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Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).

#### **Complaint of hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia (A/1946)**

[Item 68]\*

1. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) recalled that for more than three years the countries of eastern Europe, headed by the USSR, had been exercising pressure against Yugoslavia that amounted to a violation of international agreements and a threat to world peace. Despite its efforts, Yugoslavia had not succeeded in securing a settlement of the questions in dispute through normal diplomatic channels. Desirous of defending its independence and sovereignty, Yugoslavia had accordingly brought the matter before the United Nations so that the necessary steps might be taken to maintain peace and that the responsibilities might be clearly determined.

2. The USSR Government sought to justify its attitude by advancing various ideological arguments and by alleging that Yugoslavia was prompted by aggressive intentions and was politically and economically subject to the will of foreign countries, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom. The fact was, however, that if the internal régime in Yugoslavia did not find favour with the USSR Government it was because it was an obstacle to the hegemonistic ambitions of the USSR, which was striving to isolate Yugoslavia and destroy its independence. The situation should therefore be revealed with the greatest clarity. The question was of vital importance not only to Yugoslavia but also to every country that wished to lead its own way of life, as well as to the peaceful advancement of the world.

3. Reviewing the background of the question, Mr. Djilas explained that while pressure on Yugoslavia had become more marked after the publication of the Cominform resolution condemning the Yugoslav Communist Party, it had made itself felt from the very beginning of Yugoslavia's existence as an independent State, more especially in the form of the political and economic measures which the USSR Government had tried to impose on Yugoslavia, like those it had imposed on other countries in eastern Europe. Those measures were aimed at ensuring the complete subjugation of Yugoslavia. It was with that end in view, for example, that trade agreements had been worked out requiring Yugoslavia to export to the USSR certain essential industrial commodities, particularly ores and metals, and shutting off Yugoslavia from western European markets. The same trend had occurred in regard to marine insurance, the film industry, and the technical assistance granted by the USSR, the real object of which had been to create a huge network of espionage in Yugoslavia. Joint Soviet-Yugoslav aviation and river transport companies had been set up and, while most of the expenses had been borne by Yugoslavia, their management, control and administration had been in the hands of Soviet citizens. The same applied to the working of mines and oil fields, in which the USSR had drained the natural wealth of Yugoslavia and the foreign exchange accruing therefrom, and had usurped control of the country's economic life.

4. In short, the USSR had attempted to impose on Yugoslavia what it had succeeded in imposing on other eastern European countries. In Hungary, for example, joint companies under the control of Soviet citizens had been set up enjoying a degree of autonomy that made them a veritable State within the State. In Romania, the situation was even worse. According to Romanian engineers who had fled to Yugoslavia, Soviet advisers were attached to each Romanian ministry; their advice was always taken as law and im-

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

portant questions were referred to Moscow for decision; moreover, the value of goods received by the USSR as reparations was eight times higher than the previously agreed sum of 300 million dollars.

5. The USSR's interference in the affairs of other eastern European countries was not limited to their economic life; it extended to the military field. Soviet instructors, who were better paid than local officers and received bigger rations, exercised the functions of command and control in all combat units; organization and training were on the Soviet Union pattern. The policy of economic exploitation and enslavement was supplemented by measures of a cultural nature; Russian was imposed as a language on the countries of eastern Europe, and societies for friendship with the USSR played an important role in their *rusification*. The dramatic repertoire was made up mainly of Soviet plays; Soviet films were imported in large quantities and national film production was stifled; it was the same story in the field of publication and literature. The cultural policy of the USSR Government in the dependent countries was entirely chauvinistic and imperialist.

6. It would be impossible for that general policy to be continued and developed in the countries under USSR influence were it not for the collaboration of anti-democratic movements, led by hirelings of the Soviet Union, and a régime of which the outstanding characteristics were terror, violence, assassinations, spectacular trials and concentration camps.

7. A review of the relations existing between the USSR Government and certain countries of eastern Europe showed that those countries were in a state of utter subjection to the USSR and that it was therefore the USSR Government which was responsible for the hostility they displayed towards Yugoslavia.

8. The Soviet Union Government had sought to subjugate Yugoslavia in the same way. Ever since 1944 it had planned to gain control of the country's governmental machine and for that purpose had created a vast network of spies, the various groups of which had been formed in the USSR and were composed mainly of fascists who had enlisted in the one and only regiment which the Croatian traitor Pavelic had been able to place at Hitler's disposal. The Soviet military missions, the civil and military experts and, latterly, the diplomatic and consular services, had also organized intelligence network and directed activities hostile to Yugoslavia. The so-called "technical assistance" services had had the task of planning the economic development of Yugoslavia in such a way as to make it an appendage to Soviet economy and to transform Yugoslavia into a colony of the USSR. At the same time, military instructors had endeavoured to gain control of the Yugoslav army and to destroy its traditions and national spirit. For that purpose they had exerted systematic pressure on young Yugoslavs studying in schools or military academies in the Soviet Union, inciting them to rebel against their own Government. Finally, a "fifth column", composed of

former Russian *émigrés* who were angling for Soviet nationality had been raised to carry on subversive activities.

9. After collecting abundant proof of such manoeuvres, the Yugoslav Government had repeatedly protested to the USSR Government, but the latter had not only denied the facts but had demanded the adoption of measures which would have brought such practices within the law. For three years the Yugoslav Government had been making every effort to defend itself against the aggressive pressure of the USSR and had been striving to put an end to the havoc wrought by Soviet espionage. It had succeeded thanks to the patriotism of the population and of the authorities.

10. The USSR Government evidently regarded Yugoslavia as a prize of war, and, despite the promises made by Mr. Stalin during the war, considered that there, as in all countries where its armies had passed, it was entitled to impose a régime of its own choosing, completely disregarding the wishes of the people. That view was in fact shared by all the doctrinaires who were at present in control of the countries of eastern Europe.

11. The Soviet Union seemed to apply six different types of aggressive pressure on Yugoslavia: political pressure; economic pressure and blockade; terrorism and subversive activities; violation of human rights; creation of frontier incidents; military measures and breaches of the military clauses of the peace treaty.

12. Political pressure took the form of attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia, of action tantamount to the presentation of ultimatums, of the subjection of Yugoslavia to the USSR and of infringements of Yugoslav sovereignty. As an example of interference in the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia, the Ambassador of the USSR had been instructed by his Government to handle certain questions directly with the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party and not with the Government. He had also been instructed to obtain certain secret information on Yugoslav economy. Finally, under the guise of what was represented as technical assistance, the USSR Government had put forward a number of demands to which the Yugoslav Government had been unable to submit. When the Yugoslav Government had protested, the USSR Government had stated that it attached more worth to the requests and the decisions of its experts than to the statements of the Yugoslav Government and asserted, without even furnishing any proof, that the Government of Yugoslavia had been lacking in respect towards the experts of the Soviet mission. Mr. Djilas wished to point out in that connexion that his Government was neither able nor bound to grant exceptional treatment to Soviet nationals, since Yugoslavia's relations with all governments were necessarily dominated by the principle of equality of rights and of national sovereignty.

13. The resolution adopted by the Cominform on 28 June 1948 also constituted an attempt at interference.

That resolution, which had been addressed to the communists of Yugoslavia, had incited them to rebel against their Government. Having failed to awaken the anticipated response among the Yugoslav people, it had been followed by a second resolution couched in even more aggressive terms. Such machinations, intended to achieve the enslavement of a small State by a great Power, were criminal in character.

14. With regard to ultimatums and other intimidatory acts, Mr. Djilas pointed out that the governments of the eastern European countries were using methods to attack the Government of Yugoslavia which revealed a common inspiration. In that connexion, he cited documents in which the Yugoslav Government had been insulted at about the same time by Russian, Romanian and Bulgarian politicians. The attitude shown by the USSR Government and the governments of its satellites in their diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, also merited attention. The diplomatic mailbag had become a channel for influencing public opinion by false accusations and inflaming the Yugoslav people against their Government; he cited a number of cases in point. Those practices of the USSR Government and its satellites constituted a flagrant violation of the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, a principle which it was the duty of all States to respect. Such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Union Governments and of the eastern European countries was calculated to hinder all normal negotiations. Furthermore, the governments of the eastern European countries were attempting by administrative or police measures to do everything possible to impede diplomatic activities by the representatives of Yugoslavia, Mr. Djilas referred in that connexion to certain measures taken by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and showed how those Governments, and the USSR Government, had on a number of occasions not stopped at flouting the principle of diplomatic immunity. Some of them had even gone so far as to forbid their nationals to carry out work or furnish certain services for members of Yugoslav diplomatic missions.

15. Those same Governments had tried to prevent Yugoslav diplomats from establishing and maintaining contact with their compatriots in the eastern European countries; and during the last three years they had, on a number of occasions, taken action to expel Yugoslav diplomatic representatives. That again was a practice incompatible with the recognized principles of international law and the concept of diplomatic immunity. The USSR Government had officially accepted those principles but failed to apply them in regard to Yugoslavia.

16. Another form of political pressure brought to bear against Yugoslavia by the Governments of the USSR and of the countries within its orbit was radio and press propaganda. Such propaganda openly urged Yugoslav citizens to revolt against their Government and commit acts of sabotage. In that connexion, Mr. Djilas cited extracts from radio broadcasts by Bulgarians,

Hungarians and Romanians inciting Yugoslav citizens to revolt and sabotage military works. No one who went to Yugoslavia escaped attack and insult by the Cominform; for example, when the Secretary-General of the United Nations travelled to Yugoslavia last April he was accused by the Budapest radio of having gone there to prepare for war in the Balkans and the Near East under cover of the United Nations. Propaganda against Yugoslavia in the Press was no less violent. Countless anti-Yugoslav reviews and pamphlets were published in eastern European countries. In them Yugoslavians foreign policy was grossly distorted in order to justify the Soviet bloc's aggressive policy towards Yugoslavia, a policy which was a serious threat to peace and international co-operation.

17. Political pressure by the governments of the USSR and of its satellites was directed not only against the Yugoslav Government, but also against certain Yugoslav national organizations which had been expelled from associations subject to Soviet influence and had become mere instruments of the USSR Government's aggressive policy.

18. Mr. Djilas then turned to the trials in Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania of certain politicians and of members of the Yugoslav minority. Those trials were of a provocative nature, and were organized primarily to offer an opportunity to reveal alleged Yugoslav plans of aggression against the USSR and the other countries in the Soviet bloc, in order to divert public opinion from the hostile activities pursued in those countries against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

19. In those trials the principles of the United Nations Charter, the fundamental human rights and the rules of judicial procedure had been grossly violated. Yugoslav heroes of the war of liberation and the chiefs of the Yugoslav army had been accused of engaging in espionage for the Gestapo, in order to discredit them in the eyes of their comrades-in-arms and minimize the contribution made to the war by the Yugoslav people, side by side with the United Nations.

20. The purpose of the USSR Government in organizing those trials in the countries of eastern Europe was firstly to justify at any cost, in the eyes of its own people and of world public opinion, its hostile activities against Yugoslavia, and so to prepare for ultimate aggression against that country, and secondly, to use the alleged "evidence" produced in the trials as a pretext for undertaking in the eastern European countries "purges" designed to enable the Soviet Union to complete its domination over them and aggravate their relations with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

21. In view of the late hour, the CHAIRMAN proposed that the representative of Yugoslavia should continue his statement at the next meeting.

*It was so agreed.*

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.