

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 17 February 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:                      Mr. Fan GUOXIANG                      (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 389th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda items 1, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

In conformity with Rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sri Lanka, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Egypt.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine.

Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Comrade President. As you know, yesterday, 16 February, Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed the participants in the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World for the Survival of Humanity, in Moscow. The text of this statement has been distributed in a press release and any delegation that so wishes has the opportunity of reading it.

Speaking on the reorganization of society which is under way in my country, Gorbachev emphasized that for the Soviet Union, in order to concentrate on the constructive endeavours to improve the situation in our country, peace is necessary. Our desire to make our country better will hurt no one, with the world only gaining from this. Reorganization, to stress its international aspect, is an invitation to any social system to compete with socialism peacefully for the benefit of general progress and world peace. But for such competition to take place and unfold in civilized forms worthy of mankind in the 21st century, we must have a new outlook and overcome mentalities, stereotypes and dogmas inherited from a past which is gone, never to return.

We have come to the conclusion, said the Soviet leader, that in today's complex and contradictory world, new approaches and methods are required for solving international problems. These conclusions make us reconsider something which once seemed axiomatic, and fully realize that with the advent and improvement of nuclear arms the human race has lost its immortality. It can only be regained by destroying nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers must go beyond their nuclear shadow and enter a nuclear-free world, thus ending the alienation of politics from the general human ethical norms. A nuclear tornado, said General Secretary Gorbachev, will sweep away both socialists and capitalists alike, the just and the unjust alike.

Referring to the Soviet disarmament initiatives, the Soviet leader noted that none of our proposals attempts to leave out any of our weapons from the negotiations. Our principle is simple: all weapons must be limited and

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reduced, and those of wholesale annihilation eventually scrapped. He stressed, in particular, that the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to have chemical weapons totally abolished.

Comrade President, negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban have a long history, but only recently did the prospect of a successful conclusion already in the very near future become evident. This is an important result of constructive initiatives and efforts made by many countries including Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Sweden, Pakistan, Indonesia, Great Britain, Australia and other countries, and by the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups. A breakthrough in the negotiations became apparent last year, when the Soviet Union, building upon the fundamental provisions of the statement of 15 January 1986, put forward several series of proposals which contributed to accelerating the negotiations and reaching agreement on quite a number of sections of the future convention.

I believe there is every reason to regard the current session of negotiations as a decisive one. What we have now is not just the framework for a future convention but also solutions to most of the fundamental issues and, moreover, agreed texts of many provisions of a future convention.

At the same time, a number of questions are yet to be resolved. Among them I would mention declaration and verification of chemical-weapon stocks and challenge inspections. Further work is required on provisions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, the definition of a chemical-weapons production facility and elimination measures, the scope of the prohibition and various others. The "procedural" articles of the convention too, are not to be forgotten -- the procedure for the signing of the convention and its entry into force, its depositary, etc. We are therefore required to act most promptly and comprehensively so as to reach agreement on all outstanding issues and finalize the text of the convention and open it for signature.

We agree with Ambassador Butler, the head of the Australian delegation, who said on 3 February 1987, referring to the objectives currently facing the participants of the negotiations, that "we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized".

The only way to succeed is to seek mutually acceptable solutions and to negotiate, taking into account each other's legitimate concerns.

The Soviet delegation commends the energetic efforts of Ambassador Ekéus, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at a successful conclusion of the negotiations.

In the inter-sessional period of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union explored in depth all aspects of the state of affairs of the negotiations; its own position on the outstanding questions and the way other countries approach them. In doing so we looked above all for possible solutions to these questions and instructed our experts to act accordingly.

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In today's statement the USSR delegation wishes to present its proposals and ideas on the solution to a number of questions concerning the future convention with a view to facilitating more intensive negotiations and further progress therein.

I have already referred to chemical-weapon stocks. They are the subject matter of Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the draft convention which is now under discussion and negotiation. Agreement has already been reached on a number of important provisions of that article, including those relating to declarations of volumes of stocks, their methods of destruction, and verification of operations of chemical-weapon destruction facilities. So far, however, it has not been possible to come to an agreement on the provisions in the convention relating to declarations of locations of chemical-weapon stocks and to international verification of such locations. Agreement has been hampered by a number of perfectly legitimate national security concerns expressed, for example, by the delegation of France and my delegation. We, for our part, have once again weighed up all the factors, viewed them in the context of the need for speedy progress at the negotiations and the concerns expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, which attach particular importance to finding a solution to this very question as rapidly as possible.

As a result, we have come to the conclusion that with a view to finding a speedy solution to this question it would be advisable to agree to the proposal to provide, immediately after the convention enters into force, access to chemical weapons for the purposes of systematic international on-site verification of declarations of chemical-weapon stocks.

In our view each State party to the convention should, not later than 30 days after its entry into force, make a declaration containing detailed information on the locations of chemical-weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time of the convention's entry into force, both in its national territory and elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control. Such a declaration, inter alia, would specify the precise location of each storage facility, the quantity and composition of the chemical weapons in each location, methods of storage indicating the name of each chemical, munition types and calibres, etc. A State party should, within 30 days after the convention enters into force, take measures to ensure a closure of chemical-weapon storage facilities and prevent movement of stocks other than movement for their elimination.

For the purposes of effective verification of closed chemical-weapon storage facilities, it is necessary to provide for systematic international verification with permanent use of instruments, including verification of the correctness of declarations, closure of storage facilities, installation by inspectors of devices for this purpose and periodic checks on such devices, presence of inspectors at the time when chemical weapons are moved out of the facility for elimination, sealing of the means of transport, etc. Upon complete removal of all chemical weapons from the facility, an international inspection team would draw up a statement certifying this fact.

We expect that the proposals we have presented will enable us to agree promptly and without delay on the provisions relating to declarations of chemical weapons.

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A number of other issues relating to Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the convention, are to be considered in the near future. We express our willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding issues in that article, including those related to the time-frame, order and methods of elimination. Bearing in mind that the proposal that a State party should have the right to divert chemical weapons has caused difficulties, we have carefully weighed up all the pros and cons of the proposal: we now proceed on the assumption that all chemical weapons are to be destroyed.

The Soviet delegation hopes that our flexible approach will make it possible to find solutions to the above-mentioned issue and will help accelerate the negotiations. We also call upon other delegations to join in these efforts and to present concrete proposals for mutually acceptable solutions.

In his statement yesterday, General Secretary Gorbachev, referring to problems of verification, said inter alia: "Now that we are coming to consider major measures for actual disarmament affecting the most sensitive area of national security, the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification, including international verification. There must be complete certainty that the commitments are honoured by all."

That is precisely why the Soviet Union gives priority to negotiating an agreement on effective international verification of compliance by all States parties with their obligations under the convention. Such verification should not only effectively ensure confidence in the destruction of chemical weapons and facilities for their production but also effectively preclude any rebirth of chemical weapons anywhere and in any country.

The negotiations on verification machinery are based on a general understanding that the basis will be a system of "routine" international inspections. On the other hand, it has also been recognized that such international inspection should be complemented by on-site challenge inspections so that the whole verification mechanism of the Convention may be particularly reliable. Thus challenge inspections would serve above all the purpose of preventing breaches of the convention. Ultimately they would ensure the possibility of implementing international verification with regard to any activities relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These principles should be taken fully into account in elaborating specific procedures for such challenge inspection.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the participants in the negotiations, despite agreement on a number of important aspects, still encounter great difficulty in finalizing agreements on challenge inspection. We believe that basically these difficulties have a perfectly objective and real basis: States may indeed have certain locations and facilities which are not relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Access to such locations and facilities, due to their particularly sensitive nature, is normally prohibited or restricted. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility of a State having the right to refuse a challenge inspection in exceptional cases when its supreme interests are jeopardized. The existence of such areas and sensitive points have by the way been recognized in the

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document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context we consider that the view expressed by Ambassador Dolgu, Head of the delegation of Romania, was quite justified, namely that it would be advisable to use the provisions of that document at the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The participants in the negotiations have different views on solutions to the issue of challenge inspections at the present time. Some propose that the Executive Council be involved. Others, while in favour of providing access to a number of sensitive locations and facilities automatically, immediately upon request, make exemptions for private premises. Moreover the procedure for implementing challenge inspections envisaged under these proposals while securing the interest of the major Powers and members of military alliances, gives a small number of States certain rights of which practically all the other parties to the convention are deprived of. There is also a proposal to the effect that in the event of a challenge, the challenged State should have the right to propose alternative measures which should satisfy the challenging State.

In view of these various proposals and approaches, movement towards agreement apparently might be initiated by defining a number of cases where refusal of an inspection on the requested scale would not be allowed: for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons, or inspection of locations and facilities declared under the convention. It appears this idea enjoys wide support at the negotiations, and understandably so, for we are dealing with the cases and facilities which are most directly relevant to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and consequently there should be no reason for refusing an inspection.

As for other cases and other locations and facilities, in elaborating agreement on challenge inspections the idea of using alternative measures, up to viewing the facility from without and collecting chemical samples near the facility, might be helpful. Such a differentiation would, in our view, ensure progress towards agreement on this issue which, while unresolved, hampers agreement on other issues of the convention.

Of course, there remains the difficult problem of what should be done if the alternative measures still do not satisfy the challenging State.

We share the hope expressed by the head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Theorin, that the "general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue" -- i.e. international challenge inspection. The Soviet delegation declares itself ready to seek actively for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of any positive ideas and suggestions which are on the negotiating table.

We have been asked by a number of delegations to explain what is meant by permanent international verification which the Soviet Union proposes applying to chemical-weapon destruction facilities, specialized facilities for the production of category I chemicals for permitted purposes and to a certain number of facilities producing key precursors. I would like to explain our

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understanding of permanent verification. In our view, such verification can be implemented either through the permanent presence of international inspectors at facilities or through visits to facilities by international inspectors in combination with permanent use of control and measuring instruments at facilities, including remote monitoring. As for the order and modalities for the use of such instruments, helpful solutions in our view might be prompted by the experience in the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Identification of "important" (in terms of verification) points at the facilities, sealing of certain units, installation of photo and video equipment, measuring devices in agreed sections of the technological process, maintenance of international verification instruments by international inspectors, etc.

As for systematic international inspection, we propose that their frequency and timing be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of the risk posed to the convention by a given chemical or facility. In working out the details of systematic international inspections, we could also draw on the experience and practices of the IAEA, in particular with regard to providing the different types of systematic inspections, (routine and special), the frequency and time-frame of inspections, and the right of the IAEA to determine the facilities to be inspected at a given time. We believe that the experience and practices of the IAEA might also prompt us to the right solutions on other questions of verifying compliance with the chemical weapons convention. They might be drawn upon in working out an agreement on the activities of the inspectorate too, that is the appointment of inspectors, their privileges, inspection procedures, etc.

On the basis of the provisions included in the convention, it would be advisable to elaborate subsequently, along the lines of the IAEA, a model agreement between a State Party and an appropriate body of the Convention which would govern the practical aspects of implementing international verification at facilities (the verification procedure, specific measures for the closure of facilities, etc.)

When the convention is in effect, specific measures of verification with regard to chemical-weapon production facilities and chemical-weapon destruction facilities would be agreed upon by a State Party and the Consultative Committee and included in the relevant plans for the elimination of stocks and facilities.

The emerging prospect of the conclusion of a convention puts on the negotiating agenda the question of interaction of States under the new conditions where chemical weapons have been banned. The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of implementing wide international co-operation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis in the developments of peaceful chemical industry as an alternative to the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. One cannot but agree with the view that without provisions to this effect a future convention would be weakened. A convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons can, in our opinion, become an example of practical implementation of the agreed principles of "disarmament for development".

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The negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have gained momentum and it is our hope that the proposals we have presented today will contribute towards speedy agreement on the convention. However, we cannot remain impassive in the face of certain statements which are in fact aimed at creating difficulties in the negotiations.

The British magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, recently published an article on chemical-weapon issues by K. Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- incidentally, this article has been reprinted in our newspaper, Pravda. In that article, Mr. Adelman writes: "To have a chance of achieving that (a chemical-weapons ban), we need to ensure that our negotiators' hands are not empty. Congress, therefore, should fund the Administration's request for binary chemical weapons production". In our view this logic is strange, to say the least. It reminds me of a satirical story by the well-known Czech writer, Janislav Hašek, about the Conference on Disarmament at the time of the League of Nations. That Conference literally blew up as a result of careless handling of a new explosive, "Washingtonite", by a representative of the military business who stood waiting at the entrance to the conference room with samples of his product to offer the participants of the Conference.

It is simply regrettable that the negotiating portfolio of the United States delegation is still being replenished not with compromise proposals but with new types of chemical weapons, which can only poison the atmosphere at the negotiations.

The Soviet delegation has today expressed certain views on ways of reaching agreement at the next stage of negotiations. We intend to continue to work actively for the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons this year. The positive effects of the conclusion of such convention would be of great significance, and not only in the military field. Its conclusion would demonstrate that it is practically possible to find solutions to the complex problems of disarmament through the joint efforts of States, and would contribute to creating a more positive political climate. This is the aim of the new Soviet proposals, and we expect similar steps on the outstanding issues from other participants in the negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, the friendship between our two countries extending over so many centuries has resulted in a unique relationship as equal sovereign States despite vast disparities in size, population and power. In the field of disarmament we have respected your principled approach and your many initiatives including the declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons, the unilateral reduction of your army by 1 million, your decision not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere and your consistent policy that disarmament is the concern of all nations irrespective of size and might, as mentioned in your distinguished Foreign Minister's message to our Conference on 3 February. As an outstanding representative of your country we are confident that you will conduct our work in the first month of the 1987 session so as to create the necessary impetus to carry us forward in our task of negotiating for disarmament.



(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

We would like to take this opportunity of thanking Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada for having presided so competently over our work in August 1986 and in the inter-sessional period.

My delegation extends its sincere condolences to the delegation of the United States of America and to the family of the late Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have lost a friend and a colleague whose outstanding personal qualities will long be remembered. As we begin a new session in our Conference my delegation would like to acknowledge the contribution made to our forum by Ambassador Sutowardoyo of Indonesia, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR and Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, who have left us. At the same time we welcome Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine of USSR and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation was especially touched by the poignant statement last week of Ambassador Yamada speaking as a survivor of the Hiroshima holocaust. The words on that monument in Hiroshima "Let it never happen again" should indeed be in our minds at all times during our important work in this Conference to ensure their realization in our time. Nuclear deterrence theory based on the continuity of adversarial relationships and the credibility of the threat that it will happen again has only led to greater arsenals of nuclear weapons with an explosive power of over 1 million Hiroshima bombs, and greater insecurity.

Despite its being the International Year of Peace, the events of the last year did not fulfil the deeply-held aspirations of the people of the world in terms of concrete agreements on disarmament. We recognize, however, that a significant improvement in the international climate for disarmament negotiations has continued since 1985. Reykjavik was a missed opportunity where this improvement could have culminated in a radical change for the better. To the extent that the participants at Reykjavik are ready to carry forward its lessons will depend the real historical significance of that weekend's discussions. The reports we have had so far are not encouraging. The leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation who held a Summit Meeting in Bangalore on 16 and 17 November 1986, stated their view on Reykjavik in the following terms:

"The Heads of State and Government noted with deep disappointment that the promise held out by the Reykjavik Summit could not be realized. They, however, noted with satisfaction that the proposals made at the Summit were still on the table. They expressed the earnest hope that the negotiations would be resumed without delay so that a decisive step could be taken towards realizing the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether."

For Sri Lanka as a founder-member of the Non-aligned Movement and one of its former Chairmen, the Harare Summit of non-aligned leaders represented an important event in the International Year of Peace. The Declaration issued at Harare contained the main principles and policies of 101 non-aligned countries in the field of disarmament and international security. Basic to these is the non-aligned concept of global security which the Harare Declaration expressed in the following words:

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"Historically, States have considered that they could achieve security through the possession of arms. The advent of nuclear weapons, has however, radically changed this situation. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war; they are instruments of mass annihilation. The accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constitutes a threat to the continued survival of mankind. It has therefore become imperative that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament."

Many speakers in our current session have noted the achievements registered in the First Committee of the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has set out in detail the resolutions adopted in respect of some of the more important issues including the priority nuclear subjects. My delegation was also encouraged by the atmosphere that prevailed and the voting patterns which implied a broader area of agreement on the substantive disarmament issues. We now face a crucial test as we attempt to transfer those resolutions into the negotiating context of our Conference. Convergence in the deliberative United Nations bodies devoted to disarmament cannot cohere with divergence in this sole negotiating body. The hopes that have been expressed for positive developments in our 1987 session are therefore justified and the Sri Lanka delegation will strive together with others to ensure their realization. A related development which we welcome is the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga and the signature of the relevant Protocols by two of the five nuclear Powers.

With 1987, the Year of Peace has yielded to the Year of Shelter for the Homeless designated as such by the United Nations on a proposal made in 1980 by Prime Minister Premadasa of Sri Lanka. This focus on a core issue of development as an investment in mankind is also a reminder to all of us of the relationship between disarmament and development. The global expenditure of almost a trillion dollars a year on armaments, both nuclear and conventional, is by all empirical standards inconsistent with stable and balanced social and economic development and contributes to distortions and imbalances in the world economy. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development rescheduled for this year and to be held in New York can, with universal participation and intensive preparation, result in an agreed programme of disarmament measures releasing resources for development purposes.

Another forthcoming event which impinges on the work of our Conference is the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 and its preparatory process beginning this year. The approach of the third special session devoted to disarmament must necessarily lend a sense of urgency to our work. We have within our grasp the completion of a convention on chemical weapons and the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament before the third special session. In addition we can and must show progress in the nuclear issues and especially on item 1 of our agenda, Nuclear-Test Ban.

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We have entered the ninth year of our existence as the single multilateral negotiating body. The agenda before us is dictated by the needs of our common security and not by the national interest of individual nations alone. Our failure to act on this agenda is a common failure but the responsibility for that failure cannot be shared knowing as we do the relative capacity of the members of this body to contribute to disarmament. We have begun this year with the re-establishment of two Ad Hoc Committees which have begun functioning without delay and the setting up of two further ad hoc committees which we hope will commence work soon. There are two agenda items in which my delegation has a particular interest in seeing some forward movement while emphasizing the need to make progress on all agenda items.

We have in this Conference remained far too long in a stalemated position on item 1 -- Nuclear-Test Ban. The need for the Conference to work on this important agenda item is self-evident. Self-evident too is the impact of external developments. The rejection of the offer of converting a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a bilateral moratorium; the dilatory linkage being established between bilateral negotiations for a reduction in the yields and the numbers of nuclear tests with bilateral negotiations for reductions in nuclear weapons; the Six-Nation Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986, with its practical proposals on the verification of a test ban; and the overlap in content and similarity of voting patterns on General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A, which Sri Lanka co-sponsored, and 41/47, on which we voted affirmatively, are some of these developments. The impact of some of them is clearly negative and while we cannot ignore their reality we can seek to build on the positive developments for our work here.

The distinguished Ambassador for Mexico has indicated a possible way to further our work by setting up an ad hoc committee with a mandate acceptable to all. The distinguished Ambassador of Japan also made an important contribution by noting that the gap we have to bridge is indeed not so wide as to daunt us in our diplomatic efforts. Our purpose in wanting to see an ad hoc committee set up on item 1 is not a window-dressing effort to make the Conference appear to be working towards a nuclear-test ban so as to placate international public opinion, mollify domestic lobbies or stall other moves to achieve a comprehensive test ban. We want to see real work begin on practical steps or interim steps including on an international seismic monitoring network with the active participation of all delegations. But the steps must lead to the objective clearly set out in both General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A and 41/47 -- a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. We recognize and indeed respect the differences that exist among us for the moment about the pace at which we should progress towards a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The objective however remains a common one and our differences should not be an impediment towards practical work in an ad hoc committee in this Conference. Statements made here on verification clearly indicate that there is a common approach. Work in an ad hoc committee can demonstrate the reality of this. We shall soon be observing the first death anniversary of the late Olof Palme who campaigned so long and so hard for an end to nuclear testing. The Palme Commission pamphlet on a comprehensive test ban published recently in pursuance of his wishes and dedicated to his memory concluded: "Together with measures to reduce significantly the size of existing nuclear arsenals and to limit the characteristics of new nuclear

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weapon systems, a comprehensive test ban could constrain nuclear capabilities and help to create a new political atmosphere in which the danger of nuclear war would be greatly reduced".

Over recent years there has been a steady swell of support for the non-aligned resolution in the General Assembly initiated by Egypt and Sri Lanka on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which has emerged as the only resolution on this crucial issue. Last year, resolution 41/53 was adopted by a record vote of 154 for, with one sole abstention, and no votes against the resolution. Once again it seems to be a situation where there is a common objective shared by us all -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- which, as the province of all mankind, cannot be an arena for the threat or use of force and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While the resolution acknowledges the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on this issue differences exist on what steps are necessary now for this body to achieve these objectives. Since 1985 we have had an Ad Hoc Committee mandated with the deliberately circumscribed task of exploring relevant issues. Last year my delegation was encouraged by the efforts of some delegations to advance the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by attempting to agree on definitions of important concepts and terms relevant to this agenda item. We regret that the participation in this important aspect of work was limited. We would like to see the Ad Hoc Committee re-established with the minimum delay possible and as an earnest of its sincerity the Group of 21 has made a very modest proposal for a mandate which we trust will be accepted. No one can be so wedded to the status quo as to object to the addition that has been proposed, bearing in mind paragraph 80 of the Final Document as reiterated in General Assembly resolution 41/53. The message of the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations to this Conference enjoined us "to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter". That is our modest goal for this session.

We hear, meanwhile, disturbing calls for an early deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems which were until recently described to us as research programmes. They will, if heeded, inevitably involve non-compliance with existing treaties which even the most elastic interpretation will not conceal. Whether ballistic missile defence systems are being researched and developed in the full glare of media attention or in clandestine, they represent generically a dangerous new phase in the arms race. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that our discussions here are taking place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space. A balanced and even-handed non-aligned attempt in pursuance of the Harare Declaration to ban such obviously offensive weapons in space as dedicated anti-satellite weapons met with the strongest opposition from those who have crafted the most elaborate arguments to justify defensive systems. As the Harare Declaration noted "Measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying weapons and weapons systems in outer space could, through a constant chain of action and reaction, lead to an escalation of the arms race in both 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons thus making the outbreak of nuclear conflict more likely". There is an obvious inconsistency in seeking a world free of ballistic missiles and proceeding to erect shields against them which the overwhelming body of scientific opinion assesses as being vulnerable and therefore only functional as part of a first-strike capability. The

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deployment of weapons in space must be prevented in our common interest. The attractions of hi-tech warfare and an interlocking programme of lucrative research contracts should not divert us from the dangers of an arms race in space and the need to prevent it going beyond the research stage. This task cannot be left exclusively to bilateral negotiations. It also requires the establishment of a group of scientific experts within this Conference so that multilateral expertise can be pooled on the technical issues relevant to preventing an arms race in outer space. My delegation therefore supports the proposal made by the Swedish delegation and calls for an early agreement on the mandate and composition of such a group.

The discussions at Reykjavik gave us all a glimpse of a nuclear-free world as a realistic possibility seriously contemplated by the leaders of the two nations accounting for 95 per cent of nuclear weapons in the world. Non-aligned countries like Sri Lanka would like to encourage these nations to pursue this goal in their bilateral negotiations. We are disturbed however by those who seek to obstruct this, arguing the need for nuclear weapons on the basis of an alleged inferiority in conventional arms. The goal of nuclear disarmament must be pursued if the spirit of Reykjavik is to inform the bilateral discussions taking place and lead to agreements in all disarmament forums including the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, as well as the MBFR and CSCE. That goal is a priority issue in this multilateral negotiating body.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President himself and the country that the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, speaking for the first time in this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, it is a particular pleasure for me to congratulate you to the assumption of your office. At this point in time we can already note how brilliantly you discharge your duties, doing it with diplomatic skill, friendliness and resolution.

In this family of nations which constitute the Conference on Disarmament, we all feel deep sorrow for the loss of an eminent colleague who had been with us for two years. With Don Lowitz my delegation has lost a friend, the Conference has lost a warm hearted, politically engaged and professional dynamic personality. We are grateful to have known him.

We have new colleagues among us. I welcome Ambassadors Pierre Morel of France, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Chusei Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation looks forward to working closely with all of them.

Any observer with sufficient interest in our proceedings would, from a most perfunctory study of statements during the first two weeks of our work this year, certainly recognize the importance and prominence of emphasis that item 1 of our agenda, nuclear test ban, has been given in many interventions. Some of the speeches did not fail to paint a very sombre picture of the

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situation the Conference finds itself in with regard to the work on a CTB; neither was there a lack of pre-emptive accusations, which were visibly aimed at one group.

I cannot share the speculative pessimism of some of our colleagues; quite the contrary: an impartial and detached analysis both of the work the Conference achieved last year on the subject and of the developments that took place since it adjourned at the end of August lead me to believe that the circumstances are most propitious for the establishment of an ad hoc committee and for positive and meaningful results to be achieved by it.

The controversy concerning the formulation of those parts in last year's report of the Conference on item no. 1 tends still to obscure the view of what has already been achieved in terms of a considerable narrowing of differences in an important field of the CTB discussion, i.e. the question of verification. In our view the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and verification system. This promising development, as we see it, is due to the efforts of many delegations who have contributed important elements to a new and more refined view of test-ban safeguards. Needless to say, the conceptual accomplishments that have enlarged the common ground on which to build could only be achieved on the basis of the purposeful contribution by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts over the last 10 years, and especially by its last progress report, CD/721, which has opened remarkable new perspectives towards the realization of an international seismic monitoring system by detailing plans to integrate the exchange of level II (waveform) data into the next international seismic data exchange experiment.

We consider hallmarks some of the contributions of individual delegations during last year's session of the Conference. There is, for one, the Swedish Working Paper CD/712, representing an admirable and knowledgeable compilation of present insights into the requirements of a global seismic network; calling for the definition and development of prototype monitoring stations, this paper further develops a proposal my delegation had already advanced in Working Papers CD/612 and CD/624.

Norway's contribution, in this Working Paper CD/714, was particularly significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-aperture seismic arrays with a global network incorporating a number of such arrays. The practical experiences with the Norwegian regional seismic array system NORESS provide an indispensable input for the operationality and the continuous improvement of an effective global system.

The most unambiguous demand for an early installation of a world-wide seismic monitoring network along the lines of the working papers of my delegation I already mentioned is contained in the Australian Working Paper, CD/717, which clearly points out the advantage to be harvested by swift enactment of the proposals contained in it: by establishing a permanent global seismic monitoring network based initially on the existing facilities.

(Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)

In keeping with the advances of seismic technology, experience could be gained with long-term operations and the system could be perfected in such a way that, on the very entry into force of a CTBT, the comprehensive monitoring devices could at once become a truly safeguarding system.

Among other valuable contributions of individual delegations one has certainly to count Working Paper CD/724 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which it formalized a change of position concerning the inclusion of the level II data exchange in further discussions.

This brief review of some of the proceedings of our Conference during its 1986 session amply substantiates my initial claim that substantial progress towards common concepts, common methodology, has been achieved during last year's session in spite of some attempts to the contrary. In the view of my delegation the time has come to discuss inter alia those common concepts within an ad hoc committee on a CTB, to be established at the earliest possible juncture. The work of the Committee should help us to reach practical and universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban; it is our firm belief that this should be possible on the basis of the working programme proposed in CD/621 and within the confines of a mandate as contained, for instance, in CD/521.

Certainly, if an ad hoc committee were instituted, its discussions would not be exhausted in merely technical deliberations; a comprehensive and fully verifiable test ban would, if agreed upon, be of eminent importance for the security policies of States world wide. It is exactly for this reason that the topic of a CTB cannot be discussed by the Conference without paying due attention to its general implications in the nuclear age. The Federal Government believes that the goal of agreement on a reliably verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible juncture can be realized gradually. This should be achieved by reducing allowed testing to agreed and defined intervals of time and by consecutively refraining from testing altogether in the framework of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons.

While my delegation wishes for timely results from the bilateral talks which the United States of America and the Soviet Union are holding here at Geneva about questions relevant to test limitation in all its aspects and which are scheduled to enter into a new round in the middle of March, my Government has never hesitated to express its view that there are more than bilateral aspects to the problem of a CTBT. The community of States can indeed contribute substantially to the solution of those problems which still stand in the way of an agreement.

We do not agree, though, with some delegations which content themselves with dwelling lengthily on their finding that the verification problems still facing us can be solved -- and indeed some went as far as to imply that they were already solved. In our view attention should be drawn to the numerous prerequisites listed in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712 to ensure the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology into a global monitoring network that does not yet exist and has only once been tested in a most elementary form. A great number of stations that participated in the 1984 GSETT, though already representing a high level of technological achievement in themselves, would not match the definitions given in the last chapter of CD/712 for the

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prototype of a CD monitoring station. Although individual seismographic stations, even if they fell short of the aforementioned demands concerning their equipment, might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable manner an interlinked system of as much as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and run by many nations, as well as the task of communicating the data derived from these stations to and from international data centres -- possibly in real time -- has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has demonstrated. Furthermore, CD/712 proposes as an additional measure for the analysis of doubtful seismic events to combine the findings of the international seismic monitoring network with data derived from satellite inspection. The realization of this proposal would indeed greatly enhance verification capabilities and most probably resolve most of the outstanding verification problems; but no multilaterally accessible satellite system for verification purposes exists as of today or of tomorrow. And we do not know that even the most ardent NTB proponent has volunteered with a corresponding offer. The conclusion we draw from this is that we should do everything possible to improve the global seismic monitoring system until the possibility depicted in the Swedish Working Paper may come true.

My Government has noted with great pleasure that the six Heads of State or Government, of the New Delhi initiative, at the meeting in Mexico on 7 August 1986, have expressed their readiness to actively participate in surmounting the outstanding verification problems of a future CTBT. We would welcome it if, besides Sweden, also other States participating in the initiative would see fit to send their experts to the GSE, especially with regard to the new test run of the global monitoring system envisaged for 1988.

My Government has repeatedly declared that it considers a CTB as one of the main goals of its disarmament and arms control policy. And if we think that we still see some difficulties in the field of verification, we do not want to give room to any doubt that we will actively pursue a course aimed at clearing away these obstacles, which in any case we do not find insurmountable.

As a step towards substantiating its own commitment to this global system, the Federal Government decided to intensify its co-operative efforts in the field of fast and reliable data exchange and storage of acquired seismic data. It therefore finances the continuous operation of a seismic data analysis centre installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Hannover. The Institute, by way of direct computer-to-computer links with other countries, is in a position to store and to exchange all relevant seismic data including level II (waveform) data. We have concentrated our research in the field of designing the hardware and software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including waveform data on direct computer-to-computer links. Our seismic data centres, specifically and from the outset, are designed for open access and remote data treatment via telecommunication links so as to freely share our specific knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists. We explicitly request all members of the Conference to make use of this hitherto singular service, two demonstrations of which will be given to interested heads of delegations and to the experts of the GSE on 5 and 6 March 1987 here in Geneva. The data centre described above in our view constitutes an important step forward on the way to the creation and reliable operation of an international seismic monitoring network.



(Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)

Mr. President, let me now turn shortly to other subjects on our agenda. In our view the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons command high priority. In document CD/734 we have the outlines of a treaty which, in important parts, is already well developed. The Conference on Disarmament has before it the task of solving the questions still open, especially in the field of verification, as rapidly as possible.

Concerning the verification of non-production, it is in our view important that the selection of substances which are to be forbidden or controlled should satisfy the criteria of possible use, or better misuse, for military purposes. It would not be a sensible contribution to the solution of that problem if we included in that selection substances which are militarily irrelevant.

As to challenge inspection, we still see in CD/715 the model which could finally satisfy all interests. We appeal to our partners in this negotiation to co-operate in the search of a solution because it is this co-operation which is the true expression of credibility of negotiating partners. Readiness to adopt CD/715, as expressed in principle by formerly hesitant delegations, is welcome as long as the conceptual approach of this proposal is not diluted. We will, in this context, screen carefully what the Soviet delegation has said this morning, which lends itself to the interpretation that the Soviet delegation now accepts the principle of mandatory or obligatory challenge inspections; but as I say, we will have to look at the text very closely and see what the other conditions which go along with it will mean. A procedural arrangement for example prior to an on-challenge-inspection that would put into question the inspection itself, or in any case delay it, is not acceptable to us. We are convinced that an effective verification of a chemical-weapon ban is attainable if the controls on non-production and challenge inspections are adequately formed. What has to be secured is that the Convention can reliably prevent that militarily significant amounts of chemical weapons or their precursors from being produced or stocked secretly. The methods and volume of the controls must be realistic, credible and effective. These are the essentials and we think that within the near future we could make decisive progress in this field. We are ready to co-operate.

My delegation welcomes the long-established Finnish initiative to provide advice for the necessary monitoring equipment and technical means for verification purposes. I understand that the recent special workshop on automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged used, verification of destruction and non-production in Helsinki is another step towards the common goal of effective verification. My Government looks forward to the communication of the results of this workshop.

We noted with interest the reference which the Romanian delegation made in our CW negotiations to the Document of the Stockholm Conference which was taken up today. Indeed, the most important aspect of the Stockholm Conference is the agreement on on-site inspections without refusal. Thereby, obligatory on-site inspection has been recognized as an essential element of effective verification for any arms control and disarmament agreement. We think this is an essential breakthrough to which we attach great importance in light of the whole arms control process. But then, Stockholm is not part of the true arms

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control process. It is a measure of confidence-building measures, and not what we are doing here in the realm of chemical weapons, disarmament measures. As my delegation pointed out in our Plenary Statement of 5 February of this year already challenge inspections should cover all possible installations and all locations -- they all must be "challenge inspection objects", and there we differ from what we have heard this morning.

My delegation hopes that it will be possible to agree on a mandate for our discussions about space and the possible arms race in space. We think it useful to screen all aspects even more profoundly than we did last year.

Concerning radiological weapons, we think that after the reinstitution of our Ad Hoc Committee what is needed now is informal consultations, to enable us to find out how our work in both tracks, A and B, could possibly proceed. If it proves that the forced merger of the two tracks renders us unable to speak at all about those aspects of the problem which might otherwise be solvable, then we should find a way to address the unitarian approach. The public in all our countries justifiably awaits answers from the Conference on Disarmament on this issue.

In accordance with the unanimously adopted resolution 41/421 of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly all delegations should now endeavour to contribute in a realistic way to the finalization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, if possible in the given time-frame.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, I have already had an opportunity to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me to extend a warm welcome to the newly arrived Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I wish them all the best in their office as Heads of their countries' delegations to the Conference on Disarmament. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to express our deepest sympathy to the United States delegation on the unexpected passing away of its chief delegate, Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

A comparison of the initial situation at this session with that of last year reveals new elements propitious to our work. At the same time, we are compelled to note that the arms race has not slowed down and that arsenals have not become smaller. The entire international situation remains exceedingly complex and tense. In order for it to be markedly improved, much greater efforts are needed. With this aim in mind, socialist countries proposed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly that all nations should jointly commence work on a comprehensive system of peace and international security. The system should embrace the most important areas of Government-to-Government relations and their interaction and bring about a world in which peoples can look to the future without having to worry about their existence and without the tremendous burden of armaments on their shoulders.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The main thrust of this great project is to free mankind, even during this century, from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, as suggested by the Soviet Union at the outset of the Year of Peace. This initiative goes hand-in-hand with the Budapest Appeal, which calls for a dramatic cut in conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

In this context, we attach great importance to the decisions taken by the non-aligned movement and the signatories of the Delhi Declaration, which aim in the same direction.

Behind all these endeavours, there is the recognition that a joint political effort will be required and that national interests must honestly and reciprocally be respected if the security of peoples and countries is to be guaranteed in the nuclear and space age. As far as we are concerned, this is what the call for a fresh approach to international relations is all about.

We know full well how far some circles are from this mode of thinking. Yet in the final analysis, they will have to meet this historic challenge, since there is no other alternative in the face of the threatened annihilation of the human race. In yesterday's address to the International Forum for A Nuclear-Free World, General Secretary Gorbachev put it in this way: "The question is like this: either the political mentality is geared to the requirements of the times, or civilization and life itself on Earth may perish".

Naturally, the socialist countries' initiatives do not only seek to brighten the horizons for future development. They must also be considered as offers of practical measures to be tackled right now.

Seen in this light, the Reykjavik meeting was an especially outstanding event. It is among the first things to be mentioned whenever reference is made to new elements. The emerging possibility of radical disarmament measures is an encouraging sign and fosters determination to labour still more committedly for the cessation of the insane arms race. However, irritation on the part of certain quarters has not escaped our attention either. Those concerned regard Reyjavik as an accident and long to return to the status quo ante. What we, in turn, urge countries to do is to build on the results achieved in Reyjavik and translate them into concrete agreements. In particular, the aim must be to reduce strategic weapons by 50 per cent within the next five years, to eliminate medium-range weapons in Europe and to strengthen the ABM régime. The German Democratic Republic has declared on this score that the countermeasures taken on its territory could be reversed once medium-range missiles are removed.

The results attained in Stockholm and at the Conference that reviewed the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons are unanimously judged as an indication of broader readiness for constructive dialogue. May these examples, showing that problems can be resolved if reason and goodwill prevail, have a favourable impact on our forum. The same is to be hoped for the relevant resolutions adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

We are watching with keen interest and with particular satisfaction the growing efforts aimed at curbing the arms race regionally. One such instance is the ratification of the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Inspired by the same principal objective, the German Democratic Republic has proposed regional arms limitation measures in Europe, notably a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe. As for the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe, it is our hope that the current talks between the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO may very soon lead to successful negotiations by the parties concerned.

We would end up with a one-sided picture, if we left out of consideration the developments running in the very opposite direction. They are alarming indeed. The deviation from the Salt II Agreement, the mounting intensity of attacks on the ABM Treaty and the refusal to give a positive response to the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests are a clear indication of the intention to continue and fuel the arms race in all fields and to extend it to outer space.

The bilateral negotiations and talks between the USSR and the United States appear to be making no progress on matters of substance, either on nuclear and space arms or on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing.

These are, in brief, the conflicting circumstances under which the Conference has begun its 1987 term. We believe whatever positive element there is should be used to bring differing positions closer together and to seek progress with even greater tenacity in all the fields of interest to the Conference. This is precisely what the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist countries were guided by when they met in Berlin a few weeks ago to deliberate issues of relevance to the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, I wish to point out that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic considers as priority items a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Certainly, we are also aware of the importance of the other subjects on the agenda, including the call for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its resumed forty-first session.

Of special urgency now is that a fresh start be made on the drafting of a treaty that provides for the complete cessation of all nuclear weapons testing. Both the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the statements we have heard so far during the plenary debate give evidence of broad readiness to move ahead. No doubt, the fastest way to arrive at a treaty would be through regular negotiations. For this reason, my delegation would prefer an appropriate mandate for a committee. In order to help prepare the ground for an accord, it would be equally ready, however, to take part in goal-oriented discussions about problems to be resolved. Without going into details, I would like to point out some of the aspects which, in our judgement, will have a major bearing on the practical approach to be chosen.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Firstly, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests will remain an international task of utmost urgency. Achieving it would impact very favourably on the entire disarmament process, and appropriate disarmament forums should be used to pursue this goal. This Conference, however, seems to us particularly capable of working out a universal treaty.

Secondly, we believe in the possibility of intermediate measures in the event that a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests is recognized and formulated as an explicit commitment.

This idea is not new to socialist countries. Just take the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976, the Soviet programme of 15 January 1986 and the proposals put forward by the USSR in Reyjavik. Clearly, a moratorium by the Soviet Union and the United States, to which the USSR has not slammed the door after all, would be particularly effective. It will be of crucial importance in this regard that any partial step be geared to a comprehensive, legally binding ban.

Thirdly, it appears indispensable to us to discuss all the elements of a future treaty in their complexity. Any selective approach is liable to leave out of consideration the interrelated nature of the subjects involved and would thus not yield the desired result.

Fourthly, it will be necessary to rid the verification issue of all political encumbrances and to resolve it in a constructive manner, in line with the requirements of the treaty. Whatever it may take to do that is there. We need parallelism between the Committee's activities and the Group of Scientific Experts, which should expeditiously prepare the level-2 data experiment to be carried out in 1988.

My delegation takes the view that a committee should be set up as quickly as possible. We second the proposal that two working groups should be created -- one on matters of contents and scope of the treaty, and the other on compliance and verification.

If we manage to establish a committee in which business-like discussions are conducted, we must make clear their pertinence to future negotiations and that we expect all the sides concerned to strive for real results. There must not be repetition of some of the practices in which the 1983 working groups indulged.

Considerable headway has been made in drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, not least thanks to the laudable efforts of the Committee's former chairmen, Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie. The goal of finalizing the convention this year -- something that presents itself as the logical consequence of this development -- is very exacting but realistic. We fully concur with Ambassador Ekéus, Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, that there is a positive chance right now for eliminating chemical weapons from the globe once and for all. It must not be passed up. A new round in the chemical arms race would all of a sudden move to a distant future the attainment of results which we are so close to now. In fact, this is what bad experience has taught us.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Given strong commitment to accommodation and dedicated work, we could well rise to the occasion. The far-reaching proposals which the Soviet delegation has just tabled are of special significance in this context and we welcome them as yet another exemplary contribution to our work. Solving the remaining issues of substance would speed up the negotiating process. This is particularly true of challenge inspection, the locations of stocks and their verification, and matters relating to the non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. Results are possible on the basis of existing proposals.

Once this and other blanks in the text of the convention are filled, it will be a lot easier to work out details. We are convinced of the possibility of an understanding on what is needed now and what could be completed at a later stage.

We support the Chairman's desire to streamline operations of the committee so that it is able to perform its current duties. Apart from the efforts undertaken at the Conference proper, everything should be done to maintain and improve the atmosphere needed for constructive work. The USSR has suggested an agreement under which chemical weapons would be neither produced nor deployed. Such a step would give a fresh impetus to the present negotiations.

My delegation is gratified to note the interests evoked by the seminar on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be organized by the German Democratic Republic's National Pugwash Group next month. The event will focus on the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is doing its utmost to make that seminar a success.

During the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 154 countries reiterated their opposition to an arms race in outer space and called for relevant agreements. The Conference on Disarmament has the duty to answer this call. Reason and realism are utterly incompatible with the strange logic that wants to eliminate weapons on Earth and, at the same time, put most modern means of destruction in space. Hence the world-wide resistance to the Star Wars plans. Time is pressing, as the champions of SDI are doing everything to get weapons deployed in outer space and to create faits accomplis. Attacks on the ABM Treaty are increasing in number. It is thus no longer sufficient for the Conference simply to continue last year's exchange of views. Rather, it must start direct work on practical measures designed to head off the spread of the arms race to outer space and ensure that space is used peacefully, for the good of all mankind. My delegation advocates the early establishment of a committee with a relevant mandate.

In view of the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement and stimulate each other, the following projects could, in our opinion, be envisaged: prohibition of the use of force in outer space, as well as from space against the Earth and vice versa; protection of satellites and prohibition of anti-satellite weapons; and verification measures.

In conclusion, let me give you, Comrade President, the assurance that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is prepared and willing to do its very best in order that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament may conclude this year's sessions with tangible results.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President. Since this is the first time I am taking the floor allow me to congratulate you sincerely on your assumption of the post of the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I wish you success in fulfilling the important functions incumbent upon you, and I can assure you of our aspiration to give you every help in this task. Allow me also to express our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley, for his able and competent leadership of the work of the Conference last August and during the inter-sessional period. I am taking advantage of this opportunity to associate myself with the words of welcome to our new colleagues, the heads of the delegations of France, Romania, Japan, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Italy and the Soviet Union, and we wish them all every success. We ask the delegation of the United States of America to accept the deep condolences of the Mongolian delegation on the untimely death of Ambassador Lowitz and to pass on to his family and friends our sincere sympathy.

We are satisfied to note that the Conference has succeeded, as it did last year, in adopting the agenda and programme of work and also a decision on the creation of certain subsidiary bodies right at the start of the session. It is to be hoped that the coming weeks will be just as productive from the point of view of dealing with organizational questions and questions of substance.

Since the beginning of the activities of the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, today known as the Conference on Disarmament, practically a quarter of a century has passed. Possibly this date does not have any particular meaning for the activities of the Conference on Disarmament but, nonetheless, it is worth mentioning, not only as a reason for reviewing the results already achieved, but rather and mainly as an encouragement for further efforts which must be made in negotiations on disarmament. In this respect we must admit that, with regard to the main aims of disarmament, we have still been unable to justify the hopes of the peoples of the world and, particularly in recent years, solutions to many vitally important and pressing problems facing this negotiating body have been bogged down without justification. It is high time, as stated in the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/86 M, adopting the report of the Conference on Disarmament, "to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament". Appeals to the Conference to fulfil its mandate in holding negotiations in the field of disarmament are contained in many other resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly too. To ignore these resolutions reflecting the demands of the world's community is inadmissible, and we are of the view that this year it is necessary to take decisive action to speed up the work of the Conference, to achieve solutions, based on new political thinking, which would direct its efforts towards the elaboration of concrete agreements on problems which are ripe for such agreement.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The Reykjavik meeting of the heads of the world's two leading Powers and the virtual agreements reached there, thanks to the constructive efforts by the Soviet Union in its position on the most important questions of limiting and eliminating nuclear arsenals in a short period, have confirmed the truth that there are no issues in world affairs on which it is impossible to achieve mutually acceptable agreement if there is common sense, political realism and a feeling of responsibility for the peaceful future of mankind. This meeting opened up a qualitatively new stage in the fight for nuclear disarmament and has given it powerful impetus. Now the main thing we have to do is to go forward in strengthening and developing the new situation that has come about following the meeting in Iceland so that the spirit of Reykjavik is fully reflected in disarmament negotiations in various forums.

The continuation of the arms race is showing itself more and more to be a dead-end leading only to a destabilization of the situation, a pointless waste of resources, and an increased military danger for everybody, including its proponents. In order to stop and reverse around, practical measures are urgent. One such measure, and one of the most important and most urgent in our conviction, is the prohibition of nuclear tests. This question, as it certainly deserves, has been right from the beginning of the session in the centre of the attention of the Conference. In this connection we would like here and now to express the hope that the new efforts being made will make it possible finally to get this question out of its deadlock and create a subsidiary body with a proper mandate intended to start practical work on an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. In an atmosphere of growing general concern about nuclear explosions, it is unacceptable that the Conference on Disarmament should fail to deal seriously with this problem.

A few days ago we witnessed two nuclear tests carried out by the United States. Thus, the United States has taken the step that brings about the ending of the unprecedented USSR moratorium on all nuclear explosions. That moratorium has quite clearly confirmed that it is possible to take measures that can set up a firm barrier against the nuclear arms race. The Soviet moratorium made a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and was a sign of new political thinking and responsibility. The moratorium has in a sense overturned the old thesis that both the super-Powers were equally responsible for the arms race.

Speaking at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 5 February, the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkine, stated that as a result of events in Nevada, the Soviet Union no longer feels bound by its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and will, in due course, begin carrying out its own programme of nuclear tests. As you know, the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, including in its statement on 18 February last year, that the Soviet Union will be obliged to renew its nuclear test after the very first nuclear explosion by the United States in 1987. Mongolia understands this position on the part of the Soviet Union, a position dictated exclusively by the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. In this connection one cannot but stress the obvious fact that the gap between the number of nuclear explosions carried out by the United States and the USSR has increased in the favour of the United States by 26 since the Soviet moratorium. Moreover, it is no secret that the continuation of nuclear tests in the United States of America is not aimed at keeping the nuclear



(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

arsenal in a state of readiness for war or at carrying out the doctrine of "deterrence", but rather primarily at developing completely new forms and types of nuclear weapons, at creating the third-generation nuclear weapons. Mongolia is happy to note the readiness of the Soviet Union, on a basis of mutuality, to stop carrying out its nuclear test programme at any time, and expresses the hope that the leadership of the United States will see the need to respond positively to the Soviet Union's goodwill.

Questions of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war continue for us to be extremely important and have high priority. A resolution adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on these issues once again emphasized the urgent need for the Conference to begin multilateral negotiations on them. The programme put forward by the Soviet Union more than a year ago for the stage-by-stage complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, with an agreement on the prohibition of the development, testing and use of space strike weapons, is just as relevant today and could be the basis for consideration of nuclear disarmament issues by the Conference on Disarmament. One of the most important measures intended to prevent nuclear war, as we see it, remains the adoption by all nuclear States of an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It should be emphasized in this connection that the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 B asked the Conference on Disarmament to examine the question of the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character which would contain a formulation of such an obligation.

Mongolia is happy to note that the Soviet Union and your country, Mr. President, the People's Republic of China, have assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We can only welcome the fact too that both these Powers recently signed Protocols II and III of the Rarotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, which deserves general approval. We think that the aim of this Treaty is in keeping with our proposal for the creation of a mechanism for excluding the use of force among States of Asia and the Pacific. If these examples were to be followed by the other nuclear States, it would really be a concrete contribution to the strengthening of confidence among States and a reduction of the threat of nuclear war. Confidence needs to be strengthened by deeds and not by words. One cannot demand confidence from others if one reserves for oneself the freedom to continue nuclear tests and to torpedo the most important agreements.

The Reykjavik meeting has confirmed that unless the threat of the arms race spreading to space is removed, it is impossible to agree on a reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the meeting has once again cast light upon the key significance of the solution to this problem for preserving and strengthening peace and stability on Earth.

Today, the need to set up a firm barrier against the proliferation of the arms race into space is stronger than it ever has been. The proponents of the Strategic Defence Initiative are setting about speeding up the deployment of the individual elements in space and are trying in this way to shift to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In General Assembly resolution 41/53 the international community once again unambiguously expressed itself in favour of preventing the arms race in space and the holding of negotiations on

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the conclusion of an agreement or agreements on this question. It is essential now to start negotiations urgently on specific aspects of this problem, bearing in mind the final aim of the non-admissibility of arms in space. The proposal concerning the elaboration of an international agreement on ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites and the prohibition of the development, testing or use of anti-satellite systems, and the elimination of existing systems of that kind, seems in our opinion to be extremely realistic and fully in accordance with the general aspiration to keep space free from weaponry and to use it for peaceful and creative purposes.

We must as soon as possible re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space this year, and avoid creating a situation like the one which arose in the past, where the whole of the first part of the session was wasted on agreeing on the mandate and the programme of work of the Committee.

We are inspired by the general aim to complete this year the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The course of the negotiations warrants our judgement that this optimism is not built on sand. The inter-sessional consultations last year and the session of the Ad Hoc Committee in January this year have been very productive from the point of view of dealing with several complicated technical questions. Taking this into consideration, and taking into account the recommendation of the consensus resolution 41/58 D of the United Nations General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee could work without interruption to achieve the conclusion of the convention.

And now, in order to turn the possible into the real, and hopes into practical deeds, what is needed, as was very accurately and rightly stated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, in his message to the Conference, are political compromises. An example of this kind of political compromise, of a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions, is the new and important proposals by the Soviet Union, described by Ambassador Nazarkine in his statement today, to deal with various important questions of the future convention concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. These proposals, in our opinion, will no doubt encourage further progress at the negotiations to find a way to deal with the outstanding issues. They go a long way to taking account of the positions and the interests of the various partners and reflect the responsible approach of the Soviet Union in expressing new political thinking with regard to the cause of peace and disarmament. We hope that other participants in the negotiations will show the same readiness for compromise, so that, as far as possible, in the very near future the drafting of the convention will be completed.

In our opinion, the Ad Hoc Committee can achieve success in the outstanding issues of principle such as non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, procedures for the destruction of the CW production base and the question of challenge inspection, if it avoids wasting valuable time in discussing technical details of a secondary nature. After the questions of principle have been resolved, such technical details could be relatively easily settled.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

We, like other delegations, highly appreciate the contribution made by Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie in achieving the successes which have been obtained thus far, and we are convinced that under the guidance of the new Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus, the Ad Hoc Committee will achieve further decisive progress.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now come to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me first to express to you our happiness to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at the start of its 1987 session. I would like also to voice my appreciation for the way you are directing its work. This comes as no surprise from an able diplomat like yourself, and from a State like China, which you represent, and because of the special responsibility it carries as one of the Great Powers and because of its unique status within the Conference. I am confident that this status will enable you to present many initiatives to allay the difficulties slowing the pace of the work of the Conference.

Permit me also to avail myself of this opportunity to express our gratitude to Ambassador Alan Beesley, the representative of Canada, for his efforts during August 1986, and throughout the inter-sessional period.

I am saddened today by the absence from our midst of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America, whose untimely death is a loss for his country, the Conference and his friends who worked with him and came to be closely acquainted with his noble qualities. I kindly ask the United States delegation to convey my heartfelt condolences to his widow and to the other members of his family.

It gives me pleasure to welcome the new representatives who joined the Conference, Ambassadors Youri Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Rubens Antonio Barbosa of Brazil, Jorge Morelli of Peru, Kamel Hacene of Algeria, Gheorge Dolgu of Romania, Pierre Morel of France, Chusei Yamada of Japan and Marko Kosić of Yugoslavia. I am confident that each one of them will bring his own positive contribution to the work of the Conference.

Normally, a new session of the Conference on Disarmament is opened against a background of optimism, of looking forward with hope to the possibility of achieving progress in the work of the Conference. But how can this be the case today when we see the start of this session coinciding with the continuation and escalation of both the nuclear and the conventional arms race; when we see the persistence of the trend to extend it from land, sea and air into outer space and a continuation of the attempts to achieve military superiority and nuclear deterrence. All this goes on without regard to the existing arms limitation and disarmament treaties, whether they be bilateral or multilateral; without feeling bound by the pledges already made in the Geneva Joint Statement of January 1985, or those made at the Geneva Summit November 1985, where it was pledged to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on Earth, not to seek military superiority, and acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. All

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this is happening without any consideration to the security of the great majority of States or their interests, a great majority of States that find themselves drawn forcibly into untold dangers and threatened with annihilation.

The situation we face today must give rise to pessimism and generate a feeling of frustration. There is simply no other way out of this sad state of affairs but to comply with existing treaties on arms limitation and disarmament, both in letter and spirit. We have to strengthen such treaties through the conclusion of yet more treaties. This necessitates generating momentum in the bilateral negotiations in response to the high hopes pinned on them. The spirit of Reykjavik must be maintained. This also requires enabling the Conference on Disarmament to break out of the state of paralysis it has reached, by making it possible for the Conference to undertake the tasks entrusted to it instead of persisting to raise doubts about the scope of its mandate or continuing to obstruct its work. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not alternatives to one another but rather complement and sustain each other. Such efforts must be guided by the world conscience and the international will as reflected in the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. They must respond to the appeals contained in the declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement and the six countries representing the five continents.

Like the majority of States we are of the view that a nuclear-test ban is a necessary first step if we are really serious in our attempt to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament, thus protecting the world from the scourge of a nuclear war. Hence our increasing concern about the insistence of some nuclear-weapon States to persevere in their nuclear tests using, as a pretext, the arguments of maintaining their capacity of nuclear deterrence, to ensure the worthiness of their nuclear weapon stocks, and their doubts about the effectiveness of verification procedures under the technology presently available. All these arguments are not valid. They are merely used to justify the continuation of nuclear tests. They were refuted by many previous speakers in this same room. It is regrettable that some of these States are parties to, even depositaries of, both the treaties on the partial ban of nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These States have pledged to work towards a comprehensive test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. They were expected to lead the way towards a consolidated non-proliferation régime and thus encourage the States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to it. But the same States, by their present conduct, can lose their credibility as an ideal to be followed. In fact they are encouraging the States not parties to remain outside the Treaty, and worse, to develop further their own nuclear capabilities. And this is another cause for our concern, particularly when we know that among such States some are situated in the Middle East, and the racist régime in South Africa. By remaining outside the NPT and developing their nuclear capabilities they threaten to engulf the two regions in a nuclear conflict. This would have grave consequences not only for the two regions, but for the world at large.

In this context, we welcome every step which would help to achieve the objective of a nuclear-test ban. We object to every action that diverts us from this goal. Once more we welcome the decision by the Soviet Union to

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impose a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985. We welcome their decision to renew this moratorium repeatedly. We regret that the other nuclear States, particularly the United States, did not respond in kind, and all the more so in view of the fact that nobody raised doubts about the sincerity of the Soviet Union in honouring its decision. We understand the Soviet Union's decision not to be bound by the unilateral moratorium any longer. We still deem it necessary for the nuclear States to declare a moratorium on their nuclear tests, thus creating the required climate to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

We also welcome the decision by the United States Administration to transmit to the Congress, for ratification, the two draft treaties on threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions. This came after a long wait. But we hope that they will be ratified at the earliest possible opportunity. We feel satisfied at the news that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev touched upon the issue of a nuclear-test ban during their last meeting in Reykjavik, considering the possibility of an agreement on the reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests and appropriate verification procedures.

But while welcoming all these steps our objective will remain that of concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament will remain the optimum framework to conclude such a treaty, giving it the universality we all hope for. That is why we regret the failure of the Conference on Disarmament, during its last three sessions, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban, in spite of the many attempts made to reach a compromise. We hope that the Conference will succeed in its present session in re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee and in ending the deadlock on this issue. Undoubtedly General Assembly resolution 41/46 A provides a good basis for such an action. It contains many concessions that were described to us in the past stages of the work of the Conference as conducive to a softening in the position of the objecting States. The resolution also reflects the extent of flexibility of the States that sponsored and voted in favour of it. This is a positive development that should not be underestimated and should meet with a positive response.

Egypt was one of the first States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was at the forefront of the States that signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, although the circumstances prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. From this background and in the framework of the continuity of Egyptian policy, we fully support the current efforts to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Egypt will not hesitate to exert every effort to achieve this objective. We look forward to a treaty that fully and effectively bans the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; a treaty that does not, however, impede the peaceful chemical activities. We aspire to a treaty which includes effective verification provisions without such procedures that would exceed the actual requirements of the treaty, or be

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used as an indirect means to threaten the national security of the States parties. We believe that acceding to the treaty will depend to a large extent on the provisions it contains providing for international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries. In this context we welcome the decision by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider this aspect of the treaty during its current session. Lastly, I would like to mention the fact that concluding a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and to which all would accede is one of the prerequisites for its acquiring universality.

Allow me on this occasion to express my thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, the representative of the United Kingdom, for his efforts during his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the previous session. May I also congratulate Ambassador Ekéus, the representative of Sweden, on his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the present session. We all know the role played, and being played, by the delegation of Sweden, particularly by Ambassador Ekéus personally, in the ongoing negotiations to conclude a treaty banning chemical weapons. We wish him all success in his task. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will conclude the draft treaty in time to present it to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-second session in accordance with its resolution 41/58 B.

The progress we have achieved in the realms of science and technology is an indisputable fact. What is more, it is an ongoing phenomenon, day after day. Space technology available today represents the new link in the chain of evolution and advancement with both its useful and harmful facets affecting humanity. It has useful aspects, because each addition to the technological discoveries and inventions represents a new victory, increasing the welfare of the human being by what it provides to fulfil his aspirations to prosperity and the raising of his living standards. It has also harmful facets, by what is achieved by its military facet, the destructive power in the service of the selfish tendencies of the States able to exploit this technology militarily to impose their hegemony and to introduce it in the arms race, thus escalating the race to extremely dangerous heights, where security and serenity are neutralized, even for the States that do not take part in the race.

This explains why the prevention of an arms race in outer space is imposing itself as a priority item on the agenda of all international forums and meetings dealing with arms limitations and disarmament. This is particularly true since the United States declared its Strategic Defence Initiative. Today there is quasi international consensus that the extension of the arms race to outer space and the implementation of the SDI are a serious escalation of the arms race that will have grave consequences in all fields, political, military and economic.

If we spoke a few years ago about the possible availability of the necessary technology for the development and production of space weapon systems, and if we had tried then to imagine the dangers that would attend such a development, it therefore becomes a source of deep concern when we hear today that it has proved possible to achieve such progress in acquiring the necessary technology for the production of such weapon systems. We are worried to hear those who call for hastening the production and deployment of the said systems, in such a way that the danger becomes an actual reality, where it was but a mere possibility in the past.

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What complicates the issue even more is the seeking of some States to participate in the SDI. If the avowed objective of their action is to extract purely commercial profits, we are sure that the participation of other States in this programme will provide them with advanced technology which will help, sooner or later, to proliferate space weapons and will contribute, directly or indirectly, to improving the performance level of a conventional weapon system. The matter becomes more serious when, among such States, we find some that are situated in areas where tension prevails already, particularly when previous efforts to bind such States to one or more of the treaties on arms limitations and disarmament have already failed.

How we wish that the mastering of space technology and the new horizons it conquered will remain confined to serving humanity and increasing its welfare! How we wish that outer space, as a common heritage of humanity, may be explored and exploited exclusively for peaceful purposes!

If in the past we called for the possibility to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this call becomes more urgent in the light of the current developments. Undoubtedly, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is easier at present, before the space Powers multiply and militarize outer space in such a way as to impede the efforts in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, if it does not destroy the whole fabric. Here, we are at a loss as to how to perceive the fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers is to prevent an arms race in outer space, while at the same time the United States is developing, with the purpose of their deployment, space weapon systems about which negotiations are going on for their prohibition and the destruction of existing systems.

Here again, if there are priorities to be set, in the light of the present developments, we deem it necessary to take action to achieve: first, the halting of the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling of the existing systems; second, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons systems into outer space; and third, ensuring that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances.

In the face of the present situation with all its ramifications, we cannot but express our dissatisfaction with the attempts to raise obstacles to prevent the Conference on Disarmament being entrusted with carrying out the required negotiations to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, particularly bearing in mind that the record of the bilateral negotiations gives no cause for optimism, since they have failed to achieve any progress until the present. What is more, this failure in the item on outer space resulted in impeding the possibilities of agreement in other areas. General Assembly resolution 41/53 reaffirms the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Notwithstanding the important work done by the Ad Hoc Committee during the last two sessions, there must be a more specific link between the Committee's work, in any particular stage, and the

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final objective unanimously endorsed by the international community, namely to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will speedily overcome the procedural difficulties concerning the agreement on an appropriate mandate and a programme of work that ensures that its work will take the right direction towards the final objective of its activities.

It was not by coincidence that the issue of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, within the framework of the item on the prohibition of radiological weapons, received such attention by the great majority of States members in the Conference. This is an expression by these States of the interests of the greater part of the world community. This fact has been reflected by many United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the last of which is resolution 41/59 I, and by resolutions of other international groupings. This concern arises from the desire of many States to build nuclear reactors in order to benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the same States are keen that such an action on their part will not make them hostages to the dangers of nuclear radiation resulting from any attack on their facilities.

The Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was a living example of what nuclear facilities could be subjected to. The Chernobyl accident was another case in point of the dangerous effects of nuclear radiation on environment and population. We thought that the two incidents were ample evidence to validate our view about the importance and the need for the Conference on Disarmament to deal with the issue of prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities, particularly since many other international forums have transmitted the subject to the Conference for consideration. That is why we are concerned about the persistence of some members in voicing doubts about the competence of the Conference to consider this issue. We regret to have to note a clear regression in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during its past session. If we are keen about the consideration of this issue by the Conference, at the same time we do not underestimate the difficulties and varying security considerations of the member States, nor the necessity of reaching solutions that are satisfactory and acceptable to all. We are of the view that the right way is through further negotiations. We have to explore new approaches and proposals to deal with this issue. But the way does not lie in some members deliberately raising obstacles to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, even going so far as preventing its re-establishment.

The importance we attach to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should not be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the importance of the issue of prohibition of radiological weapons. We believe that if it is unacceptable to some to concentrate on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, then, and regardless of the fact that we do believe that prohibition of an actual threat has priority over the prohibition of a potential threat, let us at least consider both issues simultaneously.

Needless to say, my referring to a limited number of the items on the agenda of our Conference in my statement, and my having specified Egypt's position regarding them, does not in any way diminish the importance we attach to the other items. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under its able Chairman, Ambassador García Robles,



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the representative of Mexico, will succeed in preparing the draft before the end of the first part of the present session so as to present it to the forty-first session of the General Assembly. We are confident that this is possible provided there is the political will and if the positions of the different States are adequately flexible, particularly concerning the nuclear paragraphs of the programme, the stages of implementation and the time-frame.

We agree with the view of the members who called for the necessity that the item on negative security assurances be given the importance it deserves by the Conference. We believe that the provision of such guarantees in a legally binding international document, with no conditions attached, is a legitimate and just demand on the part of the non-nuclear States. We are confident that the Ad Hoc Committee, if reactivated, will be able to reach the appropriate formula to satisfy this demand.

We also think that the establishment of ad hoc committees, with appropriate mandates, is the best framework to consider both the items on the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

We do not deny that the international climate and the relations between the two super-Powers in general, and the stages reached in their bilateral negotiations in particular, have their impact, whether positive or negative, on our Conference. But regardless of our apprehension of the effect of these factors, we deem it necessary for the Conference to succeed in generating its own momentum for its work. This must be done in such a way that the Conference is able to carry out the tasks specified to it by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is our view that the holding of the third special session in 1988 is an opportunity for the Conference to confirm its credibility by presenting to that session specific draft treaties on arms limitations and disarmament, treaties that would provide the peoples of the world with peace and security through which they can achieve progress and enjoy prosperity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President and for the country that the President represents. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The distinguished representatives will have received today the document that has been circulated under number CD/739. This contains a letter signed by four permanent representatives, those of Argentina, India, Sweden and Mexico, containing a request that the Conference publish and distribute as a document of the Conference the joint statement that the leaders of six countries, the authors of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament, issued on the eve of the New Year. In this joint statement, there is one paragraph -- that is, paragraph 6 -- which refers specifically to the question of a moratorium that might serve as a first step towards achieving a treaty putting an end to nuclear tests. I felt that since that subject is specifically on the agenda of this Conference it was relevant for me to read out the part that seemed

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most relevant. It reads as follows: "There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? And I see none. You will recall that as an exception to the agreement reached at our last plenary meeting, the Conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Thursday, 19 February, at 10.30 a.m. On that occasion we might need to have a brief informal meeting once the list of speakers is exhausted, to consider a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.