on 13 December 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2189 (XXI) concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Operative paragraphs 8 and 9 of this resolution read as follows:

8. *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international relief organizations and the specialized agencies concerned to increase their economic, social and humanitarian assistance to the refugees from those Territories;

"9. *Requests* all States, directly and through action in the international institutions of which they are members, includ-

ing the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination";

8. At its 1518th plenary meeting, on 19 May 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2248 (S-V) concerning the question of South West Africa. Operative paragraph 2, part III of the resolution read as follows:

"2. *Requests* the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render to South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation."

### B. Replies from specialized agencies and international institutions

(a) *Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)*

9. In letters dated 2 February 1967, the FAO stated that the relevant operative paragraphs of the resolutions adopted at the twenty-first session had been duly noted.

(b) *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)*

10. With regard to the Bank's response to operative paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), see paragraph 3 above.

11. With regard to resolution 2189 (XXI), the IBRD replied that the resolution would be brought to the attention of the Bank's Executive Directors with particular reference to paragraphs 8 and 9 which were addressed to Member States.

(c) *International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)*

12. With regard to resolution 2189 (XXI), the reply stated that the Council of ICAO had considered the resolution, particularly paragraph 8, at a meeting on 8 March 1967. As a result of the discussion, the Director-General had been requested to reply that, while ICAO had no resources within its regular budget to provide assistance of the type envisaged, it was willing to render assistance to the refugees by granting scholarships out of the limited funds available to it for regional projects in Africa under the United Nations Development Programme. The applicants should have the appropriate qualifications to receive training in the different specialized fields of aviation in any of the training institutions established as Special Fund projects and for which ICAO was or is the executing agency; the applicants should also be sponsored by a State as required by UNDP procedures.

13. The information contained in the above letter from ICAO was communicated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for appropriate action.

(d) *International Committee of the Red Cross*

14. With regard to operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2151 (XXI), the reply stated that the International Committee was continuing to extend its assistance to persons detained or restricted in Southern Rhodesia for political reasons.

(e) *International Labour Organisation (ILO)*

15. In letters dated 7 December 1966 and 6 February 1967, the ILO replied that the relevant operative paragraphs of the resolutions had been noted.

(f) *International Telecommunication Union (ITU)*

16. With regard to resolution 2248 (S-V) concerning the questions of South West Africa, the ITU, in a letter dated 30 June 1967, transmitted a copy of resolution No. 619 which had been adopted by the Council of the ITU at its twenty-second session in May 1967. In its resolution, the Council, after taking note of resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby the General Assembly of the United Nations had terminated South Africa's mandate in South West Africa, decided that the Government of South Africa no longer had the right to represent South West Africa in the ITU.

<sup>a</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/6825.



(g) *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)*

17. In letters dated 3 January and 25 July 1967, UNESCO stated that resolutions 2151 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) would be brought to the attention of the Executive Board at its next session. In its letter of 3 January, UNESCO transmitted the text of resolution 11 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its thirty-fifth plenary meeting, on 28 November 1966 concerning "UNESCO's task in the light of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twentieth session on questions relating to the liquidation of colonialism and racialism". The text of this resolution is as follows:

"The General Conference,

"In accordance with the aims proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of UNESCO, and with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960,

"In accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of the 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' and with the other resolutions of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly mentioned in the report of the Director-General of UNESCO (14 C/20),

"Taking into consideration that the United Nations General Assembly, at its twentieth session, adopted a number of resolutions designed to promote the earliest possible elimination of all forms of racialism and racial discrimination and, in particular, approved and opened for signature the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and, at its twenty-first session, proclaimed 21 March as International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination,

"Having considered the Director-General's report on the implementation of resolution 6.3 on 'the role of UNESCO in contributing to the attainment of independence by colonial countries and peoples', adopted by the General Conference at its thirteenth session, and resolution 8.2 on the same subject, adopted by the General Conference at its eleventh and twelfth sessions,

"Noting with deep concern that, six years after the adoption of the Declaration in 1960, many territories are still under colonial domination,

"Affirms its belief that all colonial countries and peoples should be granted independence with all possible speed;

"Roundly condemning all forms and manifestations of colonialism and neo-colonialism,

"Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism and the practice of *apartheid* and all other forms of racial discrimination constitute a threat to international peace and security and are a crime against humanity,

"Noting that, although UNESCO has made a certain contribution to the attainment and consolidation of independence by former colonial countries and peoples by assisting them to develop education, science and culture, by no means all the opportunities at its disposal in this field have been made use of,

"Authorizes the Director-General:

"(a) To pay special attention in the practical execution of UNESCO's programme for 1967-1968, in the work plans and in future programmes, to the implementation of the resolutions of the governing bodies of the United Nations and UNESCO relating to this matter and, in particular, to provide the newly independent countries and peoples and those that have not yet attained independence, with the necessary assistance for the development of education, science and culture;

"(b) To continue, within the framework of UNESCO's programme, to organize meetings and research projects on the harmful effects of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racialism on the social and economic life of countries and on the development of their education, science and culture, with a view to assisting in the application of practical measures to eradicate such after-effects:

"(c) To make more active use of the Organization's information and publications programme and other forms of activities in order to unmask and to help to eradicate, with all possible speed, colonialism, neo-colonialism, the policy and practice of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, and also to give wide publicity to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the UNESCO General Conference;

"(d) In accordance with the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to withhold assistance from the Governments of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia in matters relating to education, science and culture, and not to invite them to attend conferences or take part in other UNESCO activities, participation in which might be considered as conferring technical assistance, until such time as the Governments of those countries abandon their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;

"(e) In consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, to use UNESCO's information material and publications and other forms of activity for the implementation of resolution 2142 (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly which proclaimed 21 March as International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination;

"(f) To appeal to the Governments of members States of UNESCO which have not yet done so to accede to the 'International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twentieth session, and to the 'Convention against Discrimination in Education', adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its eleventh session;

"(g) To report to the General Conference of UNESCO, at its fifteenth session, on the implementation of this resolution."

(h) *United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees*

18. Information concerning the measures taken to increase the assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration under the High Commissioner's Programme is contained in document A/AC.109/L.417, dated 7 August 1967.

19. In letters dated 9 March 1967, it was stated that the High Commissioner had drawn the attention of the League of Red Cross Societies to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session and had received a reply from the Secretary-General of the League dated 2 March 1967. An excerpt from the reply, which was enclosed, read as follows:

"As we have already pointed out on various occasions to the above-mentioned Department, the assistance to people in need—destitute populations, disaster victims and refugees—is one of the peacetime responsibilities of the Red Cross. It accomplishes this task within the limits of its possibilities and in accordance with its basic principles. The League is prepared to approach its member Societies with a view to assisting these categories of people provided it is requested to do so by the National Society of the country in which they are living."

(i) *Universal Postal Union (UPU)*

20. In a letter dated 8 February 1967, it was stated that note had been taken of resolution 2184 (XXI), particularly paragraphs 8 and 9, and that the resolution would be drawn to the attention of the Executive Council of the UPU at its next session in May 1967.

(i) *World Health Organization (WHO)*

21. In letters dated 7 December 1966, 10 March 1967 and 22 July 1967, the Director-General of the World Health Organization stated that note had been taken of the requests contained in the resolutions and that they would be brought to the attention of the Executive Board and of the World Health Assembly. In the letter of 22 July, in reply to the request contained in operative paragraph 2, part III of resolution 2248 (S-V) concerning the question of South West Africa, the

Director-General stated as follows: "I wish to assure you of our readiness to co-operate within the constitutional functions and capacities of the Organization in the programme envisaged by the General Assembly when the specific requirements of that programme are known."

## II. REQUESTS ADDRESSED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

### A. *Texts of the requests*

22. During its 1967 session, the Special Committee has to date (25 September 1967) adopted one consensus and three resolutions which contained requests addressed to the specialized agencies and international institutions, as follows.

23. On 1 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a consensus concerning the provision of assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration, the last paragraph of which read as follows:

"The Committee has nonetheless been deeply concerned by the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies of the United Nations and, particularly of their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the field of education and health. It accordingly expresses its regret that the specialized agencies have not yet to the knowledge of the Committee responded to the repeated appeals of the Committee and the General Assembly. The Committee therefore appeals to the specialized agencies and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to make every effort urgently to intensify assistance to the above-mentioned refugees in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination."

24. On 9 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/248) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, operative paragraph 13 of which read as follows:

"13. *Appeals* to the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia."

25. On 20 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/251) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, operative paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 of which read as follows:

"10. *Appeals once again* to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"11. *Expresses* its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and through it with the national liberation movements, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to those who have suffered and are still suffering from the military operations;

"...

"13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the specialized agencies referred to in operative paragraph 10 of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee."

26. Finally, on 20 June 1967, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/252), concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to those colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967). Operative paragraphs 8 and 12 of that resolution read as follows:

"8. *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the territories under colonial rule, their assistance to the refugees from these Territories;

"...

"12. *Requests* all States, directly and through their action in the international institutions of which they are members, including the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, and to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination";

### B. *Replies from specialized agencies and international institutions*

#### (a) *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)*

27. In a letter dated 12 July 1967, it was stated that note had been taken of the reference to IBRD contained in operative paragraph 10 of the Special Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/251) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration and of the references to the specialized agencies in operative paragraphs 11 and 13 of the resolution (see paragraph 3 above).

#### (b) *International Committee of the Red Cross*

28. With regard to the request contained in operative paragraph 13 of the Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/248) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, it was stated in a letter of 5 July 1967 that the International Committee of the Red Cross had been assisting political detainees in Rhodesia for several years past. At that moment a delegate of the International Committee, Mr. G. C. Senn, was carrying out a series of visits to detention camps and prisons in that country. In keeping with established practice, his observations and any proposals he might make would be communicated to the detaining Power.

#### (c) *International Labour Organisation (ILO)*

29. In letters dated 7 and 12 July 1967, it was stated that the requests contained in the Special Committee's three resolutions (A/AC.109/248, 251 and 252) had been noted.

#### (d) *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)*

30. In letters dated 19 July 1967, it was stated that the Special Committee's three resolutions (A/AC.109/248, 251 and 252) would be brought to the knowledge of the Executive Board of UNESCO at its seventy-seventh session.

#### (e) *United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees*

31. In letters dated 21 and 26 July 1967, it was stated that copies of the three resolutions (A/AC.109/248, 251 and 252) had been transmitted to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the International Committee of Voluntary Agencies.

#### (f) *Universal Postal Union (UPU)*

32. In a letter dated 16 August 1967, it was stated that note had been taken of the Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/251) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, particularly operative paragraphs 10 and 11.

#### (g) *World Health Organization (WHO)*

33. In a letter dated 9 August 1967 regarding the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 1 June 1967 concerning the provision of assistance to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration, it was stated as follows:

"The Special Committee's reference to the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies has been noted, as well as the reference to their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the field of education and health. The World Health Organization is ready to respond to requests for assistance from Governments and the competent organs of the United Nations in providing service to refugees.

The Special Committee is doubtless aware that the World Health Organization does not provide direct aid to individuals, any assistance which is provided is at the request of or with the agreement of Governments, or the United Nations.

"I would add that the World Health Organization continues to co-operate with the United Nations in the special educational and training programmes for Africans which are now being consolidated in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2235 (XXI). In particular the World Health Organization has co-operated with the United Nations in making arrangements for post-graduate medical studies by two Fellows from Portuguese Guinea."

34. With regard to the Committee's resolution (A/AC.109/248) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, a letter dated 14 August 1967 contained the following statement:

"It is noted that in paragraph 13 of this resolution, to which you call attention, the Special Committee has repeated and further elaborated a request made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in paragraph 11 of its resolution 2151 (XXI). As you may recall, that request of the General Assembly has been brought to the attention of the directing organs of the World Health Organization."

35. In a further letter of the same date, it was stated that due note had been taken of the request made by the Special Committee in operative paragraphs 10 and 11 of its resolution (A/AC.109/251) on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration which repeated requests made by the General Assembly in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its resolutions 2107 (XX) and paragraphs 9 and 11 of 2184 (XXI). Note had also been taken of the requests made by the Special Committee in operative paragraph 8 of its resolution (A/AC.109/252) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967), which repeated the request made by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 8 of its resolution 2189 (XXI). It was recalled that these requests had been brought to the attention of the directing organs of the World Health Organization.

#### ANNEX IV

##### Report of Sub-Committee I: military activities by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration

[A/AC.109/L.433]

##### INTRODUCTION

(paragraph 1)

\* \* \*

##### CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

###### A. Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena

B. *Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination*

(paragraphs 2 to 8)

\* \* \*

###### C. *Military activities by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration*

9. In accordance with the request by the Sub-Committee, the Secretariat made available to members in May 1967 seven working papers on this item based on information available to it. These papers cover the following Territories: Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration, Guam, Papua and New Guinea and the Caribbean Territories.

10. On 11 April 1967, the Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, at the request of the Sub-Committee, sent letters to the Permanent Missions of Australia,

France, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the United Nations, requesting these Powers to provide information on military activities and arrangements in the Territories under their administration.

11. In July and August 1967, the Secretariat received replies from four Permanent Missions to the United Nations. Following are excerpts of their replies:

Letter dated 4 August 1967 from the Australian Mission to the United Nations.

"In reply to your request I am instructed to say that the Australian Government reaffirms its acceptance of its obligations under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. It has provided on a regular basis a wide range of information, as required of it under that Article of the Charter on 'economic, social and educational conditions'. It has also regularly furnished extensive information on the political developments in these territories. This information has been made available in considerable detail to the General Assembly, and to the relevant committees and sub-committees. Australia has always been willing, in honouring its obligations under the Charter, to assist to the fullest extent the discussions by the General Assembly and its appropriate subsidiary bodies of these reports.

"The Australian Government doubts, however, whether the present request for information comes within the functions and duties of the Special Committee or its sub-committees. It notes that Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter makes no reference to military information and states that the information to be submitted by members is 'subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require'. In these circumstances, the Australian Government regrets that it is unable to accede to the request for information that has been made. It wishes to reiterate that the defence arrangements which have been made in the territories for which it is responsible are entirely consistent with its obligations and rights under the Charter, including its obligations to the inhabitants of territories for which it is responsible, and its obligations to assist the cause of international peace and security."

Letter dated 31 July 1967 from the New Zealand Mission to the United Nations.

"In reply to your letter, I am instructed to state that the New Zealand authorities know of no military activities or arrangements in non-self-governing territories for which New Zealand has responsibilities that are relevant to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)."

Letter dated 7 July 1967 from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations.

"In reply to your letter, I am instructed to recall that the United Kingdom Government has consistently fulfilled its obligation under the Charter to transmit to the Secretary-General information relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which it is responsible. In addition, my Government has gone beyond the obligation imposed upon it by the Charter and has voluntarily supplied to the General Assembly and to the Special Committee information of a political and constitutional character relevant to the work of those two bodies. My Government does not, however, regard the subject of military activities and arrangements in the Territories for which it is responsible as relevant to the work of the Special Committee, or of the Sub-Committee which has initiated the request for information, conveyed in your letter to my delegation.

"In these circumstances, it is in my Government's view only necessary to affirm that such defence activities and arrangements as may exist in the Non-Self-Governing Territories for which it is responsible are fully consistent with the United Kingdom's rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and also with the interests of the people of the territories concerned."

Letter dated 26 July 1967 from the United States Mission to the United Nations.

"Reporting obligations of Member States having responsibilities for Non-Self-Governing Territories are contained in

Article 73 e of the Charter. Under this Article such members have undertaken to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limits as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistics and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in territories for which they are respectively responsible, other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

"As you are aware the United States Government has co-operated fully in providing the Secretary-General with information on economic, social and educational conditions called for in this Article. In addition, for many years the United States has voluntarily submitted information of a political nature, having in mind its full adherence to the objectives of paragraphs 73 a and b of the Charter, calling *inter alia* for political advancement of peoples of territories and for development of self-government and of free political institutions. The United States has also voluntarily co-operated for many years, in examination of such information by the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and subsequently in the Special Committee.

"Bearing in mind the specific Charter recognition in Article 73 e that security considerations may legitimately limit transmittal of information even on economic, social and educational conditions, and the fact that there is no obligation to provide other information, the United States regrets it is unable to comply with your request for information on military activities and arrangements in the territories under United States administration. In any event, the United States Government questions the view that data on military activi-

ties are required for the performance of the duties of the Special Committee and rejects any implication that such military activities as exist in the United States territories are inconsistent with progress toward the achievement of self-determination, to which we are fully committed.

"In conclusion, allow me to emphasize that in carrying out its obligations to promote to the utmost the political advancement and well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, the United States takes full account, as provided for by the wording of Article 73 of the Charter, of the system of international peace and security which the Charter establishes."

12. The Sub-Committee began consideration of the above-mentioned item at its forty-fifth meeting held on 6 September 1967 and the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made a statement.

13. After an exchange of views on the procedure, the Sub-Committee strongly disapproves of the attitude of non-cooperation taken by the administering Powers.<sup>a</sup>

14. Owing to the refusal of the administering Powers to co-operate and in view of the lack of time and information available, the Sub-Committee decided to continue its consideration of this item at its next session.

#### D. Adoption of report

15. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 46th meeting on 27 September 1967.

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Finland reserved the position of his delegation in regard to the wording of this paragraph.

## CHAPTER II\*

### MEETINGS HELD AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS

#### INTRODUCTION

1. In its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the Special Committee envisaged, as part of its programme of work for 1967, the possibility of holding another series of meetings in Africa during that year.

2. By operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2189 (XXI), the General Assembly approved the programme for work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1967, including the possibility of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters. Within the context of the programme thus approved, the Governments of Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Iraq, Morocco, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Zambia extended invitations to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/221, 222, 224, 226-228, 230 and 232) to hold meetings at their respective capitals during 1967.

3. During the discussions on the organization of work, which took place at its meetings held between 9 February and 17 April 1967, a wide measure of support was expressed by members of the Special Committee for the holding of a series of meetings away from Headquarters during 1967. Several members stressed the positive results achieved by previous sessions of the Committee away from Headquarters. These sessions had enabled the Committee to gain more direct knowledge of the realities of the situation in a number of colonial Territories and had strengthened its capacity to assist the colonial peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence. A further series of meetings away from Headquarters would not only yield similar results but would also enable the Committee to assess the

extent to which the provisions of previous resolutions had been implemented and to recommend further measures as appropriate. It would, moreover, facilitate the appearance before the Committee of petitioners who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York.

4. At its 507th meeting on 28 March 1967, the Special Committee considered recommendations for the holding of a series of meetings away from Headquarters which were contained in the twenty-eighth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.385). The Committee also had before it a report by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of these recommendations (A/AC.109/L.386/Rev.1). At the same meeting, the Committee decided to adopt the report of the Working Group, on the understanding that reservations expressed by some members would appear in the records.

5. By adopting the report, the Special Committee decided that it would accept in principle the invitations extended to it by the eight Governments to hold meetings at their respective capitals, with an expression of its deep appreciation; that it would avail itself in 1967 of the invitations received from the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, and inform the Governments of Ethiopia, Mauritania and Morocco that, subject to their convenience, it would prefer to take advantage of their invitations at a future date.

6. The Committee decided at the same time to leave Headquarters for the purpose of the above-mentioned meetings on 25 May 1967 and to hold meetings in the capitals concerned in the following order, and for the approximate duration indicated, exclusive of travelling time:

\* Previously issued as document A/6700 (part II).

Kinshasa ..... six working days  
 Lusaka<sup>1</sup> ..... six working days  
 Dar es Salaam ..... six working days  
 Baghdad ..... four working days  
 Damascus ..... three working days

Reservations were expressed by some members regarding the justification for the visit and as to the proposed itinerary.

7. In adopting the report of the Working Group, the Special Committee also decided that the agenda for its meetings away from Headquarters in 1967 should include the Territories in Africa, Aden, Mauritius, Oman and the Seychelles, and that at the capitals indicated below, priority should be given to the hearing of petitioners concerning the following Territories:

Kinshasa	Territories under Portuguese administration;
Lusaka	Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland and South West Africa;
Dar es Salaam	Territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles;
Baghdad	Aden and Oman;
Damascus	Aden and Oman.

8. On 12 April 1967, the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee issued a communiqué on the Committee's meetings away from Headquarters which was given wide dissemination. The text of the communiqué is appended to this chapter (annex I).

9. In a letter dated 11 May 1967 (A/AC.109/238), the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the United Kingdom Government would not be represented in the Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters.

10. In a letter dated 23 May 1967 (A/AC.109/242), the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that his delegation was unable for reasons beyond its control to participate in the Special Committee's debates during its meetings away from Headquarters. He expressed support for the work of the Committee and gratitude to the various host Governments for their invitation.

11. Members of the Special Committee<sup>2</sup> accompanied by members of the Secretariat arrived at Kinshasa on 26 May 1967. The Special Committee met in Kinshasa from 29 May to 1 June 1967, at the Palais de la Nation; it arrived at Kitwe on 2 June and met from 3 to 9 June 1967 at Buchi Hall; it arrived at Dar es Salaam on 10 June and met from 12 to 21 June 1967 at the Msimbazi Community Centre. The representative of the Secretary-General joined the Special Committee in Dar es Salaam.

12. In a letter dated 13 June 1967 (A/AC.109/247/Rev.1), the representative of Iraq to the Special Committee informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that as a result of the difficult situation facing the whole of the Middle East, it would not be opportune for his Government and people to receive the Committee at that critical time. He had been assured by his Government that the Committee would be most welcome to hold meetings in Baghdad at a later date. The repre-

sentative of Syria to the Special Committee made a statement to the Working Group on 13 June 1967 to the same effect as the above letter.

13. At its 534th meeting on 14 June 1967, the Special Committee considered in the light of the prevailing conditions in the Middle East further recommendations which were contained in the thirty-first report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.410 and Corr.1) regarding the meetings scheduled to be held in Baghdad, Iraq, and Damascus, Syria, from 22 June to 1 July 1967.

14. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to adopt the report of the Working Group. By adopting the report of the Working Group, the Committee decided to convey to the Governments of Iraq and Syria: (a) its gratitude for inviting the Committee to hold meetings at their respective capitals; (b) its full appreciation of the circumstances explained to the Committee by their respective representatives; and (c) the decision that having regard to the above-mentioned circumstances the Committee would wish to take advantage of their respective invitations at a future date. The Committee also decided to conclude its meetings away from Headquarters on the adjournment of its series of meetings in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania; to adjourn its meeting in Dar es Salaam not later than 21 June 1967, and to take up at subsequent meetings at Headquarters the items which it would otherwise have considered during its meetings in Baghdad and Damascus.

15. During its meetings away from Headquarters, the Special Committee held thirty-one plenary meetings and the Sub-Committee on petitions seven meetings. The Special Committee heard twenty-four groups of petitioners and circulated thirty-nine petitions exclusive of requests for hearings.

16. During their stay in Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, members of the Special Committee were enabled, at the invitation of the organizations concerned, to visit camps and other facilities for refugees from Angola and Mozambique. In Kinshasa, they visited a reception centre, a hospital and school run by the *Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en civil* (GRAE) where they were enthusiastically received by several hundred refugees and met with teachers, doctors and others concerned with aid to refugees. In Dar es Salaam, members visited facilities run by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, including a hospital and the Mozambique Institute which provides secondary and vocational (nurses, aides) training at Dar es Salaam and conducts primary and other teaching programmes elsewhere.

17. At the opening of meetings in Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam respectively, the Special Committee was addressed by H.E. General Joseph Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, H.E. Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia and by H.E. Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, second Vice-President, on behalf of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Special Committee also had the honour of being received by the Heads of State or Government at each of the three capitals.

18. In accordance with the decision by the Special Committee at its 512th meeting on 29 May 1967 to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/AC.109/244), a delegation of that Government attended the meetings of the Special Committee in Kinshasa in an observer capacity. Further, in

<sup>1</sup> The venue for the meetings in Zambia was subsequently changed from Lusaka to Kitwe by the Government of the Republic of Zambia.

<sup>2</sup> A list of the representatives present at the meetings away from Headquarters can be found in annex II to this chapter.



accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 512th meeting on 29 May 1967, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of Czechoslovakia (A/AC.109/240 and Add.1), a representative of that Government attended the meetings away from Headquarters as an observer. Similarly, in accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 513th meeting on 30 May 1967, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of Spain (A/AC.109/245), a representative of that Government attended the meetings in Kinshasa as an observer. Further, in accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 519th meeting on 3 June 1967, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Zambia (A/AC.109/246), a delegation of that Government attended the meetings of the Special Committee in Kitwe in an observer capacity.

19. At its 517th meeting on 1 June 1967, the representative of Spain with the consent of the Special Committee made a statement relating to the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration. At its 527th meeting on 9 June 1967, the representative of Zambia, with the consent of the Special Committee made a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At its 531st meeting on 13 June 1967, a representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity, with the consent of the Special Committee, made a statement at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Dar es Salaam. At its 538th meeting on 19 June 1967, the representative of Somalia, in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee concerning a request submitted by his Government (A/AC.109/241), participated in the consideration of the question of French Somaliland.

20. Following consideration of the relevant items, the Special Committee adopted resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration and Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of these items is contained in chapters III, IV, V and XIV respectively of the present report.

21. With regard to the question of French Somaliland, the Special Committee decided at its 538th meeting held on 19 June 1967, following the hearing of petitioners and a statement by the representative of Somalia, to take up the question upon resumption of its meetings in New York.

22. In the light of its discussions on the above-mentioned items, the Special Committee also adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by it during its meetings away from Headquarters (see para. 744 below). It also adopted unanimously a resolution expressing its appreciation to the host Governments (see para. 751 below).

#### A. MEETINGS HELD AT KINSHASA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

##### OPENING OF MEETINGS

*Address by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*

23. The *President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* said that it was a great honour for the people and Government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo to serve as host to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, thus giving them an opportunity to pay a ringing tribute to the work of the Organization in the emancipation of peoples. At the present time, twenty-two years after the signing of the United Nations Charter by fifty-one nations, and seven years after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United Nations counted within its number 122 Members. Hundreds of millions of human beings had re-entered the ranks of free peoples. That great current of liberation, sweeping across the world, had overturned all barriers. The twentieth century had found in that movement what would be its true title to fame. The political, economic and social changes resulting from the accession of hundreds of millions of formerly oppressed men and women to the status of citizens of free countries were such that a new era in the history of mankind was now clearly being opened. That extraordinary development was in no small measure due to the efforts of the United Nations. It was there that the idea that every people had an inalienable right to decide its own destiny had found defenders and persons with the organizing skill to bring that idea from the realm of philosophical systems to that of political realities.

24. Considerable progress had certainly already been made, but there could be no yielding to complacency on that score as long as there was a single oppressed people, a single colonial people, left in the world. If the principles for which the former colonial peoples had fought were just, and if they had been recognized by the vast majority of States, there was no valid reason why they should be ignored and rejected in certain areas of the world.

25. The idea which had given direction to the decolonization of the entire world had been just and sound, and the Congo stood as a witness to that; it would therefore be contrary to elementary logic to admit that that idea could be flouted.

26. The Congo, as an African nation, was keenly aware of the obvious fact that the African continent remained the last refuge of those who would not accept mankind's decisive development. The Congo, which had extensive common frontiers with one of the principal supporters of moribund colonialism, was physically aware that the liberation of colonial peoples could not be regarded as fully achieved. As long as any territory in Africa was under foreign domination, the independence and peace of other countries of the continent, including the Congo, would be constantly threatened.

27. He would therefore like to be specific in the treating of the problems that were especially relevant to the African continent, that were found even on the frontiers of the Congo and only a few dozen miles away from Kinshasa. The Congo had a common frontier of thousands of miles with two countries under Portuguese domination—Cabinda and Angola. In more than one place that frontier even separated peoples who formed a single ethnic group. Father and sons, brothers and sisters, were thus separated not only by a frontier but by a veritable iron curtain. The Congo suffered directly as a consequence. Not far from where the Special Committee was meeting, Portuguese troops violated the frontiers of the Congo in armed forays and sowed death among the Congolese inhabitants. Under the pretext of the right of pursuit, bombs were dropped on Congolese

territory by Portuguese aircraft, shells were fired over the frontier by Portuguese guns, and the territorial integrity of the Congo was violated by Portuguese soldiers.

28. The members of the Special Committee could visit camps of Angolan refugees at Kinshasa itself, and there, out of the great destitution caused by colonialist repression, they could see emerging the will to resist which in the near future would ensure the victory of the Angolan patriots over their oppressors. Not far from Kinshasa there were many other refugee camps in which old people and men, women and children by the hundreds of thousands had found refuge. The sight of them told a great deal about the savagery of colonial repression and about the growing national awareness of the people under Portuguese domination; it was a constant reminder to the Congolese people of the mission which they had inherited of assisting in a particular way those brothers who were so close to them.

29. Portuguese colonialism was certainly the most obsolete and least defensible of all. It was more than anachronistic—it was mediaeval. Was it the ambition of Portugal, an under-developed country itself, to perpetuate under-development over immense African areas? It was at present encountering the stubborn resistance of peoples yearning to be free again. How could it hope to suppress their just demands by force of arms, obliging young Portuguese to perform four years of military service and wasting the meagre resources of the nation on war expenditure. In all parts of the world and within Portugal itself, regardless of religious or political philosophy, leaders and peoples regarded such antiquated colonialism as foolish and fruitless policy. Its continuance condemned Portugal, not to stagnation, but to decay. The final result could be only defeat, the more disastrous for its postponement.

30. It was clear therefore that the Congo would continue to extend its enthusiastic assistance to all liberation movements whose purpose was to put an end to colonial domination. It was giving the fullest support to the Angolan liberation movements and would continue to do so. It strongly urged them, however, not to regard Congolese national territory as an arena for the settlement of their disputes. Such fratricidal struggles moreover caused the Angolan people, still under domination, immeasurable harm. They meant a prolongation of their sacrifices and sufferings for the sole benefit of the common foe. Whatever the nature of the differences, it was a matter of honour and duty for the liberation movements to overcome them for the sake of the cause for which they had been fighting for nearly seven years.

31. The problem posed by the Rhodesian rebellion against the lawful authorities of the United Kingdom also directly affected the Congo because of its proximity to Zambia, with which it had important economic ties. The existence on Zambia's borders of an illegal force subject to no control could not but deeply preoccupy the Congo. The Rhodesian situation was not moving forward. The Congo had shown the patience asked of it, but patience could not be turned into tolerance.

32. Political responsibility for the Rhodesian rebellion lay with the United Kingdom. That great nation, the mother of parliaments, had helped to forge and spread through the world the idea of law, equal for all and from which none could escape. For centuries it had held up the image of a democracy in which power derived from the laws and from the will of the people. How, then, could that country permit the rule of law

to be absent for so long from Rhodesia? In the name of its law the United Kingdom had succeeded in putting down rebellions and in militarily subjugating those who had attempted to escape its authority in other countries in Africa and elsewhere. Why should those now in command at Salisbury be able to avert the fate met by so many other rebels? The economic sanctions which were supposed to have produced the desired result showed themselves today to be inadequate and clearly ineffectual. It was inadmissible that a great Power responsible for world peace should leave at the Congo's borders an armed, illegal group over which no valid authority was exercised and which allowed itself to express feelings of hatred and detestation for the African nations. The Zimbabwe people, who suffered more than any other people from the establishment of an illegal régime at Salisbury, were clearly entitled to protection from the United Kingdom. The Congo would not abandon them to their fate.

33. The problem of South Africa was one which the Congo understood particularly well because it had itself suffered racial discrimination up until the end of the Belgian régime. The Congolese had known what *apartheid* was; different rules based on racial origin, or rather on differences of skin colour, had shaped the colonial system of government applied in the Congo. The Congolese had been belittled and humiliated; they had suffered in their flesh and in their spirit.

34. That abhorrent system must vanish, for its continuance was in itself a challenge to the fundamental principles of the United Nations. How could a Member country so blatantly disregard the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter? Under the system of *apartheid* a white minority concentrated all power in its own hands. It was organized to maintain and extend its domination. It proposed never to submit to the law of the majority. The black peoples in that immense territory were kept in a state of economic exploitation and intellectual stagnation. Their human rights and rights as citizens were regarded as non-existent. It was inconceivable for the United Nations to remain aloof from so deplorable a situation. Millions of oppressed brothers were counting on help to hasten their deliverance. With the elimination of *apartheid* and the return to majority rule, a new State could quickly arise in southern Africa. Its natural riches could render it happy and prosperous. The important thing was to prevent the enslavement of its people from continuing.

35. There were, however, startling contradictions. He would not speak of the astonishing verdict rendered at The Hague. A resolution had been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which was clear, straightforward and consistent with the principles of law. A way to implement that resolution must be found. In the discussions concerning South West Africa much had been said about the defunct League of Nations, and it might be well to recall why that organization, in which the peoples had placed so much hope, had ceased to exist. The reason for its demise had been the egoism of the Powers which had refused to give effect to the decisions which they themselves had adopted. That reflection on the past should help to safeguard the future. It was unthinkable that the formal resolutions of the United Nations should be treated as meaningless, particularly by one of the Organization's own Member States. If such non-com-

pliance was tolerated further, the very future of the Organization would be in jeopardy.

36. He had touched on only a few problems—those closest to the Congo and most distressing to the African conscience. Clearly, much remained to be done in the sphere of decolonization. The time for sincerity had come. Procrastination was no longer possible. The questions had been clearly put and the principles agreed upon; the answers could be only positive. But without the necessary sincerity all that would be nothing but an exercise in deception for which the still-colonized peoples would pay the price.

37. The great Powers had decided that it should be they who bore responsibility for the peace of the world. The world was not, however, at peace when subjugated people rose up in revolt. It was not at peace when those entitled to live in freedom and dignity as citizens were held in subjection. If the implementation of the principles of the Charter and of the resolutions of the United Nations was sincerely desired, then there could be no doubt that the colonial régimes, a remnant of the past, would soon be coming to an end. If, unhappily, the acceptance of the principles and decisions should be only verbal, the liberation of subject peoples would come to pass anyway, through the will of the peoples themselves. But how much conflict and upheaval, how much delay in the building up of a true community of free nations, would result from the equivocal position in which those peoples would have been left.

38. Therefore, on behalf of the Congolese people and Government and on his own behalf, he expressed the hope that the Special Committee's deliberations would be fruitful and his sincere wishes for the success of its work.

#### *General statements*

39. *The Chairman* expressed to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the Special Committee's deep appreciation of his inspiring address, which would be of great assistance in its work. He conveyed the Committee's sincere gratitude for the invitation to begin its meetings in Africa in the historic city of Kinshasa, and for the hospitality and fraternal welcome extended to it.

40. The vigilance and valour of the Government and people of the Congo against the forces of reaction, colonialism and neo-colonialism had earned for them a place in the hearts of freedom-loving people everywhere. The Special Committee therefore considered it a signal honour to be meeting at Kinshasa. The common concern for the liquidation of colonialism in all its manifestations had long made the Committee and the Government and people of the Congo comrades in arms. They shared the same ideals, set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which asserted the absolute right of all colonial peoples to self-determination and independence.

41. Seven years previously the plight of the Congo had been a cause of international alarm and crisis, brought about by the despoliation of its material assets and the neglect of its human and spiritual resources during colonial rule, followed by the attempted sabotage of its independence and the sacrifice of one of Africa's most beloved martyrs, Patrice Lumumba. The resultant confusion had been intensified and prolonged by the manoeuvres of the preposterous Tshombé, whose name

had become the byword of treason and intrigue, and who had met the fate reserved for all traitors of Africa. It was not surprising that Africa's enemies had anticipated, and faint-hearted Africans had feared, a future for the Congo of continued economic and political instability, deteriorating into disintegration and possible recolonization. Those forebodings had been proved wrong, and the accession of General Mobutu to the presidency had been hailed as the return of dignity and integrity.

42. During the past year, the administrative structure had been overhauled and Congolese control over the national economy and natural resources strengthened. The Government and people had been tackling with vigour the vast work of national reconstruction and of consolidating their independence. The Congolese Government had moved to a commendable position of non-alignment internationally and into the forefront of support for measures to strengthen African unity and independence. Having saved itself by its own exertions, the new Congo was well placed to assist in the salvation of all Africa by its example.

43. The Special Committee was therefore honoured and privileged to be meeting now in the Democratic Republic; all its members looked forward to achieving fruitful and constructive results, inspired by the indomitable Congolese people and their dynamic Government. Its meetings at Kinshasa had opened at a time when the forces of colonialism had cast a gloomy shadow over the international scene in furtherance of their own sinister designs to hold the remaining dependent territories in perpetual bondage. The Committee was increasingly concerned that progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had fallen far short of expectations. In particular, owing to the deliberate opposition or non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, the serious colonial problems in southern Africa and in the Arabian peninsula had shown no perceptible progress towards a peaceful solution. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination, in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Aden, had deteriorated so seriously that it constituted a grave threat to international peace and security.

44. The Special Committee's desire to visit the colonial Territories and gain first-hand experience of the situation had been frustrated by the negative attitude of the administering Powers concerned, but its meetings in Africa and the Near East would facilitate the appearance before it of the representatives of national liberation movements who found it impossible to travel to New York. They would also reaffirm the solidarity of the United Nations with the colonial peoples in their legitimate fight to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and would further enhance the Committee's capacity to assist those peoples in fulfilling their desire for freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter.

45. The Special Committee's main function during its meetings at Kinshasa would be to assess the degree of compliance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as concerned the Portuguese colonies, particularly Angola. That resolution, embodying the Declaration, symbolized the passing of the barbarous system of colonialism, and ushered in a new era in international affairs, marked by the accession to independence of many Asian and African nations. The

fact that the people of Angola was not numbered among them was not due to any lack of desire or determination on their part. They had constantly signified their desire to be free, and had striven by every legitimate and constitutional means to exercise their inherent right to self-determination and independence. To all their appeals and legitimate efforts, the Portuguese Government had opposed a stubborn and vain refusal. Based as it was on the fascist system of repression and police rule, it had sought to stem the tide of nationalism and unity surging through Africa. In order to continue to drain the human and material resources of Angola for the benefit of their backward and stagnant country, the Portuguese authorities uninhibitedly practised wanton barbarism, mass terrorism and genocide in Africa.

46. The indigenous inhabitants had responded in the only manner compatible with dignity and honour: by taking up arms and opposing their fascist oppressors. The world was witnessing the killings and counter-killings and maimings which Portuguese obduracy and stupidity had made inevitable. While the United Nations might not condone in principle the use of force and the shedding of blood, in the case of Angola it was understandable. The rights of dependent peoples to self-determination and independence had been affirmed by the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Moreover, in several subsequent resolutions the General Assembly had explicitly recognized the legitimacy of the fight by the peoples of the Portuguese colonies for the exercise of those rights, and had invited all States to give them moral and material assistance.

47. The fight had been and would continue to be difficult, for the Salazar régime was aided by powerful allies—especially some Western Powers within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their collaborators in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia—who were determined to perpetuate the subjugation of the people of the Territories under colonialist domination. They would be sadly disappointed for, as history had shown, no human power could destroy a people's determination to be free and independent.

48. The Special Committee was mindful of the noble efforts of the Government and people of the Congo on behalf of their African brothers in Angola, where the Portuguese colonialists were waging a war of extermination against those who asked only to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. The Committee deplored Portugal's attempts to subvert constituted authority in independent African States and thus make it safe for the forces of reaction in southern Africa. It condemned the threats and molestations by the Salazar régime aimed at forcing the Governments of independent African States to abandon their sacred responsibilities towards the colonized part of southern Africa.

49. He wished to pay a special tribute to the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their courageous stand against the forces of Portuguese colonialism. Although preoccupied with internal problems and bedevilled by problems engineered by the neo-colonialists, they had gone to great lengths to give moral and material assistance to the African people of Angola who were denied their fundamental human rights. The Committee was happy to be able to learn at first hand, near the theatre of conflict, the progress of the struggle for freedom and

independence in the Portuguese colonies. It confidently hoped that it would thus be enabled to formulate specific recommendations as a constructive contribution to the solution of the problem. Portugal was the poorest and most backward country in Europe: but for the aid received through NATO from some Western countries, it could not continue its barbaric acts. The Committee appealed to those countries not to help Portugal. They must know that those acts were incompatible not only with the United Nations Charter but also with the very democracy that they always professed to defend.

50. He addressed to the leaders of all liberation movements a sincere appeal for unity in the fight for freedom. They too were conscious of the fact that the forces of reaction would not hesitate to exploit and welcome any differences in the liberation movements with a view to postponing the ultimate liquidation of colonial régimes. Those leaders were painfully aware that the fight for the elimination of colonialism would be a particularly difficult one in southern Africa—the strongest bastion of colonial interests. As had been emphasized by all heads of African Governments, the independence of existing African States was meaningless unless linked with total liberation from colonial rule; any setbacks in the fight for the liberation of colonial territories in Africa was a setback to the vital interests of all African States, and any humiliation to the Africans under colonial rule a humiliation to all Africans. Hence his plea for unity of thought, purpose and action, which was indispensable if the elimination of colonialism was to be achieved with the least possible delay.

51. The representative of *Ethiopia* associated his delegation with the tribute paid by the Chairman to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for inviting the Special Committee to Kinshasa and for the excellent hospitality they had offered. He also thanked President Mobutu for his very inspiring statement to the Committee. The leader and people of the Congo had clearly shown their determination to be in the forefront of the fight for the total emancipation of Africa. Needless to say, Africans welcomed that determination, especially in view of all the sufferings and deprivation that the Congo had undergone in the colonial and post-colonial era.

52. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, was an expression of the common desire and readiness to abolish all vestiges of colonialism without delay. The colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, and the colonialist machinations in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, showed that the objectives laid down in the Declaration were still far from being achieved. It was for that reason that the Special Committee, as the moral conscience of humanity, once again raised its voice on behalf of the world's oppressed peoples.

53. Events in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe showed that colonialism was indeed a canker spreading evil, unrest and the danger of broader conflict. It was the duty of the Committee members to bring home to the remaining colonial Powers the futility of their policy of oppression and suppression, for no matter how long and bitter the fight might be, there could be no doubt about the outcome. For that reason he

called upon the freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique and other colonial areas to redouble their efforts to achieve freedom and self-determination for their countries, secure in the knowledge that all progressive mankind stood behind them.

54. The Ethiopian delegation would make known its views on the individual items of the agenda as they were taken up. It would do everything in its power to facilitate the Special Committee's work.

55. The representative of *India* expressed his sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Kinshasa, which gave it the opportunity of discussing some of the most important problems in the proximity of the colonial Territories concerned. By their invitation the Government and people of the Congo had manifested the deep interest they had always taken in decolonization since they had acquired independence nearly seven years ago. The name of the late Patrice Lumumba would continue to inspire millions of people in the colonial Territories throughout the world. It was not surprising that his successors, and in particular the new régime under the leadership of General Mobutu, should continue to keep the torch of freedom burning. He paid a particular tribute to the practical assistance which the Democratic Republic of the Congo was providing to the people of Angola in their fight for freedom.

56. The statement by the President of the Republic contained important points to which the Special Committee should give serious thought.

57. During its stay at Kinshasa the Committee would devote particular attention to the problems of Angola and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea. The Indian delegation attached the highest importance to the attainment of freedom by those and indeed all other colonial Territories. The people of India—like those of the Congo—had suffered from colonial rule for many years and were therefore fully aware of the indignities which colonial peoples had to undergo. India too had experienced Portuguese colonial rule for several hundred years. The Indian people had argued and reasoned with the Portuguese, but in the end they had had to use the only language which the Portuguese seemed to understand—the language of force. All those factors made India's commitment to help free its brethren in the colonial Territories irrevocable. It condemned the barbarous rule of Portugal in its colonies, which perhaps surpassed all previous colonial systems in the brutality of its suppression. He pledged his delegation's unreserved support in removing the ugly cancer of colonialism from the face of the earth.

58. It was also particularly gratifying to his delegation that the Committee was meeting in Kinshasa, because India enjoyed very friendly relations with the Democratic Republic. India had had the honour of assisting the Congolese people in overcoming the external forces of reaction which had sought to divide the country soon after its independence, and had thus helped to maintain its territory's integrity and sovereignty. The delegations of the two countries in the United Nations worked very closely together in all issues, particularly colonial issues. He had very pleasant personal memories of his previous stay at the Indian Embassy in Kinshasa from 1961 to 1963.

59. The Indian delegation wished the friendly people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo success in all their activities.

60. The representative of *Iran* sincerely thanked the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their kind invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Kinshasa, a city which had been so deeply involved in the fight for freedom and independence. The meetings would be a tribute to the memory of the Congo's national leader, one of the world's great champions of freedom, Patrice Lumumba, whose ideals, indomitable spirit and legacy could not fail to inspire the Committee's work. The opening address by President Mobutu had been a further affirmation of the Congo's determination to fight colonialism.

61. The interest of the Iranian Government in vigorously pursuing a policy aimed at the total eradication of colonialism derived from the conviction that lasting world peace could be attained only by striking at the roots of the injustices which so many suffered at the hands of so few. Colonialism was one of the world's most flagrant forms of injustice; it bred hatred and thrived on subjugation. Even though most of Africa was free, certain parts continued to suffer injustice and, as President Mobutu had said, freedom-loving peoples could not rest content as long as any part of the continent remained the refuge of the oppressor. The valiant peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Zimbabwe and South West Africa, among others, were continuing the fight for independence, each in accordance with its own particular circumstances. Their struggle was also that of the States represented in the Committee; it was therefore the Committee's primary function to mobilize all international efforts to ensure its success. Any setback in the campaign to liberate the oppressed peoples in any part of Africa was a setback for the whole of Africa, but he was confident that, no matter how much longer the Portuguese, the South Africans and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia clung to their oppressive rule, the day would soon come, when Africans would once again be born free. It was against that background that he wished to pay a tribute to the valiant contribution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the fight against tyranny and oppression in Africa.

62. The representative of *Venezuela* thanked the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their warm welcome and proverbial hospitality. The Democratic Republic—an independent part of the African continent—would provide a stimulating setting for the Special Committee's work. The progress of the Republic since its independence was a constant source of satisfaction and encouraged further efforts to uproot the anachronistic colonial system and eliminate the policy of racial discrimination which was unfortunately still being practised in many parts of the continent.

63. Venezuela and Latin America as a whole were bound to the African continent not only by historical ties but also by the interests common to all developing countries and, above all, by the ideal of liberty. His delegation wished to pay special tribute to those Congolese who had given their lives in the battle for freedom.

64. Venezuela's solidarity with the African nations was shown by its firm support of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and no political, economic or



strategic consideration would ever cause it to waver. The fifth special session of the General Assembly on the problem of South West Africa was self-explanatory. The joint draft resolution submitted by the African, Asian and Latin American groups reiterated their firm resolve to continue the fight against the forces of colonialism.

65. The opinion of his delegation could be summed up in a saying of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator: "He who does not cherish liberty will be hounded by misfortune and universal censure." Those words expressed a philosophy fully shared by his country. History was an irreversible process. Those who still practised colonialism would eventually be overcome by the determination of the countries which had chosen the path of history, as had the Democratic Republic of the Congo which had invited the Special Committee as a gesture of solidarity with its African brothers still under the colonial yoke.

66. The Special Committee's work during its meetings in Africa and the Middle East was of special importance in the decolonization process. Its presence was not only a symbol of its earnest concern for the development of self-determination and independence, but also a renewed effort to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism. Its meetings would certainly provide first-hand information and new material for inclusion in the already voluminous archives on those who defied the most elementary principles of the United Nations Charter and universal morality. It would thus be possible once again to appeal for justice in the General Assembly against the supporters of colonialism and the nations responsible for the policy of *apartheid*.

67. The various Territories included in the programme of work were of such importance that he would deal with each extensively in the individual discussions on each territory.

68. His delegation was, as always, ready to support unreservedly any measure in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations likely to expedite the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other dependent countries. It denounced, in particular, Portugal's action against the Congolese people, who had welcomed the Angolan refugees, and categorically condemned Portugal's colonial war.

69. He strongly deplored the absence of the United Kingdom delegation and the lamentable failure of that country to co-operate with the Special Committee in its work. Its absence was all the more regrettable because the United Kingdom was politically responsible for granting independence to Southern Rhodesia. However, he assured the Zimbabwe people that their struggle would not be in vain and that the days of Ian Smith's racist minority Government were numbered.

70. South West Africa would understand that the principles of human rights, which the South African Government did not respect, made it necessary to open the way for the peaceful transfer of the Territory, as a first step towards final independence.

71. The work of the Special Committee in Africa and the Middle East was therefore of special significance, as a step towards eradicating colonialism in accordance with the highest principles of the United Nations. Optimism and an unquestioning faith in Africa's destiny should be the keynote of the Com-

mittee's discussions. Until Africa was free world peace would always be in danger.

72. The representative of *Sierra Leone* expressed his sincere gratitude to President Mobutu for devoting some of his valuable time to opening the Special Committee's series of meetings. His address had provided much food for thought and would remain in the minds of the Committee members not only during their stay at Kinshasa but also throughout their travels and in New York. The President was leader of a people whose recent history was marked by upheaval and a grim fight for independence, and his people had first-hand experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The President's presence at the opening meeting emphasized the great interest of the Democratic Republic in the liberation of the African peoples. During their short time at Kinshasa, all delegations had had the opportunity of appreciating the spontaneous welcome of the Congolese, which was typical of all African peoples.

73. The Democratic Republic's proximity to the scene of the crimes committed in the Portuguese Territories, its own struggles to rid itself of colonial rule and its battle against neo-colonialism had commanded general respect. He had been requested by the Chairman and members of the National Reformation Council of *Sierra Leone* to express, on their behalf and on behalf of the people of *Sierra Leone*, their best wishes to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with which *Sierra Leone* had long-standing ties. Some of the people of the Congo had settled in *Sierra Leone* over 150 years before, on their return from slavery and had founded a town, called Congo Town, which they had made their home. People from *Sierra Leone* had also travelled to the Congo some fifty years before at the request of their employers and had settled there. *Sierra Leone* had taken part in the United Nations Operation in the Congo and a contingent of its soldiers had been there during those very difficult days.

74. Turning to the matter of decolonization, he recalled that, on 14 December 1960, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV), the Magna Carta of freedom for colonial peoples. Four months later, *Sierra Leone* had become independent and the one hundredth Member of the United Nations. Since then progress in decolonization had been slow. Africa was still burdened with the archaic thinking of Salazar, who wished to turn Africans into Portuguese; it was confronted by Ian Smith and his 200,000 Whites who insisted on ruling 4 million indigenous Africans. The Government of South Africa, not content with maintaining the policy of *apartheid* in its own territory, was also applying it in South West Africa and defying the United Nations its right to rule that Territory. No less important were the Spanish Territories of Equatorial Guinea, Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, although in them there had been some slight progress towards liberation. Swaziland was still on the list of colonial Territories and the question of French Somaliland had not yet been solved. A large part of Africa therefore was still under the colonial yoke. Aden and Oman continued to present difficulties, even though it had been agreed that the former would become independent no later than 1968. The important question was the type of independence contemplated. Another problem was that of the smaller islands in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, all of which should have the right

to self-determination, whatever their size. If they decided to remain associated in one form or another with a larger Power, they should be entitled to reconsider that decision at specified intervals and to terminate it unilaterally at any time.

75. The African countries had been accused of being emotional about racial matters and of making the struggle against them their main interest. They had however experienced colonial rule in the twentieth century, had seen their natural resources drained and justifiably intended to halt that trend. They had also suffered under colonial rule, insults and a consequent loss of human dignity. It was therefore not surprising that all Africans were united in the fight to free their brothers, who were still dominated by colonial Powers. They would continue the fight with greater vigour until all Africa was free of that scourge, but they would not rest there; they would also help their brothers across the seas until all nations became free.

76. Portugal continued to wage war on Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, so-called Portuguese Guinea; that small, poor European country continued its vicious attack on people whose only crime was their wish to be free and to exercise their rights under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The fight would continue, for the spirit of Africa never would be broken. Other colonial Powers had already learnt that lesson.

77. In Rhodesia Ian Smith was boasting that economic sanctions had failed. They had done so because unscrupulous businessmen in countries, which paid lip service to the Security Council's resolution but refused to restrain their citizens, continued to trade with Rhodesia directly or through third parties.

78. A few days before, the South African Government had dealt in first reading with a bill intended to extend powers of arrest and detention of Africans in South and South West Africa. As if to show its contempt for the General Assembly, it was timing the bill to coincide with the conclusion of the debate on that Territory. Such events could continue because some nations of the world did not practise what they preached. Great nations were spending thousands of millions of dollars in many areas to further the ideology that a great Power could not allow one country to dominate another. Many thousands of people had died for that cause, yet those great Powers did little to implement the fundamental right to freedom in Africa and elsewhere. The continued efforts of Salazar, Ian Smith and Vorster to force their will on the Africans both individually and collectively could only be regarded as the domination of one group by another. Those States and the people who assisted the enemies of freedom should be condemned. It was regrettable that the administering Powers continued to cling to their Territories and refused inspection by the United Nations, as if they had something to hide.

79. With all the energy it could muster, Sierra Leone would continue to strive for the expulsion of the colonial Powers from Africa. His Government reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the Charter and the principles of human rights. It would carry out their principles and continue the fight with all its might as it had done since Sierra Leone's independence six years before.

80. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Congolese Government and people for having

invited the Committee to meet at Kinshasa. He had listened with great interest to the address by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo setting forth his Government's position in the struggle against colonialism and stressing the irreversible character of national liberation movements. The Committee's present session was opening in the heart of Africa, in a country where racists and colonialists had done their utmost to perpetuate the colonial régime and where armed interventions had cost the lives of a great many patriots. Despite all those obstacles, however, the Congo had succeeded in gaining its independence. The Soviet people, celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, were gratified by the historic transformations of the old order that had taken place in Africa. The Africans' wish to put a permanent end to colonial régimes and to combat neo-colonialism had always had the support of the Soviet Union. The process of liquidating the colonial system in Africa had gone forward because of the struggle waged by the African peoples themselves, but the United Nations had played an important role in adopting, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, resolution 1514 (XV) setting forth the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That Declaration reflected the efforts of the greater part of mankind to put an end to the infamous manifestations of colonialism. Since the resolution's adoption in 1960, 50 million human beings had thrown off the colonial yoke and twenty independent States had been formed. The task was far from being completed, however, for bastions of colonialism still existed in Africa and the Near East.

81. The Committee's task was to contribute all it could to the final elimination of colonialism. That was the point of the present session away from Headquarters, for the Committee could meet at places not far from where the colonialists were pursuing their reactionary policies and could learn of the methods they were using. There was no doubt that the direct participation in the Committee's deliberations of the African peoples fighting for freedom would make it easier to find the means of implementing resolution 1514 (XV). The Committee must pursue that task until no single piece of land remained in the hands of the racists. The struggle against colonialism must be intensified, for the continued existence of a number of reactionary centres posed a direct threat to the young States that had recently won their freedom. The basic purpose of the present session must be to work out measures for rendering political, moral and any other forms of aid to the national liberation movements and for forcing the colonial Powers to implement the decisions of the United Nations. To that end the Committee must co-operate with the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League and all others seeking to assist the peoples striving for freedom. The first objective of the Committee's work should remain the emancipation from colonial oppression of the large colonial territories of Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Guinea (Bissau) in Africa, and Aden and Oman in the Arabian peninsula.

82. The focal point of racism at present was South Africa, where the colonial Powers and imperialist monopolies exerted their influence. Acts of ruthless repression were perpetrated there. The region had witnessed the creation of a bloc of white countries—the Republic of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rho-

desia—into which the South African Government had drawn South West Africa. The object of the bloc, acting in league with the colonial Powers and imperialist monopolies, was to preserve the domination of the racists and colonialists in the colonial territories and exert pressure on the young African States. The activities of the monopolies, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, constituted an obstacle to the liberation of the African continent. The Committee should study the significant role the monopolies played in the perpetuation of the colonial order. It should make recommendations on that subject to the General Assembly, in whose agenda for the twenty-second session it had been decided to include a separate item on the activities of international monopolies in colonies. It was for the Committee to determine who was responsible for the failure to implement the decisions of the United Nations. His delegation also hoped that the Committee would devote attention to the military activities of the colonial Powers and to the presence in some territories of military bases, which were a further obstacle to the liberation of the oppressed peoples. The colonial Powers continued to establish military bases for use against the national liberation movement and the new independent States. The South African racists made use of the bases in South West Africa to suppress the national liberation movement and exert pressure on neighbouring countries. Portugal used its bases in Angola and Mozambique not only locally but also against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It continued to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congolese people, to enjoy the support of its partners in South Africa and to receive economic and military aid from the members of NATO, especially the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. It also received assistance from the United Nations and particularly from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Committee should recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of decisions which would put an end to Portugal's colonialist activities.

83. In Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom was endeavouring to protect its own interests and to safeguard the position of the imperialist monopolies. The Committee should study the situation and find the means of solving the problem speedily.

84. The Soviet Union had always stressed the need for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to be given effect. It had always declared its support for the demands of the African peoples and for the elimination of racist régimes. It believed that the day was near when the last centres of colonialism would be destroyed. It was gratified that the Committee's proceedings were being conducted by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, who discharged the important duties of Chairman with great energy and ability.

85. The Soviet delegation was prepared to co-operate in making the present session a success. It would unite its efforts with those of other delegations in order that the problem of colonialism might be solved in accordance with the lofty principles of the Charter.

86. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their invitation to the Special Committee to meet at Kinshasa, which

was an expression of the deep-rooted tradition of hospitality of the African people. There existed strong fraternal bonds between the people of his country and those of the Congo, bonds which were being strengthened by the efforts to unite the peoples of Africa. By their unity and solidarity they would march ever more strongly forward to defeat the forces of reaction and the aggressive imperialist offensive and so achieve the complete liberation of the African continent. It was no secret that such forces feared the unity of the African people and the mammoth achievements of the liberated African countries.

87. The independence of the Congo had been won at the costly sacrifice of its heroic sons, the most eminent and beloved of whom had been Patrice Lumumba. The material and spiritual achievements of the Congolese people were evident, and his delegation was convinced that, under the leadership of their Government, they would achieve further and greater victories in developing their country.

88. He expressed his appreciation of the wise and precise observations made by President Mobutu in addressing the Special Committee and associated himself with the remarks made by the Chairman.

89. He agreed with the representative of Venezuela that it was indeed regrettable that the United Kingdom delegation had once again decided not to join the Special Committee at its meetings away from Headquarters, a fact that was the more regrettable since the Committee would be discussing very serious situations which were the direct result of the colonial policies of that Government. Its absence cast doubts on the sincerity of the many professions it had made of its wish to co-operate with the Committee.

90. Since the present meeting was the first in Africa, it would be useful to analyse briefly the existing situation with respect to decolonization but, in doing so, he did not wish to minimize or magnify the problems facing colonial countries and peoples. Decolonization had to be viewed from a position of principle, but emphasis might rightly be placed on a particular situation in view of the consequences that might arise if the situation was prolonged. In that connexion, the colonial problem, created by the aggressive designs of the imperialist Powers, was undoubtedly most urgent in Africa.

91. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which, on the occasion of its adoption in 1960, had been hailed by all peace-loving peoples as an important stage in the revolt of the human conscience against the enormities of colonialism and as a milestone in the history of the United Nations, was an unequivocal condemnation of the exploitation of man by man through the colonial system. It was a declaration by the progressive forces that they intended to fight colonialism to the bitter end, in order not only to achieve the independence of the colonized peoples but also to liberate man's energy and resources for the general progress of humanity. Colonialism, which involved the brutal suppression of human beings, was definitely not a peaceful system and the fight against it was an integral part of the fight for peace.

92. The continued existence of Portuguese colonialism in Africa—a most shameful page in the annals of human history—was the direct result of the material support given to fascist Portugal by its NATO allies, for it was obvious that Portugal, a poor, weak, primitive and demoralized country, could not wage its current

costly and barbaric campaign if it was not a tool of international imperialism and a convenient overseer of the exploitation by foreign capitalist monopolies of the abundant riches of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique. Studies by the United Nations and other institutions had revealed the barefaced exploitation of the Territories under Portuguese domination by capitalist monopolies originating in the Western countries. Thus, the mining revenue alone from Angola in 1966 had been estimated at more than 3,000 million escudos, the bulk of which had gone to monopolies such as the subsidiaries of the former Union minière and the Angola Diamond Company. The latter had made a clear profit of over 170 million escudos.

93. Such exploitation, in itself immoral and unjust, formed part of the stratagems used to suppress the people of Angola, and a study by the Special Committee had revealed that the colonialists had received major donations from those capitalist sources for what was cynically called "the defence of Angola".

94. The gallant people of Angola had for years attempted to obtain by peaceful means their national right to sovereignty and independence and the United Nations had passed countless resolutions reaffirming those rights, yet the Portuguese colonialists continued to use the most modern and sophisticated forms of warfare to suppress them. The so-called "defence" was thus aggression against the Angolan people. Information available to the United Nations showed that there were more than 400 airfields and landing strips in Angola, twenty-seven of which could accommodate the largest aircraft capable of operating within the Territory, and that the Portuguese were deploying against the patriots an estimated 700 fighter planes, many of modern design, together with such aircraft as the Lockheed Harpoon PV-2 bomber.

95. That situation was contrary to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other General Assembly resolutions and was also incompatible with the principles of the Charter. Moreover, the continued existence of Portuguese colonialism constituted a dangerous threat to the peace and stability of adjoining parts of Africa. The henchmen of Portuguese imperialism had launched countless aggressive campaigns against independent and sovereign countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

96. The patient African peoples had always considered that the problem of colonialism in general, and of Portuguese colonialism in particular, could be solved peacefully. It was for that reason that his country supported the principles of the Charter and the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Countless resolutions had been adopted by the United Nations calling upon Portugal and its Western allies to change their attitude and to restore to the African peoples their sovereign rights and liberties. Time and again the international forces of reaction and plunder had defied those resolutions. It was high time that Portugal and its allies took stock of their responsibilities. The United Republic of Tanzania, in its endeavour to ensure that the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV) were achieved with the minimum of further difficulties, was prepared to do everything within its power to enforce respect for United Nations resolutions and considered it the duty of every freedom-loving human being to join in the honourable struggle to achieve the liberation of the Territories under Portu-

guese domination. It thus called upon the Angolan patriots to redouble their efforts to liberate their motherland and associated itself with the Chairman's appeal to them to make every effort to unite in their fight.

97. The same vicious and aggressive system as existed in Angola had brought about the usurpation of the African people's rights by the racist white minority in Southern Rhodesia and was holding South West Africa prisoner in defiance of international opinion. The same system was causing bloodshed in South Arabia and riding roughshod over the peoples in other parts of the world.

98. The Special Committee was well aware of the many resolutions adopted by the Committee and the General Assembly with a view to achieving the full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). In these resolutions certain action had been called for on the part of the various United Nations agencies and organs. He requested the Secretariat to prepare and distribute a working paper showing the various requests that had been made together with the action, if any, that had been taken to comply with them. Particular attention should also be paid to the aid, of whatever nature, which might have been given to the national liberation movements and what criteria they were required to meet in order to qualify for such aid.

99. The representative of *Mali* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its kind invitation to the Special Committee. Mali appreciated the true worth of that act of statesmanship by a sister Republic occupying a strategic position in Africa and the world. History had ordained that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia should be islands of liberty and hope for millions of African nationalists waging a bitter and noble struggle against the colonialism and imperialism which oppressed that part of Africa.

100. By accepting that kind invitation, the Special Committee had wished to demonstrate its solidarity with the worthy sons of Africa who were bearing arms in the fight against the injustice of the colonial régimes. He recalled the sacrifice made six years previously by Patrice Lumumba, that great son of Africa, so that freedom and dignity might return to African soil. Patrice Lumumba had given his life so that Africa in general, and the Congo in particular, could again become free, so that the exploitation of man by man should for ever disappear from the continent and so that Africans could combine their energies, potential and genius to construct a better world, on a basis of respect for the right of peoples to self-determination recognized by the United Nations Charter.

101. The message left by Patrice Lumumba would guide the African people in their struggle for the final eradication of colonialism in all its forms. His delegation paid tribute to that great patriot and wished to assure its Congolese brothers of its support in their struggle for a better future. It was grateful to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who, by his presence, had lent added solemnity to the Special Committee's work. The wisdom of his statement would certainly assist the Committee in its search for practical solutions of the grave problem of colonialism, which, unhappily, still prevailed in Africa.

102. The Special Committee's meetings in Africa during the current year were being held in troubled

times. Imperialism had returned to the attack with increased ferocity and, to safeguard sordid interests, was making a mockery of the United Nations Charter and the noble principles it contained. The world was the powerless spectator of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States; the Viet-Nameese people were being prevented from solving their problems by themselves and tension had been created in the Middle East while, at the same time, the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations proclaimed respect for the integrity of independent territories and for the right of all peoples to self-determination.

103. The failure to observe that fundamental principle was causing tension and daily menaced international peace and security. In areas not yet liberated, particularly in southern Africa, the situation grew more serious each day and was becoming a racial conflict. In Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination, white settlers who had usurped power were withholding all rights from the Blacks, the true owners of Africa. The Western Powers, by aiding such people as Ian Smith, Salazar and Vorster, were hampering the Africans in their struggle for freedom and independence. Every day the NATO Powers, disregarding the United Nations Charter and the Special Committee's resolutions, were selling conventional and even nuclear weapons to the racist settlers, thereby enabling them to prolong their domination despite the condemnation of international opinion.

104. The debates on the question of South West Africa during the General Assembly's special session had shown that colonialism understood only one language, that of force. His delegation did not believe that the Africans and Arabs would be condemned for having taken arms to free their countries. It therefore paid tribute to the patriots of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Aden, Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere, who were fighting valiantly for independence and freedom. It had always upheld their just cause and would not fail to meet its obligations. It would give moral and material assistance to all nationalists fighting for freedom and independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was convinced that the Special Committee's work during the current year would once again be extremely successful since, despite the plots of the imperialists, the Africans were determined to regain their independence. Mali would denounce the activities of the colonialists who were shamefully exploiting the human and material riches of the Africans in the Territories not yet liberated, despite their obligation under the Charter to help such peoples and prepare them to manage their own affairs.

105. His delegation would make a detailed statement at a later stage on the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. Nevertheless, it wished to take the opportunity afforded it to appeal to all Angolan nationalists to unite and drive the Portuguese occupier into the sea. Their disagreements served the cause of Salazar to the detriment of Africa. The African peoples could not understand the fratricidal struggle between the *Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola* in exile and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*. It was time for them to unite, in order to speed the process of decolonization in the Territory of Angola. It was their duty to do so because, as President Mobutu had so rightly observed, there could be no peace for any African country as long as any por-

tion of African soil remained under the yoke of colonialism.

106. His delegation's references to the threat to international peace and security posed by colonialism were not abstract. It remembered the incursions by Portuguese mercenaries into Congolese territory, in violation of the United Nations Charter, and the numerous violent and provocative acts committed against the peaceful people of the United Republic of Tanzania by Salazar's hordes, who had not even spared the peace-loving Republic of Senegal. Mali had consistently condemned such barbarous actions and would continue to do so and to support its brethren in Senegal and the United Republic of Tanzania. If that situation continued it would inevitably lead to war, for which the Portuguese and their allies would bear the sole responsibility. Mali urged all the great Powers to suspend their aid to Portugal, which refused to respect the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly's resolutions.

107. Mali was confident of the outcome of the people's struggle for their right to self-determination and for the final eradication of colonialism. Colonialism was doomed. It would soon disappear if the signatories of the Charter at San Francisco and the other Member States of the United Nations were willing to respect the Charter and to implement fully the resolutions of the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. It was high time to implement resolution 1514 (XV) in order to spare the world the further upheavals which racial discrimination supported by international capitalism could not fail to provoke.

108. His delegation reserved the right to speak again on the problems to be considered by the Special Committee. It wished once again to express its gratitude to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the great interest it was taking in the Special Committee's work.

109. The representative of *Yugoslavia*, having expressed his thanks to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their kind invitation to meet at Kinshasa and for the heartfelt welcome they had extended to the Special Committee, said that the invitation bore further testimony to the readiness of the Democratic Republic to make the greatest possible contribution to the fight of those peoples of Africa who were still under brutal colonial domination. The Congolese people had suffered greatly in fighting for their freedom from colonialist and neo-colonialist forces but, as President Mobutu had stated in his impressive address, they were determined to help in the complete elimination of colonialism from African soil.

110. The colonialist and neo-colonialist forces, in their attempt to perpetuate their exploitation of the rich natural resources of the country, had resorted to the most brutal use of force and military intervention, and the Congolese people, in frustrating their plans, had made enormous sacrifices, particularly that of Patrice Lumumba, the great champion of the freedom of the Congo and of all Africa. He was confident that the ideals for which Patrice Lumumba had laid down his life would be attained and that all Africa would in the end be free of imperialistic threats, colonial subjugation and merciless exploitation, despite the use made by the racists and fascists of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa of their material superiority as a means of blackmail, pressure and interference.



111. His delegation was well aware that the fight of the African people for liberation, and the efforts of the Special Committee to assist them, would be no easy task. It fully realized that colonialist and neo-colonialist forces were doing everything in their power to halt decolonization and to retain and strengthen their strongholds in certain regions of Africa, especially those which they considered to be vital to their political, strategic and economic interests. It was obvious that the racist minority régimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and a backward and isolated country like Portugal, could not hold vast areas and peoples in their thrall, without material assistance from elsewhere. In the case of the Territories under Portuguese domination, for example, if the only opposition facing the international community had been that of Portugal, the peoples of those Territories would have attained their liberation years before. Owing, however, to the material, military and moral help which powerful NATO allies were rendering to Salazar, Portugal had been able to continue its domination of a considerable part of Africa. The meek denunciations of the fascist policy of Portugal and other racist régimes in southern Africa by some of Portugal's allies could not conceal the glaring truth.

112. The intensification of the activities of various international monopolies in the colonial Territories, which tended to consolidate the racist régimes of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, were seriously impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Portuguese armed forces, in their war against the fight for freedom of the peoples under its domination, were using weapons acquired through their membership in NATO, or under bilateral agreements concluded with some of their allies. Foreign military bases were being established or reinforced in the colonial Territories and constituted a fundamental obstacle to the liberation of the colonial peoples and an instrument of pressure on neighbouring States. Moreover, the moral support, which was manifested even in the United Nations, received by the racist régimes from their partners and the latter's refusal to put numerous United Nations resolutions into effect, made it possible for those régimes to continue their abhorrent policy. Colonial strongholds established on African soil not only served to perpetuate economic exploitation of the Territories for the benefit of colonial rulers but also enabled the colonialists to interfere directly in the affairs of independent countries and thus hamper their political and economic development. It was clear from the facts revealed to the Special Committee that colonial wars and repressive measures against the African populations were part of a larger plan devised by the reactionary forces to preserve their foreign, political and economic interests.

113. That policy of force and pressure was being applied not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world, the most extreme example being Viet-Nam. Dangerous activities by the reactionaries were also evident in the Middle East, where attempts were being made to impose feudal rule on Aden despite the determined fight by the great majority of its people for independence.

114. Yugoslavia had always supported the fully justified and legitimate fight for freedom of peoples under colonial domination. The international community and the United Nations had a special responsibility to help such peoples to exercise their rights and freely to de-

termine their own destiny. The world Organization bore that responsibility not only in view of its emphasis on the principles of self-determination and independence but also because it was only by discharging that responsibility that it could fully carry out its primary mission of safeguarding and consolidating world peace. The great majority of the world's people had come to realize that the vestiges of colonialism constituted the most immediate threat to international peace and security.

115. The Special Committee had for years been entrusted with a highly responsible assignment: the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and, although, in view of the obstacles placed in its path by colonial and neo-colonial forces, it had not accomplished spectacular results, it had made a substantial contribution by bringing to the notice of the international community the conditions in which the colonized peoples were living and the legitimacy of their fight for national liberation.

116. The current visit to Africa, which would enable his delegation to learn new facts about the colonialist plans and activities and the efforts of the peoples in their fight for freedom, would also enable the Special Committee to help the United Nations to accelerate the decolonization process and to render more practical assistance to the national liberation movements.

117. The United Kingdom's decision not to participate in the Committee's work in Africa was very disappointing.

118. The representative of *Bulgaria* associated himself with previous speakers in expressing gratitude to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people for the cordial welcome they had given the Special Committee. The invitation to meet at Kinshasa was a friendly gesture to the Special Committee and the United Nations which his delegation warmly appreciated and which showed how deeply the Congo was interested in the liberation of the African peoples still subject to colonialist oppression. Bulgaria was linked to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by strong bonds of friendship, which it hoped to strengthen further, and his delegation had noted with pleasure the progress achieved by the great countrymen of Patrice Lumumba.

119. The debate during the General Assembly's special session and developments during the current year showed that the struggle of oppressed peoples against colonialism had entered a decisive phase. The past year had been marked by further intensification of the armed struggle of the people of southern Africa, who had inflicted heavy losses on the racist and colonialist forces. The valiant patriots of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had already liberated considerable areas of their Territories, in which they were now organizing a free and democratic life for the people and laying the political, economic and social foundations for future independent States.

120. Another characteristic of the new phase upon which the struggle for national liberation in Africa had entered was the continually increasing solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces, particularly the African, Asian and socialist countries, which had redoubled their aid, both moral and material, to national liberation movements. The United Nations had also made a contribution by condemning the various manifestations of colonialism and racism in Africa, which it had described as crimes against humanity, and by appealing to all Mem-

ber States to give moral and material support to the peoples fighting against the colonial and racist régimes.

121. Unhappily, it was a fact that, despite the enthusiastic struggle for national liberation and despite the support which the overwhelming majority of countries had expressed for the national liberation movements, very large areas were still under the colonial yoke, although over seven years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That was a disturbing fact. It showed that the efforts of the anti-imperialist forces and the colonizing activities of the United Nations must be intensified and that the Special Committee and the General Assembly must find new ways to give their decisions greater effect. They must get to the heart of the problem. They must establish the reason for the lack of decisive success in the oppressed peoples' struggle for their liberation.

122. The debates in the General Assembly had again shown the harmful results of the political, economic and military co-operation of the great Western Powers, particularly the United States, with the colonialist and racist régimes in Africa. It was quite clear that without the assistance of its NATO allies a backward country like Portugal would not have been able to withstand the pressure of the national liberation movement in Africa. The Special Committee's reports and the statements by petitioners amounted to a veritable indictment of Western monopolies and high financiers, whose malignant activities were manifest in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa. All the expressions of sympathy which the United States and other Western Powers might make were rendered hollow by the facts. The time had come to tell the Governments of the Western Powers and the NATO countries that their assistance to the colonial and racist régimes and their participation in the exploitation of an enslaved Africa made them accomplices to the crimes committed daily by the régimes of Salazar, Ian Smith and Vorster. Unless it was ended, their co-operation with Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would cause untold suffering and thousands of victims. It would aggravate racial hatred in Africa and that could not fail to have disastrous consequences. In resolution 2189 (XXI) on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the General Assembly had once again requested the Governments of Member States to end their co-operation with the colonial Powers. That appeal had fallen on deaf ears and the debates of the Fourth Committee and the appeal to IBRD and other specialized agencies had had no greater success. It was distressing to note that even some international organizations and agencies within the United Nations system continued to co-operate with the colonial and racist régimes. The International Telecommunication Union had officially circulated the letter from the South African Government in which it had stated that it was acceding on behalf of South West Africa to the International Telecommunication Convention. The Soviet Union had rightly drawn the attention of Member States to that fact, which was incompatible with the General Assembly's decisions, in the letter which it had sent to the Secretary-General on 26 April 1967.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, that was no isolated case. The General Assembly and the Fourth Committee must examine the problem and issue clear and unambiguous

guidelines and recommendations for the specialized agencies.

123. The Special Committee should take account of the fact that, as the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national liberation and independence intensified, there was a stubborn reaction in colonialist and neo-colonialist circles. There was fierce opposition to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Nevertheless, the anti-imperialist forces were immense and capable of carrying the last bastions of imperialism. The time had come to impress upon the reactionary forces, once and for all, that the era of colonialism had passed; the time had come to mobilize all forces, including those of the United Nations, to help the oppressed peoples break the last chains of imperialism. The Committee must play its part in the achievement of those ends and, in so doing, could count on his delegation's unre-served support.

124. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed his sincere thanks and appreciation for the wise words addressed to the members of the Special Committee by President Mobutu, who had emphasized that the Committee could not wash its hands of the matter when people were deprived of their rights, both as human beings and as citizens, of their liberty and their dignity, but must persist in its efforts to aid all peoples to obtain majority government. His delegation, Government and people entirely supported those principles and objectives and the achievement of fully representative government for all men.

125. He recalled the powerful and consistent support provided by his country, both bilaterally and through the United Nations, to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic and re-emphasized the great importance which his Government and people attached to continuing their close and friendly relations with that country. The recent visit by the Under-Secretary of State and Mrs. Katzenbach reflected their deep interest in furthering those good relations.

126. The progress achieved under the leadership of President Mobutu had laid the foundations for the more complete realization of the Congo's great human and material potential.

127. Despite overriding internal problems since its independence, the Democratic Republic had nevertheless had the generosity to share its heavily taxed resources with more than 250,000 refugees from neighbouring Angola. He was proud to say that the United States was continuing to supply large quantities of food and medicines to relieve the hardships of those refugees.

128. His delegation was grateful for the generous hospitality provided by the Democratic Republic for the current meetings at Kinshasa.

129. He intended to deal factually at a later and appropriate stage with the numerous misrepresentations and innuendoes that had been made against his country by several delegates in their replies to the President's address.

130. The representative of *Poland* associated himself with the appreciation expressed by other delegations to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He had been deeply touched by the hospitality and cordiality shown. His delegation felt particularly honoured to attend meetings in the country of the great Congolese patriot and son of Africa, Patrice Lumumba.

<sup>3</sup> Document A/5648 (mimeographed).

131. He had listened with great interest and attention to the important address by President Mobutu which would greatly assist the Special Committee in its deliberations.

132. The Special Committee's decision to meet in Africa and the Near East, where extremely difficult colonial problems still persisted, reflected the growing concern of the United Nations for those Territories and its determination to ensure that their peoples gained their freedom and independence under the best possible conditions. The Committee had come to Africa to make an on-the-spot examination of the situation, to acquaint itself with the problems of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa and to continue its search for ways and means of implementing the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Nevertheless, whatever part the United Nations had played and still had to play in the process of decolonization, it would be misleading to think that it was the deciding factor in the achievement of national objectives; their fulfilment depended essentially on the determination of the colonized peoples to free themselves from foreign domination.

133. Although considerable progress in decolonization had been made during the preceding decade, the dangers inherent in the continued existence of colonial régimes had by no means decreased. That was particularly true in southern Africa, where the colonial Powers were stubbornly refusing to comply with the recommendations of the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. It was that stubborn opposition to decolonization which constituted the common denominator of all the items on the Committee's agenda. The problems it was called upon to discuss were closely interrelated and connected with the policy of *apartheid*, since Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa were not merely colonies of Portugal or the United Kingdom but virtually economic colonies of the Republic of South Africa. The United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western Powers were together exploiting the natural resources and cheap labour of the richest part of Africa. The racial discrimination, aggression and direct military action of Salazar, Vorster and Smith were possible only because of the assistance given to them by leading NATO countries. It was clear that the colonial Powers were determined to preserve white domination in southern Africa and to further the interests of the monopolies and international financial groupings in the whole region. On the basis of studies made by the Special Committee, the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, had condemned those foreign financial and economic combines in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination for supporting colonial régimes and for seriously obstructing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The General Assembly had, in addition, called upon the Governments concerned to take steps to end such activities.

134. Despite the sincere efforts of the international community, the situation with regard to the implementation of the various recommendations was far from satisfactory and had, if anything, deteriorated. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, for example, the so-called selective sanctions had proved ineffective and the minority régime was continuing its illegal existence. The colonial wars waged by Portugal against the national

liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were gaining momentum and the military build-up in South Africa and the Portuguese-occupied Territories was continuing. Similar imperialist aggression was also manifest in other parts of the world, particularly Viet-Nam.

135. The many resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies calling upon the administering Powers to release political prisoners, to end states of emergency, to dismantle military bases and to grant freedom to colonial Territories in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world had so far been ignored. That situation was of grave concern to the Special Committee, and the current series of meetings offered a further opportunity of bringing the colonial Powers and their supporters, including some United Nations specialized agencies, to book. It was to be hoped that the Special Committee's presence in Africa would encourage the freedom fighters of Angola and other Territories, which were still enduring humiliation and exploitation under oppressive colonial régimes, and would assure them of the legitimacy of their fight, which was supported by all progressive mankind.

136. The Government and the people of Poland, by virtue of their historic traditions and the very nature of the socialist structure of the country, were opposed to national and racial oppression and stood for the immediate and full implementation of the anti-colonialist Declaration and the exercise in the shortest possible time of the legitimate rights of the colonial peoples to freedom, self-determination and independence. They considered the fight for freedom and independence to be also one for peace since, as long as colonialism existed, there could be no lasting peace in the world. In view of its principles, therefore, the Polish Government had always supported national liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere and had strictly abided by all the decisions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to Portuguese colonial policy, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in South Africa and those relating to the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. As in the past, his delegation would continue to co-operate to the best of its ability and would support any effective measures designed to eliminate colonialism in all its manifestations and forms.

137. The representative of *Chile* thanked President Mobutu for his address and associated himself with the thanks expressed by the Chairman to the Congolese Government and people for the hospitality they had so generously extended.

138. Chile had great admiration and affection for the Congolese nation and was well aware of the extraordinary efforts made by its Government to achieve national reconstruction and economic and social development. The Democratic Republic was a giant by reason of its geographical situation, its vast natural wealth and, above all, its people. It was clearly destined to occupy a prominent place, not only in Africa, but also among the nations of the world. Like the Democratic Republic, Chile possessed considerable copper resources and wished to make use of them for the welfare of its people. His Government had taken important steps in that direction, on the national level, by "Chileanizing" the mines and, on the international level, by concerting marketing arrangements with the other copper-producing countries of Africa and Latin America. A meeting of representatives of those countries was shortly to take place at Lusaka for the purpose of framing a joint

policy which would enable them to obtain a just reward from their mining activities.

139. It was appropriate that the Special Committee should begin its work in the Congo since that country bordered upon the largest remaining colonial Territory. Members would have the valuable opportunity of hearing the Angolan political leaders who were fighting for their country's freedom and had already had the unforgettable experience of visiting the administrative offices, dispensaries and schools which they had so painstakingly established to aid the mass of Angolan refugees. He hoped that the Committee's presence at Kinshasa would enable it to collect and reveal to the world information which would help in the fight for Angolan independence and that it would encourage unity among the Angolan patriots.

140. Although decolonization had made great headway in the preceding fifteen years and many proud nations had emerged in Africa, a number of which were the modern representatives of old African empires that had reached a high degree of civilization, the future, though full of promise, was not without its difficulties. Nevertheless, the emergence of a free Africa was the political event of the century, although some Territories were still subjected to the hateful colonial régime, and they were precisely the most difficult cases—the ones in which foreign Powers showed the greatest obstinacy and cruelty in opposing the freedom movements. Those Powers endangered the rise of a free Africa and the harmful effects extended throughout the world since respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace were indivisible.

141. The peoples of Latin America fully supported Africa in its fight to end colonialism. They too had been colonized and rather more than 150 years before had had to sacrifice many thousands of lives to wrest their independence. In modern times, with the existence of the United Nations and the possibility of arousing the world's conscience, it might be possible to help decisively by peaceful means to liberate those peoples which were still under the colonial yoke. Although the United Nations was necessarily imperfect in that respect and could not be a substitute for the efforts of the subject peoples themselves, its activities could be important. The States of Latin America were co-operating with the African and Asian countries in their campaign within the United Nations to end colonialism. Only a week before, they had unreservedly supported a resolution on South West Africa. His delegation welcomed the unity of the third world in the common search for solutions of major economic and social problems, particularly with regard to colonialism and respect for human rights and dignity.

142. The representative of *Italy* associated himself with the speakers who had expressed their gratitude to the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the generous and cordial hospitality which they had shown to the Special Committee. The meetings to be held at Kinshasa would be doubly effective: the Congolese people would be able to follow the Committee's work closely while the Committee would benefit from the attention and whole-hearted support of Congolese public opinion in discussing problems which affected the Congo directly, concerning as they did the liberty and independence of all African peoples. The geographical and political position of the Congo was, in itself, a guarantee of the success of the Committee's work. His delegation was pleased to renew its assurances that it would co-operate to the utmost

with the Committee so that its work during the current session could hasten the achievement of the objectives set forth in the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Italy had long had extremely cordial relations with the Congo, which were increasingly strengthened by economic, cultural and commercial ties.

143. The representative of *Finland* thanked President Mobutu for his kind words of welcome and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its generous invitation to the Special Committee and its hospitality.

144. Although Finland was very distant, it took great interest in the future of Africa and shared the deep concern of the United Nations about the problems of colonialism that still remained. He was sure that the Committee's meetings in Africa would make it easier to understand the problems involved and to help peoples still under colonial administration in their struggle for self-determination and independence.

145. The representative of *Australia*, speaking on behalf of his Government, expressed his appreciation of the honour done to the Special Committee by President Mobutu in addressing its opening meeting.

146. He was grateful for the hospitality offered by the Government of the Democratic Republic and for the excellent facilities placed at the Special Committee's disposal.

147. He hoped that the Special Committee's visit to Africa would contribute to his country's understanding and awareness of African problems, aspirations and achievements.

148. The spirit of co-operation shown by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would, he was sure, enable the Special Committee to approach its important work in a thoughtful and constructive manner.

149. The representative of *Syria* said he welcomed the fact that, for the fourth time since its creation, the Special Committee was holding its meetings away from Headquarters on African soil. His delegation was convinced of the value of the joint endeavour to examine the colonial problems before the Committee from close to.

150. His delegation had particularly appreciated the extremely fraternal welcome extended to the Special Committee by the people and Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such generous hospitality was not surprising in a country which had been one of the battlefields in the fight against foreign domination and whose soil had been drenched in the blood of its sons to safeguard the independence won through very heavy sacrifices.

151. His delegation had been able to visit the Angolan refugee camps of the Angolan Republic in exile. The misery and suffering of those fraternal African people, driven from their homeland by the forces of colonial oppression, reminded him of the plight of other refugees, dear to him, who had also been driven from their homes and their country, Arab Palestine, by hands of foreign Zionists who had come from all parts of the world to settle in the country by violence, with the assistance and complicity of certain colonial Powers, the inalienable rights of a whole people being held in contempt.

152. The General Assembly had been considering the question of the Territories under Portuguese domi-

nation for more than ten years already and had unfortunately failed to reach a satisfactory solution. The people of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese administration remained in thrall to the Portuguese colonizer. Under his yoke for centuries, they had known every indignity, racial discrimination, forced labour, ignorance and the denial of civil and political rights.

153. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee itself had vainly adopted numerous resolutions reminding Portugal of its obligations under the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and urging it to abandon its anachronistic policies in those Territories and to grant their peoples their inalienable right to independence and freedom. The Portuguese colonizers scorned those resolutions and continued to exploit the natural riches of the colonized Territories, sharing the profits with their foreign accomplices. They continued to use the assistance and weapons provided by their NATO allies to suppress the population of the Territories and even went so far as to send workers from them to South Africa, replacing them by foreign immigrants.

154. The Special Committee had already drawn the Security Council's attention to the serious threat to world peace and security arising from those activities and had asked it to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to ensure that Portugal respected the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. He reminded the Committee of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, in which the General Assembly urged Member States to take measures against Portugal, separately or collectively, from breaking off diplomatic relations to boycotting all trade. He reminded it also that, after taking note of the chapter of the Special Committee's report dealing with the Territories under Portuguese administration, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, recommending the Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in resolution 2107 (XX).

155. Unhappily, those resolutions had had no tangible result. Portugal continued to ignore the existence of resolution 1514 (XV) and was encouraged in that attitude by its NATO allies and by groups of foreign financiers whose interests were carefully protected, while some of their profits went to increase Portugal's stock of arms.

156. All possible moral pressure and persuasion had been brought to bear in vain. Was it not time to use more effective means in order to force the obstinate colonizer to renounce such anachronistic practices?

157. The Republic of Syria, in keeping with its traditional policy, expressed its complete solidarity with the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese domination. His delegation was prepared to support any radical, or even coercive, measure which the Special Committee might recommend in order to bring the Salazar régime to grant freedom and independence to the colonial peoples and countries which it held in subjection.

158. The representative of *Tunisia* expressed his deep gratitude to the Congolese Government and people for their kind invitation to the Special Committee to meet at Kinshasa and for the outstanding welcome

which they had extended to it. The important statement by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be a good guide for the Committee in its work.

159. All delegations were aware of the determination of the Congolese Government and people to work for the liberation of peoples still under colonial domination. They knew that they were actively supporting the patriots fighting to free themselves from the Portuguese yoke and that they received Angolan refugees as brothers, despite the reprisals and frontier incidents which that entailed. The situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was similar to that of Tunisia at the time of the Algerian liberation. His delegation therefore realized the difficulties confronting that country and appreciated the true value of the efforts and sacrifices which the Congolese people had taken upon themselves.

160. As a result of the Congolese Government's invitation to meet in the great African capital of Kinshasa, the Special Committee would be able to hear petitioners and to form an exact idea of the situation.

161. The discipline and determination of the Angolan patriots had made a deep impression on the Special Committee when it had visited the *Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil*. Sooner or later, their enthusiasm would overcome the Salazar régime.

162. Many African peoples were, unhappily, still under the yoke. Horrible atrocities were committed daily by the colonialists, who stubbornly maintained their domination, disregarding international public opinion and human rights.

163. The Special Committee had the heavy responsibility of finding solutions which would meet the aspirations of the peoples still under colonial rule. His delegation would co-operate in its work to the utmost in order to ensure respect for the principles of the Charter and the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

164. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* joined previous speakers in expressing his deep gratitude to the President and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the cordial and fraternal welcome which they had extended to the Special Committee.

165. At the present stage in the Special Committee's work, his delegation was not in a position to make a general statement on the problems with which the Committee was concerned. He reserved the right to express his delegation's views on certain agenda items at a later stage.

166. His delegation attached considerable importance to the problems of decolonization, as did all the other delegations present, and it very much hoped that other countries would follow the Congo's example, so that the United Nations, and more particularly the Special Committee, could better discharge their difficult tasks. His delegation hoped that the Committee's work would be an effective contribution to the complete liberation of the peoples still under foreign domination.

167. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation was particularly pleased to have an opportunity of seeing for itself the achievements of the newly independent African countries, of which the Democratic Republic was one of the foremost. He was grateful to the Congolese Government for its hospitality, and to President Mobutu for his address.



168. It was particularly significant that the Special Committee's work should have begun with a visit to the camps of the Angolan refugees. The courage, determination and patience of those refugees would inspire the Committee to help them in their plight and their fight for freedom. The United Nations had a sacred duty to help refugees from countries with illegally established Governments, such as Angola, Palestine and South Africa. The United Nations and the specialized agencies should do more to assist refugees in the attainment of the rights recognized by the international community.

169. Iraq had always supported the African countries in their fight for liberation, for it too had suffered from colonialism, racial discrimination and foreign exploitation. His delegation had co-sponsored scores of resolutions concerning African and Asian countries, the latest of which dealt with South West Africa. It would continue to support the fight of the people of Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and other Portuguese colonies, French Somalia, Aden, Oman and Palestine.

170. His delegation very much regretted the enforced absence of the delegations of Afghanistan and Uruguay, and the continued absence of the delegation of the United Kingdom.

171. The representative of *Madagascar* associated himself with the tributes paid by earlier speakers to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people.

172. His delegation was gratified that the Special Committee's first meetings were being held in one of the greatest countries in Africa and had listened to the important and wise speech by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with great satisfaction.

173. Madagascar's position on colonial problems was well known, both in the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity, and it was therefore unnecessary to explain it afresh. His delegation would have the opportunity of giving a detailed explanation of its views on the questions to which it attached importance at subsequent meetings of the Committee. It was convinced that the Committee's work at Kinshasa would be most fruitful and was ready to co-operate whole-heartedly with all delegations present in the search for ways and means to enable peoples and countries which were still under colonial rule to exercise, at an early date, their right to freedom, self-determination and independence.

#### CLOSING OF MEETINGS

##### *Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*

174. *The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* thanked the Special Committee, on behalf of the President of the Republic, Lieutenant-General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, the Congolese people, its Government and himself, for having accepted the Congolese Government's invitation to meet at Kinshasa. Now that the session at Kinshasa was coming to an end, it was time to pay a tribute to all the participants, who had spared no effort to make it a success. The cordial atmosphere which had reigned during the Committee's debates, the frankness with which the Committee had conducted its discussion, and the solicitude with which it had tackled the various problems

before it all proved its determination to find speedy and satisfactory solutions to the problems of decolonization.

175. In its exchanges of views with the petitioners, the Special Committee had evoked the thorny problems raised by the liberation of Angola, Cabinda and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The frank dialogue between the members of the Committee and the representatives of the liberation movements had contributed significantly to the definition of many questions raised by the struggle for national liberation and had also enabled the members of the Committee to realize how much work remained to be done. The Committee's visit to the Angolan refugees had amply brought out the fact that colonialism was still a reality, despite the irreversible current of decolonization and progress which characterized the twentieth century.

176. On the present occasion it would be appropriate to address a solemn appeal to the great Powers which, directly or indirectly, by their passivity, encouraged the countries which were perpetuating colonialism. They should be invited to help implement the relevant United Nations resolutions and persuade the countries which were lagging behind to accept the decolonization process. It was useless to extol the principles of freedom and democracy, while tolerating a situation in which much of the world remained subject to the colonial yoke.

177. On the eve of the Special Committee's departure to continue its mission, he wished to state that the Congo would never shirk its responsibility to aid Africa. He reaffirmed that his Government would aid Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other African countries which had not yet been liberated. He also wished to reiterate the heartfelt appeal which the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Committee had made at the opening of the session at Kinshasa to all African combatants to work together in a united movement in order to speed the liberation of the whole continent.

178. The Congolese Government had been particularly touched by the kind words addressed to it by the members of the Special Committee, and wished to avail itself of the opportunity to reaffirm its faith in the work of the United Nations.

179. He congratulated the Special Committee warmly on the work it had done at Kinshasa and expressed his conviction that its recommendations to the General Assembly would advance the cause of the liberation of the Territories which had not yet gained their independence. He wished the Committee every success in the continuation of its mission.

#### *General statements*

180. *The Chairman* thanked the Foreign Minister for his encouraging address which clearly reflected the active support of the Congolese Government in the fight to liberate colonial countries, its dedication to the aims of the Charter and its complete solidarity with the Special Committee's objectives and efforts. The Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa had, thanks to the lavish hospitality, co-operation and goodwill of the Government and people of the Democratic Republic, taken place in an atmosphere which left nothing to be desired and none of the technical prerequisites for successful meetings had been lacking.

181. He expressed the Special Committee's deep gratitude to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic and assured them that the

impetus which the Congolese Government had given the Committee would be an important source of sustenance during the remainder of its journey.

182. The members had been very happy to visit Kinshasa, not only because of the opportunity thus provided to strengthen contacts and friendships with the warm, vital and dynamic Congolese people, but also because the visit had enabled them to sense at first hand the attachment of that people to the cause of liberty, its concern to eliminate all vestiges of colonialism from its system and its progress in consolidating its independence.

183. While at Kinshasa, the Special Committee had heard eleven groups of petitioners concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination and had been horrified by the additional and incontrovertible evidence provided concerning the atrocities and acts of genocide being carried out by the Portuguese colonialists against people whose only demand was to exercise the right of self-determination. Further evidence had been received of the continued assistance, both material and moral, which certain of the friends and allies of Portugal, together with foreign and other economic interests, were giving to the Salazar régime in the pursuit of its brutal colonial policies. There had, nevertheless, been encouragement in the news of the unrelenting struggle being waged with increasing intensity by the national liberation movements seeking to free themselves from the yoke of the oppressors.

184. The Special Committee had also noted the commendable efforts being made by those movements to advance the social and material welfare of the Angolan people in the liberated areas and of the Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic. It had been directly informed of the difficulties and needs of the national liberation movements: their difficulties in assisting the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Angola, and their urgent need for assistance from the High Commissioner for Refugees and from the specialized agencies, particularly in education and health.

185. The Special Committee had thus acquired a greater understanding of the sufferings and legitimate wishes of the people of Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda, a fact which constituted yet another justification of the Committee's decision to hold a series of meetings at Kinshasa, since the information received would not have been available had that decision not facilitated the appearance of petitioners before it. It would be a disservice to the cause of decolonization if leaders of national liberation movements were always expected to relinquish their posts to appear before the Committee in New York. The Committee fully supported their fight, which was as just as it was urgent, and would redouble its efforts to hasten the independence of Angola.

186. The Special Committee had been unanimous in calling for the intensification of aid to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, through that organization, with the national liberation movements in those Territories. He reminded the petitioners that the Committee's action would not be limited to that consensus. After it had heard the other petitioners, who would appear before it at the other capitals to be visited, the Committee would proceed to the adoption of conclusions and recommendations concerning all aspects of decolonization,

taking full account of the valuable testimony furnished to it at Kinshasa.

187. He reiterated his plea for unity among the liberation movements—unity of thought, purpose and action—since only through such unity could colonialism be eliminated and freedom and independence achieved for the people of Angola.

188. He requested the Foreign Minister to convey to the President of the Democratic Republic, to his Government and to his dynamic people the gratitude of the Special Committee for the hospitality and friendliness with which it had been received.

189. The representative of *Ethiopia* associated himself most heartily with the Chairman's remarks. He had the honour to speak on behalf of the African and Asian countries and Yugoslavia in thanking the Foreign Minister not only for his inspiring address but also for the great hospitality the Special Committee had received from the Government and people of the Democratic Republic. That was not, however, unexpected, since such hospitality was an integral part of the best African tradition.

190. He assured Mr. Bomboko of the continually increasing interest of the delegations, for which he was speaking, in the development of the Democratic Republic and their sympathetic admiration and full support for the work of its people in the cause of national reconstruction. He also thanked them for the strong moral and material support they have given to the Angolan patriots. By inviting the Special Committee to Kinshasa, the Congolese Government had clearly demonstrated the great importance it attached to decolonization in general and to African freedom in particular. Despite the activities of Salazar, Vorster, Smith and their like, the flame of freedom would continue to burn bright and, though the pace might be slow, decolonization would continue on its inexorable march until all Africa—and, indeed, the whole world—had won the basic human right of self-determination.

191. He thanked the Government of the Democratic Republic for the facilities it had extended to the petitioners in enabling them to appear before the Special Committee and to supply it with so much valuable evidence. He conveyed the fraternal greetings of the delegations for which he spoke to the Congolese people and its President and wished them every success.

192. The representative of *Australia* said that he was speaking for the representatives of Finland, Italy and the United States in addition to his own delegation. He expressed his thanks for the excellent facilities and great hospitality with which the Special Committee had been received. Meetings had been expedited in a most effective manner and, although his anticipations on coming to the Democratic Republic had been high, they had been more than completely fulfilled.

193. He offered the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic his most sincere wishes for their continued prosperity and happiness and assured them that the Special Committee was leaving their country with great regret and with many pleasant memories.

194. The representative of *Venezuela* said that, on behalf of the Chilean delegation and his own, he wished to congratulate the Foreign Minister on his inspiring statement and to thank him and the Congolese Government for the warmth of their welcome and the facilities

and hospitality they had provided. The reception given to the Special Committee was yet another sign of the devotion of the Congolese people to the cause of decolonization. The Government was also to be congratulated on the progress that the Democratic Republic had achieved and on its dedication to the cause of liberty which made countries great.

195. The Special Committee's presence at Kinshasa had enabled it to meet many important petitioners and obtain much valuable information which might not otherwise have been available. Its report would be much richer as a result of its stay in the Democratic Republic. That happy result could not have been achieved without the help and co-operation of the Congolese Government and people and the facilities they had so generously provided.

196. The representative of *Poland* said he was speaking on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as his own. He expressed his gratitude to the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic for their generous hospitality and the facilities they had so kindly provided to assist the Special Committee in its work. The impressive statement by the Foreign Minister was further evidence of the determination of the Congolese people to assist the United Nations in the important work of decolonization.

197. It had been useful and, indeed, indispensable for the Special Committee to hold a series of meetings at Kinshasa, close to the battle-front, since members had thus been able to listen to spokesmen for the national liberation movements and to obtain further evidence of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese in their savage war against the Angolan people. There was no longer a shadow of doubt that the régimes in control of Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were engaged in a conspiracy to maintain white domination in southern Africa. The evidence which the Committee had heard at Kinshasa had enabled it to gain a closer insight into the situation and learn more concerning the needs of the national liberation movements.

198. He conveyed fraternal greetings to the patriots of Angola and assured them that they had the full support of the socialist countries in their fight for freedom. He associated himself with the Chairman's appeal for unity in the Angolan patriotic movement which would, undoubtedly, greatly assist it to attain its cherished goal.

199. The information obtained by the Special Committee at Kinshasa had been very valuable and would prove extremely useful in drawing up the report.

200. In conclusion, he wished the President, Government and people of the Democratic Republic every success in their endeavours to build up a happy and prosperous future for their nation.

201. The representative of *Iraq* thanked the Government of the Democratic Republic for its prompt response to his appeal that permission should be granted to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola to produce captured weapons manufactured in Israel and elsewhere for the enlightenment of the Special Committee. That rapid action was typical of the helpful attitude adopted by the Congolese Government throughout the Committee's stay at Kinshasa and had enabled the Committee to identify the source of the arms that had been used to kill scores of Angolan freedom fighters.

## B. MEETINGS HELD AT KITWE, ZAMBIA

### OPENING OF MEETINGS

#### *Address by the President of the Republic of Zambia*

202. The *President of the Republic of Zambia*, speaking on behalf of the Government and people of Zambia, welcomed the Special Committee to his country, which was greatly honoured to have the opportunity once again of acting as host to the Committee. This was the second very historic meeting held at Kitwe during the first half of 1967. In January he had addressed about 800 delegates attending the Zambia National Convention "Achievement 1967"—a convention of party and government officials, teachers, industrialists, miners, financiers and people from all walks of life, who had met to exchange views on various aspects of Zambian development plans and problems. He regarded the meetings of the Special Committee as a continuation of "Achievement 1967" from a different angle. The Committee had the blessing not only of the city of Kitwe but of the whole country.

203. As the Inter-governmental Copper Conference was being held at Lusaka it had been decided that the meetings of the Special Committee should be held at Kitwe. That gave members an opportunity of seeing another side of Zambian life, namely the Copperbelt. The memories of the Committee's last visit to Zambia were still fresh in his mind. At that time Zambia had been only eight months old as an independent nation, born out of a difficult fight for independence. Without help from the freedom-loving sons and daughters of Africa and from Africa's friends abroad, Zambia's fight for independence would have been much more difficult. In that respect he did not forget the support which the Committee had given to the people of Zambia in the darkest hour of its fight for liberty and justice.

204. The members of the Special Committee had been in his country for only a few hours, but he was sure they already had the feeling of the kind of life the people of Zambia were leading: the economic and social effects of the colonial and racial problems that plagued southern Africa. It was perhaps only fitting that the Committee should breathe such an atmosphere and get to know the problems it had set out to solve at grass-root level.

205. Five years ago, when he had appeared before the Special Committee in New York, the plight of the Zambian people had been so unbearable that it had made him weep at the sad realization that man, for no other reason than colour, should be the greatest enemy of man, and due to his selfishness and parochialism, should be the greatest single cause of unhappiness for all mankind. That state of affairs still continued east, south and west of Zambia.

206. Zambia was passing through the most critical period of its history. Since the Special Committee's last visit to Zambia, the white racialists in Southern Rhodesia had seized power from an apparently feeble and decidedly hesitant British Government. With the unilateral declaration of independence had come not only increased oppression of the majority of the people in Southern Rhodesia, but also immense economic difficulties for the young Republic of Zambia. Its transport and communication systems had suddenly had to be re-oriented, costing millions of pounds in contingency measures and a great deal of inconvenience in that supplies of essential goods had not come in such quantities as formerly. What greater sacrifice could a young Member of the United Nations like Zambia make?

207. But thanks to God's blessings, to the kind help it had received from brothers and sympathizers, and thanks to the resoluteness of the people themselves, Zambia was still holding its own. It would continue in its efforts for peace, justice and happiness for all human beings, not only in southern Africa but in the world as a whole. The fight of the majority for democratic rights was a human one in which all men of goodwill the world over must be actively, and not just passively, interested.

208. If the Zambian people deplored the situation in which it found itself it was because the creators of the problems facing it—problems to which the Special Committee's mission was designed to find answers—were doing little to undo what they had done. But the Zambian people knew that its cause was noble and just and that right was on its side. The very presence of the Committee at Kitwe was an indication of mankind's determination to see that justice and freedom were brought to the oppressed millions the world over.

209. So far, he had spoken only in very general terms about the southern African political complex and the way Zambians had been battling with that problem. He would now turn, in equally general terms, to the various trouble spots that concerned the work of the Special Committee.

210. The question of Rhodesia had, of course, been exercising the minds of Committee members, who had doubtlessly been following the turns and twists of developments in that matter. He regretted to say that the international community seemed to be treading along a blind alley in its quest for a solution to the Rhodesian question.

211. Since the passage at the United Nations of the resolution on selective mandatory sanctions, there had been no sign of the rebel economy running down as a result and no indication that the objective of the resolution would be achieved. If anything, the Rhodesian economy was holding its own. Zambians were not at all surprised that that was so because, ever since the beginning of the Rhodesian crisis, they had held the view—and had repeatedly warned the United Kingdom Government—that sanctions would never bite deep enough to bring down the rebellion. How, indeed, could sanctions work when Southern Rhodesia's economy was secretly and openly supported by South Africa and Portugal through deliberate leakages in the sanctions wall, and when the United Kingdom Government was not prepared to seal off those leakages? Recent events had proved beyond all doubt how easily the rebel régime at Salisbury could defeat any sanctions which fell short of comprehensive mandatory sanctions backed by force. Rhodesia was selling its tobacco under iniquitously secret conditions; and brokers in South Africa, Portugal and other European countries were re-exporting many Rhodesian products to various countries under the guise of South African, Portuguese or European exports. Only a few weeks before, thanks to the vigilance of Zambian customs officials, the Zambian authorities had seized 1,000 tons of Rhodesian raw sugar which was being imported into Zambia by such devious means.

212. It should be clear to everybody that the United Kingdom Government's Rhodesian policy, to which some Members of the United Nations had, well-meaningly, but regrettably, lent their support, was not only a dismal failure but a disgrace to freedom-lovers. The most urgent question which the Special Committee and its parent body as a whole should now ask themselves

was: after the failure of selective mandatory sanctions, what next?

213. The people of Zambia had never found an alternative to the use of force. They had been accused of being unrealistic and unduly pessimistic on account of their consistent stand that only force could solve the Rhodesian question. But if being realistic meant compromising moral principles for "kith-and-kin" sentiments, and if being optimistic meant making ill-conceived pronouncements that the situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence would be over in a matter of weeks as a result of inadequate and piecemeal voluntary sanctions, then the Zambian people would have nothing to do with such "realism" or "optimism".

214. The United Kingdom Government had tried persuasion, threats to use effective measures and voluntary sanctions. The problem had not been solved. Neither "realism" nor "optimism" had restored the rights of the 4 million human beings in rebel Rhodesia. In the meantime, United Kingdom troops were continually in action killing Arabs in Aden. Were the human beings in Aden different from the rebellious Whites in Rhodesia?

215. As the United Nations procrastinated, the rebels in Rhodesia were losing no time in tightening their grip on their unhappy country. It should be common knowledge to all members of the Special Committee that the rebels were now heading for a watertight *apartheid* State. A legislative move was under way in the rebel parliament that would soon empower them to do that. He strongly repudiated the unfounded allegations by the rightist supporters of Smith and his gang, that Zambia was bloodthirsty. Zambia was a peace-loving nation. All it said was that, if the United Kingdom Government found it worth while to mow down Arabs in an Arab country just to ensure its own presence there until 1968, then it saw no reason why that Government should not be equally resolute in a just cause. Was the world to be forced to conclude that the United Kingdom Government was following the "kith-and-kin" approach? Yet those who declared that that was a blatant form of racial discrimination were accused of being unrealistic and bloodthirsty. For him it was immaterial whether God's blood ran through veins that were under a red, brown, yellow or black skin. Its worthiness in God's sight was the same. Zambia demanded that the United Kingdom Government should hold the black blood in Rhodesia to be as sacred as the white blood. Rhodesia was a colony of the United Kingdom in the same way as Aden, at the moment, was a United Kingdom Protectorate.

216. He had always maintained that, if man's life was indivisible among white communities, it could not but be indivisible among the so-called dark races, unless God had created two species of man, but of that there was no evidence anywhere in the world. He asked the United Kingdom Government which had significantly contracted out of its responsibility to the Special Committee, what it wanted to achieve in Rhodesia and what its objective was. What was the killing in Aden about? If Members of the United Nations which subscribed to the ideals and principles of the Charter failed to honour its provisions, then their membership of the world body was but a mockery.

217. He then referred to a very well-organized smear campaign against countries which were fighting hard to achieve freedom and justice for all. A very vicious campaign was going on in the right-wing Press

of the United Kingdom and most other capitals of the West. They painted such a dark picture of what countries like Zambia were doing that, even if one quarter of it were true, those countries would have collapsed a long time ago. But that was designed to give a distorted picture of the efforts that Zambia and its friends were making to bring sense and realism to the politics of southern Africa. The campaign was well financed and well organized, and the tragedy was that people tended to believe what those ill-intentioned planners said to them.

218. On Africa Freedom Day, he had said that the United Kingdom Government had tricked the world and the United Nations into a false strategy, a false start in seeking a solution to the unilateral declaration of independence. After several months of protracted talks about talks with the rebels, the United Kingdom Government after the summit meeting on H.M.S. *Tiger*, had made the belated pronouncement that, from then on, it would have no more negotiations with the rebels and that it would not grant Rhodesia independence before majority rule. Those, in themselves, were very welcome assertions of noble principles—the principles that Zambia and its friends were at pains to make the United Kingdom recognize and live up to. But, coming so belatedly from a Government reputed for unpredictable and grasshopper tactics, they merited little appreciation from the Zambian Government: it saw, lurking beneath those seemingly well-intentioned pronouncements, the United Kingdom Government's design to wash its hands of the Rhodesian problem.

219. As early as last year, he had warned that the United Kingdom Government was pursuing a dangerous policy of "honourable defeat". He had described the policy of the "protracted war" as dishonourable and disastrous and he was now more than ever convinced that the United Kingdom Government did not intend to honour its obligations in Rhodesia. He had no reason to believe otherwise. He had been told that the United Kingdom Government was immune from criticism with regard to Rhodesia, but he believed that its impotence in quelling the rebellion, coupled with meaningless declarations, was part of a deliberate design to mislead the world. That was the tragedy of Rhodesia. The picture was dark and brutal.

220. It was clear that the United Kingdom Government knew full well that its present sanctions policy would not bring about the desired results. At the same time, the use of force was anathema to it. There was therefore no alternative but to conclude that that Government was trying to saddle the United Nations with the problem so that the world body took all the blame for the United Kingdom's failure to settle the problem. In that way, and taking advantage of the apparent present inability of the OAU to take effective action against Smith and South Africa, the United Kingdom hoped that the Rhodesian question would be buried and forgotten and that Smith would get away with it, as South Africa had done in 1910. That was what he had meant by saying that the United Nations was treading along a blind alley in following the United Kingdom Government's lead over Rhodesia.

221. During its deliberations, the Special Committee must pause for serious reflection on its responsibilities in the matter of freedom for the oppressed who cried for legitimate representation in the Government of their own country and in the United Nations. The Committee had a duty to maintain and it must discharge it without prejudice based on colour or race.

222. If the Rhodesian crisis had exposed the slipperiness of United Kingdom policy in southern Africa, the question of South West Africa had laid bare the collusion of some big Powers in colonial matters. It was also clear that the great Powers were being obstructionist in the United Nations. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) revoking South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa should have logically led to the establishment of United Nations administrative machinery in South West Africa. But, alas, that logical sequence of measures and events had been conveniently lost sight of by some big Powers; for some of them a United Nations presence in South West Africa meant a diplomatic as well as a physical confrontation with South Africa, the bastion of their economic and racial interests in southern Africa; for others, the implications of a take-over in South West Africa by the United Nations conjured up the image of the Congo situation of the early sixties, with its attendant financial commitments. So they had abstained from voting.

223. Here again, matters of principle had been thrown to the wind; some big Powers had found in the pursuit of their parochial interests a semblance of mankind's hopes and objectives. If that was not brute selfishness and a betrayal of world peace and happiness, then he did not know what else to call it. Certainly the fear of a confrontation with South Africa did not encourage support for the principles of the fight for human rights.

224. Out of all the fracas surrounding the question of South West Africa one very significant fact had emerged more prominently than ever before, namely, that the processes of democracy in the United Nations could be rendered impotent by the plutocratic influences of some big Powers. The majority of Member States had, by their vote, decided to take steps to implement the 1966 resolution on South West Africa. But without the support, money and arms of the big Powers resolution 2248 (S-V) adopted by the General Assembly at its fifth special session might very well be abortive. He added that Africa was not going to be weak for ever.

225. If the big Powers vacillated so much over the question of South West Africa, it was easy to imagine what they thought about South Africa proper. There one could see man in his crudest form, nakedly oppressing his fellow man, and, whereas the world had been prepared to fight the Nazis, there the big Powers were silent: they allowed themselves to be guided, not by the noble principles of the Charter but by their economic interests.

226. Recently the world had learnt of yet another tragic step taken by men who had little regard for the suffering of humble people in their society, black or white. A girl, Sandra Laing, born of white parents had been singled out by Vorster's all-powerful and crushing machinery, and Vorster, as was common knowledge, had been a wartime admirer and supporter of the Nazis. The poor girl had been classified as "non-white" and would therefore suffer non-white treatment in that country. Was it possible to think of anything more devastating to the human soul? The people concerned claimed to be Christians and to maintain Western values and civilizations. He preferred to be simple and down-to-earth and to believe in the importance of man regardless of his colour. That was what Zambia was trying to do and the Zambian Government made no apologies to anyone for being non-tribal and non-racial.



227. The question whether or not Portugal should direct the destiny of millions of people in Angola and Mozambique from Lisbon against their will was a matter for serious consideration by the international community. Very few of the present generation of Americans and Europeans knew what it was to suffer the miseries of oppressive colonial régimes. In the present age of enlightenment, it was inconceivable that a foreign country should subject other people to a rule in which they had no voice in the administration of their affairs. The spirit that had animated the General Assembly in adopting its resolution on decolonization must be rekindled to bring reality into full focus once again. That depended on each and every member of the Special Committee as representatives of their respective Governments.

228. He implored the representatives to tell the States Members of the United Nations that the people of southern Africa were truly suffering; Angolans and Mozambicans were pleading for no more than the restoration of their birthright of freedom and justice, of fair play and full participation in the development of their homelands without institutional impediments calculated to stifle their efforts to build up stable and progressive societies.

229. Those powers which had the capacity to bring about stability in freedom and justice must be converted to the view that the consequences of delay, reluctance, selfishness or lack of timely action were grave in the extreme not only for the people of Angola and Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, but for them, too, for the Members of the United Nations and, indeed, for mankind as a whole.

230. One of the strange ironies of history was that the same countries which had been principally instrumental in the formation of the United Nations and in the formulation of its Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should today throw to the winds the very principles upon which their solemn affirmations had rested two decades before. It would be better for such countries to declare publicly that they no longer adhered to those principles than to pay lip service to freedom and justice.

231. Those were some of the ugly problems to which the Special Committee would have to find solutions. The problems of southern Africa posed a very serious danger to international peace and security. Southern Africa was, so to speak, like a dormant volcano: nobody knew when it would erupt, but everybody knew that it certainly would. When that happened, the results would be disastrous.

232. There was thus a grave risk of a third world war, fought not merely on racial but also on ideological grounds. Race being a very sensitive aspect of man's nature, such a war would be a war not of conquest but of extermination, and would certainly make the Second World War look like the rehearsal for a play. It would truly be a war to end all wars, for nobody would be left to tell the story or to talk of peace or war. It was tragic, therefore, that the big Powers should treat the problems of southern Africa with the light-mindedness of actors in a melodrama. If prevention was better than cure, then the United Nations, in the true spirit of its Charter, representing in a large degree what man stood for, must take effective preventive measures immediately.

233. He craved the indulgence of the Special Committee if, by saying those rather hard words about

certain Members of the United Nations, he had given the impression that the Committee was standing trial in Zambia: that was far from being the case. He was merely trying to apprise the Committee of the seriousness with which the Zambian people viewed the situation in southern Africa and the failure of some States Members of the United Nations to see the situation in the same light. Fellow human beings suffering the pangs of oppression and inhuman laws needed the support of the United Nations, of the free international society of man. It was, however, his sincere hope that the Special Committee's visit to Zambia would arm it with more facts, so that from its on-the-spot observations it would be better able to find timely and more effective solutions leading to the humanization and liberation of that part of the African continent.

234. He hardly needed to remind the Special Committee of the high esteem in which it was held by the people of Zambia, for it was in it that the world's oppressed millions had vested their hopes for liberty and justice. What reason had anyone to feel happy and free, while the rest of mankind languished in the slough of serfdom and oppression? The Committee's mission, therefore, called not only for faith but for action as well.

235. The people of Zambia believed in the United Nations. The Special Committee could depend on the Zambian people even though they were beset by a multiplicity of problems. Zambia was barely three years old, and therefore not strong in the conventional sense, but it would do whatever was in its power to support the noble cause which had brought the Committee to Africa.

236. The Zambian people were only too conscious of the fact that the world body which the Special Committee represented was a true thermometer of the feelings of its individual Member States. If they decided to make it strong it would be strong and vice versa. The Zambian nation believed in the United Nations and wanted it to be strong and would therefore, small and young though it was, give it all the support it was capable of giving. It could do no better.

237. He assured the members that they were very welcome in Zambia and that the Zambian people would do everything possible to make their stay in the Republic a pleasant one. He wished the Special Committee success in its deliberations.

#### *General statements*

238. *The Chairman*, speaking on behalf of all members of the Special Committee, expressed deep appreciation of President Kaunda's extremely moving and sincere address, which deserved the most careful attention, coming as it did from one of Africa's most respected statesmen, highly regarded for his courage and magnanimity by friends and foes alike. Based as they were on the realities of bitter confrontation with the champions of colonialism in southern Africa, the considerations and views to which President Kaunda had given expression would undoubtedly be of great assistance to the Committee in its work.

239. The Special Committee was deeply grateful to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their invitation which had enabled the Committee to continue its meetings in Africa at Kitwe. In 1965, the Committee had had the signal honour of meeting at Lusaka at the invitation of the Government and people of Zambia. The records of the Committee bore

testimony to the important decisions taken at those meetings, which reflected the Committee's sincere appreciation of the fraternal hospitality and co-operation extended by the Government and people of Zambia. The address which President Kaunda had delivered at the opening meeting at Lusaka in 1965, had stood the test of time.

240. In that address he had stressed that the time had come for Member States to make the United Nations a force for action rather than a forum for speeches, and in support of that plea he had warned of the consequences of continued non-co-operation by the administering Powers concerned in the implementation of United Nations resolutions on the colonial Territories in southern Africa. Today, two years later, that address read like a prophecy which had come to pass, particularly in the case of Southern Rhodesia.

241. Personally, it was a great pleasure for him to be in Zambia: it was like being at home again. Few countries reflected so well the cruel past and the glorious prospects of the great African continent. The fact that that was so was no credit to, but a severe indictment of, the moribund colonialist system.

242. As was well known, Zambia had occupied an important part in the schemes of those megalomaniacs who had dreamed of an unbroken empire stretching from the Cape to Cairo. Ambitious and unscrupulous men, drawn by Africa's coveted wealth and backed by the imperialist Powers, had engaged in the ruthless exploitation of the human and material resources of Zambia to the exclusive advantage of the interests and powers they represented.

243. The culmination of all that deplorable process had been the creation, despite the opposition of the African peoples, of the Central African Federation. Conceived with the objective of delaying the inevitable demise of colonialism, of imposing a one-sided partnership of horse and rider, and of enabling the racist settlers of Southern Rhodesia to participate even more effectively in the merciless plunder of Zambia's wealth, that unworthy scheme had surely deserved to fail. That it had failed was due in large measure to the resoluteness and solidarity of the Zambian people under the leadership of the United National Independence Party and its President, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda.

244. Zambia was truly fortunate to have produced such a worthy son of Africa as President Kaunda. Being a forthright, sincere, dedicated and humble man, the virtues he possessed were exactly those calculated to evoke the finest response from the Zambian people. And there was need of such qualities and such response now, for Zambia found itself in the thick of the anti-apartheid campaign, one of the greatest epics of the latter half of the twentieth century. Caught in a vice between the all-African resolve to bring down the illegal racist régime in Rhodesia and its own undeniable necessity to survive, a less courageous and united country might long ago have weakened. Indeed, it might be said that some less dangerously placed countries of Africa had done so.

245. But Zambia under President Kaunda stood stalwart and undaunted. In doing so, it had given hope and courage to all Africa, and not least to the struggling African people of Zimbabwe. The example of Zambia would shine as a light to brighten and inspire the Special Committee's deliberations and endeavours during the present series of meetings.

246. At Kitwe, the Special Committee would concentrate on the situation of the people and Territory of Rhodesia. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was, and continued to be, applicable to that colony despite attempts to deny its applicability. The long and continuing denial of the rights of the indigenous people of the Territory to self-determination and independence had contributed materially to the present deplorable situation. The neo-apartheid system, the discriminatory land laws and the exclusion of the African peoples from any significant participation in economic and political life had been and were a flagrant violation of fundamental human rights.

247. After the collapse of the Federation, it had been hoped that at last the rights of the African people of Southern Rhodesia to self-government and independence on a genuinely democratic basis would be recognized. Instead, a series of manoeuvres, covert and overt, had been carried out, resulting in the betrayal of the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population and in the entrenchment of the racist settler minority. During all those shameful manoeuvres and preparations, a firm display by the United Kingdom Government of regard for, and determination to uphold, the legitimate rights of the indigenous population would undoubtedly have had a beneficial effect. Instead, vacillation and implicit collusion had resulted in the present grave situation. No one who had studied the problem in its entirety could refrain from saluting the Government and people of Zambia for the heroic stand they had taken against the Smith régime at great cost in terms of human and material resources. Through the colonialist manipulations of the administering Power, aided and abetted by foreign economic and other interests, Zambia at the time of its independence had been heavily dependent on Southern Rhodesia for its economic well-being: communications, transport power and many essential supplies. Hence the Smith régime, at the time of the unilateral declaration of independence had assumed, in its folly, that it had a trump card to play if Zambia did not fall into line with its sinister racist plans. Not surprisingly, attempts by the Smith régime to hold Zambia to ransom by a process of economic strangulation had met with a magnificently defiant response from the Government and the people of Zambia, even though that had entailed heavy sacrifices and serious dislocation. What was more, Zambia had not faltered in its whole-hearted support of the African people fighting against the racist Salisbury régime for their freedom and independence. Contrary to the expectations of the Smith régime, the Republic of Zambia had continued to keep faith with the African people of Zimbabwe.

248. The praiseworthy stand taken by the Government and people of Zambia against the reactionary racist Smith régime had won it the respect and admiration of all freedom-loving people. For that reason it was only fitting that the Special Committee should open its discussion on the question of Southern Rhodesia in Zambia. At Kitwe, the Committee would receive the testimony of the representatives of the freedom-fighters in Zimbabwe, seek additional information on recent developments in that Territory and study at first hand, near the theatre of conflict, all aspects of that very grave problem. The Committee would also give attention to and hear petitioners concerning Angola, South West Africa and Swaziland.

249. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia to be a most serious threat to

international peace and security. The defiance of the whole international community by the racist Salisbury régime called for decisive action against it and its supporters, particularly South Africa and Portugal. It must be recalled that if now, belatedly, the international community was obliged to come to grips with and put an end to an intolerable situation, that was because of the unprincipled failure of the United Kingdom Government to discharge what it had all along insisted was its legal responsibility.

250. The Special Committee's meetings at Kitwe would, he hoped, throw new light on the problem and enable it to arrive at conclusions and recommendations which would contribute to a speedy solution consistent with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

251. He would be failing in his duty if he did not appeal to the freedom fighters to unite because, in disunity, they would always find that the forces that could have been used to fight colonialism would be wasted in fighting among themselves. In disunity, they would find the prolongation of their sufferings and the postponement of their day of liberation. But in unity, they would find the strengthening of the fight against colonialism, the bringing together of all their forces against the oppressors and the bringing closer of their day of independence. He appealed to representatives of the freedom movement inside and outside the meeting room to show unity of thought, unity of purpose and, above all, unity of action.

252. He was confident that the Special Committee's work at Kitwe would lead to positive and significant results.

253. The representative of *India* expressed sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their generous invitation to the Special Committee to meet at Kitwe. The hospitality offered and the overwhelming enthusiasm of the people were deeply appreciated. The invitation was a practical demonstration of the genuine and profound interest of President Kaunda and his people in decolonization. It was hardly necessary to describe the vital contribution which Zambia was making to the eradication of injustices and indignities in all parts of the world. That the leaders of Zambia had selected 24 October, the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, as their day of liberation from colonial subjugation was conclusive proof of their dedication to the ideals of the Charter. The election of Zambia by the African group at the United Nations to be one of the three countries to serve on the Council for South West Africa was further evidence of the leading role they played in African affairs. The experience of coming to Zambia and of listening in person to its President was for him the fulfilment of a long-standing wish.

254. President Kaunda's moving address could not fail to inspire anyone who had the slightest concern for the well-being of the millions of people still suffering under the colonial yoke. The President's reference to his appearance in the Fourth Committee some five years before was both a source of satisfaction and a reminder. It was a satisfaction to see a person who had appeared before the United Nations as a petitioner occupying such a distinguished position, and it was a reminder that the battle against colonialism was almost always long, bitter and often frustrating. The President's analysis of the colonial problems in southern Africa was unsurpassed in the history of the Special Committee. The Indian delegation had been

deeply impressed by the address and would endeavour to live up to the lofty goals he had set. It was to be hoped that President Kaunda's sombre warning that southern Africa was a dormant volcano which would one day erupt unless the colonial Powers joined those on the side of right and justice would be heeded in the appropriate quarters.

255. The subject to which the Special Committee would give particular attention during its meetings at Kitwe was, of course, Southern Rhodesia, on which his delegation would give its views in full at a later stage. It considered that the United Kingdom bore sole responsibility for the deplorable state of affairs in Zimbabwe. By its various acts of omission and commission, the United Kingdom Government had encouraged the blindly racist minority in Southern Rhodesia in its evil designs. Had the necessary measures been taken and a firm warning given to the Rhodesian racists, the present situation would never have arisen. The Indian delegation condemned in the strongest possible terms the illegal and unjust seizure of power by an insignificant proportion of the population to the detriment of almost 95 per cent of the rightful owners of Zimbabwe. The half-hearted and meaningless measures adopted so far had conclusively proved their impotence to deal with the situation. Unless and until the United Kingdom Government was prepared to use force against the rebel régime, Ian Smith and his henchmen would not be brought to heel. The appeal for the use of force made by a person known for his sincerity, his love of mankind and his preaching of non-violence should be taken with the utmost seriousness. India demanded for its brothers in Zimbabwe, to whom it would continue to lend whole-hearted support both in the Committee and elsewhere, immediate and unconditional independence on the basis of one man, one vote.

256. India was particularly gratified that the Special Committee should be meeting in Zambia, with which it enjoyed extremely friendly relations. Zambia and its President were held in the highest esteem, not only by the Government, but also by the common people of India, who greatly admired their dynamism and the firm determination with which they were tackling their manifold problems. Both countries belonged to the economically developing group of nations; there was therefore ample scope for co-operation between the two to their mutual advantage. The actual record of such co-operation since the early days of Zambia's independence was a glowing testimony to the friendship between them and the forthcoming visit of President Kaunda to India, to which the Government and people of India were eagerly looking forward, would bring the two countries yet closer together.

257. In conclusion, the Indian delegation extended its greetings to the people of Zambia and wished them every success in their undertakings.

258. The representative of *Ethiopia* thanked President Kaunda, the Government and the people of Zambia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Kitwe and for their warm hospitality. His delegation had been deeply touched by the President's frank, sincere and inspiring opening address. To those who had come to know him closely since the days of Zambia's fight for its own independence, his statement and delivery were no revelation, but characteristic of a man who had not been changed by the trappings of power, and who, in spite of the many vicissitudes of life, had the courage

of his convictions, a man whose devotion to duty had never flagged. Africa, and indeed the entire world of today, were in great need of more leaders of his calibre.

259. The Ethiopian delegation fully endorsed the comprehensive analysis of the Southern Rhodesian problem made by the Chairman and President Kaunda. It took a serious view of the worsening situation in Rhodesia since that Special Committee had last considered the problem. In spite of all protestations to the contrary, Ian Smith's rebel régime, by all evidence aided and abetted by the United Kingdom, the administering Power, had become even more defiant of international public opinion and had adopted far more oppressive measures towards the African masses of Zimbabwe. It was now devising a constitution which would permanently entrench minority rule and racism. In an attempt to suppress the African people's legitimate fight for independence, the illegal régime was imprisoning and massacring the gallant sons of Zimbabwe and, no doubt helped by South Africa, was attempting to introduce *apartheid*. It was difficult to believe that that was being done without the connivance of the United Kingdom. The crux of the problem in Southern Rhodesia had been and remained the refusal by that Power to face its responsibilities honestly and to put the interest of the majority of the population above that of the minority who happened to be its kith and kin. When viewed in the context of the problems of southern Africa, that attitude was fraught with great danger. President Kaunda's warning that the dormant volcano of southern Africa might erupt any time was therefore very opportune. The United Kingdom should be made to realize that the world could not be deceived by "talks about talks" and mandatory sanctions which were never meant to achieve anything substantial for the African masses of Zimbabwe. The Ethiopian delegation considered that the only honourable course open for the United Kingdom, if it was to retain its respect in the eyes of Africa and the world, was to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia.

260. Ethiopia deplored the United Kingdom Government's tendency to shirk its responsibilities which, no matter how much it wished to pass the problem on to the United Nations, should rest squarely on its shoulders.

261. While the fight for freedom from the ferocious brand of settler colonialism in Rhodesia continued on its inexorable course, the Special Committee should call upon the nationalist movements to close their ranks and present a united front to the enemy. The Chairman's fervent appeal to that effect had the full support of the Ethiopian delegation, for the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe could not afford the luxury of division at so critical a juncture in their nation's history.

262. With regard to South West Africa, the General Assembly at its fifth special session had further implemented its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, when it had voted unanimously to revoke South Africa's Mandate and provided for the United Nations to assume direct responsibility for the Territory. In its resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, the General Assembly had voted to establish a United Nations Council for South West Africa and a Commissioner responsible for the Territory's administration. That positive step had been acclaimed by all freedom-loving peoples, and it was to be hoped that the great Powers

who held the key to its successful implementation would see the wisdom of giving their unstinted support to the United Nations. The fascist régime of South Africa was still defying the resolutions of the General Assembly but Vorster and his war council, facing the last political battle both internationally and from within the Territory, had been driven to the futile expedient of attempting to impress the world by their so-called "one man, one vote" offer to some parts of South West Africa, a move which deceived nobody. South Africa should recognize that its status as the mandatory authority for South West Africa had ended in October 1966 and that, subsequently, the only body competent to lead South West Africa to self-determination and independence was that established by the United Nations.

263. Attention should also be drawn to the grave problem of racial discrimination in South Africa. The anti-colonial revolution had abolished racial discrimination as a criterion in international relations, but in some Territories the practice still continued, the victim being mainly the black race and the area in which it was practised—colonial Africa. The white man had been deprived of his power in most parts of the African continent and the hated system of racial discrimination eliminated in the process, but it was significant that the areas in which discrimination prevailed today were the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. The Special Committee, which represented the moral conscience of mankind as a whole and which had been set up to act as a watch-dog and to work relentlessly for the total elimination of the evil of colonialism, should also adopt the same approach towards racial discrimination.

264. In conclusion, he recalled President Kaunda's call for a resurgence of the spirit which had led the United Nations to adopt the historic resolution on decolonization in 1960. If, as a result of the Special Committee's action and the heart-rending evidence supplied by petitioners from areas still suffering under the yoke of colonialism and racial bigotry, some headway could be made towards bringing the entire problem of colonialism into a new focus, the Committee would have achieved its purpose.

265. The representative of *Chile* expressed his delegation's sincere gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Zambia for the generous hospitality being extended to the Special Committee during its stay in Zambia. The Zambian Government's invitation had made it possible for the Committee to meet for the second time in that land of freedom, where it had been privileged to hear the lofty address—whose human content was stamped with the die of the most absolute sincerity—of President Kaunda, as ever indefatigable in the forefront of the struggle against colonialism.

266. The Chileans knew and admired President Kaunda's dynamic personality, for the Chilean Government and people had been privileged to receive him as a guest of honour, and his presence and words alike had made a deep impression on all sectors of the population. Everyone had recognized him as an eminent statesman who was leading his people with a sure hand and extraordinary clear-sightedness along the path of progress and ever increasing prosperity.

267. For the Chileans, President Kaunda was, above all else, a great African leader who stood at the lead of the battle being waged to overthrow the last bastions of a hateful colonial régime and put an end

to racial discrimination and infringements of human rights. By its sacrifices, Zambia had given proof of its devotion to the cause of African liberation and its determination to give effective support to that cause. In that most just struggle, President Kaunda and the Zambian people knew that they could count on Chile's sincere solidarity and full support. In that land of liberty, the Chilean delegation once more assured the people of Zimbabwe, subjected to the cruel tyranny of Ian Smith's racist minority régime, of its support. It would not be possible, without seriously endangering world peace, to tolerate for much longer the existence of that régime, which trampled human rights underfoot and presented a challenge to the conscience of the international community. The economic sanctions adopted by the Security Council had been applied in full by Chile and by the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations. Nevertheless, as President Kaunda had pointed out, those sanctions would not be enough in themselves to bring down Ian Smith's rebel régime because of the considerable assistance being given him by his allies in the criminal venture which aimed at maintaining colonialism and racial discrimination in southern Africa. That unholy alliance would not take anyone by surprise; it only strengthened the courage and determination of those who were fighting for the freedom of Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese domination and South West Africa. It would clearly be necessary to use infinitely more vigorous methods in order to attack the evil at its roots. If the United Kingdom was to crush the rebellion, it must use force, and the oppressed peoples themselves must, before all else, unite in order that that vitally important undertaking might be crowned with success. The Chilean delegation fully supported the appeal for unity which the Chairman of the Special Committee had just made. As, however, the international community too bore a collective responsibility for that lamentable situation, it had the obligation to take effective action to put an end to colonialism and racial discrimination.

268. The Latin American countries, and Chile in particular, had co-operated with their African and Asian brothers in the United Nations for the adoption of the resolutions calling for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The special session of the General Assembly which had been convened for the purpose of considering what means should be employed to give effect to the historic decision of October 1966, under which the United Nations was to assume full responsibility for South West Africa, had ended just a few days ago. On that occasion, the Latin American nations had given further proof of their solidarity with Africa and Asia by submitting and unreservedly supporting a joint resolution providing that the United Nations should assume the direct administration of South West Africa in order to enable it to attain independence by way of self-determination.

269. He felt sure that the work done by the Special Committee in that hospitable land would help to bring closer the liberation of the peoples still subject to the colonial régime in Africa. The Republic of Zambia would have the satisfaction of having made a noble and effective contribution to the common effort.

270. The representative of *Iran* recalled President Kaunda's farewell to the Committee after its visit in 1965, in which he had expressed the hope that it might never have to come back. That hope, cherished by all

freedom-loving peoples, was a fittingly sincere wish for the success of the Committee's work and the speedy liquidation of colonialism. That the Committee should again be in Zambia at the invitation of the President himself, who together with his Government and people were providing such generous hospitality, was due to the Committee's failure to fulfil its mandate, or rather to the failure of the Powers concerned to honour their obligations under the Charter. The unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia and the establishment of Ian Smith's rebel régime had taken place despite the action of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The situation had gone from bad to worse, and more fuel of the most explosive type had been added to the flames in southern Africa.

271. In his brilliant opening address, President Kaunda had outlined a picture of southern Africa which could not have failed to move even the most heartless. It depicted not only the sufferings and deprivations of the victims but also the irresponsible acts of the culprits. The address had been delivered by a man who was obviously deeply concerned with the human conditions and at the same time fully alert to the bitter facts of his environment. The Chairman had expressed the feelings of all members in saying that Zambia was truly blessed to have produced such a worthy son of Africa and that his virtues were likely to evoke the finest response from the Zambian people. The address would guide and inspire the Committee's work.

272. The Committee's return visit provided an opportunity of seeing at first hand the great strides made in Zambia's development. The gathering of 800 participants three months earlier in the same hall for Zambia's National Convention—"Achievement 1967"—testified to the Government's determination to continue and intensify its development programme despite the obstacles created by the Southern Rhodesia problem. The Copper Conference at Lusaka was a further reflection of Zambia's achievements in the quest for progress and prosperity. The problems to be studied were the outcome of the explosive situation created by some racist colonizers in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration, who had persistently obstructed the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. In addition, they had systematically consolidated their stranglehold over the vast masses of Africans, intensifying the reign of terror they had instituted to shield them against the people's wrath in the hope of perpetuating their exploitation and domination. The Africans, however, remained steadfast in their determination to overcome the forces of darkness and oppression. During the hearings at Kinshasa, fresh evidence had been provided concerning Portugal's rule in the Territories under its domination and in particular in Angola and Guinea (Bissau). The Committee had also learnt that different Angolan organizations were actively engaged in the fight for liberation; a similar fight was being waged in Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique. In order to obtain maximum results in the shortest possible time, the nationalists had been repeatedly exhorted, especially by the Chairman, to unite.

273. In the beautiful city of Kitwe, the industrial centre of Zambia, the Special Committee hoped to hear petitioners from Zimbabwe, South West Africa and Swaziland. The information which they provided would be of immense value to the Committee,



which would at the same time, be able to assure them that they were not alone in their fight for freedom and independence.

274. The Iranian Government, one of the few original participants in the preparation and drafting of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, would spare no effort in seeking the speedy liquidation of colonialism. It had already taken the action called for by the Security Council and the General Assembly to bring down the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia and was continuing to urge the release of all political prisoners, particularly such African leaders as Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole.

275. In its anti-colonial and anti-racist policy, the Iranian Government was moved by a strong desire for peace and justice. It recognized that there could be no lasting peace in Africa until the dark forces of oppression and exploitation were overthrown and until every African regained his dignity and full freedom and rights. No peace was possible as long as the despicable episode of Sandra Laing could recur. The day of liberation from the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa was drawing near, but its coming could be hastened only if the various nationalist groups took a united stand against the oppressor. The paramount importance of unity among the ranks of the freedom-fighters could not be exaggerated. He therefore reiterated the appeal which the Chairman had so wisely launched. With unity, not only would the attainment of freedom and independence in the remaining parts of Africa be greatly hastened, but President Kaunda's prophecy would also come to pass and Africa would be able to contribute much to world happiness and enlightenment during the second half of the twentieth century. It had, in fact, already begun to do so, but the full impact of its contribution would be felt only when all the continent was free.

276. The opportunity of holding some of the Special Committee's meetings in Zambia would enable it to co-ordinate its action, especially with the African freedom fighters, in the pursuit for freedom and justice. Reiterating his thanks to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their kind invitation, he assured them that the people and Government of Iran wished them every success in their tremendous and courageous efforts to better the life of the Zambian people and liberate the Zimbabwe people.

277. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the Government and people of Zambia for their invitation to the Special Committee to meet in their gallant country. Their typical warm hospitality was all the more praiseworthy in view of the fact that they were not perturbed by the aggressive designs of the henchmen of imperialism lurking south of their border.

278. The strong bonds binding the people of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia had a historical background of long standing. The efforts of the Government and people of Zambia had always been a necessary and important complement to the United Republic of Tanzania's own efforts to liberate the African continent, to bring about the rapid development and progress of its lands and, above all, to achieve the unity of Africa which all the forces of reaction strongly feared. In those efforts, the people and Government of Zambia, headed by their wise and gallant leader, held a prominent position. Their fight for liberation was an illustration of the iniquitous manoeuvres of the United

Kingdom colonialists and their efforts to coerce and suppress the African peoples. Under the steadfast leadership of President Kaunda and the unflinching dedication of the masses to their patriotic fight for national emancipation, the forces of United Kingdom colonialism had been defeated. The Zambian people's gigantic economic and other achievements had been possible only because they had routed the exploiters and wrested from them control of their motherland's destiny.

279. President Kaunda's opening address had been not only the counsel of a great statesman but also the inspiring appeal of a gallant fighter for the acquisition and consolidation of Africa's freedom and liberty in all parts of the world and reflected the militant spirit of his own country.

280. It was therefore only natural that the Government and people of Zambia had invited the Special Committee to meet in their country in order that, by direct contact, it could acquaint itself at first hand with the situation in Southern Rhodesia where Ian Smith and his racist minority régime were continuing the colonial subjugation of the African people. That situation was the result of the colonial policies of the United Kingdom Government, which had for decades, while exploiting the rich resources of their land, suppressed the African people of Zimbabwe and manoeuvred the white minority into power, with the consequent usurping of state control. The illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was a tool of international imperialism and the caretaker of the foreign financial monopolies which were even extending their illegal operations in Zimbabwe. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania would deal with that aspect in greater detail later, in order to expose the hypocrisy and opportunism of the forces of reaction which, because of their lust for profit, were boosting the illegal Smith régime and impeding the attainment of independence by the African people of Zimbabwe.

281. It was such factors which revealed the true motives and hypocrisy of the opposing forces which had been calling the loudest for so-called economic sanctions and engaging in every possible kind of manoeuvre in order to prevent the use of force which was the only effective way of crushing and eliminating that product of imperialism, the Ian Smith régime. The continuation of colonialism in any part of the world was a threat to freedom everywhere, and the situation in Southern Rhodesia was even more threatening because it was based on the racial policy of a fascist minority and deviously protected by the United Kingdom. The minority régime, as a tool of international imperialism, was committing all types of atrocities in order to maintain its illegal position. As late as 19 April 1967, its spokesman had announced that the oppressive forces had been reinforced. The budget of its aggressive army for the financial year 1966-1967 had been increased by roughly 20 per cent over the previous year. Such militaristic moves, with the introduction of the *apartheid* armed forces in Zimbabwe, not only revealed the desperation of the imperialist henchmen but also reflected the aggressive designs against the African peoples as a whole and those of Zambia in particular.

282. A similar situation prevailed in Mozambique and Angola, where the Portuguese colonialists were daily committing barbarous crimes against the population in order to exploit those lands for the sole benefit of the international financial monopolies. In South West

Africa, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, in defiance of the international community, was desperately attempting to cling to the Territory. Those were, however, all temporary phenomena, because the revolutionary forces of the peoples of those Territories were waging a just and necessary fight which would finally triumph. The Africans and freedom-loving people everywhere had pledged themselves to rid humanity of colonialism. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania, therefore, appealed to the heroic people of Zimbabwe and to all freedom-fighters to close their ranks, and, in an irresistible wave, to eliminate the forces of colonialism from their homeland.

283. The Special Committee was most anxious to receive all possible information which would serve the interests of decolonization, as called for by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It was therefore grateful to the Government and people of Zambia for the opportunity of meeting the Zimbabwe and other liberation forces. His delegation was convinced that, under the wise leadership of President Kaunda, the people of Zambia would attain yet greater achievements which, in the final analysis, were those of Africa as a whole and a blow to the forces of colonialism and imperialism.

284. The representative of *Venezuela* thanked the President, Government and people of the Republic of Zambia, on behalf of his delegation, for their warm welcome and generous hospitality. The meetings which the Special Committee was holding in Zambia were of very special significance. In the short time which had elapsed since it had become independent, the Republic of Zambia had twice extended an invitation to the Special Committee and had welcomed it with unbounded enthusiasm. That gesture was a clear manifestation of that country's desire to serve the cause of decolonization. But the most irrefutable proof of its anti-colonial dedication was afforded by the sacrifices which that young country had had to make and the high price it had had to pay for its loyalty to the cause of freedom in that part of the African continent which was still dominated by colonial forces. Amid all those sacrifices, the President and people of Zambia had come before the Special Committee to give testimony to their firm resolve to support its work. At the most critical moment in their short history as an independent country, as President Kaunda had said, the Government and people of Zambia had come and told the Committee that their revolt against colonial oppression and their readiness to fight for the ideal of freedom remained unswerving. The Venezuelan delegation admired the Zambian people for their resolve to make their country a symbol of salvation for their oppressed brothers. Zambia's flank bore a wound which would heal only when colonialism and racism had finally disappeared from the African continent. It was a small country, but the cause for which it was fighting and the principles by which it was inspired would make it immortal. As long as Africa and the world had before their eyes examples like that of Zambia, the principles on behalf of which the Special Committee was opposing the paranoid madness of the racists of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa and colonialism wherever it appeared would never perish. As long as there were freedom-loving men like President Kaunda and peoples resolved, like the people of Zambia, to sacrifice themselves in the cause of freedom, the conspiracy being hatched in Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portu-

guese administration against the most elementary principles of the civilized world would have no possibility of survival.

285. He expressed his heartfelt appreciation to President Kaunda for the constructive and moving address he had made before the Special Committee. His emotion had expressed itself in tears which would cease to flow only when the ignominious fate imposed on other African peoples had been ended for all time. The problem of Southern Rhodesia had reached its most critical point following the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith's racist minority Government. That declaration had been the consequence if not of the complicity at least of its complaisant attitude, an attitude that remained unchanged. The measures taken to put an end to the illegal situation in Southern Rhodesia had not only come too late but had proved incapable of affecting the Rhodesian régime mainly because the allies of its odious policy continued to disregard the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council. More effective measures must therefore be taken to bring the situation in that Territory to an end once and for all.

286. True to its anti-colonial tradition and unwavering in its support for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the Venezuelan Government had rigorously applied the measures adopted by the Security Council. Those who believed that the people of Zimbabwe could be deprived by force of their right to freedom and independence were mistaken. Venezuelan and Latin American solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe needed no comment; it was lasting and unshakable.

287. The representative of *Finland* thanked the Government of Zambia for its invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in that young, proud and dynamic country. Members had been struck by the warm welcome and felt the keen interest taken in their work.

288. He particularly wanted to thank President Kaunda for his moving address and to say that he was very much impressed by President Kaunda's sincerity and great understanding of the serious problems that concerned not only Zambia but all countries present.

289. Members were well aware that they were, geographically speaking, very close to the scene of one of the most difficult and serious situations which had confronted the United Nations: the situation in southern Africa and especially Southern Rhodesia, concerning which the Finnish delegation fully shared the indignation, frustration and impatience expressed by previous speakers. It was most unfortunate that the measures so far taken had not produced any decisive results. In spite of the weight of world opinion and contrary to all accepted principles of human rights, Mr. Smith's illegal régime continued to uphold its system of minority rule and oppression of the African people. The solution of that explosive problem called for concerted action. Unless all countries were united in their efforts to achieve a peaceful solution, the danger of violent racial conflict was bound to increase.

290. He was fully aware of the special problems posed by the situation for Zambia and appreciated the economic sacrifices referred to by President Kaunda in saying that his young country was passing through the most critical period in its history, but past experience had shown that sanctions, to be really effective, must be extensive and fully implemented. Finland had

fully responded to the recommendations and decisions of the Security Council. An act had recently been passed authorizing the Government to take all necessary measures to implement fully Security Council resolution 232 (1966), although, in fact, in pursuance of the recommendations contained in resolution 217 (1965), it had already decided to bring all trade between Finland and Southern Rhodesia under government control, as a result of which it had come to a virtual standstill.

291. He reiterated his belief that the Special Committee's fact-finding visit would lead to a better understanding of the difficult and serious problems of Territories still under colonial rule and facilitate their effective solution in keeping with the aspirations of their peoples.

292. The Finnish Government's attitude to the problem of colonialism was quite clear and well known. It followed the Nordic tradition of opposition to all forms of minority rule and racial discrimination, considering it to be self-evident that all peoples of the world should have the right to choose their own future and to live in a society based on equality of opportunity and freedom from discrimination.

293. As the representative of one of the Nordic countries, he expressed his appreciation that a visit to the Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial had been included in the official programme. It was very proper that a United Nations body in Zambia should pay homage to the late Secretary-General who had lost his life in the service of the Organization.

294. Finally, he thanked the Government of Zambia for its efficient organization of the Special Committee's visit. The contacts between Finland and Zambia were far closer than it would appear from the two countries' geographical position. In September 1966, Finland had had the pleasure of welcoming an important delegation from Zambia, headed by Vice-President Kamanga and including the Minister for Foreign Affairs which would contribute to the establishment of closer relations between the two countries.

295. The representative of Syria said that, on behalf of his delegation, he wished first of all to join the previous speakers in expressing his heartfelt gratitude to the people and Government of Zambia for the warm hospitality which the Special Committee was meeting throughout their beautiful country. Thanks to that hospitality, the Committee had been able to pursue its scrutiny of certain African questions and to seek out an equitable solution for the countries and peoples still living under the yoke of colonialism.

296. The Syrian delegation had been especially moved by the wise and impressive words addressed to the Special Committee at the opening meeting by President Kaunda. As it had listened to him, it had recognized clearly the sincerity of that great African leader's feelings and his unfailing dedication to the task of ensuring his people's prosperity and of helping other African peoples who were fighting to recover their inalienable rights to freedom and independence. Southern Rhodesia, about which Mr. Kaunda had spoken at length and which the Chairman of the Special Committee had himself mentioned in his brilliant address, had undoubtedly been one of the main focal points of that struggle for a number of years. The illegal racist minority régime which Ian Smith was stubbornly maintaining in that troubled part of southern Africa continued to present an explosive situation which was threatening international peace and security and was of

especial concern to the Special Committee and other principal organs of the world Organization.

297. The racial discrimination, segregation and other abuses committed by Smith's rebel régime for the benefit of a white minority which kept itself in power at the expense of the inalienable rights of the overwhelming African majority of the Zimbabwe people were rightly regarded by those forums of international opinion as an abominable crime against the whole of mankind. It was hardly necessary to recall that the ink of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, solemnly declaring the opposition of the United Nations to any unilateral declaration of the independence by the United Kingdom colony, had not yet been dry when Ian Smith had proclaimed that so-called independence on 11 November 1965, less than a week after the date of the General Assembly resolution. Since that date, Ian Smith had persistently continued to defy the United Nations and world public opinion.

298. He would not have been able to do so had he not enjoyed the solid support of his racist partners in Portugal and South Africa, which those régimes had, moreover, been obliged to provide in face of the rising tide of popular liberation movements. It would undoubtedly have been unable to persist in its defiance if it had not enjoyed the questionable complicity of the United Kingdom, which had consistently engaged in a complex series of clever manoeuvres to spare a rebel minority that was usurping the rights of an entire people.

299. The Security Council meeting of 8 December 1966 [1331st meeting] which had been convened on the initiative of United Kingdom diplomacy in order to propose mandatory selective sanctions against the rebel régime had turned out to be just another link in that skilfully forged chain of manoeuvres. It was, indeed, hardly likely that those sanctions against Smith's illegal régime could be effective so long as Portugal and South Africa firmly refused to apply them and Smith's other imperialist partners were determined to safeguard the strategic and economic interests of their business firms, which were continuing to direct Southern Rhodesia's production.

300. Africa had refused to endorse that new policy of the United Kingdom. In November 1966, a month before the Security Council had declared itself in favour of those sanctions, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting at Addis Ababa, had declared that the programme of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, as conceived and directed by the United Kingdom Government, was incapable of bringing down the illegal government at Salisbury, had condemned the United Kingdom's refusal to crush the rebel government of Southern Rhodesia and had once more urged the United Kingdom to bring about the immediate downfall of that government by every possible means, including force.

301. Syria, which had already taken successive decisions, on 31 May and 26 June 1966, to break off all economic and trade relations with the illegal Salisbury régime and to suspend all direct and indirect dealings with Southern Rhodesia, had been and remained convinced, together with the African States, that the United Kingdom Government bore full responsibility for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and was in duty bound to remedy that situation by all the means available to it in its capacity as administering Power, including the use of force. The Syrian Republic

had clearly stated its position in a letter which it had addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 16 February 1967.<sup>4</sup>

302. In his eloquent address, President Kaunda had made several references, when speaking of the Rhodesian rebellion, to the struggle of the Arab people in Aden. He had mentioned, in particular, how the people of Aden were still being ruthlessly held down by the British settlers, whereas the Salisbury rebels were still being treated with scrupulous circumspection. As President Kaunda had so eloquently put it: "Are the human beings in Aden different from the rebellious Whites in Rhodesia?". The logic of colonialism was, indeed, strange, and it was to be wondered how it could justify before the world its use of a double standard without fear of being discredited by such flagrant discrimination.

303. Under the impetus of Mr. Kaunda's profound observations, the Syrian delegation was led to carry the comparison somewhat further. The colonialism in Southern Rhodesia was in essence a colonialism based on settlement in the heart of Africa. A similar kind of colonialism had been rife for years in the Middle East, in the midst of the Arab nation, for a part of that nation, so dear to his own heart, had itself been invaded by bands of Zionists who, through the collusion of imperialism and colonialism, had come from all corners of the earth to settle in Arab Palestine at the expense of the inalienable rights of the indigenous population. The outrage committed in the Middle East had been more flagrant than those committed elsewhere because the original inhabitants of Palestine had been driven by armed force from their homes, which had then been occupied by the baneful alien usurper whose successive acts of aggression were still disturbing the peace in that part of the world. Just as it was true that colonialism based on settlement was by its very nature racist, it was also true that it could survive only by violence.

304. In the brilliant address he had made at the opening meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee had once again rightly stressed the importance of unity in the struggle of the popular liberation movements. The Syrian delegation fully endorsed that opinion. It was convinced also that the common cause of the liberation of peoples would be strengthened if, in the resolute struggle being waged in the three great awakening continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the national liberation movements continuously supported each other in their efforts to recover the inalienable rights of the peoples still subjected to the colonialist yoke.

305. The representative of *Poland* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their generous invitation to the Special Committee, which greatly appreciated their warm welcome. That it should issue a second invitation was further proof of the deep interest Zambia had always taken in the activities of the United Nations and of their dedication to the noble cause of liberating the millions of Africans suffering from colonialism and racism. Those members who had had the privilege of visiting Zambia in 1965 would be gratified to see the progress achieved under President Kaunda's great leadership and to admire the determined approach to

the great task of development adopted by Zambia since its independence in 1964.

306. The Polish delegation was grateful to President Kaunda for having spared the time to open the Special Committee's meetings in his country. It had been greatly impressed by his moving address in which he had described in the most touching terms the seriousness of the situation in southern Africa. Wedged in between Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, Zambia occupied a unique position in the heroic struggle against those strongholds of racism and colonialism and was playing a major role in helping the freedom fighters in those Territories. A special tribute should be paid to the young Republic for its gallant contribution and the sacrifices it was making at a crucial juncture in the fight for human rights and independence.

307. Poland's attitude on colonial matters was well known. For centuries it had been fighting to preserve or regain its independence and was therefore particularly sympathetic to the efforts made by other peoples in the same cause. The Polish Government had expressed those feelings on many occasions and in various forms and would continue to support the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe, South West Africa, Angola and Mozambique to freedom and independence.

308. Since the Committee had last met at Lusaka in 1965, important resolutions had been adopted by the General Assembly, which, if they had been implemented, would have led to the liquidation of the abhorrent colonial régimes in southern Africa. However, the events that had taken place during that period bore witness to the grave deterioration of the situation in the whole region. His delegation was particularly concerned at the situation in Southern Rhodesia and deeply regretted the absence from the Special Committee of the representative of the United Kingdom, which was politically responsible for the Territory. Blame for the unilateral declaration of independence and the continuing existence of the illegal minority régime lay with the United Kingdom Government which had reprehensibly failed to take any vigorous action in its capacity as administering Power to end the rebellion of the racist minority. As expected, the selective sanctions, initiated at the request of the United Kingdom, had proved ineffective because of the open defiance of South Africa, Portugal and Western Powers with vested interests in the area to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The illegal minority régime was taking full advantage of the apparent weakness of the United Kingdom Government and above all of its repeated announcements that force would not be used to quell the rebellion. It was also obvious that the Smith régime, confident of the support of the monopolistic industrial combines of the United Kingdom, United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and other foreign financial groups interested in the preservation of the colonial *status quo* in southern Africa, was engaged in an unholy alliance with South Africa and Portugal to perpetuate white supremacy. Smith had come out into the open with his *apartheid* policy of separate development and was tightening his grip on the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe. Thus the United Kingdom Government and its allies had once more paid lip service to the appeals and recommendations of the OAU and the many United Nations resolutions. The Polish delegation shared the opinion expressed by

<sup>4</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, document S/7748.

President Kaunda in his opening address that the United Kingdom's impotence in quelling the rebellion, coupled with meaningless pronouncements, was part of a deliberate design to mislead the world. In its view, the Committee and the United Nations were in duty bound to bend their efforts towards defeating those designs.

309. During its meetings in Zambia, the Special Committee would have ample opportunity of exploring more deeply the various items on its agenda, particularly the question of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia's immediate neighbour. The sons of Zimbabwe who would appear as petitioners would provide first-hand information and new evidence which would help the Committee to understand better the realities of the situation in the area.

310. The Polish delegation considered that the principal function of the Special Committee during its present series of meetings was to work out practical measures to assist the national liberation movements and secure the compliance of the colonial Powers with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those States which assisted the enemies of the people of Zimbabwe and were instrumental in building up the vast colonial empire in southern Africa should be denounced and isolated. It should be impressed upon the United Kingdom that it must live up to its responsibilities and introduce democratic institutions in Southern Rhodesia, based on the principle "one man, one vote", and grant independence to Zimbabwe.

311. In conclusion, he hoped that the Special Committee's meetings at Kitwe would achieve practical results and encourage the freedom-fighters in their legitimate fight for the liquidation of colonialism in Africa.

312. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that the President of Zambia had delivered yet another of his very moving addresses to the Special Committee at the previous meeting. As the Chairman had said, it was undoubtedly the most striking address that the Committee had heard since its arrival in Africa. Zambia was not a new country for his delegation since it had been present in May 1965 when the President had expressed his strong conviction that Ian Smith would make a unilateral declaration of independence, a view rejected by the United Kingdom as unthinkable. Events had subsequently proved that the President's assessment of the situation was correct. On the occasion of the Committee's last visit, it had been able to share with the people of Zambia the joy of recent independence when that country became the newest Member of the United Nations. That, in the face of strong opposition, so young a nation had been prepared to extend an invitation to the Committee had kindled his imagination and commanded his respect. That courageous nation was currently facing economic, political and diplomatic problems created by the double-dealing United Kingdom Government, and the fact that it had once again invited the Committee to study the problem of Southern Rhodesia from close at hand, was not only a supreme act of sacrifice but also a tremendous reminder of the fact that President Kaunda and his people placed in the United Nations a faith he had once again reiterated in his address. It was vital that the Committee should not fail them and should convince its parent body that every endeavour must be made to persuade the administering Power with jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia to cease its

vacillation, which only added to the strength of Smith, Salazar and Vorster.

313. The President had suggested that it might be a blessing in disguise that the Committee was meeting at Kitwe, in the heart of the copper belt. It would be able to judge for itself the impact of United Kingdom intransigence on Zambian life and realize the problems posed by the Rhodesian threat to the main source of the Zambian economy.

314. In the name of the people of Sierra Leone, he saluted the people of Zambia for their firm stand and assured them that his country would continue to support them to the best of its ability. His country had not changed its attitude towards the Southern Rhodesian crisis and would continue to insist that it was folly on the part of the United Kingdom Government to have told Smith in advance that force would not be used. It was still convinced that voluntary sanctions were a mockery and that the only effective way of quelling a rebellion was by force. If force could be used to suppress a strike, a minor tumult or a popular uprising, what logical reason was there why all the might that the United Kingdom could command should not be used to quell the rebellion of Ian Smith and his 200,000 partners who were trying to enslave 4 million indigenous Africans in Zimbabwe?

315. The confrontation between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia was between a multiracial society in which all men lived in harmony and one dedicated to white domination. The white Rhodesians, the white South Africans and the white Portuguese were welcome in the African continent, but Africans could not and would not tolerate a situation in which they were third-class citizens in their own lands.

316. When, in 1965 and earlier, the African and Asian countries had told the United Kingdom that it should not preclude the use of force, they had been accused of being unrealistic and unduly pessimistic. He agreed with the President's analysis that, if being realistic meant compromising moral principles for kith-and-kin sentiments and being optimistic meant making ill-conceived pronouncements that the situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence would be over in a matter of weeks as a result of inadequate and piecemeal voluntary sanctions, then he preferred to have nothing to do with such "realism" or "optimism". After the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country, together with three other African Ministers, had attempted to convince the United Kingdom that only total sanctions with the possibility of using force could be meaningful, but no attention had been paid to them. The Security Council had ended its deliberations with the famous *Manuela* resolution (217 (1965)) of 20 November 1965 on the subject of two oil tankers. By 16 December 1966, the United Kingdom was initiating action for another Security Council resolution concerning voluntary sanctions, a resolution which was doomed in advance. Violations were a daily occurrence and governments and nationals turned a blind eye to leakages. Quite recently, as President Kaunda had mentioned, third parties had had the audacity to export to Zambia 1,000 tons of crude Rhodesian sugar.

317. Such flagrant breaches were symptomatic of the world's reaction to the crisis. The fact that sanctions had failed had become so notorious that even Wilson had accepted it. It was reliably suggested that, within the next few weeks, the United Kingdom would once



again appear before the Security Council to ask for further sanctions. If such an application was made, his country would once again point out that it was impossible effectively to strangle an economy unless there was willingness to carry out enforcement action under Chapter XI of the Charter. As if to emphasize the United Kingdom's lack of faith in its own policy, the Foreign Minister of that country was reported to have said a week before that his Government would ask the Secretary-General to send a special representative to Southern Rhodesia for purposes of conciliation. His delegation wondered what conciliation was intended.

318. It was reminded of United Kingdom intransigence over another Territory. For many years, the members of the Special Committee and the Members of the General Assembly had been urging the United Kingdom to establish a United Nations presence in Aden. That Government had always refused. Suddenly, at the end of 1966, when its policy had created the worst relationship ever in that Territory, the United Kingdom had asked for a United Nations presence to clean up the mess it had created. Similarly, in Rhodesia where, having by its foolish attachment to kinship rather than the principles of human rights and the Charter made it possible for Smith to consolidate his illegal régime, the United Kingdom Government now wanted the Secretary-General's special representative and through him, the General Assembly, to take the blame for its failure. His Government had constantly maintained that Southern Rhodesia was a colonial question and that the responsibility for solving it lay with the United Kingdom. The United Nations was not empowered to negotiate with a colonial Territory but it could discuss with the administering Power how decolonization could best be effected, and an administering Power seeking such help should be prepared to accept the recommendations made. It was to be hoped that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom would have the courage to take an unpopular decision which would command world respect and contribute to the stability of southern Africa, namely, to make it perfectly clear to Ian Smith and his group that their days were numbered and the time had come for all the people of Zimbabwe, and not just white Rhodesians, to build a nation in accordance with the will of the majority.

319. He mentioned, in passing, the Southern Rhodesian White Paper which would bring the Territory nearer to *apartheid* and a diabolical union with South Africa. In that connexion, President Kaunda had warned the Special Committee of the grave danger of a racial and ideological war in southern Africa and of the duty of the world community to avert that threat. To do so it was necessary that the super Powers, the major Powers and all others should pool their efforts and not be separated by selfish parochial interests. Wherever the will existed, every nation, whatever its ideology, found a means of acting. The nations of the world had to unite to save southern Africa and ensure the freedom of all its peoples.

320. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the President, Government and people of Zambia for their hospitality, and President Kaunda for his address which manifested, once again, the readiness of the Zambian people to continue the fight for the freedom and independence of African countries from colonialism. The Soviet Union, which would shortly celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the

October revolution and had transformed itself from a backward and exploited country to a united and prosperous one, well understood the difficulties confronting Zambia on its path to independent development.

321. Zambia was an immediate neighbour of the colonial Territories of Portugal and the racist strongholds of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was also close to South West Africa, whose people were suffering under the yoke of the South African racists who were illegally maintaining their hold on that Territory. Zambia's successes in overcoming the sequels of colonialism were an inspiration to its neighbours still under the domination of the colonialists. The Soviet Union would continue to co-operate with Zambia and other African countries in giving support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate fight for national independence.

322. The Special Committee again had to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia, involving the fate of the 4 million people of Zimbabwe. The racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, flouting world opinion and in defiance of a number of United Nations decisions, continued to deny the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence. That was because of the refusal of the imperialist Powers to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples because they did not want to give up their plans to maintain southern Africa as a stronghold of colonialism. Eighteen months ago when, as a result of the rebellion, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had become dangerous, the General Assembly had approved measures aimed at helping the people of Zimbabwe in their fight for freedom. The General Assembly had recommended that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia should be discussed by the Security Council which, on 16 December 1966, had adopted resolution 232 (1966) imposing economic sanctions on the racist Salisbury régime. Those sanctions had proved to be insufficient and ineffective. The situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to deteriorate instead of the rebels in Southern Rhodesia being brought to heel, the racist régime had been able to consolidate itself; instead of the establishment of a government representing a majority of the population, the Zimbabwe people continued to be the object of cruel repression; instead of action to end the racist persecution of 1961 and its replacement by a democratic constitution, legislation was being promulgated which only strengthened racial discrimination and was designed to perpetuate the privileges of the white settler minority.

323. In violation of United Nations decisions and despite the imposition of sanctions, the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, with the support of its many patrons abroad and the help of the international monopolies, continued to build up a new bastion of racism in southern Africa which constituted a menace not only to the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia but also to the independent African States, since the Rhodesian racists were working in close collaboration with their spiritual brethren in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.

324. The United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was unquestionably responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In December 1966, the Soviet delegation in the Security Council had drawn attention to the fact that the measures taken by the United Kingdom in relation to Southern Rhodesia were quite inadequate to divert the minority régime from its

criminal policy towards the indigenous inhabitants. The sanctions imposed did not cover oil, on which the economy of Southern Rhodesia was largely dependent. Even the partial sanctions imposed were ignored by the Western Powers, whose monopolies were ruthlessly exploiting the national wealth of Zimbabwe. Those monopolies had not limited and had in fact extended the scope of their operations in Southern Rhodesia. Exhaustive evidence of that fact was contained in numerous publications, in particular in document A/AC.109/L.393.

325. Investments by the United Kingdom monopolies in Southern Rhodesia amounted to £200 million; more than 180 United Kingdom firms had more than 290 branch offices in Southern Rhodesia. Other countries with large investments in Southern Rhodesia were South Africa with £75 million, the United States with £20 million, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Portugal and others. Seventy-five per cent of Rhodesia's mining industry belonged to foreign monopolies. Amongst western European countries, the Federal Republic of Germany in particular had increased its trade turnover with Southern Rhodesia. That showed that the West German Government was continuing to co-operate with the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. In chapter III of document A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>5</sup> for instance, confirmed the striking fact that the Federal Republic of Germany took 40.8 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to western Europe and provided 29.1 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports from western Europe. During 1966, the average monthly value of the goods delivered by Southern Rhodesia to West Germany had risen from \$3.8 million to approximately \$5 million. That stood in marked contrast to the policy of the German Democratic Republic, which had strictly complied with the United Nations resolution and had refused to recognize the Smith régime. As could be seen from document S/7794,<sup>6</sup> the German Democratic Republic had reaffirmed its determination to fulfil without reservation the demands set forth in Security Council resolution 232 (1966). In conformity with its consistent anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist policy, the Government of the German Democratic Republic was supporting the just struggle of the African population of Southern Rhodesia for freedom and independence and was actively working to bring about the end of the racist régime. In statements dated 13 November 1965 and 9 June 1966, that Government had already made it clear that it refused to recognize the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, which ran counter to the principles of international law, and that even at that time it had broken off all trade relations with Southern Rhodesia. That stood in marked contrast to the policy of the German Democratic Republic which had strictly complied with the United Nations resolution and had refused to recognize the Smith régime.

326. Air Vice-Marshal Hawkins of the Southern Rhodesian Air Force had recently claimed that, except for the South African Air Force, the Southern Rhodesian Air Force was the most powerful within a radius of 3,500 miles. The military budget of Southern Rhodesia had been increased by 20 per cent during the past year.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967*, document S/7794.

327. The delegation of the Soviet Union insisted that effective measures must be taken against the fanatical racists of Salisbury. The problem could be solved along the lines of the programme approved by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: through the repeal of the racist constitution of 1961, the release of political prisoners, the holding of elections on the basis of "one man, one vote" and the transfer of power without delay to a government representing the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. In order to implement that programme, the Western Powers, and above all the United Kingdom, must be required to fulfil without duplicity the decisions of the United Nations aimed at guaranteeing the rights of the people of Zimbabwe to true independence and freedom. States which undermined the United Nations decision on Southern Rhodesia, in particular South Africa and Portugal, deserved the severest condemnation.

328. The Soviet Union would continue to comply to the letter with the Security Council's decisions. It held the views that no decisions of the United Nations relieved the United Kingdom, as administering Power, of the full responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the tragic plight of the people of Zimbabwe. That applied not only to the United Kingdom but also to its NATO partners which supported the United Kingdom in its Southern Rhodesian policy.

329. True to its policy of supporting the national liberation movements of colonial peoples and countries, the Soviet Union was in complete sympathy with the people of Zimbabwe and was ready to co-operate with the African countries in providing full support to the people of Zimbabwe in its just fight for national independence. The Soviet Union would endorse all United Nations decisions aimed at eradicating colonialism and racism from Southern Africa.

330. The representative of Mali expressed his delegation's gratitude to the people of Zambia, to their party and to their Government under the clear-sighted leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda for the kind invitation which had been extended to the Special Committee and for the warm and brotherly welcome accorded it. Mali had not been surprised by the Zambian gesture because ever since that country had become independent, it had been the bastion of anti-colonialism in an especially sensitive region where injustice, racism and the most flagrant kind of exploitation had unfortunately run rampant to the detriment of the African population. Mali respected Zambia's brave stand, expressed its full sympathy with that country and gave it its unconditional support in its struggle to endow the black man with the dignity which the racist settlers of Salisbury and Pretoria, with the support of the big Western Powers, were flouting with impunity in defiance of world public opinion.

331. The Special Committee could not do better than to study the situation in Southern Rhodesia from the vantage point of the mining region of Zambia, a short distance from Salisbury. Its presence there should give fresh confidence and courage to the nationalists of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union fighting against the racist minority of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The last General Assembly had considered the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and had adopted important recommendations which had become binding

upon all States Members of the United Nations. Since the previous autumn, the situation had continued to deteriorate in that United Kingdom colony. Ian Smith had consolidated his position, as the President of the Republic of Zambia had so rightly pointed out at the opening of the session at Kitwe. Ever since the unilateral declaration of independence by the clique of racist colonialists led by Ian Smith, the United Kingdom, the administering Power, had confined itself to statements of intention, while refusing to take any vigorous action to restore the rule of law in the country, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

332. The delegation of Mali reaffirmed its consistent stand, which was one of condemnation for the unilateral independence of Southern Rhodesia. It considered that the United Kingdom bore full responsibility for the situation created in that country, and it denounced the manoeuvres of Wilson's Government. The only purpose of such delaying tactics was to enable Ian Smith's clique to establish itself comfortably in its illegal position, in order the better to exploit the people of Zimbabwe for the benefit of the United Kingdom companies and foreign monopolies operating in Southern Rhodesia.

333. On the proposal of the United Kingdom Government, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965) and, most important, resolution 232 (1966) imposing selective sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. Those resolutions had had no effect because of the negative attitude of the Pretoria and Lisbon régimes, which had vigorously supported Ian Smith. Thanks to that support and Wilson's procrastination, the Rhodesian economy was now even better off than before. Statistics published by the United Nations had shown the ineffectiveness of those sanctions, for the major Powers, from the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom included, had been expanding their trade with Ian Smith's régime even while their delegations, in their statements, had been condemning the stand taken by the racist settlers. That ambiguous situation had lasted long enough; the time had come for action. Document S/7781/Add.1,<sup>7</sup> published on 23 February 1967, namely, more than two years after the adoption of the Security Council resolution, showed that the value of Southern Rhodesian exports of all commodities to the United States had totalled \$8,434,000 for the period from January to October 1966. During the same period, the value of Rhodesian exports to the Federal Republic of Germany had been \$25,579,000; to the United Kingdom, \$12,754,000; and to Japan, \$13,280,000. Sugar exports to the United Kingdom during the same period had totalled 20,486 tons, representing a value of \$1,278,000, and sugar exports to Canada had totalled 14,921 tons, representing a value of \$747,000.

334. During the same period, Southern Rhodesian exports of tobacco had amounted to: 714 tons, representing a value of \$933,000, to the United States; 1,751 tons, representing a value of \$1,742,000, to Belgium and Luxembourg; 6,293 tons, representing a value of \$7,267,000, to the Federal Republic of Germany; and 2,484 tons, representing a value of \$3,236,000 to Portugal (Mozambique).

335. Those were only a few examples selected from a list,<sup>8</sup> which had been compiled by the Secretariat, of

commodities sold by Southern Rhodesia to the major Western Powers. That document showed that the United Kingdom had imported from Southern Rhodesia, between January and November 1966, 6,904 tons of tobacco, representing a value of \$8,243,000, and that, in the case of commodities such as hides and skins, asbestos, chromium ore and concentrates, iron, pig-iron, copper and so forth, the major Powers were rushing to the support of Southern Rhodesia by purchasing those commodities at favourable prices, in violation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966). It was thus no longer surprising that Ian Smith was defying international opinion and strengthening his position by taking stricter coercive measures against the people of Zimbabwe. The reason why the major Western Powers refused to take the only valid and just course which could resolve the Rhodesian crisis, namely, the use of force, was obvious. It was to safeguard selfish interests and enable companies such as Hippo Valley Estates or Rhodesian Anglo American (subsidiaries of the trust company, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, which had vast holdings in the sugar industry and in agriculture and other economic sectors of the country, to make bigger profits at the expense of the Zimbabwe people. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was drawing off from the Rhodesian economy 70 to 80 per cent of the profits which were transferred to London banks. There was thus an organized system of exploitation at all levels within that unfortunate country.

336. Mali denounced that collusion of interests which was presenting the people of Zimbabwe from attaining self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Zimbabwe people had been betrayed, and their natural wealth was being pillaged for the benefit of the international trusts and monopolies. For that reason, Mali welcomed the inclusion of the following item in the agenda for the next session of the General Assembly: "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination". There could be no doubt that it was precisely those sordid economic interests which lay behind the attitude of certain major Powers, and of the United Kingdom in particular, towards Ian Smith and Vorster.

337. To the foregoing reasons must be added the alleged strategic value which the countries where racial discrimination prevailed represented for the hypothetical defence of the so-called free world. Mali rejected such a claim and considered that the principle of self-determination should apply for all alike.

338. Now that the world had realized the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions, it was time, if the worst was to be avoided, for the United Kingdom to use force to overthrow Ian Smith. It had been the United Kingdom which, four years previously, had armed the racist settlers by its refusal to comply with United Nations recommendations. It alone was thus responsible for the situation. In his country's opinion, economic sanctions, whether selective or total, would serve no purpose. The only suitable course was the use of force by the administering Power. That the United Kingdom was firmly convinced of that fact was demonstrated by its use of force to stifle Arab nationalism in Aden and the

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/7781/Add.1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

Protectorates. However, as President Kaunda had said, the blood of the white Southern Rhodesians was the same as that which flowed in the veins of the Arabs of occupied South Arabia and in the veins of the people of Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom's procrastination could be accounted for, it seemed, only by the fact that the racist settlers were of British stock and that the British preferred to sacrifice 4 million Africans rather than shed a single drop of British blood. If that were so, the nationalists were left with no other choice than to take up arms to liberate their country.

339. The Malian delegation joined with the Chairman in calling upon all nationalists to unite their efforts in order to join battle against the Salisbury racists. They could be assured of the total support of the Republic of Mali in their fight for the liberation of their country. He recalled that his Government did not recognize the present régime in Southern Rhodesia. He reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence, as recognized by the United Nations Charter and all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Mali recognized the legitimacy of the struggle being waged by all the oppressed peoples—whether in Asia, the Middle East or right there in southern Africa—in order that man might live in freedom and dignity.

340. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed his warm appreciation for the invitation of the Government of Zambia, the hospitality of the people of Zambia and the excellent arrangements made for the Special Committee's stay at Kitwe. His delegation had been impressed and moved by President Kaunda's address in which he had spoken of the problems of colonialism, minority rule, and the denial of fundamental human rights in the area of southern Africa with which the Committee would deal during its meetings in Zambia.

341. Those problems were matters in which all free people were involved; they appealed to the conscience and the enlightened self-interest of the entire world community. The existence of colonial minority régimes in the countries surrounding Zambia created for it particularly pressing economic, political and social problems. His delegation was impressed with Zambia's progress in meeting those difficulties during the short time since its independence, notably in lessening its economic dependence on Southern Rhodesia and in strengthening alternative transport routes and sources of supply. In that connexion he recalled that the United States, immediately after the Smith régime's illegal declaration of independence, had assisted with a \$5 million emergency petroleum airlift to Zambia, and had supplied additional resources for road maintenance. Moreover, the United States Government was at present financing a full engineering survey of that portion of the Great North Road which lay in the United Republic of Tanzania. Zambia was progressing rapidly with practical plans for creating a dynamic, multiracial society, typified by its ambitious four-year development plan.

342. Relations between the United States and Zambia were characterized by mutual respect and understanding, although the two countries did not always agree on the best means of reaching mutually desired goals in the complex and potentially explosive political arena of southern Africa.

343. Turning to the two problems upon which the Special Committee would deliberate during its meetings

in Zambia, he said that the United States supported the principle that the people of South West Africa should be enabled fully to exercise their right to self-determination and independence under the Charter of the United Nations, that the hateful and doomed policy of *apartheid* should be brought to an end in South West Africa and that the United Nations should discharge its responsibilities with regard to that Territory. The General Assembly, in adopting resolution 2145 (XXI) which ended South Africa's mandate over South West Africa, had taken an important step. His Government supported that resolution and, in the words of the United States Representative, "would do whatever it could by all appropriate and peaceful means to implement it".

344. Concerning the critical and unsolved problem in Southern Rhodesia, his Government had given strong support to the measures taken by the Security Council to bring the illegal Smith régime to an end. He reaffirmed his country's support for a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem to ensure the achievement of its objective, which, in the words of President Johnson, was "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia, not just 6 per cent of them".

345. His Government had voted for Security Council resolution 232 (1966) which imposed certain mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, and had complied fully with its provisions.

346. The representative of *Yugoslavia* thanked the President, Government and people of Zambia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in the beautiful city of Kitwe, thus demonstrating that Zambia was ready to contribute to the elimination of colonialism from Africa. President Kaunda's remarkable address reflected Zambia's determination to contribute fully to the liquidation of all remnants of the brutal and inhuman régime of colonialism.

347. The major Western Powers, in particular the United Kingdom, were those most responsible for the present situation in Africa. They should regard President Kaunda's words as a serious warning of what would happen if they continued to support the illegal Smith régime. Moreover, President Kaunda's wise words would inspire the Special Committee in its work at Kitwe.

348. His own country was linked with Zambia by ties of friendship, a common policy of non-alignment, and a common desire to combat the threat of colonial and neo-colonial pressures and interference in the internal affairs of independent States. Both countries attached great importance to the United Nations and were doing all they could to make it an effective instrument for the achievement of its lofty aims.

349. The prompt eradication of colonialism was one of the primary responsibilities of the United Nations. All progressive peoples were gravely concerned at the recent stagnation in the process of decolonization. Colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers were doing their best to impede the process of development in the newly independent countries and were attempting to strengthen their rule over Territories still under colonial domination. The most glaring examples were the racist régimes in the south of Africa, and Zambia, because of its geographical position, was directly threatened by the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

350. Yugoslavia fully sympathized with the dangers and difficulties faced by Zambia. During its sessions at Kitwe the Special Committee would give special atten-

tion to the question of Southern Rhodesia. Because of the ineffective measures so far taken and the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to assume its responsibilities and employ military force, the situation in Southern Rhodesia was deteriorating, representing a direct threat not only to the future of the people of Zimbabwe, but also to that of Africa as a whole. The people of Yugoslavia full shared the fears expressed by President Kaunda in that respect. It was the Committee's duty to denounce the real causes of concern in southern Africa and to address its demands to those upon whose policies, in the final analysis, the solution of the problem of southern Africa and other colonial problems depended.

351. His delegation was confident that Africa, with the aid of the progressive elements in the international community, would succeed in uprooting the last remnants of racism and colonialism from its soil. Progress was too irresistible to be diverted by the selfish interests of the racists of southern Africa or by their allies. Yugoslavia would, as in the past, continue to support the people of Zimbabwe, South West Africa and others who were fighting for their independence.

352. The representative of *Bulgaria* associated himself with the expressions of thanks to President Kaunda, his Government and people. In inviting the Special Committee, the Zambian Government had demonstrated its sense of responsibility with regard to finding a solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had not only offered hospitality to thousands of refugees, but was also in the forefront of the fight against the criminal régime of Ian Smith and those who supported him.

353. The Special Committee would not forget President Kaunda's moving appeals to the conscience and goodwill of the Government of the United Kingdom to take effective measures against the Smith régime, nor his warnings to the United Kingdom and its Western allies that the illegal unilateral declaration of independence would have catastrophic consequences for Africa and the world as a whole. Members of the Committee had already had the privilege of hearing the remarkable statements of Mr. Kapwepwe, the Zambian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which he had declared that only the use of force by the United Kingdom could bring down the rebel régime. Unfortunately that country and its allies had not listened to those appeals. The United Kingdom was continuing blindly with its old imperialistic policies and had indeed encouraged the illegal régime by declaring before the unilateral declaration of independence that it would not use force against the rebels.

354. He assured the people of Zambia that Bulgaria admired their courage and determination to help their brothers of Zimbabwe at great personal sacrifice. Zambia's non-compromising policy was one of the most important factors in fighting the illegal Smith régime and in restoring the lawful rights of the Zimbabwe people.

355. His delegation had been deeply impressed by President Kaunda's address, by his evaluation of the present situation in Africa, and by his analysis of the unrealistic policy of the United Kingdom.

356. His Government's policy with respect to Southern Rhodesia coincided with that of the majority of the African States, which considered that only the use of force by the United Kingdom could bring down the

illegal Smith régime. His delegation unhesitatingly supported President Kaunda's assertion that there was no alternative to the use of force by the United Kingdom, which bore full responsibility for the events in Southern Rhodesia. It also agreed that only thus could mandatory sanctions contribute to the elimination of the Smith régime.

357. The Special Committee would be discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia at a time when the Zimbabwe people's fight for liberty was entering a decisive phase. The Zambian invitation would give the Committee an opportunity of coming into contact with the genuine representatives of the liberation movement. His delegation hoped that those representatives would concentrate and not dissipate their efforts, and that they would inform the Committee of the role that the United Nations could play in mobilizing world opinion against the racist régimes in southern Africa. It also expected to hear new information concerning the support for those régimes afforded by the Western Powers and the members of NATO, and the activities of international monopolies and financial interests.

358. He asked the Observer for Zambia to transmit the cordial greetings of the Bulgarian people to the people of Zambia, and to assure them of Bulgaria's desire to develop friendly relations with them.

359. The representative of *Madagascar* said that he too wished to express sincere and profound gratitude on behalf of his delegation to the Government and people of the Republic of Zambia for their kind invitation, which had enabled the Special Committee to meet in Zambia once again. He was very touched by the hospitality and the brotherly welcome which the Zambian people had extended to the Committee.

360. His delegation also wished to state that it greatly appreciated the important and wise statement which President Kaunda had made at the Special Committee's first meeting in Zambia. That outstanding statement, which would undoubtedly provide the Committee with useful guidance in its work at Kitwe, had eloquently demonstrated the determination of the Government and people of Zambia to work for the liberation of the countries and peoples still under colonial domination.

361. Despite the long frontiers which it shared with the main proponents of colonialism, the Republic of Zambia was showing truly remarkable vigilance and courage in opposing the white racists of Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa.

362. His delegation shared the concern expressed by President Kaunda when he had denounced the United Kingdom's policy of "honourable defeat". It was the United Kingdom's duty to honour its responsibilities and obligations in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government was completely free to use all means at its disposal to solve the Rhodesian crisis. It was in that perspective that the Council of Ministers of the OAU, at its eighth regular session, at Addis Ababa, had adopted a resolution condemning the United Kingdom Government yet again for having evaded its moral and constitutional responsibilities with regard to the people of Zimbabwe.

363. Madagascar remained faithful to its policy of non-violence and did not advocate the use of force to solve colonial problems. However, if the use of force was considered the ultimate solution of the Rhodesian problem, in his delegation's view it was for the United



Kingdom, and the United Kingdom alone, to use it. That was the solution which the United Kingdom Government had already adopted to crush nationalist movements in other colonies.

364. In conclusion, he wished to reaffirm his delegation's firm resolve to work for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to assure the national liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration once again that the people of Madagascar supported their heroic struggle to exercise their right to freedom, self-determination and independence. Lastly, his delegation requested the Chairman of the Special Committee to convey Madagascar's brotherly greetings and sincere good wishes to President Kaunda, the Government of the Republic of Zambia and the dynamic Zambian people for their faith in the dignity of man and their determination to free Africa from colonialism.

365. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that his delegation was happy to salute the Government and people of Zambia and to thank them sincerely for the brotherly welcome they had extended to the members of the Special Committee. The warmth of that welcome showed the importance which Zambia attached to the United Nations and to international problems. The Ivory Coast was used to playing host to international conferences and knew that the organization of such meetings involved enormous efforts and sacrifices for the host country. It was for that reason that his delegation had appreciated the traditional African hospitality offered by the brother people of Zambia.

366. He particularly wished to thank the President of the Republic of Zambia and to congratulate him on the moving and masterly statement he had made before the Special Committee. In his delegation's view, that statement would stimulate the members of the Committee and lead them to reflect deeply on the serious situation in Rhodesia. By inviting the Committee to meet on its soil, Zambia and its distinguished President would enable the Committee to work more efficiently and give substantial assistance to the African peoples of the Territories still under foreign domination, who were struggling unceasingly for their lawful rights and freedoms.

367. The Ivory Coast was not indifferent to that struggle. It attached particular importance to the problems of decolonization and would therefore spare no effort within its means to make a full and complete contribution to the application of the principle of decolonization and to the Special Committee's work at its current session. Its desire to see all Africans, without exception, enjoying that essential nutriment, freedom, had been demonstrated on many occasions, in particular throughout the debates on the Territories under Portuguese administration, the problem of Rhodesia and South West Africa. Its position was clear and well-known: the Ivory Coast believed it to be its duty, as an African State, to demand the liberation of all African territories and justice for their peoples. It had always believed and still believed that the most reasonable way to achieve that goal was to settle international crises by peaceful means, for as President Houphouët-Boigny had said, war had never really settled anything.

368. Unfortunately, the hopes of the Ivory Coast had been disappointed on more than one occasion, particularly with regard to the Rhodesian affair. It had

placed its confidence in those responsible for the Rhodesian crisis, because it had believed that under the wide powers which they held, it was their duty, as administering Powers, to lead the Rhodesian people to independence in conditions which would permit all citizens to enjoy equal rights. Economic sanctions had been in effect for over a year but it was an open secret that they had failed miserably.

369. His delegation was uncertain what steps should be taken to resolve that situation, but nevertheless wished to reaffirm emphatically that the African countries could not wait for ever. Ever since the beginning of the Rhodesian crisis the United Kingdom had been perfectly well aware of what world opinion expected of it, namely, to crush the rebellion which it had recognized as such, to destroy the illegal régime of Ian Smith, and in short to restore legality and grant independence to Rhodesia in the best possible conditions.

370. The Ivory Coast called on its African friends to join it in launching a new and urgent appeal to the United Kingdom to recognize the failure and ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and invite it to use the appropriate energetic means recommended on several occasions by the General Assembly and the majority of African States. At the same time, the Ivory Coast appealed to all the nationalist movements to unite in their struggle for freedom.

371. The representative of *Italy* recalled that, for its meetings in Zambia the Special Committee had one of the heaviest agendas outside Headquarters, which proved the wisdom of accepting the Zambian invitation. All the items for the meetings at Kitwe affected Zambia directly and deeply, since that country was so very near the scene of what might be termed "ultra-colonialism". The events in southern Africa constituted a major political problem, often involving the denial of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

372. The defiance of the international community by the illegal Smith régime was a source of anxiety to the United Nations, and in particular to the Special Committee. Recent news, some of which was contained in document A/AC.109/L.393/Add.1, showed that the Salisbury régime was introducing even stronger measures of racial discrimination. It was easy to guess what the provisions of the new Rhodesian constitution in course of preparation would be.

373. The Special Committee's meeting at Kitwe would provide it with direct evidence concerning the unfortunate consequences of policies that denied fundamental human rights. His delegation looked forward to taking part in the careful examination of whatever additional information was submitted to the Committee for further action by the United Nations. President Kaunda's opening address had given the Committee a picture of the economic strain placed upon Zambia by the present situation. In spite of those difficulties, however, Zambia was maintaining and strengthening its measures to combat the Smith régime in pursuance of the United Nations decisions.

374. Italy's position was clear and had recently been reaffirmed in a decree promulgated by its President designed to ensure full and prompt compliance with the Security Council's decisions and which compounded and completed previous administrative decisions.

375. He endorsed the remarks made by the Chairman and previous speakers in expressing gratitude

to President Kaunda and his people for the welcome they had given the Special Committee and for the reaffirmation of Zambia's faith in the United Nations. No better words of encouragement could be given to the Committee in its work.

376. The representative of *Iraq* thanked the Zambian Government for its invitation to the Special Committee and for its warm welcome, good planning and foresight.

377. President Kaunda's brilliant address would greatly influence the Special Committee's work and decisions, for he had expressed his point of view with sincerity, thought and good judgement. The Arab countries ascribed particular importance to the Rhodesian situation since they had faced and were still facing similar problems; they understood the miseries involved when the majority of an indigenous population was subjected to the rule of a foreign authority which denied it fundamental freedoms. Rhodesia was, so to speak, another Palestine, for the racist Government of Ian Smith paralleled the racist leadership of Israel, which was supported by international Zionism and the forces of colonialism. Indeed, the administering Power, namely, the United Kingdom, was the same in both cases. Each country had to tackle the problem of protecting refugees from despotism and brutality. For that reason his delegation fully sympathized with the Zambian Government and people who were offering hospitality to many thousands of their brothers who had escaped from the Rhodesian dictatorship.

378. His delegation reserved the right to speak later on the problems created by the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

379. The representative of *Tunisia* said that first of all he wished to associate his delegation with all those which had spoken previously and to express to the President, the people and the Government of Zambia its sincere thanks and deep gratitude for their invitation to the Special Committee, which had enabled it to meet for the second time in just a few years, in a sister country whose hospitality did honour to Africa and whose faith in the work of the United Nations and of the Committee was well known.

380. He wished to pay a special tribute to President Kaunda for his untiring efforts to ensure the well-being of his people and country and for his continuing action on behalf of the countries which were still colonized and the peoples who were still oppressed and enslaved. The moving statement which he had made at the opening of the Special Committee's work had deeply impressed all those who had heard it. That statement revealed both profound humanism and an acute and moderate political sense, and every Government and individual of goodwill who desired peace would endorse the conclusions to be drawn from it. The significance of President Kaunda's statement was all the greater because it had been made by a Head of State whose level-headedness, wisdom and sense of responsibility were recognized by all.

381. As a result of its geographical situation and its economic structure, Zambia had been deeply involved in the Rhodesian tragedy and had suffered the consequences of that involvement from the moment it had been independent. The courage of its President and the determination of its people alone had enabled it to survive the terrible ordeals to which it had been subjected. However, despite the warning notes which President Kaunda had long been sounding and the

efforts of the peoples of Africa and Asia, no serious steps had yet been taken to settle the problem of Southern Rhodesia once and for all; no steps had been taken to prevent the racist minority in Rhodesia from transforming that territory into a new field for experimentation in the widely criticized policy of *apartheid*. There was no doubt as to the United Kingdom's responsibility in the matter. In fact, the United Kingdom had always asserted its responsibilities, but by its hesitations, its tergiversations and its so-called negotiations it had allowed Smith and his accomplices to seize power illegally. By advocating the application of economic sanctions, it had enabled him to consolidate his régime, for it was obvious to all that the sanctions had failed. Because they were selective and because they could easily be circumvented, those sanctions had not weakened Smith's minority, illegal, racist régime or disturbed the country's economy. On the contrary, they had enabled Smith to gain time, to move closer to South Africa and to submit himself entirely to the orders of his masters in Pretoria. They had enabled the evil and criminal triple alliance to consolidate its position and to defy the conscience of the world with impunity. Smith now felt encouraged: his régime had been consolidated, the restrictions he had imposed in the country were being relaxed and a constitution even more racist than its predecessor was being prepared. The United Kingdom, like all the other Powers which had supported its policy, was responsible not only for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia but also for the explosion of violence which would unfailingly occur in the territory, for oppression and injustice could not continue. Law and justice would eventually triumph in Southern Rhodesia, as they had triumphed in other countries. The Zimbabwe people would eventually rise and expel the usurpers. Fortified by international support, they would ultimately recover their rights, their independence and their freedom. The Special Committee should make specific recommendations, for only energetic action could avoid bloodshed and an explosion of violence in the future.

382. In conclusion, he reaffirmed that the Tunisian people would always stand shoulder to shoulder with the Zimbabwe people and would defend their cause, support them in their combat and assist them in their struggle.

383. The representative of *Australia* thanked President Kaunda for his lucid and moving address, which revealed him as a man whose first consideration was always the well-being of his fellow men. His delegation was also grateful for the opportunity of visiting Zambia and had been impressed by the achievement and friendliness of its people. To some extent Australia was itself still a developing country and could therefore appreciate Zambia's many problems. It had unreserved faith in the future of the vigorous and robust young Zambian nation under the leadership of its distinguished President.

384. His delegation was looking forward to hearing first-hand accounts of the situation in the Territories surrounding Zambia, which would be of great value to the Special Committee's work. Australia was deeply conscious of the problems arising for Zambia in an unhappy and difficult situation.

385. In many ways Australia could claim a special relationship with Zambia, since both countries shared a common heritage. Moreover, Australia was fortunate in having the opportunity to learn more about the African members of the Commonwealth because of

the significant number of Africans who were studying there. That special Commonwealth relationship was, he felt, best exemplified by Australia's action in imposing voluntary sanctions on the illegal Rhodesian régime within five days of the unilateral declaration of independence. That action had thus anticipated Security Council resolution 217 (1965). Since then, Australia has complied fully with the resolution requiring the imposition of mandatory sanctions. Australia opposed any system of government which denied basic human rights to any part of its people, and adhered unequivocally to the principle of self-determination.

386. His country's attitude towards colonialism, with particular reference to Southern Rhodesia, could be summed up by a quotation from recent speeches by Mr. Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs:

"... we have taken various steps including drastic restrictions of imports from Rhodesia, to try to induce the régime under Mr. Ian Smith to return to constitutional government. We continue to believe that the objective should be a government in Rhodesia responsible to all the people of the country and with effective safeguards for all elements of the population... Australia believes that a society and form of government cannot, and should not, persist where a minority dominates the majority and where basic human rights and opportunities are denied to any of the population. We in Australia believe in basic human rights and participation for all persons in the life of a country. We believe that neither a majority nor a minority should be oppressed, or denied human rights, or shut off from opportunities of participation in government... Australia was one of the first countries in the world to apply sanctions against Rhodesia [and] has refused to recognize the unilateral and illegal declaration of independence by the régime in Southern Rhodesia."

387. Australia believed in the promotion and encouragement of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations.

#### CLOSING OF MEETINGS

##### *Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia*

388. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia thanked the Special Committee for affording him the opportunity of addressing it. He knew that the past week had been a week of toil and moil for the Committee and perhaps also a period of frustration for some members, but he hoped the Zambian people would be forgiven for any mistakes they had made and for any inconvenience such shortcomings might have caused.

389. For the Zambian people, the Special Committee's deliberations had been a source of further inspiration in the very difficult situation in which, through no fault of their own, they found themselves. Members had not minced their words in condemning the United Kingdom's Rhodesian policy or in castigating South Africa and the Western Powers for their obstructionist policies on South West Africa. Now had they closed their eyes to the heart-rending sufferings of the millions of Africans under the feudalistic and

genocidal Portuguese oppression in Angola and Mozambique.

390. There was nothing more reassuring to the people of Zambia than to find that the Special Committee viewed the problems of southern Africa in the same light as they did. But the Zambian people were not armchair political philosophers: they did not content themselves with sitting back and philosophizing about problems which called for action. The unanimity of purpose which the Zambian people shared with the Committee was not enough. The Committee should go more than half way to meet the demands and wipe away the tears of southern Africa's oppressed millions. Words, and indeed resolutions and solemn pronouncements were meaningless, if they were not followed by action; it was pointless for the Committee to listen to the humble pleas and sad revelations of freedom fighters merely as a formality and to do nothing thereafter.

391. Thousands of families in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa were close to death from starvation. Some of them were homeless and without medical care. Freedom fighters needed substantial financial and material assistance if they were to wage a successful fight for independence. If the Special Committee was to rise above a status of a debating society, to which the passage of time seemed to have relegated it, it should engage in practical programmes designed to assist the oppressed peoples of dependent Africa and to help them attain independence. The colonial problems of southern Africa would not be solved merely by resolutions in the Special Committee, in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, but by action outside the conference halls—and daring action at that.

392. In that connexion, he reminded his brothers in Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and South West Africa that independence would not be won by petitions, nor by elaborate and academic denunciations of what the colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa were doing, but by blood and iron. The peoples of southern Africa must fight for their independence and not just shout from the roof-tops or stage war dances. That was the lesson taught by colonial history; and history was repeating itself every day.

393. He had unfortunately been unable to be present during the Special Committee's deliberations owing to prior commitments with another international conference at Lusaka. But he had tried to follow the trend of the discussions. It was instructive to note the statements by some delegations on the question of Rhodesia. Certain delegations had entered reservations on what should surely have been a unanimous appeal to the United Kingdom, as administering Power in Southern Rhodesia, to release all political prisoners and prevent the passage of the *apartheid* bill in the rebel Parliament. Those delegations had given as the reason for their reservations the argument that, because Southern Rhodesia was in rebellion, the United Kingdom Government was incapable of implementing such an appeal. Should that be taken as a confession of defeat by that Government? It appeared to him that, although the United Kingdom was absent from the Special Committee's tour, it was being effectively represented by those delegations. Perhaps it was sheer coincidence and, if so, it certainly was a very curious coincidence that the people who were defending the United Kingdom should be of the same stock. Did

that not justify the conclusion that those countries were looking at the Rhodesian problem through the same "kith and kin" spectacles as the United Kingdom? The burden of proof to the contrary lay on their shoulders.

394. He found it strange that some of those countries should continue to have consular or trade missions at Salisbury. It had been said that the reason for the continued existence of such missions was to look after the interests of those countries' nationals in the rebel colony. But it was known that the rebels' flag was still flying in the capitals of those countries. Were the interests of their nationals more important than those of the international community? That was the hypocrisy of sanctions: to maintain trade relations and, at the same time, to enact ineffectual laws against trading with Southern Rhodesia was, according to those countries, to abide by the Security Council's resolution on Southern Rhodesia. Could there be any more transparent pretence?

395. The reason why the United Kingdom delegation had stayed away from the Special Committee's present series of meetings was that country's realization that the African people resented the United Kingdom's asking for United Nations support for such a "rider-and-horse" partnership. What the United Kingdom Government had done was to try to avoid embarrassment over the confusion and failure of its policy towards Southern Rhodesia. That was why he had recently called it a toothless hyena. Some people in Zambia and southern Africa might regard that as a mere emotional outburst, but it was a serious matter because the picture was now very very clear. It was not a matter of playing politics but of an agreement between the big Powers. If behind Southern Rhodesia stood South Africa, and behind South Africa the United Kingdom, and behind the United Kingdom the rest of the imperialist Powers, that was part of a consistent, concerted policy to maintain white supremacy in southern Africa.

396. The original aim had been a white South Africa, just as there already existed a white Australia and a white North America; and everybody knew what had happened to the Australian aborigines and the Red Indians of North America. The only thing that had prevented that fate being repeated in Africa was the fact that the world had become a little more civilized than when the British had killed off the aborigines in Australia. Today there were committees, such as the Special Committee, to denounce them. Had it not been for that little advance in civilization, the African people in South Africa would have been wiped out to make room for the white colonists.

397. The problem of southern Africa was the problem of white people believing they were a *Herrenvolk*, born to rule, born to govern, born to inherit the earth. They claimed that the Africans could not govern themselves and had to be governed, dominated, exploited; white farms and white factories had to be manned by cheap African labour. That was why South African policy was supported in fact, though denounced in words.

398. Colonialism was a two-faced phenomenon: the colonists really thought it was their duty to educate the "natives", but in practice it turned out to be a duty to exploit them. When they said "We must teach the Africans to work" what they meant was "We must force them to work for us". All the high-minded intentions of certain white colonialists were distorted

and corrupted by the underlying greed and arrogance. What the Africans finally received from their "civilizing mission" was the barbaric régime of the pass-laws and detention camps. As far as the black man was concerned, the white civilizing mission was a smoke-screen for "gracious living" at the expense of black misery.

399. South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia were not separate problems: there was a single problem of southern Africa which, if not handled properly, would lead to a clash between black and white to a war of disaster for both races.

400. Portugal claimed that Angola and Mozambique were provinces of Portugal. A glance at the map was enough to show the madness of its claim.

401. The United Kingdom refused to exercise its constitutional rights in Southern Rhodesia because the latter had a special role marked out for it by the United Kingdom and the other imperialist Powers: to act as a buffer State protecting South Africa from direct contact with African nationalism. The United Kingdom and other Powers had thousands of millions of dollars worth of investments in South Africa which were highly profitable; Southern Rhodesia was the buffer which protected those investments and profits.

402. There was no mystery about what colonialism did for the colonialists. But while it gave them millions, it also robbed them of their human values. Humanity, ethnics, logic counted for nothing, and all that remained was the "kingdom of business" where reason was absent.

403. It was grim and painful for a people to see their country's policy manipulated from outside and the best of their natural resources and raw materials squandered without any hope of redress. When men believed in materialism, they forgot about mankind. Human values became secondary and money became their major preoccupation.

404. The time had come for all freedom fighters to stand together. They should not hope for any Government to set them free. They must free themselves. They must be prepared for sacrifice. They must accept death. No price was too high to establish their human dignity and the power to shape their own destiny.

405. The imperialists were cruel and had not left any colony by simply handing it over. They had to be driven out. The liberation movements would have to produce fighting men with wills and bones of iron. Africa would not rest till the whole of Africa was free. Africa would regain its self-respect and the world's respect only when the last of the colonialists was driven out. Today Africa was not respected. Africans were thought of as children who had to be guided and governed. Africans, it was said, did not deserve freedom because they had made no contribution to world culture, to thought and philosophy. But the truth was that, because Africa was not free, African thought and culture were ignored and neglected.

406. It was only since some African nations had become free that the world was waking up to the existence of the Africans as people. In the past, when tourists had come to Africa, they had stared at the elephants and the zebras and the antelopes; they had not seen the African people. They could afford to overlook the rich culture and wisdom of Africa and the fact that Africa had been the birthplace of civilization, because Africa was not free.

407. The story of South West Africa was sad indeed. The views of the Zambian Government had been stated on a number of occasions and he would not reiterate them. But he stressed that the future of the United Nations hung in the balance because of South West Africa. The sincerity and genuineness of the big Power's professed belief in the world body was perhaps undergoing the greatest test since the founding of the United Nations. Its future, for better or worse, must depend on the fate of the formerly mandated Territory. Compromise with the forces of *apartheid* would make the world body a futile institution which had lost sight of its cardinal principle of establishing and maintaining liberty and peace.

408. He was grateful to the Special Committee for coming to Zambia and providing an opportunity for those things to be said, and he hoped that the representatives would go back to the United Nations and impress upon the international community the urgency of the southern African problem. Their resolutions must not be buried but must result in practical and timely action. The Bible said that with faith man could move mountains; but that biblical truth hardly applied to the brutal facts and lessons of everyday life. Action was the prerequisite.

409. The people of southern Africa still clung to the hope that the big Powers would realize the dangers ahead and turn back to the path of truth and civilization, because no one who exploited other human beings could be truly civilized. No one who believed in exploitation could believe in Christianity, and anyone who said he did was a hypocrite. He asked the great Powers to show sincerity and not to mouth good words without acting on them.

410. Today Africa was weak, but it would not be weak tomorrow. Empires came and went; they ruled and disintegrated. Man was everywhere the victim of time and change. It would therefore be foolish to believe that Africa would always be weak and helpless. The African people prayed that those who controlled the destinies of mankind would realize that it was not colonialism, or cannibalism, that should guide their thinking, but the welfare of their fellow men.

411. He thanked the Special Committee for having considered Zambia worthy of the honour of acting as host for its deliberations. He hoped that the members' stay in Zambia had not been as unpleasant as it had been tiring and trusted that, in the future, they would again accord the Zambian people the privilege of their visit. On behalf of the President, Government and people of Zambia, he wished them a safe journey throughout their mission.

#### *General statements*

412. *The Chairman* expressed the Special Committee's deep appreciation of the address with which it had been honoured by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia. His address had touched the hearts not only of the members of the Committee, but of all who had heard it. As Chairman, he had, at the opening meeting at Kitwe, paid a tribute to the eminently wise, statesmanlike and courageous leadership of the President of Zambia, and had taken the opportunity of applauding and expressing solidarity with the resolute and heroic stand taken by the Government and people of Zambia, at the cost of enormous sacrifice and economic dislocation, in their bitter confrontation with the forces of colonialism and imperialism in southern Africa. He had expressed deep gratification at the

unswerving dedication of the Government and people of Zambia to the cause of freedom and independence for all peoples under colonial domination, and in particular at their whole-hearted support of the fight by the national liberation movements in that part of the world. Further justification of those sentiments had been more than amply provided by the eloquent address the Committee had just heard.

413. A week of deliberations as fruitful as they had been constructive had brought the meetings at Kitwe to a close. It was his pleasant duty, as Chairman, to express the warm gratitude of the Special Committee for the generous hospitality extended by the Government and people of Zambia and for the facilities which, unstintingly placed at its disposal, had ensured the smooth running of its meetings. It was no less grateful for the opportunities that had been afforded it to see something of the delightful country of Zambia, to renew its friendships and consolidate its fraternal links with the gentle and courteous but brave and indomitable people. It went without saying that it also set a very high value on the contribution the Government of Zambia had made to the success of its meetings by its co-operation and participation in its work. If its meetings could be said to have achieved positive results, of which he had no doubt, then due credit must be given to the President, Government and people of Zambia for making it possible for the Committee to hold them. In the course of its meetings at Kitwe, the Committee had heard seven groups of petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa. By virtue of the close proximity of those Territories to Zambia, the Committee had had a unique opportunity of studying the sinister role of the Salazar, Smith and Vorster conspiracy in entrenching racism and the most nefarious forms of imperialist exploitation in southern Africa. It had acquired more direct knowledge of the unscrupulous interest of that unholy alliance, aided and abetted by its friends and well-wishers, in perpetuating colonialism in southern Africa, and had gained a deeper understanding of the living realities of the continuing struggle against the forces of colonialism and reaction in that part of the world, and of the obstacles blocking the way to their effective elimination.

414. The situation in Southern Rhodesia, as outlined by the petitioners, was indeed grave and depressing. They had drawn attention to the consequences of the unprincipled refusal of the United Kingdom Government to take effective action to bring down the illegal minority racist régime, and to guide the Territory to independence in conditions of complete democratic freedom and equality of political rights. In its devotion to its kith and kin in the Territory, and in its concern to protect its economic interests in that part of the world, the United Kingdom, which had never been slow to intervene with armed force, often without justification, in its other colonies, was not even co-operating in the effective implementation of the selective mandatory sanctions which it had advocated in the United Nations with such sanctimonious urgency. It was common knowledge that Portugal and South Africa had shown flagrant disregard for the relevant United Nations resolutions. But, as the petitioners had pointed out, it deserved to be more generally known that a number of Western countries, while paying lip service to those resolutions, had maintained their trade with Southern Rhodesia at an only slightly reduced level.



415. Meanwhile, the economy of the Territory had shown no sign of serious damage, let alone of collapse. What was more important, none of the political objectives postulated by the United Kingdom—objectives deliberately limited for reasons which were easy to guess—had been achieved. It was small wonder then that the illegal régime had continued to ride roughshod over the legitimate interests of the African people of the Territory; nor was it surprising that the régime had intensified its suppressive and repressive activities, and had adopted new and even more Draconian measures aimed at the African people, nor unexpected that the régime should embark on a programme of legislation designed to entrench *apartheid* policies and minority dictatorship in the Territory. The so-called Constitutional Commission would soon be submitting its reports, which would undoubtedly provide the United Kingdom with the pretext it sought for carrying forward in discussion with the illegal régime the infamous arrangements made at H.M.S. *Tiger* in December 1966, to the further detriment of the interests of the African majority.

416. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese domination, Portugal continued to cling desperately to its anachronistic colonial policies and to insist, contrary to the most elementary notions of realism, that those Territories were integral parts of the so-called pluri-continental Portuguese nation. In contemptuous defiance of the will of the international community, it was determined forever to trample the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the African people of the Territories underfoot. In response to the legitimate demand of those people to exercise their right to self-determination, Portugal had vastly increased the intensity as well as the scope of its war of extermination, a campaign of genocide accompanied by savage brutality which was without parallel in the recent annals of colonial history.

417. Not content with ruthlessly exploiting the resources of the Territories, it had taken steps to transform their economic and social system in order to serve the purposes of a war effort far in excess of its own capabilities. In that effort it continued to enjoy diplomatic, economic and military assistance from a number of its friends and allies, including certain members of NATO, in addition to the support it received from its racist collaborators of Salisbury and Pretoria. It had also intensified its violations of the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants, and by adding to the system of forced labour the forcible export of African workers to South Africa. The Special Committee had also learnt how, in the face of those overwhelming odds, the national liberation movements had nevertheless pressed their just and honourable fight to free the Territories from the colonial yoke. It was much encouraged by the information it had received concerning the efforts of those movements to rehabilitate the liberated areas and to promote the welfare of the refugees from the areas yet to be liberated. In that connexion, the petitioners had also reminded it of their urgent need for more assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations.

418. Regarding South West Africa, the petitioners had informed the Special Committee that, far from offering its co-operation in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248

(S-V), South Africa had recently stepped up its naked fascist oppression of the people of the Territory, including the use of organized terrorism and inhuman torture. Moreover, the white supremacists of Pretoria had taken steps to establish so-called self-government for Ovamboland. As the petitioners had rightly observed, that was a usurpation of the United Nations role and flagrant defiance of its authority. It was an extension of the Bantustan policy of the Pretoria régime aimed at fragmenting the Territory, at misleading indignant public opinion, and at setting up a smoke-screen for continued domination by South Africa.

419. The Special Committee had also heard testimony concerning the installation of new military bases, designed to crush the fight for liberation and to provoke and threaten neighbouring African States. It had been informed that, in spite of all those handicaps, the fight for national liberation in South West Africa was being waged in earnest and that the Vorster régime had been obliged to increase its military establishments on the borders of the Territory. It had also heard about the massive assistance which South Africa was receiving from its major trading partners, which no doubt made it easier for that régime to refuse to make any concessions either to reason or to the principles of the Charter.

420. Finally, all the petitioners from Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa had stressed the prominent role played in the economic life of those Territories by international economic, financial and related interests. They had all pointed to the merciless exploitation by those interests of the human and material resources of the Territories and had pointed out that those interests, acting in collusion and in support of the colonial régimes, had been instrumental in denying the African people the means of effective participation in the economic life of their country and in withholding from them the enjoyment of its resources and the means for economic, social and educational development. The conclusion was inescapable that the activities of those interests represented serious impediments to the realization of the wishes of the African people for freedom and independence.

421. The evidence received from the petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia had been duly taken into account, first, in the consensus adopted by the Special Committee by near unanimity a few days before (A/AC.109/SR.523) and, second, in the adoption of an important resolution by a vote of 17 to 1, with 3 abstentions (A/AC.109/SR.528). In the consensus, the Committee had appealed to the United Kingdom Government to ensure the release of all political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, particularly Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole. It had also urged the United Kingdom Government to prevent the enactment of pending legislation by the illegal régime which would entrench *apartheid* policies in the Territory. It had reiterated in stronger language a number of considerations and demands contained in its previous resolutions. Moreover, it had stressed the need for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by the use of force by the United Kingdom Government to bring down the illegal régime. In that connexion, the Committee had laid special stress on the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to achieve that objective and to ensure the immediate application

of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

422. To that end, the Special Committee had reaffirmed the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted on the "one man, one vote" principle. Further, the Committee had, *inter alia*, condemned the support of Portugal and South Africa for the illegal régime, as well as the activities of the foreign financial and other interests to which he had referred. The Committee had also urged increased assistance by all States to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, and by all international organizations to the refugees from the Territory. Finally, the Committee had recommended that the Security Council take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to implement its own recent resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.

423. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese domination and South West Africa, it was hardly necessary to explain why the Special Committee had not taken any decisions. A number of other petitioners were to be heard at Dar es Salaam concerning those Territories, and it was only appropriate that the Committee should await their testimony before adopting any conclusions and recommendations. The Committee would, of course, take the valuable evidence it had so far received into full consideration in formulating its conclusions and recommendations.

424. Members of the Special Committee had been impressed by the way in which the freedom fighters had accepted the challenge in the colonial Territories. Victory would doubtless soon be theirs. He appealed to them to intensify their efforts. The tide of freedom could not be stemmed, and they must march on until all Africa was free. He appealed for unity among the various liberation movements, since the forces of colonialism and imperialism could scarcely be expected not to take full advantage of any gaps in the vanguard of the fight for their elimination, and such gaps would only delay the achievement of freedom and independence. The peoples under colonial domination and the African and other anti-colonialist States could not afford those gaps.

425. He thanked the members of the Zambian delegation for their help, expressed appreciation to those who had publicized the meetings, particularly the Ministry of Information and Zambia Radio, and voiced the sincere gratitude of the Special Committee to the President, Government and people of Zambia for their generous hospitality and for making possible the very fruitful meetings the Committee had held at Kitwe.

426. The representative of *Sierra Leone*, speaking on behalf of the African, Asian and Yugoslav members, expressed gratitude to the Government and people of Zambia. When they had invited the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings on their soil, it had been convinced that its presence so near to Southern Rhodesia would help it to understand more fully the problems to be faced. The Committee's proximity to the scene of crime had enabled petitioners who could not have gone to New York to describe in detail the sufferings of their people, and the members had been able to understand better the great dangers that threatened the world. As President Kaunda had pointed out, the situation could lead to a third world war not only on racial but on ideological grounds. Such a war

would be one not of conquest but of extermination, a war indeed to end wars, for nobody would be left.

427. It was tragic that the major Powers should treat the people of Southern Rhodesia with the light-mindedness of actors in a melodrama. Effective and immediate preventive measures must be taken. President Kaunda had stated succinctly the same thoughts that were in African and Asian minds. The delegations for which he spoke would persevere in the fight and leave no stone unturned to bring freedom to the people of Zimbabwe.

428. The Government of Zambia and the Mayor and Council of Kitwe had spared no effort to ensure that the Special Committee's stay in Zambia was a pleasant one. He wished them and the Zambian people continued prosperity in their industrial growth. They were a particularly happy people, and it was heartening to see the different races working together to form one nation and one people. Their example should not be lost south of the Zambezi, and he hoped that the Committee's visit would contribute to a change of heart in that part of Africa. The extreme kindness, help and courtesy of the Zambian people would always be remembered. He thanked the Mayor and Council of Livingstone for having arranged the interesting visit to Victoria Falls.

429. The President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other members of the Government had voiced their faith in the United Nations and the Special Committee, and the members of the African and Asian group and Yugoslavia would not betray that trust but would endeavour to rise above the standard of a debating society and take action on the resolutions adopted. The most recent resolution had been sponsored by all the members of the group for which he spoke.

430. He appealed to the freedom fighters to unite against the common enemy. It had become clear that to attain freedom in the twentieth century, force was needed.

431. All the members of the group would take away with them fond memories of their stay in Zambia, and would rededicate themselves to the eradication of colonialism in Africa.

432. The representative of *Chile*, speaking on behalf of his own delegation and that of Venezuela, expressed his deep gratitude to the Zambian Government and people for their generous and cordial hospitality to the Special Committee.

433. During the meetings at Kitwe, the Special Committee had been able to hear many petitioners representing Angolan and Rhodesian liberation movements, and had collected a considerable amount of extremely important information which would enable it to assist the United Nations in its difficult struggle to eliminate colonialism throughout Africa.

434. The delegations of Venezuela and Chile had been greatly impressed by the progress achieved by the Zambian people and by the climate of freedom prevailing in Zambia. They had no doubts as to the great destiny reserved for Zambia.

435. He was particularly gratified that the copper conference recently held at Lusaka had led to a further strengthening of the bonds linking Chile and Zambia.

436. The representative of *Bulgaria*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Poland, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, associated himself with the expressions

of thanks to President Kaunda and the Government and people of Zambia, and expressed gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his moving and thought-provoking address. Members would leave Zambia with deep feelings of gratitude for the excellent conditions in which they had been able to carry out their work.

437. The resolution which the Special Committee had adopted was the best proof of the inspiration it had drawn from President Kaunda's moving address. It had discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia at a time when the fight of the people of Zimbabwe for their liberty was entering a decisive stage. The contacts established with the liberation movements and the petitions that had been heard were therefore of the utmost importance. He hoped that the Committee had reflected their feelings in condemning the policy of the United Kingdom and those who assisted it, and in declaring that racial discrimination constituted a crime against humanity.

438. The Special Committee had had a unique opportunity of observing the patience and courage of the people of Zambia, who were helping their brothers of Zimbabwe at great personal sacrifice. It had noted the successes they had already achieved, which were the best proof of what a free nation could do when there were no colonial masters to suppress it.

439. On behalf of the three delegations for which he spoke, he asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transmit their sincere thanks to the people of Zambia, and their best wishes for further success in their independent country.

440. The representative of *Italy*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Finland, Italy and the United States, expressed to the Government and people of Zambia sincere gratitude for their generous hospitality. They had spared no effort to ensure good facilities, pleasant accommodation and a cordial atmosphere. The delegations for which he spoke were grateful to the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs for their addresses. He also thanked the Mayor of Kitwe and the Zambian delegation for their help.

441. The Special Committee was proceeding to the United Republic of Tanzania to pursue its work there, but its admiration for the impressive achievements of the young and energetic country of Zambia in the face of the sufferings caused by the illegal régime at Salisbury would remain. He expressed sincere wishes for the happiness and prosperity of the Government and people of Zambia.

#### C. MEETINGS HELD AT DAR ES SALAAM, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

##### OPENING OF MEETINGS

##### *Address on behalf of the President by the Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania*

442. The *Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania* recalled that it was the third time that the Special Committee had included Dar es Salaam in the itinerary of its meetings outside New York. For many representatives, therefore, it would not be the first time they had tackled the question of colonialism in southern Africa from so close a vantage point. Their past experience of the problems of decolonization would be of great assistance to the Committee during its deliberations in the United Republic.

443. For some other members it would be their first visit to Dar es Salaam and perhaps even to Africa. He hoped that they would find the opportunity of co-operating with African nationalists rewarding and that, as a result, they would be better able to judge the issues involved.

444. On behalf of the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania he extended to all members a warm and sincere welcome.

445. During its meetings in the United Republic of Tanzania, the Special Committee would be considering the question of southern Africa, which was a compound of colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination. The two latter phenomena did not fall within its competence, but they were an integral part of the over-all problem of southern Africa and formed an unavoidable background.

446. Africa's fight in Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was in fact a fight against white minority domination and exploitation. Their realization of the fundamentals common to those problems had led the Special Committee and the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa jointly to sponsor the forthcoming seminar on *apartheid*, which would enable both Committees to benefit from an exchange of knowledge and experience, so that the issues involved and the possibilities for action would be clarified and each Committee would be better able to fulfil its mandate.

447. It was not his intention to talk at length on South Africa. That he did so at all arose from his conviction that it was impossible to talk of colonialism in Africa without mentioning *apartheid* and racial discrimination. They were closely linked in an unholy alliance; their methods and objectives were similar, as were their economic structures and their dangerous and corroding effects upon their victims.

448. No case was more typical than that of South West Africa, where colonialism and *apartheid* were wedded. For almost fifty years the international community had turned a blind eye on the nefarious abuses committed in that Territory under cover of the Mandate. Finally, all patience exhausted, and stirred to moral indignation by the International Court of Justice's shocking abdication of its duty, the United Nations had revoked the Mandate and had assumed responsibility for leading the South West African people to self-government and independence.

449. South Africa was still defying the United Nations resolutions, and it was still being suggested in some quarters that the United Nations should avoid a confrontation with South Africa. That policy was mainly advocated for reasons of national self-interest, but sometimes it was argued as a matter of tactics. It was suggested that by tackling South Africa, efforts and energies would be wasted which could more usefully be expended on weaker areas, such as Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. But whatever the reasons advanced, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania could not agree with the suggestion. South Africa's international position in relation to South West Africa was very weak and the international community should ensure that its defiance was not successful. The attack on that front should not be weakened even while other aspects of the southern Africa problem were being tackled.

450. In Southern Rhodesia, the narrowly based, unrepresentative Government was grimly clinging to its illegal seizure of power. The Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania were waiting, like the rest of the world, for the collapse of the régime through the weight of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, but they were not optimistic as to the result. It was their conviction that sooner or later force would have to be used to topple the Smith régime. It would then be the responsibility of the international community to ensure the independence of the Territory under conditions of genuine self-determination.

451. The subject of Angola had already been exhaustively dealt with by the Special Committee at Kinshasa and Kitwe; in the United Republic of Tanzania the Committee would confine itself to the matter of colonialism in Mozambique, but the problems of Portuguese colonialism were by and large similar in each Territory. In each, there were people living in misery, being tortured and denied their legitimate birthright. In each, people were being hanged and separated from their relatives and were experiencing all the suffering caused by those inhuman acts. The United Republic of Tanzania had a special interest in the problem of Mozambique, because its border was often violated by the Portuguese in their savage acts of repression and its people had close ties and relations with the neighbouring tribes.

452. Finally, the Special Committee would have the opportunity of hearing petitioners from French Somaliland. It was well known that the so-called referendum recently held in that Territory was a fraud unworthy of those who practised it. Nothing so exposed the ill-intentions of the present authorities as the proposed change of name. The Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania supported the wishes of the people of that Territory for true self-determination. Only when conditions permitted the inhabitants of the colony to choose freely the form of their government and their future could there be peace and security in that troubled part of Africa.

453. As the Special Committee was universally recognized as an authority on problems of colonialism and imperialism, he would not take much more of its time at the formal opening of its meetings in Dar es Salaam and extended to it once again the warm welcome of the Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania, who were confident that its work would be crowned with increasing success.

#### *General statements*

454. *The Chairman*, speaking on behalf of all members, sincerely thanked the Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania for attending the opening meeting and expressed deep appreciation of his important address, which would, of course, be given the most serious consideration. The Special Committee was particularly appreciative of his concise and enlightening analysis of the very grave colonial problems which continued to plague the southern region of Africa and of his assurances of continued whole-hearted support for its objectives and work. His address had once again underlined the contribution and irrevocable commitment of the United Republic of Tanzania to the struggle for the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism everywhere, and especially in Africa. It would be an inspiration to all those who, concerned about domination by colonialist and neo-

colonialist forces, attached importance to the speedy liquidation of colonialism and racialism.

455. He also wished to convey, through the Second Vice-President, the Special Committee's profound gratitude to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the gracious invitation which had enabled it to hold yet another series of meetings at Dar es Salaam. All members were deeply impressed by the fraternal welcome and the traditional African hospitality so generously extended since their arrival and by the demonstrations at the airport, a reminder of their heavy responsibilities and of the confidence placed in the United Nations by the peoples still under colonial domination.

456. It would be invidious for him, as a citizen of the United Republic of Tanzania, to mention his justifiable pride in his country, his confidence in its leaders and his solidarity with its people. Yet, as Chairman, he would be wanting in courtesy and indeed failing in his duty, if he did not, on behalf of the members, acknowledge the special position and esteem enjoyed by the Special Committee in the United Republic. It was only necessary to recall that the Committee had held meetings at Dar es Salaam, at the invitation of the Tanzanian Government and people in 1962, in 1965 and again in 1966.

457. That the Special Committee was meeting in Dar es Salaam for the fourth time testified to the view expressed by the Second Vice-President in his address in 1966 that, for the United Republic, the Committee's work was fundamental to the whole purpose of the United Nations. For the United Republic, the very basis of the Committee's mission—to ensure without delay the eradication of colonialism—was the noble principle of human equality. For the United Republic, no durable peace was possible which allowed the abominable injustice of colonialism to persist. For the United Republic, the great and irresistible movement for the emancipation of Africa was inseparable from the universal fight of progressive forces everywhere for freedom and peace.

458. It was only to be expected therefore that the Tanzanian Government and people should always have taken an uncompromising stand against colonialism. They were acutely and painfully conscious of the sufferings of their brethren under colonial bondage. After all, it was but a few years before that they had thrown off the colonial yoke and regained their independence. Moreover, the United Republic of Tanzania was physically as well as ideologically in the front line of the grim fight against colonialism. To the south lay Mozambique, dominated by the ruthless fascist régime of Salazar. Also in close proximity lay the colonial Territories dominated by the racist régime of Vorster and Smith. Inevitably, therefore, the United Republic had been a haven for thousands of African people seeking refuge from these oppressive régimes. In addition, it had been doing its utmost, at considerable hardship to itself, to give material as well as moral succour to the neighbouring national liberation movements in the confident hope that such assistance would bring closer the day of freedom and independence for the whole continent. It was therefore no coincidence that Dar es Salaam was the headquarters of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity and eagerly looked forward to its continued co-operation.

459. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania was nevertheless not unaware of the implications of its unshakeable anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stand. In rejecting the path of indifference to the inhumanity of colonialism, in resolving fully to discharge its duty to assist all those striving to exercise their inalienable rights, it fully realized that the United Republic would be victimized by intrigues and threats of every kind from the forces of reaction. But it also appreciated that only thus could it find meaning in its declared objective of national reconstruction and development, only thus could it fully meet the aspirations of the people and only thus could it give even greater substance and reality to its own independence.

460. At its forthcoming meetings in the United Republic, the Special Committee would give further consideration to the more intractable colonial problems in Africa, including the question of South West Africa and that of the Territories under Portuguese domination, particularly Mozambique. It would no doubt hear further harrowing accounts of massive violations of fundamental human rights, of brutal atrocities and of monstrous crimes committed by the colonial régimes in those Territories.

461. The stubborn refusal of Portugal and South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions was well known. But the Special Committee would no doubt receive further evidence of increased oppression and intensified military action against peoples who asked for no more than the rights proclaimed in the Charter. It would no doubt be told of the assistance which the anachronistic régimes of Salazar and Vorster were receiving from some of their friends and allies, without which their nefarious policies would be difficult if not impossible to pursue. It would no doubt be shocked by further information regarding the cruel exploitation of the human and material resources of those Territories and the pernicious role being played by foreign economic and other interests in impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It would also derive some encouragement from news of the unrelenting struggle of the liberation movements to free themselves from the chains of their oppressors.

462. The Special Committee would probably hear petitioners on French Somaliland, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Ifni and Spanish Sahara in addition to the colonial Territories of southern Africa.

463. The Special Committee would no doubt be interested in examining the progress made in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) and its own resolution of 15 March 1967, concerning French Somaliland. The inalienable right of the people of that Territory to freedom and independence was beyond question, but attention would no doubt be given to the further measures necessary to ensure that decolonization proceeded without delay, and in conditions of peace and harmony.

464. With regard to Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Special Committee would consider whether political progress towards independence had been adequate and in conformity with the Declaration's provisions. The unsatisfactory economic situation of those Territories, and the creation of the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory in violation of their territorial integrity, would no doubt be the subject of serious concern.

465. The Special Committee would also be called upon to express its views on the latest developments in Ifni and the Spanish Sahara and in particular, the response of the Spanish Government to the relevant General Assembly resolution and the steps necessary for its full implementation.

466. In all those colonial Territories, it was the Special Committee's duty to consider the best ways and means whereby the United Nations could meet the just demands of the people. It would no doubt be asked whether the Committee was doing everything within its power in that respect and whether it was a tribute to its efforts that, in spite of four visits to southern Africa, only limited progress had been made in the elimination of colonialism from the region. Such queries would be unfair unless they were accompanied by recognition of the fact that the responsibility for the unsatisfactory situation lay principally, if not entirely, on the shoulders of the colonial Powers and their friends. At the same time it was the Committee's duty, in anticipation of such queries, to consider whether there might not be some way of improving the effectiveness of its work, by drawing the appropriate conclusions from its previous experience and applying the lessons of the past.

467. For instance, the Special Committee was to be commended for not contenting itself with general resolutions and pious exhortations addressed to the colonial Powers. It had rightly attached importance to the adoption of concrete resolutions, outlining in specific terms the measures, emphasis and modalities for the implementation of the Declaration in each Territory—a policy which should be continued. Moreover, he thought the Committee should place greater stress on its work of checking on and following up the implementation of its own and the General Assembly's resolutions, and of adopting further recommendations for remedial action as necessary. It was obvious that resolutions, however constructive in intention, which were not implemented might as well not have been adopted. The necessity for continuous supervision of their implementation was therefore evident, as was the need to set up appropriate machinery for the purpose. In addition, it would probably be advisable for the Committee to avail itself to a greater extent than before of operative paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) which authorized and requested it to make concrete suggestions and recommendations to the Security Council to assist the latter in considering the necessary measures to be taken under the Charter.

468. He reiterated the appeal for unity made to all freedom fighters, reminding them that every day they remained disunited meant another day's delay in their fight for freedom, another day during which people would be killed and tortured. Disunity between the liberation movements had even led to depletion of their forces, so that the means available were not properly utilized. When Africa as a whole decided to unite in the fight for its freedom, it would realize that the United Nations and especially the Special Committee stood solidly behind it. In that connexion, he emphasized the Committee's dedication to the cause of decolonization and its determination to leave no stone unturned until the whole of Africa was free.

469. In conclusion, he thanked the Second Vice-President once again for his inspiring address and through him the President, the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the



Special Committee to meet at Dar es Salaam. With the confidence inspired by the atmosphere of militant anti-colonialism and revolutionary enthusiasm prevailing in the dynamic Tanzanian capital, the work of the Committee should yield important and constructive results.

470. The representative of *Ethiopia* sincerely thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam and for their remarkable hospitality. As Ethiopian Ambassador to the United Republic he had had the unique opportunity and privilege of observing very closely the rapid progress of that country under the able, wise and dedicated leadership of President Nyerere and to obtain first-hand knowledge of the great work in development and reconstruction which had been going on in all sectors since its independence in 1962. In such a very short period the United Republic had made great strides, of which its people could rightly be proud.

471. Perhaps the most important aspects in which the United Republic had given a lead to Africa and the world were those of unity and decolonization. The union between the mainland and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania was a shining example worthy of emulation by the whole of Africa, especially at a time when the scourges of division and fratricidal strife were emerging elsewhere. The great sacrifice that the United Republic was making for the advancement of the cause of decolonization in Africa and the rest of the world could not fail to impress even the most casual observer. The growing number of refugees from neighbouring colonial areas such as Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had put a great strain on its human and material resources; the establishment of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity in the United Republic of Tanzania had made that country a target of imperialist attacks and machinations; yet, as the Vice-President's inspiring address had clearly indicated, the Tanzanian Government and people were moving forward undaunted on the path of militant anti-colonialism.

472. During the previous two weeks the Special Committee's attention had been drawn once more to the highly dangerous and potentially explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination. Racial confrontation was growing more critical and intolerable every year and if nothing was done to bring it under control, there was every reason to fear that it would one day reach such proportions as to engulf the entire continent in open conflict and bloodshed. The Committee's work was therefore of great significance to the whole cause of international peace and security and the States Members of the United Nations had to do all in their power to forestall a dangerous explosion.

473. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration the distressing information supplied by the petitioners was still fresh in everyone's mind, and the sinister aims behind the alarming measures taken by the Portuguese were abundantly clear, without even re-examining the brutality, killing and arbitrary arrests taking place every day.

474. It was well known that Portugal was neither rich nor militarily powerful and there was no need to ask what forces were helping it to continue its relentless fight against the irresistible forces of African

nationalism. It was clear that Portugal's anachronistic policy in Africa had always been inspired by the determination to exploit the abundant resources of its colonial Territories to the detriment of its indigenous population.

475. Since 1964, Portugal had been fighting a defensive war against the liberation forces in Mozambique—which by some fantastic trick of the imagination Portugal considered merely a province—with a consequent rise in the cost of military and related expenditure. The Territory's budget for defence and security in 1966 had been about 255 million escudos more than the allocation for 1965 and about twice the expenditure on the armed services in 1963, before the fighting had started. There had also been a progressive tightening of security measures in Mozambique to counter any possible subversion, and the same situation existed in Angola and Guinea (Bissau). Since 1960 the world community had been appealing to Portugal to cease its repressive measures and to undertake reforms with a view to the transfer of power to the indigenous population. The non-compliance of the Portuguese Government and the deteriorating situation in the Territories had been the subject of numerous resolutions by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council, but Salazar continued to turn a deaf ear to the appeals of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. The Committee should therefore once more call upon the Powers involved to honour the resolutions they themselves had supported, not only in the interest of the Organization's very existence but also in order to end the enslavement and degradation of millions of Africans.

476. Even during the past few months there had been fresh but poignant reminders of the dangers underlying the understanding between Vorster, Salazar and Smith. The current dilemma in the whole of southern Africa was inextricably tied up with the policies being separately pursued by the Governments of Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury. Unless those Governments were compelled to abandon their policies, their continued harassment and their violations of human dignity would remain unchecked.

477. The Vice-President had also touched upon the question of Djibouti—or so-called French Somaliland—which was of vital concern to Ethiopia and its Government. In the referendum held on 19 March 1967 to decide the future status of the Territory, the vast majority of the people had decided to retain their links with France, a decision which might have been a surprise or even a disappointment to some members of a Committee dedicated to the cause of decolonization in its ultimate sense. The surprise or disappointment felt by some members of the Special Committee about this decision was not, however, the point at issue; the important point was that the people of Djibouti had been given a free choice and that in their own wisdom they had decided for themselves. If it was remembered that, in 1958, out of the many countries then forming the French community, only Guinea had opted for a complete break with France, the decision of the people of Djibouti might appear less surprising. The fact that almost all the countries which in 1958 had voted to retain their links with France had since become independent sovereign nations was a clear indication that, when deciding its destiny, a people always adopted its own tactics and methods of evolution. It should not cause disappointment that they did not always conform to cut-and-dried formulas.

478. The Ethiopian delegation was aware that attempts had been made from a certain quarter to challenge the decision of the people of Djibouti. Had the challenge been motivated by a true feeling for their welfare, it might have been taken seriously, but since it was common knowledge that it was aroused by an ulterior motive of a more selfish nature, it should be dismissed with the contempt it deserved.

479. In any case his delegation strongly held the view that the people of Djibouti should be the sole arbiters of their own destiny and that no outsider had the right to interfere or to challenge their decision; it would be the height of folly to pass judgement on their verdict.

480. As for the allegation, which had been heard continuously from the same quarter, that France did not conduct the referendum in a fair and impartial manner, he stated categorically that his delegation had not found a single shred of evidence to substantiate the claim. Unfortunately, it was an example of the current success of distortionist propaganda that so malicious a falsehood had gained currency among usually knowledgeable circles. On the contrary, the French Government should be congratulated on the timely steps it had taken to ensure that the referendum reflected the true feelings of the people of Djibouti at the time and on providing the inhabitants of that small Territory with the necessary protection from the coercion, intimidation and attempted infiltration to which they had been subjected by a neighbouring country in order to distort and negate their true democratic choice. The role of France under the enlightened leadership of that great European liberal leader, General de Gaulle, in the matter of decolonization was, he considered, beyond reproach. The Ethiopian delegation felt that the recent experience in Djibouti had clearly indicated France's dedication to and belief in the process of decolonization. His delegation considered that the decolonization process in Djibouti was proceeding at a satisfactory pace and hoped that France, in co-operation with the true leaders of the people of Djibouti, would continue the process until the ultimate goal was reached. The attempt to make a mockery of the people's decision was being continued by those who apparently did not agree with their choice. Alien interlopers had embarked on vicious propaganda in an attempt to cast aspersions on the validity of the referendum, assuming that the majority of the people of Djibouti did not know what was good for them and that their future should be decided by aliens. Those who were protesting against the decision were the same who in August 1966, had welcomed the holding of a referendum, had since tried and failed to subvert it and were lobbying to misrepresent it. That in itself was proof that what they had wanted to hear on 19 March was not the voice of the people of Djibouti but their own voices through their own agents.

481. Ethiopia accepted in principle and in practice the right of the people of Djibouti to decide their own destiny; it supported the decision of the people, whatever that decision might be, and opposed and would resist any attempts designed to make a mockery of the future of the Djibouti people. Ethiopia's attitude remained what it had always been, friendly and designed to maintain and strengthen even further the already strong ties of brotherhood and neighbourly interdependence based on mutual respect and common benefit. Ethiopia had no designs on Djibouti's political status

nor did it constitute a threat to its political future; it was to be hoped that others in the region felt the same. It was in that spirit that Ethiopia supported the recent exercise in self-determination in Djibouti and welcomed the steps taken by France to transfer power to the inhabitants, which, it hoped, would soon lead to their complete freedom.

482. That brief summary of the position of his delegation on an issue of vital concern to the peace and stability of the region was intended to clarify the policy pursued by the Ethiopian Government so as to leave no doubt in the minds of the Special Committee as to its exact position in that respect. His delegation reserved the right to intervene again in the discussions should the situation warrant further clarification.

483. The Ethiopian delegation has already expressed its views on the question of Mauritius and the Seychelles in Sub-Committee I, the report of which would soon be examined by the Special Committee. He reiterated his appeal to the administering Power to take effective measures to implement fully General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to expedite the long-promised elections and the granting of independence to those Territories.

484. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his country's determination, in concert with freedom-loving countries throughout the world, to do all in its power to eradicate the evil cancer of colonialism and imperialism from the face of the earth. Ethiopia considered its own independence incomplete as long as any part of African soil remained under colonial rule. The heroic fight of the Ethiopian people for freedom and independence through the centuries and the glorious tradition of their long history as an independent and sovereign nation had taught them the great lesson that no sacrifice was too great for freedom and human dignity. It was a matter of satisfaction and pride for the whole Ethiopian nation that the example of dedicated sacrifice for freedom and independence it had set in its long and chequered history had not been ignored. It was in that spirit of dedication to the eternal cause of freedom and human dignity that it called upon the freedom fighters in the remaining areas of colonialism and imperialism to unite and redouble their efforts to achieve final victory. They could rest assured that, in the sacred fight which they were waging, Ethiopia and all freedom-loving men stood solidly behind them.

485. The representative of *India* associated his delegation with the thanks already expressed to the Tanzanian Government and people by the Chairman and the preceding speaker. Their invitation to the Special Committee to hold meetings at Dar es Salaam for the fourth time was evidence of the United Republic's irrevocable dedication to the cause of liquidating the remaining vestiges of colonialism. The election of Mr. Malecela as Chairman was yet another proof of his country's interest in the Committee's efforts to eradicate the evil of colonialism and racism from Africa. That the United Republic was the seat of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity was further proof of its deep concern to accelerate the process of decolonization. In that connexion, he renewed India's pledge of continued and whole-hearted support in the fight against colonialism.

486. The Second Vice-President's inspiring address and succinct analysis of the problems in southern Africa would be a most important contribution to the Special Committee's work. He had emphasized that racialism,

colonialism and *apartheid* were closely intertwined and formed an unholy alliance which should be attacked as a whole. He fully endorsed the Ethiopian representative's proposal that both the Vice-President's address and the Chairman's reply should be recorded *in extenso*.

487. During its meetings at Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee would be dealing with the problems of southern Africa and particularly the Territories under Portuguese domination, South West Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius and the Seychelles and his delegation would have the opportunity of stating its views on those matters more fully at a later meeting. He wished, however, to outline briefly his country's position. India was particularly interested in the Portuguese colonies, having itself suffered under Portuguese rule and, like the freedom fighters in those Territories, had realized that the language of force was the only one understood by the fascist dictators.

488. The question of South West Africa had been discussed at great length both by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly and his delegation had had an opportunity of stating its views on both occasions. It fully supported the resolutions adopted and hoped that all Member States would co-operate to ensure their speedy implementation. In spite of the almost unanimous endorsement of those resolutions, the racist régime at Pretoria had not abandoned its designs on South West Africa, and his delegation heartily condemned its manœuvres to detach Ovamboland with a view to forming a separate entity and extending the policy of Bantustan to South West Africa.

489. With regard to Mauritius, Swaziland and the other Territories mentioned, he pledged his delegation's full support in their fight for independence. It was in particular strongly opposed to the establishment of the projected Indian Ocean bases in Mauritius.

490. India had enjoyed extremely cordial and friendly relations with the United Republic of Tanzania since the latter's independence. Its Government and people had the highest esteem for President Nyerere, one of the most outstanding African leaders, who was successfully building up the country as a multiracial society in which people of different origins could live in peace and harmony. The treaties of trade and friendship concluded between India and the United Republic in 1966 were another step towards bringing the two countries even closer together. Developing countries had much to learn from each other's experience and he hoped that the co-operation between the two countries would be intensified to their mutual benefit.

491. In conclusion, he extended the greetings of his delegation to the friendly Tanzanian people and wished them happiness and prosperity.

492. The representative of Iran said that, for the third consecutive year, the Tanzanian Government had made it possible for the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam. He wished to express, on behalf of his delegation, his sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of the United Republic for their kind invitation and the traditional African hospitality which they had shown. He had already had the privilege of attending meetings of the Committee at Dar es Salaam on three earlier occasions and was looking forward to renewing old friendships.

493. He had been greatly impressed by the inspiring and important address which the Second Vice-

President had delivered and was sure that it would guide the work of the Special Committee. As a centre for African liberation movements and the seat of one of the most important units of the Organization of African Unity, the United Republic of Tanzania offered a unique opportunity for the Committee to discharge its obligations. That country, under the wise and dynamic leadership of its President, had made a notable contribution to the fight against colonialism, oppression and injustice, both inside and outside the United Nations. Within the United Nations, the contribution made by the Tanzanian delegation was too well-known to require any comment. The moral and material support which the United Republic offered to the various liberation movements had enabled them to continue the fight against the usurpers of African freedom and wealth. It had also generously received numerous refugees from the oppressive rule of Portugal, South Africa and the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. Very soon the international seminar on *apartheid* and colonialism, which the representatives of more than fifty countries were to attend together with representatives of many non-governmental organizations and prominent individuals, would be held at Dar es Salaam at the invitation of the Tanzanian Government. That was a further indication of the United Republic's desire to remove racialism and colonialism from the African continent.

494. It was thus of particular value for the Special Committee to meet in the United Republic where it had the opportunity of making contact with people who shared its objectives and of obtaining first-hand information concerning the latest developments in Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, Mauritius, the Seychelles and other colonial areas. It was to be hoped also that the Committee's presence would provide additional encouragement and assistance to the freedom fighters in those Territories. The Committee had already had the opportunity of hearing the views of various political organizations, particularly from Angola, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia at Kinshasa and Kitwe and, on the basis of those hearings, had adopted appropriate decisions, notably a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In reaching such decisions, the Committee was bound to adhere to the facts, as well as to the principles which it had the duty to uphold. Any failure to implement the Committee's decision should not, therefore, be attributed to a lack of realism on its part. Reproaches should be addressed rather to those Member States, particularly Portugal, South Africa and the United Kingdom, which had failed to carry out the decisions.

495. His delegation would continue to give its full and unflinching support to every decision capable of accelerating the liquidation of colonialism in Africa, in the firm conviction that the only way to prevent the eruption of the live volcano in southern Africa was to uproot the outmoded colonialist and racist systems there. Peace and justice could not be restored in Africa until that had been accomplished. Although the picture appeared gloomy and the colonialists and racists seemed to have the upper hand, he had been much encouraged by the determination and fighting spirit of the leaders of the various political organizations which the Special Committee had already heard. Provided the nationalists were united and resolute, the day would soon come when Africa would be liberated from the last vestiges of colonialism and racism. Africa would then regain its rightful place in the sun and could move towards the

full realization of its cherished aspiration—African unity—as championed by one of the continent's most brilliant leaders, President Julius Nyerere.

496. He was certain that, given the excellence of the arrangements made by the Tanzanian Government, the Special Committee's meetings would prove most fruitful and expressed, on behalf of the Government and people of his country, his best wishes for the success and prosperity of the people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

497. The representative of *Yugoslavia* thanked the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their generous invitation to the Special Committee to meet once again at Dar es Salaam to consider some of the most urgent and threatening colonial problems which still existed. He had been gratified by the warm hospitality and welcome with which it had been received. His own delegation felt particular pleasure at revisiting the United Republic, in view of the close links of friendship and co-operation between the two countries, which were both engaged in the fight for the removal of all colonialist and neo-colonialist pressures so that every country might be able to play an equal part on the world stage. The United Republic, under the leadership of its outstanding President, had done far more than most countries to help the national liberation movements in Africa and to succour the refugees from brutal colonial domination. In that connexion, his delegation had been greatly impressed by the important and inspiring address delivered to the Committee by the Second Vice-President, whose penetrating analysis of the dangerous situation developing in southern Africa was very enlightening.

498. It was obvious that the colonialist and neo-colonialist forces were making every attempt to slow down and check the process of decolonization in order to maintain their strongholds in certain areas which were of particular importance for their political and economic strategy. Those strongholds were intended not only to enable them to continue their economic exploitation and oppression of the majority of the population but also to serve for interference in the internal affairs of the newly independent African countries. The most obvious example of such designs was the fascist and racial system in southern Africa. A backward country like Portugal and minority racist régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were incapable of carrying out such plans alone. It was only the help they received from their Western partners which enabled them to continue their policy and to defy the numerous United Nations decisions. Verbal denunciations by some Western Powers of the racial policies of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia could not conceal the harsh reality.

499. The activities of foreign monopolies and their unscrupulous exploitation of the wealth of the colonial Territories were seriously impeding the decolonization process. The Portuguese armed forces were waging a criminal war against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), using weapons acquired through the NATO military alliance. The United Kingdom, which was solely responsible for the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia, had, by its refusal to use the only language the racists understood, allowed the illegal régime to consolidate its position, to intensify its oppression of the people of Zimbabwe and to introduce the criminal *apartheid*

system. Foreign military bases in colonial Territories not only impeded the liberation of colonized people but also served to exert pressure on independent countries. The means of pressure and interference were used today not only in Africa, but also in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

500. It was vital that rapid measures should be taken to liquidate the last bastions of colonialism which constituted a threat to the peace and tranquillity of the whole world. The fight for independence of those people who still suffered under colonial domination was just and legitimate and deserved the full support of the United Nations.

501. *Yugoslavia* had always staunchly supported any people fighting for its freedom and independence and would continue to do so. He believed that the international community and the United Nations had a special responsibility to assist colonized peoples freely to determine their own destiny. The Special Committee had a most important part to play, and his delegation would continue to do its utmost to ensure that the Committee effectively carried out its mandate, particularly the implementation of the various General Assembly decisions on decolonization.

502. He paid a tribute to the able and energetic guidance of the Chairman, which had contributed much to the work of the Special Committee both at Headquarters and during the current visit to Africa.

503. The representative of *Mali* thanked the people, the Tanganyika African National Union party and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for their kind invitation to the Special Committee and for the warm welcome accorded his delegation.

504. The people of the Republic of Mali, its party, the Union soudanaise RDA, and its Government admired the effort being made by the courageous and hard-working people of the United Republic of Tanzania under the enlightened leadership of Mr. Julius Nyerere. Since independence, the United Republic breaking with its colonial past, had courageously taken the path of independent development. Its valiant people were day by day winning fresh victories in the building of their nation. The recent decisions of the party and Government of the United Republic of Tanzania would undoubtedly clear the way for important new successes in the fight against underdevelopment. It was gratifying that the Special Committee could hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam in dealing with the serious situation prevailing in southern Africa—from Angola to Mozambique by way of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa—for the United Republic was playing a leading part in the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, racial discrimination and injustice. It had lost no time in becoming the standard-bearer of anti-colonialism, and it flew the colours of freedom and justice in a region of Africa still under the racist and fascist yoke.

505. His delegation would have an opportunity in a later statement of dealing in detail with the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. It would then show how certain of the great Western Powers were acting in collusion and scheming to perpetuate colonialism so that the African peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa could be mercilessly exploited.

506. Mali, remaining faithful to its policy, reaffirmed its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stand. It had supported the historic Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and did not mince words in denouncing the backward policies of Salazar, who had learnt nothing from history and who would soon be driven back to the sea by the valiant freedom fighters of Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and Angola. Mali was confident that the national liberation movements would be victorious and assured them that it would make every effort to help them get rid of the Portuguese and of the white racists of Salisbury and Pretoria who pitilessly exploited the natural and human resources of southern Africa for the exclusive benefit of foreign monopolies.

507. The colonialist system which continued to exist as a baneful influence in the world, was a conspiracy by certain Western Powers, which violated the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter which they themselves had drawn up at San Francisco. It was very difficult to understand the position of some countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, which through NATO armed Salazar's mercenaries in an attempt to delay the liberation of Africa. Although the representatives of those countries would undoubtedly tell the Special Committee that they condemned the policies of Portugal and South Africa or the position taken by Ian Smith, their statements were daily contradicted by facts. It was time for that to stop and for Europe and the United States of America to realize that it was in their interest to hasten the process of liberation of the remaining dependent Territories. A liberated Africa could be a better partner for the industrialized countries because of its natural wealth and its contribution to civilization and to the harmonious development of the world.

508. He referred to the good relations between his country and the United Republic, which were based on a common will to eliminate colonialism for ever and to build in each of their nations a country where there would no longer be any exploitation of man by man. The recent visit to the United Republic by the President of the Republic of Mali demonstrated their common viewpoint with regard both to African problems and to the great problems at present confronting the world.

509. The representative of *Tunisia* expressed, on behalf of his delegation, his sincere appreciation to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the generous invitation which they had once again extended to the Special Committee and for the warm welcome which they had given it at Dar es Salaam. The fact that the Committee was meeting at Dar es Salaam for the fourth time showed how deep was the interest of the United Republic of Tanzania in the Committee's work and in the decolonization efforts of the United Nations. The United Republic, which had succeeded in freeing itself from the fetters of colonial law, had undertaken from the early days of its independence to assist the peoples who were still oppressed and enslaved. It was therefore not surprising that the present Chairman of the Committee should be Ambassador Malecela, who had distinguished himself in the United Nations by his devotion to the cause of decolonization. It was also quite natural that the seminar on *apartheid* and colonialism should take

place at Dar es Salaam and that that town should be the headquarters of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of OAU and a refuge for freedom fighters.

510. When the Special Committee had met at Dar es Salaam in 1962, it had had seventeen members and its agenda had included such items as those relating to Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Zanzibar, countries which had since then obtained their independence. Even in 1966 it had still been discussing Bechuanaland and Basutoland, which had today become sovereign States. His delegation, and indeed all the African and Asian countries, would spare no effort both within and outside the Committee to ensure the complete and total elimination of colonialism in Africa and in other regions, for entire nations were still oppressed and enslaved in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and elsewhere.

511. At its meetings at Kinshasa and Kitwe, the Special Committee had heard petitioners and freedom fighters. The Committee would become the spokesman for those petitioners and would give voice to their aspirations; it would reveal to the eyes of the entire world the enslavement of the African peoples and the oppressive measures visited upon them. It would continue to fight against the colonial Powers and to denounce the collusion which enabled them to defy mankind. Tunisia, which had always supported and upheld liberation movements and defended the cause of decolonization, would continue to do so in the future. It would continue to appeal to the colonial Powers, as it had done in 1959 when President Bourguiba, in an effort to bring about a solution of the colonization problem, had suggested a meeting of the colonial Powers in order that they might come to some agreement on complying with the principles of the Charter and giving effect to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The forward march of history could not be turned back, and right and justice were on the side of the oppressed peoples. The Committee provided a forum where the demands of the liberation movements could find expression. Although much still remained to be done, all the peoples struggling for their independence could count on the support of the African and Asian countries and, in particular, on the moral assistance and material support which they would always receive from Tunisia.

512. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Tanzanian Government and people, on behalf of his delegation, for the warm welcome they had offered to the Special Committee. The Committee had frequently availed itself of Tanzanian hospitality and had always held very useful meetings in that country. He was sure that the excellent facilities provided constituted a favourable augury for the success of the Committee's work during the current series of meetings also, the more so since the Committee was meeting under the chairmanship of a valiant son of the United Republic.

513. He had listened with the greatest interest and attention to the statement by the Second Vice-President setting forth the position of his country on the various colonial problems of southern Africa. It had provided further evidence of the determination of that country to combat colonialism and racialism, acting in the spirit of solidarity which was characteristic of all progressive countries. The United Republic was making a noble contribution to the liberation of those peoples of Africa



still groaning under the colonialist yoke. It had earned the respect and esteem of all freedom-loving peoples. His country rejoiced at the success of Tanzania since its achievement of independence.

514. The Special Committee was called upon to take active steps to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. His delegation fully supported the forces that were attempting to implement the Declaration and the provisions of the Charter. Since the Second World War, colonialism had crumbled. Immediately after the war, 36.9 million square kilometres of territory with 660 million inhabitants had been under colonial rule; the current figure was 8 million square kilometres with 37 million inhabitants. Less than one eighteenth of the people who had been under the colonial yoke when the United Nations was first established were still not free. Scores of countries in all parts of the world had obtained their independence. In Africa, thirty-seven new States had emerged. It was no longer possible to imagine the United Nations without representation of the African and Asian States, all of which actively participated in its work on a basis of complete equality.

515. The liberation of those Territories had not been easy and many leaders of newly independent Governments had referred to the inspiration they had drawn from the October Socialist Revolution, the fiftieth anniversary of which was being celebrated in 1967. That revolution had awakened the under-privileged world. Constant to its principles, the USSR whole-heartedly supported the forces which were fighting to destroy the last bastions of colonialism. Nevertheless, colonialism was a tenacious creature which did not give up easily. The fight continued. The function of the Special Committee was to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which had been adopted on his delegation's initiative.

516. The major purpose of its meetings at Dar es Salaam was to consider the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. The United Nations had constantly appealed to the Portuguese to grant immediate independence to their colonies, but, to the world's deep indignation, they had continued to trample underfoot the rights of the peoples in those Territories and to ignore United Nations resolutions and decisions. His delegation proposed that the Special Committee should study the question of the failure by the Western Powers to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations concerning the Portuguese colonies. The fascist Salazar régime was doing all in its power to perpetuate colonial rule and had, for many years, been waging a war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), thanks to the help it received from certain circles in some Western countries, in collusion with the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, had formed a bloc of "white countries" in that region of the world to perpetuate the domination of racists and colonialists in colonial Territories and to exert pressure on the young African States. All those reactionary forces were acting together in a dastardly conspiracy to perpetuate colonialism and exert pressure on the independent countries of Africa. It was obvious that, without assistance, a backward country such as Portugal would not be able to devote 40 per cent of its budget to military purposes, a proportion exceeding that of all other NATO countries except the United States, nor hold in thrall areas twenty-three times its own size. Ample evidence had been available to the

Special Committee—and information from recent petitioners had confirmed it—that arms were being supplied to Portugal by a number of its NATO allies. The arguments put forward by representatives of the NATO countries that assurances had been first received from Portugal that such arms would not be used in its colonies were very naive and misled nobody. Thus, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany was supplying arms to Portugal in complete violation of numerous United Nations decisions. Krupp was among the many monopolies engaged in that sinister trade. Such activities were directly opposed to the interests of world peace and security. The German Democratic Republic pursued a very different policy: it gave no assistance whatever to Portugal which could possibly be used for its colonial wars. It maintained neither diplomatic nor consular relations with the Portuguese colonial régime. Furthermore, it had never in the past sold or delivered to Portugal weapons, ammunition or other military materials, nor would it in the future supply the Portuguese colonial régime with any such objects, as had been stated in the letter of Mr. Otto Winzer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, of 23 March 1966, setting out the position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic regarding Security Council resolution 218 (1965) on Territories under Portuguese administration. That letter had been circulated as a Security Council document.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the German Democratic Republic had issued instructions to all foreign trade enterprises of the German Democratic Republic that no deliveries whatever were to be made from the German Democratic Republic to Portuguese enterprises in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

517. Military bases in colonial Territories were particularly dangerous to peace and an obstacle to decolonization. They were used not only against the national liberation movements but also against newly independent countries. The NATO network of bases extended into southern Africa. Portugal had a number of military and naval bases in the Territories under its domination which it used in the same way that the United States used its military base in the colonial Territory of Guam for aggression against the people of Viet-Nam. The United Kingdom made similar use of such bases as Aden.

518. The United Nations should not limit itself merely to adopting resolutions on the elimination of foreign military bases in colonial Territories. It must go further by condemning the use of those bases by the Western Powers against the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and by demanding unconditional compliance by the colonialists with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

519. In the course of its activities, the Special Committee had adopted many political resolutions. Its present task was to draw up and approve constructive resolutions aimed at the prompt implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to find more effective ways and means of giving effect to those resolutions.

520. The representative of the *United States of America* observed, on a point of order, that the representative of the USSR was diverging seriously from the subject under discussion by raising the subject of Viet-Nam which was not on the agenda of the Special

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966*, document S/7290.

Committee. He requested the Chairman to ask the representative of the USSR to desist and to return to the question on the Committee's agenda.

521. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, exercising his right of reply, said that the question of bases in colonial Territories, particularly Guam, and their connexion with the war in Viet-Nam were indeed germane to the work of the Special Committee because of their connexion with freedom and independence. The Viet-Nam situation was a serious danger to the peace of the world and was poisoning the atmosphere of international co-operation. He was fully entitled to raise the matter under paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) which called on States to demolish any bases they maintained in foreign countries and to refrain from building new ones.

522. The representative of the *United States of America* protested most energetically at what he considered to be highly contentious remarks made by the USSR representative concerning a very serious matter which was not pertinent to the Special Committee's work. His delegation was fully prepared to discuss the Viet-Nameese war in the proper United Nations forum, which was the Security Council, but not in this Committee where it was totally irrelevant. He considered the attitude of the USSR representative foreign to the spirit of the Special Committee.

523. The representative of *Poland*, speaking on a point of order, drew attention to the fact that the USSR representative had referred to a military base at Guam, a colonial Territory being used in the war against the people of Viet-Nam. The point was perfectly valid and came within the Committee's purview.

524. *The Chairman* appealed to all representatives to confine themselves to the subject under discussion and to refrain from introducing other topics, however important they might be.

525. The representative of the *United States of America* agreed with the Chairman but wished to go on record as utterly rejecting the false allegations which had been made against his country. His delegation was perfectly ready to discuss the subject in the proper forum.

526. *The Chairman* said that the protest of the United States representative had been noted. He appealed to the USSR representative to continue his statement without introducing contentious material which was not entirely relevant to the subject under discussion.

527. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said he would follow the Chairman's advice but wished first to exercise briefly his right of reply, since the United States representative had insisted on so doing. As to the consideration of the Viet-Nameese problem in the United Nations, the Soviet Union firmly supported the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The Viet-Nameese question had been considered in 1954 at the Geneva Conference, outside the framework of the United Nations. The United States bore the responsibility for the fact that the United Nations was not a universal organization, and it had made consideration of that question in the United Nations impossible. That did not mean, however, that the States Members of the United Nations should not condemn the aggression against Viet-Nam. Although the question of Viet-Nam had not been on the agenda of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, a great many representatives in

their statements had shown concern about the situation in Viet-Nam. They had demanded an end to the intervention against the Viet-Nameese people and the aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, for not only the situation in South-East Asia and in Viet-Nam was being affected by those activities but also the situation of all nations throughout the world. The policy of preserving colonial and racist régimes was being pursued by the very ones who were carrying out a policy of intervention and aggression and insolently violating the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.

528. The military bases in the Territories under Portuguese control had been used against the national liberation movements in those Territories and also against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The same was true of bases in South Africa. The liquidation of military bases in colonial Territories was a vital part of the decolonization process. The abolition of foreign military bases should not, however, be limited to those set up in colonial Territories since such bases could be a threat to the independence of the country in which they were situated and to that of neighbouring countries also. It was the duty of the Special Committee to find ways of implementing General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and all the other relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions, and to support the peoples who were fighting for their independence and trying to achieve true decolonization.

529. The representative of *Chile* thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, for having again invited the Special Committee to meet at Dar es Salaam, thereby showing their determination to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism in Africa.

530. The zeal with which the United Republic of Tanzania was striving to secure Africa's liberation and the sacrifices which it had accepted in order that that noble cause should prevail were well known. Its work within the United Nations, together with its assistance to national liberation movements, placed the United Republic in the forefront of countries fighting colonialism and racial discrimination.

531. As the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, Mr. Malecela had spiritedly and vigorously defended the view of the Tanzanian Government and people that the African countries could never fully enjoy their liberty and independence until the whole of Africa had been liberated. His delegation had witnessed his fervent and untiring efforts to that end.

532. The Latin American countries, including Chile, had already given proof of their solidarity with the peoples of Africa and Asia still under foreign domination. They remembered having been colonies themselves and knew the price to be paid for freedom. For that reason, they supported the peoples of Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa and the other colonial peoples demanding their independence.

533. There had been criticism of the Special Committee's work by certain people who would like to see it adopt stronger measures to secure the immediate and complete liberation of colonial peoples. Such criticisms were readily understandable in view of the suffering and frustration of people who were unable to be free on their own soil and who saw that United Nations resolutions were not implemented by the administering Powers. For anyone not fully acquainted with the

operation of the United Nations, such a situation seemed incomprehensible. The Members of the Organization were, however, unhappily aware that its powers were limited. The United Nations was not a world government with supra-national powers. The General Assembly, a democratic body with representatives from all States, had only moral power, a power of persuasion which was effective only in so far as it influenced world public opinion. Only the Security Council had the power to take effective action and it was controlled by the great Powers, which explained why so many General Assembly resolutions were not implemented.

534. Consequently, his delegation believed that it was first for the oppressed peoples themselves to fight for independence. The United Nations would assist them by creating a favourable psychological climate and bringing pressure to bear on the colonial Powers to adopt a realistic attitude and grant the just claims of the oppressed peoples. If such pressure failed, the Security Council and the great Powers must be convinced that the enforcement action provided for in the Charter must be taken.

535. The Special Committee would have done useful work during its meetings in Africa since it would have collected extremely valuable oral testimony which would assist it in its future work, from petitioners and representatives of liberation movements in Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. His delegation was convinced that the new evidence which the Committee would collect on the situation in Mozambique and other colonial Territories would enable it to adopt resolutions that would serve the cause of decolonization.

536. The representative of *Bulgaria* thanked the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their generous hospitality and endorsed the expressions of gratitude to Mr. Kawawa for his thought-provoking address. By inviting the Special Committee, the Tanzanian Government had demonstrated its sense of responsibility for finding solutions of the grave colonial problems in southern Africa.

537. The Special Committee was meeting in the United Republic of Tanzania at a crucial juncture. Imperialist forces in the Middle East, South East Asia and especially Africa were using all possible forms of pressure to impede the fight of the oppressed peoples for freedom and independence, and economic influence and foreign monopolies were being employed to that end.

538. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination proved that the Western Powers, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, continued to ignore United Nations resolutions and to challenge world opinion. Not only did those countries disregard United Nations appeals to stop aid to Portugal, but they had also intensified their military and economic co-operation with Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The crux of the colonial problem in those regions as new evidence had shown was the co-operation between the régimes of Smith, Salazar and Vorster, on the one hand, and the United States and other Western Powers, on the other. Without the close co-operation of the NATO Powers, Portugal could never resist the liberation movements of the Territories under its administration. The patriots of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had, however, inflicted new defeats on the Portuguese colonialists and scored new

triumphs in organizing the free life of the populations in the liberated zones. His delegation looked forward to hearing the petitioners from Mozambique and other Territories and hoped they could tell the Special Committee how the United Nations could contribute effectively to their fight and how it could mobilize world opinion against the pernicious co-operation given by the Western Powers and NATO to Portugal.

539. In spite of the short time the Special Committee had been at Dar es Salaam, his delegation had sensed a new atmosphere in that beautiful city. The Government had fixed new goals for the establishment of a modern society, where no man would be exploited by another. The Bulgarian people had always admired the courage of the Tanzanian people, who were not only building an independent and democratic nation but were also helping their oppressed brothers at great personal sacrifice. He conveyed to the Tanzanian people his delegation's thanks for their warm hospitality, good wishes for their success, and its assurance that, in their fight to liberate all Africa from colonial rule and to build a socialist society, they could count on the aid and solidarity of Bulgaria.

540. The representative of *Italy* said that the links between the Committee and the beautiful city of Dar es Salaam were already strong and almost traditional. As a newcomer to the Committee, he wished to express his gratitude for the kind hospitality and thoughtfulness with which the Committee had been received.

541. However, the reason why the Special Committee had had to return to Dar es Salaam was the international community's concern at the course of events in southern Africa, in Territories to which the Committee had no access, which it could only observe indirectly through the descriptions given by petitioners and refugees. Reports of oppression, inequality and the denial of fundamental human rights had been received by the Committee. Those events were a source of major political concern and showed that mankind's forward march towards a better world had not affected some areas where men were not considered equal to others for reasons of race, creed and colour, where a majority was ruled by a minority and where the people born in a country were denied the right to govern themselves.

542. The Special Committee was only too conscious of its responsibilities and, as the Chairman had stated recently, it was certainly unanimous concerning its goals even when, in a truly democratic way, different opinions were expressed. He hoped that the Committee's work at Dar es Salaam would be fruitful and free from sterile polemics.

543. He was happy that the links between Italy and the United Republic of Tanzania were increasing which was a good example of what could be achieved when relations between countries in different continents were based on mutual friendship and trust.

544. The representative of *Poland* thanked the President, the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania on behalf of his delegation for their generous invitation. His delegation had been honoured and touched by the welcome and friendliness extended to the Committee.

545. Members who had visited Dar es Salaam during previous visits were able to admire the achievements of the United Republic in all sectors since its independence, and could not fail to be impressed by

the vigour and zeal with which it was forging ahead with its development programme.

546. By inviting the Special Committee once again, the United Republic was demonstrating the importance it attached to eradicating colonialism in general and to the achievement of African freedom in particular. He was happy to pay a tribute to Tanzania's continuing contribution towards the attempts of the United Nations to ensure respect for the inalienable rights of all peoples to freedom and independence. That attitude was best expressed by President Nyerere's assurance that Tanzania was prepared to die a little for the final removal of the humiliation of colonialism from the face of Africa. The fact that Dar es Salaam had been chosen as the headquarters of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the OAU was itself eloquent testimony to the wide recognition of the United Republic's devotion to the noble cause of African freedom. The United Nations also recognized that country's outstanding record in decolonization, which was well illustrated by the unanimous election of Mr. Malecela as Chairman of the Special Committee.

547. His delegation endorsed the expression of thanks to Mr. Rishidi Kawawa for his inspiring address, which would be a useful guide for the Special Committee in its deliberations.

548. Poland was of the opinion that the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples must be implemented in all Territories under foreign domination without exception. It regarded the elimination of colonialism in all its forms as an act of historic justice. Poland and the other socialist countries had always supported the national liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other parts of the world. The legitimate fight of the Africans to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination and independence and the liquidation of colonial and racist régimes throughout Africa would continue to have Poland's sympathy and support.

549. As the Chairman had pointed out in his reply to Mr. Kawawa, the Special Committee had always sought to adopt recommendations aimed at peaceful solutions to the problems of colonialism and racialism. Responsibility for the continued suffering of the African people in southern Africa must be placed upon the shoulders of the colonial Powers, which were refusing to comply with their obligations under the Charter and continued to contravene General Assembly and Security Council decisions. While paying lip-service to those resolutions, the imperialist Powers were acting as the accomplices of the fascist régimes of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. The same Powers had embarked on a series of aggressive acts elsewhere, including Viet-Nam and the Middle East, intervening to crush national liberation movements in flagrant violation of international law.

550. The Special Committee, at its recent meetings at Kinshasa and Kitwe, had heard evidence from petitioners from Territories under Portuguese administration and had been shocked by the crimes and atrocities committed by the Portuguese against the Africans engaged in the heroic fight for their liberation. Further evidence had been produced on the continued military, financial and other assistance given to Portugal by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States,

the United Kingdom and other NATO allies. Portugal was thus enabled to wage a savage colonial war in the Territories under its administration.

551. A similar situation prevailed in Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, where the illegal racist régimes were repressing the Africans in order to continue their exploitation of the natural resources of those Territories, for the sole benefit of international financial monopolies. That situation was a threat to the security of the newly independent African States.

552. The Special Committee was also aware that the Tanzanian frontiers had been violated and that plots were being hatched against the country because of its hospitality to African freedom fighters. Another serious impediment to the liberation of the peoples under colonial administration was the continued existence of military bases in Territories under foreign administration. Those bases were used to repress national liberation movements in flagrant violation of the many resolutions of the General Assembly calling for their dismantlement. The situation could not be tolerated by the international community. The United Nations had an obligation to denounce those of its Members that directly or indirectly impeded the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

553. Practical measures such as those suggested by the Chairman should be taken to sweep away the last vestiges of colonialism and to eliminate the servitude and humiliation of millions of Africans who were forced to live under racist colonial régimes in southern Africa.

554. His delegation looked forward to hearing additional first-hand evidence concerning the situation in the various Territories, particularly Mozambique, the United Republic's immediate neighbour. The evidence would be of great value to the Special Committee in carrying out its mandate. He was confident that the Committee's meetings at Dar es Salaam would help the leaders of national liberation movements to realize that they were not alone in their fight. His delegation associated itself with the Chairman's plea for unity of action against the common enemy, and assured the freedom fighters of Poland's continued support and earnest desire to contribute to the speedy fulfilment of their legitimate wishes.

555. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation appreciated the opportunity to express its appreciation to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. It was impressed with the pains to which that Government had gone to ensure the success of the Committee's visit to Dar es Salaam and thanked the Second Vice-President, Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, for his words of advice and welcome.

556. It was a great pleasure for the United States delegation to return again to the United Republic, a country with which its Government enjoyed close and cordial relations based on mutual respect and understanding and on a substantial record of fruitful economic and technical co-operation. He himself was particularly pleased to return to Dar es Salaam since he had had the honour to be a member of the United States delegation to the Tanzanian independence ceremonies in 1961. The vitality and continuing rapid rate of development of the United Republic were impressive, and President Nyerere's strong emphasis on hard work and self-reliance struck a sympathetic



chord with the Government and people of the United States who wished the Tanzanian people every success in their efforts. The Treaty on East African Co-operation which had been signed the previous week promised a further acceleration of Tanzanian development. The leaders of the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda were to be congratulated on their statesmanship. The Treaty would provide a firm basis for co-operation among the three countries involved and could serve as a model for regional co-operation in the interests of accelerated development in other parts of Africa and elsewhere.

557. At Dar es Salaam the Special Committee would be considering the important question of self-determination for the peoples of southern Africa, especially of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and Mozambique. The position of the United States on that subject had already been set forth by his delegation and would be made clear again in forthcoming debate. The basic issue in each of those areas was whether the African majority were to be entitled to control their own destiny. His Government believed that all men were entitled to justice, human rights and liberty and that all of Africa would not long be denied their exercise.

558. Over the past fifteen years the great majority of the people of Africa had achieved independence on their own initiative and, in some cases, ultimately with the co-operation of the administering Powers. In the case of the former Trust Territories the provisions of the Charter had enabled the United Nations to play a major role in bringing about such independence. In Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories administered by Portugal, the United Nations had to tackle the difficult problem of Territories that had not achieved independence or government by the consent of the governed. The Charter had foreseen such circumstances and provided means for bringing the pressure of the world community to bear. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the situation had been regarded as a threat to international peace and security. The problem was before the Security Council and the progressive steps provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter were being applied. In accordance with the Charter, efforts were being made to achieve compliance by peaceful means.

559. Men who sought their freedom and the right to majority rule were, and should be, impatient. But "instant freedom", regrettably, had seldom been achieved. Countries represented on the Special Committee, including his own, knew that the struggle for self-determination and freedom could be long and difficult, but the ultimate achievement of freedom by all people was certain. His Government and all States Members of the United Nations were committed under the Charter to hastening the achievement of that goal as rapidly and peacefully as possible.

560. His delegation respected the non-aligned policy of the United Republic and would not introduce polemics or divisive arguments of a political "cold war" nature into the Special Committee's deliberations. However, his delegation reserved the right to reply to any misleading and inaccurate statements or false charges which were directed by certain delegations at his Government and its policies.

561. The representative of *Finland* thanked the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for once again having invited the Special Committee to

meet at Dar es Salaam which was closely associated with the work of the Committee in which the United Republic and the Chairman had played an important and dominant role. He also thanked the Second Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, for his kind words of welcome and his understanding of the Committee's work.

562. It was his impression that all members pursued in the main the same objectives with regard to colonialism: all would like to see the system of minority rule and oppression abolished as soon as possible. But a committee of the United Nations was likely to disagree on the methods to be used to achieve that end. As the Secretary-General had said, the weaknesses and shortcomings of the United Nations lay not in its constitutional purposes, objectives and procedures, but in world conditions. Working together to achieve common goals, representatives of independent States, with their own background and history, ideals and principles, were bound to disagree on methods. But there was nothing wrong in that as long as the objectives were the same: the speedy abolition of all forms of minority rule and racial discrimination.

563. Speaking as a representative of a Nordic country with no colonial background, he fully shared the common objectives and the impatience expressed by previous speakers, but Finland was traditionally against the use of force; it firmly believed that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and strongly supported the United Nations as the organization set up to solve world problems in an orderly and peaceful way.

564. In coming to the United Republic of Tanzania he felt close to his own country: outside Dar es Salaam was a large educational project, called the Nordic Tanganyika Centre, and he sincerely hoped that the fruitful co-operation between the United Republic and the Nordic countries would increase in the future, based as it was on the common understanding of the problems confronting smaller nations.

565. He welcomed the representative of Afghanistan to the Special Committee.

566. The representative of *Syria* expressed his deep gratitude to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their cordial and fraternal welcome to the Special Committee, which would enable it to pursue its work of decolonization.

567. It was not the first time that the Tanzanian Government had allowed the Special Committee to hold its meetings on the soil of the young and dynamic African Republic with which his country had the friendliest relations.

568. The wisdom of Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa's statement bore witness to the unswerving devotion of the Tanzanian people to the cause of the emancipation of peoples and to its firm determination to continue to assist those still fighting to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism from the face of the earth.

569. The evidence of the petitioners would help the Special Committee to take decisions and make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly. In the course of its travels in Africa, the Committee would have other matters to consider, with which it had long been concerned.

570. His delegation would have the opportunity of stating its position on those matters at later meetings. It wished, however, to state that it would spare no effort to secure the adoption of resolutions and recom-



mendations designed to ensure the implementation of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and to assist the freedom fighters in their noble and legitimate struggle. His country had carried on the fight against colonialism and imperialism and would continue until final victory, believing that its sacrifices in the fight would strengthen still further its solidarity with and support for freedom fighters throughout the world.

571. The representative of *Australia* thanked the Second Vice-President for his important address, and the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam. The Second Vice-President's address would be of considerable help to the Committee in its deliberations and he endorsed the Ethiopian proposal that it should be recorded *in extenso*.

572. The address was indicative of the understandably intense interest of the Tanzanian Government and people in the problems of colonialism in Africa, an interest which was a source of inspiration to those who had not yet been able to exercise their inherent right to self-determination. It was for that reason that Dar es Salaam had become a traditional meeting-place for the Special Committee.

573. He was very pleased to see at first hand the remarkable development that had occurred in the United Republic since independence under the dynamic and dedicated leadership of President Nyerere. The United Republic and Australia had many interests in common. They were both members of the Commonwealth and recent years had witnessed a steady development of their commercial ties. The presence of Tanzanian students in Australia had added greatly to the understanding of Tanzanian and African problems and aspirations in that country.

574. What was more important, the two countries shared a common interest in the development of a world governed by a proper relationship between nations and a proper relationship of equality between all men. He looked forward to hearing further useful evidence on colonialism in Africa and hoped that it would enable the Special Committee to make a profitable contribution on behalf of the people still striving for independence.

575. In conclusion, he expressed the conviction that the Special Committee would give careful thought to the Second Vice-President's interesting assessment of the situation in southern Africa to the effect that it was a compound of colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

576. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that it was a particular pleasure for his delegation to revisit Dar es Salaam which was traditionally a "haven of peace" and security for refugees fleeing from the oppression and slavery in their Territories. The United Republic of Tanzania, and Dar es Salaam in particular, had come to be recognized as a stronghold of liberty and the Organization of African Unity had decided to establish its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa in that city.

577. His delegation was very keenly aware of the United Republic's contribution to decolonization and the fight for human rights and Mr. Malecela's own efforts for that cause had led to his being unanimously elected as the current Chairman of the Committee. Because of its leadership in the freedom movement

and its assistance to the oppressed people of neighbouring Mozambique, the United Republic was constantly threatened by the friends of colonialism.

578. Nearly all the countries represented on the Special Committee had, at one time or another, been obliged to wage a bitter fight for their independence, but it seemed that some of them now hesitated to help the peoples still under the colonial yoke. But colonialism was such that it could only be overthrown by force; independence was not given on a platter.

579. The opening addresses by Mr. Kawawa, the Second Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Chairman merited careful consideration by the Special Committee and would be of great use to it in its deliberations at Dar es Salaam.

580. He thanked the President, Government and people of the United Republic for their invitation to the Special Committee and hoped that genuine progress towards the liberation of the oppressed peoples would result from the discussions at Dar es Salaam.

581. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* expressed his delegation's cordial and sincere thanks to the Tanzanian Government and people for having allowed the Special Committee to meet once again at Dar es Salaam. The United Republic's gesture was a further demonstration of the interest it took in international affairs in general and the problem of decolonization in particular.

582. Like all African countries, the Ivory Coast attached the utmost importance to all questions affecting the dignity and freedom of men, and of Africans in particular. It remained convinced that one cause of the serious threat now facing the world was the tendency towards hegemony, which smothered liberty and fomented rebellion.

583. The situation in Mozambique, Angola, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia was the result of the expansionist designs of certain countries which, turning back the pages of history, persisted in following outdated policies of assimilation in an Africa which was independent. Such selfish policies must be condemned; they were based on violence and could only engender violence.

584. The Ivory Coast again called on the Portuguese, South African and Southern Rhodesian Governments to adopt more realistic policies, based on respect for democracy and the right of self-determination of peoples. The Ivory Coast was persuaded that self-determination was the only just solution. Unhappily, that principle was not always respected and, as a result, world peace was continually threatened. All countries had a duty to see that international peace and security were maintained; that was why they had set up the United Nations. His country set great store by the United Nations, and particularly by the Special Committee for the complete liberation of Territories still under foreign domination. It was confident of the impartiality of the Committee's decisions for, while supporting decolonization, it believed that peoples must be able to choose their own destiny.

585. The representative of *Madagascar* associated himself with the previous speakers who had paid a tribute to the Tanzanian Government and people for having again invited the Special Committee to meet at Dar es Salaam.

586. His delegation had particularly appreciated Mr. Kawawa's welcoming address to all members of the Committee.

587. His delegation was aware of the United Republic's major role in the search for solutions of the problems of decolonization. In his important address, the Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania had emphasized that no African country could enjoy peace and freedom to the full while there were still some Territories in Africa suffering from colonial and racist oppression. The Malagasy Republic shared that view and therefore closely watched developments in the colonial Territories, particularly in Africa, with great attention. His delegation would do all in its power to secure implementation of the principle of self-determination set forth in the United Nations Charter and to ensure that the decisions of the peoples concerning their future were respected.

588. In conclusion, he asked the Chairman of the Special Committee to convey fraternal greetings and sincere wishes for success from the Malagasy people to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

589. The representative of *Iraq* said that it was a great pleasure for the Iraqi delegation to be able to participate in the Special Committee's meetings in the African "haven of peace" since, the historic name of the capital of Iraq, Baghdad, had also been Dar es Salaam. The Committee's thanks were due to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania who illustrated the new spirit of young and energetic Africa in their determined revolutionary drive against foreign influence and the last strongholds of foreign economic and military abuse in Africa and elsewhere.

590. Iraq had a particular regard for the United Republic and its achievements in international politics and economic development and its evident leadership on the African stage. The stand the United Republic had taken on behalf of all colonized, subjugated and oppressed peoples was clear and consistent. Especially impressive had been the messages recently sent by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania to President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, supporting his stand and urging him to continue in his courageous and unyielding opposition to the pressure of the racist Zionists of Israel, the insidious forces of imperialism and the well-known blood merchants. Those messages would be highly cherished by the Arab people everywhere as yet another link of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of Africa and the Arab Middle East.

591. He would deal fully with the items on the Special Committee's agenda at a later stage.

592. He extended his greetings to Mr. Samnah, the newly arrived representative of Afghanistan, and wished his predecessor, Mr. Glaus, a speedy recovery.

593. The representative of *Venezuela* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold its meetings in the historic city of Dar es Salaam.

594. The Special Committee was meeting for the third time in the United Republic, which was preparing to receive delegations of every nationality and representatives of various organizations who, in a few days time, were to participate in a history-making seminar on colonialism and the policy of racial discrimination. That was further proof of its pioneering role in the fight for decolonization.

595. His delegation expressed its gratitude to the Chairman of the Special Committee, a son of that generous country, for his untiring devotion to the cause of freedom and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence. The torch burning on the summit of Kilimanjaro was not only the symbol of a nation in arms against dishonour, oppression and the paranoid behaviour of racists and their allies; it also symbolized the deliverance of peoples still under the colonial yoke.

596. The United Republic of Tanzania was one of the countries dedicated to peace and freedom which refused to watch human society foundering in the havoc wrought by its own lack of understanding, or to remain passive as its fundamental values were destroyed. For those and many other reasons, the Special Committee's discussions in the United Republic were of particular significance and importance.

597. The testimony of petitioners from various Territories which the Special Committee would be able to hear at Dar es Salaam would clearly be extremely valuable for its work. Those who denied the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling the aims of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples were mistaken. The proof of its effectiveness was so evident that it needed no comment. It could, in all certainty, be said that if the United Nations had not written the epilogue to the history of the liberation of peoples, it had at least written the prologue. Those who, for political, economic or strategic reasons, played the colonialists' game and supported the hateful policy of racial discrimination, were also mistaken. So too were those who attempted to establish a social structure which contradicted the most elementary principles of ethics and civilization. Likewise mistaken were those who set little store by the right to freedom and made no distinction between the fight for that supreme ideal and the defence of their own squalid interests. Those who strove to continue insolently disregarding the world's conscience were also mistaken. Right and justice would triumph over colonialism and racism.

598. His delegation had already had occasion to set forth its attitude to the problems concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration during the general debate at Kinshasha and Kitwe. Venezuela categorically refused to accept the juridical fiction, which the Portuguese Government was attempting to impose, that the African Territories under Portuguese administration were Portuguese overseas provinces and an integral part of Portugal's national territory. Venezuela had condemned the Portuguese Government's obstinate refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. It also condemned the colonial war being waged by Portugal to perpetuate its colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. His country would do everything in its power to ensure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) as it affected those Territories.

599. His delegation was convinced that the work of the Special Committee at Dar es Salaam would be crowned with success. It renewed its thanks to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for allowing the Special Committee to meet a second time in a country which was in the forefront of those fighting to uphold the aspiration of peoples to self-determination and independence.

600. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the previous speakers for their kind words which he would convey to his President and to the Second Vice-President. Their words would be of great encouragement to the Tanzanian Government in its uncompromising stand against all the evils of colonialism and imperialism. The United Republic had only recently become independent and it was too soon for it to have forgotten those evils; that was why it was determined to render all possible assistance to its fellow men who were still being dominated by foreign oppressors.

601. He wished the Special Committee every success in its complex deliberations and its efforts to promote the noble cause of the freedom of mankind.

602. The representative of *Afghanistan* associated his delegation with the thanks that had been expressed by other members of the Special Committee for the cordial welcome and generous hospitality offered by the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

603. He paid a tribute to the Second Vice-President for his important address, which would be of great assistance in the Special Committee's deliberations. The Committee's meetings among the peace-loving Tanzanian people under the chairmanship of one of its sons would be a source of inspiration to those who desired the complete elimination of colonialism and racism. The heroic efforts of the Tanzanian people to overcome foreign domination would serve as an example to those still fighting for their freedom and independence.

604. *Afghanistan* and the United Republic were bound by common ideals and spiritual ties. *Afghanistan* supported all those who were fighting for their freedom and had condemned all forms of colonialism. It considered the shameful policy of *apartheid* and racism in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration to be crimes against humanity.

605. Colonialism had reached a crucial phase, particularly in the African Territories, and the United Nations must take immediate action for its elimination.

606. He thanked the Chairman and committee members for their words of welcome to his delegation and expressed his heartfelt wishes for the happiness, prosperity and progress of the Tanzanian people.

*Statement by the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the Organization of African Unity*

607. The representative of the *Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa*, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that he was extremely honoured to have the privilege of addressing the Special Committee and wished to convey the greetings and sincere good wishes of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU and the Executive Secretariat of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

608. The Co-ordinating Committee sincerely hoped that the Special Committee's efforts during its work at Dar es Salaam would be crowned with success which would ensure the realization of the hopes of millions of Africans still enslaved under the cruel and inhuman system of colonialism. On behalf of the Co-ordinating Committee, he assured the Chairman that his wise guidance of the Committee was a matter of

great pride and a shining example to every true son of Africa. The Executive Secretariat of the Co-ordinating Committee was at the Committee's disposal for any assistance it might require during its stay at Dar es Salaam.

609. The problem of colonialism had already been extensively studied. Many books and papers had been written on the subject. Some cheap authors and journalists from the colonialist countries were making a good living by producing superficial copies on that most serious problem.

610. The Co-ordinating Committee was an organ of action and not a debating society. It was therefore not his intention to repeat what had already been said. He wished, however, to draw the Special Committee's attention to some important points.

611. The Organization of African Unity viewed colonialism with grave concern, and for that reason it had set up a special committee to co-ordinate the work of African liberation. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism were words which were spoken and written hundreds of times each day. To certain people—some of them Members of the United Nations—those words had become meaningless, but in Africa they were a constant reminder of the inhuman treatment, tortures and degradation of the vast population of Africa. The OAU would keep drumming those words into the ears of the world until the last square inch of Africa was free from foreign domination. There would be no peace in the world so long as the shameful system of colonialism prevailed. The world could know no tranquillity as long as certain fanatics were allowed to continue the brutal policy of segregation and racial arrogance. To Africans the word "colonialism" was not an abstraction and when Africans spoke of the decolonization of Africa they were not merely expounding a theory: they meant the total eradication of colonialism in all its forms.

612. The OAU, being a peaceful organization, would be happy if the United Nations were to find an immediate and practical peaceful solution to the burning problem of colonialism. The OAU would be only too happy if the Special Committee were to use its influence to persuade Portugal, South Africa and other colonialist countries to stop their mad policy of oppression and subjugation. But, in the absence of any guarantee of an immediate peaceful solution, the OAU would feel free to use all means at its disposal to restore elementary human rights to the oppressed peoples of Africa. It had no intention of compromising on the question of decolonization.

613. Of late, the oppressors of the African people had been jubilant about certain setbacks and difficulties in Africa. Africa's enemies were rejoicing at its troubles. They were convinced that Africa's energy was spent and that decolonization had become a dream. He assured the Special Committee that the total decolonization of Africa remained a top priority on the OAU's agenda and that, failing an immediate and practical solution to the problem of colonialism on the part of the United Nations, the fight for liberation raging throughout the occupied Territories of Africa would be waged to the bitter end. The OAU believed that peace, freedom and human rights were not the monopoly of any particular nation and that it was therefore its responsibility to restore elementary and fundamental human rights to the African Territories still under foreign domination.

614. Colonialism took many forms: political, economic and cultural. Cultural colonialism was no less serious than political or economic colonialism. On the contrary, it could be its most pernicious form. It was a process whereby the colonial Powers dominated the very thoughts and minds of the oppressed and destroyed their soul so that they were made to feel inferior. It drove a wedge between the so-called *élite* and the masses of the colonized. In Africa, sad to say, it tended to drive a wedge between the English-speaking and French-speaking peoples. That state of affairs was incompatible with progress. He appealed to the United Nations to take immediate steps through its education programme to eradicate cultural colonialism from Africa.

615. In recent years another urgent problem had arisen in Africa: that of refugees and displaced persons. Portugal, South Africa and their colonial friends had uprooted thousands of innocent people from their countries and rendered them homeless. Hundreds of thousands of peace-loving Africans had been forced to flee their countries as a result of the manoeuvres of the colonialists and their friends. While the OAU appreciated the good work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, it appealed to the Special Committee to use its good offices to inform the United Nations that the best solution of the problem of refugees and displaced persons was the abolition of colonialism. It also appealed to the United Nations to make provision for the education, medical treatment and social welfare of refugees and displaced persons.

616. If the United Nations found a solution to the colonial problem, Africa's freedom fighters would lay down their arms forthwith. If the systems of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism came to an end, the OAU would be very happy to divert the resources it spent on decolonization to development purposes.

617. One of the functions of the United Nations was to work for world peace. The ending of the evil of colonialism would enable the OAU to concentrate all its efforts on the pursuit of world peace. He was quite confident that a free and united Africa would make a great contribution to that cause.

#### CLOSING OF MEETINGS

#### *Statement by the Minister for Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania*

618. The Minister for Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania congratulated the Special Committee and everyone who had made its meetings at Dar es Salaam possible on behalf of the people and Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

619. The Tanzanian people were deeply committed to the cause of freedom for their brothers in Africa and elsewhere who were still living under colonialism. They knew the evils of that system both because they themselves had suffered under it and because they could compare it with the freedom and independence they enjoyed at present. In particular, the Tanzanian people knew that institutional racial discrimination, i.e. the humiliation of a man for being the colour he was born, was linked with colonialism. That such discriminatory policies were sometimes camouflaged by high-sounding names did not alter their character. Discrimination existed in the Portu-

guese-administered Territories despite attempts to confuse the issue by talk of an "assimilation policy"; just as colonialism existed despite the pretence that the United Republic's southern neighbour was Portugal. Attempts were made to present a more attractive appearance, and the manner of oppression might be different, but the fact of oppression remained the same.

620. It was for that reason that Tanzania had always supported visits by the Special Committee to countries that were close to those colonies whose constitutional development they had been asked by the United Nations to keep under constant review. Such visits enabled Committee members to examine much more deeply and at close range the effects of colonialism and *apartheid* and therefore to pierce any disguise which might be worn. At the same time, because the petitioners had an opportunity of putting their case and answering questions, the rest of the world became better informed of the nature of the colonial problem.

621. The importance of that was obvious. Those in America, Europe and elsewhere who had never suffered colonial oppression needed to be constantly reminded of those evils if colonialism was to be quickly defeated. The imperialist Powers needed to be reminded too that they could not escape their responsibility for the continued oppression of people in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South West Africa, Aden and elsewhere.

622. In that respect the absence of a United Kingdom delegation from the deliberations of the Special Committee during its present African tour was a matter of regret. The responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for what was taking place in the southern half of the African continent was unquestionable. That country had created South Africa in 1910; it had laid the ground in 1923 for what was taking place in Southern Rhodesia; and, together with others, it was supporting Portugal through NATO and in the United Nations. When the United Nations had voted to end South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa in October 1966, it was significant that the United Kingdom had been among the abstaining delegations. As if that were not enough, the United Kingdom Government was making arrangements to buy islands in the Indian Ocean for the purpose of establishing military bases. The threat of such bases in that particular area had been discussed by the Committee and was covered in the resolution adopted by the Committee on Mauritius and its neighbouring islands. When so much of the Committee's work was of the United Kingdom's creation, surely the Committee was entitled to ask for that Power's co-operation in its endeavour to fulfil its mandate. It was to be hoped that the Committee's resolutions would be carefully studied and rapidly implemented by the United Kingdom Government and its allies. For, even if the United Kingdom refused to participate in the work of a Committee of which it was a member, it could not by default escape its responsibilities.

623. The Tanzanian people would continue to give the Special Committee all the co-operation and assistance within their power. It was a pity that the Committee could not visit the areas in the Middle East which it had arranged to visit, but the United Republic understood very sympathetically the events that had made Iraq and Syria unable to receive the Committee during

its present tour. It would be agreed that a great part had been played by those countries in the cause of freedom for oppressed peoples, and it was his Government's hope that it would be possible for the Committee to visit Syria and Iraq in the future.

624. The Tanzanian Government and people had been happy to receive the Special Committee in their country. They hoped that the visit to the United Republic and the other African countries had been helpful to the Committee in discharging its responsibilities.

#### *General statements*

625. *The Chairman* said that during the Special Committee's stay at Dar es Salaam, members had had yet another opportunity of appreciating the dynamism and revolutionary ardour of the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, their unstinting support, second to none, of the fight for the total liquidation of colonialism and their active solidarity with the efforts as well as with the objectives of the Committee. All those attributes had been amply reflected in the address with which the Committee had just been honoured.

626. The Special Committee had come to the close of its meetings at Dar es Salaam and the end of a fruitful session away from Headquarters. The vigour with which the Committee had tackled its work at Dar es Salaam, the success of its meetings, and the importance of the conclusions and recommendations adopted had all been made possible by the invitation extended to the Committee by the Tanzanian Government, the environment it had been privileged to work in and the facilities which had been so generously placed at its disposal by the Government. As Chairman, he expressed the Committee's warm gratitude, through Mr. Saidi Maswanya, to the President, the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, to whom the Committee was also deeply thankful for their kind hospitality. In addition, the Committee was happy to have had the opportunity of visiting the interior and further to develop long-established friendships and fraternal links with the valiant Tanzanian people.

627. In the course of its meetings at Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee had also been honoured by the participation in its deliberations of the representative of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa of OAU. As Chairman, he acknowledged that contribution with gratitude and stressed the importance of developing further the ties of co-operation that linked the Special Committee to the OAU, as also the League of Arab States. For only in close collaboration could those bodies ensure the speedy attainment of their common objectives, namely, the elimination of colonial domination, respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination and to the free choice of their national institutions.

628. At Dar es Salaam the Special Committee had heard six groups of petitioners concerning Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mauritius and French Somaliland. On behalf of the Committee, he thanked all the petitioners for the contribution they had made to the Committee's consideration of the various colonial questions. They could be assured of the Committee's continued whole-hearted support in the struggle of their peoples for freedom and independence in keeping with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. On its return to New York, the Committee, in addition to the

recommendations it had already adopted in Africa, would intensify its efforts to mobilize world opinion in support of their legitimate struggle, in order to achieve without further delay the exercise by their peoples of the right to self-determination.

629. The petitioners had reminded the Special Committee that the people of Mozambique totally rejected the thesis that their Territory was an overseas province of Portugal. The petitioners had also recalled that Portuguese colonialism, based on exploitation, oppression and repression, and accompanied by ruthless racial discrimination, continued to deny to the people their most elementary human right. The Committee had received further testimony of the savage brutality with which Portugal was intensifying its war against the people of Mozambique, a war which could not be prosecuted without the assistance extended to Portugal by a number of its friends and allies within NATO. The petitioners had again confirmed that, if the people of Mozambique had resorted to armed struggle, it was because Portugal had refused outright to accept all peaceful means for bringing them to freedom and independence.

630. The Special Committee had been gratified to receive additional information regarding the progress of that honourable and just struggle to free Mozambique from the yoke of the oppressor. It had been very much impressed to hear of the efforts being made by the national liberation movement to rehabilitate the liberated areas, amounting to one third of the country, to rebuild the economy and to promote the material and social welfare of the people. It had also been heartened to learn of the measures taken by the national liberation movements to assist the thousands of refugees from the areas still under Portuguese occupation, particularly as far as education and health were concerned. Nevertheless, having gained greater understanding of the magnitude of the task and of the difficulties involved, members had become more conscious than ever of the urgent need for vastly increased assistance from the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations, as well as from Governments.

631. As far as South West Africa was concerned, the petitioners had informed the Special Committee that the fight for national liberation continued unabated and that the fascist Vorster régime, responding with characteristic brutality and harshness, had imposed even more extensive repressive measures, involving mass arrests and inhuman torture. They had drawn attention to the merciless pillage of the human and material resources that was being carried out by the régime of Pretoria with the co-operation of foreign companies, and to the large-scale assistance that the régime was receiving from certain States Members of the United Nations in violation of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII). They had denounced with legitimate indignation the proposal to establish a Bantustan in Ovamboland, which they regarded as an attempt to dilute the essence of the struggle of the people for dignity. In conclusion, the petitioners had urged that in view of the unco-operative attitude that might be expected of certain big Powers with gigantic economic and financial interests in the Territory, Member States should have recourse to the Security Council in order to obtain the compulsory enforcement of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) under Chapter VII of the Charter.



632. Regarding the question of Southern Rhodesia, the petitioners had exposed the failure of the so-called selective mandatory sanctions to bring about the downfall of the illegal racist minority régime, let alone the establishment of conditions of equality and democratic freedom in implementation of the Declaration. They had condemned a number of Western and other Powers for circumventing those sanctions, and had called for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions backed by force, both against the régime and against any countries refusing to co-operate in that regard. The petitioners had also registered the determination of the people of Zimbabwe to intensify their fight for liberation by armed force. Finally, they had insisted on the immediate establishment of African majority rule, followed by independence within the shortest possible time.

633. Once again most of the petitioners heard by the Special Committee—from Mozambique, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia—had referred to the role played by entrenched foreign economic and other interests in impeding the implementation of the Declaration. It was evident that those interests had not only been giving active support to the colonial régimes in those Territories, but that, acting in concert, they had also been relentlessly exploiting the human and material resources of those Territories, denying to the African people the means for their economic, social and educational development, and had thus stood in the way of the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence.

634. On Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Special Committee had been told about the failure of the administering Power to take steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the recommendations of the Committee. In particular, dissatisfaction had been expressed about the inadequate rate of political progress and about the present electoral system. The detachment of a group of islands from those Territories in violation of their territorial integrity, to form the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory, and the establishment of military installations therein had come in for particular condemnation.

635. Regarding French Somaliland, the petitioners had referred with grave concern to recent developments in the Territory and had stressed that, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2228 (XXI) independence should be granted in the shortest possible time after the holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, under international supervision. They had also urged that all political prisoners should be released, that democratic freedoms should be restored and that all refugees should be enabled to return and to secure international assistance.

636. All the elements thus brought to the attention of the Special Committee by the petitioners had been taken into account in the highly important resolutions adopted during its last few meetings concerning Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration, and on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to the colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its current session away from Headquarters.

637. The texts of those resolutions were, of course, available to members. Many of their provisions were not new but they were important in being stronger and

more far-reaching formulations of considerations and demands to which the Special Committee and the General Assembly had previously given expression. There were a number of significant new elements and ideas contained in them to which attention should be drawn.

638. For instance, in the resolution on Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/249), the Special Committee had described the establishment of military installations and the carrying out of any military activities in those Territories not only as a violation of General Assembly resolution 2232 (XXI), but also as a source of tension in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. That was clearly a development of some importance in the Committee's consideration of those Territories. In another noteworthy move, the Committee in its resolution on South West Africa (A/AC.109/250) had condemned unanimously as illegal, contrary to the relevant General Assembly resolutions and a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations the measures taken and proposed by South Africa regarding Ovamboland.

639. The resolution concerning Territories under Portuguese domination (A/AC.109/251) also contained significant new ideas. In that resolution, the Special Committee had further developed the concept, which it had first advanced during 1965, of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples to achieve freedom and independence. In the last preambular paragraph, the Committee had expressly noted with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements both by struggle and by a reconstruction programme. That implied at once an endorsement of the efforts of the national liberation movements to achieve freedom and independence for their countries, and a recognition of the valuable work they were carrying on in the liberated areas. By way of underlining their role, the Committee had requested, in operative paragraph 11, that the granting of assistance by the specialized agencies and other international assistance organizations to the victims of Portuguese military operations should be done in co-operation with the national liberation movements.

640. In operative paragraphs 7 and 8 of the same resolution, the Special Committee, availing itself of the provisions of operative paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), drew the attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation and recommended that the Council should make mandatory the provisions of its own resolution 218 (1965) and of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). In doing so, however, the Committee had also drawn attention to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that bordered upon its colonies. Those provisions accordingly represented a further and notable definition of the serious implications of Portuguese colonialism for international peace and security.

641. Also, in operative paragraph 11 of the resolution, the Special Committee correctly attached importance to the role to be played by the OAU in any measures to be undertaken by international organizations to increase assistance to the refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration. Those provisions testified to the value of the co-operation with the OAU, to which he had already referred, and also to the Committee's confidence that the effectiveness of international assistance to refugees could be enhanced by means of such co-operation.

642. Lastly, emphasis had been rightly placed on the need for continuous and widespread publicity for the work of the United Nations in order to educate world opinion concerning the situation in the Portuguese colonies and the fight for liberation. At the same time the resolution visualized that efforts to meet that need would be made in consultation with the Special Committee. That was a logical development: it was obvious that efforts to publicize the decolonization work of the United Nations and to mobilize world public opinion for the eradication of colonialism would benefit from the participation of the Committee.

643. Those considerations were also reflected in the general resolution (A/AC.109/252) adopted by the Special Committee concerning the colonial Territories it had examined. With regard to publicity for the work of the United Nations on those Territories, particular reference had been made to the preparation of suitable publications in consultation with the Committee. Moreover it was noteworthy that, in operative paragraph 6, the Committee condemned in more categorical terms than previously the formation of an *entente* between South Africa, Portugal and the illegal Smith régime. Another significant development was that the Committee had not been content to request the dismantling of military bases and installations in colonial Territories. It had also, in operative paragraph 10 of the resolution, described such bases and installations as an obstacle to the liberation of the peoples of those Territories. Lastly, in seeking to ensure that the specialized agencies withheld assistance to the régimes of Salazar, Smith and Vorster, the Committee had emphasized, in operative paragraph 12, the responsibility of States to take appropriate action as members of those agencies.

644. He wished to record his conviction that the decision to undertake yet another series of meetings away from Headquarters had been more than justified by the results achieved. By reason of its closer proximity to the colonial Territories under discussion and of the easier availability of leaders of the national liberation movements, the Special Committee had been able to acquire additional and more direct knowledge of conditions in those Territories, as well as deeper understanding of the wishes of the people, and of the difficulties and obstacles hindering their fulfilment. He was confident that the capacity of the Committee to assist those peoples had thus been enhanced. Finally, the active solidarity of the United Nations with colonial peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence had once again been underlined.

645. It was true that several petitioners had expressed disappointment, even disillusion, with the results of the efforts of the United Nations. The reason was not far to seek. It was the reluctance, and in many cases the deliberate refusal, of the administering Powers to co-operate in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. At the same time the Special Committee would be failing in its duty if it did not give continuous consideration to ways and means of improving the effectiveness of its work. In that connexion, he commended to members for examination the ideas he had expressed at the Committee's opening meeting at Dar es Salaam.

646. The colonial Powers by their adamant refusal to grant the African peoples independence had forced them to resort to arms. He urged the freedom fighters to redouble their efforts, for force was the only language that the colonial Powers understood. He also appealed to them to unite, for only through unity of

action and purpose could the sufferings and humiliation of the peoples in the Territories under colonial domination come to an end.

647. He also appealed to the international community, both inside and outside the United Nations, to realize the plight of the African people. The world community should not leave the people of Africa to be butchered; they deserved freedom as much as their fellow men in Europe or North America.

648. On behalf of the Special Committee, he expressed his appreciation to the Under-Secretary, who in spite of his heavy schedule, had been able to find time to attend the Committee's meetings at Dar es Salaam. The Committee's thanks also went to the members of the Secretariat and particularly to the interpreters, to the Information Services and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, to the Press, which had been particularly co-operative, and which could play a vital role in informing public opinion about the Committee's work on decolonization, to the management of the Msimbazi Community Centre and indeed to all who in one way or another had contributed to make the work of the Committee both possible and fruitful.

649. The Special Committee was also grateful to the President, Government and people of the United Republic for enabling it to hold such a constructive session at Dar es Salaam.

650. The representative of *Venezuela*, speaking on behalf of his own Government and that of Chile, warmly thanked the Tanzanian people and Government for inviting the Special Committee to Dar es Salaam. In that town, the Committee had found a favourable climate which had enabled it to carry out its work successfully. The United Republic of Tanzania was a country which loved peace and freedom and which served as a refuge for the nationals of countries still under the colonial yoke. He also thanked the petitioners who had come to tell the Committee about the progress they had achieved in their struggle. He supported the appeal for unity which had been made to the liberation movements, for it was only in that way that the people suffering under colonialism could achieve their independence.

651. He emphasized the solidarity which existed between the Latin American countries and the African continent, particularly the United Republic. That was an indisputable fact which had been clearly shown on many occasions. The Latin American countries were ready to support the cause of all peoples fighting for their independence.

652. The representative of *Syria*, speaking on behalf of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, expressed his deep gratitude to Mr. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to the Tanzanian Government and people, for the generous hospitality and warm welcome they had extended to the Special Committee. The United Republic had thus once again revealed its awareness of its duty to help wipe out the last vestiges of colonialism which caused indescribable suffering. The wise and encouraging words which the Minister for Home Affairs had just spoken were eloquent proof of the importance of the task undertaken by the United Nations to bring about the complete emancipation of those peoples who were still suffering under the colonial yoke and who were fighting for their fundamental rights.

653. For a month the Special Committee had been following its itinerary in order to examine colonial questions more closely. At Kinshasa, it had heard the testimony of those who were fighting for the freedom and independence of the Territories under Portuguese domination, and particularly for the liberation of Angola. It had visited a camp for refugees and had seen at close range their sufferings and afflictions. It had understood the need to come to their aid and to increase the assistance provided by the specialized agencies and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. It had realized that the combatants were determined to continue their struggle against the oppressors.

654. At Kitwe, its second stop, the Special Committee had heard the testimony of victims of the racist régime of Pretoria which remained in power in defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and despite the indignation of world public opinion. In its resolution on Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248) the Committee had reaffirmed once again the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence. It had condemned as a crime against humanity the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia. It had expressed the conviction that sanctions, in order to bring about the downfall of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, must be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power.

655. At Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee had heard the statements of petitioners from Mozambique, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena, and French Somaliland. It had thus obtained valuable information. The Committee had adopted a resolution on the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251) in which it had strongly condemned the negative attitude of Portugal and its refusal to implement the provisions of resolutions adopted on that subject by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee. It had further condemned the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination and had requested all States to desist from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enabled it to continue its repression of the African people. It had recommended that the Security Council take measures to make mandatory the provisions of resolutions adopted on the subject by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

656. The Special Committee had adopted three other resolutions. In the first, concerning Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/249), the Committee had deplored the dismemberment of the islands in question and had declared that the establishment of military installations and any other military activities in the Territories were a violation of General Assembly resolutions and constituted a source of tension.

657. In its resolution on South West Africa (A/AC.109/250), the Special Committee had reaffirmed the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the right of its people to freedom and independence and had condemned the measures taken by the Government of South Africa. Lastly, in its resolution (A/AC.109/252), the Committee had called for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

658. Those resolutions were evidence of the fruitful results achieved by the Special Committee. During its stay in the United Republic, the Committee had been able to appreciate the aid given by that country to the refugees from Mozambique in their legitimate struggle against Portugal. It also noted the remarkable progress achieved by the Tanzanian Government for its people in the economic, social and cultural fields. Lastly, it had been given an opportunity of admiring the beauty and natural wealth of the country. He extended to the Government his most sincere good wishes for the prosperity of the United Republic.

659. In conclusion, he congratulated the Chairman on the skill with which he had conducted the Special Committee's deliberations and thanked the Secretariat for their contribution to the work of the Committee.

660. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Tanzanian people and Government for the kind invitation they had extended to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings at Dar es Salaam. The invitation testified to the great importance that the United Republic attached to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He hoped that his thanks would be conveyed to Mr. Kawawa, Minister of State, to Mr. Maswanya, and to other Tanzanian leaders who had personally participated in the Committee's work.

661. During its meetings away from Headquarters, the Special Committee had made a positive contribution to the implementation of the Declaration. The decision to hold those meetings had been fully justified by the practical and useful results that had been achieved. It had been able to study in greater detail the problems of many African Territories still under colonial domination and had become better acquainted with the efforts of the African peoples fighting for freedom and independence; it had heard petitioners who had provided new information which would be extremely useful for the Committee's subsequent work, and it had adopted constructive resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other important questions and had also adopted a general resolution on decolonization. Those resolutions reflected the basic findings of the Committee's investigations and also certain desires expressed by the representatives of the liberation movements. They had also focused attention on the major obstacles which were retarding the progress of the African colonies towards the achievement of their legitimate rights to independence.

662. In his brilliant analysis of the situation in the colonial Territories, the Chairman had once again stressed the role of the capitalist monopolies and the use of military bases to crush the liberation movements of the African peoples. He had torn the mask from the bloc of white States in southern Africa and had exposed the role of the NATO bloc which gave open or clandestine support to the racists.

663. The Special Committee's visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to Zambia and to the United Republic of Tanzania had shown that the United Nations still had a great deal of work to do in order to find ways and means of implementing the Declaration in those areas of the world where the shameful remnants of colonialism still existed. The specialized agencies of the United Nations must provide

greater economic, financial, cultural, educational and health assistance to the colonial peoples.

664. The Security Council must warn the colonialists very seriously by stating clearly that it considered their activities to be contrary to the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those activities included the waging of aggressive war against the liberation movements, the use of neo-colonial manoeuvres, the establishment of puppet régimes, support to the activities of financial monopolies, the building of military bases and the dismemberment of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

665. But the United Nations must not content itself with adopting resolutions calling for the liquidation of military bases and denouncing the use of military bases by the Western Powers against the countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa. It must take steps to ensure their immediate implementation. The destiny of the United Nations depended to a large extent on the energy and determination of its Member States in eliminating the shameful vestiges of colonialism and neo-colonialism and in securing strict adherence to the Charter. The socialist countries, in pursuance of their policy of over-all support for the peoples fighting for their national liberation, would not slacken their efforts until the last vestiges of colonialism had been wiped from the face of the earth.

666. The Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet delegations had been deeply moved by the welcome given to the Special Committee by the wonderful Tanzanian people and had been impressed by the way in which, under the inspiring leadership of President Nyerere, the Tanzanian people were advancing towards development and welfare and playing a leading role in the fight against colonialism and for international peace. The three delegations expressed their deep appreciation of the efforts of all those whose work had contributed to the success of the Committee's meetings in Africa.

667. The representative of *Finland*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Italy, the United States and his own, thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the warm and friendly hospitality and assistance offered to the Special Committee. The city of Dar es Salaam was closely linked with the work of the Committee and it was most fitting that the concluding part of its meetings in Africa should be held in the United Republic, a country which had played such an important role in decolonization. Thanks largely to the energy and dynamic personality of the Chairman, the Committee had succeeded in accomplishing a substantial amount of work and had completed its programme on time. Thanks must also go to those who had worked so hard to arrange the mission and who had assisted the Committee in its work.

668. The mission had brought the members of the Special Committee together and had given them a better understanding not only of the serious problems on the agenda, but also of the views of the various Governments which, in his opinion, did not differ so widely as might have appeared to an outside observer.

669. The representative of the *Secretary-General* of the United Nations welcomed the opportunity of saying a few words to the Special Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General who, despite his many grave preoccupations, was following with keen interest the progress

of the Special Committee's work. By asking him to go to Dar es Salaam to represent him, the Secretary-General had sought once again to express his deep concern for the problems which the Committee was studying and to reaffirm his conviction that the continued existence of racism and injustice in those parts of southern Africa still under the domination of a racial minority was a festering sore in international politics. That sore must be healed if the United Nations was to achieve its objectives of justice based on the universal recognition of human rights.

670. He himself, as an African, could not help feeling deeply distressed over the sufferings of the people in the Territories under Portuguese control, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, which had been so movingly described by the petitioners. In an age when so many technical successes had been achieved and when man possessed the scientific knowledge which enabled him to conquer matter, it was appalling to realize that millions of human beings still had to live in conditions belonging to a bygone era and were deprived of the essential requirement for human dignity: the freedom to determine their own future. In the age of the atomic bomb, when man was at the same time under constant threat of massive destruction and on the threshold of important achievements, both material and spiritual, on earth as well as in space, the fact that people were still suffering under colonial domination and were deprived of the fundamental rights which were a corner-stone of the Charter of the United Nations could only be deplored as an inadmissible contradiction and a frightening anachronism. That was why the Secretary-General, referring to the problem of decolonization, had quoted the words of an eminent jurist, "Justice delayed is justice denied". Those, who like Portugal and South Africa sought in defiance of the United Nations to perpetuate colonialism or domination by a racial minority should perhaps be reminded that they were sowing the seeds of a whirlwind which would one day sweep them away. The least that the administering Powers could do for the colonial peoples was to recognize their right to self-determination and to give them the freedom to manage their own affairs in a democratic manner. Only then could those peoples take their place beside their fellow men and play their part in the world community.

671. The Special Committee had held thirty-two meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. It had heard a constant succession of petitioners who had described in detail the conditions prevailing in their countries in terms which could leave no doubt in anyone's mind. Some of the petitioners had criticized the United Nations for its failure to impose its will on Portugal, the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. But they forgot that the United Nations was not a world government and that it only drew its strength from the support and co-operation it received from all Member States. All that the Special Committee could do was to expose the facts, analyse the problems, propose measures to resolve those problems and mobilize world public opinion, as well as the appropriate organs of the United Nations, in favour of the speedy implementation of those measures. The Committee had done that ably in the resolutions which it had adopted during its meetings in Africa. It was now up to the individual Governments of States Members of the United Nations to exert the necessary pressures to ensure that those resolutions were imple-



mented. All must co-operate, for in the final outcome the interests of all were at stake.

672. Before concluding, he thanked all those delegations which had paid a tribute to the work of the Secretariat during the series of meetings. It was obvious that when a committee met away from Headquarters many problems had to be resolved and the strain on the Secretariat was greater than usual. Yet, if the Secretariat had been able to provide the Special Committee with the services it expected, that had been due largely to the forbearance, understanding and co-operation shown by all the members throughout the Committee's work. That harmony was due not only to the members of the Committee but also to the competent way in which the Chairman of the Committee had conducted its work.

673. On behalf of the Secretary-General, he thanked the three host Governments which had once again shown their devotion to the United Nations and to the cause of decolonization by inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings on their soil. He also wished to express to them his deep appreciation of the resources they had made available to the Committee and to assure them that the facilities which they had provided had made a great contribution to the harmonious conduct of the Committee's work. He also thanked them warmly for the generous hospitality they had extended to all the members of the Secretariat. He could not complete his statement at the closing meeting in Dar es Salaam without paying a well-deserved tribute to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania; the kindness and friendly interest they had constantly shown in the work of the Committee had been appreciated by all delegations. His thanks also went, of course, to the President of the Republic, Mr. Julius Nyerere, one of the main pillars of African solidarity, to whom he was happy to pay a shining tribute for all that he had done and would continue to do in furthering the interests of Africa and the cause of world brotherhood.

674. The Special Committee's work was, of course, not finished; some of the most serious and pressing problems of colonialism remained, and it was the Committee's duty to seek in unity a constructive and peaceful solution to those questions which affected all Members of the United Nations.

675. Thanks to the generosity of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Special Committee members had had the opportunity of seeing something of that marvellous country. He asked the Tanzanian delegation to convey to the President, Government and people of the United Republic the delegations' wishes for a bright future in peace and prosperity.

#### D. ACTION ARISING FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S MEETINGS AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS

*Adoption of resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters (1967)*

676. At the 539th meeting of the Special Committee on 19 June 1967, the representative of Sierra Leone introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1), sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia,

which dealt with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to the colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its 1967 meetings in Africa. He recalled that each group of petitioners had spoken of the oppression in the Territories under colonial rule, of the countless injustices, the conditions of near-slavery and the restriction of the right of the indigenous peoples to free expression and citizenship in their own land. The Committee had heard of conditions in Ovamboland and Southern Rhodesia, and of the existence of military bases which represented a threat to independent African States, particularly in the Territories under Portuguese domination.

677. With that information in mind, the sponsors had prepared their text, to which they wished to add, after operative paragraph 10, a new paragraph 11 to read:

*"Urges the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance."*

The sixth preambular paragraph had been included because the question of Southern Rhodesia had played an important part in the Special Committee's deliberations and it was highly regrettable that the United Kingdom had not been represented at the meetings in Africa.

678. The seventh preambular paragraph had been included because the co-sponsors felt that the attitude of Portugal and South Africa must change. Other colonial Powers had once adopted the same attitude, but had had to change it. Pressure should be exerted on those countries through their friends. At present expanding trade relations seemed to indicate that encouragement rather than disapproval was the latter's policy.

679. Operative paragraph 2 had been included because the petitioners had shown that the continuation of colonial oppression, *apartheid* and racial discrimination constituted a threat both to the peoples of the colonial Territories and to those of neighbouring independent countries. Indeed, dogs were better treated than Africans in those Territories.

680. Operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 had been included as a corollary to paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which read:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"...*

*"Requests the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations."*

Friends of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal were finding constitutional methods of supporting those régimes on the pretext that their nationals who traded with and invested in those countries could not be controlled by their Governments. Foreign financial and economic interests were increasing their activities, exploiting cheap African labour and preventing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Moreover, countries that disapproved of the *entente* between the three racist Governments should demonstrate their feelings by action.



681. Operative paragraph 7, reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and urging all States to assist national liberation movements, had been included because, although most of the countries represented on the Special Committee had had to fight for their independence, some delegations had never supported the efforts of the freedom fighters in the Territories under colonial administration. The paragraph was intended to recognize the freedom fighters' right to fight for their independence.

682. Operative paragraph 8 had been included because many delegations had expressed the desire that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies should increase assistance to refugees from the Territories under colonial administration.

683. Operative paragraph 9 had been included because populations had been transferred and land annexed for purposes incompatible with the principles of the Charter. The annexed land should be returned to its rightful occupant.

684. Operative paragraph 10 requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases in the Territories under their administration, for the sponsors believed that such bases were being used to oppress the indigenous peoples, particularly in the Portuguese administered Territories. New operative paragraph 12, requesting all States to withhold assistance of any kind to Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, followed upon General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) which appealed to countries to discontinue giving help to those Governments. The paragraph included a reference to action through international institutions.

685. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414) dealt mainly with South Africa. That was because southern Africa had been the main topic discussed during the Committee's meetings in Africa; it was a chronic case and the sponsors considered that vigorous co-operative action was needed. They hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.

686. The representative of *Mali* said that, since the adoption of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, his country had never faltered in making its contribution towards hastening the liberation of the Territories still under colonial domination. The Special Committee had repeatedly made concrete proposals to the General Assembly and the Security Council, drawing the attention of international opinion to the fact that the persistence of colonialism was a permanent source of tension, and consequently, a threat to international peace and security.

687. The Committee had heard numerous testimonies from petitioners from Territories under Portuguese domination, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other Territories. It had been able to form an idea of the crimes committed by the colonialists and racists in southern Africa, Aden and the islands of the Indian Ocean. It might therefore be asked why the colonial system continued in existence despite the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, which reflected the views of the international community. The system was in fact perpetuated only through the collusion of the financial interests of certain great Powers which gave their support to reactionary régimes and favoured the exploitation of the human

and material resources of the colonial Territories. There were many facts and documents to show that only the financial and economic interests of the Western Powers, together with strategic considerations, prevented the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

688. Many petitioners had spoken of the military aid which Salazar received from certain of his NATO allies. The Committee had been able to ascertain the extent of such aid and it must therefore once again launch an appeal to the States concerned to cease violating the United Nations Charter, and to stop all deliveries of weapons to the Salazar régime and the racist settlers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. In the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414), the Special Committee made certain suggestions and recommendations for asking the States Members of the United Nations to help in speeding the process of decolonization. The Committee deplored the fact that, six years after the adoption of the Declaration, it should still be discussing, in the absence of certain colonial Powers, the continuation of the colonial system despite the wishes of the peoples suffering under foreign domination. The Committee also deplored the attitude of certain States which had continually refused to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and had given their support to the Portuguese in the war which they were waging in Africa. The Committee reaffirmed the right of the peoples to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and with the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. The General Assembly had already condemned colonialism as a crime against humanity. The Committee reaffirmed that view and urged the abolition of the hateful colonial system.

689. With regard to the economic and financial interests of certain Western Powers which were obstructing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the statistics compiled by the United Nations Secretariat had shown that the United Kingdom and the United States were deriving enormous profits from the Territories under foreign rule in southern Africa. Large concerns such as the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, the Angola Diamond Company, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company and the Pan American International Oil Company were exploiting the natural wealth of these Territories. One must therefore be cautious in accepting the theoretical declarations in the representatives of the Western countries when they claimed to favour decolonization. The delegation of *Mali* would be happy if the representatives of those countries could put forward concrete proposals for abolishing colonialism throughout the world and particularly in Africa. The peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, Zimbabwe and South West Africa had never been consulted regarding the exploitation of the riches of their countries. Of course, every country had the right to negotiate with private companies regarding the investment of capital in its national territory, but that had not happened in the case of the colonies. The Committee should therefore urge the suspension of such activities until the countries had become independent.

690. As to military bases, the problem was similar. Those bases had been imposed on the peoples of terri-

tories which were still dependent and they were a means of putting pressure on peoples demanding independence. There was another reason for dismantling them; they were a source of tension and insecurity for neighbouring countries. He would only recall in that regard the use which had been made of Ascension Island, and the raids of Salazar's armies on Senegal, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania. In other regions of the world military bases were used to stifle nationalist movements, particularly in the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia. In view of the existence of those bases, it was impossible for the peoples of the areas concerned to accede to self-determination and independence and to settle their own affairs alone. The draft resolution therefore contained an appeal to the administering Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

691. The representatives of the *Ivory Coast* reaffirmed the attachment of his Government to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. His delegation wished once again to express reservations regarding operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414), which related to military bases and installations. It supported the rest of the text and would vote for the draft resolution.

692. The representative of *Syria* said he had already explained at earlier meetings the views of his delegation on the colonial questions considered by the Special Committee during its African tour. He would therefore confine his remarks to certain particularly important paragraphs in the operative part of the general draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) submitted by the representative of Sierra Leone and supported by the representative of Mali.

693. He would like first to comment on operative paragraph 5, concerning the activities of foreign financial and other economic interests in colonial Territories, in particular in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination.

694. The testimony of the petitioners had clearly shown that the foreign monopolies were supporting the remaining colonialist régimes and that they constituted a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those monopolies were managed principally by commercial firms of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. They were perpetuating the exploitation of the human and material resources of the colonial Territories, supporting the criminal repression of the liberation movements by the colonialists and retarding the progress of the peoples of those Territories towards freedom and independence. The fact that those foreign monopolies were an obstacle to the liberation of the peoples in question had been repeatedly stressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions. In that connexion he cited resolution 2074 (XX), operative paragraph 8, resolution 2107 (XX), operative paragraph 6, resolution 2151 (XXI), operative paragraph 5, and resolution 2184 (XXI), operative paragraph 4. In operative paragraph 6 of the last-named resolution the General Assembly appealed to all States to prevent their nationals from taking part in the reprehensible activities of those monopolies. The States which sincerely wished to help the colonial peoples achieve their independence and freedom, in accordance with resolu-

tion 1514 (XV), should take adequate measures to give effect to the repeated appeals addressed to them by the General Assembly.

695. In operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution the Special Committee requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories. The existence of those bases and installations, established against the wishes of the local population, was a continual source of tension and posed a constant threat to international peace and security, whether they were in Angola, in so-called Portuguese Guinea, in Mozambique, in the Seychelles and Mauritius, or in the southern and south-eastern part of the Arabian peninsula. It could not be claimed that the question of dismantling those bases and installations fell outside the competence of the Special Committee, for it was at the very essence of the colonial problem; the existence of those bases permitted the colonialists to maintain their oppressive régimes and retarded the process of decolonization, which, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV), should be speedy and unconditional. If the Western Powers sincerely wanted to contribute to decolonization they should respond to the repeated appeals of the General Assembly requesting them to dismantle their existing bases and to refrain from establishing new ones.

696. All the liberation movements should unite so that they could more quickly overcome the obstacles which the colonialists and their accomplices were increasingly placing in the way of the emancipation of peoples. The Special Committee in its decisions would do its utmost to serve the legitimate cause of those who were fighting for their freedom.

697. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation fully supported the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) so ably presented by the representatives of Sierra Leone and Mali at the previous meeting. The meetings away from Headquarters had once again thrown light on the sad colonial problems which confronted the world, especially in the southern part of Africa. The adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) had given hope to many Africans that the United Nations had at last decided to come to the active aid of the millions of people suffering under colonial oppression, but to their great bewilderment, those hopes had not been fulfilled. The Tanzanian delegation therefore shared some of the disappointment expressed by the petitioners. The reason why, in spite of several resolutions, the solution of the terrible problems had eluded the Special Committee lay in the very evidence given by the petitioners. Colonialism and international imperialism had become one and the same thing; they were inherent in the theory of "kith-and-kin" in Southern Rhodesia and in the selfish economic exploitation in South West Africa and, above all, were being strengthened by military alliances in the case of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

698. Some of the Members of the United Nations which had voted for General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were undermining its implementation. The United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and some other Western countries preached one policy in one part of the world and practised another in Africa. It was hard to reconcile the United Kingdom's policy in Aden with its policy in Southern Rhodesia or United States policy in the Far East with its policy in Africa. In

the Far East, the United States wished to make people believe it was defending so-called democracy, whereas in Africa the same Power was on the side of the fascist forces which were flouting democratic principles. Those Western countries appeared to have completely lost all sense of moral values and to be pursuing power for its own sake.

699. The Tanzanian delegation stressed once again that the march towards freedom and independence could not be halted. Whatever aid Portugal might receive from its allies, its colonial Territories would inevitably attain freedom. In spite of the United Kingdom's "kith-and-kin" policy in Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe would finally be free.

700. The Tanzanian delegation strongly appealed to the Western Powers not to allow the bloodshed to continue. They should know that power for its own sake was doomed to fail. It was in their interests to support the colonized people's fight for independence and to cease enriching themselves at their expense.

701. The Western Powers did not consider colonial oppression in Africa a crime against humanity simply because to them the oppressed people were merely chattels to be exploited, but the crimes committed by Portugal, South Africa and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia certainly constituted the most heinous crime of all. Those crimes were the same in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination, but any country pointing them out was accused of cold war semantics.

702. The Tanzanian delegation strongly condemned all the countries which were aiding Portugal. It was not concerned with the official objectives of NATO but only with the fact that arms provided by that giant instrument of European defence were being used to kill the peoples of Africa.

703. It was well known that the capital flowing into those Territories was not only exploiting the African people but also contributing to the forces intended to exterminate them. The Tanzanian delegation was not interested in the laws governing that capital in its country of origin but only in the destruction it produced. While not sharing in the so-called global strategy of the Powers using the military bases, his delegation condemned the existence of bases which were used to exterminate the African people and appealed to the Powers not to frustrate the efforts of decolonization and thus cause more bloodshed.

704. The United Republic hoped that the draft resolution would be supported by all members of the Special Committee. Apologies were not required; what was required was definite action against colonialism.

705. He appealed to the freedom fighters to fight with all their might, for therein lay their hope. If they did so, it would not be long before their countries were welcomed into the family of free nations.

706. The United Republic would always be on the side of those who fought to the bitter end for the cause of liberation and the final liquidation of colonialism.

707. The representative of *Iraq* said that he would speak mainly on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) but would also make short references to the other draft resolutions before the Special Committee. *Iraq* had co-sponsored all the draft resolutions because it felt that they were relevant to the requirements of each particular situation and based on the work and inquiries of the Committee as well as the United Nations as a whole, and on the petitioners'

testimony. *Iraq* continued to believe in the right of all peoples to free themselves from foreign rule and subjugation. It maintained that peaceful changes could and should take place in and out of the United Nations in order to achieve the complete liquidation of colonialism and foreign economic control. It was undeniable that the trading and colonial Powers had no intention of willingly accepting those peaceful methods. It was for that reason that they continued to arm their racist allies in Africa and other areas of the world under different guises, ranging from partnerships and alliances to mutual agreements and even what they called "the dictates of national security", which were merely manifestations of neo-colonialism. It was in the mutual interest of the trading nations to support and reinforce the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the dictatorial Portuguese rule in the African Territories. Vast amounts of capital and shiploads of arms and ammunition were continuously being made available, to those condemned régimes by the leading countries of NATO and by Israel, to be used against the African peoples and their brave freedom fighters. Military bases, the subject of paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, had played a leading part in the aggressive operations of the colonialist régimes in the past and were continuing to do so.

708. It was especially disheartening to listen to the elaborate statements made by the United States delegation in defence of the so-called "agreement of December 1966" between its Government and that of the United Kingdom, the administering Power in Mauritius, concerning the establishment of refuelling arrangements on the island. It sounded very fair and legal, but the people had not been consulted about whether they would accept the plan to refuel military and other aircraft on their islands. They had no assurance that the aircraft would not be used against their own people and against neighbouring nations in East Africa, Aden, Southern Arabia, Oman, the Indian sub-continent or even Viet-Nam. Such aggressive bases should be dismantled because they were a major handicap to the liberation of many oppressed peoples all over the world.

709. It was the Iraqi delegation's wish and hope that the trading Powers of the Western world would realize the dangers they were helping to foment in those parts of the world by their continued commercial and economic support to the aggressive régimes and would finally honour their international obligations to the family of nations. The day might then dawn when all men, regardless of colour, creed or national origin would live and co-operate together in mutual agreement and genuine understanding. The trading and colonial Powers had amassed wealth and built empires from the blood and sweat of oppressed peoples all over the world. They could still obtain a good return on their investments if they put a halt to their greed and tried to work out arrangements with the liberated peoples under which they could still continue, peacefully and with the consent of the other parties, to keep the profits of their skills and capabilities.

710. There was no need for the trading countries to depend so completely on the continued existence of the unpopular régimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia or the Territories under Portuguese domination: in fact, if they continued to do so, they would end by losing all their investments. The alternative was to implement various United Nations resolutions in the

colonial and subjugated areas by all possible means in order to re-establish sounder relationships, a better understanding and a more solid foundation for economic and other co-operation. The many leading African statesmen and dignitaries who had spoken before the Special Committee during its tour had emphasized that Africa was large enough, rich enough and wise enough to accommodate everyone who was willing to live and work with others without resorting to exploitation, discrimination or the illegal influence from outsiders.

711. It was in that spirit that the delegation of Iraq appealed to the specialized agencies which could render help to the oppressed peoples of Africa and elsewhere to do so generously without dwelling on technicalities which might hinder them from relieving human misery, hunger and pain. Such help was necessary as the Special Committee had seen in many places it had visited. The newly independent countries of Africa were doing their utmost to help, but their capabilities were limited. The refugee problem in particular was a major one and his delegation felt that the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned should play a bigger role in helping the victims of colonization, whose survival depended on such assistance, to see the day when their future would be decided by the United Nations or the responsible Powers.

712. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that he would like to make a few observations on the substance of the general draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) concerning all the questions considered by the Special Committee at that session.

713. On the whole the work of the Special Committee had been in keeping with the objective which it had set for itself. The overwhelming majority of the Committee, as well as all the petitioners, had expressed the desire to put an end to the odious manifestations of colonialism and racism, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the implementation of which constituted one of the most important tasks of the United Nations.

714. The general draft resolution as a whole reflected the opinion of the petitioners and the majority of delegations that the administering Powers were directly responsible for the intolerable situation prevailing in the Territories under Portuguese domination, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the other colonial Territories and that the States members of NATO which were continuing to ignore the resolutions of the General Assembly were also in part responsible for the maintenance of racist and colonialist oppression. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, had stepped up its technical, scientific and military assistance to the racist régimes. In recent years the political and cultural links between the Federal Republic of Germany and Southern Rhodesia had been strengthened and the resurgence of neo-Nazi activities in the latter country, where the anniversary of Hitler's birth was observed, could be noted. That demonstrated the connexion between racism and Nazi ideology. The support for the colonialist régimes in certain Western circles was explained by the stake which they had in the maintenance of those régimes. The statements of the Western countries to the effect that they were assisting the African countries and respecting the

decisions of the United Nations should not be allowed to obscure that fact.

715. The Special Committee had done well to include in the general draft resolution a paragraph concerning foreign monopolies, which were supporting the colonialist and racist régimes and were enabling them to continue exploiting the material and human resources of the colonized Territories. In South Africa, for example, it was the foreign monopolies which reaped the biggest profits. Those profits were increasing daily, as evidenced by increased investments. One had only to note the trend in the price of the shares issued by the companies in question to realize that such was the case. Those foreign monopolies exercised enormous political influence.

716. The racists and colonialists were arming feverishly. Political life was assuming an increasingly fascist character. The régimes were obviously seeking to establish a position of strength from which to negotiate with the liberated African countries. The Federal Republic of Germany was assisting South Africa even in the nuclear field. A uranium reactor had been built at Johannesburg and rocket tests had been made. All those symptoms were extremely disquieting and the Special Committee should examine closely the activities of the countries in question.

717. His delegation approved the draft resolution as a whole, the adoption of which would be a step forward in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, but it thought that some of its provisions should be worded in a slightly different way.

718. For example, it felt that the text did not condemn with sufficient vigour the countries which were members of NATO and the Western countries which were continuing to assist the colonialist and racist régimes. The Special Committee should make sure that those member States did not give any assistance to the colonialist and racist countries, or else take measures to put a stop to that assistance.

719. The Soviet Union would always support oppressed peoples who were fighting for their freedom. His delegation would do everything in its power to hasten the accession of those peoples to independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

720. The representative of *Madagascar* said that his delegation approved the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) as a whole, and considered it to be in conformity with the principles which the Malagasy Republic had always upheld. However, it felt that the question of military bases and installations did not fall within the Special Committee's competence. That was a question which the colonized Territories where such bases and installations had been established should decide for themselves when they became independent.

721. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he had carefully studied the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) which set out the conclusions reached by the Special Committee during its meetings away from Headquarters. His Government had supported and would continue to support the speedy implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). It noted with great regret that many areas were still under the colonial yoke. The task facing the Committee and the General Assembly was gigantic, and he reiterated the unswerving devotion of his Government and people to the cause of freedom and self-determination for all.

722. In his delegation's view, paragraph 4 of the draft resolution did not appear to make the necessary distinction between the various United Nations organs. His delegation would therefore abstain in the vote on that paragraph and also on paragraph 10 concerning the dismantling of military bases. He had repeatedly expressed his delegation's categorical opposition to the establishment of military bases in the colonial Territories, because they tempted the administering Power to perpetuate its presence in the Territory concerned, but the dismantling of existing bases was a matter for the General Assembly or the Disarmament Conference at Geneva rather than for the Special Committee.

723. His delegation would also abstain on paragraph 12 for the same reasons which had led it to abstain in the vote on paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI).

724. Although his delegation intended to abstain on those three paragraphs, it would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. He therefore requested a separate vote on paragraphs 4, 10 and 12.

725. The representative of *Iran* said that it was unnecessary for him to dwell on his delegation's reasons for supporting the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1), the object of which was the speedy liquidation of colonialism everywhere. He wished, however, to make a reservation with regard to operative paragraph 10 for the reasons which his delegation had given at the time when a similar resolution was adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 in Algiers (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619). That reservation, based on a question of principle, in no way detracted from his country's unflinching support for the liberation of all peoples from colonial bondage.

726. During the consideration of the various agenda items, his delegation had emphasized that lasting peace could only be established in the world by eradicating all the social, economic and political ills created by colonialism and racialism. For those reasons his delegation had taken a firm and unequivocal stand against colonialism and fully supported the draft resolution despite its reservations on operative paragraph 10.

727. The representative of *Italy* pointed out that the operative part of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) consisted mainly of paragraphs taken from resolutions previously adopted and in particular from two adopted by the Special Committee in the past two days. He had already mentioned the question raised by operative paragraph 10 in his statement concerning Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena. Other points, such as those in operative paragraphs 2 and 4 were contained in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) or in the Special Committee's resolution of 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) on which the Italian delegation had abstained.

728. The provisions in some of the paragraphs reflected a sound approach to the remaining colonial problems and his delegation could support them. Unfortunately, the general wording of the draft resolution was such that it gave an over-all impression of unbalance and, as previously stressed in many of his delegation's statements on similar decisions, did not constitute a wholesome contribution to the search for the best ways and means of coping with the serious problems still confronting the Special Committee.

729. The Italian delegation noted with regret that such texts, though obviously inspired by the noble

and lofty motives of implementing the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), did not take into consideration the suggestions offered on many occasions by the Italian and other delegations on the best means of pursuing the search for the most effective and constructive measures for putting such principles into practice. That would not prevent his delegation from making a sincere contribution to the Special Committee's work on future occasions, since it was convinced that differences on methods and approach would not forever impede the common endeavour to achieve the ideals which it upheld.

730. For those reasons his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1).

731. The representative of *Finland* said that it was unfortunate that there had been so little time to study the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1). He would therefore confine his remarks to some very brief and general comments.

732. Part of the text, as formulated, did not meet with the Finnish delegation's approval. A number of operative paragraphs were not in conformity with its beliefs and, in some cases, it felt that the competence of the Special Committee had been exceeded. A different or more precise wording would have been preferable in many instances. Moreover, the resolution as a whole appeared somewhat unbalanced. For those reasons the Finnish delegation would abstain in the vote.

733. In a recent statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland had stressed that Finland had always been against racial discrimination but that, like the other Nordic countries, it took the view that, in order to be effective, enforcement measures required the approval of the Security Council, as prescribed in the Charter. Finland had therefore never supported any General Assembly resolutions recommending sanctions or applied such sanctions unilaterally.

734. The remaining problems of colonialism were perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all. Their solution required a joint effort by the permanent members of the Security Council as well as by the United Nations as a whole. The progress made might be slow, but all nations should maintain their confidence in the United Nations as a universal organ for peaceful co-operation between independent Member States.

735. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the United States delegation had numerous reservations with regard to the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1). It naturally joined in reaffirming the right of all peoples to freedom and independence. The search for a practical, speedy and peaceful means of making that right a reality, especially in southern Africa, was the essence of the Special Committee's mandate. His delegation had, however, found it necessary in the past, and continued to find it necessary, to register objections to some of the steps set forth in the general implementing provisions of resolutions both in the Committee and in the General Assembly.

736. His delegation believed that the draft resolution under consideration, like the one on the Territories under Portuguese administration, encroached in several places upon the responsibilities of the Security Council. Those incursions were contained in some very sweeping and inexact phrases, for example, operative



paragraph 4 which recommended that the Council should make obligatory against Portugal, South Africa and the Smith régime the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter. It also believed that the findings set forth in operative paragraphs 2 and 6 concerning threats to international peace and security were a matter not for the Special Committee but for the Security Council. Similarly, it considered the request concerning the dismantling of bases, contained in operative paragraph 10, an incursion into the Security Council's sphere of responsibility. Such a question, if it was to be considered at all, would most probably arise in the United Nations organ which had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. His delegation did not share the view of some that the existence of a military installation in a dependent Territory automatically operated to the detriment of the people of that Territory, or prevented or delayed the exercise of their right to self-determination or their political, economic, social and cultural development.

737. Those objections left the United States delegation no choice but to vote against the draft resolution. It was as anxious as any other that the United Nations should act to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories and to help them advance as rapidly as possible towards self-government and freedom. It wanted to ensure for all the unfettered exercise of their right to self-determination and independence and had supported, and would continue to support, the responsible and practical actions which it considered designed to meet those objectives. It could not support the draft resolution, however, because it would not further progress towards those goals.

738. *The Chairman* drew the Special Committee's attention to paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), because some members appeared to think that there were certain contradictions in the provisions of the draft resolution under consideration (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1). He thought that that paragraph was the one which the sponsors of the draft resolution had in mind.

739. The representative of *Australia* said that his delegation felt that little purpose was to be served by such resolutions as the draft under discussion. Its aim was clear enough, but it was an omnibus-type of resolution and, perhaps for that reason, was framed in general and therefore inevitably imprecise terms.

740. He had made it clear, in his statements on the resolutions on specific Territories, that Australia strongly supported the principle of self-determination but that it could not support several paragraphs some of which were repeated in the draft before the Special Committee. With regard to operative paragraph 4, for example, he reminded the Committee of the views he had expressed on the proposal to use force in Southern Rhodesia. As far as a number of others were concerned, his delegation would either have the strongest reservations or would be strongly opposed. It intended, for instance, to vote against operative paragraphs 10 and 12.

741. For those reasons the Australian delegation intended to vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

742. At its 541st meeting, the Special Committee voted on the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) by roll-call vote. Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 16 votes to 4, with 1 abstention. The voting was as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Finland, Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 10 was adopted by 13 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 12 was adopted by 16 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Venezuela.

743. The revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.414/Rev.1) as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to 2, with 2 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Italy.

744. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/252) adopted by the Special Committee on 20 June 1967 reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having held meetings from 29 May to 21 June 1967 at Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kitwe, Zambia and Dar es Salaam, the United Republic of Tanzania, and having heard the statements of the spokesmen for these Governments,*

*"Having heard the petitioners from Territories under colonial rule,*

*"Having considered the situation in various Territories still under colonial domination,*

*"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,*

*"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966,*

*"Regretting the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to participate in the meetings of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Im-*

plementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples away from Headquarters,

"*Noting with deep regret* that six years after the adoption of the Declaration many Territories are still under colonial domination, and deploring the negative attitude taken by certain colonial Powers, and in particular the intransigent attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa which refuse to recognize the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence,

"*Deploing* the attitude of certain States which, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, continue to co-operate with the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and with the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia which are continuing to repress the African populations,

"1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people in colonial Territories to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. *Further reaffirms* the declaration of the General Assembly<sup>10</sup> that the continuation of colonial oppression seriously threatens international peace and security and that the practice of *apartheid*, as also all forms of racial discrimination, constitutes a crime against humanity;

"3. *Deplores* the refusal of certain colonial Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee and their continued disregard of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

"4. *Recommends* once again that the Security Council make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against Portugal, South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. *Condemns* the activities of those foreign financial and other economic interests in colonial Territories, in particular in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination, which support colonial régimes and thus constitute a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and calls upon the Governments concerned to take the necessary measures to put an end to those activities;

"6. *Condemns further* the formation in the southern part of Africa of an *entente* between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and calls upon all States to withhold any support or assistance to this *entente*, whose existence and activities run counter to the interests of international peace and security;

"7. *Reaffirms* the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and urges all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories;

"8. *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to

increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial rule, their assistance to the refugees from these Territories;

"9. *Reaffirms further* that the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"10. *Requests* the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories which are an obstacle to the liberation of the peoples of these Territories and the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence, and to refrain from establishing new ones;

"11. *Urges* the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories under their administration and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;

"12. *Requests* all States, directly and through their action in the international institutions of which they are members, including the specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, and to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination;

"13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to promote the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee, including in particular the preparation, in consultation with the Special Committee, of publications covering the work of the Committee at its current session away from Headquarters, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in colonial Territories and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by colonial peoples."

745. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Adoption of resolution expressing appreciation to host Governments*

746. At its 542nd meeting, the representative of India introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.415) co-sponsored by twenty-one members of the Special Committee. He said that it was a rare but happy event for the Special Committee to adopt a resolution unanimously. It was even more rare for all delegations present to join in sponsoring it. He was sure that the other three members of the Committee, had they been present, would have wished to support the resolution as well.

747. The resolution sought to express the feelings of gratitude which the Special Committee members felt towards the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania, for their generous invitations to the Committee to hold meetings in their respective countries, and for their warm reception, kind hospitality and enthusiasm for the Committee's work.

748. The second paragraph of the resolution referred to the statements made by the spokesmen of the host Governments, distinguished personalities who had

<sup>10</sup> See resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, operative paragraph 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8024.*

provided valuable guidelines for the Special Committee in its work.

749. All members of the Special Committee felt that the mission to Africa had been very successful. The Committee had had the opportunity of hearing a number of petitioners, many of whom could never have travelled to New York. The Committee had visited refugee camps and the Mozambique Institute, which provided a glorious example of what determined freedom fighters could do to lay down a firm foundation for their country's future independence.

750. The impact made by the Special Committee's visit in Africa had been substantial and notable. It was regrettable that the remainder of the Committee's programme of visits could not be carried out because of unfortunate circumstances. The draft resolution was a general expression of appreciation on the part of all delegations, to the three Governments concerned for their generous hospitality and for the provision of facilities to help the Committee hold its meetings near the operations of the liberation movements.

751. At the same meeting the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.415) unanimously. The full text of the resolution (A/AC.109/253) adopted by the Special Committee at its 542nd meeting on 21 June 1967 reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having held meetings from 29 May 1967 to 21 June 1967 successively at Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kitwe, Zambia and Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and having heard the statements by the spokesmen for those Governments,*

*"Expresses its profound gratitude to the Governments and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings in Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam, for providing the Committee with the necessary facilities for its meetings, and for their generous and kind hospitality."*

## ANNEX I

### **Communiqué issued on 12 April 1967 by the Chairman of the Special Committee**

1. Availing itself of invitations extended to it by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Syria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, the Special Committee has decided to hold a series of meetings this year in Kinshasa, Baghdad, Damascus, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.

2. This decision, like the decisions taken by the Special Committee in previous years to hold meetings at various African capitals, was taken in the context of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 which in establishing the Special Committee authorized it "to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters, whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions". The Special Committee was also aware that the General Assembly in its resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966 approved "the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1967, including... the possibility of holding a series of meetings away from Headquarters".

3. In deciding to hold another series of meetings away from Headquarters this year the Special Committee was particularly

mindful of the constructive results achieved by its previous sessions in Africa. While it remains the desire of the Special Committee to visit the colonial Territories themselves, and to gain first hand experience of the realities of the situation there, this desire has regrettably been frustrated by the negative attitude of the administering Powers concerned. Nevertheless, by reason of the proximity afforded by its previous sessions in Africa and the availability of representatives of national liberation movements from the colonial Territories, the Special Committee was enabled to acquire more direct knowledge than before of conditions in these Territories and deeper understanding of the wishes and aspirations of their peoples. The knowledge and understanding thus obtained by the Special Committee were duly reflected in a number of concrete and important resolutions which were the basis of the relevant decisions taken by the General Assembly at succeeding sessions.

4. Also valuable to the work of the Special Committee during its previous sessions away from Headquarters was the co-operation it established with the Organization of African Unity through the participation of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa as well as of its Administrative Secretary-General and with the League of Arab States through the participation of its acting Secretary-General.

5. The Special Committee is increasingly concerned that progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has fallen far short of the expectations aroused by its adoption over six years ago. In particular, owing to the deliberate opposition or non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, the serious colonial problems that remain in southern Africa and in the Arabian peninsula have shown no perceptible movement towards peaceful solution within the context of the Declaration.

6. The forthcoming session of the Special Committee in the above-mentioned African and Arab countries will therefore serve not only to underline once again the active solidarity of the United Nations with colonial peoples in their legitimate struggle to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In addition, the session will further enhance the capacity of the Special Committee to assist these peoples in realizing their aspirations, which are enshrined in the Charter, to freedom and independence. Finally, in the light of past experience the session will facilitate the appearance before the Special Committee of representatives of national liberation movements wishing to express their views regarding the future of their countries, who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York.

7. The programme of the Special Committee's meetings away from Headquarters is as follows:

	<i>Between</i>
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo .....	26 May and 1 June 1967
Lusaka, Zambia .....	2 and 10 June 1967
Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania .....	11 and 20 June 1967
Baghdad, Iraq .....	21 and 26 June 1967
Damascus, Syria .....	27 June and 1 July 1967.

8. The items on the agenda of the Special Committee for these meetings will include all the colonial Territories in Africa, Aden, Oman, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The Special Committee will of course wish to hear all petitioners desiring to appear before it concerning these or other Territories. It envisages that at the capitals indicated below priority will be given to the hearing of petitioners concerning the following Territories:

#### Kinshasa

Territories under Portuguese administration (Angola, Cabinda and so-called Portuguese Guinea).

#### Lusaka

Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland and South West Africa.

## Dar es Salaam

Territories under Portuguese administration (Mozambique), Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mauritius and the Seychelles, French Somaliland.

## Baghdad

Aden and Oman.

## Damascus

Aden and Oman.

## ANNEX II

## List of representatives who attended the Special Committee's meetings away from Headquarters

## Chairman

Mr. J. W. S. MALECELA, *United Republic of Tanzania*

## Rapporteur

Mr. M. S. ESFANDIARY, *Iran*

## Members

## Afghanistan

Mr. M. A. SAMMAH

Mr. A. S. GHAS

## Australia

Mr. H. D. WHITE

Mr. A. P. GODFREY-SMITH

## Bulgaria

Mr. M. KARASIMEONOV

## Chile

Mr. J. ILLANES

## Ethiopia

Mr. A. G. MEKASHA

Miss K. SINEGIORGIS

Mr. F. TADESSE

## Finland

Mr. M. CAWEN

Mr. T. BROTHIERUS

## India

Mr. C. R. GHAREKHAN

## Iraq

Mr. S. A. SALEEM

## ANNEX II (continued)

## Italy

Mr. C. M. ROSSI-ARNAUD

## Ivory Coast

Mr. K. KOUAME

## Madagascar

Mr. R. G. RALISON

## Mali

Mr. M. M. THIAM

## Poland

Mr. K. SMIGANOWSKI

## Sierra Leone

Mr. G. E. O. WILLIAMS

## Syria

Mr. A. NACHABE

## Tunisia

Mr. H. BEN AISSA

## Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. B. P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V. K. FEDORINOV

Mr. G. I. VEKILOV

Mr. V. I. USTINOV

Mr. A. S. POKROVSKI

## United Republic of Tanzania

Mr. C. Y. MGONJA

Mr. R. S. WAMBURA

Mr. R. D. SWAI

Mr. M. A. FOUM

## United States of America

Mr. O. DEMING

Mr. R. JOHNSON

Mr. E. C. GRIGG

## Venezuela

Mr. G. I. CARRASQUERO

## Yugoslavia

Mr. D. PEJIC

## CHAPTER III\*

## SOUTHERN RHODESIA

## A. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. The situation in Southern Rhodesia has been under continuous consideration by the Special Committee since 1962 and has been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions. It was also considered by the Security Council both before and after the illegal declaration of independence. By its resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, adopted after the illegal declaration, the Security Council, *inter alia*, called upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to quell the rebellion of the racist minority and called upon all States not to recognize the illegal authority and to do their utmost to break

all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. By its resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, the Security Council called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowered the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the *Joanna V* upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo was discharged there.<sup>1</sup>

2. At its 407th meeting on 21 April 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on the question

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.1 and Corr.1.

<sup>1</sup> For details of Security Council decisions of April-May 1966, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, paras. 589-592.

of Southern Rhodesia (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 587). In this resolution the Special Committee:

"1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. *Reaffirms in particular* General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) which condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"3. *Condemns* the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council by giving support and assistance to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. *Calls upon* the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. *Considers* that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;

"6. *Recommends* to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia;

"7. *Decides* to transmit to the Security Council the records of the discussions of the Special Committee on this question;

"8. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the Special Committee and to review the situation whenever it considers it necessary."

3. During its meetings in Africa the Special Committee adopted a further resolution relating to Southern Rhodesia (*ibid.*, para. 1097), as well as a general resolution on the question of the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with particular reference to the Territories in southern Africa (*ibid.*, chap. II, para. 619).

4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, adopted two resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

5. By its resolution 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966, the General Assembly:

"1. *Condemns* any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which will not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. *Reaffirms* the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle of 'one man, one vote'."

6. By its resolution 2151 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, the General Assembly:

"1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, and the

legitimacy of their struggle for the exercise of that right;

"2. *Deplores* the failure of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland so far to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. *Condemns* any arrangement between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime in the Territory which would transfer power to the latter on any basis and which would fail to recognize the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"4. *Condemns* the Governments of Portugal and South Africa for their support of the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. *Condemns* the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, are preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and calls upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures to bring to an end such activities;

"6. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council once again to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, in order that it may decide to apply the necessary enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

"7. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to take prompt and effective measures to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia;

"8. *Calls once again upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to take all the necessary measures, including in particular the use of force, in the exercise of its powers as the administering Power, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions;

"9. *Calls upon* the administering Power to report on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"10. *Calls upon* all States to extend all moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to overthrow the illegal racist régime and to achieve freedom and independence;

"11. *Requests* the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"12. *Requests* the Special Committee to continue its study of the situation in Southern Rhodesia;

"13. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."

7. As at the end of December 1966, replies had been received from seventy-four States in response to the *notes verbales* of the Secretary-General transmitting the text of General Assembly resolution 2022



(XX) of 5 November 1965 and Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 14; *ibid.*, chap. III, part II, annex, appendix II, paras. 3 and 4; and A/C.4/671)<sup>2</sup>. The seventy-fourth reply was received from the Government of the Sudan and is contained in documents A/6479 and S/7558.<sup>3</sup>

8. At its 1331st to 1333rd, and 1335th through 1340th meetings, held between 8 and 16 December 1966, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 5 December 1966<sup>4</sup> from the representative of the United Kingdom in which he stated that since the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had not been brought to an end, and following consultation with other Commonwealth Governments, he had been instructed to request an early meeting of the Security Council at which his Government would propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

9. At its 1340th meeting on 16 December 1966, the Security Council adopted resolution 232 (1966) by a roll-call vote of 11 to none, with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first year, Resolutions and Decisions, 1966.]

10. By a note dated 17 December 1966, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies and drew their particular attention to the fact that the Security Council had acted in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter and had reminded Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the resolution would constitute a violation of Article 25 of the Charter. He drew attention to the provisions of operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the resolution and requested information, as early as possible, on the measures taken by the Governments in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

11. In a further note dated 13 January 1967 addressed to States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, the Secretary-General added that he would appreciate receiving a detailed account of the action taken by the Governments in the implementation of operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of the resolution, as well as such other measures they might have taken in accordance with the spirit and general intent of the resolution. The Secretary-General transmitted with the note a questionnaire on imports and exports of the commodities listed in paragraph 2 of the resolution in order to facilitate the supply of uniform data by States and to enable the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council from time to time with analyses of the progress of the implementation of the resolution with regard to trade in those commodities.

12. In his first report in pursuance of the above resolution,<sup>5</sup> the Secretary-General stated that up to

21 February 1967 he had received replies from seventy-two States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies. The substantive parts of these replies were reproduced in annex II of the report.

13. The Secretary-General also noted in his report that a substantial number of States, including certain States which had significant trade with Southern Rhodesia, had not yet reported in pursuance of operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 232 (1966).

14. The Secretary-General noted further that while several States had undertaken to provide the trade statistics requested in his note of 13 January 1967, full information on the effect of implementation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) on the trade of Southern Rhodesia was not at present available and might not be available for some time. It was his intention to utilize the data hitherto provided by States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies as a basis for estimating the effect of these measures. A report to this effect would be submitted to the Council later.

15. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies would submit information on the measures taken in accordance with the provisions of the resolution or, in the case of those States which had replied to the two notes, information on further measures they had taken, if any.

16. The report also provided the Security Council with certain data on the trade of Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and 1966. These data, set out in document S/7781/Add.1, show the direction of past trade in commodities listed in the resolution and the value of the trade of Southern Rhodesia with each trading partner.

17. The second report of the Secretary-General<sup>6</sup> in pursuance of the above resolution showed that nineteen more States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies had replied to the above notes, bringing the total to ninety-one. In addition to the replies mentioned above, the Secretary-General also drew attention to a letter dated 27 February 1967<sup>7</sup> from the representative of Bulgaria transmitting "a statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the implementation of resolution 232 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 1966 concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia".

## B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

### 1. Political developments (June-December 1966)

#### *Opening of Southern Rhodesian "Parliament"*

18. On 22 June 1966, the first session of the Southern Rhodesian "Parliament" since the illegal declaration of independence, was opened. The official opening was not attended by the judges of the High Court. The "Speaker of Parliament" issued a statement on 16 June 1966 in which he said that the judges had informed him that certain litigation was pending in the High Court involving the standing of the Government and possibly of Parliament itself. In these circumstances, the judges considered it proper to stand aloof from the present parliamentary proceedings. The statement added that both the "Speaker" and the "Prime Minister" recognized the desirability of judges

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23.

<sup>3</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/7610.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, documents S/7781 and Add.1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/7781/Add.2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/7794.

preserving their impartiality in all judicial proceedings and appreciated the difficulties facing them.

19. Mr. Clifford Dupont, "Officer Administering the Government", delivered "the speech from the throne" after the Speaker had formally declared "Parliament" opened. The speech from the throne, under the 1961 Constitution, is delivered by the Governor as the Queen's representative.

20. After reviewing the work of the "Government" and outlining future legislative, economic and social plans of the régime, Mr. Dupont stated, *inter alia*, that it would be imprudent for the régime to ignore the threat to security which faced Southern Rhodesia from those who resented the peace and tranquillity enjoyed by all people in the country and who for their own purposes would rather see chaos supervene. His régime had no intention whatsoever of relaxing its forces either to deter aggression from any external source or to eliminate internal subversion. The regular forces of the British South Africa police, the Army and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force would continue to be maintained at maximum efficiency and every endeavour would be made to provide the additional training, for which in their keenness to be prepared, all branches of the reserves were being called.

21. In the field of international affairs, Mr. Dupont said that the régime had assumed full responsibility for the conduct of external relations, and the possibility of establishing formal diplomatic relations with other countries was under constant consideration. His régime appreciated the action of other Governments which had retained missions in Salisbury, notwithstanding that some had been reduced in size. Indeed his régime noted with gratification that of the twenty countries represented in Salisbury before 11 November 1965, only two, regrettably both Commonwealth countries, had withdrawn their local missions, and three others had terminated the appointment of their honorary consuls.

#### *"African Affairs (Amendment) Bill"*

22. The "Minister of Internal Affairs" of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. William Harper, introduced an "African Affairs (Amendment) Bill" in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in July 1966. He stated that policy towards the Southern Rhodesian African population would be channelled through the chiefs. He said that the bill contained provisions which would give more dignity and power to the chiefs, and these new powers would fulfil the undertaking which had been given by the "Government" to the country's tribal leaders. In the tribal areas, Mr. Harper said, the chiefs would now become responsible for the administration of their people. The "Government" had a high regard for African traditions and customs and did not wish to see them removed when they were not offensive to common right. Opposition members criticized a provision in the bill which made it mandatory for Southern Rhodesian chiefs to notify district commissioners of all rumours which might affect the public peace. The bill was subsequently approved by the Legislative Assembly and signed by the "Officer Administering the Government".

#### *Extension of state of emergency*

23. On 28 July 1966, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly purported to have approved the extension of the state of emergency for a further

three months. The state of emergency was declared by the Government of Southern Rhodesia on 5 November 1965, and has since been extended in three-month periods. In moving the emergency resolution, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, said there was an obvious threat to lives and properties from terrorist activity directed from Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. For these and other reasons the security forces must have the power to detain terrorists and saboteurs who infiltrated from neighbouring territories. In view of the threats still facing the country, the powers must be available to deal with any deteriorating situation and they must be able to maintain the emergency measures at present in force to deal with sanctions. On 27 October 1966, the Legislative Assembly again extended the state of emergency for a further three months to expire on 31 January 1967. On 26 January 1967, the Legislative Assembly approved a further three-month extension of the state of emergency to expire on 30 April 1967.

#### *Restriction powers extended for two years*

24. On 23 August 1966, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly purported to have extended for two years, from 31 August, the period during which the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order" might restrict people without trial for periods up to five years. These powers of restriction were conferred on the Government of Southern Rhodesia in 1962 and were extended in 1964 for a further two years. Mr. Lardner-Burke, speaking on the motion seeking the further extension, said that they were still at a critical stage in their fight to maintain law and order under present circumstances and to maintain the comparative peace and calm which existed in Southern Rhodesia today. He emphasized that the powers sought had nothing whatever to do with detention since restrictees were given basic freedom of movement within an area, communications and so on. The Government would continue to use the courts whenever it could but the normal processes of the court were extremely difficult to apply in cases of subversion.

#### *"Constitution Amendment Bill"*

25. On 25 August 1966, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order" introduced in the Legislative Assembly the "Constitution Amendment Bill" to amend a number of provisions of the Declaration of Rights which form an entrenched chapter of the so-called 1965 Constitution carried over intact from the 1961 Constitution.

26. A statement issued by the Commonwealth Office in London on 25 August 1966 said that the United Kingdom Government had learnt with concern of the intention of the illegal régime in Salisbury to introduce a "Constitution Amendment Bill" containing powers of preventive detention and making changes in the specially entrenched clauses of the 1961 Constitution. These changes would, of course, have no legal validity. Ministers were studying the implications of these new developments.

27. Speaking on the bill in the Legislative Assembly on 26 August 1966, Mr. Lardner-Burke said that the bill was designed to make possible the passing of legislation to provide for detention without the existence of a state of emergency. This new legislation, "The Public Security Bill", would be presented to the Legislative Assembly in due course. He recalled that

preventive detention had been introduced in Southern Rhodesia by an act passed by a previous Government in 1959. The act, which had a life of five years, was renewed by the Government in 1964, but when challenged in the courts, was declared to be outside the powers of the 1961 Constitution. Neither, he said, had the 1965 Constitution made any provision for preventive detention outside of a state of emergency. The Public Security Bill would therefore remedy this omission and regularize the laws relating to all restricted and detained persons and so restore the position as it was in 1959.

28. So that the detention of an individual should not be left entirely to the discretion of the "Minister of Justice", Mr. Lardner-Burke said the bill would provide for the establishment of an impartial body other than the Minister which would give consideration to each case. The powers of preventive detention without a state of emergency, he added, were absolutely necessary to permit the "Government" to maintain law and order in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Lardner-Burke denied that the proposed amendments to the Constitution were an attempt to give the régime more permanent and arbitrary power with the object of stifling the Opposition.

29. Mr. Harper, "Minister of Internal Affairs", also stated that the bill would empower the régime to introduce legislation to give the African chiefs greater powers in the administration of their areas. Among other powers, the proposed legislation would give the chiefs or their courts powers for dealing with certain criminal offences. The legislation would not force the tribal courts to adhere to the Declaration of Rights in so far as legal representation was concerned. It would also give powers to the chiefs for the removal of certain people from one position of tribal trust land to another. The legislation would also make some changes in relation to tribal trust lands.

30. During the debate on the second reading of the bill on 8 September, the Leader of the Opposition and most of the opposition United People's Party (UPP) members walked out of the Assembly; they had not returned when the vote was taken. There were 48 votes for the bill and 2 against (1 UPP member and 1 independent member). Mr. Ian Smith announced on 14 September that the bill had been signed by Mr. Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government".

### *Court judgement*

31. Within the period under review, many cases which in one way or the other challenged the legality of the Ian Smith régime were brought before the courts of Southern Rhodesia. Of these, the most important in terms of the judgement delivered was the case before the High Court in which two detainees, Mr. Leo Baron and Mr. Daniel Madzimbamuto, had applied to be released on the ground that the orders detaining them were illegal. The Court held on 9 September 1966 that their application must fail.

32. One of the two judges, Mr. Justice Lewis, was reported to have stated his conclusions in the case, which came before the High Court in Salisbury in March 1966 as follows:

"1. The 1965 constitution is not the lawful constitution of this country and the government of this country set up under it is not the lawful government; it will not become the lawful government

unless and until the ties of sovereignty are severed either by consent or by acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in abandoning the attempt to end the revolution.

"2. The government is, however, the only effective government of the country and therefore on the basis of necessity and in order to avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law this court should give effect to such measures of the effective government, both legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have been taken by the lawful government under the 1961 constitution for the preservation of peace and good government and the maintenance of law and order.

"3. The extensions of the state of emergency and of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations contained in Rhodesian Government Notice 71 of 1966 made thereunder are measures falling within the above category and neither in their purpose nor in their mode of enforcement in the present cases have they been shown to be hostile to the authority of the sovereign power or to have impaired the just rights of citizens under the 1961 constitution or to have been taken with actual intent to further the revolution.... In the result I am of the opinion that both applications must fail."

33. The other judge, Mr. Justice Goldin, agreed in a separate judgement with the conclusions of Mr. Justice Lewis. He was reported to have written:

"In my view, after careful consideration of the unprecedented situation in which the court finds itself, I am satisfied that the court can and should give effect to at least certain legislative measures and administrative acts performed by virtue of powers exercised under the 1965 constitution. I base my conclusion on the doctrine of public policy, the application of which is required, justified and rendered unavoidable in these circumstances by necessity."

An appeal by the two detainees against the judgement is currently being heard by the Court of Appeals in Salisbury.

### *Changes in Southern Rhodesian opposition leadership*

34. The opposition UPP caucus on 31 August 1966 replaced Mr. Chad Chipunza by Mr. Josiah Gondo as party leader. Mr. Gondo, who became Leader of the Opposition, formerly led the party before Mr. Chipunza. On 22 January 1967, at a later party congress, Mr. Percy Mkudu was elected to succeed Mr. Gondo.

### *Deputy Prime Minister named*

35. On 7 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith named as "Deputy Prime Minister" Mr. John Wrathall. The announcement said that Mr. Wrathall would continue to hold the portfolio of finance in addition to his new responsibilities.

### *Rhodesian Front Party Congress*

36. The annual Congress of the Rhodesian Front Party was held in Bulawayo from 22 to 24 September 1966. It was reported to have been attended by more than 500 party delegates from all over the country. The open session, which started on 23 September 1966, was addressed by Mr. Ian Smith in his capacity as

president of the party. In his statement, Mr. Smith recapitulated the history of the party from the time of the 1961 Constitution to the period ending with the illegal declaration of independence and stated that as long as he continued to be president of the party, his régime would never deviate from the principles which the party stood for and the promises it had made to the electorate of Southern Rhodesia. Regarding the period after the illegal declaration of independence, he stated that "Rhodesians" had come a long way, which he described as an incredible success. So long as they continued to succeed, those friends that they had in the world today would not let them down. They were carrying on one of the most incredible exercises in contemporary history by standing up not to one great country, but almost to the whole world.

37. On 24 September, the Congress, in closed session, held the election of party officers. The results of the elections showed few changes from 1965. Mr. Ian Smith was re-elected president of the party. Mr. William Harper, "Minister of Internal Affairs", and Lord Graham, "Minister of External Affairs and Defence", were re-elected as deputy presidents. Four party vice-presidents were elected—two of whom have to be "MPs" and two drawn from party members. They were Mr. John Wrathall, "Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance", Mr. Jack Carey, Mr. Stan Eastwood and Mr. D. C. Lilford. Col. W. M. Knox was re-elected chairman of the party and Mr. Ralph Neilson was elected deputy chairman.

38. The Congress debated twenty resolutions on both local and national affairs. Of these resolutions, the most important was adopted on 24 September 1966, by which the Congress unanimously endorsed the action of the "Government" during the last twelve months and recorded its full confidence in the "Prime Minister" and his cabinet and caucus. The proposer and seconder and all the speakers mentioned not only the courage and determination that had been shown by the "Prime Minister" and his cabinet, but also the "unity that they had achieved amongst the people of Southern Rhodesia". In a statement after the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Smith said that by the resolution, the Congress had made him and his officers even stronger and more dedicated. After this they could not, even if they had any intention of doing so, deviate or let the party down.

#### *Clashes with nationalists*

39. On 13 May 1966, twenty Africans were sentenced in Salisbury to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour after being found guilty in the High Court of being saboteurs and spies. All were found guilty of preparing for an African nationalist attempt to overthrow the white minority régime. A twenty-first man was given five years with hard labour. In his judgement, the judge said that a sabotage training scheme had been organized in Lusaka, Zambia, by officials of the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) with staging posts at Mbeya and Dar es Salaam.

40. A European farmer, Mr. Viljoen, and his wife were murdered in the farming district of Hartley, about seventy miles from Salisbury, on 17 May. A police statement said that they had been shot with an automatic weapon and that the murders were believed to be "the work of a dangerous gang". Later the same day in Lusaka, responsibility for the murders

was claimed by the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

41. On 1 June 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police announced that an African arrested on suspicion of being connected with the terrorist gang that murdered the white couple had died from wounds he received. The police had said earlier that he had been wounded when arrested by the security forces.

42. On 13 June 1966, there was a two-hour outbreak of violence in Salisbury. During the outbreak, a hotel about seven miles from the city near the African township of Highfield was stoned and petrol bombs thrown. A car in the hotel grounds was set on fire but the fire was extinguished. A furniture warehouse in the same vicinity was burnt out causing damage estimated at £50,000. A bus was burnt out in Highfield township when an incendiary device was thrown into it. Other stoning incidents in the African township and an attempt to set fire to an office in the industrial sites were reported. It was also reported that in the neighbouring township of Harare there were scattered outbreaks of stone-throwing.

43. On 22 June 1966, three Africans who were accused of having attacked a train with knobkerries and stones and set it on fire with petrol were sentenced to death in the High Court in Bulawayo. The sentence for such an offence is mandatory under Southern Rhodesia's Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.

44. On 23 June 1966, seven Africans who were reported to have been caught armed in Southern Rhodesia after entering the country secretly from Zambia were sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment each in the High Court in Salisbury. The judge found the men guilty of illegally possessing a large quantity of Soviet and Chinese weapons and explosives. Evidence was given that all the accused were members of the banned ZANU. The prosecution said they had entered the country secretly from Zambia on 1 April 1966, with orders to blow up the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline, attack white farmers and fight the army and police in an attempt to overthrow the "Government".

45. On 19 July, the Southern Rhodesian police stated that an "African nationalist terrorist gang" had opened fire on Southern Rhodesian security forces and hurled hand grenades at them in a gun battle in a remote part of the Zambezi Valley on 18 July 1966. The statement said that the security forces immediately returned fire, killing one "terrorist". The dead African was "positively identified" by the police as a member of the nationalist gang which had gunned down the white farming couple in the Hartley district, about seventy miles from Salisbury, in May. A member of the security forces was said to have been wounded but not seriously. The statement said that the terrorists fled shortly after the start of the battle.

46. On 22 July 1966, the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, in reply to a question in "Parliament", stated that there had been eighty acts of sabotage since the illegal declaration of independence. There had been twenty attacks on railroads, twenty-three cases of interference with essential services, thirty-two Molotov cocktail cases, and five involving the use of explosives.

47. On 5 August 1966, the "Department of Information" announced that five African "terrorists" would appear in the Sinoia magistrates' court the same day to answer charges of carrying offensive weapons. The statement said that the terrorists had surrendered to

the security forces during the recent operations in the Zambezi Valley near the frontier with Zambia. It said that the terrorists had infiltrated Southern Rhodesia from Zambia and were members of a banned Rhodesian African nationalist organization. On 3 October 1966, four of the arrested Africans were sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment each for the above charges. The fifth African was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.

48. On 12 August 1966, the police reported that seven white people and an African waiter were taken to a hospital with slight injuries after an explosion in a café in the city centre near the Salisbury town hall. A subsequent police statement said that the bomb thrown into the café was a hand grenade. On 24 August 1966, it was reported that the Southern Rhodesian police had arrested four Africans in connexion with the grenade thrown into the café. On 21 September 1966, two Africans were sentenced to death by a Salisbury court for the hand-grenade attack in the café.

49. On 15 August 1966, the police reported that another group of African "terrorists" had surrendered to Southern Rhodesian forces. According to the statement by the police, they were captured in an area to the north of Matabeleland. It was alleged that these individuals who recently left Lusaka, Zambia, had received training in a communist or pro-communist country and were carrying weapons and materials of communist origin. On 29 September 1966, eleven of the terrorists were each sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for possessing firearms.

#### *Official statements on security forces*

50. The annual defence report tabled in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 26 April 1966 stated that throughout the past year emphasis had been placed on counter-insurgency in training at all levels and on "the defence phase of limited war". Certain parts of the country's borders were now under continuous surveillance and troops were permanently stationed at Kariba. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force possessed a considerable strike ability which posed a valid deterrent to aggression. In almost 13,000 hours flown, a daily serviceability rate of 82 per cent had been recorded.

51. The "Ministry of Defence" of the illegal régime announced on 1 July 1966 that territorial force and army reserve training camps would be held between 24 July and 2 October 1966. An official announcement said that the camps would be held in areas not only in but outside the main centres of the country and training would include refresher courses, range firing, and night operations.

52. In a recorded interview which was broadcast on 26 August 1966 on the African Service of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", Mr. William Harper, said that nearly all the terrorists who had entered Southern Rhodesia had been captured and that the security forces had shot whole gangs of terrorists, not one surviving, when they had resisted arrest. Those people ought to know that when they resisted arrest that was the sort of treatment they were going to receive from the armed forces of Southern Rhodesia. Asked what sort of reception Southern Rhodesian Africans who had left their country and wished to return would receive, Mr. Harper replied that if those people were terrorists their chances of being rounded up were extremely high.

53. On Southern Rhodesia's security position, Mr. Harper said that there was no suggestion of a general breakdown in law and order. Since political hooligans had been removed from the townships and countryside he thought that everyone would admit that life for the average man and woman was far more peaceful than anything the country had known for a long time. He said that it had always been the case in Southern Rhodesia that it was only those who did wrong, the evil-doers, who had cause to fear the authorities. People who organized the terrorists should not think that they could work against Southern Rhodesia while they lived beyond its borders and then be welcomed back with open arms if they sought to return. Those people shared equally the guilt with the actual terrorists themselves. Mr. Harper said that if such people fell into the hands of the police they would be dealt with as the criminals they were, and they should remember that the police did not close cases on such persons until they had achieved their objective.

54. In a recorded interview on the African Service of the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation on 2 September 1966, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins, AOC, the "Royal Rhodesian Air Force", stated that apart from South Africa, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force was the strongest and best balanced force within 3,500 miles. He said that there was nothing like the Royal Rhodesian Air Force "this side of North Africa". The RRAF had the weapons and the bombs. Air Vice Marshall Hawkins said: "If anyone attacked us, if we were certain that anyone was about to attack us, then we reserve the right to defend ourselves in this way, by using our offensive force. But let us be clear for this moment and for the foreseeable future that we have no aggressive intention against anyone." The Rhodesian Air Force jet bombers were the country's strike effort. This meant that anyone with evil intentions towards the country would have to think twice before attacking it. It also meant that if anyone was misguided enough to launch a fairly large land-based assault against the country, it could withstand these forces and give support to the army and other security forces in repelling such an attack. The Rhodesian Air Force was also well equipped and capable of capturing and wiping out small groups of terrorists. In case of an attack the Rhodesian Air Force would, with transport aircraft and helicopters, get ground forces to any point, in some cases, within minutes. Asked if he could see any threat which the country could not meet, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins said he did not. He just hoped that no one was misguided enough to pose one.

#### *Further clashes with Africans*

55. On 2 September 1966, three alleged African "terrorists" were committed to trial in Bulawayo for being in possession of offensive weapons. A fourth African appearing with them was committed to a similar charge and was alleged to have hidden guns and ammunition for the terrorists. The men were reported to be handcuffed in pairs and wearing leg-irons when they were escorted into court by the police. At the preliminary hearing, the judge ruled, among other things, that the political parties they represented should not be published. They were reported to have crossed the border into Southern Rhodesia from Zambia. On 27 September 1966, the three African terrorists were each gaoled for eighteen years, and the fourth for six years.



56. The police announced on 27 September that two suspected "terrorists" had been killed and a number of others captured in a clash with security forces on 25 September 1966. The action took place in the Chirundi Valley near the Zambian border when a patrol of the Rhodesian Light Infantry ran into the alleged terrorist group. According to the report one member of the security forces suffered a slight injury. The clash, according to the police, took place near the spot where an African driver was found shot dead and his truck wrecked in the Chirundi Valley on 18 September. Since then the police had instituted a convoy and patrol system in the area. Seven Africans accused of the murder on 18 September of an African truck driver were found guilty and sentenced to death in Salisbury High Court on 14 December. In passing sentence, Mr. Justice Fieldsend said that the men were members of a gang who had entered the country with the avowed intention of raising a "rebellion riot". All seven men pleaded not guilty to the charges and appealed against the verdict.

57. On 6 October 1966, an African clerk was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for being in possession of offensive weapons.

58. On 1 November, Mr. Elisha Tarisayi, an African, was sentenced to death under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act in the Salisbury High Court. He had been found guilty for having thrown a hand grenade at a suburban house in August. No one had been injured in the ensuing explosion.

59. On 3 November, four Africans who had been found guilty of having been in possession of offensive weapons and of having entered Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of making war, received the death penalty in Salisbury High Court. The Court was told that the men had been captured by a patrol of the Rhodesian Light Infantry in the Zambezi Valley near the Zambia border.

60. Two Africans were each sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the High Court in Salisbury on 8 November for illegal possession of two machine-guns of French manufacture and over 2,000 rounds of ammunition of Russian and Italian manufacture. A third African received a prison sentence of eight years for a similar offence.

61. Following an official report from Zambia that a Zambian woman had been shot while in a canoe on the Zambezi River near the Zambian shore, an official statement in Salisbury on 8 November said that Rhodesian security forces in the Chirundi area had surprised three Africans in a boat near the Rhodesian bank of the Zambezi and that the security forces had opened fire on the boat when the occupants, called upon to identify themselves, had paddled back across the river. The Rhodesian statement said it was possible that one person in the boat may have received fatal injuries, and emphasized that persons attempting to enter Rhodesia at places other than recognized border posts, particularly in areas known to be favoured by infiltrating terrorists, ran the risk of injury or possibly death.

62. The appeals of seven Africans, who had each been sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on charges concerning the bringing of arms and explosive materials into Rhodesia with the intention of using them, were dismissed by the appellate division of the High Court in Salisbury on 19 November.

63. On 23 November, four Africans were convicted by the High Court in Salisbury on charges of carrying offensive weapons and attempted murder. They were stated to have been captured by a Rhodesian Light Infantry patrol operating near the Zambezi Valley. The arms were reported to have included three Russian rifles, a Chinese rocket launcher with seven rockets, twelve American hand grenades and six British anti-personnel mines. The accused were all sentenced to death.

#### *Reports on clashes*

64. A pamphlet prepared by the illegal régime on "terrorist" activities entitled *Nowhere to Hide* was issued on 17 October 1966. According to the pamphlet, as of the end of September 1966, twelve African "terrorists" had been killed and several score captured by the security forces with the co-operation of the local African population. According to the pamphlet, the terrorist campaign had been a dismal failure.

65. Reports issued by both ZANU and ZAPU in 1966 claimed that their forces had killed large numbers of the security forces of the illegal régime in the past months.

#### *Restrictees and detainees*

66. On 21 June 1966 it was reported that the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the banned ZANU, and some of his lieutenants had been moved from their restriction camp at Sokombela, near Que Que, to the remand prison in Salisbury. It was reported that this was believed to be a security precaution in view of recent outbreaks of violence which had been publicly claimed by the party.

67. Mr. Lardner-Burke stated in the "Legislative Assembly" on 1 July 1966 that ninety-five people had been detained under the emergency measures since the declaration of independence in November 1965. Of these, six had been released on permit and three had had their orders revoked. He declined to reveal where they were being held. He also stated that 331 people had been in restriction camps before "independence".

68. Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, was released from restriction on 18 October 1966, upon the expiration of his one-year restriction order.

#### *Africans awaiting hanging*

69. As at December 1966, it was reported that there were about seventy Africans convicted of murder and offences under the mandatory "hanging clause" of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act waiting indefinitely in the Salisbury death cells because of the constitutional and legal uncertainty surrounding the Ian Smith régime. Mr. Herbert Bowden, Commonwealth Secretary, and Sir Elwyn Jones, the Attorney General, were reported to have let it be known during their visit to Salisbury in September that the signing of a death warrant by Mr. Dupont under the present circumstances would have serious consequences for him and those concerned.

#### *University College and the illegal régime*

70. On 16 July 1966, a group of African students demonstrated against the illegal régime at the annual graduation ceremony of the University College of Rhodesia.

71. On 27 July 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police detained under the emergency regulations nine lecturers and an Asian student. Nine other students, three Whites, one Asian and five Africans, were also placed under restriction.

72. On 31 July 1966, eight of the nine lecturers detained were served with deportation orders and left Southern Rhodesia on 3 August. The ninth, a British-born Rhodesian citizen, was released on 31 July and escorted to the airport where he left for London on the same day. The Asian student who had been detained with the lecturers was also released and left for the United Kingdom by air on 2 August.

73. Of the nine restricted students, five of them—all African—were restricted at the Gonakudzinkwa restriction camp where the African nationalist leader, Mr. Josiah Nkomo, is being held.

74. It was announced on 2 September that a number of persons had been detained under the emergency powers regulations; these included another lecturer from the University College, Mr. John Andrew Conradie. On 5 September, Mr. Conradie and an employee of an industrial firm, Mr. Dixon, were charged in the Salisbury magistrates' court with offences against the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The prosecution alleged "that the accused, with others at the University College, were members of a group responsible for the reception, storage and eventual distribution of offensive materials for use against the European community, their property and homes", and that the group was "responsible for maintaining contact with infiltrated terrorists". Another allegation involved the possession of Russian hand grenades. It was stated that warrants had been issued for the arrest of two former lecturers at the college, both of whom were reported to have left Southern Rhodesia.

75. On 20 February 1967, Mr. Conradie was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for offences rising out of terrorist activities.

#### *Exploratory talks between United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian officials*

76. It will be recalled that on 27 April 1966, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons that informal talks between officials of the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had been arranged, directed only to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely existed, and that they were without commitment on either side.

77. Altogether, three rounds of informal talks were held between 9 May and 25 August 1966. The first round of the informal talks was held in London from 9 to 20 May 1966, followed by two sessions in Salisbury between 2 June and 5 July, and between 22 and 25 August 1966.

78. The talks were mainly directed, firstly, to the method and condition of a return to legality and constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia, and the determination of the question of with whom official negotiations could subsequently take place; and, secondly, to an informal exploration in detail of constitutional problems to see what amendments to the 1961 Constitution would be needed to give effect to the six principles which had been the basis of discussions with the legal Southern Rhodesian Government up to 11 November 1965.

79. The six principles to which the United Kingdom Government was committed in the above and subsequent discussions with the Southern Rhodesian authorities were as follows:

(1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

(2) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.

(3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

(6) It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

80. The third round of informal talks ended on 25 August 1966, soon after the British officials were informed of the illegal régime's plans to introduce the Constitution Amendment Bill in the Legislative Assembly (see paras. 25-30 of this chapter). The bill was described by a spokesman of the Commonwealth Relations Office as a most provocative act. Mr. Smith, however, was reported to have stated that his Government had not introduced the bill to end the talks, although the United Kingdom had used it for that purpose.

#### *Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference*

81. A Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was held in London from 6 to 14 September 1966 and was primarily devoted to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Twenty-two Commonwealth countries were represented.

82. In the separate *communiqué* issued on Southern Rhodesia at the close of the Conference, most of the Heads of Government urged that Britain should make a categorical declaration that independence would not be granted before majority rule was established on the basis of universal adult franchise and that this declaration should not be conditional on whether the illegal régime agreed to surrender or not. They further urged that Britain should refuse to resume discussions or to negotiate with the illegal régime.

83. According to the *communiqué*, the British Prime Minister stated that the British Government would not recommend to the British Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the six principles; that they attached particular importance to the fifth principle, namely that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; that they regarded it as implicit in this fifth principle that the test of acceptability must enable the people of Rhodesia as a whole to indicate whether or not they were prepared to accept any settlement which provided for the grant of independence before majority rule was achieved; and that there would be no independence before majority rule if the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be opposed to it.

84. The Conference noted the following decisions of the British Government:

(a) After the illegal régime was ended a legal government would be appointed by the Governor and would constitute a broadly based representative administration. During this interim period the armed forces and police would be responsible to the Governor. Those individuals who had been detained or restricted on political grounds would be released and normal political activities would be permitted provided that they were conducted peacefully and democratically without intimidation from any quarter;

(b) The British Government would negotiate, with this interim administration, a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles;

(c) This constitutional settlement would be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means;

(d) The British Parliament and Government must be satisfied that this test of opinion was fair and free and would be acceptable to the general world community;

(e) The British Government would not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be in favour of it.

85. The *communiqué* stated that the Heads of Government also noted that the British Government proposed immediately to communicate the British intentions, as indicated above, through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia and to inform the illegal régime there that if they were not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps whereby the rebellion was brought to an end and executive authority was vested in the Governor, the following related consequences would ensue:

(a) The British Government would withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which had been made: in particular it would not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involved independence before majority rule;

(b) Given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government would be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of 1966 a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

86. On 16 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have said that his régime was under no obligation to accept any decisions made at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, as it had not been invited to attend.

#### *Discussion of the United Kingdom Government's proposals*

87. The Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Herbert Bowden, and the Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, visited Southern Rhodesia from 19 to 28 September 1966 for the purposes indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' *communiqué* on Southern Rhodesia. During the course of their visit, they met under the aegis of the Governor, a cross-section of representative opinion in the country, including Mr. Smith and members of the régime. In these talks they clarified the United Kingdom Government's requirements for a settlement of the Southern Rhodesian problem and what the consequences of the rejection of the United Kingdom proposals would be. Discussions of the proposals were continued during a visit to Southern

Rhodesia in October by Sir Morris James, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office. Further discussions of the proposals took place when the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, paid a second visit to Salisbury between 25 and 27 November 1966, and had talks with the Governor and also met Mr. Smith. Following the return of the Commonwealth Secretary to London, Sir Morris James left for Salisbury on 28 November to see the Governor and under his auspices to clarify certain issues which had arisen from the Commonwealth Secretary's report on his discussions in Salisbury.

#### *Meeting between the United Kingdom Prime Minister and Mr. Smith*

88. Mr. Harold Wilson told the House of Commons on 1 December 1966 that he was leaving that afternoon, together with the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General, for a meeting with the Governor of Southern Rhodesia and Mr. Ian Smith. The purpose of the meeting was to ascertain whether, within the programme of action to which the United Kingdom Government was committed by the *communiqué* issued at the end of the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, a settlement of the Rhodesian problem could be reached on the basis of the principles to which successive British Governments had throughout adhered.

89. The meeting of the British Prime Minister and Mr. Ian Smith took place aboard H.M.S. *Tiger* off Gibraltar from 2 to 4 December. Also present were the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General; the Governor and the Chief Justice of Rhodesia; and another member of the Rhodesian régime, Mr. Howman.

90. The meeting resulted in a working document setting out proposals for an independent constitution which would accord with the six principles and arrangements within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' *communiqué* for a return to legality.

91. A statement was signed by the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, in the presence of the Governor, on 4 December, indicating that this document was without commitment on either side and that both sides would decide by 12 noon (Salisbury time) on 5 December whether it was accepted in its entirety.

#### *Proposals for a settlement*

92. The working document was drawn up in accordance with the six principles and provisions were made for a return to legality and the testing of opinion.

93. As set out in the working document, Chapter III of the 1961 Constitution as modified would be entrenched in the new constitution, subject to the increase of constituencies ("A" roll seats) called for by the normal increase of population. This increase would be effected by an agreed formula which would safeguard against diminishing African representation. In modification of the Chapter, the number of "A" roll seats would be reduced from fifty to thirty-three, the "B" roll seats increased from fifteen to seventeen, and a new block of seventeen European seats created. A Senate would be created composed of twelve European seats and fourteen African seats, eight popularly elected and six elected by the Chiefs' Council; entrenched provisions could be amended only by a three-quarters vote of both houses and amendments could

not come into effect until the time-limit for appeals had expired. Appeals against amendments would be made first to a Constitutional Commission in Rhodesia and further to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In addition, the "B" roll franchise would be extended to all Africans over thirty years of age and cross-voting would be retained.

94. Steps for a return to legality required the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based interim government with Mr. Smith as Prime Minister which would include representatives of existing political parties, independents and Africans; the dissolution of the legislature; and the restoration of constitutional government based on the 1961 Constitution, modified (by Order in Council) to provide that during the interim period, which would last a minimum of four months, the ministers would be responsible to the Governor, who would have legislative powers and would normally act on their advice in all internal matters. In cases involving law and order and protection of human rights the Governor would be advised, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, by a Defence and Security Council comprising the responsible ministers, the heads of the Defence Forces, the Chief of Police, and a representative of the British Government. Furthermore, during the interim period, the test of acceptability of the new constitution would be carried out and new elections held; if the constitution was found to be approved, a further election on the basis of that constitution would be held. Failing acceptance, however, alternative proposals for a new constitution would be devised by both Governments. Additionally, before any testing of opinion, censorship would be removed, prisoners detained on security grounds released, and normal political activities permitted. Regarding racial discrimination, a Royal Commission would be set up to study the question and make recommendations, especially with regard to land apportionment; a standing commission would keep the problem under regular review. Finally, the proposals called for the negotiation of a treaty guaranteeing the independence constitution under which, in the event that unilateral action against the constitution was again taken by the Government in power, Britain reserved the right to use force.

#### *White Paper on proposals for a settlement*

95. A White Paper issued on the proposals for a settlement<sup>8</sup> stated that the document provided for unimpeded progress to majority rule (i.e., the first principle), while finding a means of introducing European reserved seats (to give effect to the sixth principle). It met the second principle by establishing an effective blocking mechanism in a Senate and Lower House voting together, and by providing a right of appeal against the amendment of specially entrenched clauses of the constitution, in the first instance to a constitutional commission in Rhodesia, and from that commission, as of right, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It met the third principle (i.e., an immediate improvement of the political status of the Africans) by an extension of the "B" roll franchise to cover all Africans over thirty years of age; by increasing the "B" roll seats in the Lower House from fifteen to seventeen, and by a total of fourteen African seats in the Senate of which eight would be elected and six would be Chiefs.

<sup>8</sup> *Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement—1966* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Cmnd. 3159.

96. Also, according to the White Paper, the fourth principle was met by a Royal Commission to study and make recommendations on the problems of racial discrimination and land apportionment. It also suggested satisfactory arrangements within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' *communiqué* for a return to legality by means of the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based administration, and for the testing of the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole as required by the fifth principle after constitutional government had been restored.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Working document rejected by illegal régime*

97. On 4 December 1966, the United Kingdom Government accepted the working document in its entirety. On the evening of 5 December 1966, the Ian Smith régime informed the United Kingdom Government that it was unwilling to accept the document in its entirety. According to the White Paper on the working document, as had been made clear to Mr. Smith on the H.M.S. *Tiger*, and as he had recognized in signing the statement, the illegal régime had thus rejected the document.

98. In a subsequent statement on 5 December 1966, Mr. Ian Smith said that the Rhodesian Government was prepared to accept the constitutional proposals by Mr. Wilson which fulfilled the six principles as a basis for a constitution for an independent Rhodesia. He added, however, that the British Government's expectation that the Rhodesian Government would abandon the 1965 Constitution before a new constitution had finally been secured and put to the test of public opinion, was utterly irresponsible. The proposals also envisaged by Mr. Wilson under the heading "A Return to Legality" were repugnant to the Rhodesian Government involving as they did: (a) control of the armed forces and police being invested in the Governor; (b) the Governor being invested with discretion to appoint the ministers of the Crown, of whom no less than five were to be appointed outside the government party and not less than two must be Africans; (c) the dissolution of Parliament and the Governor being invested with legislative powers which in general would be exercised on the advice of his ministers, but which in certain cases might be exercised at his discretion.

#### *Further action taken by the United Kingdom Government in pursuance of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué*

99. On 5 December 1966, the United Kingdom Government requested an early meeting of the Security Council to propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia (see para. 9).

100. On 20 December, Mr. Wilson stated in the House of Commons that the British Government was from that time withdrawing all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and that it would not submit to Parliament any settlement involving independence before majority rule. By this declaration the United Kingdom fulfilled its final obligation under the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' *communiqué* of 14 September 1966.

<sup>9</sup> For details covering the whole range of talks, see *Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a Settlement—1966* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Cmnd. 3171.

101. In his statement Mr. Wilson explained that in the future a settlement could be brought about only by a legal government and that the settlement would consist of a return to the 1961 Constitution, the lifting of sanctions, and long-term progress to majority rule set out in the 1961 Constitution. At present, Mr. Wilson continued, there had been no change in the Government's position regarding the use of force, but if a change were necessitated by events the House would be informed.

*Other developments between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal régime*

102. The House of Commons on 10 November 1966 approved without a division the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1966. The Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, which empowers the United Kingdom Government to legislate for Southern Rhodesia by orders in council and provides for executive authority in Rhodesia to be exercised on behalf of the Queen by the Commonwealth Secretary (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, part I, appendix II), was due to have expired on 15 November. It now continues in force.

*Relations with South Africa*

103. Throughout 1966, the Government of the Republic of South Africa maintained its policy of "non-intervention" in "the Rhodesian dispute" as laid down by Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd in his policy statement of 11 November 1965 (*ibid.*, part I, para. 124). Accordingly, South Africa continued "to maintain the normal friendly relations" with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. Within the period under review, the social activities and public appearances of Mr. John Gaunt, the illegal régime's "plenipotentiary diplomatic representative in the Republic", were given wide publicity in the local newspapers of South Africa.

104. Throughout 1966, the "Friends of Rhodesia" organization in South Africa (which was set up soon after the illegal declaration of independence to buttress the Ian Smith régime) continued to open offices and branches in the major cities of South Africa which openly identified the struggle of the illegal régime with that of South Africa and canvassed support and collected funds to aid the illegal régime. On 20 June 1966, Mr. Ian Smith sent a message to the Friends of Rhodesia in South Africa in which he said that it was impossible to express adequately the gratitude Rhodesians felt towards their friends in South Africa for the support they were giving in the struggle to preserve the standards of Western civilization in that part of Africa.

105. On 23 July 1966, the "Minister of Local Government" of the illegal régime, Mr. Mark Partridge, speaking in a suburb of Salisbury at the opening of a fountain built as a symbol of thanks to South Africa and Portugal, said that without the help of Portugal and South Africa after the declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia could have lost everything.

106. The President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Charles Swart, in his speech opening the first session of the third Parliament on 29 July 1966, stated that his Government welcomed the resumption of talks between the British and Southern Rhodesian authorities and trusted that they would soon lead to beneficial results and the removal of sanctions.

107. On 15 September 1966, the former Rhodesian High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Brigadier

Skeen, told the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury that Southern Rhodesia's most important diplomatic mission was the one in South Africa, followed by those in Portugal and Mozambique, and appealed for increases in funds for the South African mission.

108. Following the assassination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 7 September 1966 unanimously moved a respectful address to Mr. Clifford Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government", asking him to express its shock and deep sorrow at Dr. Verwoerd's tragic death to the Government and people of South Africa and to Mrs. Verwoerd and her family. Introducing the motion, Mr. Ian Smith said that the world was poorer for Dr. Verwoerd's passing and that the people of Southern Rhodesia would never forget him. On 10 September 1966, Mr. Smith flew to Pretoria to attend Dr. Verwoerd's funeral in what South African officials called a private capacity.

109. In a statement to the South African Parliament on 21 September 1966, the new Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Johannes Vorster, said that he wanted to correct any wrong impressions which might be created by published reports of a statement by Mr. Wilson on Dr. Verwoerd's role as adviser to Mr. Smith.

110. There had been an exchange of correspondence not only between Mr. Wilson and Dr. Verwoerd, but also between Mr. Smith and Dr. Verwoerd. He had gone through this correspondence and what the late Prime Minister had said in it was in large measure what he had said in public. There had been an appeal to both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith to try to see if they could, through discussion, solve a domestic difference which in the interest of all should be solved as a domestic matter.

111. Also in his statement, the new Prime Minister stated that he intended to follow the same policy towards Southern Rhodesia as had been followed by Dr. Verwoerd. Mr. Vorster further said that neither under pressure nor force would South Africa take part in boycotts or sanctions. His Government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.

112. In an interview which was published on 5 December 1966, Mr. Vorster stated that although South Africa would welcome an agreement between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, it would in no circumstances take part in United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if agreement failed. South Africa's policy was absolutely clear. It would neither take part voluntarily in sanctions nor would it allow itself to be forced into them. Asked what South Africa would do if the United Nations decreed sanctions against it on account of Southern Rhodesia or South West Africa, Mr. Vorster said that South Africa had made all necessary preparations to defend what legitimately belonged to it and its rights.

*Relations with Portugal*

113. Portugal has continued to maintain normal relations with the illegal régime which it describes as the "local government of Southern Rhodesia". Since 15 September 1965, Southern Rhodesia has had a "diplomatic representative" in Portugal who is officially referred to as "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission". He deals directly with the Portuguese Ministry of



Foreign Affairs concerning "all matters of interest to Portugal and Southern Rhodesia". Portugal has also continued to maintain its representation and its offices in Southern Rhodesia at the same level as before the illegal declaration of independence.

114. Speaking at a civic reception in Umtali on 21 May 1966, which was attended by people from Umtali and Mozambique, Mr. Smith expressed the gratitude of "Rhodesians" for the tremendous support being given by the Portuguese, particularly those who lived in Mozambique. Mr. Smith said that after the little upset "Rhodesia" was now going through was completed, and he had no doubt that it would be completed in the right way as far as Rhodesians were concerned, the bonds of friendship between his country and the people of Mozambique would be far stronger than ever before. He added that through the links now being forged there would probably come a movement for greater unification between Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa.

#### *Zambia and Southern Rhodesia*

115. Purported legislation to suspend in Southern Rhodesia the services of process and the execution of judgements made in the courts of Zambia was introduced in the "Rhodesian" Legislative Assembly in July 1966. The member of the régime responsible for justice, Mr. Lardner-Burke, said that the legislation was necessary as Zambia had recently repealed, as far as "Rhodesia" was concerned, the 1956 Federal Act which had made court judgements in one of the territories which at that time composed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland applicable in the others. Zambia's action, he said, meant that judgements of the "Rhodesian" courts would not be operative in Zambia whereas those of the Zambian courts continued to be operative in "Rhodesia".

116. It will be recalled that in response to an appeal by the Government of Zambia to the United Kingdom Government to send troops to help Zambia to defend the Kariba Dam, a Royal Air Force squadron of Javelin aircraft was sent to Zambia on 3 December 1965. The squadron was withdrawn from Zambia at the end of August. A Commonwealth Office statement, issued in London on 24 August 1966, said that the Zambian Government had been recently asked whether it wished the squadron of Javelins to remain in Zambia. The Zambian Government indicated in its reply that the Javelins could now be withdrawn. The arrangements for the withdrawal were consequently put into effect.

#### *Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the question of Southern Rhodesia*

117. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting in its third ordinary session at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 5 to 9 November 1966, adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution, the Heads of State and Government bitterly and unreservedly condemned the current talks between the British Government and the rebel settler régime in Southern Rhodesia as a conspiracy aimed at recognizing the independence seized illegally by the rebel settlers; called upon all member States of the OAU and all other States to continue to refuse recognition to any independent régime which the present talks between Britain and the Southern Rhodesian rebels might bring about unless such a government was based on majority rule; strongly con-

demned Britain for her refusal to crush the Southern Rhodesian rebel régime and repeated its demands to the United Kingdom Government to bring about the immediate downfall of that régime by any means including the use of force; reiterated the terms of paragraph 4 of its resolution of 5 March 1966, and accordingly recommended that the OAU, and all friendly Governments, give material and financial aid to the Zimbabwe people who were actually fighting inside Zimbabwe; condemned those States, especially Portugal and South Africa, which render support to the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia; called upon all member countries and all countries which wished to see human dignity and freedom in Africa and throughout the world to support a programme of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, repeated its calls upon all member countries to contribute to a special Southern Rhodesia Liberation Fund to enable all Zimbabwe nationalists to intensify the fighting against the rebels; called upon member States to give practical implementation to paragraph 3 of the resolution of 5 March 1966 by which it decided to establish a "Committee of Solidarity for Zambia composed of five members whose task shall be to seek appropriate measures of technical and economic assistance by Member States to Zambia", so as to enable Zambia not only to withstand the effects of the unilateral declaration of independence but also to help all Zimbabwe freedom fighters more effectively.

#### *Relations with other States*

118. On 19 August 1966, Lord Graham, the "Minister of External Affairs", in answer to a question in the Legislative Assembly regarding the representation of foreign countries in Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence, said that five countries—Denmark, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America—had withdrawn their heads of mission, but had not closed their offices. Eight other countries—Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland—had maintained their representation and their offices at the same level as before. Australia and Canada had closed their trade missions. Finland, Sweden and Turkey had closed their honorary consulates.

119. One of the two diplomatic missions in Salisbury, the United Kingdom, had withdrawn its High Commissioner and various members of his staff and closed its diplomatic office, but had left a residual mission in the city. The only other diplomatic mission, that of South Africa, had maintained its representation and its office.

#### *2. Economic developments (June-December 1966)<sup>10</sup>*

120. According to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury on 6 June 1966, Rhodesian trade reached record levels in 1965. Exports (including gold sales and re-exports) were worth £165 million (compared with £140.5 million in 1964) and imports, £120 million (£109.7 million in 1964). An economic survey, presented to the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on 6 July 1966, stated that the country's gross domestic product was £354 million in

<sup>10</sup> For economic developments since the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) on 16 December 1966, see paras. 322-363 of this chapter.

the year ended 31 December 1965, an increase of 7 per cent over the preceding year. *Per capita* income had risen by £2.2s. to £84.

121. It will be recalled that by operative paragraph 8 of resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, the Security Council, *inter alia*, called upon all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The resolution also called upon the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it had announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 of the resolution.

122. Pursuant to the above resolution and its own policy towards the illegal régime, the United Kingdom Government, by 30 January 1966, had imposed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia and announced the imposition of a total ban on all British exports to Southern Rhodesia with the exception of essential humanitarian needs, essential requirements of the joint Central African organizations, and goods on the quayside already paid for. On the same date it also announced that the ban on imports of goods from Southern Rhodesia had been extended to cover all imports from Southern Rhodesia.

123. By the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966, the United Kingdom Government was empowered to embargo Southern Rhodesia's trade in any specified product to cover also trade transactions with third countries. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that foreign Governments would recognize its legal authority to impose this embargo as they had done in the case of oil. Under this Order, the United Kingdom Government had by the middle of 1966 imposed an embargo on the export from Southern Rhodesia of essential commodities, including chrome, sugar, tobacco, pig-iron, iron ore, copper and asbestos.

124. By the end of December 1966, seventy-four States had replied to the Secretary-General's notes transmitting the text of resolution 217 (1965) for appropriate action. In general terms, a substantial number of these replies showed a complete break in all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, while a number of replies showed a gradual phasing out of economic relations based on the banning of trade in specified products.

125. Since the imposition of international sanctions, the internal economy and trade patterns of Southern Rhodesia have undergone some reorganization. Statements made by officials of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia have confirmed that these changes have become necessary as a result of the international sanctions which have been imposed on Southern Rhodesia. Since February 1966, however, the Smith régime has suppressed the publication of relevant statistical information on the state of the national economy in addition to the imposition of censorship on economic news. Statements by the Smith régime regarding the state of the national economy in 1966 could not therefore be verified.

#### *Rhodesian budget, 1966-1967*

126. The Rhodesian budget, introduced on 21 July 1966 by Mr. John Wrathall, "Minister of Finance", provided for current account expenditure of £73.3 million (an increase of £500,000 over the previous

year) and revenue of £71.4 million (£2.5 million lower than in 1965-1966). Taking into account the previous year's surplus of £1.5 million, the deficit at the end of June 1967 was estimated at £400,000. Loan account expenditure was estimated at £26 million; £14 million of this was already available or certain to materialize and Mr. Wrathall said he was confident that the remainder could be raised locally. There were no increases in income tax or super tax rates, but the tax on undistributed profits was increased from 5s. 8d. to 7s. 6d. in the pound. The investment credit system was abolished.

127. The police, army and air force vote rose from £11.1 million in the original estimates for 1965-1966, excluding the instalment of £500,000 for purchase of aircraft but including army and air force buildings, to £12.7 million. In the increase of £1.6 million, the major items were £785,000 for pay increases awarded during the past year and £303,000 for the extended National Service Scheme. The biggest increase in expenditure was in the army vote, which rose by £600,000, or nearly 20 per cent. The police vote was increased by 6 per cent but the air force vote was reduced. Expenditure on health and education was estimated at £19.6 million, an increase of £1.5 million; provision for African education was increased by £590,000 to £6.97 million.

128. Mr. Herbert Bowden, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, said in reply to a parliamentary question on 11 August, that the United Kingdom Government's conclusion, after a close study of such figures as the régime had thought fit to publish, was that the budget was a deliberately slanted and misleading document which was more noteworthy for what it omitted than for what it revealed.

#### *Official report on the state of the economy*

129. In the budget statement of 21 July, Mr. Wrathall gave what amounted to a progress report on the economic activities and achievements of the Smith régime since the illegal declaration of independence.

130. In his statement, Mr. Wrathall said that since 11 November 1965, foreign exchange had been allocated for the establishment of new industries, the value of whose fixed investment totalled almost £4 million. Of this, over £800,000 was in the food, drink and tobacco industries; more than £900,000 in the metal, metallic and non-metallic mineral manufacturing industries; £1.9 million in the textile, clothing and footwear industries; and about £300,000 in rubber, wood, paper, travel goods, furniture, chemicals and various other industries. These projects would give direct employment to over 200 Europeans and nearly 2,000 Africans.

131. The Government was also examining new proposals for a projected fertilizer factory, estimated to involve an investment of £10 million. A major nickel project involving an investment of £4 million would add very considerably to the foreign exchange earnings. There were many other interesting developments in the mining field.

132. New expenditures to combat the effects of sanctions included £325,000 to enable the Industrial Development Corporation to establish a confirming house and to provide it with additional capital for assisting with the diversification and development of industry, particularly industrial projects directed towards economically sound import substitution. The

upsurge in cotton production made it necessary to bring forward the construction of the new ginnery at Bindura; this involved an additional allocation of £197,000, and £450,000 were made available to the Sabi-Limpopo Authority to finance the wheat scheme at Mkwase in the lowveld, using water from Lake MacDougall, for growing about 2,600 acres of wheat.

133. According to Mr. Wrathall's statement, production continued at a high level in the first half of 1966 despite sanctions. Although 1965 had been a good year, the figures for the first five months of 1966 were even better for some industries, notably mining, food-stuffs and electricity. Industrial production as a whole, however, fell by about 7.5 per cent during this period compared with the same period in 1965. In the early months of 1966 there was a setback in some types of retail business, but in the food, clothing, footwear, drapery and general merchandise trade business was at a higher level than in the corresponding months of 1965. The building societies had continued to improve their position. Deposits and share capital increased from £44.6 million to £46.8 million between 30 June 1965 and 30 June 1966.

134. Mr. Wrathall also stated that the dark cloud over the agricultural industry could not be attributed primarily to sanctions. Sanctions might have brought matters to a head more quickly than would otherwise have been the case, but this meant that the problem was being tackled sooner rather than later, which was all to the good. The banking system and the money market were in a particularly sound position, and were braced to meet any further assaults which might be made upon them. The Government's own financial position was also highly satisfactory. On loan account it was probably in a stronger position than ever before; and on revenue account without any further increase in taxation, it expected to reach 30 June 1967 with a small accumulated deficit which could quite well be extinguished entirely by fortuitous savings and under-spending throughout the year.

135. Claims that the economy was on the point of collapse were obviously arrant nonsense. On the other hand, the economy might well be subjected to more serious stresses and strains before it resumed the rapid rate of progress achieved in 1965.

#### *Employment situation*

136. According to the illegal régime, at the end of June 1966, the number of African registered work-seekers stood at 4,586 or 11 per cent lower than at the same date in 1965. Africans in employment at 31 March 1966, the latest date for which statistics were available, numbered 655,000, the highest number ever achieved in Southern Rhodesia's history. In recent months the gap between the 1965 and 1966 numbers of European work-seekers had narrowed considerably. At the end of June the number stood at 768, only fifty-eight higher than at the same date in the previous year. The number in employment at 31 March was 1,300 higher than in 1965.

137. On 4 September 1966, the "Minister of Internal Affairs", Mr. William Harper, stated in the Legislative Assembly that since the assumption of "independence", nearly 3,000 appointments had been made in the public services. This had been a major influence in keeping down employment and had helped the morale of the country.

138. On 25 October 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that no detailed employment statistics had been published in Salisbury since February 1966, nor had the régime mentioned any figures which the United Kingdom Government could accept as accurately representing the extent of African unemployment. The increase in African unemployment was entirely the responsibility of the régime, which could remedy the situation by making a return to constitutional rule.

#### *Commerce and industry*

139. In his statement delivered at the opening of the Legislative Assembly on 22 June 1966, Mr. Clifford Dupont, "Officer Administering the Government", stated that the imposition of sanctions had led to the introduction of import controls. The resultant inconvenience to the people of Southern Rhodesia, and more particularly to the merchants, had been accepted in a most generous and co-operative manner. These controls had not been without positive advantages, which industrialists had been quick to exploit. Clear evidence was already to be seen of the accelerating development of industry, new products in substitution of imports constantly coming on the market. Industrialists were continuing to expand and diversify, and were producing goods now which they would not have thought possible to make a few months ago. His "Government" would continue to provide to the maximum possible extent such foreign currency for capital goods and raw materials required for new investment projects.

140. In the budget statement referred to above, Mr. Wrathall stated that import control was one of the steps being taken by the régime to safeguard the balance of payments and the value of the "Rhodesian" pound. Although these measures had been successful, it remained vital to Southern Rhodesia's economic strength to continue to husband its resources.

141. The President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. C. J. Hughes, in a foreword to the Chamber of Commerce Annual Report which was published on 2 June 1966, stated that while the ingenuity shown by the Rhodesian businessmen in their efforts to overcome sanctions was outstanding, it would be unrealistic not to acknowledge that sanctions had had some effect. Mr. Hughes added that as at June 1966, the distributive sector of the economy had been hardest hit and some of the weaker and less efficient organizations in this section had succumbed. Mr. Hughes forecast that in the long term this cutting out might result in an over-all strengthening of the distributive sector of the economy. In reply to the régime's appeals to commerce in 1966 to try to help agriculture in Southern Rhodesia by supplying farmers hit by sanctions or drought with credit over a difficult period, the annual report stated that repeated warnings had been issued that, because merchants' credit facilities had been curtailed, the amount of money which it would be possible to advance to the agricultural sector would be extremely limited.

142. At the annual general meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia in Salisbury on 8 June 1966, Mr. Hughes was reported to have repeated that it would be dishonest and dangerous for members to delude themselves that sanctions were not having an effect on the economy. The distributive

sector had been hard hit and the position was not improving. Commerce was bearing the main burden. Many firms were incurring heavy losses to keep people in employment. They could not continue this holding operation indefinitely. Mr. Hughes was also quoted as having said that the savings campaign launched by the Government, by transferring money from the private to the public sector, was almost "robbing Peter to pay Paul". If it was the "Government's" objective to reduce private spending as a matter of over-all economic policy, then there was no point in many firms carrying on with the present holding operation.

143. On 19 August 1966, the president of the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce, Mr. G. J. Sichel, in a message published in the organization's annual report, was reported to have warned that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would "take yet a larger toll of casualties". The message also stated that it would be foolish for members to allow themselves to be lulled into a sense of false security on the strength of short-term achievements and early successes in the economic war. He stressed the need for forward planning to counter long-term problems arising out of sanctions and added that tomorrow's problems would undoubtedly be more intractable than those facing Southern Rhodesia today.

144. On 1 September 1966, Mr. Sichel, speaking at the group's annual meeting, criticized the "Government" for withholding statistical information needed by businessmen for planning. He stated that the withholding of external trade and tobacco statistics was understandable but he seriously questioned the need for an embargo on such items as the retail sales index for motor vehicle sales and the cost-of-living index.

#### *Finance*

145. Prior to the illegal declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia's principal source of credit and finance was the United Kingdom. Almost all the major financial and banking institutions in Southern Rhodesia were net borrowers in London and net lenders in Southern Rhodesia. Credit facilities from London were the main prop of Southern Rhodesia commerce, industry, and agriculture. Credit from London was particularly important for financing the tobacco crop, which normally accounts for over 30 per cent of the domestic exports of Southern Rhodesia.

146. Following the illegal declaration of independence, the Government of the United Kingdom imposed financial sanctions on Southern Rhodesia to reinforce its economic sanctions. These financial sanctions involved the cessation of all aid, the removal of Southern Rhodesia from the sterling area and a ban on the export of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was denied access to the London money market and exchange control regulations were introduced against it. A stop was placed on practically all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except for those rising out of the very limited trade in goods permitted and certain minor specified remittances. By the end of December 1965, virtually all Southern Rhodesia's accounts in London had been blocked or frozen and a new Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia appointed to ensure that the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia held abroad were safeguarded in the interest of the people. Other sources of credit which were open to Southern Rhodesia in

third countries outside Africa were also reported to have been closed as a result of representations from the United Kingdom Government.

147. Pursuant to the above policy, the United Kingdom Government by the end of 1966 had issued five major warnings to would-be subscribers to loans floated by the illegal régime. These warnings stated that the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. Any person who lent money or otherwise gave credit to the régime or any agency or purported agency thereof did so entirely at his own risk. No permission would be granted to United Kingdom residents to subscribe.

148. Following the imposition of these sanctions, the Smith régime resorted to floating "Rhodesian Government" loans through the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia to be used in financing maturing debts and government development plans. By the end of October 1966, four such loans had been floated locally and fully subscribed to the value of £20 million. Sales of "independence bonds", introduced on 1 February 1966, were also reported by the "Minister of Finance" to have exceeded the target of £1 million by June 1966. He also stated that sales of saving certificates for the financial year ending 30 June 1966 amounted to £1.8 million, well over double the previous year's figure.

149. In addition to the above, it was reported that in 1966 Southern Rhodesia also had access to an estimated £10 to £13 million by its corresponding counter-financial sanctions against the United Kingdom. According to these estimates, Southern Rhodesia, by also blocking the payments of interest, dividend and profit payments etc. to the United Kingdom gained a net of between £10 to £13 million over the United Kingdom in the two-way blockade of interest, dividend and profit payments between the two countries.

150. Further financial counter-measures announced by the Smith régime on 18 July 1966 stated that Southern Rhodesian merchants would not be allowed to make payments to British and sterling area exporters for goods shipped to "Rhodesia" before 18 December 1965. It was stated that this step had been taken because the British Treasury was not prepared to release from the blocked account of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in London funds needed by Rhodesian merchants to pay for goods shipped from Britain and other sterling area countries before that date.

151. In his budget statement of 21 July, Mr. Wraithall stated that because of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom Government, foreign bodies whose loans were under United Kingdom Government guarantee had been advised that they should look to the United Kingdom Government for satisfaction. "Rhodesia's" debt obligations to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are guaranteed by the British Government under the Colonial Loan Acts.

152. On 14 November 1966, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in the House of Commons that since the illegal declaration of independence, £1,854,860 had been paid by the United Kingdom Government as guarantor of the service of these loans to Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government has also stated that the money paid would be recovered from

Southern Rhodesia when constitutional government was restored.

153. The Minister of Finance of the Smith régime also stated that the skill with which the banks had met the nation's requirements had done much to stabilize the economy. Bank deposits at 31 May 1965 amounted to £75 million and advances to £49.1 million, giving a ratio of advances to deposits of 65.5 per cent. The comparable percentage for May 1966 was 58.4 per cent, which left a reasonable margin towards financing the coming agricultural season. Loss of the London market credit facilities had not had the effect which had earlier been assumed; nevertheless the loss of credit had brought problems. Credit would be made available to enable the agricultural industry to continue.

154. It will be recalled that by a joint arrangement reached between the Reserve Banks of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia on 18 November 1965, negotiations were concluded by which "permissible financial and trade transactions" between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were resumed immediately on the same basis as before 11 November 1965. Since then no statement has been made by the Ministry of Finance of South Africa on South Africa's financial relations with the Smith régime, although it has been reported that South Africa has become the main source of credit to Southern Rhodesia.

### *Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia*

#### *General*

155. Agriculture is Southern Rhodesia's biggest and most important industry, and the largest single contributor to the national income as well as the largest single earner of foreign exchange and employer of labour. In 1965, it accounted for 40 per cent of all Africans in employment and contributed about 20 per cent to the gross domestic product, which was larger than any other sector.

156. Sales of the principal agricultural commodities in 1965 amounted to £63 million. Southern Rhodesia's main export crops, tobacco and raw sugar, together in 1965 accounted for £50 million, or about 35 per cent, of total domestic exports. In 1966, Southern Rhodesia was reported to have faced a farm crisis as a result of drought in nearly the whole of Matabeleland and in part the Midlands. The drought was reported to have affected Southern Rhodesia's agriculture, although to what extent was not known.

157. At the opening of the annual congress of the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union on 21 June 1966, the President, Mr. Tim Mitchell, said that, with the possible exception of the 1930s and the war years, agriculture in the country had never been in a worse position. This position, he said, had not been caused by drought and the actions of the United Kingdom Government. It had arisen because of an accumulation of many factors, including a number of past policies which in some instances had unwittingly increased the cost of production. Mr. Mitchell said the present situation in agriculture was that there was no over-all profit in the industry. The return on investment capital, he added, was undoubtedly less than 5 per cent. "Rhodesian" farmers were not only tired of receiving prices which were satisfactory to everyone but themselves, they were also in no mood to allow such a position to continue.

158. On 21 July 1966, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. Wrathall, stated in a broadcast that the agricultural industry was facing problems which had arisen from causes other than sanctions. Sanctions had brought them to a head somewhat earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In order to assist in stabilizing the situation and to help the industry to regain its confidence in the future, he stated that he had included an amount of £1,250,000 in the estimates for 1966-1967 to enable assistance to be given to those sound farmers who were in financial difficulties for reasons beyond their control, and particularly to enable them to come to a settlement with their creditors. Furthermore, credit would be made available to enable the industry to continue to operate during the new season.

159. On 4 September 1966, the Que Que Farmers' Association sent a resolution to the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union saying that, despite assertions in parliament, agriculture in Rhodesia was "bankrupt". The resolution demanded that the "Government" take immediate steps to forestall the complete collapse of the industry before it was too late. A similar resolution had been sent from the Lomagundi West farmers and another resolution had been sent to the Midlands branch of the Union calling for a £1 rise per bag for the price of wheat.

160. The "Minister of Agriculture", Mr. George Rudland, announced on 23 November 1966 two measures designed to assist farmers. The first of these was a subsidy on nitrogenous fertilizers purchased between 1 April 1966 and 28 February 1967. This subsidy, together with a rebate of £8.10s. per ton recently announced by the fertilizer companies, would reduce the total expense by farmers on fertilizers by about £450,000. The second measure was a rebate of 3d. per gallon in respect of diesel fuel purchased in bulk by farmers during the same period. The Minister said that this particular form of assistance had been chosen because it would give help over a wider field than any others. He regretted that the concessions could only apply to the 1966-1967 season and were therefore holding measures, but added that longer-term planning was not being neglected.

161. It was reported that the above subsidies brought the total allocation of government funds to farmers in 1966 (excluding special supplements for tobacco) to about £3 million: £460,000 for drought relief; £500,000 for irrigation development; £1,250,000 for the Graylin Committee to provide interest-free loans to farmers in financial difficulty; a supplementary payment for maize expected to amount to £500,000; and subsidies of £330,000 for fertilizers and £100,000 for fuel.

#### *Tobacco crop for 1966*

162. Total exports of unmanufactured Southern Rhodesian tobacco in 1965 amounted to £47 million or roughly 30 per cent of the total value of domestic exports (£142,455,433). The major portion of this consisted of 246 million pounds of Virginia flue-cured tobacco auctioned for £33.8 million in Salisbury. The total crop for 1965 sold on the auction floors of Salisbury for about £35 million.

163. The Southern Rhodesian tobacco crop for 1966 was estimated at around 250 million pounds. The State Tobacco Corporation handled the sale of the tobacco crop.



164. On 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made an order which banned the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia and the sale of tobacco in Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported. Under the order, it became an offence under United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law for traders or speculators to buy Southern Rhodesian tobacco and stockpile it until the return of lawful government.

165. In an official statement issued on that day, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced that, under the order, purchasers of tobacco in contravention of the order would have no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back once lawful government was restored. At that time, stocks of tobacco that had been illegally transacted would have to be re-auctioned before they could be exported. Only lawfully sold tobacco would be exported, under an export licence system; equally, only lawfully sold tobacco would be allowed into the United Kingdom.

166. By the end of March 1966, all the major consumers of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, namely, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Benelux countries, the Scandinavian countries and Australia, had announced that they would not buy any more tobacco from Southern Rhodesia while the Smith régime remained in power. In terms of the 1964 trade figures, over 90 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's tobacco had already been placed under an embargo by exporting countries before the auction sales of the crop for 1966.

167. On 19 January 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced new regulations for Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auction sale. A statement by the Tobacco Marketing Board said that all tobacco would be pre-classified and a reserve price fixed for each grade. Classification would be carried out by two independent classifiers, checked by a senior classifier. During classification, the classifiers would be completely isolated. There would be no appeal by buyers or growers against the classification. There would be elaborate precautions to ensure that classifiers had no idea whose tobacco they were grading. Once graded, the tobacco would be vested in a Tobacco Corporation. The leaf would then be offered on one or two tobacco auction floors at the reserve price or a price above it, and bales not bought would be taken by the Corporation at the reserve price. The Corporation would hold this in the pool and be responsible for its disposal. It would then be responsible for distributing the proceeds equitably among growers. Even if a grower's leaf was sold above the reserve price, he would only be paid the reserve price in the first instance. The surplus would be credited to a pool and shared among growers. There would be a separate pool for flue-cured and burley tobacco.

168. On 24 March 1966, the "Ministry of Agriculture" announced a list of reserve prices for different grades of tobacco. The crop would be classified into 273 grades for each of which a price ranging from 1d. to 48d. per pound was fixed. The announcements emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase price to tobacco merchants. On the whole, the reserve prices announced averaged around 26d. (about 31 cents (US)) per pound. The average price of the Southern Rhodesia leaf in 1965 was 33d. (about 39 cents) per pound.

169. When the tobacco sales opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1966, the régime abandoned the traditional public auction system for private treaty sales by which the buyer would decide what grade of tobacco he wanted and then make an offer to the Tobacco Corporation. This was reportedly done to protect the identity of the buyers. The sales were held in secret.

170. On 15 July 1966, Mr. Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, stated that at the prices fixed by the Tobacco Corporation, the farmers could have expected to receive an average of 24d. per pound. But on the best evidence available, the prices paid by the "Government" had been averaging no more than 20d. per pound and there had been numerous complaints from farmers that the Tobacco Corporation had been deliberately down-grading the tobacco sent for sale to depress farming receipts. Since the régime had abandoned public auctions for private treaty sales, the farmer had no redress. If he did not sell to the Tobacco Corporation, he could not sell to anyone else, and if he did not sell he could not live.

171. The member of the Rhodesian régime responsible for agriculture, Mr. George Rudland, announced in the Legislative Assembly on 23 August that the Tobacco Corporation was to increase by 5 per cent the fixed prices paid to farmers for tobacco of all grades, except the lowest. The increase applied to tobacco already bought by the Corporation as well as to future purchases. Mr. Rudland said that the increase would cost about £1 million. On 8 November, he announced that the Tobacco Corporation would make further supplementary payments to tobacco growers. The scale of payments was reported to be 6.8 per cent on the grade price for Virginia flue-cured tobacco, 10 per cent for burley tobacco and 15.6 per cent for oriental tobaccos. It was estimated that the above supplementary payments would amount to £1.5 million, bringing the total value of bonuses for 1966 to £2.5 million. With these payments, it was calculated that the Tobacco Corporation's total payments to the industry for the 1966 crop would amount to £24 million. In 1965, the crop sold for £35 million on the Salisbury auction floors.

172. On 9 November 1966, the President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association, Mr. Carol Heurtley, stated that the "Government's" 6.8 per cent payment to flue-cured tobacco growers meant that the national average cost of production (about 24d. per pound) had now been covered. While not every grower had received his cost, he was pleased that the Government had completed its promised obligations.

173. The deliveries of Virginia flue-cured tobacco from growers to the Tobacco Corporation ceased on 17 October 1966. There had been various reports about the proportion of the over-all crop sold. However, the reports agree in estimating that the majority of the crop bought by the Corporation remained unsold.

#### *Tobacco crop for 1966-1967*

174. On 14 July 1966, Mr. Rudland announced that the target for 1966-1967 flue-cured tobacco production would be 200 million pounds. He gave an assurance to growers that if sanctions made a return to free unfettered auction impracticable, the "Government" would guarantee the market for the crop at grade prices calculated to return to the growers an average of 28d. per pound. Mr. Rudland said this target was indicative of the "Government's" determination that

the country would continue to produce its tobacco, which had gained its place in the world markets on quality and price considerations alone. Buyers could therefore be assured that Rhodesian tobacco would continue to be available. A control scheme would be introduced, he said, and the details of this would be announced by the President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association, Mr. Heurtley.

175. Mr. Rudland stated that the control scheme had been devised by the Rhodesian Tobacco Association in consultation with his Ministry, and had the full support of the "Government" and would remain in force for the coming season. The administration of the control scheme would be undertaken by the Tobacco Marketing Board and not by the Ministry. It would be possible, said Mr. Rudland, for all farmers to plan their individual production programmes for the coming season. He advised farmers to plan for maximum individual profit according to their own capabilities and that of their land.

176. Mr. Heurtley welcomed the announcement of the 200-million-pound target figure, which he said should be sufficient to guarantee continuity of supply to the country's established markets. The average price of 28d. per pound, he said, had been calculated to provide the grower with the possibility of regaining something above production costs.

177. On 15 July 1966, Mr. Heurtley stated that he felt confident that, following the Government announcement, commerce would react favourably towards Southern Rhodesia's 2,600 farmers by granting them credit facilities for planting the next crop.

178. Commenting on the announced target for the 1966-1967 crop, Mr. Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, said in London on 15 July that if the new target were to be realized, the farmers would receive between £23 million and £24 million, compared with £32 million to £35 million which they normally received. This represented a crop of some £10 million in the farmers' receipts from tobacco. But the new figures were merely target figures. Credit was the life-blood of the tobacco farmers and they would need credit immediately for the seeds, fertilizers and equipment for the next twelve months.

179. Mr. Bottomley also stated that the new policy directive, to the extent that it was accepted by the tobacco farmers, would only put off the inevitable day of reckoning. Though a policy of internal subsidies would further delay the full impact of sanctions on the farmers, this in turn must raise many problems of economic management. Not the least of these would be the difficulties caused by the storage of the greater part of the 1966 crop and the effect on future demand should a large part of the 1966 crop be left unsold in the hands of the Tobacco Corporation.

180. On 24 July 1966, the Rhodesian Ministry of Agriculture announced that the target for the 1966-1967 burley tobacco crop had been set at 6 million pounds. Provision was made to guarantee to growers an average of 23d. per pound of tobacco. On 31 August 1966, the Ministry further announced that it would, if necessary, provide financial support for a crop of 1.5 million pounds of Samsun Oriental tobacco for the 1966-1967 crop at grade prices designed to give an average return of 26d. per pound.

181. On 20 October 1966, Mr. Rudland warned tobacco growers not to produce a crop in excess of their allocated quotas. He said any such action next season

would be irresponsible and would upset present marketing arrangements. Plans had been made, he said, to ensure that no grower who ignored the requirements of the tobacco control scheme would benefit by so doing.

### *Sugar crop for 1966*

182. Southern Rhodesia's sugar industry has expanded almost tenfold during the last six years. The 1965 crop before the illegal declaration of independence was estimated at 250,000 tons and the total export of raw sugar in 1965 earned £3,482,485.

183. On 17 March 1966 the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on all exports of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. According to the order, which is effective under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law, it is now "illegal for speculators or others to buy Rhodesian sugar and hold it in Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal government is restored". Those who bought Rhodesian sugar in contravention of the order would acquire no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. Furthermore, all transactions that took place in Southern Rhodesia aimed at the export of sugar were invalid whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

184. By February 1966, the main buyers of Southern Rhodesian sugar, namely the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, had already placed an embargo on sugar imports from Southern Rhodesia. United Kingdom authorities hoped that Zambia and Malawi, which have been dependent on Southern Rhodesia for their sugar supplies, would co-operate as well.

185. It was announced on 19 July 1966 that Japanese orders for about 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar had been cancelled. The orders were placed before the illegal declaration of independence and their cancellation was reported to represent a foreign exchange loss of £750,000.

186. Hippo Valley Estates, one of Southern Rhodesia's main sugar producers, reported on 19 July a loss of £372,345 for the year ended 31 March 1966. The chairman, Sir Raymond Stockil, was reported to have said that the loss was due primarily to low world prices and difficulties in commissioning a new sugar mill; he added, however, that the Zambian market had already been entirely lost and the market in Malawi, where the planting of cane had started, would be lost also.

187. It has been reported that cotton and citrus fruits have become alternative crops in place of sugar.

### *Cotton*

188. It was reported from Salisbury on 30 September 1966 that official sources had estimated that a record crop of 120 million pounds of cotton would be grown in the 1967 season. This followed a recent government recommendation to double the size of the cotton crop, which was estimated at 60 million pounds for the 1966 season. (In 1965 the crop was 40,102,000 pounds.) The report stated that the indications were that this increased amount of cotton could be readily marketed both in Southern Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries. The actual price would be announced before the ginning season started about May 1967. The "Government" was reported to be analysing proposals put to it by the cotton marketing committee for future

marketing policy. The growers' committee had reached agreement in principle on government proposals.

### *Maize*

189. On 23 August 1966, Mr. Rudland announced bonus payments to maize growers by which they would receive a supplementary payment of 2s. per bag (200 pounds) of maize on top of the basic price of 29s.6d. per bag already announced from the government Grain Marketing Board. It was announced that the supplementary payment would cost £500,000, which meant that the present maize crop sold to the Board had totalled 5 million bags. In 1964-1965, the Grain Marketing Board had bought 2,569,183 bags of maize from Europeans and 254,452 from Africans.

### *Mining*

#### *General*

190. Mineral exports of Southern Rhodesia earned £32,353,669 in 1965, the highest ever attained. Asbestos remained Southern Rhodesia's most valuable mineral followed by gold and copper, these three accounting for over two thirds of the total value of all minerals mined. Coal and chrome ore were the next most important minerals. These two minerals, together with asbestos, gold and copper, accounted for 89 per cent of the total value of mineral production. Other minerals which accounted for the remaining 11 per cent of the mineral exports included iron (3 per cent), tin metal (2 per cent), limestone and lithium (1 per cent) and others (4 per cent).

191. By the end of July 1966, the United Kingdom Government, under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, had imposed embargoes on the export of chrome, pig-iron, iron ore, copper and asbestos, which together constitute the main mineral exports of the country.

192. No figures are available from within Southern Rhodesia on the operation of the mining industry since the illegal declaration of independence. However, activities within certain sectors of the mining industry were reported in 1966 by the "Government" and the mining companies themselves. While these do not provide an over-all picture, they are worth noting as indications of the state of the industry.

#### *Copper*

193. Despite sanctions, the operation of the copper mining industry was considerably extended in 1966. Southern Rhodesia's normal copper production is about 24,000 tons a year.

194. On 3 March 1966, the "Deputy Minister of Mines", Mr. I. B. Dillon, stated in an interview that three new copper mines would probably be opening in the northern area of Southern Rhodesia within the next twelve months, and that the ministry was aiming at 30,000 tons within the next two years. If that figure were reached then consideration would be given to the installation of a copper refinery. Consideration had already been given to a possible site for the refinery and it was hoped that its establishment would lead to another industry producing copper piping, sheeting and other products. Mr. Dillon also stated that sanctions would not affect Southern Rhodesian sales of copper. The current emphasis on copper mining in Southern Rhodesia was dictated simply by demand and value.

195. At the end of August 1966, the "Ministry of Information" announced that a new high-grade

copper mine, the first of its kind in Southern Rhodesia, had begun full operation in the Sabi Valley, 150 miles south-east of Salisbury. The first sample of the mine's cathode copper had already been accepted abroad at 99.9 per cent of purity and the first long ton fetched £600. Known as the Elephant Mine, it had been developed by private enterprise with government assistance. The ministry said it believed that the plant installations and processes used could now be duplicated on several other known copper-bearing properties in Southern Rhodesia. The statement added that at a conservative estimate of future copper prices, the new mine development could mean an increase of at least £250,000 in annual export figures.

196. On 20 September 1966, it was reported that Lonrho, Ltd., was to undertake a new drilling programme aimed at establishing the extent and value of the copper deposits in the Inyati block, a few miles north-east of Headland. The area to be explored covers about sixty square miles. Lonrho would operate through a subsidiary company.

#### *Gold*

197. Gold has been one of Southern Rhodesia's main exports. Net gold sales in 1965 amounted to £6,794,000.

198. According to the Barclays Bank, D. C. O. *Overseas Review* for April 1966, the Anglo American Corporation had sunk three new shafts at its mines on the Felixburg gold belt, near Umvuma. Another shaft at the Tchargwa mine, which was abandoned some years ago because of water difficulties, was being deepened and developed.

199. In June 1966, the Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, Mr. Oppenheimer, stated that an exploratory shaft was being sunk at the Champion mine in the region of Odzi, where bore holes indicated the possibility of mineable tonnages of both gold and silver ore.

200. It was reported in August 1966 that the country had launched its biggest gold prospecting programme to date, with most of the large mining companies throwing all their resources into an all-out bid to find new gold-fields and develop existing ones. Mr. D. A. Pretorius, Director of the Economic Geology Research Unit of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines, who had returned to Johannesburg after discussions with the régime and mining leaders, was reported to have said that Southern Rhodesia was determined to go it alone and intended to offset losses through boycotts by increasing gold production. The régime was well aware that gold was its most secure foreign currency earner and that little effort was required to sell it at an international level. Gold's countering effect against inflation, its lack of price fluctuation and the possible devaluation of sterling provided an ideal climate for the easy selling of gold.

#### *Nickel*

201. It was reported in May 1966 that a further £2.2 million a year was expected to be added to the country's foreign exchange income when the Trojan nickel mine, at Bindura, had been developed to full production. It was further reported that the Anglo American Corporation had bought an 85 per cent interest in the mine and was to invest £4 million (including the purchase price) to expand production to 600,000 tons of ore a year. Behind the plan to expand the

Trojan mine was the growing demand for nickel. On 20 September 1966, it was further announced that Anglo American Corporation would examine the economic potential of base mineral claims owned by the Shamva Nickel Mines under an option agreement between the Corporation and that company. The Shamva mine is located about forty miles from the Trojan mine.

#### *Iron ore*

202. Following the embargo on the export of iron ore and pig-iron, it was reported that the output of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) had decreased. RISCO was declared a "designated industry" by the Southern Rhodesian régime to prevent it from being closed, and a manpower control order was issued to prevent dismissal of employees. In February 1966, it was reported that RISCO had shut down two of its three blast furnaces and one of its two open-hearth steel furnaces and had abandoned a £7 million expansion and modernization scheme. This has made about 400 workers, including 100 Europeans, redundant. However, an official industrial review published in Salisbury in July 1966 stated that RISCO had three blast furnaces with a combined annual capacity of more than 400,000 tons and two open-hearth furnaces which could produce 165,000 tons of ingots a year.

203. In October 1966, it was reported that the régime had lifted the manpower provisions on RISCO and on Richard Costain (Africa), who had a contract at RISCO. No explanation was offered officially, but it was understood that RISCO had managed to replace lost pig-iron markets, though at lower prices than in the past.

#### *Coal*

204. The Wankie Colliery Company's preliminary profits statement for the year ending 31 August 1966 showed that over-all sales were maintained during the year at 3,369,870 tons, compared with 3,348,455 tons in 1964-1965. The statement added, however, that sales for June and July had been adversely affected by the Rhodesia Railways dispute between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia which had resulted in a truck shortage for the transport of coal to the Copperbelt. In September 1966, sales amounted to 227,009 tons, comfortably above the July low of 127,009 tons, but still almost 100,000 tons less than those for September 1965. The monthly average in 1964-1965 was 280,822 tons.

205. On 15 November, Sir Keith Acutt, Chairman of the Wankie Colliery Company, stated that as a result of reduced sales to Zambia one of the two coal mines the company operated might have to be put on a care-and-maintenance basis by the middle of 1967.

206. Wankie coal sales for November 1966 were later reported to have dropped by about a third in comparison with sales for November 1965. The report stated that the Anglo American Corporation had attributed the drop in sales mainly to rail transport difficulties with Zambia.

#### *Scheelite*

207. The "Ministry of Mines" announced at the beginning of October 1966 that two new scheelite mines were to come into production. Scheelite, a strategic mineral, is the basis for tungsten, and was reported to be in world demand.

208. One of the mines, known as the Tact mine, owned and operated by the Rhodesian Selected Development Company, Ltd., was said to be already producing a high grade of scheelite, and was hoping to produce six tons of refined mineral from every 1,000 tons of ore each month when a second mill comes into operation. The second mine, the Killarney, located in Filabusi, was expected to go into production within three or four months.

#### *Graphite*

209. The Industrial Development Corporation announced in May 1966 that the new graphite mining project near Karoi, 120 miles north of Salisbury, would go into production soon.

210. The statement said that the construction of the plant at the £50,000 project was almost complete and would be officially opened in the near future. The Industrial Development Corporation was backing the project in conjunction with Rhodesian Graphite and a Federal Republic of Germany company based in Munich. It was planned to produce about 500 tons of graphite a month, worth £150,000 a year.

#### *Other reported developments*

211. It appears from statistics compiled by the port of Beira authorities that exports of Rhodesian chrome through Beira in the first five months of 1966 totalled some 94,000 tons, compared with 100,000 tons in the corresponding period of 1965. Sundry ores exported totalled 183,000 tons, compared with 202,000 tons in the comparable period of 1965, and asbestos exports through the port of Beira totalled 7,000 tons, 2,000 less than in 1965. It was reported, however, that in the past asbestos had mainly been exported through Lourenço Marques.

#### *Economic relations with Zambia*

212. In 1965 the total value of exports, including re-exports from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia, amounted to £46 million, of which domestic merchandise accounted for £36.1 million; imports from Zambia amounted to £4.3 million.

213. Since the illegal declaration of independence, Zambia has imposed a licence system whereby only certain commodities can be imported from Southern Rhodesia. The permitted imports from Southern Rhodesia are mainly essential commodities for which alternative sources of supply have not been found. Trade figures between the two countries for 1966 are not available, although, according to press reports, Zambia has cut its imports from Southern Rhodesia by an estimated 30 per cent.

214. It will be recalled that following the Southern Rhodesian oil embargo against Zambia on 18 December 1965, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States together started a regular airlift of oil and petroleum products to Zambia to beat the embargo. The Canadian and United States airlifts to Zambia ceased at the end of April 1966. The airlift by British civil aircraft to Zambia also ended on 29 May 1966. However, the airlift by Royal Air Force aircraft to Zambia partly to meet the fuel requirements of the air defence force there and partly to supply oil products to the civil economy ended on 31 October 1966. According to United Kingdom sources, the total cost of these British airlifts to the United Kingdom Government was nearly £6 million. The cost of the oil itself except for

that used by the Royal Air Force itself had been met by the Zambian Government.

215. In 1966 the Governments of Zambia and the United Kingdom held a series of talks on intensification of sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and the maintenance of the Zambian economy in all circumstances arising from the Southern Rhodesian rebellion. The discussions covered a great deal of ground concerning practical and technical problems associated with the changing pattern of Zambian trade.

216. On 1 November 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, stated in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government had offered the Zambian Government further aid up to a total of £13.8 million for expenditure up to 30 June 1967. The United Kingdom Government later stated that this was assistance for the intensification of sanctions and would cover any contingencies that arose during the coming months. Most of the assistance offered was intended to assist Zambia in developing alternative routes whereby one of the indirect outcomes would be a steadier supply of copper in the future. Since the illegal declaration of independence, £3.8 million had been provided by the United Kingdom towards the cost of alternative supply routes besides the £13.8 million on offer for the development of new import and export routes and new sources of supply.

217. On 1 February 1967, an agreement was signed in Lusaka between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Zambia for the provision by the United Kingdom of £13.8 million in contingency aid to Zambia for the above-stated projects. The agreement provided for the United Kingdom Government to join the Government of Zambia in the implementation of the above-listed projects.

218. On 23 February 1967, the Government of Zambia informed the Secretary-General (S/7783)<sup>11</sup> that since the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority white régime in Southern Rhodesia, Zambia had spent well over \$US90 million implementing its policy of severing its trade and economic ties with Southern Rhodesia.

219. In his address before the General Assembly on 15 November 1966, the President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, stated that the common services owned jointly by Zambia and Rhodesia, like the railways, the Kariba hydroelectric scheme and the Central African Airways,<sup>12</sup> which provide Zambia with its vital power supplies and its communications and external trade links and whose headquarters were all in Rhodesia and for all practical purposes were controlled from Salisbury, could not be properly operated and administered in the absence of a legal government in Rhodesia.<sup>13</sup>

220. In its letter dated 23 February 1967, the Government of Zambia informed the Secretary-General that:

(a) Negotiations to separate the jointly owned Rhodesia Railways were going on;

(b) Similar negotiations to separate the jointly owned Central African Airways were also going on;

<sup>11</sup> Incorporated in substance in document S/7781/Add.2, annex (*Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967*).

<sup>12</sup> Malawi is a third partner in Central African Airways.

<sup>13</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1464th meeting, para. 50.

(c) Payments received by the Kariba Power Corporation from Zambia were being blocked and not allowed to go over to Southern Rhodesia to supplement their foreign exchange.

### *Rhodesia Railways*

221. The chairman of the board of Rhodesia Railways (jointly owned by Rhodesia and Zambia) said on 18 May 1966, after a two-day meeting of the board, that although the three Zambian members of the board had cast dissenting votes, a decision had been made on future operations of the railways. The member of the Southern Rhodesian régime responsible for transport, Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, said on 20 May that Rhodesia Railways needed to move about £1 million a month from Zambia to Southern Rhodesia in order to continue their operations. No such transfers had been authorized by the Zambian authorities for the month of April and he understood that they had refused to authorize any further transfer. This meant that there would be no contribution from Zambia towards the costs of operating that part of the railway system outside Zambia.

222. It was later announced that from 24 May the Southern Rhodesian authorities would require payment to be made in advance in convertible currency for Zambian traffic by rail through Southern Rhodesia unless the Zambian Government agreed to the transfer of railways funds from Zambia to Rhodesia.

223. The President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, announced on 21 May his Government's rejection of the arrangement whereby payment should be made in advance for Zambian rail traffic through Southern Rhodesia. On the same day, a spokesman for the Zambian Ministry of Transport in Lusaka was reported to have said that it might become necessary for the railways in Zambia to be operated as an independent system.

224. On 10 June 1966, the Government of Zambia introduced regulations which empowered an Administrator of Railways, appointed by the President, to control the movement of locomotives, rolling stock and railway equipment from Zambia to Southern Rhodesia.

225. On 11 June 1966, the illegal régime issued an emergency order signed by its "Minister of Transport", Brigadier Dunlop, which provided for impounding Zambian goods in transit through Southern Rhodesia for which freight payments had not been guaranteed. Following the issuing of the order, it was reported on 20 June 1966 that Southern Rhodesia was holding £10 million worth of Zambian copper destined for Mozambique ports. A Rhodesia Railways spokesman was reported to have confirmed that the copper had still not been moved through Southern Rhodesia because confirmation had not been received from the Portuguese authorities that payment had been made for railings the copper through Mozambique to Lourenço Marques or Beira.

226. On 22 June 1966, the Government of Zambia decided to authorize the copper companies to send a limited quantity of copper through Southern Rhodesia, on condition that the buyers would be responsible for paying the freight charges in hard currency as the Southern Rhodesian authorities had demanded. The transport of copper by that route was accordingly recommenced in August 1966.

227. It was reported that as a result of the dislocation in rail services, a stockpile of about 60,000 tons of



Zambian copper had accumulated inside Zambia. Zambia's monthly production of copper is about 58,000 tons.

228. Coal supplies to Zambia from the Wankie Collieries in Southern Rhodesia continued to be transported by rail, but it was reported that since August trucks were being sent north by the Rhodesia Railways authorities only as trucks arrived from Zambia, on a truck-for-truck basis. This affected the coal supplies of the mines.

229. It was reported that Rhodesia Railways' report for the financial year ending June 1966 showed a loss of £383,000, compared with a profit of nearly £2 million in the previous year, despite an increase in traffic and total revenue.

#### *Kariba Dam*

230. The Central African Power Corporation, in its annual report published on 13 December, stated that, despite the Rhodesian crisis, the Kariba hydroelectric dam made a record profit of £1,010,810 in the year ending 30 June. Zambian purchases during the year increased by 5.8 per cent and accounted for 51.4 per cent of the sales. Purchases by Southern Rhodesia increased by 4.4 per cent and accounted for 48.6 per cent of the sales.

#### *Central African Airways*

231. The Central African Airways announced a record profit of over £600,000 for the year ending 30 June 1966. All its subsidiary airlines—Air Malawi, Air Rhodesia and Zambia Airways—realized operating profits for the year.

#### *Economic relations with Malawi*

232. In 1965 total exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to Malawi amounted to £9.5 million, of which domestic merchandise amounted to £7.7 million; imports amounted to £1.4 million.

233. The Government of Malawi, between November 1965 and December 1966, imposed some trade restrictions in Southern Rhodesia. It continued, however, to trade with Southern Rhodesia in essential commodities while it appealed to importers to find alternate sources of supply outside Southern Rhodesia. Trade figures for 1966 between the two countries are not yet available.

#### *Economic relations with Bechuanaland*

234. In 1965 total exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to Bechuanaland amounted to £2.3 million, of which domestic merchandise amounted to £1.6 million; imports amounted to £72,000. Bechuanaland became independent as Botswana on 27 September 1966. By the end of 1966, no reports regarding economic measures against the illegal régime were available.

#### *Economic relations with South Africa*

235. In 1965 the total value of exports, including re-exports, from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa amounted to £14.4 million, of which domestic merchandise accounted for £12.8 million. Total imports from South Africa amounted to £27.5 million.

236. Pursuant to its declared policy of not participating in any form of sanctions and boycotts, the Republic of South Africa has, since the illegal declaration of independence, continued to maintain "normal trade

relations" with the Smith régime. In clarification of the term "normal trade relations", the Government of the Republic explained that this did not mean continuing to sell the same commodities or quantities as before. It meant that everybody in competition tried to sell what and as much as he could. It also meant trade without inhibitions and without breaks.

237. In a statement to the South African Parliament on 21 September 1966, the new Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Johannes Vorster, stated that he intended to follow the same policy towards Southern Rhodesia as had been followed by his predecessor, Dr. Verwoerd (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 279). Mr. Vorster further said that neither pressure nor force would compel South Africa to take part in boycotts or sanctions. His Government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.

238. Although South Africa has not published any trade statistics on Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence, it has been openly acknowledged by official sources in Salisbury that the Republic is the main economic prop of the Smith régime. In a speech on 3 May 1966, the Southern Rhodesian "Minister of Local Government" was reported to have stated that it might well be no exaggeration to state that if it had not been for the steadfast and responsible attitude adopted by both the Republic and their Portuguese neighbours, Southern Rhodesians would have lost not only their possessions but also their liberty and perhaps their lives.

239. On 16 August 1966, the South African Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. N. Diederichs, was asked in the Assembly for a breakdown of import-export values between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique for each month since June 1965. In reply to the question, Dr. Diederichs stated that he did not regard it as being in the national interest to give the statistics separately. In a further question as to whether the monthly abstract of trade statistics included figures of trade between the Republic and each African country, the Minister said that it did not because he did not regard it in the national interest to have these figures published separately.

240. According to trade figures released by the South African Department of Customs and Excise in September 1966, trade figures for the first eight months of 1966 showed that while South Africa's exports as a whole had risen about 12 per cent over the same period in 1965, exports to the rest of Africa increased by 30 per cent to a little over £60 million. Imports from the rest of Africa for the first eight months of 1966 reached about £35 million. The Department of Customs and Excise ceased some time ago to provide detailed breakdowns, by countries of destination, of exports to African countries.

241. Although no details were given, it was reported that the bulk of the increase in exports of about £15 million to the rest of Africa was in the main due to a sharp rise in the flow of goods to Southern Rhodesia. Imports from the rest of Africa at about £35 million were reported to be around the same level as in 1965 although imports as a whole had fallen by 15 per cent. The difference in the general trend was also attributed mainly to an increase of imports from Southern Rhodesia.

242. Quite apart from South Africa's own trade with Southern Rhodesia, it has been persistently reported

that South Africa had been providing cover for clandestine trade between third countries and parties with Southern Rhodesia. According to these reports, goods ostensibly directed to South Africa from third countries eventually find their way into Southern Rhodesia under prearranged contracts. Conversely, South African ports were reported to have increased their tonnage of Southern Rhodesian exports which pass through the ports under cover of South African goods. It should here be noted that since the illegal declaration of independence, South Africa has ceased to differentiate between its exports and re-exports.

243. Since the illegal declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesian industrialists have embarked on a sales promotion campaign in South Africa with a view to increasing sales in the Republic. There have also been exchanges of visits between manufacturers and industrialists of the two countries to discuss marketing problems and how best to facilitate the flow of trade between the two countries.

244. One of the most important such visits to be publicly announced was that of a six-man delegation from the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in June 1966, at the invitation of the Rhodesian Promotion Council. The Handelsinstituut is the most important organization in South Africa of Afrikaans-speaking leaders of industry, mining, commerce and finance. While in Southern Rhodesia, the party met with the régime's "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. Mussett, and other officials. They also met leading personalities in the business and financial sectors of the country's economy and visited Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, the Midlands and the Lowveld. On 22 June 1966, the Director of the Handelsinstituut, Dr. Van den Berg, stated in Johannesburg that the delegation had returned with a proposal to the Government of South Africa that factories in Southern Rhodesia should be granted quotas to export goods to the Republic duty free, or under rebate. In this way, Southern Rhodesia would help to ensure that South African productive capacity would not be fully expanded at a time when such expansion was not in the Republic's interest. At the same time, South Africa would be helping Southern Rhodesia to adjust to the loss of the Zambian export market.

245. The delegation was also reported to have recommended to the Government that South Africa should enter into a common market arrangement with Southern Rhodesia so that the origin of Southern Rhodesia products exported through South Africa could not be known; that South African capital should be used to help Southern Rhodesia industries lessen the force of sanctions; and that South Africa should provide £3 million for a sixty-mile rail link across the Limpopo joining the South African and Rhodesian Railways.

246. Among other important visitors to Southern Rhodesia was Mr. Hobson, the General Manager of the Durban Chamber of Commerce (South Africa) who was in Southern Rhodesia in the second week of November 1966. He was reported to have said in Salisbury that South African industrialists were more favourably disposed towards imports, especially those from Southern Rhodesia, than before. He added that Southern Rhodesian exporters should not be slow to take advantage of opportunities in the South African market. Also, a group of prominent South African businessmen led by the Chairman of Sasol and the South African Gas Distribution Corporation, Dr. Ettis Rousseau, visited Southern Rhodesia in the third week of November 1966, at the invitation of the Rhodesian Promotion

Council. The visitors were reported to have seen various aspects of economic development in Southern Rhodesia and to have met a number of leading businessmen.

247. On 6 June 1966 it was reported from Johannesburg that a new trading link between Rhodesia and South Africa had been forged with the formation in Johannesburg of Rhodesian Industrial Confirming (Private), Limited. The company is a subsidiary of Industrial Confirming (Private), which is backed by the Industrial Development Corporation of Southern Rhodesia, and commenced operations in April. In addition to ordinary confirming or export guarantee business—in both directions—Industrial Confirming and its subsidiary assist potential importers and exporters to promote trade between the two countries. The Johannesburg manager, Colonel R. Jones, was reported to have said that his company was also interested in guaranteeing trade between Rhodesia and other markets.

248. In order to facilitate trade between the two countries, Rhodesia Railways introduced a new fast freight service to Johannesburg and the South African ports. On 26 August 1966, a spokesman for Rhodesia Railways announced that a new fast goods service to be known as Rail Trader would come into operation on 27 August 1966. The new service would link Salisbury and Bulawayo with Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Cape Town. Trains from Salisbury would take four days to Johannesburg and six days to the ports. Trains from Bulawayo would take a day less to the ports. Negotiations were also under way to introduce a similar service from South Africa to Southern Rhodesian centres.

249. On 26 September Rhodesia Railways took over the control and operation of the rail line through Bechuanaland, which is the most direct rail link between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Control of the 400-mile line was formerly split between South African Railways and Rhodesia Railways, with the South Africa railways operating the line from Mafeking up to the half-way point at Mahalapye, and the Rhodesia Railways operating it over the rest of the distance to Plumtree, on the Southern Rhodesian border. According to a statement issued by the Bulawayo headquarters of the Rhodesia Railways, the entire Bechuanaland section of the railway line in question had been owned by the Rhodesia Railways since it was built in the 1890s although one half of it had been managed by the South African Railways.

250. In May 1966, the Smith régime appointed a three-man commission of inquiry to investigate an alternative rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa through Beitbridge. The commission, which held its first sitting on 15 June 1966, is composed of three South African experts, Mr. W. G. Muller, an advocate of Johannesburg, and two economists, Mr. H. G. Ashworth of Cape Town and Dr. M. D. Marais of Pretoria. The two possible connexions being considered by the commission are either from West Nicholson or from Rutenga to join the South African Railway line from Beitbridge. Any one of the two proposed connexions would give Southern Rhodesia a direct rail link with South Africa. According to South African sources, whichever route the alternative rail link would take, it would help to strengthen trade bonds between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

251. On 20 September 1966, a new road was opened between the Cape Province and Southern Rhodesia through Bechuanaland. The Bechuanaland Government

worked on the section between the Cape Province border and the Southern Rhodesian border while the South African Government worked on the connexion inside the Republic. The new road is reported to facilitate travel between Cape Town and Southern Rhodesia.

### *Economic relations with Portugal*

252. Portugal has also continued to maintain trade relations with Southern Rhodesia, having declared on many occasions that it would not take part in sanctions that would affect the flow of trade in southern Africa. Although trade between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal and the Territories under Portuguese administration is almost negligible, Portugal occupies a predominant position in controlling the external trade routes of Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, through the seaports of Beira and Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. It also has rail links to all the three landlocked countries and South Africa. Southern Rhodesia's principal export and import outlet is the seaport of Beira in Mozambique, which also handles the main bulk of the external trade of Zambia and Malawi.

253. Portugal's policy of maintaining trade relations with Southern Rhodesia has therefore offered the illegal régime a most valuable outlet for exports and imports. Figures published by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique show that Beira has maintained its position as the main export-import outlet of Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence. According to press reports Portugal has become an outlet for re-exporting embargoed Southern Rhodesian commodities, primarily tobacco and sugar.

254. According to statistics compiled by the port of Beira authorities in November, total tonnage handled at the port of Beira dropped 24 per cent in the first ten months of 1966. It was estimated that about half the drop in tonnage represented the cut-back in the supply of crude oil to Southern Rhodesia, but no figures on individual traffic were available. It was reported that the changes which have taken place in southern African trade and communications since the illegal declaration of independence rule out precise interpretation of the Beira figures.

255. In a letter dated 3 February 1967,<sup>14</sup> addressed to the Secretary-General, the Government of Portugal stated that as a result of the carrying out of a number of measures envisaged in resolutions 221 (1966) and 232 (1966) of the Security Council, voted upon on 9 April and 16 December 1966, the economy of Mozambique was suffering severe financial and economic losses which the Portuguese Government estimated at about £10 million sterling, up to the end of 1966. Annexed to the letter were particulars of this amount by various items.

256. Within the year 1966, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration in southern Africa were brought closer together economically through visiting trade missions. In early April 1966, a delegation of the National Export Council of Southern Rhodesia visited Lourenço Marques. The Chairman of the Council was reported to have said that the contacts made by the delegation in Mozambique indicated possibilities for increased exports from Southern Rhodesia. In May 1966, a six-man delegation representing the Associated Chambers of Commerce of

Mozambique visited Southern Rhodesia at the invitation of the National Export Council. In June 1966, a seven-man trade delegation from Angola visited Southern Rhodesia for a seven-day tour at the invitation of the National Export Council of Southern Rhodesia. The leader of the delegation was reported to have said at Bulawayo that Angola had many markets which could be exploited by Southern Rhodesian manufacturers. The best openings in Angola were for the manufacturers of cotton goods, electric cabling and canned foods. He said that Southern Rhodesian goods appeared to be very competitive and would hold their own in any overseas market.

257. On 8 July 1966, the régime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Mussett, opened the Southern Rhodesian pavilion at the Mozambique trade fair in Lourenço Marques. In his statement, he said that the time had come for countries in southern Africa to support each other. In 1965 visible trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia left Mozambique with a favourable balance of £180,000, but when invisible transactions, primarily transit, were taken into account, the balance was increased to £6 million. For this reason, he said that he would like to see a greater level of purchases of Southern Rhodesian goods in Mozambique.

258. According to official figures released in Lisbon, Portugal's imports from Southern Rhodesia for the period January to September 1966 amounted to \$942,000, of which tobacco and sugar accounted for \$349,000 and \$111,000, respectively. Other imports included meat of bovine products, asbestos, copper and skins and hides. Exports from Portugal to Southern Rhodesia for the period January to September 1966 amounted to \$809,000.

259. A six-man trade mission from Southern Rhodesia headed by Mr. Maltas, Chairman of the National Export Council of Rhodesia, visited Portugal in the first week of November 1966. The mission included Mr. Graylin, Chairman of the Rhodesian Tobacco Export Council.

### *Southern Rhodesia and the oil embargo*

260. It will be recalled that the United Kingdom Government imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965. By the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, the United Kingdom, in exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, prohibited the import of oil and oil products into the Territory. It prohibited United Kingdom nationals from supplying or carrying oil products for Southern Rhodesian use.

261. The Commonwealth Secretary on 6 June 1966 made regulations under the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1966, permitting certain specified quantities of specialized lubricants (mainly greases) to be imported into Southern Rhodesia for the use of Rhodesian Railways. This was reported to be in keeping with the British Government's policy of excepting from its embargoes, goods essential for the continued running of the Central African Common Services. In view of the uncertainty concerning the future of Rhodesia Railways, the regulation, which can be revoked at any time, permits the import by Caltex Oil (S.A.) Ltd., at monthly intervals, of quantities sufficient for only one month's consumption.

262. On 9 May 1966, the Smith régime increased the price of petroleum products. The price increases,

<sup>14</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967*, document S/7781, annex II.

which with one exception were uniform throughout the country, were as follows: petrol, both regular and premium grades, was increased by  $\frac{1}{3}$ d. a gallon; diesel fuel by 7d. per gallon; power paraffin by 9d. per gallon; illuminating paraffin by 5d. per gallon; aviation turbine fuel by 10d. a gallon; and aviation gasoline by  $\frac{1}{2}$ d. a gallon. The one exception was the area within a radius of twelve miles of Beitbridge, where prices remained the same.

263. Rhodesian motorists at Umtali, who in the past were able to purchase petrol over the border in Mozambique at very low prices without paying any tax, were affected by these restrictions for the first time. All Rhodesian registered vehicles which entered Southern Rhodesia after an absence of less than two nights were required to pay a special import duty of £1 for motor vehicles and 2/6d. for motorcycles. Only vehicles used for the carriage of passengers or goods across the border for hire or reward, and vehicles of persons resident in Mozambique who worked in Rhodesia or *vice versa*, were exempt from the special import duty.

264. To ensure the successful implementation of the new regulations, petroleum products were removed from the open general licence category and could henceforth only be imported under licence. Any persons who imported or took out of bond any of the fuels enumerated above under authority of a licence issued by the "Secretary for Commerce and Industry" and under such conditions as the Controller of Customs and Excise might approve would pay the old rate of duty.

265. Some exceptions to the new regulation that petroleum products could only be imported under licence were also announced on 9 May 1966, by which the Controller of Customs and Excise was given a blanket authority to admit all gifts of motor fuel without the production of an import licence, subject to the payment of an increase of 3d. per gallon customs duty on all those products imported, with the exception of illuminating paraffin.

266. On 10 June 1966, the ration of diesel fuel to farmers which was fixed at 50 per cent of the 1965 consumption was raised to 70 per cent for the months of June, July and August. The additional 20 per cent was issued at the discretion of the oil companies.

267. Effective from the first week of July 1966, "off-ration" petrol coupons were made available to the public by which any person who needed extra petrol beyond the normal allowance could buy extra coupons at an additional price of two shillings a unit for six pints. This in effect meant that while petrol would cost the regular coupon holder 6s. for first grade and 5s. 8d. for second grade petrol, the "off-ration" coupon holder would, in terms of over-all cost, pay 8s. 8d. a gallon for premium brands and 8s. 5d. for regular. Effective from 4 August 1966, off-ration petrol coupons were also made available for the purchase of aviation fuel at the additional rate of 2/- a unit for six pints.

268. Statements made by Mr. Mussett on 9 May and 28 June 1966 in explanation of the price increases and the introduction of "off-ration" petrol coupons give some indication of the impact of the oil embargo on the economy. In his justification of the increase of the price of petroleum products on 9 May 1966, which according to him was inevitable, he stated that the Rhodesian Treasury could not be expected to absorb the enormous additional costs involved in the supply

and transport of fuel. On 28 June 1966, he also stated that prior to the introduction of formal rationing and with the disruption of the normal methods of obtaining supplies, an initial deficit was incurred. This was not being recovered in the present price of petrol. The Government therefore felt justified in asking the ordinary motorist who wished to obtain more petrol (under the "off-ration" petrol coupon system) to make a contribution towards this deficit.

269. On the basis of the above references, these measures were interpreted to reflect the extra cost to the Smith régime of importing refined petroleum products from South Africa and through Mozambique. In the past, the government oil procurement agency, GENTA, had been bearing the extra cost of these imports with prices remaining the same at the retail level.

270. In his statement in Parliament on 28 June 1966, Mr. Mussett also stated that since the introduction of the coupon system consumption of petroleum products had dropped and this had naturally added to the difficulties which were already facing the motor trade and ancillary activities. The only practical way of alleviating the petrol ration at this stage was through the "off-ration" petrol coupons.

271. Following the increase in prices, the President of the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union, Mr. T. Mitchell, was quoted as saying that the 7d. a gallon rise in the price of diesel fuel would raise the cost of agricultural production by £500,000 a year.

272. On 17 June 1966, the President of the Rhodesian Motor Trade Association was reported to have said in a speech at Umtali that petrol rationing had been catastrophic for the trade and to have spoken of the possibility of a breakdown. Since petrol rationing had been introduced, he said, new car sales had dropped by more than 40 per cent and commercial vehicle sales by more than 50 per cent. Workshop revenue and the sale of spare parts were also down.

273. In his statement before the Rhodesian Front Party Congress on 23 September 1966, Mr. Ian Smith made reference to what he called "the battle for fuel, petrol and the oils". He said that there had been one or two sticky moments but that his régime was in the happy position of having more petrol than it did at the commencement of that exercise and that was a measure of its success.

274. Although no figures are available on imports of oil and petroleum products, an indication of the increased volume of oil reaching the country is given by the expansion of storage tank facilities. On 26 August 1966, it was reported that a request from the Smith régime to the Salisbury City Council to relax petroleum storage by-laws and thus enable oil companies to build more storage tanks had reached the committee stage. Similar requests had either been made or approved by other municipal authorities in Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 1 August 1966 that three international oil companies were extending their storage facilities at Gwelo, a town 170 miles from Salisbury. According to the report, included in the monthly municipal building figures was the news that Shell, Mobil and Caltex had had building plans approved for storage tanks.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> On 21 December 1965, the oil companies operating inside Southern Rhodesia were put under the Emergency Regulations, giving the Ian Smith régime control over their operations.

275. According to press reports, petroleum and oil products reaching Southern Rhodesia from across the borders daily were far in excess of the amount required under rationing. Petrol tankers on the roads and the railways had become acceptable features of the Southern Rhodesian scene. Refined petrol continued to be railed up from South Africa through the then protectorate of Bechuanaland and from Mozambique. In addition, long convoys of trucks continued to carry thousands of gallons of petrol across the South African border town of Beitbridge into Southern Rhodesia.

#### *South Africa and the oil embargo*

276. From January to November 1966, the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation gave wide publicity to the arrival in Southern Rhodesia of consignments of refined petroleum products from South Africa. They were described as "gifts" from the "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements in South Africa which are spearheaded by the Friends of Rhodesia organization. According to the radio reports, these consignments of petroleum products varied from a few hundred gallons to 4,000 gallons per shipment by road. However, it was estimated that these "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements were only making a modest contribution to the Smith régime's stock as compared with the gigantic exercise organized by the illegal régime in 1966 to bring in petroleum products from South Africa. It was estimated that the petroleum products reaching Southern Rhodesia from South Africa reached the level of 35,000 gallons per day from February 1966 to May, when supplies were reported to have jumped to 140,000 gallons per day (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, paras. 216 and 734). It was stated that these reported huge daily supplies of petrol were not due to the "Petrol for Rhodesia" movements; they were mainly attributed to GENTA, a petrol haulage and procurement agency of the Smith régime. The statement by the Minister of Commerce and Industry of Southern Rhodesia on 9 May 1966 that the Southern Rhodesian Treasury "could not be expected to bear the enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel" clearly indicated the Smith régime's role in the above-mentioned shipments of oil. Since the "enormous additional costs involved in the supply and transport of fuel" continued to be passed on to the consumer throughout 1966, it was obvious that the bulk supplies of petroleum products reaching Southern Rhodesia in 1966 were not "gifts" from South Africa but rather officially controlled exercises.

277. On 8 August 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson stated in the House of Commons in reply to a question that oil had been going through from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia although at a very high price and was very costly to the régime. He stated that the South African Government had explained that it was its policy to allow normal but not abnormal trade, whether on oil or anything else, to Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson was also asked a further question on stories which were circulating that large quantities of oil were being exported from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia via Bechuanaland. In reply, Mr. Wilson stated that the United Kingdom Government had been watching this very carefully. Some of the stories and figures which he had seen were vastly exaggerated compared with the relatively small amounts going through Bechuanaland.

#### *Portugal and the oil embargo*

278. Since the illegal declaration of independence, the Government of Portugal has reiterated its policy of keeping transit facilities through Mozambique open to Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia, and of not interfering with goods destined to any of those countries. The Government of Portugal has also stated that it has not taken any initiative tending to ensure the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia nor purchasing it in the name of that country nor transporting it in Portuguese ships. It would not, however, permit any consignment of oil to be diverted to a country different from the one for which it was destined.

279. It will be recalled that in the first quarter of 1966, it was reported that oil and petroleum products had continued to reach Southern Rhodesia from South Africa by rail through Mozambique at the rate of about 100,000 gallons daily. In addition, it was also estimated that Mozambique was itself supplying Southern Rhodesia with 10,000 gallons of refined petroleum products daily.

280. In a press release dated 12 May 1966, the Government of Portugal "categorically rejected" reports stating that Mozambique had become the chief source of oil supply for Southern Rhodesia. In the statement, which was repeated on subsequent occasions in 1966 to counteract press and other reports, the Government of Portugal stated that Mozambique was not an oil-producing country and that its own annual requirement of crude oil amounted to 200,000 tons as against 400,000 tons for Southern Rhodesia. According to the statement, since the amount of crude oil imported into Mozambique had not increased since 11 November 1965, and further considering that no measures of austerity rationing of gasoline and oil products had been introduced since that date, it was difficult to see from where the stocks needed for the so-called supply of Southern Rhodesia could have been provided by Mozambique.

281. On 8 August 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson stated in the House of Commons in reply to a question that one of the big problems (of the oil embargo) had been oil going through Lourenço Marques, passing from there into South Africa and from there to Southern Rhodesia.

282. On 7 June 1966, it was reported that bulk consignments of refined petroleum products from the SONAREP refinery in Lourenço Marques were believed to be reaching Bulawayo and Salisbury weekly by way of South Africa and the main Mozambique railway. Observers believed that the rate of supplies from Mozambique might average as much as 20,000 gallons a day—twice what it was in April 1966. According to this report from South Africa, the biggest single consignment was understood to have been dispatched in the first week of June 1966. It consisted of nineteen tankers, each carrying a maximum load of 8,020 gallons of petrol—a total of 152,380 gallons. Rail and refinery officials were reported to have maintained that these consignments were bound for Beira. It was pointed out, however, that the port of Beira was usually supplied by sea—a cheaper and more direct route.

283. On 17 May 1966, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government had agreed for the time being to help with the expenses of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçam-



bique-Rodésia and in particular the expenses of maintaining and repairing the pipeline installations, since the pipeline was out of use. The agreed contribution was £54,000 a month for a minimum period of three months from 7 April 1966. On 13 September 1966 the United Kingdom Government announced that it had decided to terminate the payments of £54,000 monthly to the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia. The termination of payments took effect from 7 October 1966.

### *Foreign trade*

284. According to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury on 6 June 1966, total exports in 1965 amounted to £164.690 million, of which domestic exports accounted for £142.55 million; re-exports £15.145 million and net gold sales £6.794 million. Total exports in 1964 amounted to £140.55 million. Imports in 1965 amounted to £119.8 million as compared with £108.2 million in 1964. Foreign trade for 1965 thus showed an increase of 17 per cent in total exports and 10.7 per cent in imports.

285. The main customers of Southern Rhodesia maintained their order of importance as in 1964 and took domestic exports in 1965 as follows: Zambia (£36.1 million); United Kingdom (£31 million); South Africa (£12.8 million); Federal Republic of Germany (£12.8 million); Malawi (£7.7 million); and Japan (£7.4 million). The main suppliers for imports were the United Kingdom (£36.4 million); South Africa (£27.5 million); United States of America (£8.2 million); Japan (£6.6 million); Federal Republic of Germany (£4.9 million); and Zambia (£4.3 million).

286. The visible balance of trade after making allowances for stocks and internal freight showed an improvement over 1964. It rose by £5.3 million from £36.5 million in 1964 to £41.8 million in 1965. After deduction of net payments abroad for visible items, the current account balance amounted to a favourable £14 million.

287. Sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia by most of its normal trading partners outside Africa, in terms of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), generally exempted contracts concluded before the illegal declaration of independence, or, in certain cases, before the States concerned went through the necessary legislative processes to give effect to these sanctions. Other States put their trade with Southern Rhodesia under a licensing system by which trade in specified commodities was permitted pending their availability from other sources at competitive prices.

288. External trade statistics for 1966-1967, in conjunction with other relevant statistics since February 1966, have been suppressed by the illegal régime on the grounds that publication of such reports were detrimental to the national interest because they would aid and encourage opponents to take counter measures and embarrass the friends of the régime. However, data on the trade of Southern Rhodesia for 1966 were reported by certain countries of destination and origin. The data reported as of 23 February 1967 in the addendum to the Secretary-General's report<sup>16</sup> are in no way complete and do not include any data from some of the normal major trading partners of Southern Rhodesia,

namely, Zambia, South Africa and Malawi, which together accounted for about 40 per cent of the total domestic exports and about 30 per cent of total imports in 1965. Data provided by countries of destination and origin for the foreign trade of Southern Rhodesia as contained in document S/7781/Add.1 did not cover a uniform period of time. Full information on the trade of Southern Rhodesia is not at present available and may not be available for some time.

289. As far as the Smith régime is concerned, the only statement of substance on foreign trade for 1966 was made by Mr. Wrathall, the régime's Minister of Finance, on 21 July. He said in his budget statement that with the imposition of sanctions, it was inevitable that there would be some decline from the high levels of exports achieved in the period July-December 1965. The drop for the six months to June 1966 was not nearly so large as had been predicted in some quarters. This was because of the efforts made by industrialists to search out and open up new markets and because of the ingenuity with which they had circumvented sanctions. During the six months to the end of June 1966, the value of exports other than tobacco was £46.4 million, or 17 per cent lower than that for the comparable period of 1965. Imports were reduced to the desired level without causing any widespread hardship or impairing the effectiveness of essential industry. For the six months to June 1966, the total value of imports was limited to £40.1 million, or 32 per cent below the 1965 figure. The substantial reductions in imports and the much smaller decline in the value of exports had a profound effect on the balance of trade and, in respect of trade other than tobacco, produced a favourable visible balance of £6.3 million, compared with an adverse balance of £2.9 million for January-June 1965.

### *3. Political developments (January-April 1967)*

#### *Question of separate development of the races in Southern Rhodesia*

290. On 27 January 1967, Mr. Ian Smith stated in the "Legislative Assembly" that his régime would establish an independent commission to advise on a new constitution for the country. He stated that the "ideal" after which his régime was striving was a system that acknowledged the different communities of Southern Rhodesia and provided safeguards which would enable the different communities to live according to their own wishes and with adequate protection for their rights and freedoms.

291. Commenting on Mr. Smith's statement at a press conference on the same day, the newly elected leader of the United People's Party (UPP), Mr. Percy Mkudu, stated that Mr. Smith's statement presaged Southern Rhodesian constitutional developments in the direction of South African *apartheid*.

292. On 30 January 1967, the *Rhodesia Herald* in a leading article forecast a move by the Smith régime towards *apartheid*. According to the article, the "ideal" announced by Mr. Smith was something more akin to South African policies than any previous Southern Rhodesian Government had contemplated.

293. On 17 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in an interview on the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation that it was the belief of his régime that the chiefs and tribal structure were more suited to represent the views of the Africans than the African members of the

<sup>16</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, document S/7781/Add.1.

Legislative Assembly. The democratic system of government was new to the African, and it was something which took time to adjust oneself to. He believed that for as long as there was separate development, it was more necessary to educate the African than otherwise. Without separate development he could live under the wing of the European, but if the African was expected to develop his own areas—the tribal trust areas—to the maximum there was all the greater need to educate him. The evidence he had from Africans was that they preferred to live according to their own customs in the same way as the Europeans did. What they wished to have was equal opportunity with the Europeans.

294. On 21 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in the Legislative Assembly that the crux of the problem in Southern Rhodesia was to devise a constitution which would assure the rights of both the African and the European people. All the evidence showed that the Europeans were deprived of their rights under African majority rule. It was obvious from evidence inside and outside Southern Rhodesia that the African was manifestly unable to govern himself. One of the roles of the European in Southern Rhodesia was to protect the African from himself. Referring to suggestions from the Opposition that the régime intended to introduce a policy of separate development, Mr. Smith stated that the new Constitution must provide adequate protection for rights. This did not mean taking anything away from the African.

#### *Developments in the tribal trust land areas*

295. At the end of February 1967, the Legislative Assembly purported to have given second reading to the tribal trust land bill. The bill, which was subsequently signed by the "Officer Administering the Government", made certain changes in the administration and distribution of land in the tribal trust land areas by which the chiefs and tribal leaders were given responsibility for the administration, distribution and parcelling of land under their jurisdiction. The various tribal land authorities to be formed under the act were given powers to make their own by-laws, subject to the approval of the "Ministry of Internal Affairs". The tribal land authorities would operate according to local custom. The purpose of the act, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was to enable the Africans to develop their own tribal areas.

296. During the debate on the bill, some members of the United People's Party criticized the bill for providing for separate racial development. Mr. J. M. Gondo, UPP member for Nganda, stated that the bill appeared to have been copied from the South African Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.

297. The "Tribal Trust Land Act" was a follow-up to the "Constitution Amendment Act" of 14 September 1966. In the course of the debate on the bill, Mr. William Harper, the régime's Minister of Internal Affairs, stated that in addition to the changes in the administration of the tribal trust lands, the bill would empower the régime to introduce legislation to give the African chiefs greater powers in the administration of their areas. Among other powers, the proposed legislation would give the chiefs or their courts powers for dealing with certain criminal offences. The legislation would not force the tribal courts to adhere to the Declaration of Rights in so far as legal representation was concerned. It would also give powers to the chiefs for the removal of certain people from one tribal trust

area to another. The legislation would also make some changes in relation to tribal trust lands.

298. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Clifford Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, stated in the Legislative Assembly that the régime would introduce legislation to clarify the field of African law and to specify the areas of civil and criminal jurisdiction for tribal courts.

#### *Appointment of "Constitutional Commission"*

299. On 28 February 1967, the Smith régime announced the composition and terms of reference of the Constitutional Commission to advise on a new constitution for the country. The chairman of the Commission is Mr. W. Whaley, a Salisbury lawyer. The other members are Mr. R. H. Cole, a Bulawayo lawyer, Mr. S. E. Morris, the chairman of the Public Service Board, Mr. L. C. Mzingeli, an African businessman, and Chief Simon Sigoda. The secretary of the Commission is Mr. Peter Claypole, a Salisbury senior magistrate.

300. Mr. Whaley is a member of two government statutory bodies and a member of the Rhodesian Front Party (RFP). Mr. Morris, a former Chief Native Commissioner, was a member of the Rhodesian team of officers which took part in the informal talks with United Kingdom officials in 1966. Mr. Mzingeli took part in the 1961 Constitutional Conference.

301. The terms of reference of the Commission are:

"To examine the provisions of the constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, and, having regard to any other constitutional precedents and to views and opinions made known to you, to advise the Government of Rhodesia on the constitutional framework which is best suited to the sovereign independent status of Rhodesia and which is calculated to protect and guarantee the rights and freedoms of all persons and communities in Rhodesia and ensure the harmonious development of Rhodesia's plural society, having regard to the social and cultural differences amongst the people of Rhodesia, to the different systems of land tenure, and to the problems of economic development."

302. The Commission was to conduct its inquiries in private. It was empowered to present interim reports to Mr. Dupont.

#### *Developments in security matters*

303. On 26 January 1967, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", stated in the Legislative Assembly that nearly 100 trained African terrorists had been captured or killed by the Southern Rhodesian security forces during the past nine months.

304. On 7 February 1967, Mr. Lardner-Burke announced that eight former students at the University College of Rhodesia had been released from restriction to enable them to continue their studies outside Southern Rhodesia.

305. The annual report of the "Secretary for Law and Order" was tabled in the Legislative Assembly on 15 February 1967. The report stated that apart from a sharp increase in the number of cases of house-breaking and theft, and offences under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, there was a considerable drop in serious crime last year. The number of cases of arson fell from 99 in 1965 to 24 in 1966, culpable homicide from 102 to 72, and murder from 166 to 156.

Law and order cases rose from 47 in 1965 to 60 in 1966, and housebreaking and theft from 136 to 195. During the year, 927 persons, including 21 Europeans, were charged with 1,086 crimes.

306. On terrorist activities, the Secretary said the state of emergency existing in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 had provided an essential weapon in dealing with the many threats to the maintenance of law and order. During 1966, a maximum of 159 detainees and a minimum of 52 at any one time were held under ministerial order. The number of restrictees, while constantly changing, showed a maximum of 444 and a minimum of 306. By far the most serious threat was the infiltration of trained terrorists from neighbouring territories. Arrests had proved that these terrorists had received their training in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as in certain African States such as Algeria, Ghana and the United Republic of Tanzania.

307. The report stated that as a result of the extraordinary powers given by the emergency regulations in force throughout the year and many successful prosecutions of subversionists, the internal threat to law and order in the country had not been as great as in preceding years.

308. On 31 March 1967, the Smith régime set up a tribunal to review the cases of all detainees. Mr. M. F. Garnett, provincial magistrate for Mashonaland, was named as chairman of the three-man tribunal. The sittings of the tribunal would be held *in camera* and the régime's Ministry of Justice and Law and Order would not be bound by its recommendations. On 19 April 1967, the Ministry announced that the 170 people in detention had all received letters inviting them to submit their cases to the review tribunal.

309. On 8 April 1967, Mr. Lardner-Burke stated that there had been no known cases of terrorist infiltration into Southern Rhodesia since September 1966. He stated that radio broadcasts from Zambia had caused a number of attacks on farms and crops but believed that this had now ceased. A total of 115 people had been arrested by the security forces while attempting to enter the country with illegal intent and had since been prosecuted.

310. On 19 April 1967, Mr. Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, in his speech to the third session of the "Eleventh Rhodesian Parliament", stated that the régime would introduce legislation to provide for preventive detention without the need for a state of emergency by making the necessary provision in the ordinary statute law of the country. Press censorship would be maintained but the régime would continue to keep it under review.

311. On 25 April 1967, the state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia was renewed for a further three months by the Legislative Assembly, effective from 30 April.

312. Among other developments, the Smith régime launched a "Guard Against Gossip Campaign" (GAG) on 19 March 1967 to prevent people from indiscreetly passing on vital information to strangers and so-called spies. Advertisement and posters aimed at curtailing free speech, particularly on economic issues, carried slogans such as "Loose tongues lose battles". Introducing the campaign on 18 March 1967, the "Minister of Information", Mr. Jack Howman, stated that secrecy and security must become increasingly Southern Rho-

desia's watchword. He appealed to Rhodesian journalists to be security minded.

313. On 14 March 1967, two members of a "terrorist gang" who were reported to have been caught in a running fight with Rhodesian security forces near the Zambian border on 18 July 1966, were each sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment.

#### *Rhodesian Front Party Congress*

314. On 22 April 1967, a special congress of the Rhodesian Front Party was called in Salisbury to consider, among other things, amendments to the list of the party's principles.

315. At the congress, the first principle of the party was amended to read:

"The party affirms its loyalty to the independent country of Rhodesia."

The first principle of the party prior to the above amendment had read:

"The party affirms its loyalty to the Queen but rejects the principle of subordination to any external government."

A further amendment urging the immediate assumption of republic status by Southern Rhodesia was defeated. Mr. Smith was reported to have opposed the amendment but to have urged that the question should await the report of the Constitutional Commission.

316. Other principles of the party adopted by the congress ran completely counter to the United Kingdom Government's six principles for a constitutional settlement which Mr. Smith had accepted at the talks with Mr. Wilson on the H. M. S. *Tiger* (see paras. 88-98 of this chapter).

317. The second principle stated that the party "will ensure that the Government of Rhodesia remains permanently in responsible hands". It was reported that there was a move to amend this to read "permanently in European hands" but that this was considered not necessary.

318. The sixth principle stated that the party would uphold the principle of land apportionment. The Land Apportionment Act of 1941 is the key legislation on racially discriminatory practices in the Territory.

319. The eighth principle presaged legislation on separate African and European communities. It reads: "The party opposes compulsory integration and believes that the peaceful coexistence of people can only be achieved when communities have the right and the opportunity to preserve their own identities, traditions and customs". It also refers to "the obligation of the Government and the respective communities where necessary to ensure the provision of such separate facilities as will make this possible".

#### *Resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)*

320. The Council of Ministers of the OAU, meeting at its eighth ordinary session in Addis Ababa from 27 February to 4 March 1967, adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia. In this resolution, the Council of Ministers again condemned unreservedly the Government of the United Kingdom for shirking its moral and constitutional responsibilities to the people of Zimbabwe by allowing the illegal Smith régime to consolidate its position in defiance of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and world opinion; reaffirmed that primarily the responsibility of toppling the illegal

régime in Rhodesia rested with Britain and remained convinced that the only way to do this was the use of force; strongly reaffirmed the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and self-determination; called upon the nationalist movements in Zimbabwe to unite their ranks, co-operate and intensify their efforts against the common enemy in order to expedite the liberation of their territory and also on African States to give every assistance to the nationalist movements to ensure the liberation of the territory and the establishment of majority rule; once again called upon the African members of the Security Council to continue to sponsor the necessary measures which would strengthen and complete the implementation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966), including the invocation of Article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### *Visit of Mr. Smith to South Africa*

321. On 1 March 1967, Mr. Smith arrived in Cape Town on a visit to South Africa "to enjoy his first holiday since becoming Prime Minister". He was met on arrival by the Foreign Minister of the Republic, Dr. Muller, and "the accredited diplomatic representative of Rhodesia in the Republic", Mr. John Gaunt. On 21 March 1967, Mr. Smith, accompanied by his wife, paid a courtesy call on the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, at his official residence in Cape Town. According to official South African sources, Mr. Smith and his wife had lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Vorster and returned to their holiday resort immediately afterwards. No details of the meeting were available. However, Mr. Smith was reported to have stated on his return to Salisbury that he had been greatly encouraged by his meeting with Mr. Vorster. Speaking at a newspaper interview on 26 March 1967, he was reported to have stated that he had found among South Africans an incredible amount of goodwill, a desire to assist in every possible way and at the same time a tremendous realization of the problems ahead.

#### *4. Economic developments (January-April 1967)*

##### *Official published figures and statements on the economy of Southern Rhodesia*

322. On 9 February 1967, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. John Wrathall, made a statement in the Legislative Assembly on the economic situation of Southern Rhodesia in 1966. He described the economic situation, after twelve months of sanctions, as being far more satisfactory than most people had believed. There had been a drop of less than 5 per cent in the gross domestic product compared with the figures for 1965. The gross domestic product for 1965 was officially quoted at £351.6 million. Regarding employment, he stated that the indications were that the monthly average of European, Coloured and Asian persons in employment had remained on the same level as in 1965 but that there had been an increase of some 2,500 in the monthly average of African employees. There had been a net loss of Europeans by immigration of just under 1,000, compared with a net gain of 4,000 in 1965.<sup>17</sup> Mr. Wrathall also stated that in 1966 the consumer price index increased by 2.5 per cent in the case of Europeans and by 2.3 per cent for Africans.

<sup>17</sup> Figures issued by the Bureau of Statistics of South Africa on 17 January 1967 vary from Mr. Wrathall's quotation by a wide margin. The figures showed that Southern Rhodesia in 1966 lost on balance 3,000 residents to South Africa.

323. On 14 April 1967, the Smith régime reported that retail trade had recovered steadily throughout 1966 from a low level of turnover in the first quarter and was on the average 9 per cent below the average for 1965. Industrial production declined by 6.8 per cent to a level which was still above that of 1964. Since March 1966, the consumer price index had risen from 108.5 to 110.9, or a little over 2 per cent. There had been a net loss of 1,421 European emigrants in the first nine months of 1966. Since September 1966, there had been a reversal of the trend and Southern Rhodesia had experienced a net gain of 1,158.

324. On 17 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that although retail trade in 1966 was 9 per cent below the average for 1965, this decline was not a fair reflection on the majority of trades. Addressing the annual general meeting of the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce, he stated that motor trade turnover in 1966 fell to 73.5 per cent of the 1965 figures. If this item were not included in the index, the level of turnover for all other retail trade would be only 1.6 per cent below the 1965 level. Explaining figures released on the cost of living, he pointed out that among increases in food-stuffs was a rise of more than 24 per cent in the cost of a four-pound packet of sugar, but other increases were small and some, including pork and butter, had declined in price. Thus, the over-all index for food-stuffs had risen by only 5.6 per cent since October 1965.

325. Mr. Wrathall also stated that seven of nine major groups of items in the household budget had increased since 11 November 1965. These increases were: 11.2 per cent for vehicle expenses; 10.6 per cent for drink and tobacco; 5.6 per cent for food-stuffs; 3.3 per cent for miscellaneous items; 2 per cent for clothing and footwear; 1.6 per cent for household stores; and 0.5 per cent for fuel and light. The other two groups, servants' wages and rents and rates, showed no change.

326. On 5 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced that, effective from the middle of the month, the Smith régime would resume publication of selected economic statistics in a quarterly digest. It will be recalled that although a number of statistics had been disclosed from time to time in statements by officials of the régime, there had been a ban on the regular publication of economic information since November 1965.

#### *Foreign trade*

327. Following the above statement by Mr. Wrathall, the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury, on 14 April 1967, issued a report on foreign trade figures and economic trends in 1966. According to the report, exports in 1966, despite sanctions, amounted to £104.7 million. Imports totalled £84.2 million, showing a visible trade balance of £20.5 million.<sup>18</sup>

328. On 17 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that Southern Rhodesia had benefited by nearly £20 million, as a result of the two-way blockade of payments such as interests, dividends and debts between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. According to Mr. Wrathall, the value of interest on debts and debt repayments not being paid in the United Kingdom had so far been £9 million. Current investment income which was due to residents in the United Kingdom

<sup>18</sup> In 1965, total exports including re-exports and gold sales amounted to £164.7 million; imports amounted to £119.8 million.

but which was now blocked in Southern Rhodesia amounted to over £10 million.

329. It was reported that if the Southern Rhodesian statistics were accepted it would mean that the country's economy had been able to withstand sanctions with a much smaller reduction in its import bill than would otherwise have been necessary. In 1965, Southern Rhodesia ran a visible trade surplus of £42 million, but a deficit of invisibles of £28 million. The elimination by the United Kingdom of £20 million of this "invisible" bill—even taking into account the loss of dividend income due to Southern Rhodesia—must have meant that a favourable visible trade surplus of only £15 million would have been adequate to prevent any drawing on Rhodesian reserves.

330. On 15 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that according to Southern Rhodesian figures, United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 amounted to £11 million, while United Kingdom figures amounted to £2.7 million.<sup>19</sup> He gave a list of total imports from the United Kingdom, of which £7.1 million was represented by various forms of machinery and transport equipment. He stated that if the United Kingdom figure of £2.7 million was correct, then British exporters had obviously made an effort to bring their goods into Southern Rhodesia by devious means. In a subsequent statement on 17 March 1967, Mr. Wrathall stated that Rhodesian figures for British imports in 1966 were £25.4 million less than in 1965. The British overseas trade account showed a greater fall, namely, £28.8 million.

331. According to figures released in Zambia on 11 April 1967, Zambia's trade with Southern Rhodesia for 1966 was as follows: domestic imports from Southern Rhodesia amounted to £23.1 million, compared with £35.5 million in 1965; exports to Southern Rhodesia amounted to £2.5 million, compared with £5.4 million in 1965. It was reported that Zambia had achieved the reduction in trade with Southern Rhodesia through strict control of imports of non-essential items, among them clothing, footwear and food-stuffs for which alternative sources of supply have been found.

332. According to trade figures released by the Republic of South Africa in January 1967, exports in 1966 to "the rest of Africa" rose by 32 per cent to R 194 million (about £100 million). The South African Government has not published a geographical breakdown of its trade with the rest of Africa since mid-1965. However, assuming that exports to Southern Rhodesia rose by a corresponding proportion, it is estimated that, on a conservative basis, exports and re-exports to Southern Rhodesia would have amounted to about R 100 million (£50 million). South Africa's imports from the rest of Africa increased by 18 per cent in 1966. On the assumption of past performances, imports from Southern Rhodesia can be estimated at R 50 million (£25 million), repeating the 1964-1965 increases.

#### *Other developments in foreign trade*

333. Effective from 9 February 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced that Southern Rhodesia would adopt a single column customs tariff system. All provisions for automatic preference, and in particular the remaining Commonwealth preferences, would be permanently abol-

ished, but South Africa, Portugal and its African territories, Malawi and Botswana would all continue to enjoy preferential treatment, as would Lesotho, Swaziland and South West Africa. Mr. Wrathall stated that he believed the change would do much to consolidate the new pattern of trading relations which had emerged in the past fifteen months.

#### *Agriculture*

##### *General*

334. It was reported in February 1967 that sanctions were changing the farming pattern of Southern Rhodesia. According to press reports, about 160 million pounds (about two thirds) of the 1965-1966 tobacco crop bought by the tobacco corporation remained unsold and had been stockpiled in Salisbury. The sugar crop, which together with the tobacco accounted for over 30 per cent of domestic exports in 1965 (£50 million), was also reported to be in serious difficulties as a result of sanctions and low world market prices. Hippo Valley Estates, one of the main sugar producers, reported a net loss of £372,345 on 19 July 1966 and the Chirundu Sugar Estates, another big producer of sugar, ceased production in February 1967. In April 1967, Rhodesia Sugar Refineries Ltd. announced that it would no longer continue to subsidize the growing side of the industry by paying over all of its profits.

335. According to press reports, present diversification trends in Southern Rhodesia, necessitated by sanctions, show that tobacco is now giving way to beef, wheat and maize as principal agricultural crops.

336. The cattle industry had been expanded in acreage and production and was estimated in May 1966 by the régime's Ministry of Agriculture to be worth £200 million. In March 1967, it was reported that beef was "booming" and that the cattle industry had gone ahead of tobacco as the main agricultural produce. The value of the cattle industry in 1967 was estimated to be well in excess of the £200 million quoted for 1966.

337. The local usage of wheat in Southern Rhodesia is in excess of 700,000 bags annually. In 1965, wheat production amounted to 43,300 bags, compared with 20,900 bags in 1964. It was therefore pointed out that there was ample scope for increased production in Southern Rhodesia in 1966-1967. In a joint statement issued in Salisbury in April 1967, the "Department of Water Development" and the "Ministry of Agriculture" declared that a number of tobacco growers had indicated their intention of growing wheat. It was further stated that this was in the national interest.

338. On 7 March 1967, the régime's Minister of Agriculture, Mr. G. W. Rudland, announced the prices that the Smith régime would pay to farmers to encourage the diversification of agriculture. He stated that for the 1967 maize crop agreement had been reached with the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union on a price of between 27s. 6d. and 28s. per bag. He emphasized that farmers would get less than 30 shillings per bag. In 1966, farmers were paid 31s. 6d per bag of maize. For crops that would be planted at the end of 1967 and reaped in 1968, he gave a set of prices as follows: A grade ground-nuts, from 90 to 110 shillings a bag; B grade ground-nuts, from 78 to 85 shillings per bag; soya beans, from 50 to 80 shillings per bag; and wheat, from 60 to 67 shillings per bag. Mr. Rudland stated that the wheat prices would come into effect in 1967 but that the prices for soya beans and ground-nuts would apply

<sup>19</sup> According to Southern Rhodesia figures, domestic exports to the United Kingdom in 1965 amounted to £31 million; imports amounted to £36.4 million.



to crops to be reaped early in 1968. He also stated that it had been decided to discontinue the £430,000 a year subsidy on diesel fuel and fertilizers to farmers, and to put the money available on to the end prices of the above-mentioned crops. Mr. Rudland gave an assurance to tobacco growers that there would be a crop in the coming year and that this would go on in perpetuity. In referring to the tobacco crop for the coming season, he stated that he wanted to make it quite clear to tobacco producers that he had not mentioned that he would announce the price and quantities of the crop in July 1967, as he had done in the previous year.

#### *Tobacco crop*

339. Secret tobacco sales of the 1966/1967 crop opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1967. The Smith régime had guaranteed the farmers a minimum price of 28d. per pound for Virginia flue-cured tobacco. The production target of the crop for the season was fixed by the régime at 200 million pounds. It was presumed that most of the sales were likely to be concluded on the basis of private negotiations, as was done in 1966, rather than auction sales, as was the case before the unilateral declaration of independence. Elaborate security arrangements were reported to have been made to protect the identity of buyers. Under the system introduced last year, the leaf was offered to buyers with a minimum guaranteed government price. If buyers were not prepared to meet this minimum price, the leaf was then bought in by the Tobacco Corporation, which undertook to dispose of the leaf itself.

340. On 11 April 1967, Mr. Carol Heurtley, President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, stated that a further cut in the size of the tobacco crop could bring financial ruin to hundreds of growers, wholesale unemployment to the rural areas, impugn the livelihood of many people in commerce, and adversely affect the marketing of other crops due to over-production. The foundation of the country's agricultural industry would be rocked if the tobacco target for next season was cut below 200 million pounds. He further stated that there were about half a million people dependent on the tobacco industry—most of them Africans—and another cut in the size of the crop would jeopardize the livelihood of everyone connected with the industry.

#### *Commerce and industry*

341. On 3 March 1967, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B. H. Mussett, gave figures for the country's industrial growth for the previous eighteen months. He stated that since "independence" more than 200 new industrial projects involving a fixed capital investment of £4,750,000 and a sales potential of £13 million had been approved. Many of these projects were now either in operation or about to be put into operation. On the future of Rhodesian industry, he stated that the continued use of import controls would be necessary to achieve expansion.

342. On 18 February 1967, the chairman of the Board for Industrial Development, Mr. Sears, stated in Salisbury that more than £6 million was available for investment in Southern Rhodesia to local and overseas investors. The Board wished to hear from industrialists and potential industrialists who needed money for expansion or new ventures.

343. On 5 April 1967, Mr. Wrathall announced tax concessions for industrialists to help to stimulate Southern Rhodesia's export trade. The concessions related to bigger allowances for export market promotional expenditure.

344. On 6 April 1967, the Smith régime was reported to have drastically reduced import quotas for non-essential goods in an attempt to preserve the country's foreign currency reserves. Figures on the new import quotas were not released but it was reported that cuts on some luxury items were as high as 75 per cent. Imports hardest hit included clothing, table-ware, perfume, glassware and chocolate and other food-stuffs. The cuts were reported to be a move by the régime to carry out its pledge to protect local industry through quota cuts on goods which were once imported but could not be produced locally.

345. In his opening address to the third session of the "Eleventh Parliament of Rhodesia", Mr. Dupont, the régime's Officer Administering the Government, paid tribute to the industrial sector of the economy for the expansion and diversification of its products. He stated that import substitution, exports and the maintenance of employment had benefited from these endeavours. Mr. Dupont also stated that the régime acknowledged that the impressive achievements of the mining industry had been a major factor in the maintenance of the country's economic equilibrium.

#### *Finance*

346. On 24 February 1967, the régime's Minister of Finance, Mr. Wrathall, stated in the Legislative Assembly that the Smith régime considered itself to be entirely absolved from the responsibility for servicing all London market debts which were listed as debts due to the United Kingdom Government and its agencies and debts under United Kingdom Government guarantee. He stated that Southern Rhodesia had been relieved of obligations totalling £160 million, excluding sinking funds, which were under the control of the United Kingdom Government. There could be no question of Southern Rhodesia resuming responsibility for this obligation unless and until the United Kingdom Government had made adequate reparation for the damage done to the Rhodesian economy by sanctions. Holders of this debt must look to the United Kingdom Government for satisfaction.

347. On 31 March 1967, the Smith régime floated a new £7.5 million three-year loan at 5 per cent which was almost immediately over-subscribed when subscription lists opened. The loan was to be used to pay for government development projects and to finance maturing debts. It was the sixth such loan to be floated by the régime, bringing the total to £27 million, since the illegal declaration of independence. The United Kingdom Government, as in the case of previous loans floated by the régime, issued a warning to investors informing them that the illegal régime was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that anyone subscribing to the loan did so entirely at his own risk.

#### *Rhodesia Railways*

348. On 23 March 1967, the "Ministry of Transport and Power" announced that discussions had taken place between Rhodesian and Zambian senior government officials relating to the dissolution of the Rhodesia Railways. It had been agreed that, progressively,

operational control of the sections of the railway within each country would respectively be taken over by the authorities to be established in each country, and that this process would be completed by 30 June 1967. It was intended that Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and the Railway Board would co-operate in bringing this about. Negotiations would continue until all aspects of the dissolution of the railways had been resolved. It was hoped these would be completed as soon as possible after 30 June 1967.

349. The Government of Zambia also issued a statement on 23 March 1967 in which it announced that it had started negotiations with Southern Rhodesia for breaking up the jointly owned Rhodesia Railways system.

350. On 6 March 1967, Rhodesia Railways started a new fast freight rail service between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to speed up imports to Southern Rhodesia through South Africa's ports. In an official statement it was stated that initially the service would be available for urgent goods dispatched from the main ports and Reef complex to Bulawayo and Salisbury. Traffic for these centres in Southern Rhodesia would go forward from Bulawayo and Salisbury by the daily internal express goods service. Goods from the Johannesburg area should be available for delivery in Bulawayo in five days and in Salisbury in six days. A similar fast freight service has already been in operation from Salisbury and Bulawayo to Johannesburg and the South African ports.

351. On 30 January 1967, the three-man Commission of Inquiry which was appointed by the Smith régime to investigate an alternative rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa submitted its report to the régime's Officer Administering the Government. The report of the Beitbridge Rail Link Commission, which was composed of three South African experts, recommended a direct rail link from Rutenga to Beitbridge to join the South African railway. On 3 February 1967, Mr. Smith stated in the Legislative Assembly that his régime had no intention of rushing in to implement the recommendations "on this vital issue".

#### *Other developments*

352. In January 1967, it was reported that the French textile company, Boussac, had made a barter deal with the Rhodesia Tobacco Corporation to import textiles to Southern Rhodesia in exchange for £2 million worth of Rhodesian tobacco. A company spokesman was reported to have confirmed reports that Boussac material was on sale in Salisbury but denied that the company had agreed to take Rhodesian tobacco at below world market value in return. The textiles were being paid for in sterling by normal commercial means.

353. On 8 February 1967, the Ford assembly plant in Salisbury, which had held the leading share in the market for the industry, closed down as a result of lack of parts. The British Motor Corporation plant at Umtali, the second major producer, was also reported to be running out of parts.

354. It was reported that on 16 February the British consul at Beira prevented the ship *Clan MacInnes* from unloading a cargo of automobile parts destined for Southern Rhodesia.

355. On 8 March 1967, it was reported that the Union Carbide Company of the United States of

America had established a new company incorporated in South Africa to take over responsibility for the southern African interests of the Union Carbide group. The new company—Union Carbide Southern Africa—would assume control of eight companies, three of them Rhodesian chrome mines. The three Rhodesian chrome mines affected were Rhodesia Chrome Mines of Selukwe, African Chrome Mines and Union Carbide Rhomet of Que Que. It was reported that the move was viewed as an effort to avoid any embarrassment for the parent company owing to the fact that the Rhodesian mines were attempting to evade sanctions on chrome exports from Southern Rhodesia.

#### *Effects of the oil embargo*

356. On 27 April 1967, Mr. Mussett, the régime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced that the present form of fuel rationing would continue after 30 April 1967. Rationing has cut petrol consumption by about one third since the oil embargo. Under the present rationing system, motorists get a basic ration calculated on the weight of the vehicle and a supplementary ration calculated on the distance from home to work. However, the public can buy as much petrol as they want through the off-ration petrol (and aviation fuel) coupon system by which they pay an extra 2 shillings for additional coupons outside their normal ration allocation. Under the off-ration petrol system, premium petrol costs 8s. 8d. as against 6s. per gallon for normal allocation under the ration system; the regular brand of petrol under the off-ration system costs 8s. 5d. as against 5s. 8d. for the officially allocated ration.

357. On 23 March 1967, Mr. Mussett announced that the validity of the off-ration petrol coupons was to be extended indefinitely. It had originally been announced that the validity of the coupons would expire on 30 April 1967. The statement added that while it was hoped that there would be no need in the foreseeable future to cancel the off-ration coupon system, the public would appreciate that the Government must reserve the right to do so should circumstances make it necessary.

358. On 8 March 1967, the Johannesburg *Star* reported in a leading article that since the beginning of the oil embargo Mozambique had supplied Southern Rhodesia with enough refined fuel to enable the Smith régime to stockpile against two years of sanctions. It stated that this was the minimum estimate of foreign observers who had kept a close watch on "clandestine" petrol and oil trains from Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia since the initiation of the fuel run in November 1965. The observers calculated that at least 70 million gallons of petrol alone had reached Salisbury and Bulawayo from the SONAREP (Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleos) refinery in the past twelve months. The estimate did not take into account the supply from South Africa, which on its own had probably covered most of Southern Rhodesian requirements since the unilateral declaration of independence.

359. The article stated that observers along the Mozambique rail route north of Lourenço Marques reported that up to four but never less than three fuel trains a day passed through their check points with supplies for Southern Rhodesia. Each train consisted of ten or twelve tankers with a carrying capacity of 5,000 gallons a tanker. As a conservative estimate, the article stated, this would constitute a daily supply of

150,000 gallons, reaching nearly 240,000 gallons on certain days.

360. On 10 March 1967, the Portuguese oil company of SONAREP denied in Lisbon that its refinery at Lourenço Marques had supplied Southern Rhodesia with 70 million gallons of petrol. A spokesman for the company was reported to have said that a Cape Town newspaper, the Cape *Argus*, and the British Broadcasting Corporation had recently implied that SONAREP had furnished Southern Rhodesia with that amount of petrol. He explained that such quantities of petrol were quite incompatible with the production of the Lourenço Marques refinery, and stated that Southern Rhodesia had never been a client of SONAREP. He added that foreign newspapers had for some time been trying to implicate Lourenço Marques refineries with the Southern Rhodesian question.

361. Under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Amendment) Order, 1967, which came into operation on 15 March 1967, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Herbert Bowden, on the same day barred the United Kingdom firm of Lonrho, Ltd. from negotiating the sale of its share in the Beira-Umtali pipeline company without the approval of the British Government. A *communiqué* issued by the Commonwealth Secretary invoked the above law, which empowered the Secretary of State to prevent or restrict the transfer of ownership of property overseas, where such a move might lead to contravention of the embargo on oil for Southern Rhodesia. The ban followed confirmed reports that the Portuguese directors of the company had expressed the desire to sell the pipeline to an unnamed buyer. Lonrho, Ltd. owns 62.5 per cent of the shares of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia, but the Portuguese directors outnumber the British.

362. On 12 March 1967, the Johannesburg *Sunday Express* reported that South Africa was supplying Southern Rhodesia with large quantities of aviation fuel from a new Rhodesian-built depot on South African soil. The reporter of the newspaper stated that he had seen the depot and interviewed Mr. Ben Van den Berg, an employee of the Rhodesian oil-supplying organization, GENTA, who ran the depot.

363. Also, according to the report, observers estimated that each day an average of eighteen road tankers, carrying various fuels, crossed the Limpopo bridge into Southern Rhodesia at the small town of Messina. The reporter of the newspaper described the dump near Messina as a dozen big tanks fed from rail tankers, each holding about 8,000 gallons, which came daily from coastal refineries and occasionally from an oil pipeline in Johannesburg.

## C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE<sup>20</sup>

### Introduction

364. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 521st to 523rd, 525th,

527th, 528th and 536th meetings held in Africa between 5 and 15 June 1967.

### Written petitions and hearings

365. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:

Petitioner	Document
Mr. Carl-Axel Valén, Secretary General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY) ..	A/AC.109/PET.548
Mr. Omer Becu, Secretary-General, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) .....	A/AC.109/PET.595
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Publicity Department ..	A/AC.109/PET.596
Mr. Omer Becu, Secretary-General, ICFTU .....	A/AC.109/PET.597
Mr. H. Imhof, General Secretary, International Transport Workers' Federation .....	A/AC.109/PET.598
Secretariat, WAY .....	A/AC.109/PET.599
Miss Susan Bennet, Secretary, Irish United Nations Students Association ..	A/AC.109/PET.600
Mr. Gregory Calvert, National Secretary, Students for a Democratic Society ..	A/AC.109/PET.612
Mr. G. H. Coombs .....	A/AC.109/PET.629
Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, General Secretary, WAY .....	A/AC.109/PET.695

366. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:

- Mr. T. G. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.681) (521st and 522nd meetings)
- Mr. W. H. Chitepo, National Chairman, ZANU (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.1) (523rd meeting)
- Rev. Bernard H. Zulu (A/AC.109/PET.689) (523rd meeting)
- Mr. P. L. Chihota, Chief Representative of ZANU, United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.109/PET.596/Add.2) (536th meeting)<sup>21</sup>

367. Mr. Silundika, Secretary for Publicity and Information of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), thanked the Special Committee for having decided to look at the Southern Rhodesian case from close range, for its continuous vigilance over the situation and for permitting him to contribute to its work.

368. Since the presentation of evidence on the Southern Rhodesian question to the Special Committee in 1966, political developments had shown that the situation had worsened: the settler régime had adopted a more defiant attitude towards the international world community and had introduced far more oppressive measures towards the majority of the country's inhabitants. Moving along that disastrous path, it had established a commission to prepare a constitution—with the encouragement of South Africa and the connivance of the United Kingdom Government—for the permanent entrenchment of a minority dictatorship and racism. The commission was engaged in a fake exercise of receiving evidence from all over the country, but had not had, and would not have, evidence from the genuine leaders of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was an instrument for the implementation of an idea conceived by the United Kingdom Govern-

<sup>20</sup> This section includes those portions of the statements made on Southern Rhodesia in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in the succeeding section. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Southern Rhodesia were contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II of the present report.

<sup>21</sup> This petitioner was heard after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (see para. 609 below) at its 528th meeting on 9 June 1967.

ment for imposing the plans made during the conspiracy on H.M.S. *Tiger* in December 1966. The constitutional commission could not therefore be divorced from the imperialist tactics of the United Kingdom Government.

369. In adopting measures to oppress and suppress the undaunted African people, the régime was assuming powers to make Rhodesia a permanent police State. Following the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, under which brave sons of Zimbabwe had been massacred, imprisoned and thrown into death cells and detention camps, there was now a Preventive Detention Amendment Bill, under which the régime could detain for any length of time any number of people for any allegation conjured up by a policeman, without a state of emergency being declared or a report being made to Parliament.

370. The régime was whittling down the allocation for African education at a rapid pace, expenditure on it being limited to 2 per cent of the gross national product. African teachers were being dismissed in the hundreds, so that thousands of African children were cast into the streets and the remaining teachers had to take over about three classes each. There was a restriction on the development of new schools, and missionary bodies were being deprived of several that they had been operating. More than 75 per cent of the schooling for Africans had for long been provided by missionaries on their own initiative and at considerable cost to themselves, and the régime was taking action to discourage that development. The intention clearly was to add to African suffering and to the reservoir of cheap labour.

371. Africans were being ousted from types of employment earmarked for white workers, a measure aimed to ensure full employment for, and the elimination of discontent among, the white population. The discontent was thus transferred to the Africans, who then encountered force and oppression.

372. The most significant political development introduced by the régime was open *apartheid*. The mask of multiracialism used by the United Kingdom Government for many years had been removed, and the régime had prescribed separate facilities for various tribal and ethnic groups—a direct copy of the Group Areas Act and the Bantu Authorities Act of South Africa. Under that scheme, housing for Africans settled in towns was to be provided according to the areas of their original villages and chiefs. Education was planned in accordance with the language and cultural habits of the tribal group, but the syllabus was to be drawn up on the advice of industrialists in terms of the cheap labour required. In the rural areas, further measures were being implemented to increase the punitive powers of the puppet chiefs. To give them a semblance of authority, a Local Authorities Act had been promulgated authorizing chiefs to collect taxes, from which allocations would be made to them for implementing some of the régime's measures. They enjoyed the protection of the settler army and the police and were instructed to deport from their areas and hand over anyone who disagreed with the régime.

373. The régime had continued to expand its armed forces, on which it had spent in 1966 a total of £11 million—an increase of £5 million over 1965. In that connexion, the international conspiracy in support of the régime was very evident: military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey and Taiwan had been brought in to train the régime's armed forces

in their war preparations against the African masses of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian army was equipped largely with United Kingdom arms, for which spares continued to pour in. Under the alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, there was an interchange of security officers for various operations. South African regular troops had been brought in to reinforce the régime's offensive line along the Zambesi border. Between 19 and 23 March 1967, 525 South African soldiers had entered Southern Rhodesia in civilian clothes and changed into uniform at Bulawayo before being sent to points on the Southern Rhodesian site of the border with Zambia. Of that number, 225 under Colonel Dries Kotzenberg were stationed near Chirundu, and the remaining 300, led by Daan Pretorius, were in the Zambesi Valley. In addition, five South African army officers had been seconded to the Southern Rhodesian armed forces during the first three weeks of April: Colonels J. A. du Plooy, H. F. van der Spuy and T. M. C. Diederichs, and Commanders M. Rupert and H. P. Brand. During the same period, 317 South African recruits had entered the Salisbury Police Training Depot for paramilitary training for the Southern Rhodesian fascist minority dictatorship.

374. In considering measures to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem, which was a threat to international peace, the United Nations had been led by the United Kingdom along the path of economic sanctions, on the assumption that the United Kingdom, as one of the great Powers and a Member of the United Nations, would finally respect and honestly implement the United Nations resolutions. It had been demonstrated beyond doubt that those assumptions had been wrong from the start, and that the programme of sanctions could never be a success. The United Kingdom, backed by its allies, had sponsored the programme of sanctions as a decoy and a device to give it sufficient time to make a success of the unilateral declaration of independence.

375. Meanwhile, the economy of Southern Rhodesia continued to flourish, without the slightest sign of collapse or any possibility of bringing about a political change. South Africa, which backed up all of Southern Rhodesia's international trade, was a haven for United Kingdom money, and trade had gone on between Southern Rhodesia and United Kingdom firms. United Kingdom commercial banks—Barclays, National Provincial and Grindlays—and the Standard and Ottoman Banks were continuing to operate in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was permitting the entry of capital under cover of necessary items for the University of Rhodesia and other schemes. The British-Dutch combine, Unilever, based in and controlled from London, had recently authorized the expenditure of £135,000 for the extension of its Southern Rhodesian subsidiary. Sixty per cent of the ships carrying oil to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique were British. The British Petroleum Company was supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia and continuing its business. It was clear, therefore, that the first defaulter in the programme of sanctions was the United Kingdom itself, which while advocating a programme of sanctions in the United Nations, was adopting measures to undermine them in Southern Rhodesia itself. The conclusion was that it had in fact introduced sanctions in the full knowledge that they would harm not Southern Rhodesia but the economy of Zambia. If to that were added the conspiracy of the big international

capitalistic combines to prop up the economy of Southern Rhodesia, it became clear that the United Kingdom and its allies were intent on foiling any possible effect that sanctions might have because the economy of Southern Rhodesia was not so much in the control of the settlers as of those international financial combines. For example, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey handed over oil from the Middle East to the French company, Total, which carried the oil to Southern Rhodesia through depots in Lourenço Marques, and transferred the oil to British Petroleum, Shell and Caltex for direct sale to Southern Rhodesia. That was the pattern for many companies dealing in various lines. Those sustaining the Southern Rhodesian dictatorship by revenue included such companies as Lonrho, Anglo American and Rio Tinto Union Carbide Corporation, all of them based in the United Kingdom or the United States. Since it was impossible for them to refrain from expanding or diversifying the economy of Rhodesia, it was impossible for sanctions to have the required political effect.

376. The régime had established agencies to handle the sale of its products to international markets, some based in Southern Rhodesia and others in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. The Manica Trading Company, for example, was connected with several shipping lines, and delivered Southern Rhodesian goods. Sugar was sent to Mozambique where it was given a Portuguese label to conceal the source, and attempts were made to sell it even to African countries. Perhaps the best indication of the strength of the Rhodesian economy, in spite of sanctions, was the loan of £7.5 million floated in April, and over-subscribed within minutes.

377. It was clear that sanctions had a chance neither of being fully and effectively applied nor of bringing about a political change in Southern Rhodesia—their supposed original objective. Since Southern Rhodesia continued to be a threat to international peace, a change of strategy was imperative on the part of the progressive nations which were determined to liquidate the racist dictatorship and establish a popular African government in the interests of justice and peace.

378. In view of that enormous problem, the African people of Zimbabwe continued to resist the oppressive régime. They had always been convinced that the Rhodesian settler régime depended on force and could only be eliminated by the use of force. They were therefore being mobilized to sacrifice their lives in waging an armed fight against the enemy. The courageous sons of Zimbabwe were rallying to that fight within the country. The rigorous measures being taken by the racist régime through its enormous army to repress the African people were evidence of its awareness of the growing strength of the African people.

379. ZAPU therefore called upon the Special Committee to condemn the United Kingdom and its allies for deliberately misleading and deceiving the United Nations about the programme of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, to regard the United Kingdom as the real enemy, to recognize that the sanctions programme was a fraud which could never bring about the required political effect, and to encourage all nations that genuinely supported the African fight for the elimination of the racist minority dictatorship and the establishment of an African popular government, to support, by all means within their power, the African

people of Zimbabwe in their armed fight to attain their objective.

380. The international finance companies operating in Southern Rhodesia were putting pressure on the Smith régime and on the United Kingdom Government to impose their own policy. The financial magnate Oppenheimer, for example, had recently suggested that the United Kingdom Government should enter into talks with the régime for that purpose, and it had been announced that day that Smith had made a request to the United Kingdom Government for the resumption of talks.

381. He thanked the members for their words of support and encouragement, which he would convey to the African people.

382. In reply to a question concerning the number of people in imprisonment or detention in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that his latest information was that there were about 100,000, though the official figure for those in prison was given as some 34,000. There were a large number of detention camps in remote areas under more than 250 chiefs, in which many freedom fighters were detained. Most of the prisoners were taken to the small townships in remote parts of the country in order to conceal their true number.

383. With regard to the treatment meted out to prisoners, he said that various methods of torture were used. When a person was arrested he was taken to some remote area and interrogated by as many as ten policemen. Several had lost their sense of hearing from the treatment they had received. Some were given electric shocks, and electric sticks were sometimes used to frighten them into giving information. Other methods were to strip prisoners and drive pins through the penis, or hang them face down and beat their genitals in order to force them to sign statements prepared by the police. Another way of attempting to force them to give information was to tie them to a tree and light a stick of gelignite that had been fixed to it. Many had died rather than submit. A number of resisters in the countryside had been rounded up and shot, having been taken to European farms by white-settler constables, and the African police were not allowed in the area. Other prisoners were starved, some for as long as a month, though sixteen days was considered the normal period.

384. Asked what further help could be given to the freedom fighters by the international community, the petitioner thanked the international community for having recognized the legitimacy of the fight and replied that the Southern Rhodesian problem could only be solved by force. The members were aware of the support being given to the Southern Rhodesian army by a number of countries, particularly those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bloc, to enable it to entrench the racist policy. Since force could only be eliminated by force, those countries able and willing to assist could help by making equipment available to carry on the armed fight. It should be understood that the people of Zambia were threatened not only by the crippling of their economy, but were also faced with bayonets from South Africa and Angola. Since Zambia had taken a stand for justice, it should be given the full weight of international support.

385. Asked what aid the international community could give in respect of the refugee question, he replied that his organization's view was that everyone in



Zimbabwe was required to share the burden of the fight, and refugees were therefore not encouraged. Should the question arise, however, any material and educational assistance that could be offered through the international refugee agencies would be appreciated.

386. Asked for further details concerning the so-called Preventive Detention Amendment Bill and the introduction of the *apartheid* system, he said that the bill was intended to bring into permanent effect an act introduced, supposedly for five years, in 1959, when the African National Congress had been banned and hundreds of leaders placed in custody. It empowered the régime to imprison an individual without trial, but the minister was supposed to report to Parliament within three months. Under the amendment, however, that would not be necessary, and detentions could continue almost indefinitely. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act enabled the police to search any house or arrest anyone without warrant.

387. Southern Rhodesia had in practice been applying *apartheid* for many years, in the shops, in the provision of separate residential areas, and in the division of land under the Land Apportionment Act. It was now being extended, not only on the basis of colour, but tribally. Africans were to be settled in the towns according to their area of origin or the tribe from which they came, while all Whites regarded themselves as one community. The plan followed the same lines as the Group Areas Act of South Africa. Chiefs would have their representatives in the townships, so that if a township was divided into, for example, six tribal groups there would be six different representatives to identify those regarded as undesirable by the régime, and to send them to the rural areas under their respective chiefs. Such divisions were being introduced in order to create tribal conflict. It was intended to introduce total *apartheid*, including the provision of separate windows for the buying of bus tickets.

388. Asked whether anything could be done by the international community, through such agencies as UNESCO, to offset the restrictive measures adopted in respect of African education, the petitioner replied that the international community could play a part with regard to higher education. A number of countries had for many years been helping to fill the gap in education by taking students into their respective institutions, and further assistance in that respect would be useful.

389. Asked whether the establishment of some form of supervisory commission by the Security Council might help in the more effective application of sanctions, he replied that, although the aim of such a commission would be well intentioned, it could not, as a merely supervisory body, ensure that mandatory sanctions were effective. The fact that such sanctions were selective would give the régime a breathing space in its economy. What was missing was an enforcement measure, which could only be applied by the use of force to prevent the interflow of trade across the borders of Southern Rhodesia, particularly through Mozambique and South Africa. Sanctions themselves were not likely to be effective, and the idea of a supervisory commission was merely academic.

390. Asked to what extent the effectiveness of stricter mandatory sanctions would be enhanced if they were expanded into a complete and comprehensive system, incorporating all exports, imports, communica-

tions and transport, coupled with the setting-up of a co-ordinating agency, the petitioner recalled the words of the President of Zambia to the effect that nothing short of complete and mandatory sanctions coupled with force would bring about the fall of the régime in Southern Rhodesia and the establishment of a popular Government. That view was correct. There was no need to follow the United Kingdom line of applying piecemeal sanctions while preparing for presenting the world with a *fait accompli*.

391. Elaborating further on the statement he had made concerning the constitution being framed by the illegal régime with the co-operation of South Africa, he said that the five-man constitutional commission had failed to evoke any response from the African population because it was part and parcel of the system they rejected. The régime had recently obtained the assistance of a professor sent by the South African Government at its request to help to draw up the so-called constitution, which was being done with the connivance of the United Kingdom Government, whose agent Smith was. The meeting on H.M.S. *Tiger* had been a conspiracy disguised by a show of disagreement on whether the suggested commission should be appointed by Wilson or by Smith. It had now been appointed by Smith, and the United Kingdom Government had not taken a position on the matter. The United Kingdom Conservative Party had been used to appear to put pressure on the Government for a further meeting with Smith. Mr. Bowden had said in the House of Commons that, if Smith took the initiative for a meeting, the United Kingdom Government would be willing to resume talks. Oppenheimer had since remarked that such talks should take place, and that had been followed by an initiative by Smith, to which the United Kingdom Government's reaction, already forecast by Mr. Bowden, was awaited.

392. In reply to a request for further examples of how the United Kingdom Government had permitted the entry of capital into Southern Rhodesia in the guise of necessary items, the petitioner said that, in the case of the University of Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government was contributing £250,000, and that it had stated that it would not impose sanctions upon such items as medical supplies for international welfare agencies like the British-based Amnesty International, for which welfare funds were also allowed in. Under cover of humanitarianism, the United Kingdom was thus able to transfer capital into the country.

393. Asked whether he thought that the United Kingdom and United States oil companies had expanded their activities after the so-called declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner replied that those companies that had formerly competed against each other were now working in co-operation to promote and defend their business interests in Southern Rhodesia, and their activities appeared to be expanding. The Rio Tinto Union Carbide Corporation, for example, had recently purchased the Bronton Gold Mine, which had known overseas reserves of £11 million. A notice in the *Rhodesian Government Gazette* of 11 March 1967 disclosed that another large monopoly, Lonrho Ltd., had applied for an exclusive order in respect of an area of 253 square miles to prospect for coal, mineral oil and natural gas. There were many more examples of the extension of such companies in the country. Oil companies had further been diversifying their activities since the unilateral

declaration of independence by building storage tanks in various places.

394. With regard to the sources of the arms used by Southern Rhodesia, he said that the Southern Rhodesian régime had inherited almost the entire military equipment of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Most items were of United Kingdom make, though some had also been supplied by the United States. Since the unilateral declaration Southern Rhodesia had continued to receive arms through Portugal, whose supplies came from NATO countries, and through South Africa, assisted by the Federal Republic of Germany. Spares from the United Kingdom were still being received. Japan and Turkey had also furnished supplies, and the United Kingdom was continuing to do so through a factory in Brussels.

395. Asked whether he had any information concerning the reported increase in the income of the foreign monopolies which were mining minerals in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that copper, asbestos and chrome were produced in Zimbabwe. Italy bought copper concentrates and asbestos, and the United States, chrome. The largest buyer of copper concentrates was the Federal Republic of Germany, which also bought asbestos. The United Kingdom bought all three. According to recent figures, the Federal Republic of Germany had increased the value of its purchase of copper concentrates from £3 million to £5 million.

396. *Mr. Chitepo*, National Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), said that, in 1966, his organization had had occasion to present to the Special Committee a document outlining the grave situation then existing in Southern Rhodesia, a situation which had subsequently been described by the General Assembly and the Security Council as constituting a very serious threat to international peace and security. The current visit of the Committee and the hospitality offered to it by the President and Government of Zambia were continuing evidence of the concern felt by that country and by the international community at the dangerous situation existing in Southern Rhodesia. He extended a welcome to the Special Committee on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe, in the sincere hope that it would be able to study at closer range the problems arising from the Rhodesian crisis. The people of Zimbabwe and, indeed, the international community were faced with a crisis that had been deliberately created, encouraged, aided and abetted not only by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland but also by a number of other Governments and nations. The United Kingdom Government, in flagrant violation of its obligations under the Constitution of its own colony of Southern Rhodesia and under the Charter, had made use of naked falsehood, shameless pretence and every conceivable stratagem to deceive the world community concerning its role in the Rhodesian situation.

397. Some time before the unilateral declaration, when it had been well known that the crisis was approaching and the United Kingdom had already warned that any such action would be regarded as treason, the Prime Minister of that country had gone to Salisbury and carefully assured the would-be rebels that, whatever happened, he would not resort to force. It had been the first time in history that a duly constituted authority had given its permission to commit treason. The world had subsequently watched in amazement the antics and falsehoods of the Prime

Minister in his attempts to camouflage the real intention and role of his country in the crisis. There had been the rush to the United Nations to demand limited and voluntary sanctions, followed by fanciful statements that the rebel régime would fall within a matter of weeks; the pretended blockade of the port of Beira and finally, after a year had passed with nothing to show for voluntary sanctions, the request to the Security Council for mandatory sanctions.

398. In that connexion, it would be recalled that the United Kingdom had objected to the inclusion of oil and it had been only at the insistence of many other Members of the United Nations that oil had, in fact, been included. The reason for the disinclination to include oil among the mandatory sanctions was to be found in subsequent actions by the United Kingdom organizations. Another and more serious act of deception at the time of the application for mandatory sanctions had been the warning delivered by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that there should be no provocation or general confrontation in southern Africa—a clear preparation for things to come. Voluntary sanctions were already being applied and it was notorious that voluntary associations had been formed in South Africa to supply oil to Southern Rhodesia, and that oil was also being obtained from Mozambique.

399. The United Nations and many of its Member States, both individually and collectively, had emphasized to the United Kingdom that the only way to suppress the rebellion was by force. The United Kingdom, which had thousands of its troops committed to the so-called defence of Malaysia and the Far East, thousands of others in the Federal Republic of Germany, and yet others to defend its colonial interests in the Middle East and Aden, had shuddered at the thought of using force to suppress the most blatant rebellion against its rule in modern history. The chief representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations had solemnly warned that the threat of racial conflict was the greatest danger currently facing the world. The President of Zambia had reminded the Special Committee and the world at large of the danger, not only of racial conflict but of ideological conflict also in southern Africa. Nevertheless, the racist handling of the Rhodesian rebellion courted the very conflict that the United Kingdom pretended to fear. It had seen fit to treat the Rhodesian rebels with kid gloves for two reasons, the "kith and kin" idea and its own economic interests in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

400. The United Kingdom claimed to be one of the greatest champions of United Nations authority. It had clamoured for United Nations action in the Middle East, because its oil supplies had been threatened. It was all too evident that, like other major Powers, it wished to make use of the world body when its interests were threatened and when it could not find sufficient cover to enable it to act unilaterally contrary to the principles of the Charter. What did it matter to the United Kingdom that newly independent Zambia was, in some respects, more severely affected by the sanctions than Southern Rhodesia? When the United Kingdom had asked for mandatory sanctions, it had been well aware that the supply of oil to Zambia had ceased, while Southern Rhodesia was still obtaining supplies from South Africa and Mozambique. What did it matter to the United Kingdom that the black man in Southern Rhodesia was the greatest victim

of the incidence of sanctions and that Zambia was living under the constant threat of Rhodesian sabotage, provided that United Kingdom interests and its kith and kin in Southern Rhodesia and southern Africa continued to be safeguarded?

401. Subsequent to the unilateral declaration, the Smith régime had amended the notorious 1961 Constitution—itself imposed by the United Kingdom against the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe—and was currently drafting a so-called “separate development constitution” which would institutionalize *apartheid* under another name.

402. Measures were being taken in Southern Rhodesia to link that country ever more closely to South Africa, not only administratively but also in philosophy and social attitude. The danger was not simply that of a group of racists desperately trying to hold its position, but a more sinister threat of a new outgrowth of that *Herrenvolk* doctrine which had already produce one of the world's greatest tragedies.

403. Although the United Kingdom had sanctioniously urged the world to co-operate in the sanctions campaign, it was itself one of the chief blockade-runners. Sixty per cent of the ships carrying oil to Mozambique sailed under the flag of that country, although it was common knowledge that oil delivered to Mozambique was intended for Rhodesia as well. The United Kingdom continued to trade with Rhodesia through middlemen and third parties. What faith could the world continue to place in the Government of that country after such pretences and violations of solemn pledges?

404. The race issue pervaded the atmosphere of all southern Africa. *Apartheid* was spreading and growing in intensity. It had made deep incursions into the rights of the indigenous people of South West Africa, in utter defiance of United Nations guarantees. The rebel Rhodesian Government had seriously embarked on a programme of racial discrimination more intense even than the South African one since in that country the Whites were outnumbered by sixteen to one. It was clear that where such a small minority possessed all power, privilege and authority, it would have an even greater fear of democracy and thus make greater use of oppression. There was indeed a serious threat of racial conflict in southern Africa, not because Africans were racialists, but because the great Powers, devoted to their own narrow interests, were prepared to stand by and watch while the latter-day “Hitlers” of southern Africa propagated and implemented policies that were very little different from those of the nazis. Mr. Wilson, the modern Chamberlain of United Kingdom politics, had “done a Munich” in Southern Rhodesia, an act the bloody repercussions of which would surely spread beyond the confines of Zimbabwe.

405. On two occasions since the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Nations had been stampeded by the Government of the United Kingdom into imposing economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and, on both occasions, it had been adamant in resisting the full and comprehensive measures that alone might have guaranteed some limited success. It had solemnly promised that the measures contemplated would bring down the rebel régime and, trusting in that undertaking, the United Nations had acquiesced. Nineteen months had since passed and nothing had happened. The reasons were plain to see. The calculated forewarning given by the United Kingdom

had enabled the Smith régime to prepare counter-measures. Even the voluntary United Kingdom sanctions had been introduced individually, after due warning. It was hardly surprising that the rebels had been able to prepare for them. Furthermore, the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to co-operate in the sanctions programme had guaranteed easy channels for Rhodesian exports and imports. In fact, the missing link in the sanctions programme had been the failure to introduce enforcement machinery under Chapter VII of the Charter. When it was known that South Africa and Portugal would refuse to comply with the resolution, the decision should have been accompanied by the establishment of enforcement machinery. The Smith régime had defied the United Kingdom, but South Africa and Portugal had defied the United Nations.

406. Any effect that sanctions might have produced had been softened for the régime and its white supporters by the mass dismissal of African workers, including more than 500 school teachers. White workers, on the other hand, were protected from dismissal by new legislation under the emergency regulations. It was difficult to assess whether sanctions were in fact having any real impact. The United Kingdom pointed to the closure of the Ford factory, to a certain decrease in exports and to a fall in the Rhodesian gross national product as evidence that they were. However, the purpose of sanctions was not to reduce the gross national product or ruin the Rhodesian economy but to produce political changes, and no favourable political changes had resulted. That was due to the basic nature of the situation: a small number of white settlers were crushing 4 million Africans. Under such circumstances, even a complete breakdown of the economy would not necessarily produce the desired political change, namely, the replacement of a hierarchical society by an egalitarian one, which, of course, would mean majority rule. It was doubtful whether even a well-enforced sanctions programme could produce such a change. It was no longer a question of desire for white domination among rebel supporters but a definite growth of racist philosophy. Such a community might well resist until everything lay in ruins about it.

407. The Smith régime had switched to home industries to replace whatever imports had been effectively blocked, and the viability of the Rhodesian economy was such that a certain degree of diversification and reorientation had taken place.

408. Apart from the recalcitrance of South Africa and Portugal, other Members of the United Nations had, like the United Kingdom, merely paid lip-service to mandatory sanctions and continued to trade in embargoed goods with the rebel régime. Following reports that a Swiss consortium had bought Rhodesian tobacco and sold it overseas, the Swiss Government had stated that it was unable to restrict private Swiss companies and was maintaining a strictly neutral attitude towards Southern Rhodesia. France had exported £2 million worth of Marcel Boussac textiles to Southern Rhodesia, paid for under a tobacco barter arrangement, and there were plans to build a Peugeot assembly plant at Salisbury. United States exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 had totalled £2 million, as against £8 million before the unilateral declaration. The Federal Republic of Germany continued to trade with Rhodesia “to the extent of existing contracts”, which earned Rhodesia £1 million in foreign exchange. Southern Rhodesia's exports to the Federal Republic

of Germany under so-called "existing contracts" totalled £13 million, including £7 million worth of tobacco, £3 million worth of copper and £1 million worth of asbestos. Rhodesian imports from the Federal Republic, which were worth £5 million, covered a wide range of products sorely needed in Rhodesian markets.

409. United Kingdom trade with the rebels, also under so-called existing contract arrangements, exceeded £15 million. Other countries shielded under similar arrangements were Switzerland, Japan and the Netherlands.

410. A host of repressive legislative measures had been taken to prevent African workers from economic action which could have supplemented sanctions from within, including: the detention, restriction and imprisonment of more than 10,000 political activists and trade-unionists excluding those detained by sentence of the courts; a perpetual state of emergency restricting people's movements; the establishment of a harsh police régime; and rigorous censorship of news, and control by the régime of all news and information media.

411. In view of the foregoing facts, the United Nations must realize that only full and effective measures against South Africa and Mozambique could produce a solution by way of sanctions. Southern Rhodesia was linked with both those Territories by first-class road and rail connexions and, even if it were impossible to impose a blockade on those Territories, it was certainly possible to block the points of entry, either by the physical presence of United Kingdom or United Nations forces on Rhodesian territory, or else by bombing.

412. The crux of his argument was that selective mandatory sanctions had proved ineffective mainly through the resistance of South Africa and Mozambique and the lack of enforcement machinery. In calling for sanctions under Chapter VII, the United Kingdom had pledged its honour but, by adopting that resolution, the United Nations found itself in a position where it had to salvage its own reputation and not merely that of the United Kingdom. He therefore urged the United Nations to concern itself with enforcement measures as of right, since its own reputation—and possibly even its survival—were at stake. It had, in fact, been led into a trap by the United Kingdom. Any enforcement measures introduced should not be dependent on the United Kingdom's willingness or otherwise to implement them. Two methods were possible: either the application of sanctions against both South Africa and Mozambique, which had been feebly and deceptively tried when the United Kingdom had asked for authorization to intercept any tanker carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, or the physical removal of the channels through which those two countries continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia.

413. He would dwell for a moment on the conditions inside Zimbabwe, since the rebel régime had made many propaganda claims concerning its work for the benefit of all the people of that country.

414. The movement towards full *apartheid* was clearly reflected in the data concerning the yearly expansion of African education. In the period 1946-1957, that expansion had, in terms of expenditure, averaged 35 per cent per year. That period had seen the downfall of Todd, who had doubled the personal tax for Africans and had planned to step up the rate

of expansion. In the period 1957-1961, the rate had fallen to 28 per cent. That also had been considered excessive by the white community, and by 1961 the Rhodesian Front, which had pledged to lower the rate, had been voted into power. The Front had kept that pledge, and the rate for the period 1961-1966 had fallen to 9 per cent while, in the current financial year, it had dropped to 6.5 per cent. In 1966, only 66 per cent of the hundreds of thousands of African children of school age had been enrolled, 15 per cent of whom were in the final year of the eight-year primary-school course and less than 1 per cent in secondary schools. The rebel régime had spent annually less than £10 on each African school child and more than £110 on each white school child. Education for Whites was compulsory and free up to the age of sixteen while African children had to pay school fees. African schools were understaffed and poorly equipped, yet the régime was currently implementing a scheme to dismiss some 3,500 of the less qualified teachers. It had cut the intake into training colleges by one half, the intake into secondary schools from one fifth of primary school leavers to one eighth and had stopped equipment grants to African schools. A so-called registration fee of 50 shillings per child had been imposed which raised the average African parent's expenditure on education for each school child from 14 to 17 per cent of his annual income.

415. Still harsher measures were to be imposed. As in South Africa under the so-called Community Development Plan, African education was going to be financed almost completely by the African communities themselves, which would be responsible for running the schools. That was designed to reduce the missionary contribution to African education which, in the past, had amounted to more than 75 per cent. African communities were situated in the most barren parts of the country, and the schools open to Africans in the European suburban areas had been closed to enforce segregation and disguise the injustice of the so-called open franchise based on stiff educational and income qualifications.

416. With respect to employment and working conditions, there had been marked and crippling discrimination against Africans. In theory, they could rise to any rung of the employment ladder but, in practice, settler employers and the settler régime had made sure that Africans were employed only in unskilled and in a limited number of semi-skilled jobs. No apprenticeship was available to Africans and even the handful trained outside the country could not find employment. During the period of partnership under the Federal Government, a Technical College for Africans had been established at Luvuvu, but it had been closed by the Smith régime. Where qualifications were equal, the African received about half the wage paid to his white counterpart. The average wage for an African was £140 *per annum* and that for a white employee £1,700 *per annum*. African workers were poorly housed and had to travel long distances to work from areas badly served by an inadequate transport system. To restrict the growth of African trade-unionism, the régime had passed oppressive legislation which it ruthlessly enforced, e.g., the Industrial Conciliation Act which, by categorizing sources of employment as "essential services", could forbid strike action. Since the imposition of sanctions, virtually every capacity in which Africans were employed had been so categorized. African trade-union organizations were subjected to close scrutiny



and financial control, it being forbidden for them to use their funds for certain stipulated purposes, e.g., for political activities. Under current conditions, any strike action was regarded as political and the organizers subject to prosecution. The régime, having registered puppet minority unions, in which the votes were so weighted that the white workers could outvote much greater numbers of Africans, had decreed that only one union was permitted for each trade and that strikes by unregistered trade unions were illegal. Most Africans could only belong to unregistered trade unions.

417. African farm labour in Rhodesia was hardly distinguishable from slave labour. The Industrial Conciliation Act had been supplemented by the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, which provided that any person who advised, encouraged, incited, commanded, aided or secured any act likely to hinder or interfere with the carrying out of an essential service would be prosecuted.

418. The whole system was designed to maintain the *status quo*, with its appalling low wages and poor working conditions for the African. Since the imposition of sanctions, redundant white workers had begun to fill the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs previously held by Africans, since the law made it illegal to dismiss white workers. Under the Vagrancy Act, unemployed Africans were either forced into overcrowded rural areas or condemned to detention and restricted areas as vagrants.

419. The Land Apportionment Act, like the Group Areas Act in South Africa, was the cornerstone of the system of land discrimination which affected trade, commerce, industry, residence and education. The whole subject had been fully covered in documents submitted by ZANU to United Nations bodies in the past. All that remained to be said was that, since it had come to power, the Rhodesian Front had been implementing that Act more viciously and intensively than ever before.

420. Since it was currently a crime in Rhodesia to reveal trade figures or any other statistics, it was extremely difficult to obtain full details of what was happening, so that the shocking picture he had just revealed was only a partial reflection of the grave situation that had developed. In the inevitable clashes that had taken place, many people had been killed and whole villages razed to the ground as reprisals for their sympathy with or active participation in the war against the régime. The rigid censorship imposed since the unilateral declaration hid many such happenings, but much more was known than the rebels would admit.

421. Conditions in the restriction and detention camps where many thousands were confined were appalling, inhuman and calculated to break the morale of the prisoners. Inmates were confined in small crowded huts which were surrounded by barbed wire and heavily guarded by armed soldiers. Floodlights played on them all night. Their wives and families were not told of their whereabouts. They were not permitted reading material or news from outside. There were no sanitation or washing facilities. All visits, even by the clergy, were forbidden. Permission had been denied even to the Archbishop of Mashonaland. Photostats had been submitted to the Special Committee telling part of the story of the gallant resistance of his people to the régime. Their faith in peaceful solutions betrayed, the people had taken to arms. As soon as the first major battle had been fought at Sinoia in May 1966,

the régime had imprisoned all ZANU leaders, who were detained at Sikombela near Gwelo. The situation had developed to the point where any white man was "licensed" to shoot an African on sight and to go scot-free merely by pleading that he had suspected him of being a guerrilla. Both the President and the Vice-President of ZANU had been brutally assaulted by white prison warders. In an effort to cover up the facts of the fighting, the régime had publicized only such incidents as would give the impression that it had the situation under control.

422. In the meantime, it was using special hospitals—usually military barracks—to treat its wounded, the doctors being sworn to secrecy. The régime's special service police patrolled the African residential areas night and day to arrest anyone caught loitering or listening to foreign broadcasts. It had become common practice to imprison a person for a month without trial on mere suspicion. It was the height of cynicism for a régime that had held people who had never been convicted in a court of law in prison for more than five years to be considering a Preventive Detention Bill.

423. The people of Zimbabwe had taken a solemn pledge to fight to the bitter end. They had no illusions that the fight would be an easy one; their enemy was highly equipped and resolute. His was not only a racist régime but a military one also. In addition to the regular white army of 25,000 men (including reserves), the whole civilian white population was undergoing military training. All white men between eighteen and fifty-five years of age were liable to conscription. All white Rhodesians were armed, even the women. Every policeman had unrestricted powers to arrest on suspicion.

424. *Apartheid* in housing had virtually existed since 1923 and every African area had recently become a prison all but in name. Police were to be seen everywhere. People were constantly being questioned and interrogated and road blocks were commonplace.

425. Despite all that display of apparently insuperable power, the people of Zimbabwe had not faltered in their decision to fight to the last. ZANU had reached that decision long before. The Reverend N. Sithole had taught its members that they were their own liberators and that, with the unilateral declaration of independence, all Zimbabwe might well be required to take up arms. The people had answered the call. The only language that the settlers understood was that of force and ZANU considered that force was legitimate when it was used to regain one's birthright. Had there been any doubts concerning the legitimacy of the fight, they would have been dispelled by the United Nations declaration that the cause of the people of Zimbabwe was a just one. That people was gratefully aware of the declarations by the Special Committee and the General Assembly calling upon all Member States to support them in their fight for liberation.

426. He had listened with interest to the opening statements by many representatives to the effect that the only solution to the Rhodesian problem was the use of force. He warned the Special Committee that it would be futile to expect the United Kingdom to provide force. The only possible force that could be used was that of the people of Zimbabwe themselves. The United Nations, having committed itself to sanctions, might find itself obliged to make some use of force to vindicate its authority. For its part, ZANU would use force to vindicate the dignity of the people



of Zimbabwe. All ZANU required of the Committee was, in the first place, that it should repeat its call to all Members States to support the Zimbabwe liberation movement.

427. There had been a conspiracy between Wilson and Smith on H.M.S. *Tiger* to betray Zimbabwe. By a miraculous accident, the deal had not been accepted by the rebels. He was nevertheless sure that further attempts would be made by Smith and Wilson to reach a private agreement. Despite recent denials, he was sure that further talks were in the offing. The danger was that the United Nations might find itself faced with a *fait accompli*, i.e., a return to legality on the part of the rebels in exchange for a minority-oriented constitution from Wilson.

428. The second thing which ZANU required of the United Nations was that, under no circumstances, would it accept as justifying a grant of independence any constitution arrived at through private negotiation between Smith and Wilson. The only valid constitution would be one drafted or approved by the duly elected and acknowledged leaders of the people of Zimbabwe. It was vital that the Special Committee should expose the machinations of the United Kingdom and stick firmly to principle. There had been much talk after the failure on H.M.S. *Tiger* to the effect that all that was needed was for the Smith régime to return to the 1961 Constitution and sanctions would be lifted. ZANU hoped that the purpose of the sanctions was not to restore a mere technical legality but to ensure the establishment of majority rule.

429. He expressed his own gratitude and that of the Executive of ZANU for the opportunity afforded him to inform the Special Committee of the situation in Zimbabwe, a situation that should arouse the conscience of every Member of the United Nations. He assured the Committee that his people would not lay down their arms until they were able to work and live freely and be masters of their own destiny.

430. Asked to enlarge on the details he had already supplied on the fate of the Zimbabwe prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, the petitioner said that figures for the political and other prisoners in Southern Rhodesia could not be assessed with any degree of accuracy since strict censorship had been imposed immediately after the unilateral declaration. His organization did, however, have contacts and sometimes direct correspondence with certain prisoners, and the figures published by the rebel régime bore no relation to the number of prisoners actually detained.

431. The figure of 10,000 to 15,000 which he had quoted referred to political prisoners only, i.e. people against whom warrants had been issued either for detention or restriction but against whom no charges would be brought. The régime had powers of summary arrest and there might be many other persons arrested for interrogation on trumped-up charges or on suspicion.

432. Political prisoners in detention were usually confined to prison: a number of them were in Salisbury Maximum Security Prison. Other prisoners were held under restriction, which merely meant that their area of confinement was larger than a prison cell. Restriction was generally ordered for people in remote areas, after incidents such as the recent Zimbabwe National Liberation Army's attack at Karoi. Africans were detained for long periods in appalling conditions, often with no medical facilities available, under close surveillance by

police and the armed forces, and with severe restrictions on visits and mail.

433. The old Preventive Detention Act had provided for the holding of some kind of tribunal to make recommendations to the Government, but since the unilateral declaration no such tribunals appeared to have been held.

434. Asked to comment on the press reports that certain countries had not withdrawn all the technical experts who had been working in Southern Rhodesia prior to the usurpation of control by the Smith régime, he said that it was common knowledge that the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa were providing military assistance in the form of experts to Southern Rhodesia. According to information available to his organization, since the inception of armed resistance, Japan had been invited and had agreed to send experts in guerrilla warfare to help the rebels in Southern Rhodesia; it had also sent experts in steel and iron manufacture. He believed that the United Kingdom still gave technical assistance openly, by providing a certain amount of money for the University. He believed that France had also provided some technical experts. Other countries might also be giving technical assistance, but the situation was fluid.

435. Asked which countries were represented, diplomatically or otherwise, in Southern Rhodesia, he said that the United States maintained a consul at Salisbury and that the United Kingdom had a "residual mission". Other countries such as France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany were represented by trade commissioners. Portugal and South Africa were strongly represented and had exchange diplomatic personnel with Southern Rhodesia.

436. Asked what particular difficulties the freedom fighters were encountering and how they thought the international organizations could help the people of Zimbabwe, the petitioner said that medical facilities and other assistance were needed to help those who had taken up arms. Even more important, however, was the plight of the refugees. The definition of refugees used by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not seem to include persons who were endeavouring to end the situation or system that caused them to become refugees; by taking up arms they ceased to be refugees for the purposes of the High Commissioner. Moreover, the families of the freedom fighters did not count as dependants of genuine refugees under the High Commissioner's definition. That definition was unfortunate, particularly in view of the General Assembly's decision that the fight of the Zimbabwe people was legitimate.

437. Asked about the possibility of the people of Zimbabwe organizing a passive resistance movement, the petitioner recalled that passive resistance had been made famous by the late Mahatma Gandhi in India and had been followed to some extent in other parts of the world. Such resistance could succeed in cases where the authority at which it was directed had some conscience that could be appealed to. The rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia, however, was devoid of conscience, and it had therefore been necessary to resort to armed resistance.

438. Asked about his reaction to the establishment of a co-ordinating and supervisory commission to ensure full implementation of comprehensive sanctions, to include communications and transport, he recalled

that, in his main body of evidence, he had stated that, if sanctions were to be applied, they must at least be comprehensive. He would have no objection to the setting up of a co-ordinating and supervisory body of the United Nations, provided that there was in addition effective enforcement machinery. If the aim of such a supervisory body was merely to give information to the Security Council concerning breaches of sanctions, it would be of little use, since the culprits were, to a large extent, already known and, in the case of comprehensive sanctions, any breaches would be even more obvious.

439. When questioned about the kind of assistance that could usefully be provided by such agencies as UNESCO for the promotion of education among the Zimbabwe people, he replied that the rebel régime had embarked upon a dehumanizing and cruel policy designed to ensure that the African people of Zimbabwe would always be available as cheap labour for the menial services required by the settlers. In the prevailing state of affairs, ZANU considered the fight for independence to be the primary objective. The provision of education relevant to the fight for independence would be welcome. If the Iranian representative's question referred to general education, however, he envisaged difficulties. The rebel régime had ensured that Africans were educated only to the level necessary for providing intelligent service, and few possessed the necessary qualifications to proceed to higher education. When the fight for independence had been brought to a successful conclusion, there would be a serious shortage of manpower in the higher administrative and technological grades, and ZANU would then welcome assistance in those fields from UNESCO or individual Governments.

440. Asked of what type the twenty aircraft were to which he had referred, and when they had been delivered, the petitioner replied that they were mainly of United Kingdom manufacture and all of the military type. They had been delivered during 1966.

441. Asked to furnish a comprehensive list of the foreign commercial interests operating in Southern Rhodesia, with their countries of origin, the petitioner said that he would like to have time for research in order to provide as comprehensive a list as possible. Meanwhile, he could name some of them: Lonrho, Anglo American, Lever Brothers and Rio Tinto. He later provided the following list:

<i>Company and headquarters</i>	<i>Type of business</i>
Anglo American, South Africa ..	Mining, breweries and other industries
Lonrho, United Kingdom .....	Mining estates
Reupert, South Africa .....	Tobacco (Peter Stuyvesant, Rembrandt, etc.)
Rothmans	
United Kingdom } .....	Tobacco
United States } .....	
B.A.T.	
United Kingdom } .....	Tobacco
United States } .....	
Gallaher, United Kingdom .....	Tobacco
Fraser and Chalmers, United Kingdom	Steel and steel construction
Monarch Steel, United Kingdom	
British Insulated, United Kingdom	Steel and steel construction
Callender's Cables, United Kingdom	

<i>Company and headquarters</i>	<i>Type of business</i>
Stewards and Lloyds, United Kingdom .....	Steel and aluminium tubes, pumping equipment
Supersonic, United Kingdom ...	Radios
Phillips, Netherlands .....	Radios
Bosch, Federal Republic of Germany .....	Television and radios
United Transport Co., United Kingdom .....	Heavy vehicles (Leyland Albion, buses and lorries)
G.E.C., United Kingdom .....	Electrical equipment and parts
Shell, Netherlands .....	Petroleum
B.P., United Kingdom .....	Petroleum
Caltex, United States .....	Petroleum
Mobil, United States .....	Petroleum
Unilever, Netherlands .....	Soap, edible oils, toilet preparations
Ford	
United Kingdom } .....	Cars
United States } .....	
G.M.C., United States .....	Cars
B.M.C., United Kingdom .....	Cars
Peugeot, France .....	Cars
British Metal Corp., United Kingdom .....	Metal processing and engineering
B.S.A.	
South Africa } .....	Land holdings and other investments
United Kingdom } .....	
Coca Cola, United States .....	Soft drinks
Schweppes, United Kingdom ...	Soft drinks
Dunlop, United Kingdom .....	Rubber
English Electric, United Kingdom	Electric equipment
Fiat, Italy .....	Cars
Ozalid, Federal Republic of Germany .....	Photocopying equipment
Boots, United Kingdom .....	Medicine and drugs
I.C.I., United Kingdom .....	Medicine and drugs
Kodak, Federal Republic of Germany .....	Photographic equipment
Burroughs, United Kingdom ....	Business machines and computers
C.B.R. Bental, United Kingdom	Diesel engines (Perkins Diesel, etc.)
Elna Sewing Machines, Switzerland .....	Sewing machines
Nestlé, Switzerland .....	Dairy products
V.W. Car Parts, Federal Republic of Germany .....	Cars and parts

He stated that many of the companies listed were subsidiaries of South African companies, which were also subsidiaries of other international companies. Rhodesian companies were kept alive by supplies from the South African companies.

442. *The Reverend Bernard H. Zulu* said that the description he would give of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a first-hand account of what he had seen. As a minister of religion he had moved among the Zimbabwe people and lived the same life. Conditions in the country were of grave importance not only to the people of Southern Rhodesia but to the world at large.

443. There were sixty-five parliamentary seats, fifty of which, known as "A" roll seats, were held by European members of the Rhodesian Front. Fourteen of the "B" roll seats were held by Africans, and the

other by a Mr. A. Palley, who had polled only sixteen votes. As only a two-thirds majority was required for constitutional change, the fifty white voters held effective control. To qualify for the franchise, educational, property-holding and income requirements had to be met. Few Africans considered it worth-while to register for the "B" roll vote, and African "A" roll voters were so widely spread across the country that it was doubtful whether they could win a single seat in parliament. It was very difficult for an African to obtain sufficient education to qualify for the "A" roll, and the income qualification was almost impossible except for the few favoured puppets. With the land-holding potential of the African strictly limited under the Land Apportionment Act, the fixed property qualification was also extremely difficult to meet. In 1965, an African with a Cambridge School certificate plus two years' teacher training would not have qualified as an "A" roll voter on his starting salary as a teacher.

444. Under the terms of the Land Apportionment Act, 37 per cent of the land was reserved for about 200,000 Europeans, and 46 per cent for almost 4 million Africans. Only 17 per cent of the 40 million acres of African Tribal Trust land was suitable for annual crops, and 9.5 per cent, or nearly three fifths, was in fact under cultivation. That represented reasonable maximum use, since there were limiting factors such as the grazing of cattle on small plots and the presence of poorer soils fit only for such crops as tobacco. Of the 33.4 million acres in European areas, 52 per cent was suitable for annual crop cultivation, yet only 2.8 per cent was cultivated. Ninety-eight per cent of the land in which the optimum conditions of good soil plus high rainfall were to be found was in European areas, and only 2 per cent in African areas.

445. Over ten times as much money was spent annually on the education of each European child as on that for the African—approximately £110 and £10 respectively. There was compulsory education for European children until completion of secondary school, while a large proportion of African children were eliminated from further training, owing to lack of facilities, and had less than a 5 per cent chance of obtaining a post-primary school certificate. Education was completely segregated, except in a few private schools, which helped to maintain the barrier between the races and prevent the development of mutual trust and understanding among Rhodesian youth. At the end of 1965 the Government had been moving against integrated schools in the European areas, basing its action on the Land Apportionment Act. The Smith régime was planning to pass the control of local village schools to chiefs' councils, taking them out of the hands of the missionary bodies that had established and developed them. As the majority of the chiefs were only semi-literate at best, the quality of the schools would thereby be downgraded. The chiefs, who were subsidized Government servants, were, through government propaganda, becoming increasingly suspicious of the better-educated and more politically minded Africans.

446. The Government had recently stated that the amount to be spent on African education would in future be limited to the tax money received from Africans—a ridiculous excuse to cut back government expenditure and keep the African in his subservient position. Moreover, at local school level, it was the African community that had to erect and furnish the school buildings and provide housing for the

teachers, while no European parent was ever called upon to make such a contribution.

447. Both of the two main African locations outside Salisbury were surrounded by high fences topped with barbed wire. Each location had two main gates, and had become a virtual concentration camp. Africans leaving them to go to work had their hands stamped with indelible ink to identify them as workers, and on return they had to approach with upraised hands to enable the police at the gates to see the mark. At night, police and army units went from door to door checking on house occupants. All children from the age of fifteen, whether gainfully employed or not, had to pay fifteen shillings a month to be allowed to stay with their families.

448. Beer halls were fenced with brick walls, twelve feet high, with broken glass affixed along the top. The walls had two small gates that allowed the passage of only one person at a time. The halls were more like fenced cattle kraals than drinking places. If any checks were to be made, the two gates were closed while police carried out their searches. The beer halls thus became useful devices for police dragnets.

449. Since 1965, the Government had relied heavily on bribery and coercing of the chiefs, paying them increased gratuities and telling them that the younger and better-educated Africans would rob them of their power. The success of that manoeuvre was questionable. The first chiefs' indaba in 1965 had almost completely robbed the chiefs of any influence they might have held over the younger people. In one large area in south-eastern Rhodesia, not one of the paramount chiefs had dared to consult his people before attending the Domboshawa indaba. They were kept in power and safety only by the continued movement of police and troops in the Tribal Trust areas.

450. The government-controlled radio had a programme called "PaDare"—an African forum for discussing the newly independent African States in a disparaging way, emphasizing the troubles in Ghana, the Congo and the East African States. It also denounced the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU.

451. The blatantly discriminatory legislation and action described had inevitably led to dissatisfaction and unrest, to deal with which the Government had been forced to the extreme measures embodied in the so-called Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Under it, anyone could be deprived of his liberty without trial for periods up to five years, which could be renewed indefinitely at the discretion of the minister. Hundreds of Africans were thus deprived of their liberty with no formal charge being made. Under the hanging clause, the death sentence was mandatory in certain cases, even for attempted arson. The clause had been condemned by world legal authorities. While many countries were moving to abolish capital punishment, Southern Rhodesia was extending its use, and there were almost 100 Africans under sentence of death in its prisons.

452. There were probably more than 10,000 Africans in detention and restriction in the country, though the exact figure was a government secret. Conditions were appalling. He had visited one of the detainee camps, Gonokudzingwa, at the time when Joshua Nkomo and others had been arrested. It was in a remote area previously occupied only by wild animals. Detainees could not escape because on the east there were Portuguese soldiers, on the south-west, South

African soldiers and to the north a game reserve. The detainees lived in inhuman conditions. There was no water system and water had to be carried in. The huts were of sheet metal and resembled ovens during the hot seasons; they provided no protection against the cold during the winter. There was no access road and no communications with the outside world, merely a Land-Rover track into the area. There were no recreational, educational or medical facilities. Detainees had had to start their own educational programmes, some money for the purpose having been provided by church groups. Those self-help projects had often been discouraged by the Government, and Mr. Josiah Chinamano had been moved from Gonokudzingwa to Wha Wha for his part in organizing them. Conditions in other camps—Marandellas, Gokwe and Wha Wha—were similar, except that those places were not so remote. In most cases, the leaders had lost contact with the people, many of whom did not even know where the leaders were. No visitors were allowed at Gonokudzingwa, and detainees were completely cut off from the outside world. Visitors to the other areas were strictly controlled.

453. The families of the detainees were breaking up because of the indefinite absence from home of husbands and fathers. Children had become fatherless and had no means of support. Families had been evicted for failure to pay rent. Wives were not allowed to see their husbands, and children did not know where their fathers were. The Christian Action group had tried to help them with money received from the World Council of Churches—their only source of assistance—but even that organization had come under the scrutiny of the rebel Government.

454. *Mr. Chihota*, speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), thanked the Special Committee for the opportunity of presenting his organization's views. Since his colleagues in Zambia had already appeared before the Committee at Kitwe and had given a full picture of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, he would be brief. Moreover, most, if not all, the members of the Committee were well aware of the problem in Southern Rhodesia and he therefore proposed to give only his organization's views on what it expected of the Committee and the United Nations as a whole.

455. He and his colleagues were appearing before the Special Committee on behalf of their President, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who was languishing in prison, and on behalf of the ZANU Central Committee and the masses who were suffering under the yoke of United Kingdom imperialism. He was also speaking on behalf of the fighting forces currently engaged in military operations in various parts of Southern Rhodesia and of the men in cells awaiting execution for their activities in the Chimurenga (war of national liberation).

456. He was glad of the opportunity provided to put the record straight and to expose the blatant lies of the United Kingdom imperialists at the United Nations in their attempt to perpetuate and justify their colonial policies in Southern Rhodesia.

457. He was also grateful to the President, Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to meet in the revolutionary atmosphere of Tanzania, whose people were in the forefront of the fight for the liberation of all southern Africa. The Co-ordinating Committee

for the Liberation of Africa was based in Tanzania, which was also a spring-board for ZANU's fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

458. It was well over sixteen months since selective sanctions had been imposed by the Security Council after the Salisbury rebels had declared unilateral independence. The sanctions had been imposed against the better judgement of ZANU, which had warned the Special Committee from the start that they would not succeed. ZANU had already told the Committee that South Africa and Portugal would continue to trade with Southern Rhodesia, and those countries were in fact still trading with Salisbury rebels in defiance of the Security Council's resolution. ZANU was not surprised: it had told the Committee that economic sanctions as an international offensive against the Smith régime must be supervised by the United Nations. But its recommendations had been ignored.

459. ZANU had a few suggestions to make concerning sanctions, not because it had any faith in them, but because it felt that the United Nations, to be worthy of its name, must carry out its own resolutions. ZANU still believed that force was the only solution to the Rhodesian problem and the people of Zimbabwe would continue to use force against the settlers under the leadership of ZANU and President Sithole.

460. The proposals of ZANU were as follows: sanctions must be made mandatory and comprehensive; South Africa and Portugal must be forced to comply with the United Nations decisions and, if they refused, as they had already done, sanctions must be imposed against them; the United Nations should send an observer force to the Rhodesian-South African border and the Rhodesian-Portuguese-Mozambican border to check all traffic to and from Rhodesia; the Security Council should adopt a resolution condemning the Western Powers and other United Nations Members for continuing to trade with the rebel colony. In that respect, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Belgium were the main culprits. The Chimurenga was steadily developing. In 1966, ZANU had informed the Special Committee of its military operations inside Southern Rhodesia, which were being intensified. They were being further intensified with the resources available. The Chimurenga forces had harassed and killed many settlers in Southern Rhodesia. A week before, forty-nine settler soldiers had been killed in an ambush near Karoi; nine others had been killed about eight miles from Banket on the Salisbury road. Another gun battle had taken place at Que Que between ZANU freedom fighters and members of the Rhodesian security forces, in which many settlers had been killed. Numerous other fights and incidents were erupting, but much more needed to be done.

461. ZANU was determined to use force against the settler community until Zimbabwe was free. ZANU asked the Special Committee to request the United Kingdom, that arch-imperialist and colonialist Power, to declare publicly:

(a) That it would not engage in any military intervention in Southern Rhodesia under the pretext of maintaining law and order when the African nationalists were on the point of liberating their country. The United Kingdom had already refused to use force against the Salisbury rebels because of "kith-and-kin" considerations. If it tried to interfere after realizing the strength of the liberation movements, ZANU

would not hesitate to fight even the United Kingdom itself. So far as ZANU was concerned, Smith and Wilson stood for the same thing: the perpetuation of United Kingdom imperialism and settlerism in the country;

(b) That there should be African majority rule immediately after the downfall of the present illegal régime;

(c) That there should be no period of direct colonial rule after the termination of the present illegal Salisbury régime;

(d) That independence should be granted to Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible after the establishment of African majority government in that country.

462. If the above conditions were not met there would, he warned, be trouble inside the country. It should be clear that ZANU was not fighting Smith in order to establish another colonial régime administered from London.

463. The people of Southern Rhodesia under the leadership of ZANU had made up their minds to use armed force to win African majority rule and independence. They were convinced that that was the only effective way of recovering their birthright and human dignity in the land of their forefathers. ZANU was taking steps to ensure that every Zimbabwean was armed to meet the counter-revolutionary resistance of the settlers. Any attempt to intervene in Southern Rhodesia under the guise of maintaining law and order would be met with armed force.

464. He did not wish to leave the Special Committee with the impression that ZANU was happy with the performance of the United Nations in regard to the Rhodesian problem: far from it. ZANU was very disappointed indeed. The United Nations had regretfully turned itself into a debating society. It was capable of adopting resolutions, but incapable of implementing them. ZANU was appearing before the Committee but the matter always ended in the conference room. It was sad to have to say so in public, but there was no need for ZANU to hide its true feelings. The mission of liberating Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of its people alone, but the United Nations could help the oppressed and exploited inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia to liberate themselves. While the United Nations claimed to stand for peace and human dignity and equality, ZANU would continue to bring its problems before the Committee. But there was no point in adopting resolutions which the United Nations could not implement, for it made a mockery of the world body.

465. He appealed to the major Powers, and to the Western Powers in particular, to cease all trade with Southern Rhodesia. He also called on all the freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples represented in the United Nations and elsewhere to give support, moral and otherwise, to the struggling masses of Southern Rhodesia in their fight against the United Kingdom imperialists and settlers in their fatherland. ZANU was asking the United Nations to help it to help itself, and whatever support was given by Member States and other friendly countries would supplement ZANU's own efforts and local resources.

466. The United Nations had a moral obligation towards the oppressed masses all over the world, and the Special Committee had a special responsibility towards them.

467. Failure to grant independence to the Zimbabwe masses would mean the continuation of racial war in Southern Rhodesia and indeed in all southern Africa. ZANU would not lay down its arms until its objective of African majority rule was realized. In the meantime the war of liberation would continue and would be intensified throughout the country.

#### *General statements<sup>22</sup>*

468. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, by their thorough and well-documented statements, the petitioners had shown that the usurpation by the illegal racist minority régime was a continuation of the same colonial system by which the people of Zimbabwe had been oppressed by the United Kingdom Government. They had also shown that the so-called sanctions were a farce and an impotent way of dealing with a serious problem. The petitioners had also revealed what amounted to a conspiracy on the part of Western capitalist monopolies which were upholding the illegal régime against the interests of the African people.

469. Colonialism was not an adventure arising from the romantic whims of eccentric explorers; it was the accumulation of capital in the industrialized nations of Europe and the quest for new markets and raw materials which led to the colonization and annexation of land. That interpretation of the historical development of society was fully applicable to the colonization of Southern Rhodesia and to the situation prevailing there.

470. The acquisition of the colony of Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom had been followed by the systematic institution of racial segregation. In order to exploit the rich resources of Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, through colonial legislation and force, had systematically driven the African people from their lands and introduced the white settlers who, in order to continue that usurpation, had established themselves as the "super race", maintaining the Africans as an inferior commodity—cheap labour. It was the systematic colonial policy of the United Kingdom which had not only denied freedom and land to the African people, but had established the domination of the racist settlers who were the kith and kin of the colonizers. Thus the usurpation of State power by the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith was nothing but the continuation of the colonial policies of the United Kingdom.

471. It was abundantly clear that sanctions had failed. They had failed partly because they were being subverted by the very Powers that claimed that they would succeed. The leaders of Africa had said in advance that sanctions would not work. Why could not the Western Powers listen to the voice of Africa? And why was it, despite the fact that the representatives of many Western countries had spoken of what their parliaments had done to stop their trade with Southern Rhodesia, that Southern Rhodesia was still trading freely with those same countries? The socialist countries had had no dealings with the illegal régime. Socialism, in fact, was absolutely incompatible with everything that was going on in southern Africa.

472. The reason why Western countries continued to trade with the illegal régime was very simple: it was because those countries put profits above human

<sup>22</sup> Additional statements on the question of Southern Rhodesia appear in chapter II of the present report.



values. They did what they did not so much for love of Smith and what he stood for but for love of the profits they could derive from him. The profits of the white minority were more important to them than the feelings of 4 million Africans. It was not surprising that the African people of Zimbabwe were bewildered by such policies. The Tanzanian delegation had been shocked to hear that some United States and United Kingdom companies were not only still trading with the illegal régime, but were also expanding their installations. He singled out those two countries because they had been loudest in the Security Council in calling for sanctions.

473. He affirmed once again the conviction of Africa that only force would bring down the illegal régime. While African history was stained with the blood shed by colonizers on very flimsy excuses, it was deplorable that force was not being used to crush the selfish, racist settlers. He hardly needed to remind the Special Committee of the thousands who had died in Africa to water the tree of freedom. In Tanganyika, during the Maji Maji war, the Germans admitted to having murdered 150,000 people. The story was the same in Algeria, Kenya, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), South West Africa and South Africa and, last but not least, Aden.

474. How long would the Western countries, especially the United Kingdom, continue to apply those double standards? He appealed to the United Kingdom and to the United States to practise abroad what they practised for their own people.

475. He assured the people of Zimbabwe of Tanzania's unqualified support. The Tanzanian people felt that the fight, suffering and humiliation of the people of Zimbabwe were their own fight, suffering and humiliation, and they would stand by them to the bitter end. Its stand had made Tanzania a target for propaganda and slander; that would never be a source of discouragement but rather of encouragement since it showed that the friends of colonialism were afraid.

476. The representative of *Zambia*, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, thanked the Special Committee for allowing a Zambian delegation to attend its meeting as an observer and said that his delegation was reassured by the concern with which the Committee was approaching the problems of southern Africa. He was very grateful for the goodwill which the members had shown towards Zambia in its present difficulties. The President of Zambia had already dealt with the problems of southern Africa in great detail in his address and there was very little to add.

477. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was far more a creation of the United Kingdom than a white settlers' conspiracy. With the unlamented break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, the United Kingdom had deliberately given almost the whole of the Federation's air force to Southern Rhodesia. That addition of considerable military strength to an already defiant white settler régime had made the Rhodesian question much more complex. The United Kingdom Government had deliberately strengthened Southern Rhodesia so that a unilateral declaration of independence could be made and white minority rule perpetuated in order to buttress the United Kingdom's economic and racial policies in southern Africa. If that was not so, then the politicians in Whitehall had been guilty of culpable political miscalculation and blindness. That was partly the reason why his country had always maintained that only

force could solve the Southern Rhodesian problem and that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to destroy what it had created. Southern Rhodesia was not only a threat to international peace and security, it was also a grave security problem for Zambia. The machinations of its intelligence activities had recently been exposed in the Press, in which connexion a significant fact had emerged from the evidence obtained, namely, that Zambia was being made to pay by the rebels and their allies for its human and noble principles both economically and in terms of security risks. Nevertheless, while he deplored those hardships, he considered that more than a fight for survival was involved. It was a political as well as a humane crusade and his people were proud to be active in the arduous but noble task of reclaiming lost human rights in southern Africa. Even if his country's geographical position had been different, it would still have applied itself with equal zeal to the liberation of mankind in Africa and throughout the world. It was an oasis of racial harmony and political and democratic justice in a desert of racism and oppression. His people believed that the Special Committee was charged with the responsibility of reclaiming that desert for all men, irrespective of colour, race or religion. He hoped that the Committee's stay in Zambia had helped the members to form a clearer picture of the situation and to realize how seriously Zambia regarded it.

478. The representative of *India* said that it was regrettable that, in spite of so many appeals, resolutions and condemnations, the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia continued to hold sway over 4 million African people, condemning them to slavery and subjugation. The petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee had provided very useful and material evidence which painted a dark and gloomy picture of the situation. His delegation thanked them for their efforts in collecting such valuable information and for presenting it in such an able and comprehensive manner.

479. The sole responsibility for encouraging the Rhodesian racists lay with the Government of the United Kingdom. It was pathetic to see how that Government had, over a period of more than forty years, allowed itself to be pressured by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia who had compelled it to grant them so-called self-government in 1923. Since that date they had demanded more power and had as constantly received it. In 1953 they had forced the United Kingdom Government to create the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, against the wishes of the African populations of the three federating units. The Federation had been dissolved at the end of 1963, thanks to the persistent and effective opposition of the African populations, but the Whites in Southern Rhodesia had managed to obtain control of such essential services as the air force, the railways and the vital Kariba Dam.

480. While the performance of the United Kingdom Government before November 1965 had been regrettable, its actions since that period had been inexcusable. It had announced that force would not be used against the Smith régime if it made a unilateral declaration of independence. The announcement made without any provocation or justification had eliminated whatever slight deterrent effect the United Kingdom statement of 28 October 1964 might have had on the minority régime at Salisbury. The United Kingdom Government had declared the action of the Smith régime to be

rebellion but had failed to take effective measures to crush it. The sanctions adopted so far had failed to produce the desired results. They might have had some effect on the economy of Southern Rhodesia but, as one of the petitioners had pointed out, their aim was to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime and in that they had failed miserably. They had, in fact, tended to unite the settlers behind the Rhodesian Front under the leadership of the fanatical Ian Smith who had stated, at the Party's annual congress in September 1966, that his régime would never deviate from the principles for which the Party stood and the promises it had made to the electorate. He had proudly told his co-gangsters that they were carrying out one of the most incredible exercises in contemporary history by standing up not to one great country only but to virtually the whole world.

481. Even on the economic front, sanctions had not been effective and were proving a blessing in disguise for the rebel régime. Many new industries had been established to reduce dependence on imports and the illegal régime had ready access to the world markets through South Africa and Portugal. He agreed with several delegations that the really effective and speedy means of bringing down the rebel régime was the use of force by the Government of the United Kingdom. As the President of Zambia had stated in his inaugural address, sanctions, to produce the desired result, needed to be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power, which was fully competent to take such action. His delegation and others had been accused of adopting double standards when the Committee had been discussing another item in New York but, if anybody was adopting double standards, it was the United Kingdom Government which had never before hesitated to use force in colonial Territories. The reason for the unwillingness of that Government to resort to force in Rhodesia was, of course, the fact that the rebels were whites and "kith and kin". In other words, the United Kingdom Government had one set of rules for Whites and another for non-Whites. The failure of the United Kingdom Government to crush the Salisbury rebellion would go down in history as its great betrayal of African interests.

482. All the petitioners had referred to collusion between Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal, an unholy alliance that had recently become both official and public. The defence ministers of South Africa and Portugal, at their recent conference, had proclaimed their common objective of resolutely pursuing the defence of their common positions in Africa. The aim of that alliance was to preserve the last bastion of white supremacy in southern Africa.

483. His delegation had been concerned to hear the recent rumours of renewed negotiations between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime. Any arrangement so made, without consulting the majority African population and on any basis other than that of the independence of Zimbabwe with universal suffrage, would be unacceptable to his delegation.

484. He supported the Chairman's appeal to the freedom fighters to unite. Their enemies, the minority régime at Salisbury and the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, had realized that their own survival depended on closing their ranks. That was doubly true for the freedom fighters since they lacked the resources which each of those three parties in-

dividually possessed. He paid a tribute to the nationalist movements for their untiring efforts and sacrifices in the face of the inhuman and barbarous methods adopted by the Rhodesian racists, who seemed to be trying to compete with their Portuguese allies in that respect.

485. The sanctions, completely meaningless and ineffective in their main objective, had caused immense hardship to the young Republic of Zambia. His delegation and Government greatly admired the resolution of the President, Government and people of Zambia and their determination to aid in the liberation of Zimbabwe. As the representative of India had said in the Security Council, a concerted programme of aid to Zambia to counteract those effects would have to be pursued as a matter of highest priority. His Government, which had already made a modest contribution for that purpose, was ready and willing to participate in such a programme to the full extent of its resources.

486. The course of history was irreversible and irrevocable. Nothing could prevent the forces of freedom in Africa from advancing to their goal. The Special Committee should direct its efforts towards speeding up the process. The cost might be heavy but the stakes were high—the freedom and independence of the 4 million people of Zimbabwe and the peace of the African continent.

487. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the position of his country with regard to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was too well known to require any detailed elaboration. It was, as ever, united with the other African countries, and with all countries dedicated to the cause of freedom, in the fight to liberate the people of Southern Rhodesia from the rebellious, colonial, racist régime that was currently holding them in cruel bondage. The role and responsibility of the United Nations in the liberation of colonial peoples had been clearly affirmed in the Charter and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The question of Southern Rhodesia had been under constant consideration by the Special Committee and had been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions. It had also been considered by the Security Council both before and after the illegal declaration of independence. The Council was expected to take up the question once again in June 1967 when it considered the Secretary-General's report<sup>23</sup> on the implementation of its resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.

488. The General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, had adopted two resolutions on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee. In resolution 2138 (XXI) it had condemned any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which did not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and reaffirmed the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote". In its resolution 2151 (XXI) the General Assembly, while reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, deplored the failure of the United Kingdom Government to put an end to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and condemned the activities of

<sup>23</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967, documents S/7781 and Add.1 and 2.*

those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, were preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In the same resolution, the General Assembly had also drawn the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia in order that it might consider whether to apply the necessary enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Between 8 and 16 December 1966, the Security Council, at the request of the United Kingdom Government, had met to resume its consideration of the matter and, on 16 December 1966, had adopted resolution 232 (1966) in which it reaffirmed its previous resolution and, acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, had determined that the current situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and had called on all States to take a number of measures laid down in operative paragraphs 2 and 5. The United Nations resolutions to which he had just referred were only a few of the very recent ones.

489. When the United Nations had begun discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government opposed intervention by the world body in that Territory on the ground that it was self-governing. When in 1965 the Smith régime had declared its independence unilaterally, the United Kingdom Government had assured the world that the rebels would be forced to surrender in a matter of weeks. Nearly two years later, the preposterous Smith régime was still holding fast. Had the United Kingdom been serious in giving its assurance? Certainly the assurance was in complete contradiction to what appeared to be the current policy of the United Kingdom Government, namely "to pass the ball" to the United Nations under conditions which would make any United Nations action either impossible or ineffective. Its policy had, from the outset, been characterized by contradictions and by what President Kaunda had described as "prohibitive procrastination". As if its indecisive attitude were not enough to encourage the rebellious spirit in Southern Rhodesia, it had continued to vacillate, engaging in negotiations with Smith while endeavouring to absolve itself of any responsibility for the situation and to convince the world that everything possible was being done to restore constitutional rule. The rebels had put the interval to good use. They had created a political vacuum by imprisoning opposition leaders and had strengthened their monopoly of power by introducing repressive measures aimed at keeping the 4 million Africans in a permanent state of servitude.

490. The current intolerable state of affairs was the sole responsibility of the United Kingdom Government and not of the United Nations, which had inherited the problems in southern Africa from that country. Most, if not all, of those problems would not have existed if the United Kingdom had faithfully discharged its responsibilities towards the majority of the people living in that unhappy region. A rebel régime had been in control of Southern Rhodesia for nearly two years and the administering Power was obliged to use all possible means, including the use of force, to suppress that rebellion. India had learned from bitter experience that half-hearted measures could not thwart aggressive designs. It was only when they were

faced with determined and decisive action that aggressors gave up their evil plans. It was time the United Nations "passed the ball" back to the United Kingdom Government and appealed to it to live up to its grave responsibilities.

491. The representative of *Iran* said he had studied with the utmost care and attention the information given by the petitioners about developments in Southern Rhodesia and the information contained in working papers prepared by the Secretariat. Those sources, together with the brilliant and descriptive analysis by the President of Zambia (see chapter II, paras. 202-237), had given him a very clear and complete picture of the problem in Southern Rhodesia, a picture that was indeed unhappy and disheartening. The continuation of the sordid tyranny inflicted upon the people of Zimbabwe had only been made possible by a combination of political, economic, military and social factors operating in favour of the rebel régime. The challenge to the United Nations was indeed serious.

492. Although Iran was geographically very distant from Southern Rhodesia, the determination of its people to eradicate colonialism, racism and all other forms of injustice made them comrades-in-arms of the people of Zimbabwe, and his Government under the dynamic leadership of His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr had laid down as one of the foundations of its foreign policy the pursuit of world peace through justice. He stressed that the word used was "justice" and not "law" for the reason that the latter was a static concept primarily intended to maintain the *status quo*, while the former was a dynamic concept which offered the best hope of a lasting peace. To illustrate his meaning, he quoted the following passage from the book by Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr, Shahanshah of Iran, entitled *The White Revolution of Iran*:<sup>24</sup>

"Is it not a truism that the more rigorous the execution of the laws promulgated in a country where power is in the hands of a racist minority régime, the greater the injustice prevailing in that society? Is it not a truism also that under a fully democratic system where all political precepts are established but where a democratic distribution of wealth is lacking, those people who enjoy greater economic advantages are much better placed to secure for themselves the passage of laws necessary for the continuation of their existing conditions and advantages? Man's real progress in this day and age depends primarily on loosening the fetters with which, over the centuries, the privileged few have tied the hands and feet of the deprived masses. It is the duty of every Government and State to make its contribution to human society and world peace, through the establishment of justice in all its aspects, whether social or judicial, political or economic."

493. Southern Rhodesia was a vivid example of the type of society to which his sovereign referred. The laws enacted, or to be enacted, by the racist minority régime of Salisbury, such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or the proposed Preventive Detention Amendment Bill, were among the most oppressive in the world. Peace could only return to the Territory with the establishment of justice. United Nations efforts to obtain majority rule by persuasion had been of no avail. Selective mandatory sanctions had produced no results and, under existing conditions,

<sup>24</sup> Teheran, The Imperial Pahlavi Library, May 1967.

there was no hope of their toppling the minority régime. The only effective means of restoring the legitimate rights of the Zimbabwe people was the use of force by the authority responsible for the Territory, namely, the United Kingdom. That Power was morally bound to use every means at its disposal to discharge its responsibilities towards the population of Zimbabwe and the use of force in this case would be nothing more than a police action.

494. In accordance with its policy of opposing colonialism as a threat to world peace, his delegation had constantly sponsored or supported every resolution calling for an end to the Smith régime. Despite heavy financial losses, Iran had been the first to respond to the Security Council's call for economic sanctions against the rebel régime while, since the adoption of selective mandatory sanctions, all its commercial ties with Southern Rhodesia had been broken. If sanctions were to be effective, they needed to be complete and comprehensive, while the establishment of a co-ordination or supervisory machinery would be most valuable to implement and enforce them.

495. The African population of the Territory should also play its part in the joint effort to topple the Smith régime and the intensified activities of its two major political parties were very encouraging. He joined with the Chairman in appealing to them to redouble their efforts until freedom was won, in which connexion his delegation had suggested the organization of a passive resistance movement. He wished them every success and assured them of the full support of his Government and people as evidenced by his delegation's sponsorship of the draft resolution.

496. The representative of *Chile* said that he would not speak at length on the problem of Southern Rhodesia, the various aspects of which he had already discussed during a previous statement and when he had made the proposal, adopted by the Special Committee, to transmit the petitioners' statements to the Security Council and to appeal to the United Kingdom to secure the release of political prisoners and to prevent the introduction of the *apartheid* system in Southern Rhodesia. He merely wished to draw attention to a fundamental fact emerging from the petitioners' statements, namely that the selective economic sanctions had failed and that the rebel régime was in control of the situation and was in the process of consolidating the hateful yoke of tyranny and racial discrimination which it had imposed on the African majority of the population. The responsibility for that failure lay not only with South Africa and Portugal but also with certain companies and certain States which were co-operating with the minority régime.

497. When his country had supported the resolution on Southern Rhodesia adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, he had explained that the traditional attitude of the Latin American countries which opposed the use of force in international relations, did not run counter to the appeal to the United Kingdom to use all means, including force, to re-establish legality. Southern Rhodesia was not a State recognized by the international community. It was a Territory under British administration which had rebelled against the administering Power and installed a régime which was offensive to the international community. It was therefore proper for the administering Power to put an end to the rebellion. The failure of the sanctions justified the stronger and more effective

measures recommended by the Committee, namely the use of force by the administering Power.

498. The representative of *Finland* recalled that he had expressed the views of his Government on Southern Rhodesia in his opening statement a few days before (see chapter II, paras. 287-294), namely, that it was strongly opposed to the illegal Smith régime, which, in defiance of virtually unanimous world opinion, continued to oppress the African people.

499. His delegation considered that no peaceful effort should be spared to rectify the situation and enable the African people of Zimbabwe to choose their own future in their own country. In accordance with the Security Council's resolutions, trade between Southern Rhodesia and his country had ceased. It was very regrettable that the mandatory sanctions had not yet produced decisive results, and his delegation deeply deplored the fact that Portugal and South Africa, whose participation in the sanctions was of particular importance, had continued their political and economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in defiance of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) which was legally binding on all Member States.

500. Sanctions, in order to be effective, needed to be comprehensive and to receive the full support of Member States, all of which should stand behind the Security Council's decision and should be prepared to take further and bolder measures if the sanctions produced no results. That was of vital importance not only for the people of Zimbabwe but also for the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. It should, however, be borne in mind that it was the first time the world body had resorted to mandatory economic sanctions in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter.

501. He thanked the petitioners for the valuable information they had furnished to the Special Committee. He had listened with great care and deep emotion to what they had said concerning their devoted struggle for freedom and the sufferings of their people. His country greatly sympathized with their noble cause and hoped that the day would soon come when they would be able to take their place in a society free from discrimination.

502. The representative of *Poland* said that the question of Southern Rhodesia had first come before the United Nations almost five years before. In 1962, the predecessor of the present Committee, the Committee of Seventeen, had established that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Article 73 e of the Charter. Since then, Southern Rhodesia had become a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee. Many resolutions had been adopted requesting the administering Power to implement within that Territory the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

503. Until 1965, however, the United Kingdom had denied the right of the United Nations to consider the problem of Southern Rhodesia and had asserted that developments there were well under its control. It had ignored all recommendations and requests that it should use its residual powers to grant independence to the people of Zimbabwe. Events had shown that the passive inaction of the United Kingdom had given the white settler minority time to strengthen its position and to prepare for a unilateral declaration of independence. Its policy of non-compliance with United Nations resolu-



tions on Southern Rhodesia had paved the way for Smith's usurpation of power. Although the United Kingdom had stigmatized the unilateral declaration of independence by the South Rhodesian front as an act of rebellion, it had taken no effective steps to quell it but had adopted a hesitant and a weak attitude and had thus encouraged the settlers in their defiance by assuring them that, in no circumstances, would force be used against them. Despite warnings from African and many other Member States that half measures would never bring down the rebel régime, the Security Council had, at the instance of the United Kingdom, adopted a programme of selective mandatory sanctions. The evidence given by the petitioners and the working paper prepared by the Secretariat showed that South Africa and Portugal were assisting the régime in Southern Rhodesia to defeat the selective sanctions and that Southern Rhodesian minerals and crops were being sold to major international concerns established in Japan, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. Sanctions had, in fact, proved to be a failure and the racist régime was continuing its illegal course in defiance of the administering Power and of various United Nations resolutions.

504. Since the General Assembly had last discussed the matter, the situation in the Territory had taken a turn for the worse: the régime had consolidated itself and had intensified its oppressive measures against the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe. It was assuming new powers and moving even further in the direction of a full police State with institutional *apartheid*. It was introducing legislation on separate development that would divide the country along racial and tribal lines. It was expanding its armed forces and increasing its military allocations by about 20 per cent. The petitioners had informed the Special Committee that military experts from the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries had been brought to Southern Rhodesia to train the Rhodesian armed forces.

505. It had always been his delegation's view that the question of Southern Rhodesia could not be considered in isolation from the other colonial and racial problems in southern Africa. The collusion between Vorster, Salazar and Smith in perpetuating white supremacy in southern Africa supported that contention. The whole area was covered by a network of foreign financial monopolies which ruthlessly exploited and provided an umbrella for the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime. In fact, the foreign companies and industrial combines were keeping the colonial régime in being since they considered that it created a favourable climate for their investments. The responsibility for that situation lay entirely with the administering Power and its allies, which, either directly or indirectly, were violating United Nations resolutions despite the fact that it was the duty of the United Kingdom Government to crush the rebellion and make it possible for the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

506. The representative of the *United States of America* said that few issues in the history of the United Nations had produced such near unanimity among Members as the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. Previous speakers had emphasized that the United Kingdom must bear the heaviest responsibility for that situation, as was recognized by the Security Council and acknowledged by the United Kingdom itself.

507. Despite that clear-cut assignment of responsibility, most Members of the United Nations had viewed the matter from the outset as being of individual concern to themselves. The majority had dedicated themselves to attaining establishment of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and to taking specific action, in concert, to achieve those goals, in many cases at considerable sacrifice.

508. The reasons why the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) had evoked such a determined response from so many nations was because a basic moral issue was at stake: the principle of "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". The rebel régime was committed to the violation of that principle.

509. His delegation could well understand the apprehensions of the African countries, especially Zambia, concerning developments in Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had chosen to evolve a multiracial society, in which the majority ruled but where the rights of minorities were protected. His delegation considered that to be the only formula for political and social evolution which would further peace, freedom and progress.

510. When the efforts of the United Kingdom to bring majority rule to Southern Rhodesia had failed, the United Kingdom had called upon the United Nations in the belief that its co-operation was necessary if a peaceful solution were to be found. The basic aim of the United Nations action had been to make the illegal Smith régime understand that the international community would not tolerate the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of a discriminatory political system based on minority rule. The United Nations had sought to fulfil its aims by peaceful means, in accordance with its Charter. His Government had supported all the measures adopted by the Security Council and had scrupulously seen to their implementation. United States reaction to UDI had been quick and unequivocal. Immediately after the event the United States representative in the Council, Mr. Goldberg, had said:

"The event which has brought us into this Council this morning is one of the most shocking that has transpired since the dawn of the present era of decolonization and is fraught with the gravest of consequences.

"A small, stubborn and sadly mistaken minority has seized sole power in an effort to dominate the lives of the vast and unwilling majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia."<sup>25</sup>

He had concluded his statement by exhorting the Council to "make resoundingly clear our conviction that a small and forlorn and misguided group of men cannot for long reverse the historic trend of twentieth-century Africa towards self-determination and freedom."<sup>26</sup>

511. Since that statement had been made, the Smith régime had intensified its discrimination against the African majority. Under the extended Emergency Powers Act, new laws conferring broad powers of arrest, censorship and other curtailments of human rights had been introduced that were shocking to anyone concerned about civil liberties. Vivid evidence had been provided by the petitioners on that subject.

<sup>25</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, 1257th meeting, paras. 73 and 74.*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 92.



512. The United States Government had given unstinting support to the increasingly strong measures adopted by the Security Council. It was irrevocably dedicated to the principle of self-determination by and for the people of Southern Rhodesia and independence on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. His own country had experienced the agonies of civil war a century before as the result of an effort to legitimize the principle of racial superiority, and had worked long and hard to rid itself of that false, hateful doctrine; it could hardly pretend to ignore overseas the very inequality it had fought at home.

513. In ordering, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, mandatory economic sanctions of a substantial nature, the Security Council had taken a historic step. That step meant that for the first time in the history of the United States, certain activities in international trade were to be prohibited pursuant to a Security Council order. As a major trading and investing country, the United States had had a wide variety of economic links with Southern Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration.

514. The process of economic disengagement had of necessity involved a complex series of economic controls. His delegation had reported to the Special Committee in 1966, in considerable detail, on the steps taken to carry out the Security Council's resolution of 20 November 1965 (217 (1965)). The Council's action of 16 December 1966 (resolution 232 (1966)) had immediately led to a new series of measures by the United States Government to broaden and tighten controls.

515. The Executive Order to carry out the Security Council's resolution had been signed on 5 January 1967. On 1 February 1967 the United States Commerce Department had issued an order to implement the terms of the resolution with regard to the transport of Rhodesian goods, and on 2 March 1967, the Treasury Department had issued orders covering restrictions on imports. Action to control exports had already been taken by the Commerce Department.

516. The United States sanctions programme was in full effect, with no loop-holes, and violation was a serious criminal offence carrying penalties of up to ten years' imprisonment, a \$10,000 fine, or both.

517. The process of economic disengagement had involved a loss of trade worth many millions of dollars to the United States. It had posed problems for United States industry because of the loss of an important source of some critically needed raw materials, and the dislocation of trade and investment patterns would no doubt have lasting effects. He mentioned that not to claim any credit for the steps taken by his Government, for as a member of the Security Council, his Government had strongly supported their adoption and implementation. Other countries, including Zambia, had suffered far more seriously, accepting very considerable sacrifices.

518. He had referred to the disruption of United States trade and investment because he had observed that, whenever the question of Southern Rhodesia was discussed, delegations representing countries whose trade with Southern Rhodesia was small or non-existent boasted of their supposed "full compliance" with the Security Council resolutions and levelled unfounded charges at countries that had had substantial economic links with Southern Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration of independence, and were there-

fore encountering problems in implementing those resolutions. Some delegations had even claimed to see a sinister capitalist plot behind recent developments, arguing that the process of economic disengagement was in reality an effort to entrench capitalist interest in Southern Rhodesia. The fact was that the United States had reduced its exports to Southern Rhodesia from \$23 million to \$7 million, i.e., 65 per cent, between 1965 and 1966, before mandatory sanctions had been put into effect.

519. The steps taken by his Government were specific and significant actions, not hollow statements. The United States was one of the twelve countries which by 15 May 1967 had supplied the Secretariat with full information on their trade. His Government was taking those steps willingly because it wished to play an active part in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia under the Charter. As President Kennedy had declared to the General Assembly in 1961: "Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my country intends to be a participant, and not merely an observer, in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of self-determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support."<sup>27</sup> That was still his Government's policy.

520. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Zambian representative, who had taken part in the Special Committee's work and had outlined the deplorable situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, where 4 million Africans were suffering under the control of the Smith régime.

521. The statements of a number of representatives and petitioners had drawn attention to the machinations of the Western Powers, South Africa and Portugal, which were directed towards maintaining the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

522. The situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to be an abnormal one. If the United Nations resolution concerning the Territory was not implemented, the responsibility would rest with the United Kingdom and with those NATO countries which were supporting the United Kingdom's policy with regard to Southern Rhodesia. The statements of many delegations, including those of the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania, India, Bulgaria, Chile and Poland, showed clearly that the Western Powers, while urging implementation of the Security Council's decisions, continued to maintain economic relations with the rebel régime. The United States representative had attempted to justify his country's failure to apply sanctions. He had spoken of the economic relations between the United States and Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the arguments advanced would convince no one. It was sufficient to refer to an article in the current issue of the *Times of Zambia*, entitled "Rhodesia Laughs at Sanctions", which plainly stated which countries were giving assistance to the Smith régime. The United States representative's arguments merely emphasized the fact that the Western Powers' main reason for not implementing the United Nations resolution was to protect the interest of the monopolies. His delegation unreservedly condemned the activities of those foreign interests which were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining independence.

<sup>27</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1013th meeting, para. 76.

523. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that all members of the Special Committee were aware that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom after the unilateral declaration of independence had failed miserably. Oil flowed into Southern Rhodesia from South Africa and Mozambique; Southern Rhodesian sugar and tobacco were sold all over the world; and ships of countries claiming to uphold the sanctions were taking goods to and from Southern Rhodesia. Machinery and spare parts banned under the Security Council resolution were supplied to the rebel régime by Portugal and South Africa. However, modern machinery was designed to last a long time and the effect of an embargo on spare parts would only make itself felt after years. Many Governments had stated that they would not ship arms or machinery to the rebel régime, but it was well known that Southern Rhodesia was receiving such goods. What, in fact, had those Governments done to check and to ensure that the goods banned under the Security Council's resolution were not sent?

524. Sanctions alone had failed, but his delegation believed that they could have been effective if they had been total and mandatory, and combined with the use of force. The rebellion had come about because of the intransigence of the United Kingdom Government, which had never really wished to give up Southern Rhodesia to the people of Zimbabwe. The Smith régime had been given time to consolidate its position. Industries were being diversified and items previously imported were being produced. The only group that had suffered were the Africans, who had been thrown out of jobs and whose educational facilities had been reduced, while employment and education for white men were safeguarded. In fact, sanctions had only hurt the Africans, and those countries that declared themselves against the use of force would make sure that the Africans continued to suffer.

525. Ian Smith was turning the Territory into another South Africa: a bill to that end was in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. It was hard for the Special Committee when meeting in New York to be aware of the radio and other propaganda carried out by the Smith régime; but during its visit to Zambia, members had been able to see for themselves the régime's attempts to influence the minds of Africans within and outside the Territory.

526. He had been impressed by the contrast between the Zambian and Rhodesian sides of the border. On the Zambian side the control post was some way away from the bridge; on the Rhodesian side it was at the very end of the bridge, and any movement towards the Rhodesian side aroused the attention of armed guards. No one was to be allowed to observe the crimes committed in the Territory. The situation had arisen because of the intransigence of the United Kingdom Government. Moreover the sword of Damocles was hanging over Zambia in the shape of the Kariba Dam, on the Rhodesian side of the border. The administering Power could not shirk its responsibility by attempting to turn it over to the United Nations. Mr. Wilson should have the courage to take a decision, however unpopular, to use force to end the rebellion. The United Kingdom must be bold if it wished the United Nations to have faith in it. Africans had fought and lost their lives for the United Kingdom in two world wars, for a cause that was not their own. The United King-

dom should show its willingness to fight for a cause for which it alleged support, and take the necessary steps to quell the rebellion. However, the main issue was not rebellion but independence for the Zimbabwe people.

527. The representative of *Yugoslavia* thanked the petitioners who had provided vivid new evidence of the further crimes committed by the evil racist régime of Ian Smith against the gallant people of Zimbabwe. His Government and people would continue to support their just struggle for full independence and freedom.

528. In reviewing the problem of Southern Rhodesia, it was essential to bear in mind the fact that all measures thus far taken to liquidate the illegal Smith régime had been in vain. Indeed there was growing evidence that the régime was fortifying itself and extending its evil policies by introducing a new constitution and the abhorrent policy of *apartheid*. The racist régime had begun to follow in the footsteps of South Africa. Its reasoning was clear; the United Nations during the past twenty years had failed to overcome the racist policies of South Africa and there was every reason to believe that the Smith régime would obtain similar protection from the same countries. Those calculations had, regrettably, been justified.

529. The crux of the matter did not lie in the resistance of the Smith régime to the steps taken by the United Nations. The efforts of the countries responsible for the present situation to limit the issue to that resistance constituted an attempt to mislead public opinion and thus gain time to consolidate the régime. The real question at stake in the case of all the racist régimes in southern Africa was the wider interests of colonialists and neo-colonialists, forces and monopolies, who wished illegally to exploit the wealth of Africa, and to secure political and military outposts from which to exert pressure against the newly liberated countries and jeopardize their development. Such a policy, based as it was on the use of force, constituted a threat to the emancipation and free development of the world as a whole, and President Kaunda, in his wise and comprehensive address, had warned the Special Committee of the consequences of continuing it.

530. His delegation considered that the Special Committee's basic function was to shed light on the situation faced by the international community in Southern Rhodesia, and to take measures to eliminate the causes of that situation. Responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia fell upon the United Kingdom under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with which that country had not complied. The delaying tactics of the United Kingdom had enabled Smith to carry out his plan. After the unilateral declaration of independence, the Government of the United Kingdom had stated that it would be responsible for crushing the rebel régime. The majority of States Members of the United Nations had stressed the need for military force as the only way to put down the régime, but the United Kingdom and other Western Powers had insisted that other methods could be used. The majority of Member States were doubtful, however, as to the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government's intentions to eliminate the Smith régime, and the continuance of the racist régime in Salisbury had proved that those doubts were justified. The present situation and the failure of the measures taken by the United Kingdom could only lead to the conclusion that certain Western countries with economic

and political interests in southern Africa had, from the very beginning, wanted the sanctions to fail.

531. The majority of the Special Committee members, including his own delegation, had from the very beginning pointed out that economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia could be effective only if they were carried out by all countries. The racist régimes of Portugal and South Africa had, of course, ignored the decisions of the United Nations and given Southern Rhodesia full economic, moral and political assistance. In view of the circumstances, belief in the effectiveness of economic sanctions would be extremely naïve. As the petitioners had confirmed, Southern Rhodesia continued to receive supplies; new industries were being established; more foreign investments were being made; and companies with capital from the West were continuing to co-operate. The fact that Southern Rhodesia had a two-year supply of oil was the best indication of the support received by the Smith régime.

532. In view of the failure of the measures taken, it was clear that only the use of military force could destroy the illegal racist régime. It would be quite in order to ask the United Kingdom Government what measures it intended to adopt since those which it had already taken had proved a failure. Judging from a statement by the United Kingdom Foreign Minister, Mr. Brown, to the Security Council at its 1331st meeting on 8 December 1966, it would be logical to infer that the United Kingdom would in the end decide to use military force. But in view of the fact that there were no indications that the United Kingdom was ready to take such an action, his delegation felt that sponsors of the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia were fully justified in recommending that the Security Council undertake the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Reluctance to undertake extreme measures would jeopardize the prestige of the United Nations.

533. The case of Southern Rhodesia had demonstrated that the action of the United Nations against racialism would not be effective in isolation. The Special Committee should, therefore, work out a series of measures to be undertaken in concert by all Member States against all racist régimes at the same time. Only thus would it be possible to prevent some racist Governments from helping other racist Governments. His delegation was confident that such action would finally end the growing danger in southern Africa and contribute to the removal of colonialism from the face of the earth.

534. The representative of *Australia* said that Australia had been one of the first countries to impose economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia after the illegal declaration of independence; its action had preceded Security Council resolution 217 (1965). His Government's policy was to oppose minority rule and the denial of basic democratic rights to the African population of Southern Rhodesia. It considered the present Government to be illegal and would support all peaceful measures to hasten the restoration of legal government. Australia would not consider equitable a situation in which any one group, majority or minority, imposed its will upon the other. In the Chairman's own thoughtful words: "The Europeans in Rhodesia must be prepared to live side by side with the Africans." In the words of the distinguished petitioner from ZANU, Australia would not consider equitable a situation in which any one group, be it large or small, imposed its will upon the other, denying it the elementary freedoms.

535. The Australian Government and people did not condone the practice of imprisoning one's political opponents, and condemned it even more severely when the opponent was denied the right of fair trial and had no recourse to due process of law based on the principle that all men were equal. His Government's opposition to the policy of *apartheid*, moreover, had been made clear on many occasions. It regarded the concept that one man was inherently inferior to another as quite untenable.

536. The representative of *Italy* said that the position of Italy on the question of Southern Rhodesia was very clear. The answers given by the petitioners had confirmed his delegation's concern about the situation created by the determination with which the Salisbury régime was persevering in its defiance of the United Nations and, according to the most recent news received, the progressive application of measures to enforce discrimination, *apartheid*, and the denial to the African majority of the benefits of education, social welfare, justice and equal employment opportunities. That was why the Italian Government had had no hesitation, even before the mandatory decision of the Security Council, in taking action to ensure the economic isolation of the Salisbury régime when persuasion and negotiation had apparently failed.

537. The representative of *Iraq* said that the petitioners' statements had shown beyond any doubt that the strategy of the imperialist and racist régimes was to stand together economically, financially and militarily in the face of the powerful tide of nationalism in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world. It had also become obvious that the cause of freedom was the same in Angola, South West Africa, South Africa, Mozambique, Palestine, Aden, Oman and every other land where the forces of exploitation were striving to ensure their continued existence in the subjugated areas. The fact had also been established that the United Kingdom and its business-minded allies applied a double standard of behaviour and values in their relations with the oppressed peoples and with the United Nations itself. Some leading countries had mastered the art of hiding behind what was described as "private" activities in continuing the flow of capital and material support to the bastion of racism, prejudice and fascism in southern Africa. Such tactics had preserved that bastion and had practically nullified the effects of sanctions under a well-calculated plan of action. Seventy-two countries had already declared their support of sanctions and others were in the process of doing so, including all Southern Rhodesia's major trading partners. But the colonial Powers had turned about and made even greater investments in the areas subject to sanctions.

538. All means of bringing about a peaceful change had failed and force was the only possibility left. It was high time that all freedom-loving nations started thinking of boycotting the colonial Powers that continued to deal with the racist Governments. Those Powers needed the markets, natural resources and goodwill of the freedom-loving peoples: they should be shown that those peoples stood by their fundamental objectives, which could not be sacrificed. Those Powers should be made to realize their need of the assistance and co-operation of the freedom-loving peoples. Such action would require much sacrifice and self-denial but, together with the use of force and the local mobilization of national liberation movements, it could bring the day of victory much nearer. It was no use waiting any

longer for the imperialists and business-minded Powers to further the cause of freedom. Their assistance was only weighed against calculations of the material return on the transaction. Human misery and sufferings had no place in their ledger books or cash registers. He appealed to the liberation movements to work together in Africa, the Middle East and wherever the fight for freedom and independence was going on. He assured them of Iraq's total and continuous support until the day that the victory over colonialism, racism and all types of exploitation was won.

539. The representative of *Tunisia* said that he had already stated his Government's views on the question of Southern Rhodesia at a previous meeting. His delegation had been much interested to hear the evidence of the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee. It was grateful to them for the valuable information they had given and assured them of the Tunisian Government's support. Their evidence had confirmed that there must be urgent and effective action if the situation in Southern Rhodesia was to be rectified and if the 4 million Africans were to be given back the rights of which they had been illegally deprived by the white minority. The sanctions so far applied had proved ineffective. The endless negotiations with the Ian Smith government appeared to have encouraged it to harden its position and intensify its repressive measures. All the peaceful solutions recommended by the United Kingdom had been unworkable. Recourse to force seemed now to be the only way to rectify the situation so that a referendum, based on the principle of "one man, one vote", could be held in the Territory. Such a referendum would allow the majority to express their wishes and choose their future. The United Kingdom, which had consistently claimed responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, must take the measures necessary for the restoration of the rule of law. The resolution co-sponsored by his delegation did no more than describe the situation in Southern Rhodesia and recommend solutions which were still possible. All States Members of the United Nations, and more especially the developed countries, should bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom so that it might finally take the steps required to restore order in Southern Rhodesia and enable the Zimbabwe people to recover their legitimate rights and exercise their sovereignty.

540. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he had already explained his delegation's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia: it had condemned the illegal racist minority régime of Ian Smith in the most categorical manner; it had spoken of the United Kingdom's responsibility, as administering Power, for the failure of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council; and had pointed to the flagrant violation of those sanctions by South Africa and Portugal. Venezuela had no relations whatever with the illegal régime and had applied, and would continue to apply, all the requisite measures, just as it would continue to support the fight of the Zimbabwe people for self-determination. In conclusion, he thanked the petitioners for the new evidence of colonial oppression they had provided. The importance his delegation attached to their statements was shown by the support it had given to the Chilean proposal that the records containing the petitioners' evidence should be sent to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council. Venezuela unreservedly supported the people of Zimbabwe in its fight for liberation.

541. The representative of *Madagascar* said that the Malagasy people were closely following the course of events in Southern Rhodesia. The additional proofs furnished by the petitioners had strengthened the already strong case against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, which constituted a threat to international peace and security.

542. The policies of racial discrimination and segregation pursued in Southern Rhodesia, which rode roughshod over the rights and dignity of an entire people, had been unreservedly condemned by international opinion, as the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee amply demonstrated.

543. The peoples committed to peace and freedom were determined to support the Zimbabwe people in their heroic struggle. His delegation, in conjunction with the other delegations represented on the Special Committee, would spare no effort to seek appropriate ways and means to enable the Zimbabwe people to obtain their freedom and independence without delay.

544. The Malagasy Republic appreciated the United Kingdom's efforts to solve the Rhodesian problem at their true worth. His country had never believed in the efficacy of selective economic sanctions, and events had proved it right. The sanctions were not being applied by all States, and in particular not by South Africa and Portugal. His delegation considered, moreover, that economic sanctions should also be taken against those two countries.

545. Now that it was realized that selective economic sanctions did not work, the United Kingdom Government should be asked to take immediately, by resorting to force if necessary, whatever action was needed to end the illegal Ian Smith régime and ensure the immediate implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

546. The Malagasy Republic had consistently advocated a policy of non-violence and had always favoured the peaceful settlement of colonial crises. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, however, no peaceful solution was possible, and there was thus no alternative but to resort to force. Furthermore, his Government was surprised at the present inertia of the United Kingdom Government, which, in other colonies, had no hesitation in using force to crush nationalist movements.

547. It was for the United Kingdom, and for no other country, to use force to crush the Rhodesian rebellion. The United Kingdom was entirely responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had a duty to lead the Zimbabwe people to independence.

548. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that his delegation considered the situation in Southern Rhodesia extremely serious and a threat to international peace and security. The United Kingdom itself had recognized that that was so by twice appealing to the United Nations for help in finding ways to ensure the effectiveness of the economic sanctions. Those appeals to the international community had seemed sincere, and there had been grounds for believing that the administering Power was ready to use all the means at its disposal to restore order in Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, developments had proved the contrary to be the case. The economic sanctions had not worked, and the Ian Smith régime even appeared to have strengthened its position. His delegation still believed that the Rhodesian problem was a matter for the United Kingdom to deal with, and it was surprised that the adminis-

tering Power remained passive, displaying not the slightest intention of using other means.

#### D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

##### 1. *Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning recent developments in the Territory*

549. At the 523rd meeting, on 6 June 1967, the representative of *Chile* referred to the statement by Mr. Chitepo (ZANU), particularly that part of the statement (see paras. 396-441) dealing with mandatory sanctions and a new system of *apartheid* in Southern Rhodesia and proposed that the Special Committee should draw the Security Council's attention to it and to the debate on it. The Council must be informed that, in many cases, the mandatory sanctions which it had decided to apply remained a dead letter. Moreover, the fact that Southern Rhodesia was promulgating legislation on *apartheid* similar to that in force in South Africa was a development with irreparable consequences.

550. He therefore asked whether the Special Committee was ready to adopt a formal resolution on the matter, or at least to take a majority decision on the three following possible courses of action: sending copies of the record of the petitioners' statements and of the debate on them to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; appealing to the administering Power to secure the immediate release of political prisoners in general, and Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in particular; and asking the administering Power to oppose the promulgation of legislation to institute *apartheid*. The adoption of those three courses of action would by no means preclude the Committee's taking a decision on the problem of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

551. The representative of *Venezuela* endorsed the Chilean representative's proposal.

552. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* endorsed the remarks of the representative of *Chile* and supported his very constructive proposal. It was high time that all evidence concerning the flouting of the Security Council's resolutions by countries which paid lip-service to them was submitted to the Council. The evidence collected would help the Council to take effective measures and show which nations were adopting a hypocritical attitude and which were in favour of freedom and peace.

553. *The Chairman* suggested that the Special Committee might reach a consensus on the basis of the Chilean proposal, which had been supported by the representatives of *Venezuela* and the *United Republic of Tanzania*.

554. The representative of *Italy* said that he would be willing to go along with that kind of proposal, which he thought might be useful.

555. *The Chairman* read out the text of a draft consensus on the question of Southern Rhodesia (see para. 564 below).

556. The representative of the *United States of America*, supported by the representative of *Australia*, said that his delegation could agree to the transmission of the records to the Security Council, but for practical reasons he would have to reserve its position on paragraphs 2 and 3. The United Kingdom Government was not in control in Southern Rhodesia and did not therefore have the power to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole.

557. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that there was no question of challenging

the right of any delegation to reserve its position. It was common knowledge, however, that the United Kingdom Government had always claimed sole responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The consensus called directly upon the United Kingdom Government as administering Power, to take measures to ensure the release of all political prisoners. As long as the United Kingdom was the administering Power for Southern Rhodesia, it must be called upon to take those measures; no other country could be expected to do so.

558. The whole world had refused to recognize the illegal minority racist régime of Ian Smith and, if the United Kingdom Government did not take suitable action, it should be requested to join with the world community in taking effective measures to remedy the situation and to ensure the liberation of the African people in Southern Rhodesia.

559. The representative of *Venezuela* agreed with the representative of *Chile* that the release of political prisoners and the promulgation of laws on *apartheid* were matters within the exclusive purview of the administering Power, the United Kingdom.

560. The representative of *Bulgaria* asked for clarification of the United States representative's reservation. To whom was the Special Committee to address its appeal if not to the United Kingdom as administering Power?

561. The representative of the *United States of America* replied that he had not questioned the right or propriety of the Special Committee to reach a consensus or to transmit the records of its meetings to the Security Council; he had merely reserved his delegation's position, as had been done in the past. His reservation was based on the fact that it would be impracticable to address such an appeal to the United Kingdom Government, since that Government was no longer in control of affairs in Southern Rhodesia.

562. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation construed paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed consensus as an appeal to the United Kingdom Government to do what it could to implement the Special Committee's request.

563. The representative of *Finland* said that he would like to associate himself with the interpretation given by the representative of *Italy*.

564. On the basis of the proposal of the representative of *Chile*, the Special Committee, at its 523rd meeting on 6 June 1967, adopted a consensus on the question of Southern Rhodesia, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the records of the meeting. The full text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 6 June 1967, reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*

*"1. Decides to transmit to the President of the Security Council the records of its debates on the question of Southern Rhodesia, including the testimony submitted by the petitioners, following the conclusion of its consideration of that question;*

*"2. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent the passage of the bill now before the so-called Parliament of the illegal racist minority*



régime, which would have the effect of entrenching *apartheid* policies in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. *Appeals* to the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure the release of all political prisoners and detainees held by the illegal racist minority régime, particularly Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole."

565. The text of the consensus, together with the records of the debates on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 16 June 1967.<sup>28</sup>

## 2. Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia

566. At the 525th meeting, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407).

567. Introducing the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407), the representative of Yugoslavia said that although the text was self-explanatory, he wished to comment briefly on the paragraphs that the sponsors considered to be of particular importance. Referring to the preamble, it appeared logical to the sponsors to regret the absence of the administering Power, namely the United Kingdom, from the present deliberations of the Committee, since the administering Power alone was responsible for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and had an obligation to bring down the illegal régime in the Territory. It was also logical to recall General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which was the basis of the Committee's deliberations, as well as all other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in particular Security Council resolution 232 (1966). With reference to operative paragraph 1, which reaffirmed the legitimacy of the people's struggle for their liberation, he recalled that the United Nations had on previous occasions confirmed that the struggle for liberation of the colonial peoples was both legitimate and justified. In the course of the Committee's meetings in Africa, many delegations and petitioners had underlined that point as being one of the most important ways in which the final liquidation of colonialism in Africa and other parts of the world could be achieved. Operative paragraphs 2 to 7 were directed to the United Kingdom as the administering Power in an effort to induce it to take the only effective action which the racists of Southern Rhodesia would understand, namely, military force. In formulating the draft resolution, the sponsors had been particularly mindful that all the measures so far taken to liquidate the illegal minority régime of Ian Smith had been in vain. Not only had the racist régime of white settlers not capitulated, but there was instead a growing body of evidence that it was doing everything possible to strengthen itself and to enlarge its arsenal of criminal and illegal policies. The main reason for such a situation was the failure and refusal of the administering Power to take effective action to bring down the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The sponsors considered that the proposed measures constituted the minimum which the Committee could recommend to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and they therefore

hoped that the draft resolution would obtain the full support of all members of the Committee.

568. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council should take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. If the international community was to maintain its self-respect, action under Chapter VII was absolutely necessary.

569. He drew attention to operative paragraph 7, which called upon the administering Power, in any future consultation, to consult with the representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime. To continue negotiating with the illegal régime would completely destroy the faith that people had in the rule of law.

570. The draft resolution reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and appealed to all States to render them moral and material support. In his delegation's view, such support should be of a kind that could help them in their armed struggle against the forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

571. The draft resolution would show the people of Zimbabwe who was really on their side. He appealed to all delegations to support it for, in doing so, they would be telling the illegal racist minority régime in Salisbury with one voice that the days of its suicidal policy were numbered.

572. The representative of *Bulgaria* suggested three amendments to the draft resolution for consideration by the co-sponsors.

573. First, the notion of a crime against humanity had been introduced during the general debate in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and had been included in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) and in resolution 2184 (XXI) on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration. He suggested that the same idea should be included in the resolution on Southern Rhodesia, possibly as a new operative paragraph 2, to read:

"*Declares* that the continuation of colonial rule and the practice of *apartheid* as well as all forms of racial discrimination and oppression in Southern Rhodesia constitute a crime against humanity".

574. Secondly, the Secretary-General should be requested to take all necessary steps to ensure that the truth about the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the fight of the people of Zimbabwe for liberation was disseminated as widely as possible. Such a request might be included in a new paragraph 13 to read:

"*Requests* the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe".

A similar text was contained in General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI).

575. Thirdly, he suggested that operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution should be supplemented to take into account some ideas put forward by representatives of the liberation movements and also the consensus adopted at Kinshasa containing an appeal to the specialized agencies. The addendum might read:

<sup>28</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8006.

"... in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia".

576. The representative of *Yugoslavia*, speaking on behalf of the sponsors at a subsequent meeting, thanked the representative of Bulgaria for the three helpful and constructive suggestions he had made which the sponsors gladly accepted in principle. The revised text was contained in document A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1, with some minor textual changes.

577. The representative of *Bulgaria* thanked the Yugoslav representative and the other sponsors of the draft resolution for adopting his suggestions; that was a further example of the friendly co-operation between the African and Asian countries and the socialist countries represented in the Special Committee.

578. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor, covered all the points which the petitioners had so ably brought to the attention of the Special Committee, and he was convinced that its adoption would encourage efforts to alleviate the plight of the people of Zimbabwe.

579. Several eminent spokesmen had appealed to the Zimbabwe nationalists to forget their differences and close their ranks in the face of the common enemy, but their appeals had gone unheeded. He nevertheless appealed to them once again to do so, if they wished their fight to be a successful one.

580. He thanked all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee and assured them that the day of their liberation was not far off. They should redouble their efforts, strong in the knowledge that Africa and the whole freedom-loving world were behind them in their fight.

581. The representative of *Chile* said that the facts amply justified the strong language in which the draft resolution submitted by twelve members of the Special Committee was couched. His delegation therefore supported the draft resolution and congratulated the delegations sponsoring it.

582. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the draft resolution reflected in a concise manner the position of the majority of States Members of the United Nations and also the demands of the Zimbabwe people. It reaffirmed the legitimacy of that people's fight for independence and, with the addition of the new operative paragraph 2, declared that racial discrimination and segregation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a crime against humanity. Reflecting the frequently expressed attitude of the majority of Member States, it declared that the United Kingdom Government bore full responsibility for the establishment of the Smith régime and called upon it to take all necessary measures to bring it down and to execute General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the other relevant resolutions.

583. The draft resolution contained a very important new element which went to the heart of the matter: it condemned the foreign financial interests and international monopolies which, by supporting and assisting the illegal régime, were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence.

584. A major preoccupation of most delegations during the session at Kitwe had been the role of the United Nations specialized agencies in assisting the national liberation movements. His delegation had always been intensely interested in the problem and

had frequently submitted suggestions concerning it. He was satisfied that paragraph 13 of the revised draft opened the way for the specialized agencies to assist the refugees from Zimbabwe, and all those suffering from oppression in connexion with the national liberation movement, through the Organization of African Unity. At the same time, the paragraph would help the General Assembly to formulate clear directives and recommendations to the specialized agencies at its twenty-second session. Paragraph 14 reflected the general feeling of most delegations that the United Nations could do far more to publicize the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and the fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The request to the Secretary-General could undoubtedly improve United Nations activities in that respect.

585. His delegation's position on the Southern Rhodesia problem was well known so it was unnecessary to elaborate on it further. The draft resolution, in its amended form, reflected his delegation's position on the problem and he therefore intended to vote for it.

586. The representative of *Finland* said that his delegation fully shared the aims of the sponsors of the draft resolution but had certain misgivings with regard to operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11. Many speakers had advocated the use of force as the only means of solving the problem but, in the opinion of his Government, all international conflicts should be settled by peaceful means. Despite the seriousness of the situation, he could not believe that all possibilities of a peaceful solution were exhausted and did not think that the means the United Nations had at its disposal to impose mandatory economic sanctions should be completely discounted.

587. Paragraph 12 recommended that the Security Council should take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. At a stage when the Security Council was about to begin its own study of the Southern Rhodesian problem, it would have been preferable, in his opinion, to submit the relevant information to the Council for its consideration rather than to make a recommendation. He would not go into further detail concerning his objections to other operative paragraphs, since time was short, but he regretted that his delegation would have to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as it stood.

588. The representative of *Poland* said that his delegation welcomed the draft resolution as amended to incorporate the suggestions made by the Bulgarian representative (A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1.) The time had come for the United Kingdom Government to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and to replace the racist 1961 Constitution by a new one based on universal suffrage. He wished, however, to make a slight suggestion for the modification of operative paragraph 4: the words "without further delay" should be inserted after the word "power". The time factor was all the more important in view of the "Tiger conspiracy", which had clearly shown that Southern Rhodesia might be granted independence after a period of ten or fifteen more years. His delegation considered that the people of Zimbabwe should have been granted independence long before, at the same time and in the same manner as had been done in the case of Zambia and Malawi, the other members of the former Federation.

589. He expressed his gratitude for the appreciative words used by the representative of the United Republic

of Tanzania in commenting on the positive stand taken by the socialist countries with respect to colonialism and racialism in general and Southern Rhodesia in particular.

590. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation supported the chief goal of the draft resolution and shared the deep concern at the apparently slow rate of progress towards it. However, as a responsible Member of the United Nations, his country believed that continued attempts must be made to find a solution by peaceful means. It did not feel that all peaceful means of solving the problem in Southern Rhodesia had been exhausted and for that reason and others his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. His Government would continue in the determined search for a just and peaceful solution. Its constant objective remained, in the words of President Johnson, "to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia". The past fifteen years had witnessed remarkable progress towards self-determination and independence in Africa; his Government was convinced that that progress could and would not long be denied to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

591. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation supported the twelve-Power draft resolution and the Bulgarian amendments to it. The draft resolution could be improved by adding a provision concerning the political and military ties between Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were a threat to the neighbouring new African States.

592. The Security Council resolution of 16 December 1966, providing for economic sanctions against the racist régime, had proved ineffective and inadequate. That was the reason for operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, which condemned South Africa and Portugal in strong terms. It would be logical to add West Germany to the list, since it supported the racist policies of those countries and flouted United Nations decisions, thus pursuing a policy which was directly opposed to the interests of the peoples of Africa.

593. His delegation unreservedly supported operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution, which condemned the activities of those foreign interests which were preventing the people of Zimbabwe from attaining independence.

594. Although certain provisions of the draft resolution might usefully have been clarified or strengthened, his delegation was prepared to support the resolution since his country had always favoured the final elimination of colonialism and racism from the African continent.

595. The representative of *Australia*, explaining his delegation's position on the draft resolution, said his Government believed sincerely and earnestly that the possibilities of a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem had not yet been exhausted. He wondered whether the draft resolution was practical and whether it might not create more problems than it solved. It was also relevant that the Security Council would shortly be reconsidering the matter.

596. The natural strength and potentialities of Southern Rhodesia should be preserved. If force were employed at that stage, his delegation felt that it would involve such a great cost in lives, suffering and material

damage that the country would take years to recover from it. Indeed, a number of petitioners had expressed the hope that bloodshed could be avoided. Moreover, the use of force would have as its inevitable aftermath an atmosphere of such bitterness, spreading far beyond the borders of Southern Rhodesia, that it would take generations to restore any semblance of interracial harmony. Was it not a corollary of the Special Committee's principal aim that the problem of colonialism should be solved in a manner that would enable every man to live in harmony with his fellows? Could any member view with equanimity a course of action that might destroy the prospects of such a solution for many years to come?

597. His delegation, while agreeing with many points in the draft resolution and sympathizing with the motives of the co-sponsors, felt compelled to vote against it. That did not mean, however, that his country was opposed to the exercise of the right of self-determination, to the attainment of complete freedom by all the people of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation believed that freedom, equality and the full exercise of human dignity were the rights of all men everywhere, and this belief had been confirmed by the moving testimony of the petitioners.

598. The representative of *Italy* said that the draft resolution combined many of the provisions contained in General Assembly resolutions 2138 (XXI), 2151 (XXI) and 2189 (XXI), with some important additions referring to the use of force. At the Kitwe meetings, statements had been made by other delegations and by petitioners on the need for the use of force: some had asserted that the force should be applied by the United Kingdom, and others that it should be applied by the international community through the United Nations. Others again had advocated the stricter enforcement of sanctions. That had strengthened his delegation's conviction that, given the different views on future action, the most reasonable attitude would be not to prejudge in any way the debates in the Security Council or any ensuing decisions that it might adopt when it took up the question of Southern Rhodesia in a few weeks' time. He was not minimizing the value of the Special Committee's recommendations, but stressed that the Council, responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of peace and security, was in the best position to appraise the situation on the basis of the information supplied by the Committee. He had no doubt that the Council, whose present composition rightly reflected the membership of the United Nations and the weight of African opinion, would deal with the problem most effectively and decide on the appropriate measures.

599. That was why his delegation considered that the wording of operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the draft resolution was such that the Special Committee could not adopt them without limiting the Council's freedom of action. Moreover, it considered that those paragraphs would debar other methods which could still produce fruitful results; they even implied that negotiations should be regarded as an evil *per se* and something to be condemned.

600. His delegation could not accept the paragraph which declared colonial rule, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and oppression in Southern Rhodesia to be a crime against humanity, owing to the legal implications of the expression "crime against humanity". It could accept the wording as an expression of moral condemnation; from the legal standpoint, however, it

was not in a position either to affirm or to exclude that such policies pursued by a given country were a crime against humanity within the definition of such crimes by the Nürnberg Tribunal and the London Convention of 1946. It might be correct to affirm that some specific results of *apartheid*, such as genocide, aggression or cruel repression, fell within the definition of crimes against humanity. But it was not appropriate for a political body, such as the Special Committee, to take a decisive stand on a point of legal interpretation; that was a matter for an appropriate judicial body.

601. Those were the reasons why the Italian delegation was not in a position to vote for the draft resolution and would abstain. He deeply regretted that necessity since his delegation supported the principles of freedom, self-determination and respect for the fundamental rights of man which would be upheld unanimously by the Special Committee and by the United Nations.

602. The Chairman said that he did not agree that the adoption of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the draft resolution would restrict the Security Council's freedom. Paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) "*Requests* the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by the Committee which may threaten international peace and security and to make any concrete suggestions which may assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations". The relevant paragraphs of the draft resolution had been put forward as recommendations suggesting appropriate action which the Council might take. An identical paragraph condemning *apartheid* as a crime against humanity had been included in General Assembly resolution 2202 (XXI).

603. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation had sponsored the draft resolution because it thought it reflected the desires of the Zimbabwe people. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution provided the answers to the serious problems created for the international community by the continued existence of the racist Smith régime.

604. Operative paragraph 13 was of vital importance, since all the political groups with which the Special Committee had been in contact had stressed the need for help from the specialized agencies and other international organizations. That help should be provided in the shortest possible time because the effects of war, disease, illiteracy, etc., could not wait.

605. The representative of *Venezuela* said that the draft resolution coincided, generally speaking, with the Venezuelan delegation's position on the Southern Rhodesian régime, which it regarded not only as illegal but also as contrary to the basic principles of the civilized world. It would therefore vote for the draft resolution on the understanding that the reservations entered by his delegation in respect of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2151 (XXI) also applied to it.

606. *Venezuela* was opposed to the unilateral use of force owing to the bitter experience of Latin America in that connexion. It would agree, however, with such a measure if ordered by the competent body, i.e., the Security Council, in which case it would be multilateral action carried out by the United Nations in accordance with the explicit provisions of the Charter.

607. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that the provisions of the draft resolution before the Special

Committee represented the minimum that the Zimbabwe people were entitled to expect. The draft resolution as a whole, and more especially operative paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, did no more than remind the United Kingdom of the precise extent of its responsibilities. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by a large majority and that the voice of the international community would be heeded so that justice might be done in that part of Africa.

608. At its 528th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.407/Rev.1) as orally revised, by a roll-call vote of 17 to 1, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Italy, United States of America.

609. The text of the resolution on Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248) adopted by the Special Committee at its 528th meeting on 9 June 1967, reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having considered* the question of Southern Rhodesia,

*"Having heard* the statements of the petitioners,

*"Regretting* the absence of the representatives of the administering Power,

*"Recalling* General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

*"Recalling further* all the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia,

*"Recalling further* that the situation in Southern Rhodesia has been declared by the Security Council in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 as constituting a threat to international peace and security,

*"Recalling further* that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has declared on several occasions that the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia is illegal, and that it would not negotiate with that régime on the future of Southern Rhodesia, and that the Government of the United Kingdom has also declared that it would not grant independence until majority rule is established in the Territory,

*"1. Reaffirms once again* the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the achievement of their inalienable right to freedom and independence;

*"2. Condemns* the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"3. *Deplores* the failure and the unwillingness of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures, in its capacity as the administering Power, to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. *Reaffirms* the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted according to the principle of 'one man, one vote';

"5. *Expresses its conviction* that sanctions, in order to bring about the downfall of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, must be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force on the part of the administering Power;

"6. *Further reaffirms* that the only effective and speedy way of bringing down the rebellion in the Territory is through the use of force by the administering Power;

"7. *Calls once again upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to take immediately all necessary measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions;

"8. *Considers* that any future consultations undertaken by the administering Power to determine the future of Southern Rhodesia must be carried out with representatives of the African political parties and not with the illegal régime;

"9. *Condemns* the activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and by their exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory, are preventing the African people of Zimbabwe from attaining freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and calls upon the Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures to bring to an end such activities;

"10. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal of continued support for the illegal racist minority régime in blatant defiance of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;

"11. *Urges* all States, as a matter of urgency, to render all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe through the Organization of African Unity;

"12. *Recommends* to the Security Council, in accordance with its decision contained in resolution 232 (1966) and, in particular, paragraph 1 thereof, to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

"13. *Appeals* to the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia;

"14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to promote through the various organs and agencies of the United Nations the continuous and large-scale publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, in order that world public opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia and of the continuing struggle for liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe;

"15. *Calls upon* the administering Power to report to the Special Committee on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution;

"16. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."

610. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 13 June 1967.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/8005.

## CHAPTER IV\*

### SOUTH WEST AFRICA

#### A. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. On 9 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>1</sup> chap. IV, para. 306) reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve this right. By this same resolution the Committee, among other things, set up a sub-committee to make a thorough study of the situation in the Territory and, among other matters, to recommend an early date for independence.

2. On 18 July 1966, the International Court of Justice delivered a judgement on the contentious case brought before it by Ethiopia and Liberia wherein it was charged that South Africa, the Mandatory Power, having violated its Mandate obligations, should be or-

dered to abolish *apartheid* in the Territory and to submit its administration of South West Africa to the United Nations. In its judgement, the Court ruled that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal right in the subject-matter of the claim and that accordingly it could not decide on the merits of the case.

3. In its report to the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee expressed its grave concern at the situation in the Territory following the judgement and made specific recommendations regarding steps to be taken by the United Nations to prevent a serious threat to peace in the Territory. Among these recommendations were that the United Nations should decide to exercise the right to revert the Mandate to itself and that, the responsibilities of South Africa as a Mandatory Power having been terminated, it should assume direct administration of the Territory until independence. Independence would follow the holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the formation of a government.

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.2.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.



4. The report of the Sub-Committee was adopted by the Special Committee on 15 September 1966, subject to reservations expressed by some members, and was submitted to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly together with the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IV, appendix).

5. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly considered the question of South West Africa directly in plenary meetings, and on 27 October 1966, it adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby it terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and resolved that the United Nations must discharge the responsibilities with respect to the Territory.

6. Operative paragraphs 1 to 7 of the resolution read as follows:

"1. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) are fully applicable to the people of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa and that, therefore, the people of South West Africa have the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. *Reaffirms further* that South West Africa is a territory having international status and that it shall maintain this status until it achieves independence;

"3. *Declares* that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate;

"4. *Decides* that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations;

"5. *Resolves* that in these circumstances the United Nations must discharge those responsibilities with respect to South West Africa;

"6. *Establishes an Ad Hoc Committee* for South West Africa—composed of fourteen Member States to be designated by the President of the General Assembly—to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence, and to report to the General Assembly at a special session as soon as possible and in any event not later than April 1967;

"7. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa forthwith to refrain and desist from any action, constitutional, administrative, political or otherwise, which will in any manner whatsoever alter or tend to alter the present international status of South West Africa".

7. The *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa, established pursuant to operative paragraph 6 of the above resolution, met between January and March 1967 and submitted a report (A/6640)<sup>2</sup> to the General Assembly at its fifth special session. In this report, the Committee, having been unable to arrive at an agreed conclusion, submitted to the General Assembly three separate proposals: one sponsored by Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Arab Republic, later joined

by Pakistan; one by Canada, Italy and the United States of America; and one by Chile and Mexico, supported by Japan. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee also contained suggestions by Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reflecting a fourth position.

8. The proposal put forward by the African States and Pakistan called for direct temporary administration through a United Nations council for South West Africa assisted by a commissioner. The council, which would be given legislative authority, would proceed to South West Africa with a view to taking over the administration and ensuring the withdrawal of South African police, military and other personnel and their replacement by United Nations personnel, and would also, in consultation with the people, establish a constituent assembly to draft a constitution. New elections by universal adult suffrage would be held to establish a legislative assembly and, upon the formation of a government, South West Africa would be declared independent no later than June 1968. Any action by South Africa to impede the council's work would constitute a flagrant defiance of United Nations authority, calling for action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.

9. The proposal by Canada, Italy and the United States called for the appointment of a special representative who would make a comprehensive survey of the situation in the Territory, establish all contacts he deemed necessary and, among other things, determine the conditions necessary to enable the Territory to achieve independence. He would report to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

10. Under the proposal by Chile and Mexico there would be a United Nations council and commissioner with functions similar to those proposed by the African States and Pakistan. However, rather than calling for enforcement action, this proposal envisaged contact with the authorities of South Africa to lay down procedures for the transfer of the Territory to the council.

11. Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stating that they were opposed to direct administration of the Territory by the United Nations, proposed that the General Assembly should declare the Territory independent immediately and allow the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to assist the national liberation movement and the formation of a new government.

12. On 19 May 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2248 (S-V) on South West Africa. By this resolution the General Assembly decided, among other things, that: (a) all efforts should be made to ensure independence for South West Africa by June 1968; (b) during the period before independence a United Nations council for South West Africa, to be comprised of eleven Member States elected by the Assembly, should administer the Territory with the maximum participation of the people; (c) the Council should entrust executive and administrative tasks to a United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa and report at three-month intervals to the General Assembly; and (d) the Council should be based in and proceed to South West Africa where it would immediately enter into contact with the authorities of South Africa to lay down procedures for the transfer of the administration of the Territory. The resolution called upon the Government of South Africa to comply without delay with its terms and with those of resolution 2145 (XXI), and to facilitate the transfer of the administration of the

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifth Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 7.

Territory. It also requested the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge its functions and requested the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation.

13. On 13 June 1967, the General Assembly elected Chile, Colombia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia to the United Nations Council for South West Africa. Mr. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, Legal Counsel of the United Nations, was appointed Acting United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa.

## B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

### *General*

14. Information on the Territory is contained in previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly<sup>3</sup> and in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa (A/6640). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

### *Position of the Government of South Africa*

15. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2145 (XXI), the South African Cabinet met specially to discuss the situation. A series of policy statements were later made by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. B. J. Vorster, and other government ministers.

16. On 1 November 1966, at the Cape congress of the Nationalist Party, held in East London, South Africa, the Prime Minister stated that South Africa intended doing nothing about the General Assembly decision, which it regarded as illegal, unconstitutional, impossible to implement, and also dangerous in that it laid the foundation for further action against South Africa. He explained South Africa's position as follows:

"We are a small nation and we know it. We do not challenge anybody nor seek hostility. All we ever ask the world and ask anew is to leave us alone. We will solve our own problems in our own time and in our own way.

"... And as for the question of what we are going to do about this decision and what the Government's advice to you is—I say go on with your work. We will continue to administer South West Africa as we have always done and we will carry out what has been planned, taking into account the demands of the times.

"We are aware that there is peace and calm and progress not only in South Africa but also in South West Africa and as far as we are concerned it will continue like this."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238, chap. IX; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. IV; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IV, and annex No. 15, document A/5840; *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. IV; and *ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IV.

17. The Prime Minister's statement followed an opening address to the congress by the Minister of Finance of South Africa. The latter maintained that South Africa's case was too sound and its faith too great to be frightened by resolutions of the United Nations. Stating that South Africa would stand firmly by the warning of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations to keep its hands off South West Africa, he added:

"We must therefore be prepared to stand by that warning. We must be prepared at all times but I can only hope that the more responsible nations will not ignore the warning and be misled by the false logic of appeasement. They are the nations who will ultimately have to pay the price in money and lives.

"We must also be prepared to withstand mandatory sanctions, and the world may as well know that the Government is already taking steps to meet this eventuality."

18. On 3 November 1966, the South African Minister of Defence, addressing a civic reception in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, stated that South West Africa would remain an integral part of the Republic and that South Africa would "never allow this area to be taken away from us".

19. The South African Minister of Agricultural Technical Services and of Water Affairs, opening the Nationalist Party congress at Windhoek on 8 November 1966, emphasized that South Africa would stand with South West Africa to the utmost of its ability and would not give the area to the United Nations. He stated that the economy of South Africa was so strong that it could withstand trade sanctions for years. Internally, preparations had been made and the necessary goods stockpiled so that in case of sanctions, the country's factories could continue working. On the military front South Africa had prepared itself. The Minister, who had previously been Minister of Defence, explained that on his return from overseas he had brought back 128 licences to manufacture armaments in South Africa. "From a .22 cartridge to the newest in armoured vehicles, from the smallest item to the latest in bombs—today everything can be manufactured locally", he said.

20. Later, on 14 December 1966, he claimed that South Africa was strong enough to withstand sanctions for at least three years while, without strategic supplies such as gold and uranium, the countries applying sanctions could only keep them up for two years at the most. On this occasion, he referred in particular to the problem of Southern Rhodesia, stating that United Nations discussions of the issue made it clear that there was a possibility that sanctions could be extended to South Africa. However, he said the Republic was determined to continue its trade with Rhodesia as it had in the past. Referring to South West Africa, the Minister said there was no cause for alarm because there was no army in Africa, either singly or combined, which could attempt a military attack on South Africa. Even the United Nations was not able to do so. Only the major Powers could afford such a thing. He was also reported to have stated that South Africa was strong enough militarily to hold out until a third world war had been started.

21. Meanwhile, on 15 November 1966, the Prime Minister of South Africa affirmed that South Africa would resist all attempts to take over South West Africa.

22. In a New Year's message broadcast on 31 December 1966, after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 on Southern Rhodesia, the Prime Minister dealt with that issue as well as General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) on South West Africa. In his New Year's message, the Prime Minister referred to the possibility that South Africa might in 1967 consider withdrawing from the United Nations. He was quoted as stating:

"That question has not yet been considered nor has a decision been taken, but it remains in my thoughts all the time."

23. Describing South West Africa as "an annoying item on the agenda of 1967 as a result of the clearly unlawful and senseless decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations", the Prime Minister stated:

"While we must not allow this decision to worry us unduly and while it is equally unnecessary to reaffirm South Africa's standpoint in this regard, we must face the fact that it will create certain problems."

24. The Prime Minister described the Security Council decision on Southern Rhodesia as one which had "created a very serious problem for South Africa—a problem which if not handled very delicately can lead to confrontations with very far-reaching effects".

25. The Prime Minister summed up the situation as follows:

"From this it is clear that the year 1967 will find the peoples and nations of the world, including ourselves, confronted by the naked realities of ill-conceived decisions.

"I cannot minimize this problem. The year 1967 might be a year in which we too might get hurt. We might be bruised—but I verily believe—we will not be broken."

#### *South African information campaign*

26. In November 1966, according to publications of the Republic of South Africa Government Information Service, the Prime Minister of South Africa announced that the South African Government planned to undertake a large-scale campaign to inform other Governments and international organizations of South Africa's policies and of the progress made in their application. On 8 December 1966, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a statement in Pretoria concerning this matter. The text of this statement was transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations by letter dated 8 December 1966. The statement read in part as follows:

"I would emphasize that we, like previous South African Governments, continue to deny that we owe any accountability regarding South Africa's administration of South West Africa to the United Nations, and to affirm that the United Nations accordingly has no supervisory powers in that respect. Where we thus make information about South West Africa available, *inter alia*, to the United Nations, this will be in exercise of our own deliberate choice and subject to all juridical reservations.

"Subject to these reservations and to purely practical considerations we will, as mentioned above, make information on South West Africa available to Governments and international organizations, including the United Nations. We will seize every opportunity

for putting our case positively, without prejudice, of course, to the basic principles enunciated above.

"As a first step a detailed survey of our policy in South West Africa, its objective, and results achieved, is now being compiled for overseas distribution in the near future."

Later, by letter dated 23 March 1967 from the Acting Permanent Representative of South Africa, the South African Government transmitted to the Secretary-General a publication entitled *South West Africa Survey, 1967*.

27. In addition, the Prime Minister appealed to all South Africans to start a letter-writing campaign to inform those outside about conditions and the mood of the people. He stated that in the circumstances it was necessary to tell the world that the people were determined to solve their problems without outside help and that the various sectors of the population, whatever their differences, were unanimous in their determination to resist any attempt at interference to the last and to defend what was justly theirs with every possible means. Following the Prime Minister's appeal, the head of South Africa's largest mail advertising organization launched "Operation Friendship", a plan to send goodwill letters by the "hundreds of thousands" to people of influence overseas. His plan, sent to advertising agencies throughout South Africa, emphasized that the letters must go to the right people. To that end, lists of about 2 million influential people and opinion leaders in Europe and America were available.

#### *Extension of sabotage legislation to South West Africa*

28. The General Law Amendment Act No. 62 of 1966 extended to the Territory the sabotage provisions of the General Law Amendment Act No. 76 of 1962, making sabotage an offence, punishable by a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment and a maximum sentence of death. Sabotage, as defined by the Act, includes any wrongful and wilful act whereby the accused damages or tampers with any property of any other person or of the State.

29. The 1966 Act also further amended the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which has been in force in the Territory since 1950. One amendment provides that if it is proved that a person on trial in connexion with military training or training in sabotage left the country without the requisite travel documents after the coming into force of the Departure from the Union Regulation Act of 1955, then he shall be presumed to have undergone or attempted, consented or taken steps to undergo such training, unless he can prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.

30. Another amendment authorizes exemption from prosecution for witnesses who incriminated themselves in giving evidence. In commenting on this provision in the South African House of Assembly on 18 October 1966, the Minister of Justice explained: "We have in mind particularly such persons as receive illegal military training in foreign countries."

31. The 1966 Act introduces a new form of detention, applicable in South West Africa as well as South Africa, whereby a senior police officer may arrest any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist or of intending to commit certain security offences. The person may be detained for fourteen days, subject to such conditions as the Commissioner of Police may from time to time determine. During that period, no court of law

may order the release of the detainee and the conditions fixed by the Commissioner are not subject to review or appeal. Detention for longer than fourteen days may be authorized by a judge or a court on application in writing by the Commissioner of Police; pending the result of the application, the person may continue to be detained as if the application had been granted. The judge or court may afford the detainee an opportunity of submitting reasons in writing why he should not be detained and must then afford the Commissioner an opportunity of replying in writing. No provision is made for the detainee to appear before the judge or court and the latter are explicitly required, in considering an application, to have regard only to the information furnished by the Commissioner, the reasons advanced by the detainee and the reply of the Commissioner. The judge or court may amend the conditions of detention or order the immediate release of the detainee and their decision is final. The Act defines "terrorist" as follows: "'terrorist' includes any person who favours terroristic activities".

32. In addition to the new detention provisions, the "180-day" detention provisions earlier incorporated in the Suppression of Communism Act remain in force. The "180-day" detention provisions are also applicable under the sabotage legislation now extended to South West Africa.

33. Under the 1966 Act, South West Africans accused under the security laws may be tried in South African courts as well as in South West Africa itself.

#### *Outbreak of guerrilla fighting in South West Africa*

34. According to statements made by South African government ministers and other officials, Africans from South West Africa, trained and equipped with automatic weapons in other countries, have been returning to the Territory in small groups with instructions to start a campaign of terrorism.

35. The Deputy Minister of the South African police disclosed on 30 September 1966 that the first group to cross into the Ovamboland native reserve from Angola consisted of ten men, of whom eight were arrested in March 1966. The police are reported to have learned from them that others were grouping in Angola and were preparing to infiltrate into Ovamboland.

36. The information obtained by the police led to a gunfight in Ovamboland on 26 August 1966 between South African police and about sixteen Africans armed with two hand machine-guns and automatic pistols. Two of the Africans were killed and another later died of wounds received; eight others were arrested and the rest escaped. According to South African Government sources, none of the police was injured. According to a statement issued by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Dar es Salaam, the clash was with soldiers rather than police. SWAPO claimed that fifteen soldiers were killed.

37. On 22 September 1966, the Deputy Minister of the South African Police informed the House of Assembly that the police had already succeeded in arresting twenty-three trained Ovambo "terrorists". The police were aware that others remained in the northern Native reserve and were trying to apprehend them. The police also had at their disposal evidence that over 250 trained Ovambo "terrorists" were in transit camps in other African States waiting to return to South Africa.

38. In September 1966, a "terrorist" training camp in Ovamboland—the first to be discovered in South West Africa—was raided by the police and further arrests were made.

39. A few days later, in the early morning hours of 28 September 1966, between twelve and twenty Africans burned two administration buildings at Oshikango in Ovamboland—the house of a white clerk of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and single quarters for unmarried white men. Shots were exchanged between the attackers and the white men who rushed out of the burning buildings. One man, an Ovambo night watchman, was wounded by the attackers, all of whom escaped (see, however, para. 46 below).

40. On 4 October 1966, it was reported that air and motor patrols had been increased in northern Ovamboland. On 19 October 1966, the chief of the South African security police went to Ovamboland. He stated that his visit would mark the launching of a new offensive intended to clear up the "terrorists". He explained:

"We have big problems in Ovamboland. The terrain and people are not known to our police. At places the border is only an imaginary one and it is difficult to apprehend these terrorists because they are moving continuously."

41. On 10 November 1966, the South West Africa Nationalist Party congress decided to ask the territorial Administration to provide white farmers in remote areas with practical means of communication such as radio communication, as a safety measure, since trained "terrorists" would be likely to cut telephone wires when they became active in the Police Zone, the area in which the white population has settled.

42. On 14 December 1966, seven armed Africans attacked and wounded a white farmer on a farm eighty miles north-east of the town of Grootfontein. This marked the first such attack in the Police Zone of South West Africa. A continuous search by police, supported by helicopters, Bushman trackers, tracker dogs and armed white farmers, resulted in the capture of five of the seven Africans by 27 December. One was wounded before being captured. One was captured on 16 December, three on 19 December and the fifth on 27 December. The two others had not been reported found by the end of January 1967.

43. On 28 December 1966, one of the guards of Headman Ashipala of the Ukuambi area of Ovamboland was shot and killed and two others were wounded. It was reported that the African assailants had not been arrested as of 5 January 1967. They were said to belong to a small group which had entered Ovamboland just prior to the clash with the police on 26 August 1966. As stated in the Special Committee's previous report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IV, para. 26), Headman Ashipala had shot and killed one SWAPO official and wounded another in March 1966. Following a trial in July 1966, Headman Ashipala was discharged on a plea of self-defence.

44. On 29 December 1966, the Commissioner of the South African police said there were only six "terrorists" still free in South West Africa.

45. The editor of *The Windhoek Advertiser* reported on 12 January 1967 that at least forty Africans had been detained by the South African police in South West Africa since the beginning of "terrorist" activities in August. It was said that ten of them would give

evidence for the State, leaving the others to face trial. According to the Attorney-General of the Transvaal, where the South West Africans were apparently being held, it would be weeks before any decision about their trial could be taken.

#### *Arrests of South West Africans outside the Territory*

46. On 30 September 1966, thirty "terrorists" who had escaped from South West Africa were reported to have been captured by Portuguese soldiers experienced in guerrilla warfare who had been sent to the Ovamboland border with instructions "to clean up". It was said that there had never before been "terrorist activities" in southern Angola. In addition, the Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), the Portuguese security police, have co-operated with the South African police in the Territory. Testimony was given in the South West Africa Supreme Court in November 1966 by an Angolan agent of PIDE who had been given an assignment in Ovamboland. The PIDE agent stated that the South African police had received information from the Portuguese security police concerning gun-running in Ovamboland and had begun observation of an Ovambo businessman. The PIDE agent, after meeting in Angola with a detective of the South African police, had proceeded to Ovamboland, befriended the Ovambo businessman and attempted to obtain diamonds, ammunition and rifles from him. According to testimony by a South African detective, a Portuguese member of PIDE accompanied South African detectives when they later arrested the businessman, on 17 February 1966. (He was charged and convicted of being illegally in possession of diamonds.)

47. Eight SWAPO members were declared prohibited immigrants by Botswana on 14 November 1966. This action followed reports that seven armed Africans, on their way to Ovamboland, had been arrested at Kasana, in the north of Botswana, on 29 September 1966, the eve of independence.

#### *Arrest of African political leaders in South West Africa*

48. Three SWAPO officials were arrested on 1 December 1966, reportedly under the Suppression of Communism Act; Mr. I. G. Nathaniel Maxuiriri, Acting President; Mr. John Ja Otto, Secretary; and Mr. Jason Mutumbulua, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. A week later, on 8 December 1966, Mr. Gerson Vei, the Acting President of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), was also arrested. All were residents of Windhoek except Mr. Nathaniel Maxuiriri, who was a resident of Walvis Bay.

49. These were reported to be the first arrests in South West Africa under the Suppression of Communism Act, which has been in force in the Territory since 1950.

50. Another SWAPO official, Mr. Toivo Ja Toivo, had earlier been arrested in Ovamboland, following clashes in that Native reserve, and was reportedly being detained in Pretoria.

51. The Acting Presidents of the two organizations had been the leading spokesmen at a joint SWAPO/SWANU public meeting in the old Windhoek location early in November 1966, at which they had criticized South Africa and any States supporting it, protested against the extension of the new security legislation to the Territory, and welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2145 (XXI).

52. Following an announcement by the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development that the Government intended closing the old Native location in Windhoek, Mr. Vei, after obtaining an official permit for the purpose, had called a meeting of non-whites in the old location. At that meeting, on 4 December 1966, at which members of the special branch of the South African police were present, Mr. Vei had spoken against the anticipated compulsory removal of residents of the old location to the new Native location. He was later charged with sabotage in that in his 4 December speech he had "incited, encouraged, instigated or advised people to injure police informers, members of the police and white people and thereby had threatened the maintenance of law and order". He was tried and convicted early in May 1967 in Swakopmund, South West Africa, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labour.

53. Charges against the other African political leaders and South West Africans detained in connexion with guerrilla activities had not been published by the beginning of May 1967.

#### *Other incidents*

54. During 1966, there were several instances of mass action by Africans in the Police Zone of a character not previously noted in the Territory. All appear to have involved migrant workers from Ovamboland.

55. In May 1966, about 300 Africans at the Ovambo compound at Katutura, the new Native location in Windhoek, stoned an African detective who had been called in after the Africans had marched into the kitchen demanding to be allowed to serve their own meat. They dispersed after the detective left and before the arrival of police reinforcements.

56. In June 1966, a crowd of Africans in Walvis Bay began throwing stones following a traffic accident in which an Ovambo was killed. Police, using gunfire to quell the crowd, wounded two Ovambos. A police officer was reported to have been slightly injured.

57. On 29 October 1966, when about thirty municipal police raided the Ovambo compound in the Katutura location in Windhoek for illicit beer brewing and arrested two Ovambos, some 1,000 Ovambos began throwing burning logs, pieces of iron, bricks and stones at the police. Three policemen reportedly suffered injuries. The brewing and selling of "Bantu beer" in urban areas of the Territory is reserved to the white local government authorities, which use the profits to defray some of the costs of administering the locations.

#### *Removal of the old location in Windhoek*

58. In South West Africa, a "Native location" forms part of a white urban area. It was defined as follows by former Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd:

"The Bantu residential area near the city is only a place where the European provides a temporary home in his part of the country for those who require it because they are employed by him and earn their living there."

59. South African Government policy requires that Native locations be established far enough away from the urban centres to permit the future expansion of separate racial areas while maintaining between them a "buffer strip" of 500 yards, on which no development is allowed. After the transfer of the administration of Africans from the Administrator of the Territory to the South African Department



of Bantu Administration and Development, on 1 April 1955, a comprehensive review and planning of the urban areas in the Territory was made and "correctly situated" Native location areas were selected, entailing the replanning and removal of "incorrectly situated" and already segregated Native locations in all of the main urban areas of the Territory.

60. In Windhoek, African opposition to moving to the new location, named "Katutura", and their consequent opposition to preparatory measures such as the evaluation of homes in the old location with a view to compensating owners, led to the disturbances of 10 December 1959 in which a number of Africans were killed and wounded by police and South African Defence Force personnel (see General Assembly resolution 1567 (XV)).

61. Municipal and other government officials have since attempted by various means to persuade the remaining residents of the old location to move to Katutura. Nevertheless, some 1,000 houses in Katutura have remained vacant.

62. In January 1966, the Chief Native Affairs Commissioner for South West Africa sought the assistance of African members of the Katutura Advisory Board in the hope they might be able to persuade old location residents to move. Old location residents included friends and members of families of Board members.

63. In October 1966, each of the Board members reported on their unsuccessful efforts and indicated their reluctance to make any further attempt to persuade the old location residents to move. It was said that residents of the old location maintained that they would not move unless blood flowed.

64. In these circumstances, the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development announced on 30 November 1966 that, for reasons of health and sanitation, regulations would be framed for the transfer of residents of the old Native location in Windhoek to Katutura. He indicated that the residents of the old location would be offered aid and compensation to move. After preparatory work had been completed, the old location would be deproclaimed, and it would then be illegal to live in the old location and an offence to employ anyone living there; business rights and all services, including education and health services, would be withdrawn from the old location; and no compensation would be paid after the deproclamation.

65. At the time of the announcement, it was estimated that over 9,000 Africans, including some 3,000 migrant workers, lived in Katutura and that almost 8,000 Africans and some Coloureds remained in the old location.

66. In January 1967, the Windhoek City Council accepted a tender for the erection of 1,000 additional houses at Katutura at an average cost of R505 per house to accommodate all of the remaining residents of the old location. It served notices on every resident of the old location, offering assistance and compensation to those desiring to move and stressing the advantages of moving early and the better surroundings at Katutura. An appeal was also made to employers to assist those in their service still residing in the old location to move.

67. In a petition dated 1 December 1966 from Mr. Clemens Kapuu, Chief Designate of the Herero people, on behalf of Chief Hosea Kutako, National

Leader of the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), Mr. Kapuu stated that the situation was explosive and that only the United Nations presence in South West Africa would save the situation. It was their view, the petition stated, that the South African Government had no right to make decisions concerning South West Africa after the termination of the Mandate in October 1966 and they would therefore ignore all decisions made by that Government.

68. At a public meeting called jointly by SWAPO and SWANU in the old location on 8 January 1967, speakers urged the people to face death rather than to move.

69. A statement issued to the Press by NUDO in January 1967 indicated that some employers were attempting to force their employees to move to the new location at Katutura. The organization asked non-whites to furnish NUDO with the names of any firms and other employers who dismissed them from employment for refusing to move to Katutura, so that it could keep a record of such employers. At a subsequent rally of location residents on 29 January 1967, Mr. Clemens Kapuu urged the people not to move and to destroy posters and leaflets advising them to move. He also advised residents to clean the location themselves.

70. According to the annual report of the Mayor of Windhoek, only forty-two families comprising 245 people had moved from the old location to Katutura during 1966. At the end of February 1967, the manager of non-white affairs of the Windhoek municipality stated that families were still moving from the old to the new location. Some three to four families a week were said to be moving and officials were disappointed that the number moving had not come up to their expectations. Meanwhile, construction of the 1,000 new houses at Katutura, originally scheduled for completion in October 1967, was said to be proceeding well ahead of schedule.

71. In May 1967, as previously noted, the Acting President of SWANU was convicted of sabotage for statements he made on 4 December 1967 in connexion with the proposed removal of the old location.

#### *Implementation of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission*

72. During the last half of 1966, the implementation of the political recommendations of the Odendaal Commission preparatory to the partitioning of South West Africa reached an advanced stage.

73. The committee of experts from South Africa and South West Africa, formed in December 1964 to report on all the practical problems to be taken into account in connexion with the rearrangement of administrative and financial relations between South Africa and South West Africa pursuant to the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, submitted its report to the Prime Minister of South Africa during 1966. It will be recalled that the Odendaal Commission had recommended the transfer back to South Africa of the major portion of the government functions now carried out by the white territorial governing bodies.

74. In Ovamboland, a "Parliament" building for the proposed "homeland" of Ovamboland has been constructed at Oshakati, the future capital of the area. The new building, a conference hall capable of seating

about 230 people, is part of a complex including a residence for the Commissioner-General for South West Africa—the “diplomatic representative” of South Africa to the African population of South West Africa—houses for officials and other facilities. It was reported that the hall would be used for discussions between the Ovambo chiefs and officials of the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development, the consideration of draft law, and the showing of films.

75. Following these preparatory measures, on 21 March 1967, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development informed a gathering of chiefs, headmen and councillors at Oshakati that the South African Government was of the opinion that they were in a position to make important advances towards self-government and would assist them to advance in all spheres of their people's development including self-government; the Government intended making the same offer of self-government to other “national units” in South West Africa. He also informed them, *inter alia*, that a comprehensive plan had been prepared providing for the expenditure of approximately R30.6 million by his department in Ovamboland during the succeeding five years on stock-breeding, fencing, water affairs, electricity, towns, buildings, roads, airports, economic affairs, education, ambulance and welfare services.

76. Almost without exception, according to a report in *The Windhoek Advertiser*, the chiefs asked the Minister to convey their thanks to the Prime Minister for having sent him to Oshakati. They said their people did not want to be governed by any foreign Power, including the United Nations, but wanted to be led towards self-government by South Africa. They also stressed that they would give the Government every assistance to eradicate terrorists infiltrating into their territory.

77. By the end of September 1966, over 400 of the white farms or portions of farms recommended to form part of the proposed “homelands” for Hereros, Damaras and Namas had been sold to the territorial Administration on a voluntary basis and there were only some twenty white-owned farms still to be acquired, if necessary by compulsory arbitration procedure.

78. It may be recalled that according to official 1960 population figures classifying the population by ethnic groupings, a total of 9,017 of the 35,354 Hereros in the Territory were living in Native reserves to be included in “Hereroland”; in the same reserves, there were 10,313 Bushmen, Damaras, Namas, Basters, Ovambos, Tswanas and others. Of 44,353 Damaras in the Territory, only 2,400 lived in Native reserves to be included in “Damaraland” and those same reserves had 5,223 residents of various other ethnic classifications. Of 34,806 Namas, only 2,292 lived in Native reserves to form part of “Namaland” while 4,342 others lived in the same reserves. A total of 6,847 Africans, Basters and Coloureds lived in Native reserves to be abolished and 3,935 Africans lived in the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet. Under the Odendaal Plan, each “homeland” would be restricted to one ethnic group and all others included in the above figures would be among those having to move into the “homeland” established for them. Subject to exceptions for mining and other officially approved purposes, only the “white area” with its non-white majority would remain a multiracial area.

79. In October 1966, some of the Nama residents of the Bondels Native reserve, and their livestock, were being transferred to the proposed “Namaland” area. Approximately 10,000 sheep had already been transferred from the reserve by 24 October 1966. Bondels, to be abolished under the Odendaal Plan, is one of two Native reserves in the Police Zone which was throughout the Mandate period recognized by South Africa as the tribal property of the Bondelswartz Namas. Under the Odendaal Plan, the Herero and Baster residents of the Bondels Native reserve would be transferred to “Hereroland” and the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet; there were also Coloured residents of the Bondels Native reserve in 1960, for whom a “homeland” was not proposed. In the urban area of Gibeon, which the Odendaal Commission proposed be included in “Namaland”, a school for white children was closed down permanently towards the end of 1966 and most other “white” establishments had been acquired by the territorial Administration.

80. For “Damaraland”, the Odendaal Commission had proposed that the former “white” urban area of Welwitschia form part of the Damara “homeland”. In that town, the local white governing body was abolished effective 1 July 1966.

81. In the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet, the one remaining white-owned farm was to be transferred to the territorial Administration following arbitration procedures, as a mutually acceptable price had not been fixed. In addition, a valuation committee met in September 1966 to set a value on the white-owned businesses in the Gebiet with a view to transferring them to the Administration for resale to Rehoboth Basters. If Baster purchasers could not be found, the properties were to be leased, but not permanently disposed of, to Coloureds.

#### *Other developments*

82. A new copper mine was opened in 1966 at Klein Aub, in the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet. The mine was established by Marine Products, Ltd., General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd., and Federale Mynbou Beperk, which have a concession covering over 120 square miles. The three parent companies are South African companies, which also have other interests in the Territory. Between March 1965, when extensive prospecting was commenced, and the end of 1966, over R2.5 million had been invested on plant and equipment, housing for twenty-three white officials and thirty-four Coloureds and a compound for 262 Ovambos. The mine was expected to produce about 150,000 short tons of ore a year, yielding about 6,000 short tons of copper concentrates. The Klein Aub mine is the second operating mine to be established in a proposed “homeland”.

83. A still larger mining venture was undertaken by the South African Government Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), which holds a concession to mine zinc ore and other metals in the southern part of South West Africa. The concession area, which covers over 1,200 square miles in the southern part of South West Africa bounded by the Orange, Fish and Konkiep Rivers, has an ore reserve estimated at about 5 million tons with an average grade of somewhat over 6 per cent zinc as well as minor values of other minerals. Exploratory work on the mine known as the Rosh Pinah Mine was completed during 1966 and ISCOR had called for tenders for the erection of

large reduction works, capable of handling an estimated daily ore recovery of 2,000 tons. Expenditure for the mine, including a 5,600-yard tarred runway, was estimated at R5 to R6 million. Industrial Minerals Mining Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. (IMCOR), a wholly owned subsidiary of ISCOR, holds 51 per cent of the shares in the operating company, known as IMCOR Zinc (Pty.) Ltd., and the balance is owned by Moly Copper Mining and Exploration Co. (SWA) Ltd., a company in which Diamond Mining and Utility Co. has an indirect 26.9 per cent interest and Industrial Diamonds of S.A. (1945) an indirect 25.2 per cent interest.

84. It was subsequently announced, in March 1967, that a new R14.15 million electrolytic zinc industry, whose zinc requirements are to be entirely supplied from South West Africa, was being established in South Africa. Two new companies were being formed for the purpose: the Zinc Corporation of South Africa (ZINCOR) and Kiln Products.

85. ZINCOR, whose capital requirements were estimated at about R10 million, was to construct and operate an electrolytic zinc plant, with a capacity of 36,500 tons of zinc a year, on the site of the uranium plant at Vogelstruisbult in South Africa. It would have a fifteen-year contract to supply the entire zinc requirements of ISCOR. Most of the zinc concentrates required by ZINCOR would be supplied by IMCOR Zinc from the Rosh Pinah mine; the balance would be supplied by Kiln Products, which was to erect a Waelz kiln at Berg Aukas and buy zinc-bearing materials produced at the Berg Aukas mine from the mine owner, the South West Africa Company.

86. Consolidated Gold Fields would own 51 per cent of Kiln Products and 33 per cent of ZINCOR. The balance of Kiln Products was to be owned as follows: 34 per cent by Anglo American Corporation; 10 per cent by Vogelstruisbult Gold Mining Areas; and 5 per cent by Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company. The balance of ZINCOR would be owned 35 per cent by ISCOR, 22 per cent by Vogelstruisbult, and 10 per cent by Kiln Products. The owners of Kiln Products were to subscribe R2.25 million of that company's capital, and another R1.9 million was to be raised by loans. ZINCOR's issued capital was to be R5 million in ordinary shares, and the balance of about R5 million was to be raised by loans.

87. It was also reported that another South African company, the Van Ryn Mining Corporation, Ltd., would revive two former tin mines in South West Africa, the Schimanski and Sidney mines near Karibib and Omaruru.

88. In 1966, Otavi Minen and Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, which formerly owned the Tsumeb copper mine and other properties seized by the South African Custodian of Enemy Property, was granted a two-year concession between the Swakop and Omaruru rivers extending to the western boundary of the proposed Damaraland "homeland". The concession entitles the company to prospect for minerals other than salt, oil, gypsum and limestone.

89. Other new foreign interests established in the Territory include a subsidiary of the French petroleum company, Total Oil Products. The subsidiary, Total Oil Products (Pty.) Ltd., was registered in South West Africa in September 1966 with a capital of R15 million. In terms of the registration, the company

intended to extract, refine, compound, store and transport animal and vegetable oils, grease and waxes. A French tanker discharged the first shipment of some 8,600 tons of petroleum products into the company's newly completed storage tanks in April 1967. Apart from Total, the Territory is served by Shell Oil, Mobil, Caltex, British Petroleum and Swasol.

90. At the end of January 1967, it was reported that capital investment in South West Africa had been estimated at R352 million, as follows: R82 million by foreign investors other than South African; R170 million by the South African Government, including R105 million invested in the railway system; and R100 million by local and South African private enterprise.

91. Other developments in the Territory during 1966 included the establishment of the first government hospital in Ovamboland, at Oshakati; the opening of the new building complex for the Commissioner-General for South West Africa at Oshakati (see para. 74); and the construction or planning of additional townships in Ovamboland and other northern Native reserves.

92. In addition, Africans in the Territory became eligible in 1966, from 1 April 1965, to pensions or grants under the South African Old Age Pensions Act No. 38 of 1962, the Blind Persons Act No. 39 of 1962 and the Disability Grants Act No. 41 of 1962. South West Africa legislation covering old age pensions and pensions for blind and disabled persons applies to Whites (since 1942) and to Coloureds (since 1962). The benefits vary considerably, being highest for Whites, next highest for Coloureds, and lowest for Africans.

#### C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE<sup>4</sup>

##### *Introduction*

93. The Special Committee considered the question of South West Africa at its 524th to 526th, 535th, 537th and 539th meetings, held in Africa between 7 and 19 June 1967.

##### *Written petitions and hearings*

94. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning South West Africa:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary-General, Union of South West Africa Workers (USWAW) . . . . .	A/AC.109/PET.585 and Add.1
Mr. Mburumba Kerina, Coordinating Secretary, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF) . . . . .	A/AC.109/PET.586
Mr. John G. Ja Otto, Secretary, and Mr. Gottfried H. Geingob, representative in the United States, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) . . . . .	A/AC.109/PET.587
Mr. Jacob Kuhangwa, Secretary-General, and Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, SWAPO . . . . .	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.1

<sup>4</sup> Additional comments on the question of South West Africa are contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam (see chapter II of the present report).

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Oretu Ngranjone, Publicity and Propaganda Secretary, SWAPO .....	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.2	Mr. Ferdinand R. Merero, Chief Representative, South West African National Union (SWANU) .....	A/AC.109/PET.693
Mr. Solomon Mifima, Chief Representative in Zambia, and Lucas Pohamba, Deputy Chief Representative in Zambia, SWAPO .....	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.3	Mr. Tunguru Huaraka .....	A/AC.109/PET.694
Mr. Peter Nanyemba, Chief Representative, SWAPO ..	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.4	Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY) .....	A/AC.109/PET.695
Chief Hosea Kutako, National Leader, National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) .....	A/AC.109/PET.588 and Add.1	95. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning South West Africa:	
Mr. Carlos Hamatui, President, South West Africa Workers' Union (SWAWU) and representative of SWANUF in East Africa .....	A/AC.109/PET.589	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
Reverend Michael Scott ....	A/AC.109/PET.590	Mr. Solomon Mifima, Chief Representative in Zambia, SWAPO (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.3) .....	524th
Mr. Linekala Kalenga, President, National Union of South West African Students (NUSWAS) .....	A/AC.109/PET.591	Mr. T. T. Letlaka, Member of the National Executive Committee of PAC (A/AC.109/PET.680) .....	524th-526th
Paramount Chief David Goraseb .....	A/AC.109/PET.592 and Add.1	Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Director, and Mr. Jacob Kuhangwa, Secretary-General, SWAPO (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.4) .	535th
Chief Fritz Gariseb .....	A/AC.109/PET.593	96. <i>Mr. Mifima</i> , speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that the people of South West Africa had regarded the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), terminating South Africa's Mandate by the overwhelming vote of 114 to 2, as an historical and important occurrence in the history of the United Nations. However, they had been disappointed by the delay in the establishment of a Council for South West Africa. If the United Nations could not solve the problem of terminating South Africa's presence in South West Africa, all people throughout the world who believed in freedom and the equality of man would lose faith in it. Delaying action could do no good to the suffering people of South West Africa but would give the fascist Government of South Africa the opportunity to continue to administer and divide the Territory into the so-called Bantu homelands. The Special Committee was certainly well informed about recent developments in Ovamboland, through which South African Prime Minister Vorster had cunningly tried to deceive the world by announcing that South Africa wanted to give so-called self-government to the region. This self-government was nothing but another Bantustan similar to that of the Transkei in South Africa.	
Mr. Clarence Kapuu, Chief Fritz Gariseb, Mr. Aaron Shivute, Mr. Fanuel Kambara, Mr. Paul Male, Mr. Noah Gariseb .....	A/AC.109/PET.594	97. South Africa had turned South West Africa into a battleground, killing innocent men, women and children. It had extended its repressive laws, such as those prescribing 180 days' detention and the suppression of communism, in a country which had international status.	
Mr. Omer Becu, General Secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) ..	A/AC.109/PET.595	98. According to the South African <i>Sunday Times</i> of 28 May 1967, the South African fascist Minister of Justice had introduced the so-called Terrorism Bill, dealing with "acts of terrorism" in the Republic and in South West Africa. Those convicted of terrorism or participation in terrorist activities were liable, after a summary trial by a judge without a jury, to the penalties laid down for treason.	
Mr. Keith Gottschalk .....	A/AC.109/PET.621	99. Since the founding of SWAPO, the people of South West Africa had come to understand the weakness and failures of the United Nations and had decided to take up arms and free themselves from the racist	
Mrs. S. B. Bunting, World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners .....	A/AC.109/PET.622		
Chief H. S. Witbooi and Headman D. Isaak .....	A/AC.109/PET.631		
Unsigned petition from Tsumeb, South West Africa, forwarded by Mr. Vakulukuta Kasaka .....	A/AC.109/PET.632		
Mr. Jorma Pauku, Secretary of the Seminar on Africa arranged by the Students of Political Science Association in the University of Helsinki and the United Nations Students Association in Helsinki ..	A/AC.109/PET.647		
Mr. R. Contreras, Deputy General Secretary, World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) .....	A/AC.109/PET.648		
Mr. Alfred Kgokong, Director of Publicity and Information, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) .....	A/AC.109/PET.649		
Mr. L. Masimini, Chief Representative in Zambia, Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) ..	A/AC.109/PET.680		
Mr. David M. Sibeko, Chief Representative, in East Africa, PAC .....	A/AC.109/PET.680/Add.1		

régime of Pretoria. Since March 1966 an armed struggle had been launched against the South African colonialists. In August 1966 two freedom fighters had been killed and eight arrested when they had exchanged fire with the South African police. Some of the arrested members of SWAPO had been flown to South Africa and detained in Pretoria prisons.

100. Vorster and his Government had launched an oppressive campaign, terrorizing innocent men, women and children and arresting everyone suspected of being a member of SWAPO. All the SWAPO leaders had been arrested and detained at Pretoria under the 180 days' detention system. More than seventy members of SWAPO, including its acting President, Deputy Secretary-General and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were detained at Pretoria. According to a report which had recently reached them in Zambia, those detainees were facing daily torture and the Deputy Secretary-General was reported to have been tortured to death. After two full years' detention, a member of the SWAPO National Executive, a former President of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), was still being held in a remote area on the border of South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa. He was not allowed to move outside a half-mile area and was forbidden to talk to anyone. It was reported that seven people had been killed recently by the South African police in the Caprivi Strip.

101. South Africa had also set up large military bases throughout the country; among those already completed was the air base at Mpacha in the Caprivi Strip, fifteen miles from the Zambian border, which was guarded by South African soldiers. The military bases and installations had been built not only for internal security but also for provocative and aggressive use against the newly independent African States, particularly Zambia, in the event of confrontations between the African forces and those of imperialism. However, military bases and installations could not prevent people from fighting for freedom.

102. Since the war of liberation had broken out, the South African police and soldiers had been patrolling Zambia's borders with South West Africa and Angola, using helicopters, military police cars and police dogs.

103. On 18 May 1967, Mr. Tobias Hainyeko had been shot dead by the South African police for shooting three South African policemen (two South African Whites and one African) in self-defence. Such provocation was a daily occurrence in South West Africa. The United Nations should therefore realize that the situation in that country was a threat to peace and the security of the African people.

104. He did not intend to criticize the United Nations as such but only to draw attention to the inhuman treatment inflicted by the fascist Government of South Africa in his country. If the United Nations wished to prevent bloodshed in South West Africa, it should act before it was too late.

105. The Special Committee should send a letter of protest to the South African Government demanding the release and return to their homeland of all South West African political prisoners detained in South African prisons. SWAPO felt strongly that South Africa's action was not only injustice but a violation of international law.

106. Despite all intimidation and torture, however, the South West African people were determined to fight to the bitter end. SWAPO was already committed

to the national fight for liberation and there would be no peace until all the people of South West Africa had achieved freedom and equality.

107. The petitioner then read out a letter from one of his colleagues who was in a Pretoria prison, in which he reported that more than seventy members of SWAPO were with him on 180 days' detention, including many top officials. They were tortured every morning and afternoon in the electric chair and by other means and those who refused to give information about SWAPO activities were killed secretly. He himself expected death at any time but exhorted his countrymen to continue their fight until their country was finally liberated.

108. He had also received a report from the Caprivi Strip to the effect that the South Africans had instructed teachers and loyal villagers to report any unfamiliar faces seen in their districts and the return of any people who had left the country. A reward of £25 was offered for such reports and £150 for reports on any leaders of the movement, who were to be shot on sight. Only four people had agreed to carry out the latter order. A new camp had been completed in the area for about 150 soldiers and policemen who constantly patrolled the Zambian border to check on the movements of freedom fighters. Some 150 members of SWAPO had been arrested but it was not known whether they were being detained in South West Africa or had been sent to Pretoria.

109. Answering a question as to whether South Africa was pursuing a policy of settling Europeans in and deporting Africans from parts of South West Africa so as to change the racial composition of the population in those parts, the petitioner said that there had, indeed, been a considerable increase in white immigration in recent years, the largest group coming from South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany.

110. In answer to questions concerning the reaction of the South West African people to General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) and South Africa's announced intention of granting self-government to Ovamboland, he said that Premier Vorster had already announced that South Africa would not recognize the United Nations Council for South West Africa and would forbid it to enter the Territory. The proposed referendum to be held in Ovamboland was yet another trick to prevent a United Nations take-over, for not only was it an attempt to separate South West Africa, but the conditions necessary for a genuine referendum would not exist. SWAPO had challenged South Africa to permit a referendum to be held throughout the whole Territory under conditions of freedom of association and movement, withdrawal of troops, police and administrators, release of political prisoners and return of political exiles; furthermore, the referendum should be conducted by the United Nations Council for South West Africa.

111. Since South Africa had refused to recognize the Council, it was the duty of the United Nations to enforce General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) by whatever means were required and it appeared that the only way to do so was by force.

112. Answering questions concerning the size and organization of his movement, the petitioner said that it was difficult to state the total membership of SWAPO since many persons were not able to join it openly. There were, however, 4,000 card-carrying members.



Despite the difficulty of movement, SWAPO had succeeded in establishing branches throughout the Territory. It was organized in regions and there were branches in mines, factories and other undertakings. SWAPO was in favour of a united front against the common enemy and was willing to co-operate with any organization actively opposing South Africa's rule in South West Africa.

113. In reply to further questions, Mr. Mifima said that in addition to the seventy members of SWAPO in prison at Pretoria, a number of other members, fifty-seven in all, had recently been arrested and their whereabouts were unknown. Moreover, chiefs in South West Africa had been given powers to detain people but he had no idea how many people had been detained under those powers. Large numbers of Africans had been arrested and held for questioning, for periods of varying lengths at Windhoek, the capital of South West Africa, but all the statistics that he was able to give concerned 200 people who had been arrested since January 1967 and, to the best of his knowledge, were still in detention. Any statistics he gave were bound to be approximate since the situation changed daily. Some people would be arrested; others would be released. The 200 detainees to whom he had referred had been under restriction for some time. Apparently, it was being considered whether they should be taken to South Africa or charged in South West Africa.

114. Mr. Letlaka, speaking on behalf of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), said that PAC's interest and deep concern about South West Africa derived not only from the fact that both South Africa and South West Africa had been taken over by the same robbers in the same manner, but also and primarily because both countries were subjected to the same type of oppression and shared the same fate. In both countries the white colonialists had appropriated to themselves total political, economic, military and social power.

115. The technique of herding Africans like pigs into sties called reserves was applied in both countries. Those ghettos were euphemistically called "homelands" or, derisively, "Bantustans". Invariably they were set up in the poorer and less productive portions of the country and split up into small units on tribal and ethnic lines. While Vorster constantly called for unity among all the white ethnic groups from Europe in South Africa and South West Africa, he put into effect a policy of disunity for the indigenous people, forcibly splitting them into meaningless and antagonistic tribal units. Whereas the purpose of the call to unity among the white Europeans was clearly to secure their political domination, military strength and economic hegemony so that they could better exploit the human and material resources of South Africa and South West Africa, the unmistakable purpose of the retribalization and division of the African people into small weak units was to inspire jealousy and fratricidal strife among them so that they could be better exploited by the white racialists and their partners in the Western imperialist countries who reaped astronomical profits from their large investments in both countries. The erudite but cheap talk about separate freedoms was infantile, designed to fool the United Nations and to dull the enlightened democratic conscience of mankind.

116. The advocates of white supremacy in South Africa had consistently applied the policy of *apartheid*, which facilitated the oppression of the African people by the imposition of racially discriminatory laws de-

signed to enslave a whole people and perpetuate the policy of white supremacy. The proposed Bantustans of Ovamboland and the other regions were nothing but the studied sinister fragmentation of the South West African people in order to continue and intensify economic exploitation of the African people by the method of "divide and rule".

117. Much of the inhuman and ruthless legislation used to suppress the indigenous population in South Africa had been extended to South West Africa; under one of those laws the President of SWANU had been arrested. Those laws were still in force despite the fact that the United Nations had divested South Africa of its Mandate.

118. This system could obviously never be maintained unless coercion was used, cruelly and heartlessly. Both in South Africa and South West Africa the knock of the Gestapo and security police at midnight was well known and generally expected even by young children; the 90-day and 180-day persecution period was the cursed baptism of freedom fighters. Men and women were made to stand for long hours in narrow circles drawn on the floor; the strait jacket and the electric current shock were normal treatment to extract information and impose perjured statements; innocent and dedicated people went mad and even committed suicide; not infrequently brutal assaults were also resorted to.

119. Turning to the question of education, the petitioner said that it was used in South Africa as a method of oppression. Educational systems had always been used since the beginning of civilization to launch a new social revolution designed to produce a new people with a new philosophy of life.

120. In South Africa the racist régime aimed, through its separate educational systems, namely the so-called European Education, Bantu Education, Coloured Education and Indian Education, to create four species of human beings, each with its own philosophy. That system was based on the belief that the Whites, as a different nation, were a God-chosen people destined perpetually to dominate and exploit the Africans. The system denied all respect for human dignity, and thus condemned four fifths of the population in South Africa to the status of second-class citizens. The same callously inhuman system had been extended to South West Africa. The system did not tolerate attitudes and ideas foreign to those of *apartheid*; it was meant not only to imprison the African people's minds but totally to enslave their entire mental make-up. The division of the country's children started from the crèche. Furthermore, in South West Africa there was not a single university, not even a tribal one.

121. Turning to the question of economy, the petitioner said that the economies of South Africa and South West Africa formed an interdependent unit. The South African régime, having applied all the economic laws in force in South Africa to South West Africa, had fully integrated the two economies, creating a more viable economic system dependent on the precarious foundation of slave labour.

122. That economic interdependence had not been an accident, but the result of calculated scheming by the South African colonialist economic and political experts. Since the administration of the Territory of South West Africa had been vested in the racist and colonialist régime of South Africa by the League of Nations Mandate in 1920, a well-calculated scheme of intertwining the two economies had been put into prac-

tice. South Africa had attempted to "swallow" South West Africa completely.

123. Access to the Territory by sea was *via* Walvis Bay (which had been part of South West Africa but had been forcibly taken over and converted into an armed base by South Africa), by rail to Lüderitz from Upington (South Africa) and by air from such places as Johannesburg and Kimberley. The railways in the Territory were part of the South African system.

124. South West African trade figures were included in those of South Africa. During 1954, the last year for which separate figures had been published, exports from the Territory amounted to R73.8 million (£36.14 million). The United Kingdom's share in the 1954 total had been 45.6 per cent, that of South Africa 23 per cent. Total imports during 1954 were valued at R45.4 million (£22.12 million). South Africa, with 62.1 per cent of the total, was the main supplier.

125. Notes of the South African Reserve Bank, of which a branch had been established at Windhoek in February 1961, were legal tender. The South African commercial banks maintained branches throughout the Territory. The duties payable in South West Africa were identical to those of South Africa. The taxation applicable in South Africa was levied in South West Africa at the same rate. The whole South African economy was based on inhuman cheap labour laws, such as the contract system, the Industrial Conciliation Laws, the "tot" system, etc. The extending of the Bantu Labour Act 67 of 1964 to South West Africa regulated the movement and kind of employment an African worker could obtain.

126. The establishment of the Ovamboland Bantustan was in keeping with the general Bantustan pattern formulated by the South African régime, which aimed, *inter alia*, at the establishment of vast reserves of cheap African labour.

127. South African capitalists and their United Kingdom collaborators had vast vested interests in South West Africa. The Anglo American Corporation of South Africa was the largest shareholder in South Africa. In co-operation with Federale Mynbou, the biggest mining combine in South West Africa, it virtually controlled financial interests in that Territory. Details of the ramifications of interlocking financial interests between South Africa, South West Africa and foreign investments had already been submitted to the Special Committee.

128. As a direct result of the slave labour system to which the Africans in South Africa and South West Africa were subjected by the racialists in South Africa and their imperialist masters, the average miner in South Africa earned less than \$18 per month, compared with almost \$90 per month in neighbouring Zambia. In South West Africa, African wages were even lower, averaging about \$9-\$10 per month. The average wage of Whites, about \$300 per month, and the high profits recorded by the various monopoly capitalists (United States companies netted profits of over \$90 million last year and United Kingdom monopolists over \$180 million) were in striking contrast with those figures.

129. Thus the average annual wage of the over 500,000 African miners in South Africa and South West Africa was only \$200 (less than 10 cents an hour) compared with nearly \$900 in Zambia. One South West African mine where the average wage had been 25 cents a day in 1960 had been able to pay a dividend of nearly \$10 million. Those statistics disproved the claim of the South African capitalists and the apologists for oppres-

sion and *apartheid* that African wages were higher in South Africa and South West Africa than anywhere else in Africa.

130. Foreign companies which went to great lengths in their home countries to avoid being accused of racial discrimination had flocked to South Africa and South West Africa. A United States businessman, Marcus D. Banghart, Vice-President of Newmont Mining Corporation, had described profits in South Africa as "tantamounting", and had added pointedly, "We know the people and the Government and we back our conviction with our reputation and our dollars." (*Africa Today*, March 1964, p. 4.)

131. Since the Second World War, United States investments in South Africa had been increasing rapidly. Dollar investments were still second to sterling, but the share of the United Kingdom had been declining while the United States share had risen.

132. The sinister role played by foreign investments to bolster up the vicious colonial slave system in South Africa and South West Africa was evident in the role of United States bankers and monopoly capitalists during the Sharpeville incident. That event had caused a financial crisis resulting in the flight of capital from South Africa and thus from South West Africa. Some investors were afraid that the oppressive white Government's vicious massacre of Africans at Sharpeville and Langa might trigger off a long-expected revolution. Others had feared that the incipient boycotts by smaller countries might snowball, or that South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth might reduce profits.

133. The United States had come to the rescue, by contributing almost the entire amount of foreign exchange needed to reverse the precipitous decline of the South African economy. By June 1963, as a result of its help, South African gold and foreign-exchange reserves had more than tripled to a record and the boom was on.

134. The increasing financial involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany in South Africa and South West Africa was well known. The threat of the resurgence of fascism in the Federal Republic of Germany was also clearly to be seen in South West Africa, and, of course, in South Africa. There were many German experts in South Africa and South West Africa, including the Caprivi Strip, among them many military experts. The threat of that base to independent Africa, and especially independent Zambia, need hardly be stressed. The Federal Republic of Germany had also helped South Africa in building the huge military and naval base at Walvis Bay, in the Mandated Territory of South West Africa, which had been made part of South Africa and was under the complete control of the South African Navy. There, too, German instructors were active under the supervision of a well-known Nazi sympathizer.

135. South Africa's *apartheid* Government, as part of the "free world", received financial support and strategic materials from it. The crimes against the Africans in South Africa and South West Africa were committed in the name of the profits made by the investors from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan. Those countries derived profits from the sufferings of the African people of South Africa and South West Africa. They were partners in oppression and exploitation, and the props on which the oppressive régime of Vorster rested.

136. Those countries had aided the oppressive régime of South Africa to flout the Mandate of the League of Nations; they had abetted it in its refusal to recognize and apply to South West Africa the principles and ideas embodied in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and they had supported the extension of the policy and practice of *apartheid* to South West Africa. Their action was responsible for the present situation.

137. The United Nations as now constituted was unable to champion the cause of decolonization; some of its powerful Members still retained vested interests in colonial domination and imperialist exploitation, and it had failed to reflect the wishes of the newly independent countries and the oppressed peoples of the world. It had fallen prey to the imperialists who were using it to perpetuate their domination over the rest of mankind. He made those criticisms honestly and without malice.

138. The General Assembly resolution of October 1966 on which the United Kingdom and others had abstained, had terminated the Mandate for South West Africa exercised by South Africa since 1920 and brought South West Africa under the direct control of the General Assembly. That resolution must be put into immediate effect if the United Nations hoped to retain any of the confidence of the oppressed peoples of Africa, and especially southern Africa.

139. However, the indecisive attitude of the capitalist imperialists from the West within the United Nations had fully confirmed his party's belief that they had never had the slightest intention of pulling out of South West Africa. On the contrary, they were clearly intent, by trickery and subterfuge, on frustrating the genuine efforts of the African, Asian, Latin American and socialist countries in effecting decolonization. Consequently, PAC was immensely strengthened in its conviction that the United Nations, as now constituted, could never assist in driving the colonialist oppressors from South West Africa. There could be no doubt that the Western imperialist trading partners of racist South Africa would not support any move by the United Nations to implement the resolution in question. Their prevarication was a clear danger sign for the peace of the world. The people of South West Africa, like those of South Africa, would be their own liberators. Only by their own armed struggle, supplemented by the help of the progressive people of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and the other freedom-loving peoples of the world, would they be able to attain that freedom and independence which was their legitimate and inalienable right.

140. Asked whether he could provide information concerning the supply of arms by NATO countries and Israel to put down the struggle in South West Africa, the petitioner replied that although it was known that there were weapons of Israeli origin in South and South West Africa, it was difficult to furnish precise figures. There was tremendous flow of capital from South Africa to Israel, and South African volunteers had recently gone there.

141. *Mr. Garoeb*, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that SWAPO had come before the Special Committee to describe the role played by the great Powers in sabotaging the African and Asian moves at the United Nations since the beginning of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly; to examine the role of foreign interests in southern Africa, and in South

West Africa or Namibia as it was known in Africa, in particular; and to disprove the myth that only the great Powers could do anything for Namibia and that their co-operation and participation was indispensable.

142. At the General Assembly session in September 1966, all Member States, except South Africa and Portugal, had seemed to agree that South Africa had "forfeited" its right to administer South West Africa. The African and Asian move to have the Mandate terminated forthwith had found apparent sympathy with the great Powers, although those Powers had not concurred in their demand that the United Nations should use force to wrest Namibia from South Africa. The great Powers, led by the United States, while supporting the African and Asian move to terminate the Mandate, had insisted on the establishment of a special committee to examine practical ways through which the Assembly could take over the administration of Namibia. At that point, the African and Asian countries, which had at first been opposed to the idea, had given in to the Western demand. Thus, on 27 October 1966, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) ending South Africa's Mandate and setting up the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa, a move denounced at the time by SWAPO as a "delaying tactic". That was exactly what the great Powers had wanted; they had won the first round.

143. The *Ad Hoc* Committee duly opened its first meeting on 17 January 1967. Soon after, its fourteen members submitted their proposals to the Committee. The African proposal called among other things for the creation of a United Nations administrative council for Namibia, which was to run the country until the formal declaration of independence, at which time it was to hand over power to the Africans. It had also called for Security Council enforcement if South Africa failed to comply. The Western Powers had called for the establishment of a United Nations council, headed by a special representative whose duties would include making a comprehensive survey of the conditions prevailing in the Territory. The Latin American proposal had called for the establishment of a United Nations council for South West Africa.

144. However, while the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee appeared to have been in agreement on the establishment of a United Nations administrative council, they seemed to have essentially disagreed on how the Council was to take over control of the Territory. For instance, while the African proposal called for Security Council enforcement in case of South Africa's failure to comply, the Western and Latin American proposals said nothing about it. The Latin American proposal even suggested that the United Nations council for the Territory should contact the Pretoria régime in carrying out its work, the most fantastic idea that had emerged from the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had completely failed.

145. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had failed just as the Western Powers, led by the United States, had hoped, and, with the special session of the Assembly in sight, they had spoken of a "dialogue" with South Africa. They had won the second round too.

146. When the General Assembly opened its fifth special session on 21 April 1967, the African and Asian countries had called once more for the use of force to implement General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 1966. The great Powers had unanimously cautioned moderation and made it perfectly

clear that they would not support such a move. The African and Asian countries, in an attempt to obtain the great Powers' support for their fifty-eight-nation resolution, had decided to include a provision to the effect that they would be willing to make contact with South Africa if the Vorster Government accepted in principle the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, a major concession on the part of the African and Asian nations. But when the Assembly voted, all the great Powers had abstained. They had scored another victory.

147. All those events proved, beyond a shadow of doubt, the extent to which the great Powers had obstructed and sabotaged the cause of Namibia in the United Nations. Why had they acted in that way? The answer was clear: they had gigantic economic and financial interests in South Africa and Namibia. The leading investors in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, firmly believed that South Africa was the most politically stable nation on the African continent. They might condemn its policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, but were not willing to jeopardize the millions of pounds and dollars they had invested in that country. That United Kingdom and United States investment was the foundation of the South African racist régime and its administration in Namibia. If the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy disengaged themselves economically from South Africa, even to the extent of withdrawing their investments, the racist régime of Vorster would inevitably collapse.

148. Prior to 1959-1960 the South African economy had gone through a spectacular boom. In December 1959, the South African police had opened fire on a crowd of Africans in Windhoek who had been demonstrating against their forcible removal to a new segregated location. Thirteen Africans had been killed on the spot and more than forty wounded. In March 1960, the world had witnessed the brutal massacre of innocent Africans at Sharpeville, followed by general political unrest both in South Africa and Namibia.

149. Following these events South Africa underwent a severe financial crisis involving much flight of capital. It was obvious that, had the trend continued, had the Western Powers withdrawn their investments and suspended their huge trade with South Africa, the racist régime would have fallen. Unfortunately that had not been the case. What were the reasons behind South Africa's spectacular economic and financial recovery?

150. At the time of the economic crisis the Western Powers had come to South Africa's rescue before the innocent African victims of Sharpeville and Windhoek had been properly buried. An Italian bank consortium had extended a three-year loan of \$9.8 million; the Federal Republic of Germany had followed with another \$9.8 million loan from the Deutsche Bank. A United States banking consortium, including the First National City Bank of New York and the Chase Manhattan Bank, had made a generous loan of \$40 million. A United Kingdom banking consortium had had no small part in the rescue operation which had saved South Africa from complete downfall.

151. South Africa was again as strong as ever and its economy booming, thanks to Western investment and the support the Pretoria régime enjoyed from the United States and the United Kingdom.

152. It was more than obvious that, so long as Western economic and financial interests were so involved in South Africa, there would be no change in Namibia; most Member States had agreed that South Africa had "forfeited" its right to administer Namibia but, in spite of the general consensus, the great Powers were reluctant to embark on the only course—namely, military action—to evict the racists from Namibia. What could be done under those circumstances? Was the participation of the great Powers really required to change the *status quo* in Namibia?

153. SWAPO strongly believed that the intervention of the great Powers, in spite of their economic, military and political strength, was not essential to bring about a change in South West Africa.

154. There were 122 nations in the United Nations, five of which—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union—were recognized or regarded as the great Powers; they were also the permanent members of the Security Council. Any Security Council enforcement measure had to have their unanimous support. Using their veto, they were able to block what was unpalatable to them in the Security Council. The remaining members of the Council were automatically rendered ineffectual by the veto of the great Powers.

155. The United Nations had just appointed an eleven-nation administrative council for Namibia, on which no great Power was represented, as might have been expected, since they had all abstained in the vote. Vorster had made it perfectly clear that his Government would not allow the Council to enter the Territory to perform its duties as laid down in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V). What did the other Members of the United Nations propose to do in the light of the great Powers' unco-operative attitude? Would they do nothing because the great Powers were not willing to participate?

156. SWAPO strongly believed that those Members could act without the great Powers and that certain conditions had to be created which would force the great Powers to take a positive and active stand on the question of Namibia. SWAPO wished to make some suggestions as to how that could be achieved: if South Africa refused to allow the United Nations to enter Namibia, thus obstructing it in the performance of its duties under the terms of the General Assembly resolution, the African, Asian and other friendly nations should take the matter to the Security Council for enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. If there was the expected veto in the Security Council, then the African, Asian and other friendly countries should take the issue back to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for peace" resolution (377 (V)).

157. SWAPO considered those steps to be vital in an over-all strategy which would eventually prompt the big Powers to bring about the expulsion of the racists from Namibia. It wished to explode the myth that only the great Powers could do anything to change the *status quo* in Namibia. The African, Asian and other friendly nations should try to use their power to bring about a change in Namibia. If it came to the use of force, the rest of the Member States should use whatever military power they possessed to implement the United Nations resolution. By doing so, they would not only fulfil their sacred obligation towards the people of Namibia, but such action would also enhance the prestige of the United Nations. The greatest threat

to the existence of the United Nations was its inability to implement its own resolutions. To avoid the recurrence of such a situation, the other nations should not wait for the great Powers, but should combine to do what was right and honourable.

158. SWAPO had decided long ago that it could not rely entirely on the United Nations to liberate the country. It recognized that the United Nations had an obligation towards the people of Namibia and strongly urged it to live up to it, but believed that Namibia itself should create the conditions which would bring freedom and independence to its people. When that happened—and it was happening—he urged the African, Asian and other friendly nations to come to its assistance without waiting to see what the great Powers would do.

159. Since July 1966, the situation in Namibia had changed drastically. On 26 August, following the verdict of the International Court of Justice, SWAPO, having realized long before that Namibia could be liberated, had launched an armed struggle, and had since fought many battles against the South African army in the northern region. South Africa had reacted with characteristic brutality, first by extending the Suppression of Communism Act to Namibia and then by arresting SWAPO leaders in their homes. The Government had since given a second reading to a more sweeping new repressive measure, the Anti-Terrorism Bill, which included a maximum penalty of execution by hanging for such offences as "terrorism", "withholding information from the police" or "being in possession of fire-arms". About 200 Namibians, including SWAPO's Acting President, Acting Secretary-General and a senior member of its National Executive, were being held without trial in South African jails. The Acting Secretary-General had virtually disappeared; there were reports that he had been tortured to death at Pretoria. When SWAPO resorted to arms to liberate the country, it was under no delusions as to the reactions of the South African régime. It expected no mercy and would give none. The recent brutal laws were essentially aimed at SWAPO. It was the first time that South Africa had been challenged by Africans with guns.

160. Having started the armed struggle for liberation, SWAPO would not falter until final victory. SWAPO's over-all aim was the establishment of a Republic of Namibia; to achieve that end, it was willing to engage in protracted war. It foresaw a period of death and destruction not only in Namibia but in the whole of southern Africa. If it took death, blood and destruction to liberate the country, then SWAPO promised the racist Republic of South Africa, the international community and the United Nations that there would be death, blood and destruction, such as the world had never witnessed before, until Namibia was completely free.

161. *Mr. Kuhangwa*, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that the African States were determined to rid South West Africa of colonialism and *apartheid*. The failure of their efforts to solve the problem peacefully through recourse to the International Court of Justice had confirmed not only that the problem was a political rather than a judicial one, but also that the composition of many United Nations organs should be revised in the light of changed conditions. The problem of South West Africa, notwithstanding its complexities, was in essence a simple one: the decolonization of the Territory.

162. Unless the United Nations was prepared to take effective action and the people of South West Africa were prepared to sacrifice themselves for their fatherland, South Africa would remain in control of the Territory. Nothing worth-while had ever been won without a fight. In any case, whatever SWAPO was doing was the decision of the people of Namibia as a whole. Although young South West Africans were dying even as he addressed the Special Committee, he did not regret their sacrifice.

163. Some Members of the United Nations showed apathy and a lack of initiative in the matter, while others were deliberately unco-operative. Quibbling and hypocritical statements did not deceive his people. The United Nations was directly responsible for the deaths of young South West Africans who were dying in the mines, on the farms, in the forests and in the mountains of their homeland. Nevertheless, he was confident that, just as the United Republic of Tanzania, a former German colony and Mandated Territory, had attained its independence, so, one day, his own people would become masters in their own house. No power in the world could obstruct the inevitable course of African history. Namibia, an integral part of Africa, was protected by the Declaration of the African Heads of State which provided that any attempt by the South African Government to annex any part of South West Africa would be declared an act of aggression.

164. On the basis of those principles, the people of South West Africa were determined to liberate their fatherland from foreign domination. It should be remembered that South Africa had not conquered the Territory but had been entrusted with it for the purpose of carrying out specific responsibilities: to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the indigenous inhabitants until such time as they were capable of governing their country and controlling their own affairs. In complete violation of that trust, the South African Government had introduced into the Territory its abominable policy of *apartheid*, which had divided the nation and hampered the progress of its people. South Africa was legislating for the Territory, determining the powers and forms of its administration and moulding the structure of its society. Not only did it trade with the Territory, it also largely dictated the conditions under which the latter could trade with other countries. It thus controlled the economy of South West Africa and the course of its development.

165. Contract labour, which was virtual slavery, was a normal institution in his country and had been introduced as part of a plan to exterminate the indigenous population and prevent the growth of the nation of Namibia. That notorious and destructive institution was managed by the administrators with the co-operation of various large companies active in the Territory. Those companies were mercilessly pillaging the natural resources of the area and plundering its indigenous inhabitants in direct violation of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963. They were active in both South Africa and South West Africa, aided by certain Members of the United Nations, and contemptuously ignoring General Assembly resolutions. They had helped South Africa to strengthen its military potential and had turned it into a nuclear Power in order to reap profits ranging from 25 to 45 per cent by the brutal suppression and exploitation of the indigenous population.



166. SWAPO denounced in the strongest and most indignant terms the South African racist régime's declaration that a Bantustan was to be established in Ovamboland. His movement would ignore any such declaration. Psychological stratagems of that kind would have no effect whatever on the outcome of the fight for freedom and independence. He insisted that, in its battle for emancipation, his country had no interest whatever in the cold war. On the contrary, it needed the co-operation of all Members of the United Nations acting together to achieve the desired goal. Ideological conflicts were a luxury it could not afford.

167. It had been a matter of deep regret to his people that some Powers had felt unable to vote in favour of the recent African, Asian and Latin American resolution—the most practical resolution ever drafted in the United Nations—and whatever their reasons, whether economic or otherwise, he appealed to them to realize the appalling consequences of pandering to South Africa and to reconsider their decision. He warned them that they were permitting the situation which had occurred in Europe in 1939 to be repeated in southern Africa.

168. During his stay at the Rusk Medical and Rehabilitation Centre, he had widely distributed a prospectus on the establishment of a school for young South West Africans, who were deprived of education in their fatherland. The project had unfortunately not materialized. The United Nations said that South West Africa would attain its independence in June 1968. Such independence would be a mockery if the people were not prepared in advance for their future responsibilities. It was SWAPO's aim to represent all the people of the Territory, irrespective of race, colour, religion or national origin. Its greatest desire was to achieve freedom, justice and respect for human dignity and it yearned to eliminate poverty, disease, illiteracy, racial inequality and all other affronts to the human personality. It sought to achieve the mutual understanding and co-operation of all Namibians in building a strong society founded on the will and voluntary participation of the whole people. All activities useful to society would be fostered in the common interest so that the real needs of the people could be met. All citizens would have equal opportunities of sharing in the progress towards prosperity. Education would be compulsory and private property respected.

169. In reply to a question, the petitioner stated that there were refugees from South West Africa in the United Republic of Tanzania, their chief refuge, and in Zambia and Botswana. All of them were very badly in need of educational facilities. They had been deprived of education in their own country under the so-called Bantu Education Act. His people would be extremely grateful if a formula could be found whereby some kind of school could be established, either in Tanzania or in Zambia. A missionary in the United Republic of Tanzania had told him that four establishments were available in which refugee students could be accommodated if the necessary funds were forthcoming. The same missionary was also in a position to find teachers. Unfortunately, without financing nothing could be done. If, through the good offices of any country, the necessary funds could be found, his people would be grateful.

170. Commenting on the statements by the petitioners, the representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that it was essential to condemn the South African régime unequivocally for its refusal to

comply with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and also to condemn the countries which were obstructing the implementation of that resolution and helping to perpetuate colonial rule.

171. The newly announced policy of the Pretoria Government, which claimed to be granting self-government to Ovamboland, was extremely dangerous. The policy of "Bantustans" was not new. It had already been applied in South Africa. The so-called "self-government" being granted was a mere fiction designed to mislead public opinion and to prevent the country from attaining independence by dividing it up into a number of provinces.

172. It was essential to insist that South Africa should give up South West Africa immediately, withdraw its troops and administration from the Territory and allow the freedom fighters to return home. South West Africa could not attain independence until the racists had been expelled and until the racist administration which now ruled the Territory had been liquidated. The Western Powers—and particularly the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America—should therefore stop helping South Africa. Many delegations had stressed that the Western Powers with financial and economic interests in South Africa and South West Africa had a special responsibility in the matter. It was the duty of the General Assembly to call upon those States to take economic, diplomatic and other measures aimed at bringing pressure to bear on the South African Government to give up South West Africa.

173. It would be wrong to create the impression that the United Nations was merely replacing the Mandate in South West Africa with United Nations trusteeship. Trusteeship régimes of any kind represented a danger to liberation movements, and trusteeship might delay South West Africa's attainment of independence. An administration consisting of foreigners rather than representatives of the Territory could never create a new State.

174. The Soviet Union had serious doubts regarding the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) and had therefore been unable to vote for it. It advocated a more realistic and more radical solution, namely, immediate and unconditional independence for the people of South West Africa. Such a solution would not exclude the possibility of taking steps to hold elections and create the best possible conditions for the transfer of power.

175. The Soviet Union, like the Afro-Asian countries and all States which valued freedom and independence, would do everything in its power to devise effective measures for liberating the people of South West Africa from the racist colonial yoke.

#### D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

176. At the 537th meeting on 16 June 1967, the representative of Iran introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.412) on behalf of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

177. In presenting the draft resolution, the representative of Iran emphasized that its sole object was to safeguard the territorial integrity of South West Africa in accordance with the wishes of virtually all members of the General Assembly.

178. On 27 October 1966 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), which declared that South Africa had forfeited the right and authority to administer the Territory of South West Africa. The South African Government had since taken steps to carry out the odious Odendaal Plan, designed to break up South West Africa into three or more divisions in the hope that that would enable South Africa to perpetuate its domination. The first step towards the fragmentation of the Territory had already been taken and was about to be completed in Ovamboland.

179. The Iranian delegation which, by sponsoring resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), had from the outset stood firmly for the independence and territorial integrity of South West Africa, was shocked by South Africa's complete disregard for those resolutions. That defiance of the world organization constituted a serious challenge which should not be taken lightly.

180. In the past there had been virtual unanimity on the reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of South West Africa, in particular in the statements on Ovamboland made at the fifth special session of the General Assembly. All the members of the Special Committee had expressed their full support of the territorial integrity of South West Africa. The sponsors of the draft resolution therefore hoped that all members of the Committee would agree to condemn the measures taken or proposed by the Government of South Africa with respect to Ovamboland as illegal and contrary to the above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions and as a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations. He appealed for a unanimous vote in favour of the draft resolution.

181. The representative of *Afghanistan*, seconding the draft resolution, fully endorsed the statement by the representative of Iran and urged the Special Committee to adopt the draft resolution unanimously.

182. The representative of *Madagascar* thanked the representative of Iran for introducing the draft resolution on South West Africa: his statement reflected the feelings of the majority of the members of the Special Committee. It was to be hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by a large majority.

183. The representative of the *United States of America* said, in explanation of his vote, that at the time the South African Government had announced its plans for Ovamboland, his Government had expressed its concern and regret. The establishment of Bantustans in the Territory was inconsistent with the resolution of the General Assembly which forbade South Africa to make any substantial change in the circumstances of that Territory. His delegation therefore intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.412) noting that South Africa's expressed intention regarding Ovamboland had not yet been implemented, in the hope that the new resolution would cause the South African Government to pause and consider.

184. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.412) was then adopted unanimously.

185. The resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/250), adopted by the Special Committee at its 539th meeting on 19 June 1967, reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,*

*"Recalling General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965 and in particular operative paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof, as well as previous resolutions on the question of South West Africa, adopted by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and in particular operative paragraph 7 thereof and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and in particular section I thereof,*

*"Deeply concerned at the measures taken by the Government of South Africa to alter the status of Ovamboland, an integral part of South West Africa, by the establishment of so-called self-government,*

*"Considering that these measures are an extension of the universally condemned system of apartheid and racial discrimination and are a method of fragmenting the Territory with a view to covering up South Africa's domination,*

*"1. Reaffirms the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the inalienable right of its people to freedom and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions concerning South West Africa;*

*"2. Condemns as illegal and contrary to the above-mentioned General Assembly resolutions and as a flagrant defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the measures taken and proposed by the Government of South Africa with respect to Ovamboland."*

#### E. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TERRITORY

##### *Trial of thirty-seven South West Africans by South Africa for alleged terrorist activities*

186. As reported above (paras. 34-53), numerous arrests of South West Africans have been made by the South African police since the beginning of guerrilla activities in Ovamboland in 1966. Many of the persons arrested were apparently transferred to prisons in South Africa and held incommunicado for many months without being charged or brought to trial.

187. On 22 June 1967, however, the Attorney General of the Transvaal, Mr. R. W. Rein, announced that thirty-seven South West Africans were to be formally charged with taking part in terrorist activities and committed in the Pretoria Magistrate's Court for summary trial by a judge without jury. Those arrested included the Acting President of SWAPO, Mr. Nathaniel Maxuiriri, the Acting Secretary-General, Mr. Ja Otto, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jason Mutumbulua, and the Regional Secretary of the North, Mr. Toivo Ja Toivo. Twenty-one of the men were described either as labourers or unemployed; there were also four peasants, three farmers, two teachers, one mechanic and one clerk. The occupations of the

remainder were not known. The trial was set to begin in Pretoria on 7 August 1967.

188. Mr. Rein was said to have stated that evidence would show that eighteen of the accused had received training in several countries and that seven of the accused were political leaders of SWAPO.

189. Mr. Rein was reported to have added that evidence would be given that SWAPO was responsible for the training of terrorists in foreign countries and in Ovamboland. According to Mr. Rein, the evidence would be that all the accused were members of a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the existing government of South West Africa and replacing it with a government consisting of SWAPO members.

190. Fire-arms, including automatic weapons, ammunition and various other weapons, were also to be handed in as exhibits. It was further reported that the State intended to call between 150 and 160 witnesses and hand in about 500 exhibits of a documentary nature.

191. It was later announced that the thirty-seven men were to appear before the judge on a main charge under the recently published Terrorism Act (Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967) and on two alternative charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. Under the Terrorism Act the accused may be sentenced to death if found guilty of some of the alleged charges they are facing.

192. The Terrorism Act was passed during this year's session of the South African Parliament and was promulgated on 21 June 1967, only the day before the announcement of the charges against the accused and subsequent to the adoption of General Assembly resolutions depriving South Africa of the Mandate for South West Africa.

193. Under this Act, any person who commits the following acts shall be guilty of the offence of participation in terrorist activities and liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason, provided that, except where the death penalty is imposed, a sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than five years shall be compulsory whether or not any other penalty is also imposed:

(a) Any person who with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic or any portion thereof, in the Republic or elsewhere commits any act or attempts to commit, or conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit, or incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to commit, any act; or

(b) Any person who in the Republic or elsewhere undergoes, or attempts, consents or takes any steps to undergo, or incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to undergo any training which could be of use to any person intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order, and who fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not undergo or attempt, consent or take any steps to undergo, or incite, instigate, command, aid, advise, encourage or procure such other person to undergo such training for the purpose of using it or causing it to be used to commit any act likely to have any of the results referred to in subsection (2) in the Republic or any portion thereof; or

(c) Any person who possesses any explosives, ammunition, fire-arm or weapon and who fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend

using such explosives, ammunition, fire-arm or weapon to commit any act likely to have any of the results referred to in subsection (2) in the Republic or any portion thereof.

194. The Act provides that acts likely to have such effects as hampering or deterring any person from assisting in the maintenance of law and order, promoting by intimidation the achievement of any object, causing or promoting general dislocation, furthering or encouraging the achievement of any political aim by violence or forcible means or with the assistance of any foreign Government or international body, causing substantial financial loss to any person or the State, or embarrassing the Administration of the affairs of the State shall be presumed to have been committed with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the State, unless it is proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.

195. The Act further provides that any person who harbours or conceals or renders any assistance to a terrorist shall be guilty of an offence and liable to the same penalties as for the main offence.

196. The Act provides that any commissioned officer of or above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel may, if he has reason to believe that any person who happens to be at any place in the Republic is a terrorist or is withholding from the South African Police any information relating to terrorists or to offences under this Act, arrest such person or cause him to be arrested without warrant and detain or cause such person to be detained for interrogation at such place in the Republic and subject to such conditions as the Commissioner of the South African Police may, subject to the directions of the Minister of Justice, from time to time determine, until the Commissioner orders his release when satisfied that he has satisfactorily replied to all questions at the said interrogation.

197. Under the Terrorism Act any superior court or the Attorney General in the Republic shall have jurisdiction in respect of any offence under the Terrorism Act committed outside the area of jurisdiction of such court or the Attorney General, as if it had been committed within such area. The trial of any person accused of having committed any offence under this Act may be held at any time and at any place within the area of jurisdiction of the division of the Supreme Court of South Africa concerned.

198. The Act also provides that any person charged in the Republic with having committed an offence under this Act, shall be tried by a judge without a jury.

199. The Terrorism Act is retroactive to 27 June 1962, the date when the law making acts of sabotage a criminal offence came into force. For the purposes of the Act, the Republic is defined as including South West Africa.

200. The thirty-seven South West Africans appeared at a magistrate's court in Pretoria on 27 June 1967 and were asked if any of them had arranged for his own legal representation. Mr. Jason Mutumbulua, one of the accused men, was reported to have replied that this was impossible as they were all thousands of miles from home and asked that the trial be heard at Windhoek, South West Africa, where they would be able to get attorneys to defend themselves. The magistrate explained that the Government had ordered the trial to be heard in Pretoria and that it could not be altered. Mr. Mutumbulua is reported to have

said that the accused were not prepared to conduct their own defence but wanted *pro deo* counsel to be appointed. In any event Mr. N. Phillips was appointed defence counsel; there is no information available as to how, or by whom, the appointment was made.

201. The trial was opened in Pretoria on 7 August 1967. The thirty-seven accused were charged with entering South West Africa with the intention of creating a violent revolution and taking over the government of the country. It was alleged that they had received training in terrorism in various countries and had set up training camps in Ovamboland where they taught others guerrilla warfare. It was also alleged that they were responsible for terrorist attacks on white and African government officials and farmers and their homes during the period from June 1966 until May 1967.

202. According to press reports the forty-one-page indictment set out a long list of charges and also contained thirty pages detailing places, times, and each man's part in the alleged terrorist activity. It also listed eighty-one co-conspirators not before the Court who were alleged to have taken part in the activities. It was alleged that some of the accused plotted the deaths of three pro-government headmen; one headman was alleged to have been killed.

203. The defence counsel, Mr. N. Phillips, was reported to have challenged the right of South Africa to hold the trial. In applying for the delay of the trial until 11 September 1967, the counsel made the point that one reason for adjourning was to consider if the Terrorism Act, retrospective to 1962, was within the legislative competence of the South African Parliament as it applied to South West Africa. He added that that involved questions of international law. The defence counsel also submitted at the hearing that many of the accused were illiterate and could only speak Ovambo.

204. It was also reported that Mr. Phillips requested the Court for further particulars of the indictment, including precise details of the aims and objectives of SWAPO during the period covered in the indictment; in what manner and when SWAPO became party to the alleged conspiracy and how it was involved in the alleged training of guerrillas; how SWAPO conspired to bring about hostility between Whites and non-whites, and how the organization attempted to intimidate headmen in Ovamboland to withdraw their support from the Government. The defence counsel was said to have further stated that as the defence of each man must be separately considered, this was complicated by the fact that each of the accused was said to have acted in conjunction with others. Further, the counsel was said to have stated that the acts alleged were numerous and covered a period of five years in some cases. In other cases the acts were said to have been committed in foreign countries.

205. The judge granted the application for a postponement of the trial until 11 September 1967.

#### F. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

##### Introduction

206. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of South West Africa at its 554th, 556th and 557th meetings held in New York between 8 and 12 September 1967. The Committee had before it information on the trial of thirty-seven South West

Africans by South Africa for alleged terrorist activities, contained in a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 186-205 above) at the request of the Committee. The Secretariat paper was introduced by the Chairman at the Committee's 556th meeting, on 11 September 1967.

##### Written petitions and hearings

207. The Special Committee also circulated the following written petitions concerning South West Africa:

Petitioner	Document No.
Mr. D. Nokwe, Secretary-General, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)	A/AC.109/PET.649/Add.1
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary-General, Union of South West Africa Workers (USWAW), and Chief Representative in Eastern Africa, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF)	A/AC.109/PET.585/Add.2
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary of Labour, Mr. Isaiah Emvule, Mr. Thomas Nepaya, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	A/AC.109/PET.585/Add.3
Mr. G. H. Geingob, representative of SWAPO in the United States of America	A/AC.109/PET.585/Add.4
Mr. Ewald Katjivena, representative of SWAPO in Algeria	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.6
Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.7
Paramount Chief David Goraseb	A/AC.109/PET.592/Add.1
Mr. Preston T. Gibson, Jr.	A/AC.109/PET.711

203. The Special Committee heard the following petitioner concerning South West Africa:

Petitioner	Meeting
Mr. G. H. Geingob, representative of SWAPO in the United States of America (A/AC.109/PET.587/Add.5)	554th

209. Mr. Geingob, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that Namibia, or South West Africa, had been misruled by South Africa from 17 December 1920 until 27 October 1966, when the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, had adopted resolution 2145 (XXI). Despite that action, however, South African racists were still continuing their barbaric system of white supremacy in South Africa. They had illegally arrested thirty-seven South West Africans and transported them to South Africa, where they had been remanded in custody until 11 September 1967. Those arrested included the Acting President, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Acting Secretary of SWAPO. The majority of the patriots had been charged with entering South West Africa with the intention of creating a violent revolution and taking over the Government. Some countries called the freedom fighters of South West Africa terrorists; however, he would recall that the Declaration of Independence of the United States maintained that it was the right of people to alter or abolish any form of government which did not derive its powers from the consent of the governed. The revolutionary struggle now taking place in southern Africa was the proper reflection of the real demands and aspirations of the people of that part of the world, who were suffering intolerable oppression, exploitation, repression and humiliation.

210. Even viewed in purely legal terms, the arrest of the freedom fighters was wrongful. First, they had been arrested illegally in the United Nations Territory; secondly, they had been denied a speedy trial, since some of them had been kept in gaol for more than a year before appearing in court; thirdly, they were on trial under an *ex post facto* law; fourthly, they were being tried away from their country and thus were deprived of legal advisers. Moreover, their illegal arrest and transportation to a foreign country violated United Nations resolutions and was a defiance of United Nations authority. He therefore urged the United Nations to demand the unconditional release of those patriots, whose land, cattle and other possessions had been stolen by South Africa.

#### G. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

211. At the 556th meeting on 11 September 1967, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.428) for the consideration of the Special Committee.

212. Introducing the thirteen-power draft resolution, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the South African régime's arrest of the thirty-seven African patriots of South West Africa was an act of international piracy and abduction which flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of the United Nations decision establishing the international status of South West Africa and constituted a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations. His delegation, together with those of the overwhelming majority of Member States, had always called for the most concrete and speedy action to eliminate the crimes arising from the policies and practices of *apartheid*.

213. Despite categorical denunciations by the United Nations, *apartheid* and colonialism still existed, mainly because of the complacent attitude of those who pursued selfish interests. At the same time, it was gratifying to observe that colonized peoples and freedom-loving peoples throughout the world, as exemplified by the petitioner heard by the Committee at its 554th meeting, were determined to carry on the struggle to eliminate those inhuman systems once for all.

214. The African and Asian members of the Special Committee and Yugoslavia had prepared a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.428) condemning the illegal arrests and calling upon the South African authorities to cease all illegal acts in South West Africa and to release the arrested African patriots immediately. The adoption of that draft resolution was the minimum action the United Nations could take. He hoped that the Special Committee would unhesitatingly adopt the draft resolution and thereby indicate its solidarity with the people of South West Africa who were dedicated to achieving their liberation.

215. The representative of *India* said his delegation was gratified that its suggestion should have been taken up so promptly by the Special Committee and embodied in a draft resolution. Ever since the International Court of Justice had delivered its judgement on the South West Africa case in July 1966, the international community had exercised the utmost vigilance over the question of the future of the Territory's inhabitants. The question had been under almost continuous consideration in the United Nations, and it

was proper that the Committee charged with the task of looking after the interests of colonial peoples should be seized of the matter once again. The occasion was not a happy one, since it concerned the deprivation of the fundamental rights of the people of a colonial Territory.

216. As far as his delegation was concerned, the thirty-seven nationals of South West Africa who were being detained by the South African Government were not terrorists by any standards. They were patriots fighting for their right to freedom and independence, and India had always recognized the right of colonial peoples to wage their struggle for independence in any form they chose. Since the trial of the thirty-seven South West Africans was due to open that day, at Pretoria, it was very fitting that the draft resolution should have been introduced concurrently. He hoped that it might be possible for the Special Committee to vote on it immediately, as it contained nothing controversial.

217. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that he fully supported the draft resolution. Having listened with indignation to the statements by the petitioners from South West Africa concerning the criminal activities of the *apartheid* régime at Pretoria, he considered that the draft resolution called for the minimum that the United Nations could do at the present stage—namely, to condemn the illegal acts of the South African régime and demand the release of the thirty-seven South West African patriots. He hoped that the Special Committee would not hesitate to condemn the *apartheid* régime in South Africa in the strongest terms.

218. The representative of *Chile* said that he entirely agreed with the draft resolution. His country had participated in the work of various committees dealing with questions of decolonization, and at the last regular session of the General Assembly his delegation had unequivocally stated its views on the South African Government's policies of *apartheid*. The draft resolution before the Special Committee recalled resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), which had been adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly. Considering how it had voted on those occasions, Chile was bound to support a draft resolution which condemned the illegal arrest of thirty-seven South West African nationals by the Pretoria régime.

219. Chile also endorsed the call to South Africa, which was unlawfully maintaining its rule over South West Africa, to cease its illegal acts. For all those reasons, his delegation considered itself to be in effect a sponsor of the draft resolution, which it would unreservedly support. The latest action by the South African Government merely confirmed the policy which it had been pursuing for a number of years and which the General Assembly had categorically condemned.

220. The representative of the *United States of America* said that she shared the concern of members of the Special Committee at the arrest and trial of thirty-seven inhabitants of South West Africa under the Terrorism Act. While she did not have the full facts about the cases against the accused and must therefore reserve judgement about many questions that might arise, it was clear that the Act itself violated the rights of the inhabitants of the Territory and the international status of South West Africa. This re-



troactive legislation which made it possible for the accused to be stripped of rights essential to a proper and fair trial also shut off avenues of peaceful dissent in the Territory, thus generating the behaviour it sought to punish. It was another instance of violation of the terms of the Mandate of the kind which had led the General Assembly to adopt resolution 2145 (XXI), depriving South Africa of its right to continue its administration of South West Africa. In its application to South West Africa, the legislation was without lawful authority and in violation of the international status of the Territory.

221. Although it had thus forfeited its rights in South West Africa, the South African Government still remained obligated to the people of the Territory, to the United Nations and to the international community, to respect the rights vested in the inhabitants of the Territory by the Mandate and to account for its conduct in respect to the Territory through the United Nations and otherwise. In the view of the United States Government, the nature of the legislation and the responsibilities of the United Nations toward the inhabitants of the Territory required that the Committee call on the Government of South Africa to halt the prosecutions and cease to apply the Terrorism Act in South West Africa. That did not mean, of course, that the Territory should be without law and order or that an independent judiciary should not apply the law, but the Terrorism Act was so contrary to the principles of fairness and justice that its application to South West Africa was inadmissible. Her delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

222. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution; however, he wished to clarify his delegation's position with regard to the legal grounds for the condemnation contained in the draft resolution. On the basis of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), the illegality of the South African Government's action lay in the decision to extend the application of a South African law to South West Africa. Italy would therefore have preferred a wording for operative paragraph 1 that would give a broader scope to the condemnation, since he believed that it was directed not so much against the arrest of thirty-seven persons as against any arrest or trial of South West Africans under an Act illegally extended to the Territory.

223. At its 557th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.428) by a roll-call vote of 21 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

224. The representative of *Australia*, speaking in explanation of his vote, recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and abstained from voting on resolution 2248 (S-V). Having examined the draft resolution in the light of the provisions of those two General

Assembly resolutions, his delegation had concluded that it could not vote in favour of it. Resolution 2248 (S-V) recognized that although its Mandate over South West Africa had come to an end, South Africa still exercised physical control over the Territory, and the use of the word "illegal" in the draft resolution might imply that all acts of the South African Government in South West Africa were illegal. Australia believed that, until an international administration was established in South West Africa, the South African authorities remained in effective control of the Territory. For those reasons, his delegation had abstained from voting.

225. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recalled that the draft resolution which had been adopted derived directly from General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V). His delegation, which had abstained from voting on both those resolutions, had frequently explained the reasons for its reservations with regard to them, and it did not think it necessary to repeat them. In its view, the adoption of the resolutions had given rise to many legal doubts and uncertainties. Consequently, his delegation had been obliged to abstain from voting also on the draft resolution now adopted, but it wished to state that its abstention did not imply any judgement upon the merits of the draft resolution.

226. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, thanked those members of the Special Committee who had found wisdom in recognizing justice and in condemning the brutality of the South African Government's methods.

227. When introducing the draft resolution, his delegation had explained the reasons motivating its sponsors. To them, as to those who had voted in favour of the draft resolution, the status of South West Africa was perfectly clear: the United Nations had revoked any and all rights that might have been vested at any time in the South African Government. Only the United Nations had authority over the Territory of South West Africa. Consequently, the Pretoria régime could not deal with even the most minor offences. In any event, the Special Committee believed that it should express its solidarity with the people of South West Africa and assist them in their struggle for independence and international peace; for peace would be threatened so long as South Africa continued to pursue its policies of *apartheid* in South West Africa.

228. The representative of *Uruguay* said he regretted that, for reasons beyond its control, his delegation had been unable to participate in the voting. However, it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution, which concerned a matter on which its position had been stated in some detail, both in the Special Committee and in the General Assembly at the time of the voting on resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V). On both occasions, his delegation had explained its views on the question, which was of concern not only to the United Nations but to the entire world.

229. *The Chairman* stated that in view of the urgency of the question, it was to be hoped that the Secretary-General would ensure that the resolution which had been adopted was acted upon as soon as possible. The text of the resolution should also be transmitted to the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa.

230. Although it was not customary for the Chairman to speak after a draft resolution had been adopted, he would like, on behalf of the Special Committee, to urge the Republic of South Africa to heed the appeal addressed to it. He would also like to ask those Governments which still had some influence on the Pretoria Government to draw its attention to the international community's desire that South West Africa should be respected. In view of the position taken by the United Nations with regard to South West Africa, any attempt by South Africa to extend its racist laws to that Territory was illegal and should continue to be condemned by the international community.

231. The Chairman also expressed the hope that all organizations, both those affiliated and those not affiliated with the United Nations, would assist it in making its appeal heard in the Republic of South Africa.

232. The text of the resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/271) as adopted by the Special Committee at its 557th meeting on 12 September 1967, reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having heard the statement of the petitioner,*

*"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967,*

*"1. Condemns the illegal arrest by the authorities of South Africa of thirty-seven African nationals from South West Africa in flagrant violation of the international status of the Territory;*

*"2. Calls upon the authorities of South Africa to cease all illegal acts in the international Territory of South West Africa and demands the immediate release of the thirty-seven African nationals mentioned above."*

233. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa on 12 September 1967 (see A/AC.131/2).