

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 603rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the start of our work today, I have the pleasure to welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference, and on my own behalf, two distinguished colleagues who are joining our disarmament negotiating body. I am referring to the new representatives of Egypt, Ambassador Mounir Zahran, and India, Ambassador Prakash Shah. Both Ambassadors have had extensive and outstanding diplomatic careers. Ambassador Prakash Shah is certainly an old friend. He was Ambassador of India in Venezuela, where he worked very hard and left very pleasant memories. In welcoming the two distinguished representatives I would like to assure them of the close cooperation of my delegation and my own personal cooperation, within the context of the activities of the Conference. I am convinced that they, like their predecessors, will make a valuable contribution to the work we are doing.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will be putting to the Conference for decision today, once we have reached the end of the list of speakers, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the recommendations appearing in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I shall then invite the Conference to take note with satisfaction of the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the effective functioning of the Conference, contained in document CD/WP.410. In that context I shall read a statement relating to the participation of non-member States in our work.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Cuba, Nigeria, Hungary, Germany, Sweden, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who will do so in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, who, as Chairman of the informal consultations on the functioning of the Conference, will be presenting the relevant report, Mexico, Indonesia and France. I now call on the first speaker on my list for today, the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): For me it is a source of pride and great satisfaction to take the floor in this plenary under the presidency of a representative of our continent and the fraternal people of Venezuela. Knowing your ability and experience, I venture to state that you will lead our work towards positive results in such complex times. I do not wish to miss this opportunity to reiterate what I have already said to your predecessors concerning the positive work they have accomplished in moving our work forward and in pursuing the goals of the Conference. I should also like to welcome most warmly those colleagues who have just arrived in Geneva and extend to them the cooperation of my delegation, as well as wishing every success to those who are leaving us to take up new duties.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

Cuba, which has suffered directly and sometimes intensely the dangers of the military threat since the triumph of the revolution, has worked consciously to halt and reverse the arms race and has been, is, and will be an active protagonist in multilateral relations to achieve treaties leading to international peace and security which are fair for all. All of us as members of the Conference on Disarmament bear a great responsibility in negotiating sound and firm agreements which lead us to the elimination and destruction of the arsenals of armaments which jeopardize the very existence of mankind. In discharging such a responsibility there are priorities that we cannot forget. Rightly and in response to the clamour of mankind, it has been decided that our priority was, and is, to eliminate nuclear-weapon stockpiles and production facilities from the face of the Earth. Regrettably we must say that the danger of nuclear explosions, not only as a result of military confrontation, but equally because of technical shortcomings or negligence, continues to threaten our existence.

Some of the main and most important possessors of chemical and nuclear weapons are urging the immediate and rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons. Yet it is surprising that they are not as passionate in clamouring for the rapid elimination of nuclear armaments and new armaments technologies which constitute the most serious threat for mankind. My Government considers that all our efforts must be channelled towards effective treaties to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. In that context, aware that any agreement eliminating any category of weapons will contribute to international peace and security, it believes that the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons, even though it might be a partial achievement within the context of the more complex problem of general and complete disarmament, is a step forward in the elimination of one of the categories of weapons threatening mankind. It is for that reason that the outcome of our work is a matter for constant attention in the bodies created to this end by our national authorities, which, drawing on the objectives we must reach, have taken a number of initiatives such as the dismantling of Cuban facilities that consume chemicals which will fall under the convention and a complete study of the levels of consumption and import of these chemicals.

Before expressing specific views on the "rolling text", I should like to make some general comments. We should not forget that for many years there were obstacles which delayed our negotiations for the conclusion of the convention, among them the insistence on the right to retaliation and on the retention of 2 per cent of chemical arsenals. We feel satisfied that these obstacles have now disappeared, and we would be even more satisfied if this had been the result of the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and not the outcome of bilateral agreements which we must now welcome and acknowledge, since this undoubtedly constitutes a step forward towards the conclusion of the convention. Even though we deem it important to take advantage of this situation to achieve the early conclusion of the convention, to the benefit of the security of all our peoples, we cannot accept demands that we should sacrifice the time available to us for other negotiations in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

For Cuba, a country which does not possess chemical weapons, the conclusion of a non-discriminatory convention which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons and makes the necessary provision for the destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and launching systems, is not only of crucial importance but is an essential guarantee in its perception of security. This should be a convention embracing all States which possess chemical weapons. In it all States must have equal duties and rights, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, even though, as a simple reflection of reality, those that possess them will bear certain additional obligations.

We have always held the view that we are not negotiating a treaty for horizontal non-proliferation in the field of chemical weapons, but rather a comprehensive CW disarmament treaty, and hence the text we agree should not contain any article enabling any State party, after the end of the scheduled destruction period, to have this type of weapon in its arsenals or maintain its capacity to produce them. The convention should encompass all currently existing chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, regardless of their structure and composition, and should extend to all facilities for producing and stockpiling such weapons. The future convention should not contain any provisions that could limit or restrict international trade in chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention; on the contrary, it should provide certain guarantees that it will not offer a screen for discriminatory practices based on criteria foreign to its letter and spirit. Cuba shares the views already expressed in this room that, once the convention is concluded, there should not be any additional verification machinery that could in practice establish a dual legal regime to monitor trade in chemicals for purposes permitted by the convention. Along with 18 other members of this Conference, we have sponsored the proposed amendment to paragraph 2 of article XI concerning the elimination of all current discriminatory restrictions against States parties as soon as the future convention enters into force for them.

The economic and technological development of States parties should not be adversely affected under any circumstances. Likewise, the parties to the convention should have access to assistance in the eventuality that chemical weapons are used against them or in the case of the threat of the use of such weapons. We also believe that the convention should be adopted unreservedly, as this would effectively contribute to strengthening its provisions and its moral authority.

As for the essential problem of verification, which continues to be the subject of debate, we believe that the best system of verification which can be devised cannot be perfect, and hence moderation and awareness of the context within which the system agreed is to be applied must guide our deliberations in the matter. It will be necessary to strike an appropriate balance between what is required for a reliable and effective system and what can be viable without creating a financial burden which is unnecessary, costly and may even discourage universal adherence to the convention.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

The different types of inspection to be devised will have to be complementary in nature; they will have to be as minimal and as non-intrusive as possible without affecting the legitimate interests of States in the field of industry. Routine inspections will have to keep to the nature of the purpose for which they were conceived and, in our view, do not require elements that might be called for by challenge inspections.

We have carefully studied all proposals submitted so far to tackle the problems connected with article IX. The team of inspectors participating in the verification system will have to be as broadly representative of the States parties as possible and on each occasion be approved by the States affected. In no case should challenge inspections be used in an indiscriminate manner by any State and they should be kept free of all political or other considerations. This is why we attach importance to the concern raised in respect of the existing possibility of abusing this type of procedure, and we believe that in one way or another this concern can and must find room in the text we agree.

In respect of the composition, functions and role to be played by the executive council, we believe that this organ will have to guarantee proper geographical representation. Its size should be representative of the membership of the convention, it should not have permanent members and all States that wish to be part of it should be elected by the Conference whilst respecting the principle of re-election of all members of the council. All countries should have a vote and their financial contribution could be apportioned on the basis of the scale of assessments established by the United Nations for its regular budget. We believe that the technical secretariat should be representative of the various countries that will or might be parties to the convention and all its posts will be open to citizens of any State party. As for the financing of the future organization, we believe that this is a very important aspect. It is our impression that delegations have a clearer idea of what the system of financing should not be than what it should be. Our delegation has identified some principles that could provide the basis for future consideration of this matter which we will be setting out in the course of these negotiations. The financing of the costs incurred as a result of routine and challenge inspections could require additional provisions, and hence the alternative solutions require further study and consideration.

We believe that in the last few months we have achieved substantial progress in negotiations on the current "rolling text" of the future convention on chemical weapons. We must recall that this negotiating process has been and is the result of negotiations among the members of the Conference on Disarmament and that most countries - which we hope will sign the convention so that it enjoys universal participation - are not aware of this text. Hence we supported the letter sent by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the President of the Conference on Disarmament to the Member States of the United Nations, drawing their

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

attention to the forthcoming conclusion of the negotiating process on the convention, and we promoted the idea of informing the permanent representatives of our region which are not members of the Conference of the specific features of the evolving text. However, we consider that this is not enough given the imminence of the early conclusion of the convention and our interest in its gaining maximum participation. We suggest that the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament should immediately initiate a wide-ranging process of information and clarification for the benefit of permanent representatives of Governments which are non-members of the Conference on Disarmament on the "rolling text" of the convention so as to enable them to sign the convention immediately once it is concluded.

Allow me in conclusion to reiterate that it is our most heartfelt desire that the impetus currently enjoyed by the negotiations on chemical weapons, after long years of stagnation, should not only be crowned by success as soon as possible, but also that it should extend sooner rather than later to all the other items on the agenda of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am pleased to see you presiding over our work, the representative of a country with which Nigeria has excellent relations. Although this is a crucial period of our session, my delegation is confident that you will successfully discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. I would like to take this opportunity to compliment your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar for his significant contributions during his presidency.

A number of colleagues have left us since I last took the floor. May I use this opportunity to wish them every success in their future endeavours? I would also like to welcome our new colleagues who recently joined us.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is only natural that we take stock of our efforts and relate them to the anticipation with which it began. The first part of my statement this morning will be devoted to chemical weapons. We find most encouraging the positive spirit of cooperation that has generally prevailed in the negotiations. Already, both the United States and the Soviet Union had last year reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes the timely initiative of the United States in resolving the two key issues that had created obstacles to our negotiations in the past. We note with satisfaction their unconditional commitment to the destruction of all their chemical weapons stocks and facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. We believe that this willingness to accommodate differing views is a hopeful sign towards resolving other thorny issues in the "rolling text".

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The endeavour to complete our work should, however, not blind us to present-day realities. The final phase of our work will require careful and coordinated efforts by all delegations to ensure its consolidation through agreement on the few outstanding issues. We must demonstrate the vision and tenacity that the opportunity requires and identify practical, forward-looking ways towards an early conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction.

Despite apparent repetition, we find it essential to emphasize that Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire them. Notwithstanding that our chemical industry is still in its infancy, my Government earlier last month held a national seminar on the future of chemical weapons. The importance that my country attaches to the convention is motivated by our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In short, the convention must be economically neutral.

Our principal concern still remains that the proposed ban and restrictions would seriously affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, protracted delays and escalation in their prices. Related equipment could be similarly affected. These are very real concerns, and I believe that we are not negotiating a convention that would paralyse the chemical industry of States parties, especially from the developing countries. Such a perception would have dire consequences for universality. Hence we believe that all existing export control measures in the chemical industry must be abolished when the convention enters into force. Obviously, steps must be taken to allay such fears.

We welcome the agreement reached during the inter-sessional meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee to include the articles on assistance and protection, and on economic and technological development, as well as a new article on sanctions, in the "rolling text". This augurs well for the early conclusion of the convention. The importance that we attach to these articles arises from our belief that the convention should help to foster friendly relations among its adherence through cooperation in chemical industry. It should also provide a framework, in addition to other international mechanisms, to develop close ties through the demonstration of solidarity among States parties in times of crisis. Articles X and XI, and that on sanctions, have these potentialities and their provisions must be positively elaborated so that the potentialities can be fully realized.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Specifically on the issue of sanctions, my delegation last year advocated the provision of penalties for the violation of the convention. Notwithstanding the fact that the record of imposition of sanctions is mixed at best, its inclusion in the convention could enhance universal adherence. For a developing country like Nigeria, the creation of awareness that the use of chemical weapons would not be cost-free, through a commitment to sanctions by the States parties, would deter aggression by non-States parties.

The burden of creating a credible sanctions policy as a reprisal against the use of chemical weapons will no doubt fall on the executive council acting under appropriate supervision of the Security Council as outlined by Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt in his plenary statement on 8 August. My delegation is mindful of the difficult legal problem of trying to legitimize sanctions against non-States parties to the future convention. However, we regard them as measures that are indispensable for the undiminished security of States parties.

It would be exceedingly myopic to believe or think that the benefits of these articles will flow only to the States parties from the developing countries. As we are living in an interdependent world, all efforts must be made to ensure that the convention is as attractive as possible in order to attain the widest possible adherence.

Another unresolved key issue is verification, both routine and challenge, which remains very difficult. We must continue to address it very constructively, and with perseverance. We regard routine inspection as a purely technical exercise which should be left to the technical secretariat to conduct. Only this approach can guarantee a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory system. Challenge inspection is qualitatively different. Firstly, it is initiated by a State party. Secondly, it is intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This aspect of the inspection, together with the special interest it is bound to generate among States parties, gives it a specifically political and therefore very sensitive character. It bears repeating that the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. Thus it can only be expected that after the organization has completed its inspection of the State party's facility, the same organization should make a categorical pronouncement on the State party's compliance or not, on the basis of the inspection report. It should be a collective exercise, from the beginning to the end, especially in view of its political nature. We trust that this important aspect of the issue and of course the level of intrusiveness or the role of the observer will continue to receive careful consideration.

History has repeatedly demonstrated the fact that we cannot really enforce or legislate morality. We all know that good intention is one thing and honest implementation is quite another irrespective of whether the selection of facilities for inspection is done by the technical secretariat or States parties.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

I should now like to take up the question of nuclear disarmament which constitutes priority items on our agenda. The trend within recent years has been moving towards an era of pragmatic cooperation among States. Most importantly, the climate for consideration of disarmament matters has certainly improved. This evolution, the absence of which hitherto had provided a ready excuse for lack of progress in the disarmament process has since resulted in the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Last month witnessed another historic occasion when the two countries concluded the START agreement on cuts in their strategic nuclear weapons.

Although there are major challenges ahead, the two nuclear-weapon States must strive to maintain the momentum as there is no room for complacency. We cannot afford the resurgence of old tensions. The strategic arms control agenda is far from exhausted. START is just the beginning of a continuous process towards nuclear disarmament. There is much we can learn from the implementation of the INF Treaty. Its value lies in the promise of providing the basis for a more far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. We should however bear in mind that the ultimate goal of the bilateral negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. It is against this background that we call on the Conference to take such measures that will lead to immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations on the nuclear test ban as a matter of priority. We look forward to the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate at the next session.

Recently a number of countries including South Africa signed the non-proliferation Treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States, France and China have announced their intention in principle to accede to the Treaty. This augurs well for the NPT which has served as the most important international agreement limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. We heartily welcome them to our fold. The growing support will no doubt further strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Although these developments are a welcome step in the right direction, there are still serious concerns to be addressed. Within my region Africa, the crucial question still relates to the IAEA's safeguards of all South Africa's nuclear facilities, or highly enriched uranium in its possession. Furthermore, there is the reality of the existence of some nuclear weapons it has already produced, tested and possibly deployed. Nigeria attaches immense importance to the effectiveness of the safeguards system, which should be strengthened and the existing loopholes blocked. To do otherwise would undermine the non-proliferation regime.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Tóth.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the post of President in this very important and concluding phase of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me add that I do not envy you in fulfilling your difficult task, but my delegation is prepared to give you all of its support in your undertaking. I would like to join in your words of welcome extended to our newly arrived colleagues, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India.

The recent events in the Soviet Union caused alarm and anxiety all over the world. The abortive coup d'état was a direct assault on an unfolding democracy. My country is extremely relieved and happy to note the positive turn of events and the restoration of the constitutional power in Moscow. Hopefully, with this positive development, the fears of a shadow creeping over international disarmament efforts will be removed as well.

After years of strenuous negotiations a major disarmament agreement affecting the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States was signed at the Moscow summit meeting held a couple of weeks ago. The envisaged reduction by some 30 per cent of the offensive arsenals will undoubtedly contribute to the creation of a more secure and stable world and to paving the way for further steps in the nuclear field, particularly in eliminating short-range nuclear forces.

Other events of this year so far had a complex impact on our proceedings. Perhaps the most significant influence can be attributed to the Gulf conflict, to the lingering threat of the use of chemical weapons in the war. Expectations concerning the outcome of the conflict and the possible terms of its settlement had a discernible effect on the negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles, leading to meaningful work on pending issues of the future chemical weapons convention.

No less importance can be attached to the arms control and disarmament initiatives that were launched following the ending of the Gulf crisis. The chemical weapons initiative of the United States President, the new arms control and disarmament plan put forward by the President of France are major developments. Important steps were also made towards achieving the universality of the NPT, including the announcement of the decision in principle of two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, to sign the non-proliferation Treaty.

The re-evaluation by the United States of security policy related to chemical weapons has had an immense effect on the CW negotiations. We certainly add our voice to the numerous appraisals expressed in this hall regarding the decision announced by President Bush a couple of months ago to move away from a position previously held concerning the conditional destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons. That initiative marked a genuine intent to conclude a

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chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and led to the creation of the favourable atmosphere in which the negotiations are now progressing. The Hungarian delegation cannot but welcome the plans to intensify the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allocating as much time as possible for substantive work in order to meet the objective adopted in the new mandate of the Committee. We appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, seeking to find additional time for negotiations without the intention of interfering with other no less important events of multilateral disarmament. We do believe that some kind of activity, apart from a full session of the Committee, is possible even during periods coinciding with the work of other disarmament forums. In this regard, consideration might also be given to making good use of the presence at the United Nations General Assembly of high-level political decision makers. Their gathering in New York could be exploited for giving additional political support or impetus to the CW negotiations.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly later this fall will reflect the results achieved so far in the CW negotiations. The achievements will duly represent the current state of affairs in the negotiations and will - in a way - also indicate the fields requiring further work for concluding the CW convention. One such field is of course verification which, by nature, is one of the crucial elements of any arms control or disarmament agreement. During this year's session important new approaches have been injected into the work on the verification regime to be applied to activities not prohibited under the convention. We attach equal importance to the fact that after a period of stalling, substantive discussion in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee was resumed on the other element of the future verification system, namely, challenge inspection. The latter was substantiated not least by new ideas presented by a number of delegations giving ample material to work on with the aim of resolving the issue. The intensification of work on the verification system to be created under article VI of the draft convention was a result of the common recognition that existing provisions on the verification of activities not prohibited under the convention are far from satisfactory. We welcome the new approaches aiming to integrate the major and most relevant part of the international chemical industry in a more comprehensive system of verification. They all appear to seek some sort of solution to eliminate existing loopholes. It is also encouraging that the chemical industry is ready to provide access to all of its facilities for the main purposes of verification.

When we attempt to patch up the holes of the safety net identified with the verification system we should not overlook the imperfections that exist elsewhere. I would like to refer to the schedules of chemicals that are to play a fundamental part in conducting inspections. It is obvious that the contents of the schedules will determine to a large extent the scope of any inspection to be carried out in the future. Now, for example, as we look at schedule 1, listing chemicals known to be chemical weapons, we may have to

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face the fact that certain chemicals publicly described as possible agents for warfare are missing from our list. Also, there is good reason to presume that declared chemical-weapon States and other States known to have displayed "interest" towards this means of warfare might be in the possession of CW formulas that have not been made public so far. Thus, the danger of circumvention is inherent. Of course, it is hard to imagine any method to deal with the latter phenomenon. Yet we must be aware of certain facts of life if we are to maintain our clear-sightedness.

While there is an unquestionable need to have an adequate regime to make sure that chemical industries of future States parties are really engaged only in activities not prohibited under the convention, we should be realistic in our final objectives. It should have become obvious by now that a truly foolproof verification regime of the chemical weapons convention would entail financial and other burdens that most future parties would be reluctant to bear. However, a trade-off between possibilities and the safeguarding of implementation is indispensable. In our view, the verification system can be considerably strengthened by an enhanced challenge regime providing increased effectiveness relating, in particular, to facilities declared under article VI of the future convention.

It has often been said that one of the main purposes of verification is to detect non-compliance and through this, to deter potential violators. At the same time, realizing the limitations of any workable and feasible verification system for the chemical weapons convention, we might look at other ways as well to enhance the deterrence against possible violators. It is obvious that verification has the best chance to reveal a violation arising from the actual use of chemical weapons. This form of violation was also considered by the initiative put forward by President Bush as a grave breach of international law, and I do not believe that anybody in this hall thinks otherwise. Accepting this as a premise, the international community should have the resolve to take appropriate and determined action against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. This action, of course, would mean sanctions in the first place. The terms of the cease-fire putting an end to the Gulf conflict as reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 established stringent rules and conditions for the vanquished and have provided an important precedent. Such terms in themselves could also become a form of dissuasion to any future aggressor or violator. It could also effectively complement the deterrent potential of verification expected to detect non-compliance. Thus, it might be advisable to take another look at provisions on "measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions" that have recently been introduced into the draft convention.

There is one more issue that cannot be avoided when discussing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and that surely is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We regard the CWC as replacing totally, for States parties, the obligations and rights assumed

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under the Geneva Protocol. In accepting the spirit and the substance of the CWC, there remains no sound reason to maintain reservations attached by certain States to the Protocol. We certainly endorse the call to withdraw all reservations to the Geneva Protocol upon signature of the CW convention, at the latest. We welcome the decision by a number of States parties to the Geneva Protocol to withdraw their reservations.

Hungary has, on earlier occasions, stated that States parties to the CW convention, while assuming significant obligations, cannot be entitled to merely the same rights that non-States parties without obligations might enjoy. In this regard, the CW convention really needs to be positively discriminatory vis-à-vis States parties. Discrimination that might arise from the future CWC is to be exercised towards States failing to join the convention. If universal adherence to the future convention is a desired objective, this certainly must be kept in mind. We are, of course, aware of the existence of certain arrangements aiming to curb the actual threat of CW proliferation. Such arrangements have indeed contributed to non-proliferation efforts. However, with the achievement of the total and comprehensive ban of chemical weapons through the CW convention, these measures - being a product of a totally different situation - need to be re-examined and should be harmonized with the purposes of the convention.

The recent progress in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, and the expected completion of these negotiations by 1992, will also affect the third review conference of the biological weapons Convention. May I just recall the often heard expectation that a well-founded CWC might pave the way for the more effective functioning of the biological weapons Convention? This is not the first occasion during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament when the topic of biological weapons appears in a statement. In the framework of our informal consultations on the future of the CD, several delegations raised the possibility of conducting meaningful negotiations to establish a verification mechanism in this field. The arms control and disarmament plan introduced by the distinguished Ambassador of France on 3 June also contained a concrete proposal on the verification of the 1972 biological weapons Convention.

In our view, the question of an ensured prohibition of biological weapons is gathering increasing importance. The recent findings of the United Nations inspection teams in Iraq have caused a frightening alarm that the grave danger of biological warfare has not yet disappeared. It is our firm belief that the BWC is of crucial significance, making an undeniable and relevant contribution to international security. The system of confidence-building measures adopted at the 1987 follow-up technical meeting also played a useful role in strengthening the Convention. These positive facts, however, should not tempt us to sit back comfortably and enjoy a false feeling of satisfaction.

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

Important lessons have to be drawn from the functioning of the confidence-building system. Some of its elements need strengthened and widened scope, while the effectiveness of others is yet to be proven. A major task ahead of the Conference lies in modifying the actual modalities of the confidence-building system. In this respect, it seems inevitable to widen the scope and increase the number of involved facilities on the one hand, and concentrate the reporting on relevant and significant information on the other. The scope of the CBMs should also be wider with regard to the defence-related activities permitted under the Convention, and also to such activities that might carry an indirect danger for humankind, e.g. through damaging the environment. Another important problem is data-processing - or rather its present absence. The structure of the reports has to be modified in a way so that it would open the possibility of computerized analysis. Access to this database should be provided for all States parties. As for the future steps in the field of confidence-building, it might be advisable to establish the basis of direct communication methods between the facilities that were actually accounted for in the yearly report.

It might also be advisable to assess the present approach to the confidence-building measures and reaffirm the political commitment undertaken for participating in these measures. Another important responsibility of the review conference lies in strengthening the character of the convention as an instrument of non-proliferation, without of course changing the basic principles regarding commercial relations and scientific cooperation.

In the light of the fresh evidence that one of the signatories to the BWC conducted a biological warfare programme, the question of verification cannot be considered any more as only a theoretical one. On the contrary, this problem seems to be more topical than ever before. One of the most important and probably most difficult tasks ahead of the third review conference is to lay the groundwork for the further consideration of the establishment of a future verification system of the BWC.

Naturally, a relatively short conference cannot cover the whole problem of verification in its entirety and complexity. One possible solution is to concentrate our efforts on questions of principle and leave the practical details to a new follow-up process. It is evident that any kind of follow-up will have to face a laborious task, where a great deal of detailed technical work is to be accomplished. In the light of this, we think that such a process should not necessarily be tied to a rigid time frame. The primary nature of such a follow-up will probably have to be an exploratory one. We must not forget that verification of the BWC constitutes a very specific task, and it may easily turn out to be even more difficult than that of the CWC. As an introductory measure to further negotiations, possible approaches have to be defined and examined from the points of view of practicability, effectiveness and costs.

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

The Gulf conflict and its aftermath have consequences that go far beyond ongoing multilateral disarmament efforts. The activities carried out and the findings made by the United Nations Special Commission established to implement the relevant paragraphs of Security Council resolution 687 have a clear message to convey to the international community as a whole. Clandestine and overt attempts at proliferation, excessive conventional arms build-up having nothing to do with the needs of legitimate self-defense, have displayed vividly their extremely destabilizing effects for international security. There appear to be discrepancies between the existing, but by no means comprehensive multilateral disarmament machinery, including its legal instruments on the one hand and the revealed facts of reality on the other. Unfortunately, the problems have surfaced in areas where there was an apparent feeling of security. Uncertainties have arisen regarding the effectiveness of multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes established in the field of weapons of mass destruction. This realization might call for reflection on the effectiveness of some of the relevant aspects of existing security and disarmament treaties and other corresponding arrangements.

There is currently an important and welcome political driving force to finalize the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. Such an influence is indispensable for the conclusion of any disarmament agreement. However, we must not forget the lessons of the Gulf conflict I have just referred to, namely that some uncertainties have arisen regarding existing multilateral disarmament agreements. It surely cannot be denied that those agreements were concluded on the basis of what could then be politically achieved, yet practice appears to have defied some of the objectives. This, in our view, needs to be taken into account while working on new agreements in order to avoid future "disappointments" in matters related to international security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Ritter von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)(translated from Spanish): Mr. President, a week ago you took up your very important task of President of this Conference. We wish you every success. There is no doubt that you are highly qualified to guide us in our deliberations in the most effective manner. As your presidency will be the last in this year's session, it will cover the most important stage in the negotiations, right up until the initial weeks of next year. Under your presidency we can be sure that we will attain the lofty goals to which we aspire.

(continued in English)

Before introducing the reports on two trial challenge inspections conducted in Germany earlier this year, I would like to start with some observations on this issue in general. In the past our work on the CW convention has been criticized repeatedly from outside the CD, pointing to

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

our distance from reality in our negotiations at the detached conference table. Although critics might not be wrong in some respects, it is not true as to verification exercises. Up to now, we have a record of approximately 50 trial routine and trial challenge inspections, carried out by various CD members and observer countries in the past few years. This gives evidence of a solid, still growing practical basis and a wealth of operational experience available to us in concluding, at last, our work on the CW convention.

Some countries, including my own, have also reported on bilateral trial challenge inspections, which not only added further elements of realism to a learning process in very practical terms, but at the same time served in building confidence between the countries involved. In this context, my delegation wishes to express its particular appreciation of the interesting joint report tabled recently by the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union in document CD/1093.

Within the framework of a series of German trial challenge inspections, such an inspection was conducted for the first time at a large chemical complex at the end of February 1991. Another trial challenge inspection was conducted with participants from five other CD countries at a German air force base in May 1991. I have pleasure in introducing today the reports on these two trial challenge inspections, which are tabled as documents CD/1101 and CD/1102 (working papers CD/CW/WP.360 and CD/CW/WP.361).

In order to gain, for the first time, experience in the inspection of a large production site typical of the German chemical industry, a plant site located in Frankfurt-Hoechst was selected, comprising approximately 800 buildings and 100 individual production facilities, covering an area of over 4 square kilometres. Document CD/1101 describes in detail the scenario, the conduct of the inspection and the lessons learned. Above all, this trial inspection showed that a suspected violation of article I of the convention can be investigated successfully even in the case of a very large chemical plant site. Nevertheless, the suspicion needs to be sufficiently concrete and specified in the request. In this case, the suspected production of the schedule 1 precursor chemical DF was investigated. Another important lesson learned refers to the requirement of inspectors to be specially trained to perform such a difficult inspection task in the chemical industry. Expertise not only in chemical processes, including processes possibly used in CW production, but also in chemical engineering and plant construction, was found to be absolutely crucial. This similarly applies to the members of the escort team of the national authority.

As regards the size of the inspection team, 11 inspectors split up into four subteams were able to inspect less than a third of the facilities within the two days of trial inspection. To facilitate their task, a number of inspection assistants were found to be needed. These assistants should be assigned to each subteam to carry out, for example, sample-taking and analytical screening.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The inspection excluded the aspect of securing the site. Since securing a site of this size in a meaningful manner poses major problems, it had been decided not to overload the scenario of this first trial challenge inspection of such a site.

Basically, the trial inspection caused no problems regarding commercial confidentiality. However, it was felt that this aspect could not be enacted in a sufficiently realistic manner, given the artificial absence of real distrust in the case of this exercise. Nevertheless, the area of applied research, which represents the stage between research and production, was identified to be a particularly sensitive one: the information that could have been collected here is of extraordinary commercial value to the owner and, therefore, requires special protection. With regard to the observer, there was no indication that his role would differ from that at military facilities. In both cases he should be kept informed on how the inspection was proceeding by the chief inspector only, while it should be at the discretion of the challenged State to determine the extent of access granted to him. The observer's rights need to be clearly delimited further.

Finally, sampling and analysis proved to be particularly difficult tasks. The necessity of further development of methods and instrumentation, identified previously by the technical groups chaired by Dr. Rautio, was confirmed during this exercise. Both the number of samples and the time required for analysis need to be reduced drastically. Methods to be developed should include simple pre-screening means backed up by more sophisticated screening methods, such as recently proposed by Australia in CD/CW/WP.353. Thus, more intrusive and time-consuming in-depth analyses of samples on the site would be minimized. The use of analytical instruments of the central laboratory at the site proved to be problematic, since they took considerable time to be adapted to the needs of the inspection.

Some of the experiences I have mentioned were confirmed during the first trial challenge inspection with multinational participation and are described in detail in document CD/1102. The inspection at the Bad Kreuznach military air base, consisting of two distant areas, proceeded from the suspicion of chemical weapons being stored and personnel being trained in the use of these weapons. One of the aims in this trial inspection was to gain practical experience with an international inspection team typical of those that will be dispatched by the future technical secretariat. The inspectors, who came from Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Germany, worked extremely well together. From time to time, the course of the inspection was interrupted to discuss questions raised by team members participating in a CW-related inspection for the first time. These discussions turned out to be of great value to all participants. The need for the inspectors appointed by the technical secretariat to be thoroughly prepared and well trained again became clear.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The observer in this trial inspection, whose role was assumed by the United Kingdom, was accorded a high degree of openness, although, like the observer in previous German trial challenge inspections, he was constantly escorted. In some cases, at the request of the representative of the inspection site, he was kept at a safe distance from the inspected sensitive object.

Finally, returning to the point of the criticism of the work done in the CD, namely to be lacking the necessary sense of reality, let me add one practical proposal that builds on practical experience: in order to narrow down, in the future, the unavoidable gap between inspection exercises and real inspections, CW dummies could be hidden at the inspection site, with the task for the site management not to disclose their existence and to attempt to evacuate them in spite of the site being secured.

All in all, apart from many other lessons learned, it can be concluded from this first multinational trial challenge inspection that the challenge inspection regime envisaged can fully meet the requirements as an important verification instrument of the CW convention. It can be handled in such a way as to ensure the necessary degree of openness, while taking into account the national security interests of the inspected State.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I also congratulate him on his excellent Spanish. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, before I address the topic of my intervention today, I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference. As members of the Group of 21, our two delegations cooperate very closely on a number of disarmament issues. I am sure you will continue to guide the work of the Conference with great skill. Thanks and appreciation of my delegation go to your predecessor as President, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, for the authoritative and efficient manner in which he discharged his duties in this important office. I should also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Ambassadors Zahran of Egypt and Shah of India, as well as to Ambassador Neagu of Romania and Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia. My delegation and myself look forward to continuing with them the excellent cooperation we have had with their predecessors.

The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now seem to be entering into their final and decisive phase. They have continued to advance under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Batsanov, the chairmen of the working groups and the friends of the Chair. Provided that the necessary flexibility and determination is shown by all participants, there is every reason to expect that our efforts will be crowned with success in the course of the coming year. The convention would be a historical achievement and make the world a better place both for ourselves and for generations to come.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Article I constitutes the backbone of the draft convention. One of the major hurdles for the convention has recently been eliminated, through the inclusion of a provision on the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the scope of the convention. This was absolutely necessary and has considerably increased the prospects of progress on other remaining issues. A few remaining problems pertaining to articles I and II have not been actively discussed for several years. They must now be addressed and resolved. One of them is the question of prohibiting military preparations for use of chemical weapons. It was introduced in the negotiations long ago under circumstances that differ considerably from the present state of affairs. Today we have an unconditional prohibition of use in article I, and the need for a specific prohibition of military preparations does not, therefore, appear to be of the same importance as before. Thus, my delegation considers that paragraph 4 in article I is no longer needed.

The question of herbicides is another unresolved issue related to article I. It is the long-standing position of my delegation that the future convention should encompass a prohibition to use herbicides as a method of warfare. When the matter was discussed previously concerns were expressed that prohibiting the military use of herbicides could be interpreted as also prohibiting a State party from using herbicides, for example, to clear its own air bases, an activity which may be instrumental in supporting its war efforts. However, the formulation "as a method of warfare" makes it clear that such interpretations would not be possible. My delegation favours the inclusion in article I of a prohibition against the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, as contained in footnote 1 to the article. In view of tragic experiences in this field the chemical weapons convention could not simply ignore this problem. It is obvious that such an extension of the scope could not be coupled with verification mechanisms of the kind envisaged for chemical warfare agents. In the view of my delegation the only feasible verification would be the investigation of alleged use.

The difficult problem of "old chemical weapons", abandoned as stockpiles on the territories of other countries or found as remnants on the battlefield, will also have to be resolved. There are several problems connected with this issue, the most difficult being the question of responsibility for such weapons. There must also probably be some time limit for weapons to be included in this category. It seems to me that the problem of old chemical weapons will primarily have to be resolved bilaterally between the countries concerned, and that the multilateral convention should only refer to it in general terms.

A major breakthrough has been made over the past two years in finalizing the order of destruction in articles IV and V and their annexes. With the withdrawal of the "2% proposal" we now have an agreed text with agreed time-frames for the destruction of chemical weapons and an unambiguous obligation to destroy chemical weapons production facilities.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

This year new ideas have been introduced concerning the verification of the chemical industry. I note with great satisfaction the converging positions on the inclusion of "capable facilities" under article VI and appreciate that delegations do not reject the exploration of new ideas.

My delegation welcomes the fact that a substantial part of the chemical industry seems to be prepared to provide free access for international inspectors. Such an approach would considerably facilitate the definition of "capability". If a somewhat narrower concept is considered desirable however, my delegation believes that the exemption of certain kinds of production is the least complicated way to go.

A verification regime building upon an extended scope of declarations and nominations by States parties would constitute an important confidence-building measure, which would provide a possibility to demonstrate compliance with the convention. In the view of my delegation, declarations should be linked to production, present or planned.

The inspection site should in our view correspond to an entire plant site. From this follows that an inspection could include a variety of procedures depending on the nature of the site. The aim of an inspection should be to verify the declaration. A relatively simple inspection procedure should be the basis, with the possibility of increasing the intrusiveness, if the inspectors deem it necessary. The number of inspections possible within a given budget would then be significantly higher compared with the system currently outlined in the "rolling text".

The selection of facilities for inspection under article VI must be performed in such a way that the security concerns of States parties are taken into account. We do not, however, understand the reasoning behind a pre-determined concentration on inspections of schedule 2 facilities. In fact, my delegation does not believe that a risk assessment can be based on simple technical criteria. Thus, a selection by the technical secretariat based on such criteria would not be sufficient for singling out the most relevant facilities. A State party should take its own decision as to which facility it considers should be inspected. This must be the basis. It is conceivable, however, that inspections proposed by States parties could be complemented by inspections initiated by the technical secretariat according to agreed guidelines.

There has been much discussion about anonymous nominations. The preference for such nominations for inspections builds upon two different presumptions: first, that anonymity would avoid creating bilateral political problems and, second, that it would not be correct to single out one State party among several having made the same nomination. The list of nominated plant sites could be included in the annual report of the technical secretariat with an indication of the number of nominations for each of them.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

While very little work remains on article VII, much more should be done to start preparations for its implementation as the convention now approaches its completion. Regional efforts to publicize the forthcoming convention and its implications for the States parties on the national level play a very constructive role in this context. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my Government of the initiative that led to the regional workshop recently held in Mexico City under the auspices of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The "rolling text" with regard to article VIII has been cleaned up considerably. The core issues that remain to be solved are the composition, functions and decision-making of the executive council. How can we strike the right balance between representativity and efficiency of the executive council? It goes without saying that all States parties must be eligible for the executive council. This is not enough, however. The number of members of the council and the length of their term of office should also guarantee all States parties the possibility of serving on the council at reasonable intervals. This would undoubtedly be one important factor contributing to the universal adherence that we are all striving for. At the same time we must ensure that the efficiency of the council is not hampered. Therefore, my delegation suggests that 25-30 States parties be elected by the conference of the States parties for a two-year term. Furthermore, we suggest that provision be made for the possibility of enlarging the council at a later stage, if and when it is deemed appropriate.

The basis for the allocation of seats should be the need to ensure balanced geographical representation. However, other interests must also be reflected when composing the structure of the executive council. Political factors and the size of national chemical industries are also relevant. These interests should, at least to some extent, be taken into account within each regional group as it considers its internal allocation of seats.

It is necessary to apply a nuanced approach to the problem of inspections under article IX. This article should cover a whole spectrum, from consultations and requests for clarification on matters of compliance with the convention to requests for on-site inspections, which may be either undramatic or more or less confrontational. That is why my delegation has proposed using the term "inspections on request". It is evident from the discussion that a deliberate choice to make on-site inspections under article IX confrontational - as the term "challenge" implies - also inevitably puts more emphasis on the question of abuse.

It has been argued that if a violation cannot be proven the request should be considered an abuse of the convention. This is, of course, a grossly oversimplified view, but it may serve to deter any State party from requesting on-site inspections under this article unless it is practically 100 per cent sure that a suspected violation can be proven. Such an outcome

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

would jeopardize the whole effort to achieve an effective verification regime. Its purpose must be to deter violations of the convention rather than requests for inspections.

The terminology is of course less important than the substance of the matter under negotiation. The Swedish delegation will therefore not insist on the term "inspections on request", if this would hamper further progress on this article.

Sweden welcomes the fact that the presentation of CD/CW/WP.352 has now again brought article IX to the negotiating table. We particularly welcome the amendments proposed by the delegation of France. Together with previous documents, including CD/CW/WP.316, these contributions form a good basis for the work on article IX. The conclusion of that work is, in the view of my delegation, the most urgent task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The trend in the field of disarmament during the last few years has been to work towards greater transparency and openness as well as greater intrusiveness in terms of verification regimes and clarification of doubts about compliance. This is an important trend that inspires confidence and thereby promotes the security of States. It is on the basis of this trend, as well as of the need to create an effective "safety net" in the verification regime, that my delegation has approached article IX of the draft convention.

It is important to keep in mind that the work on a verification regime containing, among other important parts, inspections on request does not have a bearing on the chemical weapons convention only. It will also form the framework for the elaboration of verification regimes in other future multilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament.

In the opinion of my delegation it is of the utmost importance that a request for an inspection be complied with by the technical secretariat automatically and without delay. Time is of the essence. A phased approach might be a way to take care, at least to a degree, of both the demand for automaticity and the concern regarding possible abuse. A time-consuming process, hampering the start of the inspection, could erode the credibility of the convention. Besides, it is likely that the executive council will closely follow the entire process of an inspection on request and thus play a significant role in deterring abuse of the convention.

Most countries have military installations which are of the highest importance to their national security. Sweden therefore favours a procedure which makes it possible for a State party to protect its national security without giving it the right of denying access to the facility in question. Managed access offers an acceptable way of dealing with these problems. In the view of my delegation, the more restricted access approach contained in CD/CW/WP.352 gives too much freedom to the inspected State party. It may be added that the need for a strict verification regime seems vindicated by recent events.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

It would be wrong to prescribe in advance what the executive council should do once the inspection report has been submitted. There is in fact a wide range of possibilities depending on the nature of the report: the report may provide compelling evidence of a violation, it may show that there was no evidence of a breach of the convention, or it may be inconclusive. The executive council should be free to draw its own conclusions and decide on measures it deems appropriate. It is not possible to cover in the text of the convention every conceivable case, nor is it desirable even to attempt such a futile exercise.

What is essential, nay necessary, is to have a convention that deters potential violators and inspires confidence in the effectiveness of its verification and complaints procedures. This also goes for the problem of possible abuses of its provisions. Article IX must not become a paper tiger. It must have real teeth.

It is of vital importance to ensure the multilateral character of the convention. It has been proposed that the requesting State party should have the right to send a representative to observe the conduct of the inspection. As I have stated before, my delegation has reservations against such an arrangement for two reasons. Firstly, it implies that the international team of inspectors cannot be trusted and therefore has to be checked by the requesting State party. This is not acceptable as a matter of principle and would create a very bad precedent for other international treaties. Secondly, it is questionable whether such a clause would be politically realistic. It is hardly conceivable that certain States would allow representatives of certain other States to be present at installations which they regard as sensitive. However, if some States parties would like to make bilateral or regional arrangements for the presence of observers at inspections on request they should be free to do so. But it should not be obligatory under the convention to allow the presence of observers from the requesting State. Such a clause might seriously undermine the convention's chances of obtaining universal adherence.

Sweden welcomes the agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee to include the draft texts of articles X and XI in appendix I. The agreed formulations in article X will make it easier for States parties to mobilize assistance in cases of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons by giving this provision the intended operational character. The settlement of this issue represents an important step forward in the negotiations.

For several years Sweden has argued for the inclusion of the text on article XI regarding economic and technological development in appendix I. No delegation had or has, in the view of my delegation, anything to gain by holding up this important issue.

Another result of the fruitful work that has recently taken place is the agreement on the article regarding the relationship between the future convention and other international agreements. Concerns that a future

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

convention might affect obligations under the Geneva Protocol are now dispersed. The Swedish delegation is satisfied with the present wording of this article, which follows closely the pattern set out in other disarmament treaties.

Tangible results have been obtained in the negotiations on the organization, measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions, amendments, settlement of disputes, and jurisdiction and control. The constructive attitude taken by delegations augurs well for the inter-sessional work in the area of legal and institutional matters.

Over the many years that the work on a chemical weapons convention has been going on progress has been slow, not because sufficient time has not been allocated but because of the lack of a genuine will in some quarters to engage in serious negotiations. It is above all a question of the will to engage in a process of give and take. This must be our focus. We now stand a better chance than ever to conclude these negotiations. Let us not miss this opportunity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Králik, who will introduce the report distributed this morning as document CD/1104.

Mr. KRÁLIK (Czechoslovakia): I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons on the work of this Committee during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before doing so, Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month and for the coming period while the Conference is in recess. Your ability, knowledge of disarmament affairs and personal enthusiasm ensure the efficacy of your guidance.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons is available to the delegations under the symbol CD/1104. The report reflects discussion on security assurances from different points of view and perceptions, which is very interesting and instructive. Many other points relating to the influence of the current international climate on security concepts and arrangements have been raised. Some of the issues were rather controversial but, I believe, the members of the Ad Hoc Committee now have a clearer picture of the items put before the Committee. Some orientations for constructive debate discovered during this session remain opened for the coming year. Within the Ad Hoc Committee we had a fruitful exchange of views on problems which will become more and more

(Mr. Králík, Czechoslovakia)

important in our time and also in the future. We have sought to avoid a traditional repetition of well-known positions, and I personally have looked for a working philosophy for comprehensive effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, we remain far from consensus on the substance of global security assurances or making any kind of breakthrough in this very sensitive field. But in the Committee we have listened to some interesting ideas, which could and should be elaborated on further.

In conclusion I would like to thank the group coordinators, Dr. Karem from Egypt, Mr. Duboisson from Belgium and Mr. Dimitrov from Bulgaria, as well as Mr. Guoling from the delegation of the People's Republic of China, for the cooperation and assistance they have provided to me during the session. I would like to thank the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Bogomolov, and his assistant Miss Borisoff. The same thanks I would like to extend to the interpreters and translators for their work. And I am also very thankful to my collaborator Dr. Gaspar for his assistance during the time I have accomplished my duties as Chairman.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for introducing the report that appears in document CD/1104, as well as the kind words addressed to the Chair. I would also like to congratulate him on the completion of the work of that subsidiary body. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, who will introduce his report on the open-ended consultations he chaired on the effective functioning of the Conference.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): On behalf of my delegation, Sir, may I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Conference on Disarmament at this important juncture and also welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India?

As the Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament I have the honour to report on the results of these consultations. At the Conference's 586th plenary meeting it was decided that the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, which were initiated in 1990, would be continued during the 1991 session under the same chairmanship. The consultations were then conducted in a series of six meetings.

Discussions took place, once again, in a thorough debate on a wide range of subjects of common concern. Among these were the questions of the possibility of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, for which different formulas were advanced, of a re-examination of the existing groupings in the light of political changes which had taken place over the

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

past year, of a consideration of the possibility of amendments to the agenda of the Conference, of the interpretation and implementation of the rule of consensus, and of the review of administrative procedures agreed during the previous year's consultation.

The debate resulted in consensus on the following areas of possible improved and effective functioning. On intensification of work, there was general agreement that work on the chemical weapons convention had reached a stage where intensified work was necessary towards the objective of an early conclusion of negotiations. Agreed periods for intensified work, particularly during inter-sessional periods, were reported to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee concerned, and some of this intensification has already been implemented.

On non-member participation, a proposal for better participation by non-members in the work of the Conference on Disarmament was examined in detail, and it was agreed that the objective could be met by the following presidential statement to be read for the record at a plenary meeting of the Conference:

"In connection with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, which deal specifically with invitations to States non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, it is the sense of the Conference that the secretariat shall apply the current practice as follows:

"1. Non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work may, unless decided otherwise by the Conference, participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to specify in advance which ones.

"2. As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

It was felt that the exercise of informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament had once again proved its utility, not only in the general airing of views on matters of interest and concern, but also in the areas where positive decisions had been taken. The hope was widely expressed that the exercise would continue during the 1992 session, on the same format and under the same chairmanship as in the previous two years.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, which has been circulated as document CD/WP.410, and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The historic links between Venezuela and Mexico have been enriched over the last few decades by close cooperation in many fields. Personally speaking, I have had the pleasure of knowing you since we were together in New York in the 1970s. Consequently I am extremely pleased to take the floor under your presidency, a presidency which you are already exercising with your recognized diplomatic skill. I should also like to associate myself with your words of congratulations and welcome addressed to the new representatives of Egypt and India, Ambassadors Mohamed Mounir Zahran and Prakash Shah.

The Government of Mexico continues to attach great importance to work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, an item which has been on the agenda of this Conference since 1980 and which occupied a prominent place on the agenda of the ENDC as long ago as 1962. The history of multilateral disarmament negotiations shows how useful it would have been to have this programme from the 1960s onwards. The United Nations General Assembly, aware of that need, has been urging the member States of this Conference to redouble our efforts in this field. For two years now, within the context of the Third United Nations Disarmament Decade the General Assembly has reiterated this appeal. In the past decade modest progress has been made in the Ad Hoc Committee on this topic. Since last year, however, it has not been possible to re-establish the Committee. Hence the proposal made in February of this year to appoint a special coordinator for item 8 on our agenda. I should like in my capacity as Special Coordinator on item 8 (an appointment which I very much appreciate) to inform the Conference of the result of my consultations in the course of this year.

My report has the virtue of being extremely brief, as regrettably no significant changes have been recorded in the positions of the delegations present here. This is shown by the written communications conveyed to me by the spokesmen of the various groups on this item, as well as the delegation of China. The Group of 21, through its coordinator, the delegation of Cuba, reiterated the position set out in this plenary on 30 May last to the effect that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established as soon as possible. The delegation of China conveyed the same opinion to me. Meanwhile, the Western Group, through the delegation of Australia, conveyed to me what it had stated in this plenary, also on 30 May last, to the effect that it continues to consider that the circumstances are not yet propitious to continue the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and consequently they do not wish the Committee to be re-established. Lastly, the delegation of the Soviet Union, which coordinates the Eastern European Group, indicated to me that some delegations in that Group said that the Conference - and I quote in English to avoid any distortion -

(continued in English)

"should do some additional work and conduct productive discussions about concrete future activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament before its re-establishment".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, at this late hour of our debate I shall try to be brief, but allow me nevertheless to begin by joining the previous speakers in congratulating you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference and by wishing you every success in the discharge of your demanding tasks. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States. I am also pleased to welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India. At this particular juncture of our work, my delegation wishes to make some observations on agenda items 1 and 4, as well as briefly on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Let me first address agenda item 1 by welcoming the encouraging development in nuclear arms limitation and reduction. The long and delicate nuclear disarmament negotiations have been marked this year by the accomplishment of the INF Treaty, the first ever agreement eliminating a specific category of nuclear armaments, and more recently by the signing of START between the United States of America and the USSR, which will reduce some 30 per cent of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries. It is the sincere hope of my delegation, not only that this agreement between the two States will soon be implemented, but also that further efforts for strategic arms reduction between them will be vigorously pursued.

While my delegation warmly welcomes these achievements, we nevertheless continue to believe that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is an essential step in halting the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons. It has been generally acknowledged that the development of new nuclear weapons will only complicate efforts to reverse the global arms race. The speedy achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is, therefore, a global concern. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has been established this year with the mandate to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including its structure, scope and those of verification and compliance. It is encouraging to note that the Committee has, inter alia, addressed the questions of the possible establishment of a permanent global monitoring network, temporary localized monitoring and on-site inspections. The scientific Group on seismic events has also held a series of meetings including a very useful one with the Ad Hoc Committee. The draft protocol II of the PTBT on the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the draft of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as contained in document CD/1089, has also been discussed and in our view is still in need of further elaboration.

Although for those of us who have consistently advocated the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the work carried out in the Committee has somewhat fallen short of expectations, its intensive debate has indeed been an

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

encouraging sign hopefully leading towards more serious negotiations. Given the complexity of the question of a nuclear test ban and in view of the need for further substantive work, we believe it is imperative that the Conference allow the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for the coming 1992 session. In the same vein we would like to recall once again that, as stipulated in the preambular paragraph of the 1963 PTBT, the original parties proclaimed that one of their principal aims was the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test any kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons. Therefore, we continue to believe that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the process of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty through the amendment of the 1963 PTBT should complement each other.

Turning to agenda item 4 on chemical weapons, my delegation would firstly like to make some observations on an issue that has attracted considerable attention, namely the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, under article VI of the draft convention. We firmly believe that the regime should be formulated to accommodate the legitimate interests of the chemical industries, especially those in the developing countries. It should be conceived in such a way as to safeguard the objective comparative advantages of particular industries against possible abuse motivated by commercial interests. In this regard it is important to ensure that the burden of compliance with the convention will not fall disproportionately on the emerging industries in developing countries. Hence there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between justified security considerations and legitimate economic interests. The formulation of provisions governing the implementation of this article should therefore be given priority by the Committee before finalizing the article itself. Given the fact that the implementation of the convention will affect thousands of facilities located in both developed and developing countries, the formulation of such provisions should also take into account the different levels of development of the States parties to the convention. We also share the view that the States parties should play a role in the selection process of facilities to be inspected. It is in this context that the Indonesian delegation stands ready to explore every possible avenue, together with other delegations participating in the negotiation, in order to establish a monitoring regime of the convention under article VI.

Article XI, which deals with economic and technological development, has also been intensively discussed during this year's sessions of the Committee. Like many other delegations, we consider this article to be a strong incentive for States to join the convention. We would go even further by suggesting that this article would give even greater motivation if it is to promote cooperation among States parties in activities which are not prohibited by the convention.

The agreement on the inclusion of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and the basic undertaking on the total destruction of chemical weapons stocks as well as their production facilities, has indeed

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

removed the stumbling-block in the negotiation on article I. There are still, however, crucial issues which need to be resolved, such as the question on how to put into practical terms this basic undertaking on the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. We see that the political will which has emerged recently has provided us with an opportunity to begin the elaboration of practical measures regarding the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. In this connection, a new cooperative approach in order to find a practical solution to this question may be initiated among possessors of these weapons. Some States have given indications of their possession of chemical weapons and their production facilities. The information supplied by these States, and any future information given by other possessor States, would serve as the basic modality for the initiation of the new cooperative approach which I have just mentioned in this respect. Being a State party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without reservation which has never possessed nor produced chemical weapons we are very keen to see the total elimination of these weapons.

On the question of the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, my delegation wishes to recall the points it raised before the Committee during the discussions on this matter last year. We continue to believe that the representation of States parties to this body should reflect a balance in the political reality and geographical equitability of the States parties. In this regard, we preliminarily envisage the figure of 35 States as members of the executive council with the possibility of expanding the membership as the number of States parties increases. The example of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency might serve as a point of reference in the establishment of such a body.

The progress made in nuclear disarmament between the United States, and the Soviet Union and other progress registered in regional disarmament has created a new sense of optimism for new opportunities in multilateral disarmament. However, this optimism is somewhat tempered by the meagre results of various multilateral disarmament forums, including the Conference on Disarmament. It is in this context that the need to improve the effectiveness of the Conference is now more pressing than ever. We should spare no efforts in exploring more effective working methods in order for the Conference to fully discharge its mandate as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

My delegation is pleased to note our recent agreement that non-member States may participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to give advance notice. We share the view that the participation of non-member States should be encouraged and facilitated in order to enhance the prospect of universal adherence to agreements under negotiation in the Conference. On the other hand, we find it regrettable that no progress has been made in the consultation concerning the "rules of consensus" and other important matters. Over the years the "rules of consensus" have often been applied as a veto and thus

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

hampered progress in the work of the Conference. Particularly disappointing is the difficulty to reach consensus on the establishment of ad hoc committees and their respective mandates. We would thus take this opportunity to reiterate our support for the proposal of the Group of 21, last July, to establish ad hoc committees on all items at the outset of the CD's annual session. By doing so, the beginning of substantive work would no longer be delayed by discussions on the establishment and the mandates of the ad hoc committees. There is still much work ahead of us in our common efforts to improve the effective functioning of this unique forum. It is for this reason that my delegation shares the widely expressed view that the informal open-ended consultations should be continued during the 1992 session under the wise guidance of the same Chairman.

We note that the preparation of this year's Conference report is under way. I would therefore conclude my brief statement by expressing the hope that the drafting and adoption of the final report, which should reflect the views expressed during this session, will proceed as smoothly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to offer my most heartfelt congratulations upon your accession to the presidency. My delegation welcomes the fact that a man of your experience and skill is presiding over our work at such an important time. Doubtless both your professional and your personal qualities will be of very valuable assistance to us. Hence my delegation wishes you every success and assures you of its full cooperation. I should also like to pay tribute once again to your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar, for the skill and authority with which he discharged his duties. Lastly, I would like to note and welcome the arrival of the Ambassador of Egypt, Dr. Mounir Zahran, and the Ambassador of India, Mr. Prakash Shah, the representatives of two great countries with which my delegation is looking forward to continuing the relations of trust and friendship that it enjoyed with their predecessors.

I should like to address two subjects today. On the one hand, as I announced on the day following the signature of the START Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, my delegation wishes to outline France's position on this event which has rightly been described as historic. I should also like to announce the submission by my delegation, as an official document of the Conference, of the communique of the Paris meeting of the representatives of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on arms transfers and non-proliferation.

The French Government welcomed with keen satisfaction the signature of the START Treaty, which represents an important phase in the Soviet-American strategic dialogue aimed at arms control and disarmament. This is borne out

(Mr. Errera, France)

by the fact that for some systems the reduction is as great as 50 per cent, and that overall the implementation of the Treaty will result in a reduction of the order of 25 to 30 per cent of the total number of American and Soviet nuclear arms equipped with strategic delivery systems. My Government therefore considers that the START Treaty constitutes an excellent basis for other efforts to achieve additional limitations and reductions of the arsenals concerned. Aside from the fact that the implementation of the Treaty, once it is ratified, will take seven years, the work ahead remains considerable, in view of the enormity of the arsenals that had been built up over decades of East-West confrontation. That is why France commends the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake without delay a new series of discussions aimed at enhancing strategic stability even further, inter alia by dealing with the relationship between offensive and defensive systems. We note with interest that the space component of the Soviet-American strategic negotiations will continue to be on the negotiating table, and we therefore urge the conclusion of an agreement which would thus make it possible to avoid a destabilizing arms race. The French Government therefore supports the efforts of the United States and the USSR aimed at further cuts in their strategic arms.

The magnitude of their arsenals gives them good reason to continue their disarmament effort in respect of their own weapons. Even after the implementation of the START I agreement, there will still be a world of difference between the French nuclear deterrent and American and Soviet arsenals. From the outset France took a decision to acquire only the means necessary to pursue a policy of deterrence, that is, an arsenal sufficient to convince a potential aggressor - in any circumstances and whatever his means of defence - that he would run the risk of being confronted with a capability that could inflict on him, by way of reprisals for an attack, irreparable damage, that is to say damage out of proportion to the possible benefit he perceives. France will work to maintain its own capability within the strict limits of the principle it has always endorsed, the principle of minimum deterrence, naturally with the concomitant constraints on the continuation of its underground testing. France sincerely hopes that the United States and the USSR will be guided by this principle of minimum deterrence in their future strategic negotiations. The French Government wishes to recall that, for its part, it has never excluded the possibility of playing its role at the appropriate time in the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. Whatever its desire may be to see progress achieved in this nuclear disarmament, my Government wishes to recall that direct participation by France in negotiations would not be meaningful unless favourable conditions for such a dialogue were met, and the French Government will decide in due course whether future negotiations have brought such conditions closer.

Nuclear deterrence is the child of both the Second World War and East-West confrontation. The fact is that the fear and horror of nuclear war have made it possible to maintain peace for 40 years in Europe despite extreme tension and a one-sided build-up of gigantic conventional arsenals on our continent. Such a situation obviously cannot be changed overnight. Continuous

(Mr. Errera, France)

and parallel efforts are required in the political sphere and the military sphere. The year 1990, with the end of the division of Germany and of Europe, the agreement on conventional disarmament and the CSCE summit, marked a historic turning-point. Even though uncertainties may remain - as current events have reminded us - 1991 has recorded further decisive progress with the START I agreement. Agreement on a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons is in sight. But the task remains considerable, and we must spare other regions of the world the conflicts and dangers that Europe has experienced. That is why my Government is extremely alert to the problems of non-proliferation in the nuclear sphere, as in the sphere of chemical and biological weapons, and that of ballistic missiles.

With specific reference to the subject of regulating conventional arms transfers and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation, on instructions from my Government and in agreement with the other parties concerned, has just submitted as an official document of the Conference (under the symbol CD/1103) the communique of the meeting that the representatives of the five countries held in Paris on 8 and 9 July last. I think that we can all agree on the unprecedented nature of such a meeting and the importance of the discussions and the decisions that were reached. Without entering into the details of the communique, I should like to draw the Conference's attention to the following elements. The Five confirmed that they would not transfer conventional weapons when, in the light of the circumstances, such transfers would be likely to jeopardize stability. They agreed to support continued work to establish, under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, a register of arms transfers, drawn up on a non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency on arms transfers and in general in military matters. They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, through the full implementation of Security Council resolution 687 and the adoption by all the countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control. Lastly, they expressed their intention to continue their discussions on these subjects, inter alia with a view to establishing guidelines to ensure the observance of rules of restraint as regards arms transfers.

My delegation considers it a matter of the utmost importance for the Conference on Disarmament to be kept informed of the work of the Five in these areas, work which complements the efforts of other States or groups of States. For its part it will do its best to contribute to those efforts.

I should now like to say the following in my personal capacity. I know that it is not customary in this forum to comment on an event or to express feelings, still less emotions. But there are times when morality and politics converge. There are times when, through its force, through its intensity, an event takes on universal significance. There are times when what is generally called progress takes on its full meaning. So when a country - and not just any country - succeeds in avoiding a hazardous enterprise, when a people expresses its will to resist and says no - no to threats, no to intimidation,

(Mr. Errera, France)

simply in order to live freely, and when men through their inspiration and their courage open the way to the noblest of all victories, the victory of freedom, we must be glad and we must say so. We must be glad for those who, because they wished it, succeeded in preserving their liberty; we must be glad at the triumph of the principles, values and ideals which we all espouse, that is to say the democratic principle, respect for the law; and lastly we must be glad too that the process of disarmament will continue, because - let us make no mistake - if disarmament agreements have been concluded in the recent past - the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in 1987, the agreement on conventional forces in Europe in 1989, the START agreement last month, which I have just referred to - if the conclusion of a global convention banning chemical weapons is within reach today, this is indeed because, in part at least, a process of reform and democratization was undertaken in the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that the interruption of that process, a reversal of the trend in the Soviet Union, would have had particularly adverse effects for disarmament efforts and hence for our Conference. For that reason too we must be glad.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to call on Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, who has asked to speak.

Mr. ZAHARAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to express my delight at your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this important period of our work. I am confident that your competence and wide diplomatic experience will be reflected in the achievements of this important negotiating forum in furtherance of the goals and objectives towards which we are all striving, namely the establishment of international peace and security through disarmament endeavours.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for the kind welcome extended to me by yourself and also by the Ambassador of India and the other ambassadors. I wish to assure you and all the members of this Conference of my firm desire for continued cooperation, coordination and consultation at all stages of our work between my country's delegation and the delegations of all the States members of the Conference on Disarmament, which, in actual fact, constitutes a unique framework for the comprehensive discussion of disarmament matters since it is the only United Nations negotiating body concerned with those matters.

Egypt's interest in disarmament matters and in our Conference stems from basic principles that are deeply rooted in our Arab and African identity and inherent in our membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Egypt was one of the founder members and in the work of which it is still playing an active role, particularly in condemning the use of force in international relations and in advocating the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the prohibition of the arms race in outer space, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

I take this opportunity to draw attention to President Hosni Mubarak's initiative in which he proposed that all weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be removed from the Middle Eastern region, on the understanding that this would apply equally to all States of the region without distinction or discrimination. This initiative forms part of Egypt's endeavours to achieve the goals and objectives of full and general disarmament and to use the savings resulting therefrom to further the development endeavours of the developing countries. In this connection, we welcome the statement issued at the meeting of experts of the five permanent members of the Security Council, held at Paris on 8 and 9 July of this year, in which they referred to the importance of turning the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the Ambassador of the Netherlands for the kind invitation that he extended to me, at the beginning of my assignment to this Conference, to visit The Hague on 23 and 24 August to inspect the facilities that his friendly Government is offering to accommodate the organization that we intend to establish within the context of the negotiations for the drafting of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. The visit will undoubtedly be of benefit in our deliberations on this subject.

In conclusion, Mr. President, allow me to emphasize once again how proud I am to be working with you. I wish to assure you of my sincere desire to cooperate with you in this important international forum, as well as my sincere desire to cooperate with all the delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and its secretariat.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, has asked for the floor and now I invite him to make a statement.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): I am sorry to ask for the floor at such a late hour, but I would like to inform you that my statement will be very brief. First of all, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, allow me on behalf of the Chinese delegation to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the CD. I am confident that with your rich experience and outstanding diplomatic skills you will be able to accomplish in an exemplary manner the enormous and difficult task during the last stage of this session and provide a sound basis for next year's work. I would like to assure you that in discharging your responsibilities you will receive the full support and cooperation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, for his outstanding contributions. I would like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Romania, Egypt and India, who have recently taken up their posts. I wish them every success and I am looking forward to closely cooperating with them. At the same time I would also like to express my best wishes to the Ambassadors of India, Egypt and Brazil who have left us.

(Mr. Hou, China)

We have just listened very attentively to the important reports submitted by three committee chairmen - the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Králik, the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Kamal, and the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marín Bosch. We warmly congratulate them and thank them for their outstanding efforts and contributions. The positive positions adopted by China on the issues in question have been reflected in relevant documents and during the process of consultations. We have taken note of document CD/1103, which has been circulated today, and we have also listened with attention to the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Errera. In his statement he mentioned, inter alia, the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council on arms control in the Middle East, as well as the final communiqué.

I would like to point out that, in the view of China, the meeting was an important one, to which the international community attached great importance. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China participated in the meeting in a serious and responsible manner. During the meeting, the head of the Chinese delegation, the Vice-Foreign Minister of China, Mr. Liu Huaqiu, delivered important statements comprehensively expounding China's foreign policy of independence and peace and its principled stand and proposals on the issues of arms control in the Middle East, as well as his views and comments on the final communiqué of that meeting. On the instructions of the Chinese Government, I have already addressed a letter to the President of the CD requesting the circulation of the two statements made by Mr. Liu Huaqiu as an official document of the CD, and their translation into the other official languages of the CD so that the international community will understand comprehensively and fully the principled policy and positions of the Chinese Government. It is only natural that, for technical reasons, the translation of this document will take some time. I would like to express my appreciation to the CD secretariat for its assistance.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on Ambassador Prakash Shah of India, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. SHAH (India): I take the floor not because I have anything substantive to contribute at this stage to the deliberations of this Conference, but I would not wish to let this opportunity pass by without thanking you, Mr. President, and through you the colleagues in this Conference, for the very warm words of welcome that you have extended to me. I should also like to thank all those colleagues who spoke before me for their words of welcome and their offer of cooperation. As a newcomer to the CD, I shall need both their cooperation and their guidance in ample measure. Mr. President, I am specially happy that I am joining the deliberations today at a time when you have assumed the presidency. Knowing you as I do for many years, I have no doubt that at this critical juncture in the deliberations of the CD, your experience and abilities and your personal qualities will be

(Mr. Shah, India)

sorely needed for guiding the deliberations to a successful conclusion. All I would like to say here is that you have the full cooperation, not only of myself but also of my delegation, in making your task both smooth and successful.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have asked for the floor in my capacity as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to make a brief announcement regarding the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this afternoon. The open-ended consultations scheduled for 3 p.m. on inspections under article IX will not be held because of the need to conduct various other consultations. At 5.45 p.m. in conference room I there will be a meeting of the extended bureau to consider a number of unagreed issues related to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

As I have the floor I would like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union. First of all, I welcome you cordially to the responsible post you are now occupying and in that connection I should like to wish you every success. Your experience, diplomatic skills and outstanding personal qualities give us an assurance that success will accompany us at this decisive stage of the work of the Conference. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors Solesby and Ledogar, for their effective guidance of the work of the Conference during earlier periods. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf I also extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Prakash Shah of India and Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, and I should like to express my conviction that the relations of friendship and cooperation between their delegations and ours will be further productively developed.

In conclusion a few words about the fact that reference has been made at today's meeting to the dramatic events that have taken place recently in my country. I am deeply grateful to Ambassador Tóth and particularly to Ambassador Errera for the sentiments of satisfaction that they have expressed in connection with the failure of the anti-constitutional, anti-democratic coup. News of this collapse was received with profound relief and elation throughout the world, and first and foremost, of course, by the overwhelming majority of Soviet people. But even more important for us were the expressions of sympathy and solidarity which began to flood in literally from Monday morning, when it was still unclear what the outcome of the attempted coup would be. On behalf of the Soviet delegation I should like to express profound appreciation to all those colleagues who stood by us in those difficult days.

The victory of the young democracy in the Soviet Union naturally owes a great deal to the unprecedented international support and the firm rejection of the attempts to restore totalitarianism. But of course the main reason for

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

the victory lies within our country, in the far-reaching changes in our society that have occurred during perestroika, in the boldness and decisiveness, the readiness for self-sacrifice on the part of the man in the street and the resolve of the leaders of the democratic forces, among whom the President of Russia, Boris Eltsin, undoubtedly played a special role. Of course this victory has not eliminated all the problems, the often difficult problems, objective problems, that the Soviet people and Soviet society are now confronted with. These problems have yet to be dealt with, particularly in the economic sphere but also in a number of other spheres. But it has shown that there are forces within our society that are capable of resolving these problems by pursuing democracy, the pre-eminence of universal human values and the progressive integration of the Soviet Union in the world community of nations. Once again, many thanks.

And now, as a very last word, I revert to my duties as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Literally while I was speaking my attention was drawn to one more change in the schedule of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as follows: I must inform all delegates that the meeting of Group B scheduled for tomorrow has also been cancelled. So I would request you all to note that as appropriate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his important statement and for the announcements he has just made, which we have duly noted. As President of this Conference, under the current circumstances, and as the representative of Venezuela, I cannot fail to highlight the significance of the words just spoken by Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union. At this moment I cannot but express our infinite satisfaction at what doubtless is the final victory of democracy and fundamental freedoms in the Soviet Union. A victory which, as Ambassador Batsanov has just said, can be attributed to the Soviet people, its will to preserve and consolidate its important achievements of the last few years. I think I am reflecting the sentiments of all the representatives in this Conference when I emphasize the significance of what is happening in the Soviet Union and at the same time express my wishes for a steady improvement in the destiny of that great country which we so very much admire and appreciate. Thank you very much, Ambassador Batsanov, for your words. I now call on the representative of Cuba, who has asked for the floor:

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, this morning my Ambassador had an opportunity to congratulate you on the post you occupy in our Conference and to express our confidence that with your usual skill you will fully discharge the functions conferred upon you. I shall therefore confine myself to adding my voice to that of my Ambassador. As the delegate of Cuba I should like to thank all the distinguished ambassadors who have introduced reports this morning on the specific aspects of the work which have been entrusted to them in the course of the meetings of our Conference which are now coming to an end. I have also asked for the floor to express appreciation - on behalf of the Group of 21 on this occasion - for the information provided to this plenary on the outcome of his consultations on

(Mrs. Bauta Soles, Cuba)

the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 8 of our Conference, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, by the distinguished Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch in his capacity as special coordinator for that topic. The report succinctly and clearly reiterates the wishes of the Group of 21, which, in keeping with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, seeks the re-establishment of the Committee and progress at its meetings. In our capacity as coordinators on the item for the Group we have also taken note of the wishes similar to ours expressed by the delegation of China, and those of some members of the Eastern European Group which also seem to tend in a similar direction. We hope that these majority interests will be duly weighed up for the purpose of eliminating the obstacles that precluded the re-establishment of the Committee on item 8 at this session, so that when our work begins again and the subsidiary bodies are re-established, the subsidiary body on agenda item 8 will not once again be an exception.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement, of which we have taken due note, as well as her kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? If not, I suggest we turn to other matters. In connection with the report introduced today by Ambassador Králík, contained in document CD/1104, I should like to inform you that I will be putting this before the Conference for adoption at the next plenary meeting on Thursday 29 August. I now invite the Conference to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which was circulated last week in document CD/1099. If there are no objections I shall take it that the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now intend to put before the Conference the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which has been circulated in document CD/1097. The recommendation provides that the Ad Hoc Group will meet in Geneva from 2 to 13 March 1992. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now invite the Conference to take note with appreciation of the report submitted today by Ambassador Kamal in his capacity as Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, circulated in document CD/WP.410.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to convey to Ambassador Kamal our sincere congratulations on the effective, competent and enthusiastic way in which he chaired the informal consultations. In connection with document CD/WP.410 I shall now proceed to make a statement on

(The President)

the participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference. I shall do so in English, as this was the language in which the text was negotiated in the informal consultations.

"In connection with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, which deal specifically with invitations to States non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, it is the sense of the Conference that the secretariat shall apply the current practice as follows:

"1. Non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work may, unless decided otherwise by the Conference, participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to specify in advance which ones.

"2. As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

Before turning to the timetable of meetings for next week, I should like to report to you on our coming steps in respect of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. Today the secretariat has circulated the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3 and 7. Those related to agenda item 8 will be circulated shortly, possibly tomorrow, in delegations' pigeon-holes. In this connection it is necessary for us to begin our consideration as soon as possible once delegations have had enough time to consider them. I think that this requirement will be fully met if the group coordinators and coordinators on the items mentioned meet with me on the 27th at 3 p.m. in room I. Of course, any other delegations wishing to participate will be welcome. I hope we shall succeed in concluding our work on the substantive paragraphs on that occasion, as we will then have to take up the technical parts of the report and it is necessary to facilitate the task of the translation, typing and reproduction services which, as a result of some delays with the reports of the subsidiary bodies, are now receiving all the material for the annual report almost simultaneously. I repeat, then - and regrettably on this point the President has no flexibility, despite all his goodwill - 27 August at 3 p.m. in room I.

I suggest that we now turn to the timetable of meetings for next week. In keeping with the understanding reached in the consultations between the President and the coordinators, services normally assigned to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been placed at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. On Thursday 29 August we shall proceed to consider, immediately following the plenary meeting, the technical parts of the annual report and the paragraphs relating to the work of the Conference on its improved and effective functioning. The relevant drafts will be

(The President)

circulated at the beginning of next week. The timetable circulated today by the secretariat takes account of these considerations. Of course, at this very late stage in the annual session some re-adjustments might be necessary, but it would be desirable to avoid delays or complications, as these might in one way or another jeopardize the conclusion of our work on 4 September. I suggest, then, that we adopt the timetable on that understanding.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no further business for today, and consequently I shall proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 29 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.