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## SIXTH SESSION

## Official Records



## AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE 13th

MEETING

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Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

**Complaint of hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia (A/1946, A/AC.53/L.10/Rev. 1) (continued)**

[Item 68]\*

1. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asserted that the inclusion of the Yugoslav item on the agenda represented another attempt by the aggressive groups of the Anglo-American bloc to use the General Assembly to slander the USSR and the people's democracies. Far from alleviating strained relations among nations, the effect was to render existing world tension even more acute.

2. The Yugoslav Government was resorting to a campaign of slander in order to conceal from its people the true nature of the anti-democratic policy which it had adopted in order to serve the interests of United States imperialism. That policy had led it to repeal nationalization laws, to discard the blueprints for a planned economy, to restore a large part of the country's resources to private ownership, to surrender key industries to foreign corporations, and to flood the Yugoslav market with foreign commodities. Those measures had brought the Yugoslav economy to the verge of collapse. The United States, on the other hand, had been permitted to utilize huge areas of cultivated land for the construction of military airfields, to erect massive fortifications on river banks and to set up ammunition dumps and stockpiles of strategic materials in preparation for a new war. American "observers" had entered the country in large numbers with orders to execute the United States plan to

convert it into a springboard for aggression. The Yugoslav army was to be used as cannon fodder to that end.

3. The Yugoslav libel against the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe was intended to divert attention from the hostile activities systematically practised by the Tito Government and its foreign masters against those nations and against the interests of the Yugoslav people themselves. The truth was that the USSR and the people's democracies had never pursued a hostile policy toward Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav people would never forget that it was the USSR which had liberated them from the German yoke and restored their national economy.

4. The principal weapons used by the Tito régime against its former benefactors were sabotage carried out by Yugoslav diplomatic representatives accredited to the people's democracies, repeated unilateral violations of economic treaties and agreements, and deliberate provocation of border incidents with the neighbouring countries.

5. Embassy and consular officials of the Belgrade Government had acted as spies, diversionists and *agents provocateurs* as was shown by the trials held in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Hungary. Ammunition and small-arms stocks had actually been found in the basement of the Yugoslav Embassy at Bucharest. Fully-accredited diplomatic staff members from the neighbouring democracies had been arrested and attacked by the Yugoslav police. Such actions were bound to worsen relations among the States concerned.

6. Yugoslavia had further been guilty of drastic violations of treaties of economic assistance concluded with the people's democracies. It had curtailed and ultimately stopped deliveries of raw materials to Hungary; it had violated a convention regulating

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

border traffic with Romania by sending spies and hostile propaganda into that country ; and it had flouted its economic agreement with the USSR.

7. Yugoslavia's provocation of border incidents was a further factor in the deterioration of its relations with its neighbours. It had indiscriminately violated the air space and land boundaries of Albania and Hungary to such an extent that Hungary had recorded 795 border violations by Yugoslav units in 1950. Romania and Bulgaria had protested fruitlessly against similar violations.

8. For all those reasons the Byelorussian SSR delegation would vote against the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.1).

9. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) denied the allegations of the Byelorussian SSR representative regarding the location of military airfields and of foreign-owned and operated mines. As a member of the Yugoslav Government, he asserted that his country had never repealed laws governing the nationalization of industry and trade. He would welcome clarification of the allegations made by the Byelorussian SSR representative.

10. Mr. LOURIE (Israel) said that his Government endorsed the operative clauses of the Yugoslav draft resolution, particularly because no attempt had been made to assess the truth of the contradictory allegations placed before the Committee or to assign responsibility for the tension which manifestly existed between Yugoslavia and the USSR and the countries of eastern Europe. Israel fully supported the appeal for action in compliance with the Charter and approved also the method suggested to settle frontier disputes. The Israel delegation was gratified to note that the revised text (A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.1) so amended the second paragraph of the preamble as to eliminate any implication of acceptance of the evidence presented. For the same purpose, Mr. Lourie suggested that the first paragraph of the preamble should be redrafted to read as follows :

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Having considered the nature of the relations existing between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Poland, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia on the other ; "*

11. He hoped that the change, which conformed to the general character of the draft resolution and did not affect its substance, would be accepted by the Yugoslav delegation. It was not being moved as a formal amendment.

12. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) considered that the Yugoslav item had been included in the agenda in order to deflect the United Nations from its real purpose and undermine its prestige. Yugoslavia was not concerned to settle its differences with its neighbours or maintain peace ; it sought, on the contrary, to increase tension in the Balkans and to seize upon a pretext for aggression against the USSR and the people's

democracies. It was aided and abetted by the forces of United States imperialism, whose objective was to secure the necessary bases from which to launch aggression. Thus Yugoslavia became a minor link in the whole strategy of the Atlantic bloc.

13. It was significant that the Yugoslav libel had been submitted at the very moment when the United States was endeavouring to deceive public opinion by its disarmament proposals, when it had planned measures to finance subversive activities directed against the USSR and the people's democracies, and when Yugoslavia had become an advance post of the United States-dominated military bloc.

14. United States imperialist circles had long allotted Yugoslavia a part in the "cold war". At first the Tito Government had been used as a fifth column to deceive the Yugoslav people and the other peoples engaged in building socialism, and to derive the greatest benefits from the USSR and from its neighbours. Yugoslavia had then embarked upon a policy of non-fulfilment of agreements on economic co-operation in an attempt to wreck the solidarity of the people's democracies. In 1948 it had become a centre for the dissemination of hostile propaganda against the USSR and the people's democracies. At the present time it was being converted into a bastion of defence of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. Its rulers had recently boasted of the huge increase in its armed strength and had pleaded for more United States weapons. A United States Senator had ranked it with Franco Spain as a European military ally, pointing out that it was spending as large a share of its national income on military preparations.

15. No effort had been spared by the Yugoslav Government to suppress popular support for peace movements. Furthermore, recent trials had clearly revealed that since 1948 Yugoslav diplomats had been collaborating with the imperialist governments, acting as secret agents to hinder the political and economic development of the people's democracies to which they were accredited, and working under the orders of the Anglo-American intelligence services. Such activities had started as early as 1945, and in 1950, when Yugoslavia was still professing friendship for Czechoslovakia, it was sending undesirable persons to that country as diplomatic agents. In that year members of the Yugoslav Embassy staff in Czechoslovakia had been convicted and imprisoned for espionage.

16. It had been admitted that 47 per cent of the arrests made by the security police in Yugoslavia were illegal. An American expert who had been invited to inspect prisons in Yugoslavia had found labour camps reminiscent of German concentration camps. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Government had carried out mass deportations of national minorities in a manner which proved that they were part of its plan for war preparations. Czechoslovak citizens had been denied repatriation and subjected to persecution. Their cultural life was undermined and their educational organizations were disbanded.

17. The frontier incidents mentioned had been instigated by Yugoslavia itself. Numerous armed attacks had been made on Albanian territory. In Hungary, Yugoslav units had crossed the border and fired on their own territory in order to substantiate charges of aggression. Romanian patrols had been fired upon from Yugoslavia, and the latter country's attitude towards other countries on its borders was highly aggressive.

18. Yugoslavia had undertaken to play a part in the strategic plans for a new world war, and in order to do so was repaying with ingratitude the countries which had helped it in time of need. Czechoslovakia had done its utmost to assist Yugoslavia in the post-war period, but had always found itself giving more than it received. It had exported sugar, textiles and shoes to Yugoslavia and had even supplied that country with entire industrial plants. Yugoslavia had been in arrears with its exports of zinc and copper because its Government was speculating on the world market. Excessive prices had been charged for its commodities, and restrictive conditions had been laid down in agreements. Guarantees had been refused, and proposals from Czechoslovakia to improve relations had been rejected. Thousands of Yugoslavs who had received training in Czechoslovak heavy-industry firms had used that training as a cover for economic espionage. In all those ways Yugoslavia had failed to keep to its trade agreements and had sabotaged the internal economy of other countries.

19. The Yugoslav Government was engaged in restoring capitalism to the country. Five-year plans had been shelved and forgotten, and the purchase of weapons was laying a heavy burden on the people. Standards of living were falling, and little economic assistance was being provided by the Western countries, which regarded Yugoslavia as a profitable place of business.

20. The slanderous charges brought against the people's democracies by the Yugoslav Government were rejected by the representatives of those democracies, which still felt a genuine friendship for the Yugoslav people. The latter were victims of pressure brought to bear by the United States.

21. It was absurd to accuse the Soviet Union, which had early in its history promulgated a law on the self-determination of peoples, of dominating the people's democracies. Relations between them rested on a common cultural idea, and the spread of the Russian language in Czechoslovakia, far from being a sign of pressure from the USSR, as had been alleged by the Yugoslav Government, was a recognition of the historic fact that Czechoslovakia had been liberated by the Red Army.

22. With regard to certain comments made at the 12th meeting by the representative of Chile, Mr. Hajek pointed out that his country had nothing but friendship for the Chilean people, but it felt that the Chilean Government was meekly accepting the part assigned to it by the war-mongers and was exercising a reactionary

rule over a country whose natural resources were all in the hands of foreigners.

23. In conclusion, the Czechoslovak representative wished to support the USSR delegation in repudiating the charges brought by the Yugoslav delegation.

24. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the representative of Yugoslavia had produced a large body of evidence with no factual basis, and any objective tribunal would have turned the case out of court. For obvious reasons, however, the Committee was dealing with it.

25. The accusations brought against Poland were slanderous and in any case appeared to be without much importance. Apparently the Yugoslav representative saw a threat to the independence of his country in an alleged refusal to supply ration cards to the Yugoslav Embassy in Warsaw at a time when no ration cards were being issued. That example revealed the type of accusation which was being brought.

26. It was questionable whether the deterioration in the relations between the two countries was the fault of Poland alone. At a time when Poland had had no illusions concerning the true nature of the Tito regime, it had been prepared to enter into trade agreements with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had done everything possible to prevent the proper fulfilment of those agreements. It had failed to send the necessary representatives, and had obstructed the work of the Polish representatives who had visited the country. Diplomatic intervention had proved fruitless.

27. While Poland had been loyally carrying out its part of the agreement, Yugoslavia had delivered only 65 per cent of the lead concentrates and 45 per cent of the zinc concentrates required of it, while of 500 tons of copper which had been ordered by Poland none had been received. At the same time those products were being sold to the Western Powers at lower prices, and consignments of dried fruits, which were of no value to the Polish economy, were the only exports to reach Poland from Yugoslavia. Poland had accepted those exports to assist Yugoslavia rather than because they were useful. In the end Poland had stopped deliveries to Yugoslavia, but it had acted throughout with patience and in conformity with the rules customary in international relations. Mr. Katz-Suchy could only feel that Yugoslavia had been exploiting his country's sympathy.

28. The rulers of Yugoslavia had complained of an economic blockade, but the Yugoslav representative had not mentioned that the long-term trade agreement negotiated between Hungary and Yugoslavia had been sabotaged by Yugoslavia in order that the whole Hungarian economy might be disorganized.

29. Polish cultural exhibitions had been closed, and a Polish citizen had first been forbidden access even to the official Yugoslav news agency and had then been asked to leave the country. No effort had been made to implement the cultural agreement concluded between

the two countries, and societies concerned with that purpose had been forcibly dissolved. Polish citizens had been terrorized.

30. Yugoslav diplomats had committed espionage and sabotage until it had been necessary to request them to leave Poland. Yugoslavia obviously wanted to see Poland reduced to chaos, and by 1949 Poland had ceased to consider itself bound by the treaty of mutual assistance.

31. The Tito Government had come to the General Assembly backed by the promise of the United States Government to support any slander, however gross. One thing and one only was clear from the charges made against friendly and peace-loving countries, namely, that Yugoslavia, which was armed to the hilt and nursed dreams of conquest, was being threatened by the literature and the films of the Soviet Union. It was common knowledge that in the post-war period Yugoslavia had entered into treaties of friendship and alliance with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, but none the less it had perpetrated hostile acts against those countries, attempting, for instance, to overthrow the Hungarian Government. That fact had been confirmed at the trial of Rajk. Tito agents had organized subversive activities in Bulgaria and had conspired to overthrow its Government.

32. The complaints against Albania—a small country attacked by Greece—were utterly without foundation. The attitude of Yugoslavia to those brave people, showed its contempt for their dearly-won independence. After concluding a far-reaching economic agreement with Yugoslavia, Albania had been faced with an attempt of Tito's agents to control the whole economic life of the country and to deprive it of its resources. Had the plan succeeded, Albania would have been transformed into a Yugoslav colony. The Tito regime claimed that it acted in accordance with the Charter and the principles of international co-operation. In reality it applied doctrines which emanated from the United States and justified the financing of espionage and sabotage.

33. The Tito régime had constantly organized frontier incidents in order to maintain tension and create war hysteria in the country. The incident referred to at the 302nd and 308th meetings of the First Committee during the General Assembly's fourth session was typical of that technique. Instances had already been cited to show how little Yugoslavia respected international rules and practice. Mr. Katz-Suchy would not refute in detail the accusations of violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of ill-treatment of minorities, since he had already said enough to show the baselessness of the complaints against the people's democracies. International peace demanded a thorough examination of the causes of the trouble, but the present case was merely part of a plan intended to deceive the Yugoslav people and to weaken their warm and friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and its heroic army. Furthermore, the Yugoslav complaint served to divert the attention of the United

Nations at a critical moment when it was considering proposals concerning the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and the international control of atomic energy. Thus, yet another carefully orchestrated campaign against peace had been launched. The same method had been used by the Kuomintang clique when it had brought forward its complaint against the Soviet Union at a previous session.

34. Although the subservience of the Tito régime to the United States was inevitable, it could not alter the sympathy and gratitude of the Yugoslav people towards the USSR for its generous assistance to Yugoslavia. The head of the Yugoslav Government himself had openly declared on numerous occasions that the Soviet Union had greatly helped Yugoslavia both economically and politically. The real feelings of the Yugoslav people would survive slander and propaganda campaigns.

35. Severance of relations with the USSR and the people's democracies and subservience to foreign Powers had brought Yugoslavia to the brink of disaster. The building of socialism had been abandoned, the five-year plan put aside, the peoples' standard of living was being sacrificed to the exorbitant needs of preparation for war, and the country's production was geared entirely to the demands of the United States for raw materials. The United States Press openly admitted that the Tito regime must be maintained in order that the United States monopolies might retain their control over Yugoslavia's resources. That so-called aid was the price that Yugoslavia paid for its dependence on the United States. Dollars were poured into Yugoslavia in order to finance a police state able to quell the people's revolt. The President of the United States had himself stated, in a message to Congress, that without assistance Tito would not be able to suppress dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia. He had also declared that help must be given to Tito in order to protect the military and strategic interests of the United States. The country's ports and aerodromes were at the disposal of the United States, and in reality, though not as yet formally, Yugoslavia was part of the Atlantic bloc.

36. The Yugoslav draft resolution had been repeatedly described as reasonable and moderate but was obviously linked to the draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.3) establishing a Balkan sub-commission which had recently been adopted by the Committee. That organ was clearly intended not only for Greece but also for Yugoslavia and the whole Balkan region. The Yugoslav draft resolution would serve as a basis for future provocation and further incidents on the Yugoslav frontiers. The Committee should reject it and should condemn the action of the Yugoslav delegation as contrary to peace and security in the Balkans.

37. Mr. HOOD (Australia) felt that the contents and the implications of the Polish representative's statement reinforced the validity of the Yugoslav complaint. It was not a case of differences between neighbours, nor of disputes arising from past trade agreements but, as the

Chilean representative had pointed out (12th meeting), of the independence and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The allegations made by the Yugoslav representative constituted one of the most serious situations which the General Assembly had to deal with. Polemics were irrelevant in a case where a complaint had been lodged and a definite proposal submitted. He could not but join other representatives in hoping that the USSR representative, in the further statement which he intended to make, would bear that point in mind. So far the replies made to the Yugoslav complaint had largely consisted of counter-charges.

38. The Yugoslav proposal that the item should be included in the agenda had been strenuously opposed by the Governments referred to in the heading of the item and, had the representatives of those Governments refused to discuss the matter at all, their attitude would have been logical and comprehensive. By making counter-accusations, however, they had by implication admitted that tension did exist between Yugoslavia and her neighbours. What reason had they, then, for not wishing to remedy the situation, for refusing to take preventive measures? For instance, both the Yugoslav and the Byelorussian SSR representatives had spoken of the ill-treatment inflicted on the diplomatic representatives of their countries. Why, then, should there be any objection to the adoption of the second recommendation of the Yugoslav draft resolution whereby the Governments concerned would pledge themselves to conform to customary rules and practices in their diplomatic intercourse? If those Governments had complaints, why should they ignore a specific proposal for the settlement of differences? It would certainly be desirable and welcome if the USSR representative approached the matter from that point of view, even though it was undoubtedly too late to hope that a generally acceptable formula could be found.

39. The weighty evidence submitted by the Yugoslav Government showed that the responsibility for the existing state of affairs did not rest on that Government. There was a clear *prima facie* case, with which the Committee must deal in accordance with the Charter. The recommendations of the draft resolution were both comprehensive and practicable, and bore witness to Yugoslavia's good faith in bringing up the matter before the United Nations. If after adoption those recommendations failed to achieve their purpose, the responsibility for the failure would be clearly established.

40. Mr. Liu CHIEH (China) said that the events revealed by the Yugoslav representative's statement followed a pattern familiar to the Chinese people. Two years previously the Chinese delegation had submitted to the United Nations a similar but even more serious charge arising from the violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and of the Charter of the United Nations. Evidence of the USSR's aggressive designs on China corroborated the evidence furnished in regard to Yugoslavia. The increasing number of frontier incidents and the vast military preparations on the Yugoslav frontiers confirmed the fear that another Balkan crisis might arise; the situation obviously called for the services of such an organ as the Balkan sub-commission. It was the Chinese delegation's view that hostilities directed against Yugoslavia were not aimed solely at that country but were an integral part of the USSR strategy, which aimed at dominating the whole world.

41. The Chinese delegation would vote in favour of the Yugoslav draft resolution in the hope that appropriate action by the General Assembly would bring those aggressive designs to a halt.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.