



**OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
THIRTIETH SESSION**

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RECORDS OF MEETINGS

17 SEPTEMBER-5 DECEMBER 1975

UNITED NATIONS



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New York, 1976

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The *Official Records of the General Assembly* for a given session consist of records of meetings, annexes to those records, supplements, the *List of Delegations* and the *Check List of Documents*. Information on other documents is given in the *Check List* and in the relevant annex fascicles.

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

ABBREVIATIONS

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
OAU	Organization of African Unity
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
WHO	World Health Organization

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The General Assembly, at its 2353rd plenary meeting, on 19 September 1975, decided to allocate the following items on the agenda of the thirtieth session to the Special Political Committee for consideration and report:

1. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [item 50].
2. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations [item 51].
3. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories [item 52].
4. Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa [item 53]:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
5. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [item 54]:
 - (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
 - (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
 - (d) Report of the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly, at its 2355th plenary meeting, on 22 September 1975, decided to consider item 125 (Question of Cyprus) directly in plenary meetings, and at its 2367th plenary meeting, on 30 September 1975, decided that it would, when considering the item, invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views, and that it would then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTIETH SESSION

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE

**Summary records of the 948th to 991st meetings,
held at Headquarters, New York, from 17 September to 5 December 1975**

948th meeting

Wednesday, 17 September 1975, at 11.05 a.m.

Temporary Chairman: Mr. Gaston THORN (Luxembourg).

A/SPC/SR.948

Election of the Chairman

1. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) nominated Mr. Roberto Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) as Chairman.
2. In the absence of further nominations and in accordance with rule 103 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN declared Mr. Martínez Ordóñez elected Chairman by acclamation.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) was elected Chairman by acclamation.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

949th meeting

Wednesday, 24 September 1975, at 11.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.949

Statement by the Chairman

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed his gratitude to all the members of the Committee for having elected him to the post of Chairman, and, in particular, to the representatives from Latin America who had been unanimous in proposing his candidacy. His election was a great honour for him and a tribute to his country. He thanked Mr. Heckscher of

Sweden for having nominated him and said that he would make every effort to justify the confidence placed in him and to maintain the high standard of calm and impartiality set by his predecessors. He introduced Mr. Guyer and Mr. Urquhart, Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, and the new Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Chang Shu. Finally, on his own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Committee, he welcomed the represen-

tatives of the three States which had recently been admitted to the United Nations: Cape Verde, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe.

Election of the Vice-Chairmen

2. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to rule 103 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly concerning the election of Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees and invited the members of the Committee to submit nominations.

3. Mr. CONSALVI (Venezuela), after congratulating the Chairman on his election, nominated Mr. Abdirizak Haji Hussein (Somalia), for the post of Vice-Chairman.

4. Mr. GHELÉV (Bulgaria) congratulated the Chairman on his election and assured him of his fullest co-operation in the performance of his task. As a Socialist country, Bulgaria was pleased to welcome the representatives of Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique. He then nominated Mr. Erik Tellmann (Norway) for the post of Vice-Chairman.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with the provisions of rule 103 of the rules of procedure, if he heard no objections, he would take it that, since there were only two nominations, the Committee did not wish to vote by secret ballot.

It was so decided.

Mr. Hussein (Somalia) and Mr. Tellmann (Norway) were elected Vice-Chairmen by acclamation.

Election of the Rapporteur

6. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) associated himself with the speakers who had congratulated the Chairman and welcomed the representatives of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. He expressed his best wishes to the people of Papua New Guinea, which had become independent on 16 September, and said he hoped they would soon take part in the deliberations of the Committee.

7. Finally, he nominated Mr. Guenter Mauersberger (German Democratic Republic) for the post of Rapporteur.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that, since there were no other candidates, he would take it that the Committee did not wish to vote by secret ballot.

It was so decided.

Mr. Mauersberger (German Democratic Republic) was elected Rapporteur by acclamation.

9. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) said that, as a member of the delegation to which the previous year's Chairman, Mr. Per Lind, belonged, he wished to take the opportunity to congratulate the Chairman on his election, although it would perhaps be more appropriate to congratulate the Committee on its good fortune in having Mr. Martínez Ordoñez to guide its deliberations. He also congratulated

Mr. Hussein and Mr. Tellmann on their election as Vice-Chairmen and Mr. Mauersberger on his election as Rapporteur. He was confident that the Committee would benefit from the experience of the officers of the Committee and he assured them of his unreserved support.

10. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia), after congratulating the Chairman on his election, thanked the representative of Venezuela for having nominated him (Mr. Hussein). He also congratulated the representatives of the new Members of the United Nations, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe. He was confident that the new African Member States would make a great contribution to the work of the Committee.

11. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) thanked the representative of Bulgaria for having nominated him and the members of the Committee for having elected him. He would do everything within his power to be worthy of the confidence placed in him.

12. Mr. MAUERSBERGER (German Democratic Republic) congratulated the Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen on their election and thanked the Committee for the confidence it had placed in him by electing him Rapporteur. He considered his election as a tribute to his country. In particular, he thanked the representative of Indonesia for having nominated him and the countries of the Eastern European Group for their support.

Organization of the Committee's work (A/SPC/173)

13. The CHAIRMAN appealed to the members of the Committee to limit, in so far as possible, requests for additional documentation for their discussions and for extra copies of documents already distributed. He recalled that, in order to ensure maximum efficiency of interpretation services, members of the Committee should provide the conference officer with seven copies of any prepared text. He reminded the Committee of the usual times of meetings and recommended that all representatives, and especially those inscribed on the list of speakers, should be punctual.

14. In accordance with the established practice of the Committee and the recommendation of the General Assembly, representatives who wished to exercise the right of reply should so inform the Secretary of the Committee, who would then add their names to the list of speakers. After the list of speakers was closed, any change in the order of speakers should be made only by mutual agreement between two delegations wishing to exchange places. Any representative who was not ready to speak when his turn came would be placed at the end of the list of speakers.

15. The summary records would continue to be the official records of the Committee. The procedure for submitting corrections to provisional summary records was given on the cover page of each record. At its 2353rd plenary meeting, the General Assembly had once again approved the recommendation of the General Committee (see A/10250) that the Special Political Committee should be authorized to obtain, when it so requested, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings or portions

thereof. He was confident that the members of the Committee would make use of that privilege with restraint and recalled that, for budgetary reasons, that procedure should be used instead of requesting that statements be reproduced *in extenso*.

16. In accordance with the recommendation contained in annex V to the rules of procedure, he proposed to close the list of speakers for each agenda item before one third of the meetings allocated to the item had been held. In that connexion, he urged the members of the Committee to submit draft resolutions as early as possible, so that delegations could take them into account in the statements they made in the course of the debate. Together with the other officers of the Committee, he would follow closely the progress of work and would consult with the Committee on ways to overcome any difficulty which might arise.

17. The five agenda items allocated to the Committee by the General Assembly were the same as those considered

by the Committee in previous years and were listed in the letter dated 19 September 1975 from the President of the Assembly (A/SPC/173). However, the Assembly had left open the possibility that one or more additional items might subsequently be allocated to the Committee. With regard to the order in which the five items would be taken up, he said he would keep in contact with the various regional groups and try to ascertain their wishes, and would make suggestions based on the procedure followed by the Committee in previous years.

18. In conclusion, he drew the attention of the members of the Committee to two requests contained in a letter he had received from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/SPC/174) relating to two facets of the question of *apartheid*, which the Committee would consider at the current session under the agenda item concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (item 53).

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

950th meeting

Wednesday, 1 October 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.950

Organization of the Committee's work (A/SPC/173-175, A/SPC/L.323)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he had drawn up a tentative programme of work (A/SPC/L.323) indicating the order in which the items allocated to the Committee—which were listed in the letter from the President of the General Assembly (A/SPC/173)—might be taken up and the number of meetings which might be devoted to each item. His suggestions were made in the light of the Special Political Committee's past practice and took into account the state of preparation of the documents for each item. In that connexion, the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, for consideration under item 53, would be available to the Committee on 6 October, and the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (item 52) in mid-October. The report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, for consideration under item 54, would be circulated on about 20 October; the special report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (A/10268) has already been circulated; the regular report would be circulated later. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/10267), which was to be considered under item 50, had already been circulated, but the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, which was to be considered under item 51, was not yet ready.

2. With regard to item 125, on the question of Cyprus, the General Assembly, at its 2637th plenary meeting, had agreed by consensus that when it took up the item it would give the representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to speak in the Committee and express their views. The General Assembly would then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the Special Committee's report. The information concerning the Assembly decision was contained in a letter dated 30 September 1975 which he had received from the President of the General Assembly (A/SPC/175). Accordingly, the Committee would have to decide the date on which it would meet for that purpose once it had received the General Assembly's invitation.

3. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon), after having congratulated the Chairman and the other officers of the Committee on their election, said that, since the document relating to item 51—the third item in the tentative programme of work (A/SPC/L.323)—was not yet ready, it might be better to change the order of the items and take up item 54, concerning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, before item 51, on the comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects. Moreover, the items would thus be better distributed, since the Committee would not be taking up the two items concerning Palestine one after the other.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee approved the programme

of work which he had suggested, with the amendment proposed by the representative of Lebanon.¹

It was so decided.

5. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) congratulated the officers of the Committee on their election. As Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* he said he was glad that the Committee had given priority to agenda item 53, on the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, which in his view was the most important item before the Committee.

6. He recalled that the Special Committee at its 307th meeting on 3 September 1975, had recommended that the Special Political Committee should devote its meetings on Friday, 10 October 1975, to the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners and that the two South African liberation movements—the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania—should be invited to participate in those meetings and in the debate on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. The Committee would have to hold two meetings on that day since in 1973 there had been a very large number of speakers on the occasion. He also suggested that the Committee should inform interested non-governmental organizations of the observance of the Day of Solidarity and give them an opportunity to make brief statements.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 22.

7. He also recalled, in connexion with the debate on the item on *apartheid*, that it had been the practice to request the Secretariat's Unit on *Apartheid* to display relevant publications in the Committee room—publications of the Office of Public Information, the specialized agencies, liberation movements, and so on. He suggested that the Unit on *Apartheid* should be requested to display those publications at the current session and that it should arrange to have them displayed at every session when the question of *apartheid* was being discussed so that annual decisions on the matter would not be necessary.

8. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the letter dated 17 September 1975 (A/SPC/174) in which the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* transmitted to him that Committee's request concerning the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Special Political Committee decided to devote two meetings on 10 October to the observance of the Day of Solidarity and to invite the liberation movements recognized by OAU to participate in its observance and in the debate on the policies of the Government of South Africa. He would also take it that the Committee accepted the other suggestions made by the representative of the Philippines.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.

951st meeting

Wednesday, 8 October 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.951

Organization of the Committee's work

1. The CHAIRMAN suggested, at the request of the Chairman of the group of Latin American States, that the meeting should be suspended until 3 p.m. to enable the members of the Committee to hear the address by the President of the Republic of Bolivia to the General Assembly.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE

2. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines), speaking as the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, said that he had the honour of introducing that Committee's annual report (A/10022), which had been adopted unanimously on 24 September 1975. The report outlined the activities of the Special Committee during the year and contained a number of conclusions and recommendations on ways and means of intensifying concerted international action against *apartheid*. The annex to the report contained a review of major developments in South Africa since the preceding report.¹ International action against *apartheid* to isolate the South African régime and to support the liberation movements and the oppressed people of South Africa had advanced during the year with the progress of decolonization in southern Africa and the growing international opposition to *apartheid*. The rejection of the credentials of the South African delegation to the twenty-

¹ The programme of work, as amended, was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/176.

ninth session of the General Assembly by the Assembly (resolution 3206 (XXIX)) and the suspension of that delegation from participation in the proceedings of the session (2281st plenary meeting) had reflected the growing international isolation of the South African régime.

3. In 1975, a number of Member States had signed or ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. As of 24 September 1975 the Convention had been signed by 21 countries and ratified by 11 others. During 1975, in compliance with United Nations resolutions, a number of Governments had taken positive steps to sever or curtail their relations with South Africa. Several United Nations specialized agencies, including UNESCO, WHO, the ILO and FAO, and other international organizations had taken further action against *apartheid*.

4. In consultations with OAU, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 3324 D (XXIX), had held a seminar to consider the current situation in South Africa and the means for promoting public action against *apartheid*. The Seminar on South Africa had taken place in Paris from 28 April to 2 May 1975 and had been attended by all members of the Special Committee, and representatives of other United Nations bodies concerned, United Nations specialized agencies, OAU, a large number of anti-*apartheid* movements, trade unions and other non-governmental organizations, and the South African liberation movements. The participants had put forward many suggestions with regard to specific measures which might be taken to ensure the full implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions and to secure more concerted action by the international community against *apartheid*, and those views had been incorporated into a declaration and recommendations (A/10103-S/11708).

5. Also pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3324 D (XXIX), the Special Committee had sent missions to the Governments of Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for consultations to promote the international campaign against *apartheid*. The meetings of the representatives of the Special Committee with high-level officials of those Governments had been most useful. The Special Committee had continued to give particular attention to close co-operation at various levels with specialized agencies and other organizations in the United Nations system as well as with anti-*apartheid* movements and other non-governmental organizations, with a view to promoting concerted international action for the speedy eradication of *apartheid*. There had been close co-operation between the Special Committee and the OAU and the South African liberation movements. The Special Committee had continued to follow developments within South Africa and had taken action, as appropriate, within its mandate.

6. Developments in South Africa during the preceding year, which were reviewed in the current report of the Special Committee showed that the South African racist régime had not accepted the prerequisites for a peaceful solution, which had been clearly laid down in the resolu-

tions of the General Assembly, particularly those adopted at the twenty-ninth session. Instead, it had tried to break out of its isolation by a diplomatic and propaganda offensive designed to deceive world public opinion, by offers of economic assistance to other States from the profits of the oppression of the black people in South Africa, by promises to co-operate in promoting a solution in Southern Rhodesia while it continued to collaborate with the illegal Smith régime, and by mere peripheral reforms in South Africa itself. A review of some of the recent so-called "reforms", which had been highly publicized by the régime and its friends, showed that they were the result of pressure from within the country and internationally and did not represent meaningful progress towards equality.

7. From 1974 to 1975, the South African régime had doubled its military budget. The increase in military preparations had been coupled with an intensification of repressive measures against the black people and all opponents of *apartheid*. The South African régime had adamantly refused to heed demands for the release of political prisoners, the ending of repressive legislation and the withdrawal of the bans imposed on the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)—steps which the United Nations had recognized as the prerequisites for a peaceful solution. Instead, it had arrested many black leaders and had held them incommunicado for long periods under the notorious Terrorism Act of 1967. It had launched a new wave of repression against the opponents of *apartheid* in mid-August 1975. Despite the increased brutality, the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements had carried on a persistent and courageous struggle and had inspired millions of people all over the world. They had thereby made a significant contribution not only to the international effort for the elimination of racism but also to the struggle of mankind in defence of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Special Committee felt that the United Nations should recognize and commend the contribution of the South African people to the cause of the United Nations. It also believed that the United Nations and the international community should recognize that they had a special responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements.

8. The Special Committee had given particular attention to exposing the recent propaganda offensive by the racist régime and to publishing the truth about developments in South Africa. While the racist régime spoke of so-called "détente" and so-called "reforms" to deceive the world, it had in fact, embarked on further ruthless measures against the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements. The Chairman of the Special Committee had sent a detailed paper on the situation in South Africa to the Council of Ministers of OAU at its ninth extraordinary session, held at Dar es Salaam from 7 to 10 April 1975, and OAU, in the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, issued at that session, had fully endorsed its analysis and conclusions.

9. In its recommendations to the General Assembly (A/10022, chap. II), the Special Committee stressed the

importance of the implementation by the international community of effective measures for the isolation of the South African racist régime in the military, economic, political, cultural, sporting and other fields. It had, *inter alia*, drawn the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that the Pretoria régime was proceeding with plans to declare the so-called "independence" of the Transkei in 1976; it recommended that the General Assembly should denounce the establishment of the Transkei and other "bantustans" and again called upon all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institutions or authorities of the "bantustans". The Transkei, which was supposedly the "homeland" of the Xhosa people, whose numbers equalled those of the whites in South Africa, would cover only about 3 per cent of the land surface of the country. The "bantustans" were clearly a fraud of self-determination which was being perpetrated by the Pretoria régime in an open challenge to the United Nations. That was why the Special Committee urged the international community to take urgent action to frustrate the manoeuvres of the South African régime and to support the struggle of the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa for the exercise of the right of self-determination in the country as a whole on the basis of equality of all inhabitants, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

10. The Special Committee also invited the attention of the General Assembly to the desirability of an embargo on the supply of petroleum, petroleum products and other raw materials to South Africa. It felt that an oil embargo would be an effective first step towards a general embargo on all strategic commodities, as a supplement to the arms embargo called for by the Security Council in its resolution 181 (1963). It should be noted that although South Africa relied on oil imports for only 20 to 26 per cent of its total energy needs, its imports of oil were considerable and formed the major item in the country's total import bill. The oil embargo against South Africa announced by the Arab States at their summit meeting at Algiers in November 1973 had had an economic and psychological impact on South Africa in spite of optimistic statements by that country's leaders and industrialists. The Special Committee felt that, in order to ensure full implementation of the embargo, all petroleum-exporting countries should be requested to take the necessary steps towards that end and that evasions by international companies involved in the transport of oil should be prevented.

11. In commending the Governments and organizations which had continued and increased their assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements through the United Nations or OAU or through other channels, the Special Committee recommended that the General Assembly should invite all States, specialized agencies and organizations to provide more generous assistance in view of the increasing repression in South Africa and the new stage of the struggle for liberation.

12. With regard to its programme of work, the Special Committee recommended that provision should be made for the continuation and intensification of consultations with Governments—including the main trading partners of South Africa—the specialized agencies, OAU, the principal trade union confederations and non-governmental organizations. It called for a greater co-operation with the non-

aligned movement and other appropriate intergovernmental organizations. It also considered it essential to organize a conference in 1976, with the participation of OAU, the liberation movements and non-governmental organizations, to review recent developments in South Africa and to analyse the role of transnational corporations and other foreign economic interests in buttressing the *apartheid* régime.

13. The Special Committee had also recommended in its report that the name of the Unit on *Apartheid* should be changed to "Centre against *Apartheid*" and that the Unit should be strengthened. The Unit was an essential complement to the Special Committee, not only because of the services it provided but because its task was to publicize the work of the Special Committee and the United Nations. The effectiveness of United Nations efforts to eradicate *apartheid* depended largely on making people all over the world aware of the menace of *apartheid* and encouraging them to take action in support of United Nations resolutions and the liberation movements. The work on the Unit had often been commended by the Special Committee and had also been greatly appreciated by other United Nations bodies and many non-governmental organizations. The Special Committee felt that the Unit should be renamed "Centre against *Apartheid*" in order to emphasize the importance of its work and to make its title correspond to that of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. It felt that the Unit should be provided with greater resources so as to enable it to step up its activities, especially in view of the recent South African manoeuvres and the tremendous increase in propaganda by the South African régime, whose Department of Information alone spent \$14 million a year.

14. Publicity was, of course, only one aspect of the work of the Unit on *Apartheid*. The Unit, in addition to providing services to the Special Committee, had been required to assist it in high-level diplomatic missions abroad. It also administered and helped to promote assistance to the victims of *apartheid* in South Africa. The Special Committee recommended that all those activities should be strengthened.

15. The Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund had been set up early in 1975, on the recommendation of the Special Committee, in order to enable the Unit to expand its activities. He wished, on behalf of the Special Committee, to express appreciation to the Governments of Brazil, Finland, India, Kuwait, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Zambia, which had already made contributions or pledges to the Trust Fund. He understood that the Government of Japan intended to contribute soon and wished to appeal to all Governments on behalf of the Special Committee to consider making contributions.

16. The Unit on *Apartheid* had already begun, in consultation with the Special Committee to utilize the Trust Fund for printing several publications. It had also made arrangements with non-governmental organizations to disseminate United Nations information. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement, for example, had published a supplement to *Anti-Apartheid News* on the Special Committee's Seminar on South Africa, held in Paris, using a very modest grant from the Trust Fund. Publications of the Unit on *Apartheid*

had been printed by the World Peace Council at no cost to the United Nations, and similar arrangements were being made with other non-governmental organizations.

17. The Special Committee believed that decisive action to eliminate *apartheid* was essential during the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and hoped that the Special Political Committee would give careful consideration to the question and would endorse its recommendations to step up international action against *apartheid*.

18. After the liberation of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, and other developments in southern Africa, it was generally recognized that *apartheid* was the core of the problem in southern Africa. The Special Committee believed that the United Nations, on the thirtieth anniversary of its establishment, should give priority to the problem and devote all possible efforts, and resources to the speedy eradication of *apartheid*.

19. In conclusion, he wished to thank the officers and members of the Special Committee as well as the members of the secretariat of the Committee and the Office of Public Information for their co-operation, and to express his appreciation to all Governments and organizations, including OAU, for their co-operation in the past. He also wished to pay a tribute to the former Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. Ogbu of Nigeria, and the former Vice-Chairman, Mr. Seignoret of Trinidad and Tobago, for their valuable contribution to the international campaign against *apartheid*. Finally, he wished to express deep appreciation, on behalf of the Special Committee to the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs for their abiding interest and co-operation in its work.

20. Mr. MARTYNENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) congratulated the Chairman and officers of the Special Political Committee on their election.

21. Speaking as the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, he wished to pay a tribute to the outstanding contribution made by Mr. Ogbu as Chairman of the Special Committee from 1972 to 1975. Reflecting the firm commitment of his Government to the liberation of the entire continent of Africa, Mr. Ogbu had devoted himself to securing the widest possible support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa and had constantly stressed that *apartheid* in South Africa was not only a problem of the South African people but the concern of all mankind. Mr. Ogbu had sought to promote concerted action by Governments, intergovernmental organizations, trade unions, anti-*apartheid* movements and many other non-governmental organizations.

22. The World Peace Council had decided to award its Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, and he hoped that all delegations would attend the presentation ceremony on 14 October. The award was, in a special sense, a tribute to the work of the Special Committee under the leadership of Mr. Ogbu during the past three years.

23. He also wished to record the Special Committee's great appreciation of the outstanding services of Mr. Seignoret as its Vice-Chairman in 1974 and 1975.

24. The general debate at the current session of the General Assembly reflected the recognition by an overwhelming majority of Member States that *apartheid* in South Africa was a major challenge to the United Nations and that the United Nations must step up its efforts to eradicate *apartheid*.

25. The Special Committee and OAU had stressed the gravity of the situation in southern Africa as a whole and had pointed out that the main enemy of the United Nations, and of peace and progress in the whole of the region, was the racist régime in South Africa.

26. South Africa was at the cross-roads, not because of any change in the Pretoria régime or in its calculations but because of the advance of the liberation struggle, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the establishment of the People's Republic of Mozambique. Faced with growing isolation, the South African régime was resorting, in desperation, to deceptive manoeuvres and massive propaganda on the one hand and to an increased military build-up and repression on the other. The racist régime had not and could not change; any appearance of change was in its propaganda and tactics and in its manoeuvres to divide the ranks of its opponents. No one should be fooled by its use of such terms as "détente"; there could be no détente as long as there was racism.

27. The Special Committee had always stressed that a solution to the situation in South Africa required, on the one hand, the total isolation of the South African régime and, on the other, firm support for the liberation movement. In the discharge of its mandate from the General Assembly, the Special Committee had tried to do all it could to promote an end to all military, diplomatic, political, economic and other collaboration with South Africa. Its current report had drawn attention to some progress in that direction, which was reflected, for example, in the absence of the delegation of the South African régime at the current session of the General Assembly.

28. The Special Committee was gravely concerned at the increase in collaboration with South Africa by some Western and other States and foreign economic interests. According to South African official figures, there had been an inflow of R 1.5 billion—or well over \$2 billion—of foreign capital into South Africa in 1974-1975. Efforts to stop such assistance and encouragement to the South African régime must be stepped up.

29. The South African régime had also given great attention to establishing and expanding its military facilities, including a major naval communications centre near Cape Town, in the hope of enticing some Western Powers into an open or secret alliance covering the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic area. Regrettably, some military leaders in the West had expressed great interest in links with the racist régime. The Special Committee had constantly stressed that the issue of *apartheid* should not be complicated by outmoded cold-war thinking and that any military co-operation with the régime was an act against freedom

and peace. It hoped that all Governments would refrain from such co-operation.

30. The Special Committee was also seriously disturbed by the plans of the South African régime, with the co-operation of Western Governments and companies, to develop nuclear technology and the manufacture of enriched uranium.

31. The Special Committee would, in due course, provide full documentation on the continued collaboration by Governments and economic interests with the South African régime.

32. The Special Committee considered it essential that all States and organizations should provide maximum political and material support to the liberation movement during the current crucial period in order to enable it to discharge its historic task of securing the liberation of the country from the racists. The Special Committee had made some positive recommendations in that regard, and he hoped that the Special Political Committee would give due attention to that matter.

33. In conclusion, he wished to underline the importance attached by the Special Committee to concerted action by all Governments and peoples in the struggle against *apartheid*. No differences on other matters and no selfish interests should be permitted to divide their ranks and give comfort to the racists. The Special Committee would continue and redouble its efforts towards such concerted action in the discharge of its mandate from the General Assembly.

34. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden) said that he was greatly encouraged by the substantial increase in the contributions by Member States to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and welcomed that wider commitment to share in alleviating the hardships of the victims of racism. At the same time, he was concerned at the fact that, during the preceding year, the authorities in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia had subjected even more people to arbitrary restrictions, detentions and trials despite all the efforts of the United Nations and the international community. He drew particular attention to the large number of young people of the student movement who had been detained in South Africa since September 1974 and charged under various repressive laws. Unfortunately, the balance in the Trust Fund was hardly adequate to cover the pressing needs arising from such developments, and he therefore appealed for even more generous contributions by all States both to the Trust Fund and to voluntary organizations engaged in providing assistance to the victims of *apartheid*. Repression in southern Africa had persisted and had been intensified in the face of increasing resistance in the 30 years since the founding of the United Nations. The Committee of Trustees recognized that humanitarian assistance, while essential as long as repression continued, was in no way an alternative to action to secure an end to repression. In that connexion, the available information concerning persecution in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia under discriminatory and repressive laws should be publicized more widely; the General Assembly and the Secretary-General should make the necessary arrangements for that purpose.

35. The CHAIRMAN invited the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the Organization of African Unity to address the Committee.

36. Mr. ONU (Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the Organization of African Unity) noted with satisfaction that the Vorster Government in South Africa was faced with increasing international isolation, as demonstrated by the decision of the United Nations General Assembly (2281st plenary meeting) to bar the South African delegation from taking part in the proceedings of the twenty-ninth session. No one should be misled by what were only apparent policy changes masking a new diplomatic offensive by the South African Government aimed at winning acceptance and respectability under the banner of so-called détente, which in their terms meant only that free and independent Africa should coexist with *apartheid*. He called upon the leaders of South Africa to dismantle all institutions of oppression, initiate discussions with the liberation movements of South Africa and end restrictions on nationalist leaders. Efforts to isolate and ostracize South Africa should be extended to the so-called "homeland" leaders, who were merely puppets and not authentic representatives of the black majority. He noted that certain Western and imperialist countries, although they protested against violations of human rights occurring on their own doorsteps, were deaf to events in South Africa and even provided the sinews of oppression to the South African régime by their investments and military aid. The Committee should be more action-oriented, and with that end in view he recommended: speedy ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*; renewed condemnation and rejection of any "bantustan" policy and an appeal to all States Members of the United Nations to refrain from contact with "homeland" leaders; urging the Security Council to make an arms embargo against South Africa mandatory; a blacklist of transnational and other major investors in South Africa and of the trading partners of the South African régime; an appeal for the unconditional release of political prisoners; and granting PAC and ANC permanent observer status in the United Nations.

37. Mr. WHISTLER (United States of America) said that while his delegation did not oppose the participation of ANC and PAC in the Committee's discussion of the question of *apartheid*, his Government nevertheless continued to recognize the Government of South Africa as that country's legitimate representative in the United Nations.

38. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had no objection to the participation of ANC and PAC in the proceedings of the Committee and in fact welcomed the substantial contribution which they were likely to make in any debate on *apartheid*. However, it should be clear that his Government recognized the Government of the Republic of South Africa and therefore did not recognize ANC or PAC as representing that country.

39. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) said that his delegation had no objection to the participation of ANC and PAC in the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners and in discussions of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. However,

he wished to refer members of the Committee to the statement his delegation had made on the question during the twenty-ninth session, at the 906th meeting of the Committee.

40. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.

41. M. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) noted that three Member States had, in opposition to the democratic decision of the General Assembly and an overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council, abusively exercised their veto against the expulsion of the South African *apartheid* régime from the Organization. Their action had come after a statement by the representative of OAU expressing that organization's concern at the role being played by certain Western imperialist countries in providing the Fascist South African régime with the means to maintain its domination over the broad masses of the people of Azania. However, the tide of history in Africa was running against the remnants of the primitive, antiquated Fascist régime. The objections and reservations expressed by the three Powers when they cast their vetoes had been heard before, and he wondered whether they thought that their actions augured well for

future harmonious relations with a free and democratic Azania.

42. The CHAIRMAN recalled that two meetings had been set aside on 10 October for observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. Requests to participate had been received from the Secretary-General of the World Peace Council, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to grant those requests.

It was so decided.

43. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) recalled that at the previous session (914th meeting), the Chinese representative in the Committee had explained his Government's position of principle regarding the World Peace Council—namely, that it had been reduced to the status of an instrument of the super-Powers—and had stated its objections to inviting that organization to speak before the Committee. His Government's objections to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization were also well known.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

952nd meeting

Thursday, 9 October 1975, at 3.35 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.952

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(*continued*) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641,
A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) said that the Committee was discussing international action against the system of *apartheid* in the light of profound changes in the political structure of southern Africa. His delegation welcomed the entry of Mozambique into the United Nations and hoped that Angola would soon follow. With the withdrawal of the colonial Powers from southern Africa, Swaziland was no longer surrounded by territories under white domination and the geographical isolation of the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia had become as real as its political isolation in the world community. Moreover, the Smith régime had become a political burden to South Africa, which had previously been its chief sponsor.

2. Unfortunately, the uneasiness of the white settlers over such changes was being expressed in the form of intensified political repression. There were signs, however, that, to safeguard its own interests, Pretoria might be prepared to

abandon its support of Salisbury. In order to ensure the survival of its abhorrent system of government, South Africa had also abolished a number of minor rules of the *apartheid* system and was advertising its action as a major change in the system. That contention was belied, however, by the intensification of police repression.

3. According to information published by the Unit on *Apartheid*, a considerable number of persons of all races and from all walks of life were at present under so-called "banning orders", which were issued without due process of law and entailed severe restrictions. Earlier in the year, moreover, the régime had detained a number of young Coloured people for advocating a boycott of certain *apartheid* institutions. It had also arrested leaders of black high school students and detained a number of white student leaders and lecturers opposed to *apartheid*. Those who had been formally charged had been accused of supporting United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* and now faced the possibility of savage sentences for that offence. The Christian Institute of Southern Africa, in analysing the situation, had observed that detentions under the Terrorism Act were increasing and were firmly entrenched in the South African way of life and that young black people striving to create a more just society assumed that at some time or other they would also be detained.

4. Within South Africa and Namibia, the régime was attempting to disguise the *apartheid* system by claiming

that the “bantustans” enjoyed independence. However, deprived of sufficient land or resources to support their populations, the “bantustans” were no more than reservoirs of underpaid labour for the convenience of the white minority in South Africa.

5. There were signs that, in spite of persecution, the resistance of the vast majority of the black population was growing stronger. News and statements coming from South Africa indicated that the *apartheid* system was becoming increasingly vulnerable as a result of international pressure. His delegation shared the view of the African States that international pressure on the white régimes must be pursued and intensified within the framework of a generally agreed and truly international policy. Such a policy must take account of the fact that the States bordering South Africa needed special support to enable them to resist economic, political and, quite possibly, even military pressures from South Africa. The economic weakness of the African countries bordering South Africa represented a great danger and could have serious repercussions on future developments. Joint efforts were urgently needed to help certain particularly vulnerable countries free themselves from any remaining economic dependence on South Africa.

6. Sweden had long acknowledged the special needs of the countries bordering South Africa and had devoted a significant and increasing part of its development assistance to them. In that connexion, it had concluded a development agreement with Mozambique earlier in the year. His delegation hoped that all the rich countries would soon come to accept responsibility for joint action to strengthen the economies of the African States which were subject to South Africa’s economic expansionism. While measures taken on behalf of the countries bordering South Africa might not seem to have decisive importance, in the long run they could prove effective by depriving the régime of its access to transportation, raw materials, markets and cheap labour. Moreover, strengthening the border countries would bring psychological pressure to bear on the population of South Africa and would strengthen the liberation movements inside the country. The sacrifices of the liberation movements in their struggle against racial discrimination and injustice should constantly be brought to the attention of world public opinion.

7. Transnational corporations operating in South Africa were every bit as responsible for the systematic exploitation of migratory labour as were South African companies themselves, since they profited equally from the *apartheid* system. The Swedish Government was keenly aware of that problem and, whenever possible, discouraged further investment in South Africa, because non-white workers were not only exploited but also deprived of their right to bring about changes in their own situation. The struggle for basic economic and trade union rights had thus become a struggle against the *apartheid* system as a whole. Trade unions in developed countries had become increasingly aware of the racial discrimination practised by the South African affiliates of transnational enterprises and could directly in-

fluence the central management in such corporations. Such trade union pressure represented a new and valuable weapon in the struggle against racial discrimination.

8. The startling increase in South Africa’s military budget served to highlight that country’s reliance on military dominance. Over 10 years ago, on the initiative of the Scandinavian States, the Security Council, in its resolution 181 (1963), had recommended an arms embargo against South Africa. Regrettably some arms-exporting industrial nations had selfishly ignored that recommendation. Sweden, however, itself a weapons producer, had faithfully complied with the embargo. His delegation also regretted the failure of the Security Council to take a decision in 1975 on an obligatory arms embargo because of vetoes cast by certain permanent members. That matter should be raised again in the Security Council, and those States which still pursued any form of military co-operation with South Africa should be reminded of their international responsibilities. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly should increase pressure on Pretoria, since the situation constituted a threat to peace within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and thus warranted the imposition of sanctions.

9. In fulfilling its duty to disseminate information about the situation in South Africa, the United Nations was assisted by various other organizations, such as the World Council of Churches. Over the years, that body had actively helped to unmask the Pretoria régime, whose leaders claimed to be Christians while flouting the basic principles of their religion. Through various channels, such information was bound eventually to reach even the white population in South Africa, who, it was to be hoped, would ultimately realize that the inhuman and absurd policy of *apartheid* had to be abandoned in the interest of their own survival.

10. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) drew attention to the fact that a draft resolution would be introduced the following day in connexion with the Committee’s observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. He hoped that delegations from every region would join in sponsoring the draft resolution and that it would be adopted by acclamation. It would thus be an expression of universal denunciation of South Africa’s persecution of leaders of the oppressed population and a message of solidarity to the people in prison or under restriction.

11. The Day of Solidarity would coincide with the adoption, 12 years earlier, of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) requesting the unconditional release of all political prisoners. On that occasion only one dissenting vote had been cast—that of the South African régime itself. He hoped that the Committee would provide an even more impressive demonstration at its next meeting.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.

953rd meeting

Friday, 10 October 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.953

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

(a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that in response to the request of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/SPC/174), the Committee had decided, at its 950th meeting on 1 October, to devote the meetings of Friday, 10 October 1975, to the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. It had also decided, at its 951st meeting to invite representatives of the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to participate in its debates.

2. Mrs. CISSÉ (Guinea) said that in issuing a solemn appeal to the international community to observe the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners on 11 October, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* had wanted to focus international attention once again on the explosive situation prevailing in South Africa. The fact was that despite the urgent appeals of the international community and the action taken by various national and international movements, South Africa was refusing to free the prisoners. On the contrary, disregarding all United Nations recommendations and resolutions, the South African Government was intensifying repression, making further arbitrary arrests and subjecting prisoners to torture and other types of inhuman treatment. Moreover, although it spoke of détente with African States, it refused to hold a dialogue with the true South African leaders.

3. Her delegation intended to return later to the subject of the situation prevailing in South Africa, but currently it wished to reaffirm the unconditional support of Guinea and its President for the people and the national liberation movements of South Africa. The Republic of Guinea called for the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela and Mr. Mangaliso Sobukwe, the Afrikaner nationalists Breyten Breytenbach, Alexander Mombaris and Sean Hosey, and hundreds of patriots. It was convinced, like the national liberation movements it supported, that neither arms, nor torture, nor imprisonment could overcome a people that was organized and determined to defend its freedom. It saluted the initiatives taken by the United Nations and OAU to intensify the struggle against *apartheid*, in particular those aimed at implementing the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa and the diplomatic and economic sanctions

against the South African régime, putting an end to emigration to that country, bringing about the release of thousands of political prisoners, condemning the policy of "bantustans", helping the victims of *apartheid* and giving active support to the liberation movements. Thanks to the moral and material support of all progressive peoples, it was certain beyond all doubt that *apartheid* would be defeated and that the peoples of South Africa would regain their freedom and dignity.

4. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece) said that he wished to take the opportunity on the occasion of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners to state that his Government strongly condemned the fact that in South Africa and in Namibia more than 70 people were being detained without trial and incommunicado. Neither could it condone the fact that the Government of a State Member of the United Nations was disregarding all the appeals and the very resolutions of the world Organization. His delegation joined all those which had spoken out against political detentions, an abhorrent expression of the imposition of the will of the minority on the majority and a practice contrary to the human rights enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

5. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) to address the Committee.

6. Mr. NZO (Observer, African National Congress of South Africa) said that the current meeting marked the twelfth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners; since that time 11 October had come to be celebrated as the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. He paid tribute to the contribution made by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and to its efforts to make public opinion conscious of the problem of *apartheid*.

7. It was with pride and deep satisfaction that ANC noted the presence in the United Nations of countries representing the new revolutionary Africa: the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Cape Verde and the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. Angola, too, would soon take its place in the United Nations, under the leadership of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). ANC warmly saluted the peoples of North and South Viet-Nam and Laos, who had triumphed over American imperialism. Another cause for satisfaction was the fact that after 50 years of Fascist dictatorship, Portugal was now no longer a supporter of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa. Lastly, ANC was happy to salute Papua New Guinea as a new member of the United Nations.

8. He recalled that the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) on 11 October 1963 had been motivated by the arrests in July 1963 of the ANC leaders who had been sentenced to life imprisonment at the Rivonia trial. Vorster, the spokesman of the *apartheid* régime, had always described them as ordinary criminals who did not deserve the status of political prisoners. To refute that lie, he (Mr. Nzo) gave a brief biography of Nelson Mandela, militant and devoted leader of ANC, who had always served ANC, whether openly, clandestinely or abroad, and who had been arrested, sentenced and imprisoned for life, together with a group of his comrades.

9. Other trials, less widely publicized than the Rivonia trial, had put South African and Namibian freedom fighters into the clutches of the South African Gestapo. Of the 77 detainees who, it was publicly admitted, were being held in South Africa as of 4 October 1975, 56 were South Africans and 21 were Namibians. To those must be added hundreds of persons languishing in concentration camps and the victims of the *apartheid* régime's oppression and police violence in connexion with so-called illegal strike movements. The South African Congress of Trade Unions had revealed in a statement made at the sixtieth session of the International Labour Conference, held from 4 to 25 June 1975, that there had been 135 strikes during the second half of 1974 alone.

10. Behind the smoke-screen of so-called détente in southern Africa, repression in South Africa and Namibia was being intensified. He drew the Committee's attention to the fate of Govan Mbeki, a leader of the South African people, imprisoned on Robben Island and denied medical assistance by the prison authorities in spite of his poor health. Alerted by ANC, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* had called for intervention by the International Red Cross.

11. The defeat of Portuguese fascism had broken the reactionary tripartite alliance of Vorster, Smith and Caetano but, within the United Nations, the triple alliance of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France was defending the white minority régime in southern Africa, particularly in South Africa. During the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly those three States had used their veto power in the Security Council to prevent the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the imposition of a mandatory embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa. They were joining forces to enable South African neo-colonialism to develop in Africa and to weaken or even destroy the national liberation movements in southern Africa. That attitude posed a serious threat to world peace and necessitated maximum vigilance on the part of democratic forces; they must unite in support of the region's revolutionary movements.

12. On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII), ANC urged: the exposure and condemnation of the machinations of the tripartite imperialist alliance of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France and those of imperialist countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany and others in support of the reactionary white minority régimes in southern Africa, particularly South Africa; support by the international

community for the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its ninth extraordinary session, held from 7 to 10 April 1975, calling for total isolation of the South African *apartheid* régime and its puppet "bantustan" administrations—the *apartheid* régime must never be allowed to resume its seat in the General Assembly; the immediate and unconditional release of all South African political prisoners, detainees and political leaders exiled to various parts of South Africa; urgent international action exposing the crimes of the *apartheid* régime against countless African victims suffering in concentration camps; abandonment of the current court trials of the opponents of the *apartheid* régime; and all-round support for ANC in its struggle to defeat the South African Fascist régime and in its efforts to thwart the diplomatic, political and neo-colonialist offensive now being launched by the *apartheid* régime.

13. The current mass political upsurge of the various sectors of the oppressed population in South Africa forcefully demonstrated that the South African people had recognized that their liberation was their own responsibility.

14. Mr. BHATIA (India) said that the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, dedicated to the victims of the racist régime's terror, of which the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 had been an especially bloody example, marked the anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) of 11 October 1963, a historic expression of the indignation of the civilized world.

15. There had been many other resolutions since then. Many countries had expressed their condemnation of the policies of *apartheid* by severing diplomatic relations with South Africa, which had nevertheless ignored the appeals of the United Nations and intensified its brutal repression. As the United Nations was preparing to celebrate its thirtieth anniversary, the Pretoria régime was torturing student leaders and Christians who had recently been arrested, men who were fighting to ensure respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

16. His country had first brought the question of *apartheid* before the United Nations in 1946. Mahatma Gandhi had launched a civil disobedience movement in South Africa even before undertaking the one in India which was to result in the independence of the country. India had not waited for the United Nations to adopt its resolutions against *apartheid* before manifesting its opposition to that policy. In 1954 it had recalled its High Commissioner to South Africa, and in 1963 it had denied South Africa the use of its harbours and airports and had broken off all trade relations. Since then, it had helped the cause of liberty by contributing to OAU and United Nations special funds.

17. The anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1881 (XVIII) was a suitable occasion for the international community to reaffirm its solidarity with South African political prisoners.

18. Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic) expressed the fraternal solidarity of the Government and

people of the German Democratic Republic with the freedom fighters, and recalled that his country had no relations with South Africa, Southern Rhodesia or Namibia. He condemned the assistance which the imperialists were giving to the South African régime and their participation in the exploitation of natural resources belonging exclusively to the peoples of those countries.

19. He wished in particular to honour the memory of the leader of ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa, Abram Fischer, who had died in 1975 after many years of imprisonment.

20. The German Democratic Republic, in which, as in many other countries, there had developed numerous movements against *apartheid*, wished to say how much it appreciated the work of organizations such as the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization.

21. The policy of détente had given a fresh impetus to the struggle against *apartheid*. He referred in that connexion to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and said that any opposition to détente could only harm the interests of the South African liberation fighters.

22. His delegation was concerned at the alarming news from the Unit on *Apartheid* concerning the prosecution of hundreds of patriots who came from broad strata of the people of South Africa and were of different colours and creeds. His delegation therefore joined the representatives of the great majority of States in demanding the release of the patriots.

23. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) congratulated the representative of Papua New Guinea on his country's admission to the United Nations and to the Committee.

24. He deplored the fact that, once again, a resolution on South African political prisoners, adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 3055 (XXVIII)), had not had the desired effect. Further arrests had brought ever higher the number of persons detained for their opposition to *apartheid*.

25. All the world condemned *apartheid*, which was contrary to every principle of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The persecution of political opponents, deplorable wherever it might occur, took the form in South Africa of especially abhorrent discriminatory legislation. Australia strongly reaffirmed its condemnation of the means used by the South African Government to stifle opposition to its *apartheid* system.

26. It would be fitting for the international community to follow up the many efforts of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* by adopting a resolution expressing its deep concern at the denial of basic rights and justice to the people arrested. Australia, which called on the South African Government to release all political prisoners and to cease its suppression of the opponents of *apartheid*, would be glad to support such a resolution.

27. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) to address the Committee.

28. Mr. SJBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) congratulated the Chairman, complimented the Secretariat and thanked the United Nations, on behalf of the people of Azania, for allowing the liberation movements to participate in the work of its organs relating to them. On the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, the international community was joining the people of Azania in paying tribute to the men and women who had championed the principles of the United Nations. The cause of the South African people, like all just causes, enjoyed wide support. Observance of the Day of Solidarity was an unequivocal message to the South African régime. It showed that the international community was not deceived by Vorster's ruses and his speeches preaching détente. It showed that cheque-book diplomacy was not succeeding. The Day of Solidarity was a humanitarian gesture on the part of a small minority, but it was a small step in the right direction.

29. The determination and commitment of the freedom fighters could not be underestimated, for, as the Unit on *Apartheid* had reported, anyone undertaking that struggle knew that sooner or later he would face imprisonment. The heroes of that struggle were not the first ones; they were following a long tradition and that should be a warning to those who were in every way helping the South African régime to impose its policies of *apartheid*. It was the same courage that had overcome Portuguese fascism in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, despite all its backing from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

30. Some took comfort in the thought that South Africa was highly industrialized, well armed and in control of the black population. But had not the United States imperialist military machine in Indo-China been yet more powerful? Man, not things, was decisive in the making of war. Vorster himself did not dare to contemplate the alternative to a peaceful solution. Of course, he was not concerned for the African masses, who already lived in conditions of poverty, disease and repression. It was the future of his kinsmen that worried him, for he knew that a people, no matter how weak, could defeat any enemy, no matter how powerful, if it was united and prepared to fight. The South African political prisoners were a living example of that determination.

31. The South African people might be the last on the continent to gain their independence, but they would never surrender. Their struggle would be enriched by the victories of their brothers to the north, with whom they wanted to work shoulder-to-shoulder in building a lasting unity free from exploitation.

32. For three decades the world had been witness to the growth of a savage régime striving to beat down popular resistance. At that very moment, nine leaders of the black consciousness movement were standing trial in the Pretoria Supreme Court under the Terrorism Act, even though the judge had acknowledged the lack of evidence against them. Faced with ridicule, the prosecutor had withdrawn the charges against three of those originally accused and had applied for a new trial for the remaining nine. The régime had exposed the levels to which it would stoop by using taped telephone conversations against the accused.

33. There had been more than 20 mystery deaths among detainees. The bodies had shown evidence of torture. Those detained were always held in solitary confinement. Some of them, who had become known as the FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) Rally detainees, had issued summonses against Jimmy Kruger, the so-called Minister of Justice, claiming R 21,500 in damages for the torture they had suffered. Among those who were suing were Lindeliwe Mabandla, head of the Black Allied Workers' Union in Durban, and his wife; Barny Pityana, former President of the South African Students' Organization; Revabaton Cooper; Mapetla Mohabi; and Mzinkulu Gwentshe. Those courageous youths deserved the support of their colleagues and of all justice-minded people.

34. On Robben Island, John Nyati Pokela, Samuel Chibane, Isaac Mtimunye and John Nkosi, leading members of PAC, were serving long-term prison sentences.

35. There had recently been talk among Vorster's associates about releasing some of the political prisoners and employing them in their so-called Bantu "homelands". The men on Robben Island were incarcerated because they had fought for their rights, had opposed the black hirelings of the régime and had rejected the Balkanization of their motherland.

36. The United Nations, which had joined the Azanian people in rejecting the "bantustan" travesty in a number of resolutions, had a clear duty to condemn that diabolical scheme and reiterate the demand for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in South Africa. To that end, and in order to replace the racist régime with a government supporting the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations should accord to the national liberation movements unqualified support.

37. Mr. JATOI (Pakistan) offered his delegation's congratulations to the representatives of the Republic of Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and the People's Republic of Mozambique on the admission of their countries to the United Nations.

38. It was a matter of grave concern to his country that in spite of all efforts, the policies of *apartheid* continued to thrive in South Africa and anyone opposing them was arrested. The South African racist régime had ignored the appeals of the General Assembly and of international organizations to accord amnesty to all persons detained for their opposition to *apartheid*. The arrest of Nelson Mandela, the detention of Abram Fischer, who had died in May 1975, the banning of the Christian Institute of South Africa and the arrest of students, labour leaders and intellectuals were the best-known facts of the repression.

39. His delegation was convinced that there could be no peaceful solution without the unconditional release of political prisoners. The international community should therefore undertake more vigorous action to eliminate *apartheid* from South Africa.

40. Mr. EL SHEIBANI (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Arab League, welcomed to the United Nations the representatives of

Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and those of the most recent Member State, Papua New Guinea, whose independence marked a victory over racism and colonialism.

41. The observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners was proof that all Members of the Organization fully supported the just struggle of oppressed peoples and that they realized the danger of the policies of *apartheid*. The whole world had condemned the South African régime and its supporters. It was a new form of nazism in which the forces of oppression had recourse to injustice, terrorism and tyranny and endangered world peace. South African legislation was a challenge not only to the South African people but also to the Charter of the United Nations and to all human moral values.

42. The United Nations had repeatedly condemned the *apartheid* system and its discriminatory laws. The people of South Africa were fighting to ensure respect for the Charter and to eliminate oppression and colonialism. Yet men were being convicted because they had sought to achieve those objectives. The General Assembly had repeatedly called for the release of political prisoners, but they continued to languish in South African prisons.

43. It was distressing to observe that some Member States, not content with recognizing the South African régime, went so far as to collaborate with it, thus helping it to implement its policy of repression, while at the same time they declared themselves to be in favour of justice and equality. The régime could not have endured unless it had enjoyed the support of world imperialism.

44. The United Nations should therefore adopt a very firm attitude towards the régime and its supporters. The Arab countries wished once again to assure the people of South Africa that they were ready to support their cause. The political prisoners were the symbol of the fight for freedom, and the Arab countries were determined to do all in their power to put an end to the present situation.

45. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the World Peace Council to address the Committee.

46. Mr. CHANDRA (World Peace Council) noted that it was exactly 12 years since the General Assembly had adopted the first resolution (1881 (XVIII)) demanding the release of political prisoners and condemning the policies of *apartheid*. Nevertheless, the South African régime remained in the saddle and continued to defy the United Nations. The Day of Solidarity was an occasion to consider why that was so and why every resolution against *apartheid* had been deliberately violated. There was no doubt that it had been possible to violate them only because the sanctions called for by the United Nations had not been applied; some Member States, large imperialist Powers, were even supplying arms, as well as economic assistance, to the South African régime. For that reason, the régime was a threat not only to the independence to the African States but to the entire world, and by its behaviour it had placed itself outside the community of nations.

47. The release of South African political prisoners was obviously linked to the elimination of *apartheid*, and South

Africa's voice must be heard in the United Nations through the liberation movements recognized by OAU and the United Nations, which were the only authentic representatives of the people of South Africa. Homage should be paid to the leaders of those movements who were daily risking their lives, as had been evidenced, for instance, by those men, headed by Nelson Mandela, who had been sentenced in the Rivonia trial, or Abram Fischer, who had died a few months earlier as a result of his imprisonment. The World Peace Council had awarded them the Joliot-Curie Medal, and the United Nations, on its thirtieth anniversary, should also honour them. The fate of thousands who were languishing in South African gaols under racist laws was the concern of mankind; it was pointless to expect the South African régime to abandon *apartheid*. It was for the South African people themselves, assisted by the international community, to open the prison gates, as the countries recently freed from colonialism, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, had done. All freedom-loving and justice-loving countries should help the national liberation movements. The World Peace Council had become convinced, at the last meeting of its leaders in Guinea-Bissau, that it was possible to prepare for victory together, and it was ready to offer its support to all liberation movements until they succeeded in restoring justice in their countries.

48. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia) welcomed the representatives of ANC and PAC and paid tribute to the heroes of the national liberation movements and to their leaders now in prison. In a world troubled by many forms of injustice and many kinds of attack against human rights, *apartheid* still stood out as the epitome of injustice.

49. The South African political prisoners were in the front line of the struggle against *apartheid*, and they were sacrificing their freedom and their lives for their fellow-countrymen, both contemporary and future generations, and for a world community in which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would indeed have universal application.

50. On the national level, the sacrifice made by the opponents of *apartheid* showed that a small racist minority was determined to use the full force of its illegal powers to suppress the legitimate demands of the South African people and their true leaders. In that connexion, mention must be made of the names of Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, and that of Govan Mbeki, whose health was a cause of grave concern. But there were countless others, many of them young people, who were at present suffering imprisonment, internment or other cruel and arbitrary restrictions on their freedom.

51. The international community could not let those sacrifices go unnoticed. The Pretoria régime must be informed that unconditional amnesty for political prisoners and political exiles was an essential prerequisite for détente between South Africa and other States, the elimination of the risks of racial conflict caused by its unjust policies, and its admission to the circle of friendship and respect of the international community.

52. His delegation hoped that the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners would strengthen the commitment of the international com-

munity to the struggle for the national liberation of the oppressed people of South Africa. It was necessary to ensure that the South Africans who had given up their freedom for the sake of their people would not suffer in obscurity and that they would know that they were not alone in their struggle, that their work and their sacrifices had not been in vain and that all Governments, organizations and individuals who respected the dignity of man would continue to lend their unqualified support to the just struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa.

53. Mr. CRUZ SALAZAR (Guatemala), speaking also on behalf of the delegations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, expressed their profound concern, on the occasion of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, at seeing the South African régime continue to practise *apartheid*, despite the fact that the United Nations had repeatedly denounced the existence of a régime based on racial discrimination, and despite all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in order to compel the South African Government to end its systematic political repression.

54. The delegations for which he spoke sought the immediate suppression of a racial policy which was against the philosophy and traditions of their peoples. Since 1824, they had subscribed to the principle that any person, without distinction as to religion or race, was free as soon as he stepped on Central American soil. Later, the Central American Congress had unanimously abolished slavery in all its forms. The Central American countries therefore expressed their solidarity with the political prisoners of South Africa, thus recognizing the sacrifices which they were making to ensure that the fundamental principles of co-existence which the *apartheid* régime was denying to the South African people would be acknowledged. Reason and justice were on the side of the prisoners in their unequal struggle when they found themselves victims of oppression or condemned to imprisonment and exile. Such solidarity ought to encourage those who one day would eliminate, in their own country and in other parts of the world, the régime of terror now oppressing them.

55. The Central American delegations hoped that all States Members of the United Nations would implement the resolutions of the General Assembly so as to eliminate *apartheid* and any other form of racial discrimination. They reaffirmed their sympathy for the struggle of the South African patriots and their support for the goals pursued by those who were now in political prisons or in exile.

56. Mr. PALMER (Sierra Leone) said that the imprisonment and suffering of those struggling against *apartheid* were the result of a desperate but fruitless and senseless effort by the South African racist régime to silence the voices of reason. Those prisoners were to be congratulated for refusing to be dehumanized and should be urged not to give up the struggle. Judging from the increasing number of political detainees in South African prisons, it was evident that the enemy was beginning to lose hope.

57. Sierra Leone and all of independent Africa would continue their struggle and would use every weapon available to uproot *apartheid*, to restore human dignity to its victims and to give them hope.

58. His delegation appealed to the influential Members of the United Nations which had been giving tacit support to Mr. Vorster's régime to join other countries in isolating that régime. Any support to Mr. Vorster, however indirect, helped to sustain *apartheid*.

59. Those Member States had the responsibility of upholding the principles of the Charter. That was why they enjoyed special rights and they should not use those rights to protect the enemy. They must not sacrifice the interests of the United Nations for individual material interests.

60. His delegation condemned the South African régime and *apartheid*, and was convinced that the efforts of that régime were futile and that the forces of freedom would win.

61. He congratulated the leaders of the liberation movements in South Africa and was convinced that their task, however great, was not insurmountable. The whole world was behind them, for they were struggling not only to bring freedom and hope to their people but also to save humanity from a great evil.

62. The decision to declare a Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners showed that the United Nations was aware of its responsibility and could effectively realize the aspirations embodied in its Charter.

63. Mr. GHEORGHE (Romania) welcomed the participation by representatives of liberation movements in the solemn meeting as an affirmation of the principle whereby matters affecting the destiny of a people were to be

discussed only with the direct participation of the legitimate representatives of the people concerned.

64. In opposition to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in defiance of many resolutions by the General Assembly and protests by world opinion, the South African Government continued to conduct, without restraint, its policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. Furthermore, at the beginning of the year, it had carried out a series of arrests among black students and other persons who opposed *apartheid*. The white minority exercised a discretionary control over the majority of the population.

65. It was, therefore, the duty of the United Nations and all peoples devoted to liberty and justice to act more resolutely and in close co-operation against *apartheid* and all forms of discrimination. The cause of the South African population and its imprisoned representatives must be supported.

66. Romania reaffirmed its solidarity with the South African political prisoners and called for their immediate and unconditional release. The Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners was being observed in Romania through meetings and lectures organized by the Romanian League of Friendship with the Peoples of Africa and Asia. The Romanian people condemned the policy of *apartheid* and extended its full support and sympathy to those who had dedicated themselves to the struggle against *apartheid*; it was in that spirit that his delegation would act during the Special Political Committee's discussion of the policy of racial discrimination and *apartheid*.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

954th meeting

Friday, 10 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.954

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS (continued)

1. Mr. FREEMAN-GREENE (New Zealand) said that his Prime Minister had issued a statement the day before strongly supporting the release of South African political prisoners and endorsing efforts by the United Nations to call attention to the fate of the victims of *apartheid* in South Africa.

2. Mr. HRČKA (Czechoslovakia) said that his Government condemned *apartheid* as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and basic human rights and had always supported those States which were striving in deeds as well as in words to eliminate it. His Government fully supported the people of South Africa in their struggle for human rights, dignity and national liberation. He noted that despite world-wide protests, the racist régime in South Africa continued to imprison fighters for human rights and national liberation. His Government demanded that the South African racist régime stop violating basic human rights, repeal all racist laws and immediately release imprisoned South African patriots. His delegation joined in appealing to all States, especially those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which had not yet done so, to apply the sanctions invoked by the United Nations against South Africa and to implement all other resolutions aimed at eliminating the inhuman system of

apartheid. His Government would continue to give full support to all peoples struggling against colonialist, racist and social oppression and would stand shoulder to shoulder with all peoples to achieve the liberation of the courageous fighters for human rights, dignity and national liberation in South Africa.

3. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) said that his country categorically condemned the criminal, racist policy of *apartheid* and reaffirmed its consistent support for the valiant people of Azania under the leadership of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). It urged compliance with the decisions taken by the international community in support of their struggle and called upon all nations and organizations to reaffirm their solidarity with South African political prisoners by stepping up their campaign to eradicate *apartheid*.

4. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) said that his delegation firmly supported the people of Azania in their dauntless struggle against white racist domination in South Africa and wished to express sympathy for that country's political prisoners. The people of Africa were continuing to win brilliant victories in their struggle for national independence and liberation despite the counter-revolutionary tactics employed by the South African white racist authorities with the connivance of the super-Powers. Though it spoke of reconciliation, détente and peace, the South African racist régime was building up its military forces and carrying out ever more savage and brutal persecution and suppression of the South African people. Many freedom fighters had been murdered and the number of political prisoners was increasing. The détente propagated by the South African authorities was nothing but deceptive verbiage aimed at undermining the unity of the African liberation movement so as to preserve white reactionary rule. But the heroic Azanian people would not be deceived and would understand the need, stressed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its twelfth ordinary session held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, for revolutionary armed struggle to overthrow the racist régime.

5. Mr. ADJIBADE (Dahomey), while commending the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for its efforts, noted that the Vorster régime had for years ignored the efforts of the international community to protect the freedom of the black community in South Africa. It continued to create "bantustans" and to take repressive action against trade unions, students and others. The ultimate liberation of the country was all the more inevitable because of the fact that Mr. Vorster's oppressive laws were also being used against the white community. Africans could be patient, but eventually slaves had to fight back. All of Africa supported the liberation movement, and if bloodshed was to be avoided the Vorster régime would have to repeal the anti-terrorism laws and grant unconditional amnesty to all prisoners and refugees. The only alternative short of force would be economic sanctions, an arms boycott and the isolation of South Africa by the international community. There could be no peace, security or détente as long as the Vorster régime was usurping power and oppressing the people.

6. Mr. ADLI (Malaysia) deplored the imprisonment of brave African patriots whose only crime had been to engage in a just struggle for self-determination and expressed astonishment that the Pretoria régime could persist in disregarding international censure of its inhuman repression and racist minority rule. His delegation reaffirmed its full support for the liberation movements of South Africa and its opposition to *apartheid*. It felt that the Pretoria régime must be subjected to constant criticism so as to make it aware of its total isolation in the world community. The Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners was an effective way of calling attention to the plight of the victims of *apartheid*.

7. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that *apartheid* was the root cause of all South Africa's problems. That country's laws were still being framed so as to ensure the strict application of racial discrimination. All opposition to *apartheid* in South Africa was considered a crime and subject to ruthless repression. It was the duty of the international community to condemn *apartheid*, to isolate the South African régime and to bring pressure to bear upon it to repeal all repressive laws and release all political prisoners. The Special Political Committee should show its solidarity with South African political prisoners by redoubling its assistance to PAC and ANC, the authentic representatives of the peoples of South Africa, so as to enable them to hasten the total liberation of South Africa.

8. Mr. SSEGIRINYA (Uganda) said that the Vorster régime was persisting in its repressive policies despite general international condemnation because it still had the backing of some countries which recognized it and thus gave indirect support to those policies. It was absurd that those imperialist countries refused to recognize the liberation movements, which represented the victims of *apartheid*. They should be reminded that former representatives of other liberation movements were now sitting in the Committee as representatives of sovereign States. The imperialists continued to support the Vorster régime because they shared in the profits of repression. He called upon the Governments concerned to join in condemning *apartheid* and to refrain from supporting the South African régime. His delegation also called for a quick revolutionary armed struggle to overthrow *apartheid*.

9. Mrs. BERMUDEZ (Cuba) congratulated the Chairman and the officers of the Committee on their election and welcomed the entry into the United Nations of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea.

10. The Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners coincided with the anniversary of an outstanding event in Cuban history. On 10 October 1868, the struggle against Spanish colonialism had been initiated by the Cuban patriot, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, who had freed his Negro slaves so that they could join the revolutionary ranks. For Cuba, that anniversary was an ideal occasion to recall that hundreds of Africans were today languishing in South African prisons for the simple reason that they had opposed the odious policy of *apartheid*.

11. According to the statistics, one in four Africans was imprisoned every year under one or another of the

apartheid laws. In 1974 approximately 100,000 persons, including youths, women and elderly persons, had been crowded into prisons in South Africa and Namibia which were judged to be especially inhuman by the United Nations. A new wave of detentions unleashed in 1975 had met with the vigorous opposition of those who genuinely pursued justice, liberty and equality among men. Nevertheless, abetted by the Western Powers, the despicable Pretoria régime continued its machinations to perpetuate white power.

12. In mentioning the names of Nelson and Winnie Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Nyati Pokela, Karel Tip, Gerry Mare, Glen Moss and Abram Fischer, her delegation wished to pay homage to all the South African and Namibian political prisoners and to encourage the national liberation movements to intensify their struggle against the racist régime and its collaborators. Cuba joined in expressing its complete solidarity with their just cause and demanded the liberation of all the South African and Namibian patriots.

13. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law to address the Committee.

14. Mr. PEAY (Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law) said that the struggle of the South African and Namibian political prisoners was essentially a struggle for the realization of fundamental human rights for the black majorities in those countries. Their struggle symbolized the irreconcilable contradictions between the Draconian laws of South Africa and the basic human rights embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

15. The Terrorism Act of 1967, which vested the South African police with unlimited power to detain a person for life on the mere belief that his activities fell within the all-embracing definition of terrorism, was particularly repugnant. Detainees were frequently cut off from all contact with their spouses and lawyers. Moreover, no provision existed for either judicial review or invalidation of the Terrorism Act itself.

16. At the present moment, 10 courageous young black men were being prosecuted jointly as so-called "terrorists" under the Terrorism Act and, if convicted, faced possible execution or a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment.

17. Those young men were political prisoners in the truest sense of the term. They had been charged not with criminal activities but with the "crime" of expressing black pride and criticizing the injustices of *apartheid*. They had been held in detention for extensive periods, in some cases exceeding a year. Furthermore, if they were ultimately convicted and sentenced to a prison term, not one day of the time already spent in detention would be credited against the time to be served.

18. Such ill-treatment, which was regularly meted out to political prisoners in South Africa and Namibia, fell far short of even the most elementary standards of justice or fairness.

19. The number of detentions under the Terrorism Act was increasing. In recent weeks, at least 75 persons had been detained, and the total number of detainees was estimated to be in the hundreds. It was not known how many were in solitary confinement or had been physically assaulted or tortured. The detainees had no way of communicating with their families or the world about their situation or of preventing further torture or assaults from taking place.

20. At least 22 persons were reported to have died while in detention, and there was no way of knowing how many of the 75 or more political prisoners currently held would suffer the same fate. Even the pro-Nationalist newspaper *Die Vaderland*, in an editorial published on 22 August 1975, had admitted that detention without trial was becoming more and more difficult to defend.

21. Political imprisonment in South Africa and Namibia took many forms. Many prisoners were rotting away on Robben Island or in the gaols on the mainland. Scores were banned or subjected to house arrest under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. Others were banished to distant localities in South Africa to survive as best they could. What all the prisoners had in common was their desire for racial equality, justice and human rights—in short, those internationally recognized norms to which South Africa, as a State Member of the United Nations, had subscribed. When, however, would such fundamental standards of due process of law and human dignity prevail in South Africa?

22. Those who were privileged to live in societies which recognized and respected the inalienable and fundamental human rights had a moral obligation to support the political prisoners, in word and in deed, in their struggle to bring about justice, equality and the rule of law in the land of their birth.

23. Mr. MOTSEPE (Botswana) congratulated the Chairman and the other officers of the Committee on their election.

24. The Committee was meeting to register solemnly its solidarity with South African political prisoners. Those gallant people had been thrown into inhuman prisons for calling for an end to the repressive system which excluded the majority of the people from exercising their right to shape their own destiny. The voice of the victims of *apartheid* was being ruthlessly suppressed through systematic police harassment, indefinite detentions, house arrests, banning orders and life imprisonment.

25. The Day of Solidarity was an indication of the international community's continuing concern over the inhumanity of institutionalized racism and the constant violation of fundamental human rights practised by the racist minority Government of South Africa.

26. His Government rejected the policy of "bantustans", which assigned only 13 per cent of the land to 16 million Africans while 87 per cent went to 3 million white supremacists. The establishment of "bantustans" in South Africa was aimed at keeping the oppressed majority perpetually divided and economically dependent on Pre-

toria. The "bantustans" would serve as a reservoir of underpaid labour to sustain the white economy of the oppressors in South Africa. The so-called "independence" of the "bantustans" would be nothing more than a sham freedom.

27. His Government believed that a peaceful, non-racial society that was free from inequalities and injustices should be sought in that troubled land. His delegation welcomed with satisfaction the end of colonial rule in Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, which made it quite clear that there was no future for white minority rule in southern Africa. It was therefore unjustifiable and immoral for any Power to sell offensive arms and give technical military assistance to the racist Government of South Africa. Such collaboration only strengthened the régime and facilitated its constant oppression of the disenfranchised majority.

28. His delegation called for international action to press the minority Government of Pretoria to free all the political prisoners it continued to hold in disregard of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) and other relevant decisions of the United Nations. Meaningful dialogue could be held only with the true representatives of the majority of the oppressed people and not with the collaborators and leaders of the *apartheid* institutions. The prisoners were not, as the régime alleged, criminals, and the international community should therefore reject the South African Government's arrogant assertion that it was holding no political prisoners. The Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act, together with other equally repressive laws and regulations, should be abolished as a step towards a return to sanity in that part of the world.

29. The régime had given ample evidence of its disregard for human life by pursuing a policy of aggression and torture, thus posing a clear threat to international peace and security. Action was needed to defuse the explosive situation.

30. Assistance should be given to the victims of *apartheid* through the appropriate organs of the United Nations. His delegation urged pledges and contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and other such funds.

31. Finally, his delegation commended the members of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and the Unit on *Apartheid* for their work in publicizing the inhumanity and repression of the *apartheid* system.

32. Mr. BÁNYÁSZ (Hungary) welcomed the admission of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea as States Members of the United Nations. They had waged a long and bitter struggle against the forces of imperialism and had won their freedom and national independence; his delegation wished them every success and assured them of its friendly co-operation.

33. Through the observance of the Day of Solidarity, the entire international peace-loving community was standing by the men and women who had been imprisoned because of their opposition to the policies of *apartheid* and racism, policies which had been condemned by the United Nations.

34. The Socialist countries had always been on the side of the South African patriots in their fight for freedom and human dignity. The Socialist countries were providing them with assistance to enable them to achieve final victory in their just cause and were continuing to do all within their power to bring about the release of imprisoned freedom fighters.

35. Thirty years had passed since the defeat of the Hitlerite Fascist régime, and yet countless victims were languishing in Fascist prisons. The observance of the Day of Solidarity therefore must not remain a cry in the wilderness. Only by renewed action could the Committee effectively support the just cause of the South African people.

36. Mr. KASINA (Kenya) said that the Committee had decided to observe the Day of Solidarity because of its concern over the increasing number of arrests carried out by the racist régime in South Africa. In previous years, the General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations had repeatedly called upon the régime to grant unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid*. The racist régime, however, had spurned every such appeal.

37. Outstanding political leaders of the liberation movements, such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki, were still gaoled under the "Sabotage Act" of 1962 for their opposition to the policies of *apartheid*. They were the authentic representatives of South Africa, and it was they who should represent that country in the United Nations.

38. The African population of South Africa continued to be subjected to oppression and degradation of every kind. Basic human rights such as freedom of association and expression had long since been swept aside.

39. The wave of arrests and detentions which had taken place in September 1974 was a vivid example of the intensification of political repression. As recently as August and September 1975, additional detentions had taken place. Most of those detained were young people, and all were accused of opposing the policies of *apartheid*, policies which had been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations.

40. The intensification of repression in South Africa posed an ever-growing threat to international peace and security, and effective action was therefore urgently required. Persons imprisoned or restricted under the *apartheid* laws for their part in the legitimate struggle for national liberation must be released immediately and unconditionally.

41. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism should not mistakenly be attributed to South Africa's dialogue with African States. His delegation had consistently rejected the notion of dialogue with the South African régime. South Africa should instead initiate a dialogue with the black majority population within its borders. His delegation rejected dialogue because it would be detrimental to the struggle of the African peoples for self-determination and

would imply recognition of the racist régime and its vicious *apartheid* policies.

42. The attempts by Vorster to attain credibility with black Africa were mere ploys. His aim remained the same, namely to consolidate *apartheid*. The régime's new tactics had been necessitated by the intensified struggle carried on against it by the liberation movements and the world community. They were also a result of the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, which had come as a great shock to the architects of *apartheid* and had eliminated the belt of buffer States which had effectively cut off South Africa from the rest of the continent.

43. The rhetoric of "separate development" was intended to deceive Africa and the world as to the régime's real intentions in establishing the so-called "bantustans". It was easy to see through such deceit, however. The whites, who represented less than 17 per cent of the population, would receive 87 per cent of the land, while the Africans would receive what was unwanted. The "bantustans" could not conceivably be viable economically, and, moreover, nearly half the African population did not live in them.

44. South Africa continued to defy the resolutions of the United Nations because of the commercial, military and diplomatic support it received from many States Members of the Organization. Despite the appeals of the United Nations, certain Western countries, most of them members of NATO, had continued to supply arms to South Africa. Many other Western countries continued to trade with and invest in South Africa. Faced with the constant refusal of the South African régime to comply with its resolutions, the United Nations had no alternative but to maintain and strengthen military, economic, political, cultural and sports boycotts against the régime. The international community must lend all necessary support to the liberation movements in their legitimate struggle by all available means, including armed struggle.

45. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.

46. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that he wished to clarify a point; he observed that the purpose of the Committee's meeting was to express solidarity with South African prisoners and all the comrades-in-arms fighting against fascism in South Africa. He had been greatly disturbed therefore to note that speaker after speaker had referred only to the leaders of ANC. Perhaps that was merely an oversight on their part, or perhaps PAC did not have the right connexions in the right places. It might even be suspected that an orchestrated campaign was afoot. PAC had even gone to the trouble of setting up outside the conference room a display consisting of photos and texts documenting the plight of PAC leaders under Vorster's persecution. In their position in the forefront of the struggle, PAC leaders had undergone the same suffering as other leaders; they, too were therefore deserving of inclusion in the expressions of solidarity. Otherwise, the day might just as well be called a "Day of Selective Solidarity". A tribute should be paid to all who were involved in the struggle. The representatives of ANC had referred to the contributions of PAC and he himself had referred in his own statement to the contribution of

ANC, in a spirit of seeking to unite all the forces which were fighting against the common enemy. The cause of unity was not served by promoting rivalry. The Committee should not therefore try to divide the Azanian people any more than they already were.

47. The CHAIRMAN said that he believed he spoke for the entire membership of the Committee in stating that the Committee was meeting to express its solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa and for that purpose only. That did not mean that the Committee had forgotten those who were carrying on the struggle but merely that the focus of the day was on the tears, blood and suffering of the prisoners. Therefore, while respecting fully the point of view of PAC, he rejected the criticism expressed by its representative.

48. Mr. MARMULAKU (Yugoslavia) said that the solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa that was being expressed in the Committee reflected the indignation of all progressive world public opinion at a racist and Fascist régime which ruthlessly trampled on fundamental human rights, violated the Charter and ignored the decisions of the United Nations. All recent developments in South Africa as well as the documentation submitted to the Committee, the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022), the introductory statement by the Rapporteur of that Committee (951st meeting), and the statement made in the Special Political Committee by the representative of OAU at that meeting showed beyond any shadow of a doubt that the racist régime in South Africa was becoming even more brutal and that, after its defeat through the suspension of its delegation at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, it was endeavouring to deceive the international community by pretending that it was ready to negotiate with the black majority while it was actually trying to split the liberation movements and the people of South Africa in order to prolong the existence of a racist régime based on exploitation.

49. On behalf of his delegation he pledged full support for, and solidarity with, the liberation movements and political prisoners in South Africa. His delegation believed that the United Nations and the international community as a whole must make resolute efforts to secure the complete elimination of *apartheid*, the most shameful system in human history.

50. Mr. MARTYNENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that on the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners all progressive mankind and all those who prized peace, freedom, human dignity and justice were expressing their solidarity with and support for the struggle of the people of South Africa and were angrily condemning racism and the barbaric system of *apartheid*, which had been branded as a crime against humanity.

51. As far back as 1963, in its resolution 1881 (XVIII), the General Assembly had unanimously called for the release of South African political prisoners. However, the racist régime in South Africa continued to trample on the Charter of the United Nations and to ignore that resolution as well as all other decisions of the United Nations calling on it to put an end to racism and oppression. As the latest report (A/10022) of the Special Committee against *Apart-*

heid showed, racist terror had assumed even greater dimensions and there had been a new wave of arrests involving dozens of people who opposed the inhuman system of *apartheid*.

52. After illegally occupying Namibia, the Pretoria authorities were implanting colonial and racist systems there and strengthening repression against those who were struggling for the freedom and independence of the oppressed people of South Africa. The racist régime, with the help of its well-known guardians and protectors, was equipping its army with new weapons and feverishly creating a staging area against the liberation movement of the African peoples, which had gained new strength since the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. Those developments created a direct threat to international peace and security and at the same time exposed the true aims of the policy of so-called "mutual understanding" recently proclaimed by Pretoria. The reason why the South African racists ignored United Nations decisions and continued to pursue a policy of *apartheid* lay chiefly in the extensive military, political, economic and financial support being given to them by imperialist circles and their monopolies, which profited at the expense of the Africans. That was confirmed by the report and other documents of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. With the aim of preserving *apartheid*, intimidating the indigenous population and suppressing the national liberation movement, the racist authorities were continuing to apply inhuman laws which constituted a gross violation of the Charter. Using alleged infringements of those racist laws as a pretext, they had sent and were continuing to send thousands of their opponents to prisons and concentration camps, often to their death. The memory of Abram Fischer, the courageous fighter for the future of the people of South Africa, was venerated. The endurance and strength of spirit of the many who were still in prison aroused admiration, and their courage and devotion to the cause of the liberation of their country were convincing proof that the racists would never under any circumstances succeed in breaking the will of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia, who would inevitably triumph in their just struggle.

53. The sympathies of the Ukrainian people were wholly on the side of the fighters in South Africa, and his country had given and would continue to give support and assistance of every kind to the South African freedom fighters. His delegation was strongly in favour of a proposal calling for effective action against the South African racists in order to attain the release of all South African political prisoners. It was convinced that the Day of Solidarity would help to mobilize further the efforts of the United Nations and of the world community in support of the just struggle of the patriots of South Africa for the freedom and independence of their people and for the isolation and final elimination of racism and *apartheid*.

54. Mr. GHELEV (Bulgaria) said that his delegation welcomed the opportunity to express once again solidarity with the martyrs of racist repression at a time when it was more than ever necessary to mobilize world public opinion with a view to strengthening and rendering more effective the struggle against the forces of reaction. Bulgaria's position on *apartheid* was well known. Any form of racial discrimination was quite unthinkable for the Bulgarian

people. The theory and practice of racism had always been rejected and strongly condemned by the Bulgarian Government, whose position was founded on the basic principles of the Socialist State and reflected in its legislation and Constitution. The Government of Bulgaria had always associated itself with international action against racism in all its forms and manifestations and, more particularly, that of *apartheid*. For that reason, his delegation entirely endorsed United Nations activities in defence of the victims of the racist and criminal régime of South Africa. That régime had once again defied the appeals and resolutions of the United Nations and had rejected all requests by the international community on the subject of South African political prisoners. It had even promulgated still more repressive laws and had expanded the network of repression. It was the sacred duty of the international community to denounce categorically the barbaric policy of South Africa, which constituted the very negation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In view of the racists' refusal to liberate the political prisoners, all Governments should consolidate activities to isolate that régime and make further efforts to support those who fought for liberty and human dignity in South Africa.

55. His delegation was willing to associate itself with any action which would succeed in breaking down the indifference, if not the hypocrisy, of certain circles and Governments and which would also bring a message of hope and encouragement to the many victims of racist repression.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

56. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) associated his delegation with the expressions of solidarity with South African political prisoners, who were incarcerated because of their opposition to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and their struggle for fundamental freedoms and human rights. Afghanistan had always supported the struggle of peoples under colonial rule and alien domination and a cardinal tenet of its foreign policy was rejection of racism and *apartheid*. His delegation wished to reaffirm the support of the Government and people of Afghanistan for the legitimate struggle of the South African people for the total elimination of *apartheid* and for the right to self-determination.

57. The international community had first appealed in General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) for the unconditional release of all persons detained or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid*, but the South African Government had disregarded that and subsequent appeals and had enacted even more oppressive laws and extended the system of repression and imprisonment.

58. Reiterating its indignation at the continuation of the inhuman and uncivilized policies of *apartheid* in South Africa, his delegation wished to associate itself with a further call to the Government of South Africa to grant an unconditional amnesty to all prisoners detained because of their opposition to *apartheid* and to repeal all repressive laws and regulations perpetrating racial discrimination and *apartheid* in South Africa.

59. Mr. PINTO-BAZURCO (Peru) said that, although the South African racist régime continued to detain many leaders of the South African people, the just struggle of the people went on. History was irreversible and the cause of the South African people would triumph. *Apartheid* would be remembered as a strange phenomenon in the development of human civilization and an absurd practice by a State against its people. When the natural evolution of a people was hindered by force, a revolution became legitimate and, accordingly, his delegation wished to reaffirm his country's solidarity with those who were fighting to free themselves.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) resumed the Chair.

60. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, in proclaiming the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* was calling on the international community to reaffirm its support for the just struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa for their national liberation, and was also calling on all Governments and organizations to reaffirm their solidarity with South African political prisoners. The Day would be fittingly and broadly observed by Soviet society. Soviet public organizations were actively informing the Soviet people through the mass media about the events taking place in southern Africa and about the evils of colonialism, racism and *apartheid*, and were mobilizing the Soviet public in support of the campaign for the liberation of South African political prisoners.

61. The Soviet Union was pursuing a consistent and principled policy against colonialism, racism and *apartheid*: one of the basic principles of its foreign policy was all-round political, diplomatic and other support for the peoples who were selflessly struggling for their independence and national liberation. In the international arena and in the United Nations, it consistently advocated the immediate and final liquidation of the colonial and racist régimes. The Soviet Union greatly admired the thousands of selfless fighters for freedom in southern Africa, many of whom had been sentenced to life imprisonment, who were currently languishing in the prisons and torture chambers of the South African régime. Those sacrifices had not been in vain because the prisoners' deep faith in their own people and in their just cause and final victory inspired all the South African people to new efforts. The success of the heroic struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, based on the fraternal assistance and support of the Socialist countries and other progressive forces of the world, was a shining example for them. In alleviating the fate of the captives of the Fascist régime of South Africa, much depended on those countries which connived with and often protected that régime. Their representatives spoke a great deal about human rights at the United Nations, but when it came to taking effective measures to protect the rights of the freedom fighters in South Africa they failed to support the victims of racism, *apartheid* and colonialism. However, history irrefutably showed that the struggle of peoples for freedom, national independence and social progress was insuperable.

62. Détente, which through the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries was becoming

irreversible, was a powerful impulse for the new upsurge of the struggle for the full and final liberation of peoples. The affirmation of those who, contrary to commonsense, tried to maintain that détente hindered the national liberation movement was deeply erroneous and harmful, and played into the hands of the racists. In the years when the trend to détente had begun to gather force, the world liberation movement had achieved many important advances.

63. His delegation considered that the time had come to take effective measures against the South African racists and to call for the complete release of South African political prisoners as soon as possible. A wide campaign for their liberation should be waged throughout the world. The Soviet delegation hoped that the just cause of the South African patriots would triumph and that the peoples of South Africa would become free.

64. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey) said that it was most fitting for the international community to observe a Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, whose suffering would bring about a just and equal society in their country. His delegation believed that the struggle for freedom, equity and justice in Azania would be won by the Azanians themselves; whatever action the international community took would be secondary to that taken by the Azanians. His delegation solemnly affirmed its support for the people of Azania and for those Azanian patriots whose determination and devotion to the principles of freedom and equality were an example to all mankind.

65. Mr. BENUZZI (Italy), speaking on behalf of the nine delegations of the European Economic Community (EEC), read out the text of a letter from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. The letter stated that the nine States agreed to observe the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. Those States supported the relevant General Assembly resolutions and affirmed that the concept of imprisonment for political beliefs was alien to them. They associated themselves with the appeal by the Special Committee for freedom for all those who had been imprisoned because of their opposition to the policy of *apartheid*.

66. Mr. DE PRAT GAY (Argentina) said that on the Day of Solidarity his delegation wished to express the support of Argentina for all who were fighting to eradicate racial discrimination and *apartheid*. The day would come when *apartheid* would be brought to an end and when the equality advocated in the Charter of the United Nations would become a reality.

67. Mr. AMISSAH (Ghana) said that, as his delegation renewed its unflinching support for the victims of racial oppression, hatred and discrimination in southern Africa, it was consoled by the independence of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe.

68. Thirty years previously, *apartheid* had been considered an internal and domestic matter which could not be discussed by the General Assembly, but today the overwhelming majority of the membership of the United Nations had affirmed that the liberation movements were

the authentic and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa. The recharting of the map of Africa and the attainment of independent and sovereign statehood by the former colonial countries had made South Africa realize the inevitability of the collapse of the oppressive structure of that country. Its so-called *détente* was nothing more than a smoke-screen to give more time to the architects of *apartheid*. While Vorster had offered to mediate in Southern Rhodesia, he had intensified his oppression in South Africa with more arrests and detentions without trial, torture and brutal treatment of political prisoners, banishment of opponents of *apartheid* and the like. In 1974, South Africa had requested a grace period of six months to enable it to effect changes in the heinous system of *apartheid*, and that hypocritical request had been resolutely supported by the friends of South Africa. Those changes had been dictated by economic necessity caused by the non-availability of white labour at the lowest level of the skilled-labour ladder. If those petty changes were what South Africa and its allies had meant when they had given assurances of changes within six months, they must be told that the majority of people of goodwill in the world would be satisfied only with the total destruction of the entire *apartheid* apparatus.

69. The South African racists had said time and again that there would never be equality between the races in that country. Their actions were directed to stabilizing and perpetuating the system of *apartheid*. In the circumstances, the international community might ask why France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America supported South Africa with all the means at their disposal and opposed attempts to discipline South Africa. Why did those three countries want to retain South Africa, with its racist national policy and practices, in the United Nations and why did the United States find it difficult to support a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa? The answer lay in the economic and military profits accruing to those countries from the continued exploitation of cheap labour of blacks and non-whites by South Africa. In the view of his delegation, colour contributed to the negative attitude of those countries. Recently, there had been an emotional outburst in the countries of EEC against a State Member of the United Nations, but thousands of people suffered imprisonment, death, detention without trial, and the denial of basic human rights and human dignity in South Africa while EEC looked on, expressing only theoretical support and refusing to take corrective action. The European countries had instituted punitive measures against a country whose victims were white, but in South Africa the victims were non-white and Europe therefore opposed effective sanctions against that country.

70. The United States of America, the United Kingdom and France had shamelessly reiterated their support for the racists of South Africa when the Special Political Committee had decided to permit ANC and PAC to participate in its deliberations and to exclude therefrom the representatives of the Fascist régime. They had shamelessly opposed and vetoed the expulsion of South Africa. However, South Africa, by previously refusing to be present when *apartheid* was debated, had forfeited the right to participate in the deliberations of the international community. His delegation took consolation in the fact that opposition to *apartheid* was growing each day and that South Africa was

conscious of its increasing isolation. The eradication of so-called "petty" *apartheid* was not enough; what was required was the total eradication of *apartheid* in South Africa and all forms of racial discrimination anywhere in the world. His delegation believed that reason, objectivity and reality would prevail over the love of economic gain and military alliances, over racial oppression and racial injustice. Very soon those who supported *apartheid* would request permission to endorse the liberation movements as the legitimate representatives of the majority of the people of South Africa. Meanwhile, the struggle continued unabated and victory would inevitably be won by the people of South Africa.

71. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria) extended the greetings and support of the Government of Nigeria to the exploited, suppressed and dispossessed people of South Africa and to their liberation movements and pledged support for their legitimate struggle for freedom, justice and self-determination. The great heroes of South Africa, of Africa and of all oppressed and underprivileged people had for many decades fought for their basic human rights. The struggle in South Africa had started as a peaceful one. It was becoming an armed struggle and, unless the minority régime in South Africa read the warning signs, it would doubtless become a racial conflagration, which would help nobody.

72. The people of South Africa today were condemned to acquiesce in their plight and remain in delimited reserves, join the slave-camps in the mines and ghettos around the resplendent cities, or resort to armed struggle and go to prison. As was well known, 15 million non-whites were condemned to live in the most barren reserves covering 13 per cent of their homeland, while the racist minority group of less than 4 million whites plundered 87 per cent of the land. The majority could not be expected to continue to live in such despicable circumstances. Those who sought work were forced to live like slaves in the notorious compounds regulated by the pass laws and were denied the right to travel freely within their own country. The main concern of the white minority had been to create and contain a vast supply of cheap African labour by means of collective agreements by the mining companies to peg African workers' wages, a recruitment monopoly which frustrated the free relationship between supply and demand, and servile labour measures regulated by racist laws and institutions. It was well known that 97 per cent of the labour force in South Africa was engaged on yearly contracts, the purpose of which was to prevent workers from developing skills and acquiring class consciousness. Moreover, the workers were kept in place by quasi-military institutions inside the compound. The South African system was the most theoretically perfect system of labour exploitation yet devised. Workers could neither individually nor collectively exercise their power, could not bargain with management, could not employ organizers, could not withdraw their labour and could not strike. Political power was used by the minority to perpetuate economic privilege for the whites whose efforts were directed to perpetuating the *status quo*.

73. The police detained people indefinitely and held them incommunicado in the harsh conditions of Robben Island prison and in remote areas. All colour groups which supported liberal values were arrested and detained under

one repressive law or another. The brutality of the South African police was well known; all recalled FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) Day in 1974, when they had unleashed their dogs on people during a peaceful rally.

74. The Day of Solidarity was a time when the good wishes of the international community went out to the thousands of political prisoners in South Africa to pledge solidarity with them, their cause and their objectives. The international community should continue its efforts to help the oppressed people of South Africa and his delegation pledged its full support to their cause. It stood solidly by the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. It asked for the release of all political prisoners in South Africa. Though the heroes of South Africa might be held in prison today, the cause for which they were fighting would go forward to victory.

75. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, since a number of delegations still wished to speak, the Committee might wish to devote a third meeting on Monday, 13 October 1975, to concluding the commemoration of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

955th meeting

Monday, 13 October 1975, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.955

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to continue its observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners.

2. Mr. IPSARIDES (Cyprus) noted that three decades after the establishment of the United Nations, which had emerged from the ashes and ruins of the Second World War, the ruthlessly repressive white minority régime in South Africa continued to plunder the indigenous black majority of that country. His delegation, together with the vast majority of Member States, wished to pay a tribute to those who had been persecuted because of their quest for freedom and equality and because they refused to live as slaves. It was not, however, enough to pay a tribute to those men and women and to express solidarity with them in their courageous and heroic struggle. What was needed was effective action by the international community as a whole. Moreover, racism could only be effectively eradicated if those who practised it were deprived of the means of doing so. Perhaps the only effective answer would be the total isolation of the South African régime and increased support for the oppressed peoples of South Africa and their liberation movements, whose cause was the cause of all mankind.

3. His delegation associated itself with all other delegations in expressing once more its firm solidarity with South

African political prisoners and in calling upon the South African régime to halt forthwith and unconditionally its acts of persecution.

Mr. Hussein (Somalia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

4. Mr. WOLF (Austria) said that his delegation wished to join the many other delegations which had condemned time and again the inhuman policies of *apartheid*. On numerous occasions, in the United Nations and elsewhere, the Austrian Federal Government had unequivocally stated its position in favour of political liberty throughout the world. It noted with regret, however, that the efforts of the international community to put an end to the oppressive policies of the Government of South Africa seemed to have been in vain, although an undeniable wind of change in the southern part of Africa provided grounds for some measure of optimism for the immediate future. Convinced that the forces of repression in South Africa would not triumph, his delegation wished to declare its solidarity with South African political prisoners and to join in the appeal for their immediate release.

5. Mr. K.B. SINGH (Nepal) recalled that General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) had been highly significant because, with the single exception of South Africa, all Member States had voted in favour of it. However, the police régime in Pretoria had ignored that resolution and continued its reign of terror in flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The purpose of the Day of Solidarity was not merely to draw the attention of world public opinion to such violations but also to reaffirm that there could be no peaceful solution in South Africa unless all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid* were released unconditionally and allowed to participate in genuine negotiations, on a basis of equality, with a view to working out the destiny of South Africa. With the liberation of the former Portuguese

colonies, the racist régime in Pretoria had seemed to have read the warning signs, but it had apparently chosen to resort to the strategy of creating divisions among the indigenous people by establishing so-called "homelands" and by camouflaging the severe repression against those in opposition under the cover of so-called détente and dialogue. Its diversionary tactics merely concealed a determination to push ahead with *apartheid* and to consolidate and perpetuate white domination, while agreeing to relax some of the more glaring manifestations of racism in order to pacify public opinion. The continued trials, bannings and other forms of persecution reflected the vengefulness of the régime and the increasing resistance to *apartheid*. The brutal treatment and torture of prisoners continued to be a matter of grave concern. No fewer than 70 persons were under detention, most of them under the Terrorism Act of 1967, and some had been held incommunicado in prison for long periods, without access to family or counsel.

6. His delegation wished to stress once again that the international community had a responsibility to all the prisoners detained for their opposition to *apartheid*, who had been subjected to all kinds of ill-treatment and torture for upholding the principles, aspirations and rights embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it wished to reiterate its support for the aims of the Day of Solidarity.

7. Mr. KAPLLANI (Albania) said that his delegation wished to reaffirm its whole-hearted support for the just struggle of the South African people against the Fascist régime in Pretoria. The situation of the political prisoners in South Africa was but one manifestation of the inhuman conditions under which the indigenous population of that country was compelled to live. It was a direct consequence of the Fascist policies of *apartheid* pursued by the Vorster clique, which had virtually turned South Africa into a prison state. That situation had evoked world-wide indignation on the part of progressive mankind as a whole.

8. The United Nations in general and the Special Political Committee in particular had for years condemned the policies of *apartheid* of the Pretoria régime, but the bitter truth was that United Nations resolutions had not changed in the slightest the inhuman conditions of life of millions of people in South Africa. The Vorster clique was able to maintain its régime and continue the hated policies of *apartheid* because it had enjoyed and continued to enjoy the support of the imperialist Powers, mainly the United States of America, which had made the Pretoria régime a bastion of imperialism and colonialism against the independent and progressive African countries.

9. His delegation was in full agreement with those who had stated that they harboured no illusions about the alleged "goodwill" and "kind intentions" of the Vorster clique. It wished to state its contempt for and rejection of the view expressed during the Committee's deliberations that the so-called spirit of détente was helping to bring nearer the day of liberation for the peoples of Africa. Evidence of the falseness of that idea was afforded by the existence of political prisoners in South Africa and the plight of the indigenous population of that country.

10. The armed struggle of the Azanian and Namibian peoples, which was an inseparable part of the struggle of

the African continent and the liberation struggle of the peoples of the world, would surely lead them to freedom and independence. Their path of struggle had made it possible for the representatives of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde to take their rightful places in the United Nations. His delegation had always believed, and it was now convinced, that the day would come when the valiant people of Azania would, by force of arms, settle accounts with the racist Pretoria régime.

11. Mr. AL-SABAH (Kuwait), speaking as Chairman of the Asian group for the month of October 1975, noted that *apartheid* was not only a threat to international security but also a crime, since it permitted the majority to be exploited by the minority. In addition to offering moral support to those who were subjected to *apartheid*, the international community needed to consider what action it could take to end the sufferings of the majority in South Africa. In spite of the embargo imposed upon it by Security Council resolution 181 (1963), South Africa was armed to the teeth as a result of the military aid supplied by certain Western countries. It was clear that any sanctions imposed on South Africa had to be mandatory and should include the severing of diplomatic relations, an economic embargo and the exclusion of South Africa from international organizations. The problems created by racial discrimination and *apartheid* concerned all mankind and there could be no security as long as some peoples were deprived of basic rights and freedoms. The Asian peoples had been among the first to press for the inclusion of the question of racial segregation in the agenda of the United Nations, and it was incumbent upon the great Asian nations to come to the assistance of the oppressed. They therefore expressed their solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa and asked for measures to be undertaken to eradicate racial discrimination everywhere in the world.

12. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that the General Assembly, the Security Council, other organs of the United Nations, and the international community as a whole had condemned *apartheid* as a crime against humanity. They had reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa against *apartheid* and racial discrimination. They had called upon the South African régime to release all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid* and had expressed their unqualified solidarity with those brave men and women in South Africa who had devoted their lives and efforts to the struggle for the liberation of the South African people from the degrading practices and manifestations of the *apartheid* régime. The Day of Solidarity assumed special significance because of the recent wave of repression, during which the South African régime had arrested many black youths, students and cultural leaders. The régime stood condemned for its policies of repression and had brought upon itself universal obloquy in the international community.

13. The just cause of the people of South Africa would triumph in the end, since history showed that a people could not subjugate another people for ever. Just as the peoples of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Papua New Guinea had regained their freedom, so would the oppressed people of South Africa.

14. His delegation saluted the political prisoners of South Africa, black and white, as they waged their struggle for a cause that was right and just. It saluted the liberation movements, which epitomized the long struggle for liberation from the yoke of the *apartheid* régime and for the realization of the noble aspirations of the people of South Africa. The people of the Philippines, having experienced humiliation and indignity as a subject people for hundreds of years, today rose in solidarity with the political prisoners of South Africa and would continue to support them until the oppressed people of South Africa enjoyed the blessings of self-determination and independence on the basis of equality and justice.

15. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that during the commemoration of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, his delegation wished to reaffirm its total support for the liberation movements of Azania, the first victims of the racist régime in South Africa. It wished to stress that, as the President of the Republic of Zaire had pointed out in his address to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session (2140th plenary meeting), Zaire as a whole was mobilized to fight against all the racists and colonialists in southern Africa, and it would spare no efforts to aid the liberation movements which were struggling to liberate Azania. His delegation would like the Special Political Committee to adopt a forceful resolution assuring the suffering people of South Africa and their imprisoned leaders of the total support of the international community for their noble cause. In the view of his delegation, such a resolution would be the best way of assuring the liberation movements of the international community's solidarity with their aspirations and would be a source of hope for political prisoners in South Africa.

16. Mr. TSIYREGZEN (Mongolia) expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for the idea of organizing the Day of Solidarity. The Pretoria régime's pursuit of its policy of *apartheid*, thereby flouting the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations and also world public opinion, constituted a serious threat to peace and security. His delegation was deeply concerned at the new wave of repression against the opponents of that policy and the daily increase in the number of detainees. The Government and people of the Mongolian People's Republic had always condemned the policy of *apartheid* practised in South Africa and wished to join with all progressive forces in the world to demand that the Vorster régime immediately and unconditionally free all political prisoners in South Africa.

17. Mr. NDOUME AZABOUDE (United Republic of Cameroon) said that the odious system of *apartheid* was a crime against all humanity because it was based on the daily humiliation and oppression of the black people of South Africa and was a serious threat to international peace and security. Despite Vorster's cynical promises at the end of 1974 that there would be changes in the régime within six months, the situation in South Africa had deteriorated with the mass trials of students, the strengthening of the "bantustans" and the continued increase in the military budget with a view to more systematic repression of the liberation movements.

18. The Vorster régime should unconditionally free the hundreds of nationalist leaders languishing in South African

prisons, especially Nelson Mandela. A total embargo on arms, petroleum and other essential products should be imposed and strictly observed. His Government had no relations with South Africa and would always implement any measures taken against that repugnant régime. It strongly condemned the imperialist countries, above all France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and all commercial firms which helped to maintain the *apartheid* system. It also condemned the abusive use made by certain Powers of their Security Council veto in order to oppose any action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations.

19. Mr. MAGONGO (Swaziland) pledged his delegation's solidarity with the South African political prisoners languishing in that country's jails. At the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Swaziland had called upon the Prime Minister of South Africa to release all political prisoners and discuss the liberation of that country with them, as he himself had advocated in the case of political detainees in Southern Rhodesia. The French and Portuguese colonialists' efforts to create black Frenchmen and Portuguese had failed, and that same policy would not succeed in South Africa either. The South Africans' attitude was even more extreme because they regarded white supremacy as created by God. Swaziland would never condone that concept.

20. Miss LOPEZ (Venezuela) said that her delegation wished to express its deep sympathy and solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa and with the liberation movements fighting to regain the dignity of their peoples. The rejection of *apartheid* as a vestige of totalitarianism was natural in Venezuela, whose population resulted from the fusion of Indians, Africans and Europeans and where every type of discrimination was condemned. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* was to be congratulated on suggesting the Day of Solidarity.

21. Mr. KAMANA (Zambia) said that it was fitting that the Committee should hold special meetings to express solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa. His delegation wished to reaffirm the well-known commitment of the Government and people of Zambia to the total eradication of the policies of *apartheid* and racism practised by the minority régime in South Africa and to reaffirm their solidarity with the people of Azania, who, led by their national liberation movements, were struggling for national dignity and their inalienable right to self-determination and independence under majority rule. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia had said in his address to the General Assembly at the current session (2356th plenary meeting), the South African régime would never command respect and win international acceptance so long as it was committed to those abhorrent policies and fostered so-called "homelands" to perpetuate the exploitation and oppression of the black majority.

22. Zambia had never engaged in any "détente" exercise with South Africa but was committed to the destruction of the *status quo* of minority racist domination in southern Africa. Its contacts with South Africa had been limited to seeking a peaceful settlement in Southern Rhodesia on the basis of majority rule in accordance with the Manifesto on

Southern Africa issued at Lusaka in April 1969¹ and the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa issued by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its ninth extraordinary session, held from 7 to 10 April 1975. The success of its efforts to arrange talks on the future of Southern Rhodesia had not in any way affected its general attitude towards South Africa, which was based on the fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Its commitment to the eradication of *apartheid* and racism in South Africa remained firm. It had repeatedly called on South Africa to release all political prisoners and detainees, to permit free political activity, to lift the ban on the nationalist movements, and to recognize as the authentic representatives of the African people of Azania the leaders of the liberation movements rather than the leaders of the so-called "homelands", who were mere puppets. As in the past, it would match its moral support for the liberation movements with material assistance. Although the international community seemed at least verbally unanimous in its opposition to *apartheid* and minority rule in southern Africa, words alone could not free a subjugated people. It was time to move to practical action to change the *status quo*. The liberation movements must be given the means to fight, and those countries, particularly the major Western Powers, which had double standards in their dealings with South Africa must join in a total international boycott of that country, since they clearly had not used their influence to bring about change.

23. Mr. KIDANE MARIAM (Ethiopia) said that the special meetings to express solidarity with South African political prisoners were evidence that the *apartheid* régime was still condemned by most peace-loving peoples in the world. He hoped that the Day of Solidarity would remind all peoples of the need for concerted efforts to eradicate the policies of *apartheid*.

24. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia) expressed his delegation's solidarity with the political prisoners suffering persecution in South Africa for their ideals. His country was traditionally opposed to discrimination on the grounds of colour, race or religion, and all its legislation was based on that principle. All segregation must be eliminated, and United Nations resolutions aimed at eradicating the odious system of *apartheid* must be implemented in order that nationalist movements and groups in South Africa should no longer be persecuted for their ideals and for racial reasons.

25. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had concluded its observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners and would resume the general debate on item 53.

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)*

26. Mr. DE GAAY FORTMAN (Netherlands) said that the South African Prime Minister's recent statement that negotiations in Southern Rhodesia should continue because the alternative was too ghastly to contemplate might show that he was beginning to understand the implications of the

situation in southern Africa, but he should realize that that statement applied to his own country as well. The Netherlands was distressed that the many United Nations resolutions, reports and discussions had had no significant effect on the South African Government. It could not accept the view expressed by the South African representative, speaking in the Security Council during the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly,² that *apartheid* was part of South Africa's internal affairs. The people living in South Africa were not just citizens of that country but part of humanity, and systematic denial of equal rights on the basis of discrimination by colour or race was contrary to fundamental human rights and could not be regarded as a purely internal affair. In his speech, the South African representative had claimed that racial discrimination was not the same as racism and that the latter term should only be used if people had racial feelings of superiority, which did not exist in South Africa. The world could never accept any distinction between those terms, and the only yardstick to be used in judging racial policies was the principle of human equality. The problem of racism was not confined to South Africa but was a global and very explosive problem.

27. It was disappointing that the South African Prime Minister's promise at the end of 1974 that there would be surprising changes in South Africa within six months had not been fulfilled. Like those countries which had adopted the Manifesto on Southern Africa¹ at Lusaka, the Netherlands Government could agree that a political solution for South Africa based on the principle of equality might call for compromise during a transition period, but the South African Government could at least take serious steps towards revoking all discriminatory legislation and enacting new laws banning discrimination. That would eliminate the so-called "petty" *apartheid*, but the so-called "homelands" policy was equally discriminatory. About 70 per cent of the black population in South Africa were not living in the "homelands" but in ghettos within the so-called white areas, which constituted 87 per cent of the Republic's total territory. South Africa should progress towards the granting of full human and political rights and economic opportunity to the non-white population living within those areas. Independence for a so-called "homeland" would mean that all people in the rest of the Republic who were supposed to live in that "homeland" would be regarded as foreigners.

28. *Apartheid* could not survive, and the South African Government must choose between violent confrontation and real dialogue between all its citizens.

29. His country wished to keep its lines of communication with South Africa open and seek to convince white South Africans of the basic immorality and impracticality of their racial policies, because it believed that every opportunity should be used to promote peaceful change within South Africa. Many people understandably doubted whether it was still possible to have contact with those who held racist views. However, in fighting evil policies the power of words should not be underestimated. Even those responsible for such policies had a conscience, and people who supported

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

* Resumed from the 952nd meeting.

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year*, 1800th meeting.

them were often blinded by fear. It was in the white South Africans' own interest to abolish the hatred-breeding system of *apartheid* and thus destroy the roots of fear. They should be encouraged by the attitude of reconciliation demonstrated by many peoples once oppressed by racists. In the long term, the white South Africans' only chance of survival was to be recognized as Africans. Human contacts should make it possible to convey to the South African population the basic message of the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es Salaam Declaration, but the South African Government should listen above all to the voice of non-racialism from within South Africa.

30. The South African Government had accepted the new realities in Mozambique and Angola, and its Prime Minister had urged the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia to accept the inevitability of majority rule. It would be a tragic illusion for the South African Government to continue to think that such realism in foreign policy was compatible with internal repression and the frustration of every attempt to create a non-racial society within South Africa itself. South Africa had perhaps accepted the new realities purely as a consequence of changing power structures. White South Africans must realize that man was important not because he belonged to a certain race or tribe but because he was human.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) resumed the Chair.

31. Mr. ABDULDJALIL (Indonesia) said that since its inception the United Nations had been concerned with the problem of *apartheid*, basing its support for the courageous struggle for fundamental human rights in South Africa on the principles contained in its Charter.

32. Despite the imprisonment, torture, and even death inflicted on opponents of *apartheid*, the millions of South Africans who sought elementary justice had not been cowed by the brutality of the régime and were continuing their struggle.

33. The preceding 18 months had seen an important and perhaps decisive change in the international balance of forces confronting the South African Government. As a result of the collapse of the Portuguese empire in southern Africa, South Africa was no longer safely ensconced behind a buffer of colonialist and racist régimes. It had been further isolated by the success of those opposing *apartheid* at the United Nations and in other international forums.

34. Realizing the country's growing isolation, a number of South African Cabinet Ministers had recently made statements to the effect that a modification of the policy of *apartheid* was being considered. The régime's actions had made it clear, however, that no real change was contemplated and that "separate development" would remain the corner-stone of its policy. The white minority would continue to rule, while the African majority would remain powerless in their own homeland.

35. In an attempt to conceal its true aims and to convince others that it had effected a genuine change in its racial policies, the South African Government had intensified contacts with other States and influential foreigners. While that campaign had obtained favourable treatment for the

régime in some segments of the press and mass media, foreign investors, recognizing the potential instability resulting from unjust social and economic policies, were becoming reluctant to invest in a number of South African industrial projects.

36. Thus, in spite of the claims of the régime, the actual situation had shown no improvement. In fact, the conditions of the African population had progressively deteriorated. Political prisoners continued to languish in South African gaols, repressive legislation remained in force and the organizations which represented the majority of the people continued to be proscribed.

37. In disregard of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the most recent of which was resolution 3324 E (XXIX), the régime was pursuing its plans to establish the "bantustans". The latter were mere enclaves which did not possess any of the characteristics of a viable independent State. A large part of their *de jure* population would reside outside their borders, and they would serve as a continuing source of cheap labour for the South African economy. South Africa's "bantustan" policy was therefore completely inconsistent with the concept of self-determination upheld by the United Nations and constituted an attempt to perpetuate the colonialist and racist domination of the white minority.

38. In its campaign to deceive world public opinion, the régime had also held a number of so-called "consultations with black leaders" while at the same time steadfastly refusing to meet with the representatives of the liberation movement recognized by OAU. Consultations held with the régime's puppets could not be considered a genuine attempt on the part of South Africa to communicate with the majority of the African people, who continued to protest against the policies of the Vorster régime and call for the release of political prisoners. The continuing repression of the opponents of *apartheid*, the build-up of military forces, and the enforcement of *apartheid*, regulations in sports clearly showed that no significant change had taken place in South Africa and that none was contemplated for the future.

39. The question now confronting the international community was how best to maintain and increase pressure on the Vorster régime in order to compel it to abandon its policies of racial discrimination. The régime had refused to accept the prerequisites for a peaceful solution set forth by the General Assembly in resolution 3324 C (XXIX). It was imperative, therefore, that the Members of the United Nations should take additional steps to isolate the régime and support the liberation movements. Attention should be drawn, in particular, to the actions of some Governments which continued to support the régime through trade and other relations; that constituted sustained and effective support of the *apartheid* system and should be exposed as such.

40. Modification of the "bantustan" policy and changes in minor *apartheid* laws would not satisfy the United Nations or the requirements of political, social and economic justice.

41. Since no real progress had been made in the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa, his

delegation hoped that the Security Council would not fail to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

42. His delegation welcomed the increase in contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. The Seminar on South Africa, sponsored by the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, had been held in Paris from 28 April to 2 May 1975 and had proved most useful in acquainting a broader segment of the European people with the aims and activities of the Special Committee. It would be most useful to hold seminars in other places, particularly in Latin America. Close co-operation with OAU should be maintained, and consultations between the Special Committee and Governments, especially the main trading partners of South Africa, should be intensified. A stepped-up campaign to disseminate information on *apartheid* should be undertaken by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and co-operation with non-governmental organizations and the specialized agencies should be pursued.

43. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) said that since the founding of the United Nations the Government of South Africa had consistently disregarded the Charter of the United Nations as well as General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for an end to racism and *apartheid*. *Apartheid* was one of the most serious problems of the twentieth century and should be categorically condemned.

44. Racial segregation and *apartheid* as practised by the Government of South Africa were tantamount to genocide. In resolution 2202 A (XXI), the General Assembly had characterized *apartheid* as a grave threat to international peace and security and a crime against humanity.

45. *Apartheid* implied not only racial segregation and the denial of political rights but also social and economic discrimination. The black majority was compelled to perform the most menial tasks, while under the so-called Industrial Provisions of 1956 they were denied the right to organize in trade unions. In the area of education, 70 per cent of the African population of primary school age was not enrolled in school.

46. The situation therefore called for continuing major efforts on the part of the international community and should be kept under constant review.

47. Qatar complied with all United Nations decisions regarding *apartheid* and, accordingly, had no diplomatic or economic relations with South Africa. Nationals of Qatar were also forbidden to have relations of any kind with the Government of South Africa. Qatar had condemned the policy of *apartheid* in numerous international forums.

48. There were obvious similarities between the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people and the racial discrimination practised by South Africa. The masks were different, but the hideous face behind was the same. Zionist Israel and South Africa considered themselves to be outposts of European civilization in Asia and Africa. They believed that by virtue of race, origin and religion they were entitled to a privileged status. They both used the same

vocabulary to describe the indigenous peoples in their respective territories.

49. Qatar, for its part, was prepared to make every effort to bring an end to the odious policies of racial discrimination and segregation.

50. Mr. OULD SIDI (Mauritania) welcomed the admission to the United Nations of four fraternal countries, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, whose independence was the culmination of a long struggle against colonialism. His delegation was also pleased that the legitimate rights of the Cambodian people had been restored and their legitimate representatives seated in the General Assembly.

51. The United Nations had been dealing with the problem of *apartheid* for more than a quarter of a century, and there was still not the faintest hope of improvement in the situation.

52. *Apartheid* constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. Refusing to heed the voice of reason and to make any concessions whatsoever to their black compatriots, the leaders of South Africa continued to defy world public opinion in the most arrogant fashion and to arm the country in order to perpetuate their hateful system. The free peoples represented in the United Nations would not, however, be cowed by Vorster and his clique.

53. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) abounded in sordid examples of the régime's conduct. He paid a tribute to Mr. Ogbu, the former Chairman of the Special Committee, for his role in preparing that report, which contributed to a better understanding of the problem of *apartheid*.

54. World public opinion could not remain indifferent to the brutal treatment meted out to the black population of South Africa because of their quest for justice and equality. The policy of *apartheid* was a crime and was contrary to the universally recognized principle of equality among men. It was also contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, which proclaimed the fundamental rights of man and the dignity and worth of the human person. The Government of South Africa was therefore deliberately flouting the principles to which it had subscribed by acceding to the Charter.

55. Racial discrimination was practised with increasing cruelty in South Africa, and the United Nations had responded by adopting innumerable resolutions condemning that country. Yet, those resolutions had had no effect. The Vorster régime had intensified its discrimination while professing to make changes in the system. World public opinion had not been deceived by Vorster's intrigues which were aimed at ending the isolation of his country and thwarting the efforts of the United Nations to promote co-ordinated international action against *apartheid*. Vorster was seeking merely to gain time to build up his arsenal in order to suppress the ever-growing resistance to *apartheid*. It should be noted in that connexion that the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the "Sabotage Act" of 1962 and numerous other repressive measures were still fresh in the memory of all.

56. The fact that the United Nations resolutions had had no effect could be attributed to the support given to the Government of South Africa by certain Western Powers. Those Powers, although they were founder Members of the United Nations, persisted in violating the decisions taken against a country which was guilty of flagrant violations of the Charter. Their attitude was a deplorable one.

57. The time had come to go beyond mere words and demonstrate to South Africa that the march of history was

irreversible. In compliance with the provisions of the Charter, his delegation proposed that all States should take prompt economic, political and diplomatic action against South Africa to supplement the action already taken by virtually all African countries. The international community had an obligation to assist the 13 million Africans who were being terrorized by a handful of whites.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

956th meeting

Wednesday, 15 October 1975, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.956

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.324, said that at the current session the General Assembly was commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations and the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, established in pursuance of its resolution 2054 B (XX), which had been adopted on the recommendation of the Special Political Committee, but the need for assistance to persons persecuted in South Africa still remained. The foundation of the Fund was but one expression of international concern to counteract the growth of racial hatred fed by laws that a minority had thought it wise to impose on a majority of the population of South Africa, and the Fund was a common denominator for Member States of the United Nations in their debate over the years on ways of bringing inhuman oppression in South Africa to an end.

2. The Fund, which was intended to meet urgent humanitarian needs, was also commemorating another anniversary. It was just five years since its competence had been extended to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia (General Assembly resolution 2671 E (XXV)). One half of the Member States of the United Nations were contributing to the Fund. The situation in the region was such that much of the Fund's work had to be carried out secretly. The Rhodesian régime, for instance, had recently built up a so-called "defence" system to hinder assistance of all kinds to the victims of its repressive actions.

3. In view of the increasing severity of repression in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, the activities of the Fund should be expanded. It was for that reason that his delegation hoped that the draft resolution, of which the

Netherlands and New Zealand had become sponsors, would be adopted unanimously.

4. Mr. FREEMAN-GREENE (New Zealand) said that although the grace period asked for by the Prime Minister of South Africa in November 1974 had expired, the basic structure and tenets of *apartheid* remained untouched. There had been no commitment from the South African Government to abandon its racist policies. Political equality was still ruled out; equal protection under the law was unknown. Racial intermarriage was forbidden, families were split. In the name of separate development, the people were exiled to non-white areas. His Government was unequivocally opposed to the system, which the Prime Minister had recently described as "degrading".

5. He paid tribute to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and its Chairman for their tireless efforts, which were described in that Committee's report (A/10022).

6. His Government believed it important that effective international pressure be maintained on the South African Government and accordingly supported the recommendations of the Special Political Committee aimed at co-ordinating the international campaign against *apartheid*. In that connexion his Government recognized the importance of the work being done by the Unit on *Apartheid* in disseminating factual information with a view to countering the propaganda of the South African Government. There were many people who still did not fully understand the nature of *apartheid* or the international community's reaction to it. It was for that reason that his Government, which had given \$NZ 5,000 to the Unit on *Apartheid* in 1975, would welcome more information material from the Unit. It would also like to see more countries contributing to the Unit.

7. His delegation also strongly supported the recommendation, made by the Special Committee in paragraph 207 of its report, that the General Assembly should again call for full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. New Zealand had scrupulously complied with the voluntary embargo called for by the Security Council over a decade ago in its resolution 181 (1963), and at the

twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly it had been one of the sponsors of resolution 3324 B (XXIX), in which the Assembly had requested the Security Council to consider imposing a mandatory arms embargo.

8. His delegation also supported the consolidation of the sports boycott against South Africa. This was an area in which South Africa was particularly sensitive to international pressure. His Government had refused permission to any sports team from South Africa to visit its country unless it had been selected on true merit and represented a code in which *apartheid* was not practised in any form at national, provincial and club levels—a requirement which had so far excluded all South African sports teams. In addition, his Government made every endeavour to discourage New Zealand sportsmen from visiting South Africa. However it would not go to the extent of restricting the freedom of New Zealanders to travel where they wished overseas—a right enshrined in article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

9. His country's support for the campaign for the release of South African political prisoners was well known. He believed that that step would help to create an environment in South Africa which would enable all the people of that country to join in discussion of its future. His delegation would therefore support a resolution to that end. Similarly, his Government, whose contribution to various United Nations assistance funds had totalled \$NZ 26,000 for the year 1975/76, as against \$NZ 17,000 in 1974/75 and which had decided to contribute \$NZ 150,000 to a UNICEF project for assisting displaced persons in Zambia, would support a resolution calling for further assistance to victims of *apartheid*.

10. Clearly, therefore, New Zealand's stand against *apartheid* was backed with specific action. His country sought in its attitude to racial discrimination abroad to give expression to the values that guided it at home. His Government was endeavouring, in co-operation with other Governments, to persuade South Africa to move away from *apartheid*, not necessarily overnight but clearly, consistently and progressively. It wanted to see South African society changed by peaceful means and to avoid a situation which compelled liberation movements to resort to force.

11. A trade embargo would be effective only if South Africa's major trading partners observed it, and his Government, which was not one of those trading partners, had reservations on that issue. If, however, the Security Council were to impose mandatory sanctions, New Zealand would fulfil its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

12. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) congratulated the representatives of Mozambique, the Republic of Cape Verde, the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea on the admission of their countries to the United Nations. He was looking forward to the day when he could welcome the delegations of countries whose struggle was still in progress.

13. His country, like all Member States of the Organization, condemned the crime of *apartheid*, which was an attack on human rights, a crime against humanity and a

permanent danger to world peace and security, as had recently been confirmed by the revelation that a large explosives factory existed in South Africa.

14. Egypt's position was the product of many factors, chief among them the fact that it was part of the African continent and its solidarity with the struggle being waged by the peoples of that continent. Moreover, Egypt believed in a true, single and indivisible peace, founded on justice. While it recognized the need to find a peaceful solution to the situation in South Africa, it held that such a solution should not have the effect of legitimizing the Pretoria régime. For that reason, it called upon Member States of the United Nations not to co-operate with the racist régime and to implement the resolutions of the Organization. There could be no denying United Nations responsibility towards the people of South Africa, since the Charter proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination.

15. It was therefore the Organization's duty to disclose all the crimes of the racist régime and to identify the régimes which were collaborating with it. In that connexion, his delegation commended the efforts of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and approved the proposals made by it in chapter II of its report.

16. The actions of the racist régime brought shame not only on South Africa but also on the entire international community, which should therefore strive to isolate South Africa in every sphere as long as the racist policy of the Pretoria régime remained in being. That demand was justified, and the Charter of the United Nations gave the international community the means to make it successful.

17. When, future generations, reading history, saw the suffering of the South African population and the efforts of the United Nations to secure respect for human rights, they would wonder why the Organization had admitted the representatives of the racist régime and why some of its Members had maintained relations with it. For that reason, Egypt considered it essential that South Africa's seat should remain vacant until it was occupied by the legitimate representatives of the South African people. Furthermore, it believed that the liberation movements recognized by OAU should be admitted to the United Nations as observers.

18. Lastly, Egypt denounced the "bantustan" policy under which the Pretoria régime was attempting to ensure its survival. That policy, which resulted in the fragmentation of some social groups, was aimed only at establishing manpower reserves. There was no solution for the Pretoria régime but to end the policies of *apartheid*.

19. Egypt therefore supported the resolutions adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its ninth extraordinary session, held at Dar es Salaam in April 1975, and by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries at Lima in August 1975, and the decision of the Arab countries to impose an oil embargo against South Africa.

20. Egypt was not surprised to see the development of collaboration between South Africa and Israel, both of which refused to implement the decisions of the United

Nations. It could be seen from a report of the Special Committee, entitled "Recent developments in the relations between South Africa and Israel",¹ that Israel was rapidly improving its relations with the racist régime in all areas. The fact that Cape Town and Haifa had recently become twin cities was a symbol of the growing collaboration between the two régimes.

21. Despite the long road still to be travelled, despite the sadness to be found in the report of the Special Committee (A/10022), Egypt was convinced that *apartheid* would disappear, for history had proved that nothing could stand in the way of the will of a people determined to regain its freedom. Justice would triumph. Egypt, which had long experience in the matter, believed that every opportunity for peace should be seized and that racist régimes must restore to the oppressed peoples their freedom and ownership of the natural resources of their territory. Only then could real peace be achieved.

22. Mr. FAHAD (United Arab Emirates) said that his delegation was pleased to welcome the representatives of the four new Members of the United Nations. It was also gratified to see the representatives of the two South African liberation movements at the meetings of the Committee that were devoted to the consideration of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. On studying the report of the Special Committee, whose efforts in the cause of humanity in South Africa were most praiseworthy, it had noted with regret that the racist régimes were continuing their policy of oppression and discrimination in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia; it took the opportunity to reaffirm its solidarity with all the oppressed citizens and political prisoners in those territories. Despite the fact that the question of *apartheid* appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly year after year, particularly since 1952, the minority régime in South Africa was continuing to violate human rights and to show contempt for the most elementary human values. It was consolidating its domination by stifling all opposition and by stirring up tribal rivalries, it was relegating the great majority of the population to "bantustans", which were nothing but reserves of cheap manpower, and it was exploiting the Africans in contempt of humanitarian principles, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the demands of world conscience. And yet countries which claimed to be defenders of human rights and were important Members of the United Nations were not implementing the resolutions adopted by the Organization, particularly General Assembly resolution 3324 B (XXIX), and did not hesitate to provide military and economic aid to the *apartheid* régime, thus encouraging it to pursue its policy of racial discrimination. The United Nations should urge the Governments of those countries to cease all collaboration with South Africa.

23. The plight of the oppressed people of South Africa inevitably brought to mind the cause of the Palestinian people because the policies of Pretoria and those of the Zionist régime were so similar. Israel, too, was a bastion of racism and aggression. Israel had dispossessed an entire people of their homeland and had made them refugees condemned to live outside of Palestine or in occupied

Palestine under the domination of a racist and terrorist régime. Since 1948, the United Nations had adopted several resolutions which affirmed the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and to retake possession of their properties. Israel took as little heed of those resolutions as of the purposes and principles of the Charter and, denying the Palestinian reality and the existence of the Palestinian people, refused to conform to the will of the international community, as expressed in General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), which formally recognized the rights of the Palestinians. In South Africa, as in Israel, artificial régimes based their supremacy on racism and aggression, rejected the basic principles of the Charter and made light of the ideals of the international community. Those two Governments were not qualified to be Members of the United Nations.

24. His delegation condemned all forms of racial discrimination, which ran counter to the principle of equality preached by Islam. Basing itself on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it called on the United Nations to take effective steps to eliminate the relics of colonialism. It would like to see the United Nations provide all possible aid and support to the oppressed peoples and to the leaders of the liberation movements in their legitimate struggle for independence and self-determination; the United Arab Emirates, opposed to all colonialist domination, was pleased to pay tribute to those liberation movements and provided them with moral and material assistance, for example, by prohibiting the exportation of petroleum to South Africa and by maintaining no relations whatever with the racist régime. The United Arab Emirates remained devoted to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes advocated by the Charter of the United Nations and international law, but would continue to assist the liberation movements if the South African Government, ignoring the will of the international community, made any such settlement impossible.

25. After expressing his gratitude to the Chairman and the members of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, who spared no effort in assisting the victims of *apartheid*, he affirmed that his country would continue to support the action undertaken in that field by the United Nations.

26. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) congratulated the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, particularly its outgoing Chairman, Mr. Ogbu, on the positive results it had achieved through its untiring efforts, as shown by the report it had submitted for the current year.

27. His delegation observed with regret that, despite some reports of progress in the situation in South Africa, no notable change appeared to have taken place in the policy of the South African régime, as the Special Committee had pointed out. Indeed, the statements made by the South African leaders all proved that integration was completely out of the question. Africans had understood the tactics used and had made the appropriate response at the ninth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of OAU held at Dar es Salaam from 7 to 10 April 1975.

28. The South African régime had in fact strengthened its structures of repression and had recently promulgated laws

¹ Document A/AC.115/L.411 of 23 July 1975.

preventing anti-*apartheid* organizations from carrying on their activities. In addition, South Africa had continued to arm itself, with the avowed purpose of directly threatening neighbouring independent African States, and the repression of opponents of *apartheid*, particularly the leaders of the liberation movements, had been considerably intensified, thus proving that a large part of the South African population was more and more violently opposing the policies of *apartheid*.

29. Such opposition now existed at all levels in a population which was becoming increasingly aware of its situation. Mozambique's independence, for example, had given new hope to the South African fighters. There was now resistance within the white society, and recently, leaders of the National Union of South African Students and the Christian Institute of South Africa, white organizations, had been arrested. Among them were individuals such as Mr. Breyten Breytenbach, Mr. Karel Tip, Mrs. Clara Rohm and the Reverend James Polley. That phenomenon was so unusual that it had to be emphasized. White South Africans were beginning to feel burdened by an isolation which they were finding more and more unbearable.

30. It was therefore understandable that the South African régime, assisted by much of the Western press, should have tried to present the anodyne measures which had been taken as a revolution in the policy of *apartheid*. Although no one could be deceived by that, it at least proved that the international community would not have isolated South Africa in vain. But the "détente" was essentially aimed at international opinion and was motivated by considerations of domestic politics and by economic concerns. The British weekly *The Economist* had said recently that South Africa's balance of payments would show an even greater deficit in 1975 than in 1974. Only foreign investments could cover such deficits and, in order to obtain them, South Africa had to borrow on the European money markets. Its balance-of-payments position therefore depended on how foreign investors assessed the dual political risk of such investments—the risk of not receiving the expected profits because of the dangerous situation in South Africa, and, for the countries or companies concerned, the risk of international disapproval or an international boycott. Thus, such "détente" was obviously a crude deception. In reality, it was more a matter of "détente abroad, detention at home" as an earlier speaker had remarked.

31. The struggle must therefore be intensified in order to eradicate *apartheid* for ever. The freedom fighters must be helped to defend their most elementary rights.

32. The Upper Volta did not recognize the illegal régime, because it was based essentially on minority rule and on the supremacy of one race over others. His Government proclaimed the legitimacy of the struggle of the national liberation movements and other opponents of *apartheid* for the inauguration of a democratic society in South Africa and the right to self-determination of the South African population as a whole.

33. The policy of "bantustanization" practised by the South African régime was also a cause of concern to the Upper Volta. His delegation hoped that the appeal made by

the General Assembly in its resolution 3324 E (XXIX), paragraph 10, when it had requested all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institution or authority established within the framework of that policy would be heeded. That policy consisted of relegating 18 million blacks to one seventh of the land. The "bantustans" were reservoirs of manpower on which the régime drew at will in order to make huge profits. His delegation hoped that measures would be taken to put an end to that.

34. The Upper Volta was also concerned at the relations which some countries maintained with the *apartheid* régime, in disregard of General Assembly resolutions. It regretted the political, economic and cultural contacts between South Africa and countries which had major responsibilities in the United Nations. It hoped that those countries would soon take the necessary measures, since the United Nations had a special responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa. The Upper Volta particularly regretted the veto used by three permanent members of the Security Council against a mandatory embargo on arms to South Africa and Namibia. The United Nations, which was regarded with scepticism in many parts of the world, must not let slip the opportunity to assert itself at last as the hope of mankind. It was time for it to take steps to put an end to the situation prevailing in southern Africa.

35. His delegation fully supported the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, contained in chapter II of its report, and considered it urgently necessary for the General Assembly to take measures to condemn once again the system of *apartheid*, to recognize the responsibility of the United Nations towards the oppressed people of South Africa, to reaffirm the legitimacy of the struggle of the national liberation movements, to impose a mandatory embargo on arms to South Africa, to condemn the "bantustan" policy and to demand the release of all political prisoners in South Africa.

36. The Upper Volta regarded those measures as the minimum that the United Nations should do for the courageous people of South Africa, who were struggling for their own rights, but also for human rights.

37. In conclusion, his delegation welcomed the representatives of the sister republics of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, and Papua New Guinea.

38. Mr. TSIYREGZEN (Mongolia) said that the constructive efforts of the Socialist countries and of progressive forces throughout the world had brought about an era of détente in international relations, while the recent collapse of the Fascist dictatorship in Portugal and the accession to independence of new African States had given a further impetus to the struggle of the African peoples to eliminate the last vestiges of colonialism. It was therefore all the more distressing to note that racism and racial discrimination continued to exist in southern Africa; although the question of *apartheid* was still, after many years, on the agenda of the General Assembly, the Pretoria régime persisted in practising segregation, increased its military budget, intensified repression and pursued its so-called "bantustan" policy, the sole purpose of which was to consolidate the

domination of the white minority and deprive the majority of the population of their legitimate rights.

39. The South African Government could afford to remain deaf to the voice of the United Nations and international public opinion because it had the political, economic and military support of some Western countries. Moreover, when the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth session, had adopted unanimously, except for a single vote, resolution 3324 B (XXIX) requesting the Security Council to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure the complete cessation of the supply of any arms and military equipment whatsoever to South Africa, as well as any military co-operation with South Africa, vetoes by three Western Powers had prevented the Council from acting. There was abundant evidence to prove indisputably that the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued to collaborate with the racist régime in the military, economic and other fields. According to the data published by IMF, South Africa's foreign trade, which had amounted in 1970 to \$5,741 million, had increased in 1974 to \$12,141 million—the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America being South Africa's main trading partners—while the large imperialist transnational corporations had considerably increased their direct investment in the country, which was thus encouraged in its defiant attitude.

40. His delegation considered that *apartheid* could be eliminated only if all Member States strictly applied all the provisions of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. It supported the recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, particularly those relating to sanctions against South Africa, a mandatory arms embargo and an embargo on oil supplies to South Africa. It also welcomed the international campaign against *apartheid* conducted by the Special Committee, which had included the observance of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the organization, in collaboration with OAU, of the Seminar on South Africa held in Paris from 28 April to 2 May 1975, and the dispatch of missions to various European, North American and Latin American countries. His delegation attached particular importance to the association of the South African liberation movements in the work of the Special Committee, and to the active co-operation of the specialized agencies in the implementation of concerted measures designed to end the policy of *apartheid*.

41. By rejecting the credentials of the representatives of South Africa (General Assembly resolution 3206 (XXIX)), an overwhelming majority of the Member States had clearly indicated that they would not accept a Government's deliberately ignoring United Nations decisions and were determined to take effective action against *apartheid*. Faced with the indignation of world public opinion, the racist régime was looking for ways of escape: its propaganda organs spoke of "détente" and "dialogue", and claimed that wide-ranging reforms had radically changed the situation in southern Africa. Tribute should be paid to the Special Committee for having exposed such base manoeuvres, whose only aim was to delude and to sow discord among the régime's opponents and among the liberation movements.

42. The Mongolian People's Republic, which had been one of the first States to ratify the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, resolutely condemned colonialism, racism and *apartheid*. It rigorously applied in all fields the provisions of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and did not maintain any relations with the racist colonial régimes, as was shown by the third periodic report which Mongolia had recently submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under article 9 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. His delegation would vigorously support all measures taken by the United Nations with a view to eliminating *apartheid*.

43. Miss LOPEZ (Venezuela) said that, in her delegation's view, everything possible must be done to combat *apartheid* until it was totally eliminated.

44. The situation in South Africa had not changed and none of the measures taken at the international level had been effective. The South African Government ignored the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, and it was clear that repeated condemnations of that Government by Member States produced no reaction from it.

45. More drastic measures and constant repetition of what had already been said must therefore be resorted to in order to obtain a reaction and bring about a change in the condition of the black population in South Africa.

46. Venezuela had voted for General Assembly resolution 3324 C (XXIX) calling for an unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners opposed to *apartheid*, the repeal of repressive laws and regulations, and respect for the right of the people of South Africa to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Her delegation wished to repeat at the current session that it would support any action to condemn and to eliminate *apartheid* in South Africa.

47. Venezuela again urged countries which were opposing the implementation of United Nations resolutions and continuing their economic and political collaboration with the South African régime to reconsider their attitude, so that the Security Council and other United Nations organs could take more effective measures with a view to the final elimination of *apartheid*.

48. Venezuela regarded absolute isolation of the South African racist régime and support for the liberation movements as very important factors in the struggle against *apartheid*. The exclusion of South Africa, as long as it practised the policy of *apartheid*, from the United Nations and the specialized agencies would not achieve the anticipated results unless its dependence on the rest of the world became clear through the breaking of the political, military, economic and cultural ties which certain countries continued to maintain with it. That was perhaps the only way of moving the Pretoria Government to change its laws, which were in themselves an affront to all civilized moral and humanitarian principles.

49. The Venezuelan people, who were a mixture of indigenous, African and European stock, condemned dis-

crimination in any form. They could not, therefore, remain indifferent to what was happening in South Africa, and they called on all States Members of the United Nations to break off all relations with the Pretoria régime. It was only in that way and through the tireless struggle of the liberation movements that the South African people would emerge from their current situation.

50. Venezuela would fully support the programme of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and would make a contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, with the aim of achieving the elimination of *apartheid*. Her delegation wished to become a sponsor of the draft resolution concerning the Fund (A/SPC/L.324).

51. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) thanked the Venezuelan delegation for its decision and announced that three other countries, Bangladesh, Italy and Malaysia had become sponsors of the draft resolution.

52. Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria), speaking in support of the draft resolution, said he wished to join the representative of Sweden in appealing to Member States for increased contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

53. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius) announced that his delegation also wished to become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

54. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines), Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, announced that some of the members of the Special Committee had had the opportunity, through the courtesy of the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, to see a film on South Africa, entitled "A Tale of Two Cities". It was a documentary on current living conditions in South Africa. He felt that it would be useful for the members of the Special Political Committee to view the film during the discussion of the item on *apartheid*. He therefore proposed that a showing of the film for the Committee should be arranged as soon as possible.

55. He suggested that, in view of the importance of the statements made by delegations, liberation movements and non-governmental organizations on the occasion of the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, verbatim records should, if possible, be produced of the three meetings (953rd to 955th) which the Committee had devoted to the Day of Solidarity, to enable the members of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to give the proceedings appropriate publicity.

56. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the officers of the Special Political Committee should make the necessary arrangements for a showing of the film "A Tale of Two Cities" to members of the Committee.

It was so decided.

57. The CHAIRMAN noted that the General Assembly, by a decision taken at its 2353rd plenary meeting, had again approved the recommendation of the General Committee (see A/10250) that the Special Political Committee should be authorized to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings, or portions thereof. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to have the transcription requested by the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* produced in accordance with the special authorization given to the Committee.

It was so decided.²

58. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers would be closed on Friday, 17 October.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

² The full text of the statements was subsequently circulated as documents A/SPC/PV.953-955.

957th meeting

Wednesday, 15 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.957

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia) congratulated the representative of Papua New Guinea on his country's admission to

the United Nations. He paid a tribute to the outgoing Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, and congratulated the newly-elected Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The awarding of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* was both an honour and an encouragement to it to persevere in the service of the worthy cause of the oppressed people of South Africa.

2. An international campaign to eradicate *apartheid* was more urgently needed than ever before. The Pretoria régime's policy of so-called détente was not motivated by any resolve to bring about change within South Africa, but

by the hope of breaking down the increasing isolation of the régime and extending its influence over free Africa. As a delaying tactic, Vorster had promised that there would be significant constitutional changes in South Africa within six months. That promise had not been kept, and the criminal plunder of the land and national heritage of the African people continued under the name of separate development. The “bantustan” plan reflected the basic injustice, racism and inhumanity of *apartheid*. Far from modifying its policies of *apartheid*, the Government of South Africa was going ahead with its system of “bantustans”, and the deliberate exclusion of the non-white population from the mainstream of South African society continued unabated.

3. Opposition to *apartheid* was being suppressed with increasing brutality by police-state laws and methods. The Committee's recent observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners was clear evidence of the concern of the world community over the situation. Both inside and outside South Africa, many persons and organizations had insisted that the release of political prisoners would be a significant step towards genuine change. The régime's growing repressiveness, however, made a mockery of its claims to be seeking détente. The repeal of some of the provisions of “petty” *apartheid*, far from altering the basic structure of the system, in some cases actually reinforced it by furthering the “bantustan” policy.

4. In view of the steady worsening of the situation, which posed a continued threat to regional and international peace and security, it was disappointing that some powerful Member States of the United Nations were openly opposing the international campaign against *apartheid*. His delegation greatly regretted the triple veto in the Security Council during the discussion on the General Assembly's call for a review of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. It also noted with disappointment the unfavourable reaction in some quarters to the exclusion of the South African delegation from the deliberations of the General Assembly at the twenty-ninth session and the bitter concerted attack on third-world countries for their attempts to ostracize the only Member State which had been pronounced guilty of a crime against humanity. As his country's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had observed at the 2376th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, more indignation was being directed against the campaign to end *apartheid* than against *apartheid* itself.

5. His delegation regretted that the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France had pointedly insisted that they recognized the Pretoria régime as the legitimate representative of South Africa, knowing full well that the racist régime represented only a small segment of the total population. It was surprising that those States, which claimed leadership in the preservation of democratic ideals, should strongly oppose the principle of majority rule in South Africa. If they were truly committed to the principles and ideals of democracy, they would have recognized the national liberation movements as the sole and legitimate representatives of the people of South Africa. Man's legitimate aspirations for justice, freedom and human dignity were an irresistible force which could never be suppressed, as the victories of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Indo-China, to name only a few, had shown.

6. His delegation welcomed the participation of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in the work of the Committee. Support for the liberation movements was one of the most important weapons of the international campaign against *apartheid*. As the history of the liberation movements in the former Portuguese territories had shown, the predominant role in any independence struggle had to be taken by the people themselves, while the international community should support their efforts.

7. The United Nations should intensify the action it was already committed to taking in support of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and Namibia by excluding the racist régime from participation in the United Nations and all of its organs. The fraudulent nature of the “bantustans” should be exposed and the minority régime isolated and deprived of all the benefits of international co-operation. The arms embargo should be made mandatory by the Security Council and extended to oil and other strategic materials.

8. Economic and technical co-operation between a number of Western countries and the racist régime was a major obstacle to the efforts of the United Nations. A case in point was the reported deal between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Pretoria régime for the construction of a nuclear power plant in South Africa. A Frankfurt firm was said to be bidding for the contract, and French and Swiss-American concerns were also said to be involved in the deal. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had reportedly justified the deal on economic grounds, contending that it concerned only reactors and not the uranium enrichment material that was the key to bombs. That Government was, nevertheless, providing South Africa with technological know-how on uranium enrichment, and there was a wide net of semi-official contacts between scientific and military officials in the Federal Republic of Germany and their South African counterparts. Accordingly, the spectre of nuclear weapons for South Africa could not be ruled out. Any such deal would constitute a flagrant violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of resolutions 1652 (XVI) and 2033 (XX), which had called upon States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone. It was a great disappointment that the Federal Republic of Germany, which had good relations with many African countries, should contemplate a transaction which could assist South Africa in suppressing African peoples and threaten the independence and sovereignty of African States. Moreover, it was an irony of history that the Federal Republic of Germany, whose people had suffered under nazism and fascism, should support the white racist régime of South Africa, whose obnoxious *apartheid* policy was akin to nazism. His delegation therefore called on the Government of the Federal Republic and other potential supporters of the Pretoria régime to abandon any plans for such a deal.

9. The ruling minority in South Africa would not be induced to abandon its policies by anything less than the exercise of the coercive powers given to the United Nations by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, Member States could give fitting expression to their rejection of *apartheid* by signing and ratifying the

International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. It was disappointing that so far only 11 States, including Somalia, had done so. Another important practical measure which could be taken was to contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Although Somalia was classified among the poorest States, it had pledged a contribution of \$500 to the Fund as a symbol of its support for its aims. His delegation hoped that all States in a position to do so would contribute generously to that worthy cause.

10. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had exposed the untold sufferings of the majority of South Africa's people and the racist régime's increasing military repression of innocent and defenceless black people and all who opposed the obnoxious system of *apartheid*.

11. His delegation held that South Africa had been considered rather too sympathetically by the United Nations. Even when confronted with uncontested evidence of the systematic killing of black people, the United Nations had merely appealed to South Africa to cease its repressive policies. South Africa had reacted by intensifying its oppression of the black population.

12. In the view of his delegation, the Republic of South Africa was an enemy not only of Africa, but of humanity as a whole. The United Nations had repeatedly called on all States to cease co-operating with that monstrous régime and had requested countries which had relations with South Africa to review them. It had time and again exposed the military arrangements existing between South Africa and some Western countries, and had discouraged trade with South Africa in the hope of isolating the *apartheid* régime and thus bringing pressure on it to abandon the policy of *apartheid*.

13. All appeals to South Africa and the friends of South Africa had gone unheeded. South Africa had acquired sophisticated weapons from Western countries and had been given by the Federal Republic of Germany, in exchange for uranium, sufficient technological expertise to enable it to manufacture atomic bombs. Such knowledge was obviously not intended to be utilized for peaceful purposes. It was extremely unlikely that South Africa, an avowed enemy of Africa and the national liberation movements, would not use its technological knowledge against black people within South Africa and the independent African States.

14. His delegation was serious in its bid to isolate South Africa totally, and it considered that the course on which the international community had already embarked should be pursued more vigorously. Unfortunately, every move in that direction in the past had been frustrated by South Africa's closest allies in the United Nations. When the Security Council had met in October 1974 to consider the relationship between South Africa and the United Nations, all who had spoken had vehemently condemned the *apartheid* régime of South Africa. There had also been unanimous agreement within the Council that South Africa was not fit to be a Member of the United Nations. However, when the draft resolution recommending the

expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations had been put to the vote, it had been vetoed by three Western permanent members of the Security Council. In June 1975 the Security Council's move to impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa for its persistent refusal to decolonize Namibia had again been frustrated by the triple veto.

15. The allies of South Africa had at times expressed horror in the strongest language at the inhuman policies pursued by the South African régime. They had expressed solidarity with the oppressed people in South Africa but had done nothing to back up their words. Indeed, it was their support that enabled South Africa to continue its repressive policies in total disregard of the will of the international community: as long as South Africa could count on the backing of its allies, it would never change those policies. That was why it was not only going ahead with its policies of "bantustanization", but was campaigning for the legalization of those policies by the international community. His delegation therefore fully endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee (A/10022, para. 203) that the General Assembly should denounce the establishment of the Transkei and other "bantustans", and call upon all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institutions or authorities of the "bantustans".

16. His delegation believed that the international community had an obligation to give practical support to the suffering masses in South Africa. Words alone would not bring down the South African régime and, consequently, the Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania would continue to support the national liberation movements in their sacred task of liberation. Africa was committed to the liberation of South Africa and would accept nothing short of the restoration of all fundamental human rights. There would be no peace in South Africa until *apartheid* and all it stood for were completely wiped out and black people were in control of the country. The time had come for the United Nations to identify itself with the aspirations of the people of Azania by increasing support to their national liberation movements and according them the recognition they deserved. Both ANC and PNC had vowed to liberate their country by all means at their disposal. His delegation congratulated them on the courage they had shown against the most brutal régime in the world and assured them of its undiminished support.

17. His country would continue to endorse all efforts by the General Assembly to isolate the *apartheid* régime and would consider very sympathetically the call by the Special Committee for a conference in 1976 to review recent developments in South Africa and to analyse the role of transnational corporations and other foreign economic interests in South Africa in buttressing the *apartheid* régime (*ibid.*, para. 223). His delegation highly commended the outstanding work carried out by the Unit on *Apartheid* in publicizing the evils of the *apartheid* régime; the recommendation concerning the future of the Unit (*ibid.*, para. 227) deserved careful consideration in view of its additional responsibilities and assignments.

18. Mr. BHATIA (India) said that the United Nations had been considering the question of *apartheid* in South Africa

in one form or another throughout the 30 years of its existence. India had brought up the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa at the very first session of the General Assembly in 1946. Since that time, more than 150 resolutions had been adopted, condemning the racist régime for its repressive and inhuman policies and calling on States to take specific measures to isolate it from the international community. The South African authorities, however, had treated United Nations decisions with derision and had enforced *apartheid* with intensified brutality. On the eve of the current session of the General Assembly, they had launched a wave of arrests under the hated Terrorism Act.

19. It was understandable in such circumstances that the general public, and particularly the victims of *apartheid*, should increasingly feel that the United Nations was incapable of doing much beyond passing pious resolutions. Although the course of events did justify a measure of frustration and anger, his delegation did not believe that the efforts of the United Nations had been in vain. The United Nations had succeeded in making the world aware of the barbaric crime of *apartheid*. The doctrine of domestic jurisdiction claimed by the South African authorities in respect of *apartheid* had been effectively discredited. Through the initiative of the United Nations, there was an organized programme of assistance to the liberation movements and victims of *apartheid*.

20. In response to the repeated calls of the General Assembly, most—but unfortunately not all—Member States had ceased to have diplomatic, trade or social relations with the Pretoria régime, thereby making it virtually an international outlaw. In 1963 the Security Council, in its resolution 181 (1963), had adopted an arms embargo against South Africa and in 1970, in its resolution 282 (1970), it had condemned all violations of the embargo and called on all States to comply fully and unconditionally with it.

21. India had not waited for the United Nations to adopt such resolutions before taking its own stringent measures against the racist régime. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Indian nation, had launched a non-violent civil disobedience movement in South Africa even before he initiated India's own independence struggle. India had recalled its High Commissioner from South Africa in 1946 in protest against the Government's racist policies, and in 1954 had closed its diplomatic mission in that country. All trade with South Africa had been banned in 1946, and in 1963 the use of Indian ports and air space had been denied to South African shipping and aircraft.

22. The forward march of decolonization, which had been greatly expedited by the United Nations, was creating pressures on the minority racist régimes in Azania and Zimbabwe. Support or encouragement given by any Member State to the South African régime could only prolong the burden of suffering of Africans and other non-whites in South Africa. Accordingly, his delegation urged States which were collaborating militarily with South Africa to comply with the trade and arms embargo imposed by the United Nations.

23. As his country's Minister for External Affairs had observed at the 2364th plenary meeting of the General

Assembly, there was no clearer case than *apartheid* for intervention by the United Nations. In resolution 3324 B (XXIX) the General Assembly had requested the Security Council to take mandatory measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations so as to ensure strict compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo against South Africa, and his delegation regretted the failure of the Security Council to act accordingly. His delegation endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* that the embargo should be extended to cover petroleum, petroleum products and other raw materials (*ibid.*, para. 210). The danger of bitter race conflict in South Africa was real. Only effective action under Chapter VII of the Charter could compel the rulers of South Africa to abandon their pernicious and inhuman policy of *apartheid*.

24. Mr. CABRAL DE MELO (Brazil) said that his country's opposition to *apartheid* did not stem solely from universal and humanistic values, but also from its national experience. The President of Brazil, in his message to his people on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, had pointed out that Brazil was the product of the most far-reaching experiment in racial integration known in the modern world and that the phenomenon of racial discrimination was utterly alien to it.

25. In the past year Brazil had tried to inject new vigour into the struggle against *apartheid*. In June it had received a delegation of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for consultations with ministers, senior officials and members of the Brazilian Congress. His Government had pledged a contribution of \$10,000 to the newly established Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund; it had contributed \$10,000 to the Trust Fund for Namibia and \$5,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, and was considering annual contributions to those funds. His country's authorities had systematically discouraged the participation of Brazilian nationals in sports competitions held on South African territory or with the participation of South African nationals. His Government had recently refused to authorize a Capetown-Rio de Janeiro sailing race and had prohibited the use of Brazilian ports as terminal points or stop-overs for such a race. It had also forbidden Brazilian nationals and boats to participate in the event.

26. On 21 March 1975 his Government had observed the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The President had issued a message, and a commemorative session had been held at the Foreign Ministry. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a message to the Minister for External Relations, had emphasized that Brazil had been the first signatory of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and had always played a major role in that vital area of United Nations activities. His delegation assured the Committee and the General Assembly that its support would not fail.

27. Mr. MANALO (Philippines) welcomed the award of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* as a recognition of its work.

28. The Government and people of the Philippines completely opposed the practice of *apartheid*. His country had

been a member of the Special Committee since its inception. In compliance with United Nations resolutions, it had, at considerable sacrifice, cut off all trade and other relations with South Africa. It had recently refused the entry of South African delegates to the Conference of the World Boxing Association because they would not renounce the policy of *apartheid*, and it had made every effort to assist the oppressed people of South Africa through voluntary contributions to various United Nations funds. His delegation was therefore a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.324.

29. The report of the Special Committee made it clear that the problem of *apartheid* had assumed a new and even more dangerous dimension. The policy of *apartheid* was expressly designed to consolidate the political, economic, social and cultural power of a minority régime over the majority, solely on the basis of race discrimination. In all Africa, only Pretoria was ignoring the new social and economic developments and seeking to restore the old tribal enclaves. In ensuring that no African could rise above a certain social and economic level, *apartheid* effectively prevented the black people of South Africa from contributing to their own national development and, ultimately, in the context of the new international economic order, to world development. In order to maintain that system, the South African Government had spent vast sums to build up military and police forces and other instruments of repression, for the system of *apartheid* was based essentially on fear. His country strongly believed that *apartheid* was a crime against humanity, as declared in article I of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, that it violated principles of international law and that it constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. Since the establishment of the Special Committee, more than enough evidence had been accumulated to condemn South Africa under article II of that Convention. It was disheartening that nothing that the United Nations had done had had an impact on the régime's determination to implement its policies. The so-called "détente" policy had brought about no change inside the country but rather an intensification of *apartheid*. The South African Prime Minister had, indeed, stated that the public had misunderstood his pledge to the Security Council at the end of 1974 to change the situation within six months; he was in fact engaged in a propaganda exercise aimed at gaining international acceptance of his plan to separate the races, and perpetuate oppression by the ruling minority.

30. Since *apartheid* was a pervasive system affecting all aspects of life in South Africa, many United Nations organs had become concerned. In addition to the resolutions adopted by the World Population Conference, held at Bucharest from 19 to 30 August 1974, and the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, UNESCO had expressed serious concern about its effect on education, science and culture, and WHO had likewise deplored its effect on health and medical services.

31. It had been said that South Africa was a microcosm of the world and that only by ending *apartheid* could its mixed population live together in harmony and co-operation and the country play its rightful role in Africa and in

the world. In taking action to end *apartheid*, the United Nations was, therefore, striving not only to eliminate the systematic oppression and humiliation of people on grounds of colour and race, but also to enable South African society to realize its full potential for progress.

32. His delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution on the status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *apartheid*, adopted by the Third Committee at its 2122nd meeting on 6 October 1975;¹ his Government had, of course, signed the International Convention on that subject. The Convention could be a powerful instrument to help the international community to press for the eradication of the crime of *apartheid*, and it was to be hoped that all States would sign, ratify and implement it. His delegation supported the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee.

33. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.

34. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) drew the Committee's attention to a grave situation that had developed in and around Newcastle, a northern Natal industrial town, in recent days. When the bus company serving African townships around that town had raised its fares at the beginning of October, African workers had decided to boycott the company's buses, even though that meant walking several miles. The police had intervened and, according to a report in *The Times* of London on 4 October 1975, at least one African had been killed, several had been injured and three policemen had been seriously injured when trying to free two whites taken prisoner by the Africans. A Mozambique newspaper was said to have reported that two Africans had been killed during the clash with the police. Even a director of a Newcastle firm had admitted to the *Rand Daily Mail* on 9 October 1975 that the police could overdo it.

35. Clearly, the South African *apartheid* régime remained impervious to world criticism over its handling of the just democratic expression of the African masses and was prepared to re-enact Sharpeville tactics in putting down peaceful demonstrations. The international community should condemn the latest atrocities and support the Azanian national liberation movements' reasonable call for reactionary violence to be put down by revolutionary violence.

36. The South African settler colonial régime was particularly sensitive to bus strikes, which in the past had been the harbinger of successful militant struggles. During the 1950s, bus boycott campaigns near Sharpeville and in Alexandra, Johannesburg, had forced the bus companies to capitulate. In the former instance, thugs hired by the bus company to harass and intimidate the strikers—with the thinly-disguised support of the police—had been soundly thrashed, but the two co-ordinators of the boycott campaign, later to become prominent leaders in PAC, had been charged with murder and incitement to public violence. They had, however, won

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 68, document A/10320, para. 27, draft resolution IV.

their case in the Supreme Court. The Alexandra boycott had led to a nation-wide boycott of the company concerned which had ended in victory when the Chamber of Commerce had elected to pay a subsidy directly to the bus company.

37. In view of that experience, the South African police had been ordered by the Prime Minister to crush the latest boycott. Many firms had made arrangements for their workers to be transported in company vehicles, but under South African laws—observed only in the case of blacks—it was an offence to carry passengers without the necessary licence. As a result, the police had been ordering vehicles carrying the bus boycotters off the road. However, when a driver had been arrested and fined R 30 even his employer had said that the police had gone too far.

38. South Africa felt secure in the knowledge that the Western Powers would prevent the United Nations from taking the necessary action provided for in the Charter to support the Azanian people's just struggle. The only way in which those countries, particularly those holding a veto in the Security Council, could absolve themselves of responsibility for *apartheid* violence in South Africa was by joining

the overwhelming majority of Member States in genuinely condemning *apartheid* and recognizing PAC and ANC as the true representatives of the people of South Africa.

39. The people of the African townships around Newcastle deserved a clear assurance of support from the international community for standing up for rights and principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other fundamental United Nations documents. They could not afford higher fares because their wages had depreciated by 22 per cent with the two most recent devaluations of the rand. A United States congressional committee had found that Africans were the worst victims of the inflation raging in South Africa because whites could legally bargain for higher salaries. He therefore called upon the United Nations to denounce the repressive measures adopted against the latest boycott.

40. Mr. BERG (Sweden) announced that the delegations of Cyprus and Nepal had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.324.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

958th meeting

Thursday, 16 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.958

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(*continued*) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324, A/SPC/L.325):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. SERUP (Denmark), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.325, said that over the years since the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1881 (XVIII) calling on the South African Government to release unconditionally all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of *apartheid*, many Member States, including his own, had been deeply concerned about the lack of response to the numerous appeals made by the United Nations. They had therefore welcomed the Special Committee's initiative in appealing to all States and organizations (A/SPC/174, annex) to join in a concerted international campaign for the release of political prisoners and to celebrate the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners.

2. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) showed that people of all races were still being

detained or persecuted under the Terrorism Act and other repressive legislation and confirmed recent arrests and detentions. His delegation had therefore submitted a draft resolution on solidarity with those prisoners (A/SPC/L.325) which was self-explanatory. He wished to inform the Committee that Botswana and Lesotho had asked to join the long list of sponsors. The sponsors believed that the Committee could best demonstrate its solidarity with the victims of the system of *apartheid* and pledge its support for more vigorous international action by adopting the draft resolution by consensus.

3. The CHAIRMAN announced that Honduras also wished to join the sponsors.

4. Mr. GAMMOH (Jordan) supported all the proposals and recommendations made by the Special Committee in chapter II of its report, which not only described the inhuman crimes committed by the racist South African régime but also showed the forces which had relations with that régime. The African peoples' fight for independence and their legitimate rights should be helped by the international community as a whole. The racist régime—which appeared not to realize the strength of the oppressed people's will to pursue that fight—was bound to disappear through the inevitable course of historical evolution.

5. The United Nations must use all means to put an end to a régime which was intensifying its repressive measures

against the non-white people of the country and arresting and ill-treating their leaders in contravention of all principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It was trying to disperse the population through the creation of "bantustans", which were merely a source of cheap labour, and to obtain international acceptance through its so-called policy of "détente".

6. A report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, entitled "Recent developments in the relations between South Africa and Israel,"¹ showed that the racist régime collaborated closely with Israel.

7. His delegation had always supported the national liberation movements, was among the countries which were helping them to intensify their armed struggle, and implemented the decision in the Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation² adopted by the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers from 5 to 9 September 1973, inviting States to establish a solidarity fund for the national liberation movements.

8. The United Nations had a particular responsibility towards the people of South Africa and should ensure the implementation of all resolutions calling for equality between all men in accordance with the Charter. During the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, every step should be taken to liquidate discriminatory régimes, particularly that of South Africa. He was sure that the sacrifices of the South African people themselves would bear fruit and that they would eventually obtain freedom and independence.

9. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that the voluminous evidence on *apartheid* contained in the many papers before the Committee and the main report of the Special Committee (A/10022) painted the same depressing picture as in other years. They clearly showed that those who would maintain a policy of *apartheid* could do so only through a continuation of repressive acts which were both an abuse of human rights and an affront to human dignity. It was only right that many representatives should pronounce their Governments' indignation against those practices, seeking some response from the conscience of South Africa.

10. An important element in the report was the attention given to what might be called "real" *apartheid*, as opposed to what was sometimes called "petty" *apartheid*. The Special Committee warned against thinking that minor changes in the *apartheid* system indicated that a major change was under way. The minor changes within South Africa and the attempts to present a changing image to the world were so far designed only to misrepresent the real situation. There had still been no real changes which would dismantle the *apartheid* structure and restore the human rights of every individual.

11. Policies of racial discrimination were directly contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and

could not be accepted by the international community. The Australian Government had committed itself to increasing the effectiveness of United Nations resolutions and helping to end all discriminatory policies. It had maintained an embargo on all exports of arms and war-like stores, had cancelled official trade missions and the official encouragement of economic relations, and had stated its willingness to support any Security Council decision to impose sanctions against South Africa, provided they were adhered to by South Africa's other major trading partners. It had accepted membership of the United Nations Council for Namibia and stated that Australia would co-operate with the Organization to oust South Africa from its illegal occupation of Namibia. As early as December 1972, his Government had announced that racially selected sporting teams would not be allowed to enter Australia, even in transit. It also declined to accept sporting invitations from South Africa. Sport was an area in which international action could be effective because sporting activities received such broad publicity.

12. As long as *apartheid* continued, the United Nations must consider, on the basis of the material provided by the Special Committee and the Unit on *Apartheid* and by individual speakers, the best methods provided under the Charter by which to maintain pressure on South Africa.

13. Mr. PALMER (Sierra Leone) said that the attainment of full nationhood by the four new States Members of the United Nations was both a source of strength to those who sought to eradicate *apartheid* from the African continent and a significant message to the South African régime that no arms could subdue the love of freedom. Because *apartheid* sought to destroy the black man's identity as a human being, independent Africa would not rest until that system was destroyed for ever. The Special Committee's report not only exposed the evils and insanity of *apartheid*, but also described the collaboration of Member States with its perpetrators. The friends of South Africa were no doubt embarrassed by the South African régime's failure to carry out its pledge to do something positive to dismantle *apartheid* within six months. Independent Africa, however, was not surprised by that breach of faith; it knew that Mr. Vorster was ruling South Africa because of *apartheid* and would not willingly destroy himself.

14. The South African régime had made its peace moves the previous year because it had been stunned by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and worried by the gains made by the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. Mr. Vorster had therefore quickly assumed the unfamiliar and unfitting role of peace-maker. Those peace moves were mainly intended to distract world attention from the horrors of *apartheid* and to give him time to plan more effective means of sustaining that policy. The very secrecy of his visits to African capitals was suggestive of the diabolic nature of his message. Any peace worked out by Mr. Vorster would be one in which Africans, both independent and under foreign domination, would be the losers. He must first embrace the black leaders in his country before embracing those in other parts of Africa. His attempt to divide Africa through so-called "détente" had failed. For his own safety, he was even prepared to sacrifice his brother in crime, Mr. Ian Smith, telling him to accept majority rule, which he himself would never grant in his own country.

¹ Document A/AC.115/L.411 of 23 July 1975.

² See A/9330 and Corr.1.

15. The Special Committee's report had revealed that collaboration provided by the South African régime's powerful friends had been maintained and was even spreading. Third-world and even African countries had also put aside their pride and feelings for the oppressed and unashamedly rushed to South Africa for aid, even if the money came from the sweat and tears of their brothers in South Africa. In view of such action by African countries, it was difficult to condemn the United States of America, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany for their collaboration with the régime. However, some encouraging steps had recently been taken by certain Western companies. In paragraph 61 of the report it was stated that four of five United States oil companies which had been active in Namibia had pulled out of the Territory. If those oil companies could sacrifice their interests for African dignity and freedom at a time when their country was experiencing a shortage of fuel, it was surely not too much to ask that at least African countries should show solidarity with their own brothers. That aid to African countries was obviously part of Mr. Vorster's plan to break the ranks of opposition to *apartheid* while he continued his wicked acts undisturbed. Since threats and force had failed, he was now trying détente and aid, starting with the weak and hoping to use them as bait for the others. He was no doubt being aided by some European countries which had maintained post-independence ties with some African countries. Fortunately, most of Africa saw through those tactics and was determined to maintain its dignity and retrieve that of the oppressed people in South Africa. Alone, African countries were vulnerable to the oppressor. Unity was their strongest weapon and those who continued to betray Africa were merely seeking their own ruin and would be denounced by their children.

16. His delegation condemned *apartheid* and called on the South African régime to release all political prisoners. It also called on the influential Members of the United Nations to break off all contacts with the racist régime for the effective isolation of the world's most inhuman form of government. As long as those Member States continued to deal with Mr. Vorster, *apartheid* would stay, for its perpetrators would consider that association as an endorsement of their policy.

17. His delegation also reiterated its support for the liberation movements in South Africa recognized by OAU and urged their leaders to increase the offensive until *apartheid* was finally eradicated.

18. His Government rejected the "bantustan" policy, which meant that all but a handful of South African people would be crammed into less than 20 per cent of the worst land in the country. Moreover, once those settlements had been called independent, the South African régime would claim rights of territorial integrity and non-interference to reject any criticism from those settlers of its odious policy. The creation of "bantustans" was another means of escaping universal condemnation and outcry against *apartheid*, of rigidly containing and controlling the settlers and of escaping the responsibilities of an administering Power. The "bantustans" were mainly designed to consolidate the inhuman policies of the *apartheid* system, which was alien to the world and should be rooted out.

19. Mr. DOSUMU-JOHNSON (Liberia) said that *apartheid* was an abomination to all lovers of justice and peace throughout the civilized world, a crime against the United Nations and an insult to the dignity of men of colour everywhere. His delegation was therefore grateful to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for its efforts to expose to the entire world the evil practices of that system.

20. The South African Government had dashed the hopes of those who had believed that it was sincere in asserting that it would do everything within its power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour. It had instead continued to invoke the Terrorism Act to carry out wholesale arrests of the opponents of *apartheid*. Such tactics had appalled large numbers of both white and black South Africans and even the Afrikaans-language newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, had stated in an editorial that detention without trial was becoming increasingly difficult to defend.

21. Black South Africans were barred from every area of modern life and were kept in the most abject state of wretchedness, with no end in sight. The plight of the black South Africans should be the concern of the entire civilized world. Unless the great Powers took immediate action, they would be guilty of acquiescing in another holocaust more terrifying than the last. The action of the great Powers was of paramount importance, because the future of the contemporary world was in their hands. If they were to continue to give ethical direction and guidance to Africa and enjoy the respect of the third world, they must put aside national self-interest and take action to promote fundamental human rights and freedoms.

22. The situation in South Africa required great circumspection, especially in view of the pervasive surveillance of the security police. South Africa did not, however, present a classical colonial situation. Confrontation there would result only in a Pyrrhic victory for the winner. The advocates of dialogue were neither inured to the sufferings of the people, nor were they cowards. They had been led to believe by the logic of history that violence inevitably failed to achieve its goals. Violence would only alienate supporters outside South Africa and discourage moderates within. Therefore, the advocates of violence, who were far removed from the scene of events, should be guided by the views of those who would suffer the consequences of such violence.

23. South Africa's prosperity depended on integrating the black population into society and the economy as equal partners. The greatest single factor in that connexion was pressure from the outside. The existence of an independent Mozambique could have an effect on the situation, while the most influential outside pressure on South Africa was United States public opinion. United States business in South Africa held the key to a solution to the problem of *apartheid*. Accordingly, a special appeal from the Special Political Committee to the Government and public of the United States of America would go a long way towards bringing about rapid change in the South African way of life.

24. Finally, the United Nations should not fail to discharge its responsibilities in the matter. The permanent members of the Security Council acting in concert could

compel the Government of South Africa to comply with the decisions of the United Nations. His delegation hoped that the great Powers would enlist in the struggle to create a multiracial society in South Africa.

25. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) said that his delegation appreciated the contributions of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in unmasking the true nature of that system. The Special Committee's report documented the plight of a people whose only fault was to have been born black. His delegation endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee.

26. Despite encouraging developments in southern Africa following the fall of fascism in Portugal, the situation had been stagnating and continued to pose a dangerous threat to international peace and security. Disregarding the efforts of the international community to eradicate *apartheid*, the Vorster régime persisted in violating the Charter of the United Nations and fundamental human rights in South Africa and Namibia. Even the exclusion of its representatives from participation in the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly had had no effect on the régime.

27. Bahrain rejected racial discrimination as a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace and security. It was opposed to all forms of racism because of its Islamic traditions, which upheld the equality and dignity of all men. Moreover, such principles were specifically reflected in its Constitution. Bahrain had professed its solidarity with the people of Azania and their national liberation movements and took the view that it was the duty of the international community to do likewise.

28. The Pretoria régime was proceeding with the implementation of its "bantustan" policy, which it euphemistically termed "separate development". Constituting only an infinitesimal part of the national territory and intended to serve as a source of cheap labour for the South African economy, the "bantustans" could not be regarded as true "homelands" for the African population.

29. South Africa continued to defy the international community by occupying Namibia and sought to perpetuate its control of that territory by ostensibly pursuing détente. The United Nations must continue to exert pressure on South Africa to bring an end to the illegal occupation of that territory.

30. It was regrettable that many decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council condemning the racist régime had met with the non-compliance of some Member States which continued to collaborate with Pretoria in the political, economic, diplomatic and military spheres. Particularly through the shipment of arms to South Africa, such countries actively abetted the régime in its defiance of the United Nations and helped to create a serious threat to international peace and security. His delegation therefore called for compliance with the arms embargo. Furthermore, the Security Council should take action under the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to bring an end to the shameful situation in South Africa.

31. Bahrain had no relations whatsoever with the South African régime and, together with other Arab States, had

scrupulously complied with the arms and trade embargoes. His delegation appealed to all States to give priority to moral considerations over economic ones and to comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions as the only means to bring about change.

32. The Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, had expressed concern over the growing collusion between South Africa and Israel, especially in the military, economic, political, and cultural spheres. That development was not surprising, since Zionism and racism were identical. Zionism was based on the view that the Jewish people were superior to all others, just as *apartheid* was predicated on the superiority of the whites over the blacks. Like the African people living under *apartheid*, the Palestinians were suffering under Zionist occupation.

33. Despite the repeated condemnations of the General Assembly and other United Nations organs, South Africa stubbornly refused to release the political prisoners it held. The number of detentions had increased recently as opponents of *apartheid* from all walks of life had been herded into gaols where they were often ill-treated or tortured. His delegation called upon Pretoria to stop its acts of terrorism against the opponents of *apartheid* and to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners.

34. The specialized agencies, other organizations of the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations should co-ordinate their efforts to expose the system of *apartheid* and should take effective measures aimed at assisting the victims of *apartheid* and ending racial discrimination and repression in South Africa. South Africa must be made to know that it would remain isolated from the international community until it renounced its policies of *apartheid* and accepted a dialogue with the African majority within its boundaries. South Africa should also be excluded from participation in the United Nations until such time as it complied with the resolutions of the Organization.

35. Mr. VAZIRNA (Mozambique) said that, during the colonial era which had recently ended with the declaration of national independence in June 1975, the people of Mozambique had endured a highly cynical type of racial discrimination. While the Portuguese colonial laws had stated that all those who had been born in Mozambique were Portuguese, and had equal rights and duties, the letter and spirit of those laws had not been observed in practice. In reality, the whites had had the rights and the blacks had had the duties. Despite those odious precedents, the Mozambican liberation front had introduced anti-racist legislation, the effects of which could be seen in everyday life and according to which there were no blacks, whites or yellows, but only Mozambicans. Mozambique not only totally condemned *apartheid* as an insult to human dignity, but was committed to the establishment of a new society in which the barriers of racial discrimination would be destroyed and persons of different ethnic origins would live in harmony. In such a way, Mozambique felt that it would be setting a modest example with regard to the elimination of the social malady of racism and *apartheid* which its racist neighbours might well emulate. Mozambique supported the

liberation movement which opposed the practice of *apartheid* in Africa and which sought to establish a democratic government capable of meeting the needs of the non-white population. It condemned the manoeuvres of the South African Government to perpetuate the shameful policy of *apartheid* through the fragmentation of the country into "bantustans". Against that background, his delegation would like to call upon all States Members of the United Nations to help the liberation movement in South Africa, with a view to freeing the non-white population from their bondage and ending the neo-Nazi system of *apartheid*.

36. Mr. HALL (Jamaica) said that, despite collective condemnation by the United Nations of the system of *apartheid*, some Member States continued to support the South African régime, both militarily and financially. Their support not only postponed the inevitable, because time was certainly not on the side of the practitioners of that system, but resulted in unnecessary suffering and degradation for the indigenous peoples of South Africa.

37. Recent events had led to an intensification of political repression in the form of imprisonment or the application of severe restrictions under the banning orders. However, those activities simply indicated that *apartheid* was being subjected to tremendous strain, which could lead only to an eruption of violence and bloodshed ending in its total destruction.

38. The economic support given to the South African régime by certain developed market economy countries was a shocking example of financial interests and concerns overriding the ethical and moral standards preached by the very countries which were the principal violators of those standards. Transnational corporations with heavy investments in South Africa were allowed by those Governments, which had the power to curtail their activities, to continue to profit from the sweat and blood of human misery. Those Governments persistently proclaimed their inability to exercise control over the activities of the transnational corporations, but were quick to leap to their defence when developing countries sought to exercise such control.

39. The international community had recently witnessed a manifestation of new support of the South African régime by the major industrial nations when the question of the imposition of an obligatory arms embargo on South Africa had been vetoed in the Security Council. In the view of his delegation, that question should be re-introduced in the Security Council at the request of the General Assembly, with a strong recommendation for the imposition of an arms embargo on South Africa. Those who preached the need for international morality and loudly condemned *apartheid* in various international forums should match their words with appropriate actions in the Security Council, so that the downfall of the South African régime would be hastened and the world would be rid of the evil and inhuman institution of *apartheid*.

40. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* constituted a comprehensive assessment of develop-

ments in South Africa over the preceding years; his delegation congratulated the Special Committee on its work and generally endorsed its recommendations. His delegation was most concerned about the intensification of the "bantustan" policy aimed at the fragmentation of the indigenous population. It totally rejected that policy of imposing a political system which constituted a denial of the rights of self-determination of the inhabitants of South Africa as a whole. His delegation felt that it was of paramount importance for the international community to increase assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements, since it was through the intensification of the struggle by those movements, fully supported by the international community, that the existing régime would be toppled. His delegation also wished to stress the importance of co-ordinating international efforts in order to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the campaign against *apartheid*. The rejection by the South African racist régime of the prerequisites for a peaceful solution clearly implied that the subjugated peoples of South Africa could obtain freedom only through violence and bloodshed unless the international community subjected the régime to continuous and relentless pressure.

41. The CHAIRMAN said that the delegations of Greece, Japan, Somalia, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.324.

42. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) announced that the delegations of Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates and Zaire had announced their intention of sponsoring draft resolution A/SPC/L.325.

43. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) drew attention to disparities in the Arabic language version of document A/SPC/L.325. He said that the Arabic version should be brought into line with the English language version and that his delegation was willing to submit the necessary correction, if the Secretariat so desired.

44. Moreover, the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had not yet been issued in Arabic. Since the Committee's consideration of the current item was based on that report, the delegations which worked in Arabic were experiencing some difficulties. It would be indeed unfortunate if a delegation was compelled to insist that consideration of an item should be postponed until the basic documentation was available in all working languages.

45. The CHAIRMAN said that it would be most useful if the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic would submit the necessary corrections in the case of document A/SPC/L.325 to the Secretariat. He would consult the Secretariat to see what could be done to remedy the situation regarding the Arabic translation of the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

959th meeting

Friday, 17 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.959

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324, A/SPC/L.325):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that the Congo, Ecuador, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and the Upper Volta had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325.

2. Mr. AL-HADDADI (Iraq) said that his delegation, too, wished to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325.

3. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) said that the item under discussion was of paramount importance for mankind as a whole. As well as the intensive deliberations in the United Nations, a great number of meetings, symposia and study groups had been held throughout the world to try to find a solution to the problems created by the South African régime's policy of *apartheid*. As a result, the peoples of the world had come to acquire a proper understanding of that abhorrent policy. *Apartheid* was now not merely considered to be a crime perpetrated against the peoples of South Africa but also a crime against humanity in general. It was universally felt that nothing could be worse than discrimination based on colour, since it stood in the way of economic and social development and also constituted a threat to international co-operation and peace. *Apartheid*, in fact, differed little from the racist policies practised by the Nazi and Fascist régimes. Since its inception, the United Nations had been deeply concerned about the *apartheid* policy practised in South Africa, and the General Assembly and Security Council had on various occasions condemned that policy as a dangerous violation of human rights which constituted a threat to the very existence of the world Organization.

4. Although the United Nations had succeeded in enlightening world public opinion about the dangers of *apartheid*, the South African régime continued to pursue its criminal policies. The inability of the United Nations to implement its own policies and principles and attain its own objectives was due first and foremost to the policies pursued by some of its Members in violation of numerous resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations. It was obvious that the racist régime in South Africa could not have defied the world had it not been supported by the colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers. Those Powers loudly condemned the policies of *apartheid* in the United Nations, where they

talked of human rights and claimed to be the sole defendants of freedom and the rights of man, and at the same time established high-level relations with the Pretoria régime, provided it with weapons which enabled it to enforce its policy of *apartheid* and to defy neighbouring African States, and collaborated with the régime in trade and economic matters in full awareness of its callous and illegitimate exploitation of the indigenous people of South Africa. Those Powers were therefore actively helping the racist régime to implement its evil policies and must be regarded as a party to its crimes.

5. They also served the South African régime well inside the United Nations; there was no need to remind the Committee of what had happened when the Security Council had sought to expel the racist régime from the General Assembly; its failure to do so had been due to the misuse of their powers by some of the permanent members of the Security Council. As the previous Secretary-General of the United Nations had correctly pointed out, the effectiveness of the United Nations in exercising a significant influence towards peaceful and just solutions to the difficult problems in South Africa would depend essentially on the willingness and ability of the permanent members of the Security Council and the main trading partners of South Africa to harmonize their positions and to take more effective measures to persuade South Africa to abandon its present course and seek a solution consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council. His remarks were still applicable. Previous reports of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* had revealed many aspects of the co-operation between the colonial Powers and the racist régime in South Africa, and the current report (A/10022) offered further evidence that military, trade and political benefits were seen as more important than principles.

6. His delegation had for some time been aware that the South African racist régime was a link in the chain of imperialist domination, but it considered that world public opinion should be fully apprised of that fact, particularly in view of the information received from the British Anti-Apartheid Movement concerning high level military collaboration between South Africa and several Western Powers. According to the report of the Special Committee (*ibid.*, para. 73), the British Anti-Apartheid Movement had revealed that the defence code of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was available to the Pretoria régime and had been utilized to code the equipment and spares of its new military communications system known as Project *Advokaat*. He agreed that the evidence added substance to warnings that South Africa was being steadily integrated into the over-all Western defence system despite official statements to the contrary from the major Western Powers and that, in the light of that evidence, it was easier to understand why certain countries which claimed to abide

by the United Nations arms embargo still felt it necessary to oppose a mandatory arms embargo. Their alliance with the racist régime allowed the Western Powers to dominate Africa, the southern part of the Indian Ocean and the southern part of Asia.

7. In paragraph 66 of its report, the Special Committee referred to the relations between the racist régime in South Africa and the Zionist régime in Palestine; it noted press reports concerning a visit to Israel by the South African Minister of Interior and Information and the elevation of the South African Consulate-General in Israel to an embassy as further evidence of increasing collaboration between Israel and South Africa, despite the warnings by the General Assembly. His delegation had not been surprised to learn of that increasing collaboration. It was now generally recognized that there were many similarities between the régimes in South Africa and Palestine. Both depended on force for their existence rather than on justice or human rights. Both depended on foreign settlers and immigrants from Europe and claimed supremacy over the indigenous population, using terrorist methods, and both provided strong bases from which imperialism could dominate the third world. South African *apartheid* had been consolidated by international imperialism, in collusion with world Zionism. It had persisted because the world had allowed it to do so and it had been accepted by some Powers because it provided increasing benefits to them in the military, political and economic spheres. The racist minority had elevated the myth of white supremacy into a philosophy whereby foreign whites ruled the indigenous population by terror and exploited their manpower and their sources of natural wealth, while keeping them in a state of continuous humiliation and degradation. In order to justify that domination, the racist régime claimed that it was protecting the civilization of Europe. The same justification had been used in Palestine, and in his own country when the Fascist imperialists had occupied it. It was the continuing illogical logic of imperialism, and the only answer to such an allegation was that African civilization was genuine and authentic and that the people of Africa had a right to build and preserve their civilization in Africa.

8. The economic aims of *apartheid* were well known; they consisted in exploiting the African population as a source of cheap labour in order to bring greater prosperity to the white settlers and produce increased profits for imperialist interests. The South African régime had been able to export its policies to Namibia and Zimbabwe and, by virtue of its arsenal of weapons, had been able to constitute a continuing threat to all the peoples of Africa and to confront and challenge world public opinion.

9. His delegation believed that the situation in South Africa was the inevitable outcome of the denial to the people of South Africa of their natural and inalienable right to self-determination. Unless they were allowed to exercise that right, free from foreign interference, the situation in South Africa would undoubtedly deteriorate further. The United Nations must intensify its efforts to enable the people of South Africa to obtain that right.

10. His delegation wished to congratulate the Special Committee on its work and to express its support for the

recommendations contained in chapter II of its report. His country's position on *apartheid* was well known and required no further explanation. It supported the just struggle of the people of South Africa, under the leadership of their liberation movements, against the forces of evil, imperialist domination, racism and injustice, and would continue to do so until the people of South Africa had achieved their freedom and their right to self-determination.

11. Mr. MATHABA (Lesotho) said that, during the period under review, there had been no improvement in the plight of the oppressed people of South Africa. The six months' period of grace requested by the South African Prime Minister had been used not only to maintain *apartheid* through intensive repression but also to search for international acceptability. The numerous United Nations resolutions had been treated with indifference and opposition, and peaceful resistance to the policies of *apartheid* had been met with police brutality, detentions and restrictions. It was therefore fitting that the Special Committee should have designated 11 October as the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. The presentation of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee by the World Peace Council should be taken as an encouragement to it to intensify the struggle against *apartheid* rather than as a reward for its uncompleted work.

12. While appreciating the valuable contribution to the fight against racism made by the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, he endorsed the Swedish representative's appeal (956th meeting) for more and increased contributions to that Fund.

13. His delegation was grateful to those Governments which had extended invitations to the Special Committee to hold consultations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3324 D (XXIX) and earnestly hoped that the consultations with those Governments and with the specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations would lead to active support in the strategy to eliminate racial discrimination.

14. Despite the South African representative's statement in the Security Council¹ that his country would do everything in its power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour, it remained committed to ethnic discrimination within the so-called separate development areas, in the hope of finding acceptability in the international community. Since the *apartheid* States which South Africa proposed to create would be permanently dependent on the white minority, such a policy showed total disregard of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It was a challenge to the United Nations and to Lesotho; his country had a common frontier with the Transkei, which was due to become "independent" in 1976.

15. His Government appreciated the assistance of many friendly countries and the support of international organizations for its endeavours to provide employment for its citizens at home, but, since his country's economy could not yet support its people, most of its inhabitants were

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year*, 1800th meeting.

condemned to work in subhuman living conditions as migratory labourers in South Africa, where remuneration was not based on productivity, qualifications or skill but on the colour of a man's skin. The much-vaunted increased wages were unnoticeable with current inflation.

16. The Unit on *Apartheid* would need all possible support to counter South African propaganda and to support the Special Committee in its activities and the United Nations in the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

17. Mr. AASLAND (Norway) expressed appreciation of the visit of a delegation of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to Oslo in May 1975. The Special Committee's contacts with various organizations in Member States would arouse a greater awareness in the international community of the evils and dangers of *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

18. Despite the South African Government's statements during the previous year, the concessions made by the régime in accordance with its newly announced policy of reducing the so-called "unnecessary discrimination" had been outweighed by the stricter enforcement of repressive legislation. The plan to create so-called "independent bantustans" with inadequate territories and resources was only a way of consolidating white domination in South Africa. Despite calls upon the South African Government to find a peaceful solution, South Africa had not yet accepted the seriousness of the situation. The international community must therefore continue to exert pressure for change and to support the oppressed people in their legitimate struggle for freedom and a transition to a non-racial society. The systematic racial discrimination practised by the white minority régimes in southern Africa was intolerable and represented a threat to peace in that area. It was hard to understand why the white minorities did not profit from the bitter experience of other colonial régimes which had tried to resist the winds of change.

19. With regard to the recommendations put forward in chapter II of the Special Committee's report, his Government fully agreed on the need to step up international action against *apartheid* and to increase the dissemination of information about that policy in order to undermine international support for the white minority. More resources for that purpose would therefore be needed, as well as larger contributions to the Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund. His Government had contributed \$10,000 to that Fund in 1975 and would look favourably on future requests for economic support. It worked in close co-operation with the United Nations and OAU and with voluntary humanitarian organizations working for the oppressed peoples of South Africa. In 1975, his Government had been one of the largest contributors to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and it would increase its contributions considerably in 1976. It also contributed to voluntary organizations in South Africa and greatly regretted that the South African régime had tried to put a stop to the valuable humanitarian work they were doing. More and increased voluntary contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa would be a practical means of showing sympathy for the victims of *apartheid*.

20. Referring to the Special Committee's recommendations regarding sanctions against South Africa, he said that the Norwegian Government had strictly observed the arms embargo and was in favour of making it compulsory. It would abide by mandatory sanctions decided upon by the Security Council but felt that individual measures would prove futile as long as South Africa's main trading partners were opposed to them. The Norwegian Government was keeping the general public as well as the relevant institutions in Norway fully informed about the recommendations of the United Nations.

21. Although the situation was far from encouraging, there were some hopeful signs. With the emergence of the new States of Mozambique and Angola, independence seemed nearer for Zimbabwe and Namibia. After those countries had gained independence, the pressure on the South African régime would be irresistible. The increase of black consciousness in South Africa and the emergence of a large number of new young black leaders were also encouraging signs, and it was to be hoped that the white minority would agree to a peaceful transition to majority rule before it was too late.

22. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that his delegation was aware of the efforts of the Government of South Africa to convince the world that it was effecting a fundamental change in its treatment of the non-white majority. Statements by the South African Prime Minister, together with his visits to the capitals of neighbouring African States, had given rise to speculation that the South African Government might at last be responding to the pressure of world public opinion. In reality, however, no fundamental changes had been made in the system of *apartheid*. On the contrary, the Government had intensified its oppression and was proceeding with the establishment of "bantustans". Although 12 months had not yet elapsed since the South African Prime Minister's request for a period of grace to allow his Government to effect changes, the Committee could not fail to accept the view set forth in paragraph 25 of annex I to the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* that the "détente" proposed by Vorster was designed not only to enhance the security of the racist régime but also to give it a dominant role in the entire region.

23. While intensifying its pressure against the black people, the South African Government had doubled its military budget. In the view of his delegation, that was a most disquieting development. The Government of South Africa must be prevented from proceeding with its military build up and its intensified repression of the black population. His delegation therefore strongly urged those countries which continued to supply South Africa with arms to comply faithfully with the arms embargo.

24. Japan had complied not only with the arms embargo but with all other United Nations resolutions and recommendations dealing with the situation. Japan had no diplomatic relations with South Africa and had no intention of establishing any such relations unless and until the Government of South Africa abandoned its policy of *apartheid*. Since June 1974, Japan had refused to issue visas to South Africans to take part in either cultural exchanges or sporting activities in Japan.

25. Deeply concerned over the plight of the victims of *apartheid*, the Government of Japan had consistently supported programmes of humanitarian and education assistance for them and, at the preceding meeting, had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.324 on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Japan had increased its contribution to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa for the current year and was also actively considering a contribution to the Unit on *Apartheid*.

26. Japan was dependent on international trade for its survival, but, because of its determined opposition to *apartheid*, it had refrained from taking any special measures to promote trade or other economic relations with South Africa. Moreover, although the Government had removed restrictions on Japanese investments abroad, Japanese enterprises were still forbidden to make any direct investments in South Africa. Thus, there had been no change in his Government's determined opposition to *apartheid*.

27. In view of the independence of the former Portuguese Territories in Africa, the white leaders of South Africa should come to realize that they could not live in isolation and must therefore find ways to accommodate their policies to those of the independent African States. In his statement at the 2358th plenary meeting of the current session of the General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan had called upon the Government of South Africa and the majority régime of Southern Rhodesia to heed international criticism of their policies and bring about the transformations essential to justice and tranquillity in southern Africa. His delegation fervently hoped that the Government of South Africa would at last take a genuine step towards the establishment of a society where all people could enjoy freedom and equality regardless of their colour or race.

28. Mr. ZHIRI (Morocco) expressed the hope that the newly independent States which had just become Members of the United Nations would be followed by those other Territories which were still deprived of their freedom so that the Organization would become fully representative of the community of mankind. The information provided in the Special Committee's report would be a useful instrument in the continuation of its work. It was regrettable to note the difference between the efforts made to put an end to the system of *apartheid*, under which the great majority of the indigenous inhabitants of southern Africa were oppressed by a white minority which had made of racism a creed and a way of life, and the results obtained. Little new could be added to the condemnation of that policy expressed in the United Nations over the years, but it was clear that it was the product of sick minds such as those of the Nazis and Fascists whose methods the white minority applied. The brutal treatment of fellow human beings for no reason other than the colour of their skin made *apartheid* a crime against humanity and a disgrace to the whole international community.

29. The numerous recommendations and resolutions adopted by the United Nations urging the Pretoria Government to put an end to *apartheid* had only increased its determination to usurp the rights of the non-white inhabitants of South Africa. Despite the régime's manoeuvres,

which were designed to deceive the international community in order to gain time and to allow it to strengthen its grip on the country, its intentions were clear and it was time for all Members of the United Nations to demonstrate their belief in the principles of the Charter by showing their solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and eliminating a régime which was a threat to international peace and security.

30. His country was convinced of the dangers inherent in *apartheid* and fully supported the principles of the Charter and the recommendations and resolutions of OAU. There could be no compromise with the racist régime, which must be eliminated in accordance with the Dar es Salaam Declaration, on Southern Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU in April 1975. The minority régime in Pretoria, which dominated by oppression the overwhelming majority of the indigenous peoples of the Territory, had not the slightest right to represent South Africa. The representatives of that régime must be expelled from the United Nations and from all the specialized agencies. The decision to invite two South African liberation movements to send representatives to attend United Nations meetings as observers could only be a step towards providing the liberation movements in southern Africa with full membership in the United Nations, which he hoped they would attain in the near future.

31. Morocco had been host to the twenty-fifth session of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa which had been held at Rabat from 9 to 12 June 1975 for the purpose of studying ways and means of strengthening and assisting liberation movements in southern Africa.

32. The United Nations should call for increased anti-*apartheid* activity by Governments, governmental and non-governmental organizations and for the full mobilization of world public opinion in order to isolate the racist régime in the political, diplomatic, military, economic, cultural and other fields. The Arab States' complete embargo on the supply of petrol to that régime and their determination to have no relations with it whatsoever was an example to be followed.

33. His delegation strongly condemned the conduct of those Western States which, while denouncing the Pretoria régime in international forums, continued their political, economic and even military co-operation with it. Their co-operation increased the racist régime's capacity to control the fate of the peoples under its domination and to oppress them by economic and military means. There was increasing co-operation between the Pretoria and Tel Aviv Governments, which followed similar policies. The latter settled Zionist immigrants from every part of the world in Palestine, dispersing the indigenous population, and occupied the territory of three Arab States Members of the United Nations. Not satisfied with merely violating United Nations resolutions designed to put an end to its aggression in the Middle East, Israel also continued to defy the resolutions concerning *apartheid*, thus providing further proof, if such were needed, of the similarity between the two systems.

34. His delegation fully supported measures aimed at eliminating the virus of *apartheid* from southern Africa and

freeing the African peoples suffering under that system. However, no measures adopted by the United Nations would have the desired results without the full determination of all Member States to unite in honouring their commitment to the principles of the Charter.

35. Although his delegation appreciated the efforts made by the Special Committee in recent years, it hoped that its new officers would manage to achieve more effective results in eradicating the abhorrent system of *apartheid*.

36. Mr. IPSARIDES (Cyprus) said that the Committee should consider the situation arising from the practice of *apartheid* in South Africa in both its aspects, namely, as a gross violation of human rights and as a threat to the peace and security of the African continent and the world as a whole.

37. The States Members of the United Nations had a duty, both individually and collectively, to ensure the implementation of the principles set out in the Charter. While the international community had been categorical in its condemnation of *apartheid* and had taken numerous measures to meet the challenge of *apartheid*, it had met with failure in securing compliance with those measures. A grave responsibility for that failure rested particularly with those States which had put economic, political and strategic considerations above the dictates of conscience and had aided and abetted the racist South African régime. Especially deplorable was the attitude of those Governments which invoked the dubious distinction between external defence and internal security to justify arms shipments to South Africa when in reality those shipments enabled the régime to export *apartheid* beyond its borders and pose a real threat to the security of neighbouring States.

38. The obstinacy of the racist régime left little or no hope for an alternative to a racial conflagration. There were, however, several areas in which the efforts of the United Nations could be strengthened, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, contained in chapter II of its report, provided indications as to how that could be done. The international community could, for example, reapply itself to efforts to convince South Africa that it faced a united front of opposition to its racial policy. States which continued to trade with South Africa should be persuaded to place the dictates of conscience above economic and other considerations. The South African régime must be persuaded that it was set on a collision course fraught with catastrophic consequences and that it would be wiser for its own sake to change its ways. In that connexion, the independence of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa and their subsequent admission to the United Nations had created a favourable climate for the fight against *apartheid*. The international community should also support and assist the liberation movements in South Africa.

39. In view of the ineffectiveness of measures taken to date, the international community should contemplate more specific steps aimed at giving substance to its general attitude towards *apartheid*. His delegation therefore shared the view that the Security Council should take appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

40. His Government was fully committed to the principle of racial and ethnic equality. In accordance with resolution 1761 (XVII) of the General Assembly, it had no relations whatsoever with the Government of South Africa and, within the limits of its capacity, had contributed regularly to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, and the relevant programmes of OAU. It would continue to do so, despite the unprecedented and devastating tragedy which had recently befallen his country and people, the effects of which were still being felt.

41. His delegation categorically condemned the establishment of the so-called "bantustans" as a "fraud of self-determination", as the Special Committee described them in paragraph 200 of its report. The compulsory uprooting and transfer of whole populations was a violation of territorial integrity, the principles of the Charter and fundamental human rights and freedoms. His delegation therefore endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee in paragraph 203 of its report that the General Assembly should denounce the establishment of "bantustans" and should call upon all Governments to refrain from according any form of recognition to them.

42. The ultimate aim of the people of South Africa was majority rule based on universal suffrage with full guarantees for fundamental human rights. His delegation would support every United Nations initiative aimed at promoting that goal.

43. Mr. SSEGIRINYA (Uganda) said that Uganda had always opposed any system which denied the basic equality of all human beings, irrespective of colour, religion, race or sex, which was one of the cardinal rules of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was an anomaly therefore that a solution to the problem of *apartheid* had eluded the United Nations for three decades, while mankind had made startling progress in other areas. The United Nations should reappraise the situation to determine whether the solutions it had been advocating for 30 years were correct or whether a different approach was called for.

44. The efforts made by the United Nations to date had failed because of the economic selfishness of some of its Member States. Every attempt to isolate the racist régime had been thwarted by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and others. Those same countries had in the past supplied arms to South Africa and continued to do so. As paragraph 273 of annex I to the report of the Special Committee indicated, the South African régime was now arrogantly asserting that it could be self-sufficient in arms, and it was reinforced in that attitude by continued Western investments in its economy. His delegation appealed to all Member States to urge those States which continued to supply arms to Vorster's terrorist army to cease from doing so and to support the right of the black majority to self-determination.

45. The myriad resolutions of the United Nations dealing with the situation in South Africa had failed to have the slightest effect. Uganda, for its part, was totally committed to all measures aimed at the eradication of *apartheid*.

Uganda had always contended that it would be necessary to use force if the South African racists persisted in their refusal to grant freedom to the indigenous population. His delegation therefore appealed to the international community to increase its assistance to the national liberation movements of Azania in order to enable them to effect a swift overthrow of the Fascist clique.

46. His delegation totally condemned the “bantustan” policy, because it was predicated on the notorious tactic of “divide and rule”. Accordingly, States Members of the United Nations should refrain from all contacts with the leaders of the “homelands”.

47. His delegation also called for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in South Africa. The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and the

African National Congress of South Africa should be granted permanent observer status in the United Nations as a proper expression of the Organization’s recognition of those movements as the authentic representatives of the black people of South Africa.

48. Finally, his delegation endorsed the recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and would support all measures designed to put them into effect. He paid a special tribute to the World Peace Council for having awarded the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee. That honour would serve to inspire the Special Committee to redouble its efforts to expose the evils of *apartheid* to the international community.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

960th meeting

Monday, 20 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.960

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324, A/SPC/L.325):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. HASSAN ADLI (Malaysia) observed that despite the disapproval of the international community, clearly expressed in the suspension of the right of the representatives of South Africa to participate in the work of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly (2281st plenary meeting), the racist régime in Pretoria refused to change its deplorable policy. It continued arbitrarily to imprison opponents of *apartheid* and to hold them incommunicado for their crime of attempting to restore freedom, equality and justice to their country.

2. The Pretoria régime had tried to make its credentials more respectable by opening a dialogue with some African States, offering economic assistance and trying to act as an honest broker on the question of Southern Rhodesia. Such manoeuvres deceived no one, especially when they were accompanied by intensified repression and the application of the “bantustan” policy.

3. The United Nations had the responsibility of seeing that South Africa complied with its resolutions. The struggle against *apartheid* had to be waged on all fronts: diplomatic, political, economic, social and cultural. The international community should strictly enforce all measures adopted by

the United Nations to isolate the Government of South Africa and make it realize that its racist policies were unacceptable and a deep offence to human dignity.

4. His delegation reiterated its country’s support for the national liberation movements and urged the Government of South Africa to change its racist policies before the subjection of a people to permanent bondage led to violent confrontation.

5. His delegation fully supported the measures recommended by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in chapter II of its report (A/10022). It welcomed in particular the recommendation in paragraph 222 on establishing greater co-operation with the non-aligned movement, which had been playing a very active role in the struggle against *apartheid*. It also supported the Special Committee’s recommendation in the same paragraph, on the continuation of its activities in maintaining contacts with all organizations in a position to contribute to the elimination of *apartheid*, and its recommendation in paragraphs 223 and 224 that a conference or seminar should be organized in a Latin American country in 1976 with the participation of OAU, the South African liberation movements and non-governmental organizations.

6. His delegation believed that the constant weight of international criticism and the complete isolation of the *apartheid* régime would ultimately cause South Africa to reconsider its attitude.

7. It was regrettable that some countries should still maintain links with the South African Government; he urged them to end those links and to comply with all resolutions of the United Nations.

8. His delegation was convinced that much more could be achieved by positive than by negative policies, and that the South African Government was capable of being positive and of accepting the challenging task of directing its energies to the implementation of a new, truly democratic policy that would equip the Africans in South Africa for full participation in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country. It was to be hoped that that change would come about soon.

9. Mr. GREGORIADES (Greece) said it was lamentable that the *apartheid* issue should remain unsolved despite the efforts of the United Nations and the many resolutions and decisions that the international community had adopted by an overwhelming majority. Racism and all forms of racial discrimination were diametrically opposed to human dignity. In southern Africa racial discrimination was one of the worst manifestations of the domination of a majority by a minority which refused to comply with United Nations decisions, and it constituted a very serious threat to society and to the international community.

10. The situation in that part of the world was becoming worse daily, despite the measures taken by the international community. The minority was seeking to impose its will on the majority, ignoring democratic concepts and resorting to armed force. The majority was being expelled from its own territory in order to alter the demography of the country. The "bantustan" policy was being used to divide the African people and convert them into a population of refugees in their own country.

11. His delegation agreed with the view expressed in the report of the Special Committee that *apartheid* and all doctrines derived from it were a matter of universal concern. One of the most serious aspects of that policy was the arbitrary detention of political offenders without trial and without the consent of the courts, a practice to which Greece was utterly opposed.

12. The international community could not ignore the fact that the racist policy of *apartheid* was not confined to South Africa and that the rule of minority supremacy was being imposed in Namibia also. Greece joined those who had opposed that expansionist policy.

13. His delegation believed that the work of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, to which Greece had contributed, was most important; the Committee should, however, consider the reason for the existence of that Fund. It was a worsening moral and political problem, which was creating a situation and a precedent extremely dangerous for international life. The dangers to which failure to comply with United Nations resolutions exposed the international community had already been pointed out. It was the duty of the great majority to show those who thought that they could safeguard themselves against international opinion by ignoring it that that was no longer possible.

14. Mr. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen) observed that the agenda item under consideration related to the acts of savagery committed by a white minority supported militarily and economically by a number of developed European countries. The racist régime was persisting in its

campaign to make the world believe that it was prepared to abandon its policies of *apartheid*, and to that end it was allowing black and Coloured South Africans to become members of the diplomatic corps and to prepare for responsible posts. His delegation believed that détente with racism was unacceptable and that the only solution was to recognize the national liberation movements and offer them material assistance.

15. The racist régime had expressed its intention of granting independence to the "bantustan" of Transkei as part of its policy of "bantustans", a racist procedure which the international community could not agree to.

16. His delegation could not accept the minor changes introduced by the white minority and believed that steps should be taken to secure the transfer of all power to Africans, in conformity with the will of the people, and to eliminate every kind of discrimination.

17. Certain Governments had taken advantage of the willingness of some African States to accept peaceful solutions in order to increase their support of the racist régime. The United Nations had the responsibility of expanding its information campaign against that attitude and condemning it. Some countries which considered themselves defenders of human rights were nevertheless supplying arms to South Africa and preventing with their veto the imposition of a total embargo on the sale of armaments. The whole world had been shaken when a European State had executed five citizens, but the same press which had publicized that fact was ignoring the bloodshed in South Africa. Democratic Yemen had been one of the first signatories to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and had also signed, in 1974, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. His delegation urged Member States to sign and ratify those conventions in order to give increased moral and financial support to the persecuted Africans.

18. Paragraphs 66 and 205 of the report of the Special Committee indicated how important the relations between the racist régime of South Africa and Zionism were. The African States had understood the relation between the suffering of the black people in South Africa and that of the Palestinian people in the territories occupied by Israel, and they had approved the draft resolution adopted by the Third Committee at its 2134th meeting on 17 October 1975,¹ which affirmed that Zionism was a form of racial discrimination.

19. His delegation praised the attitude of Australia and Mexico, which had not allowed sports teams from their countries to participate in sports competitions with South African teams, and the attitude of the oil-producing Arab countries which had refused to export oil to South Africa.

20. Peace-loving countries had waged a successful information campaign to expose to the world the attitudes of certain States which were not practising what they

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 68, document A/10320, para. 27, draft resolution III.

preached; that success showed that the basic solution to the problem of *apartheid* lay in concerted action at the local and international levels.

21. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) said that many third-world countries had spoken to condemn the white racists of South Africa for their crimes and their pretence of pursuing a policy of détente. China supported the position of those countries and believed that in the preceding year the African peoples had advanced far in their united struggle against colonialism. The peoples of Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and the Comoros had achieved independence, and Portuguese colonialism was collapsing after almost five centuries of domination. The people of Zimbabwe had dealt severe blows to the enemy; the people of Namibia had opposed the scheme of “bantustan” elections and the “constitutional conference” engineered by the South African authorities; and, lastly, the people of Azania had made new progress against *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

22. It was evident that the white colonialist authorities were isolated and that the international situation was developing in a direction favourable to the peoples of Africa and unfavourable to colonialism, racism, zionism and big-Power hegemony. However, history showed that no reactionary force ever relinquished power of its own free will, and South Africa was no exception in that respect. Thus, it was resorting to political deception and violent repression in an attempt to retain its position.

23. For the past year, Vorster had been proclaiming “détente” and even declaring his readiness for dialogue and co-operation with the African countries and his willingness to provide them with economic assistance. Some imperialist propaganda media had given great publicity to those manoeuvres, describing them as “positive changes”. But Vorster himself had said that white domination in South Africa was non-negotiable and that South Africa must remain the guardian of southern Africa. That was tantamount to saying that the reactionary Government of a handful of white racists was sacred and inviolable and, what was more, wanted to rule all of southern Africa. For that purpose, it had strengthened its military forces and its machinery of repression; one need only note that South Africa’s military budget for 1975/76 was three times the budget for 1971/72. The Vorster régime had also stepped up its repression and intensified its “bantustanization” policy, under which 70 per cent of the population was forced to live in one seventh of the country’s territory.

24. As if that were not enough, the racist régime was collaborating with the Smith régime of Southern Rhodesia to suppress the struggle of the Zimbabwe people. Thus, it was clear that the changes proclaimed by Vorster were nothing but a stratagem to undermine the unity of the African States, divide the liberation movements and repress the struggle for freedom and independence. As had been pointed out recently by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, Vorster’s so-called “détente” was merely a trick to disarm the freedom fighters.

25. The arrogant and hostile attitude audaciously adopted by the white colonialists was in keeping with their

colonialist nature, but it was also inseparable from the support they received from the super-Powers and the imperialist countries, which had huge interests in South Africa.

26. He recalled that one of the super-Powers, together with two other countries, had used the veto twice in one year to protect the South African authorities. In the meantime, the other super-Power was proclaiming détente as a panacea to solve all problems, but its true purpose was to disguise its war preparations and continue its contention with the first-mentioned super-Power for hegemony.

27. *Apartheid* was not something inherent in South Africa. It had appeared there after the seventeenth century, when the colonialists had arrived, for it was rooted in the colonial system. Racism was also a form of colonialism. During the preceding 30 years the United Nations had adopted many resolutions, some of which had helped to inform public opinion and isolate South Africa. But the nature of racism would not change. The only solution was for the people of Azania to use revolutionary tactics to overthrow the racists, since, as an African representative had said in the Committee, violence must be met with violence. The future of South Africa was in the hands of the Azanian people, not of a handful of white racists, and his delegation was convinced that in the end that people’s efforts would be crowned with victory.

28. Mr. AL-HADDAWI (Iraq) welcomed the new members of the Committee and congratulated the Chairman and the other officers of the Committee on their election.

29. Racism in all its forms was contrary to Islamic culture and civilization, and for that reason Iraq condemned *apartheid* in South Africa and everywhere. It constituted a crime against morality, and its continued existence was difficult to understand. But *apartheid* was not limited to the domination of an African majority by a white minority. It was a policy of repression used for depriving the indigenous population of all its rights and exploiting it in its own land, which paradoxically, was rich and fertile. The way of life of the African majority in South Africa was a tragedy, proved by countless facts.

30. Iraq did not maintain relations of any kind with the racist régime and had prohibited oil exports to South Africa and all imports from that country. It complied with all United Nations resolutions and had signed and ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. In addition, the Government of Iraq kept public opinion in the country informed about the evils of racial discrimination and the odious practices of racism. Iraq had responded favourably to the Special Political Committee’s appeal and was contributing to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

31. It was clear that the racist Government of South Africa was responsible for the situation prevailing in that country, but some Members of the United Nations were also responsible. Some great Powers maintained economic and commercial relations with South Africa and others even supplied it with arms. One need only recall that some

members of the Security Council had not responded favourably to the wishes of the great majority of the peoples of the world and had preferred not to expel South Africa from the United Nations. Their ambiguous position with respect to the racist régime encouraged it to continue defying the United Nations and pursuing its policy of repression.

32. In the face of such a situation, it should be recalled that peace and security were indivisible. In order to strengthen international peace, the guarantees necessary to secure the political and economic independence of all peoples must be given, and if racial discrimination was not eliminated, there would be no peace.

33. Peace-loving peoples had consented to great sacrifices in order to attain freedom, independence and national sovereignty, but the end was not yet in sight and the fight to eliminate imperialism and colonialism must go on. The tragedy of the people of South Africa was very similar to the tragedy of the people of Palestine. In fact, one might say that what applied to the white minority of South Africa applied equally to the Zionist minority of Israel. Zionists practised racial discrimination against the Palestinians and applied laws as unjust as the Terrorism Act of South Africa. Under those laws, the population was grouped into four categories: the first was made up of European and American Jews; the second, of Asian and North African Jews; the third of Negro Jews; and the fourth of the Arabs of Palestine, who were the legitimate inhabitants of the country. The people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Palestine were all victims of the same evil, racial discrimination.

34. He reiterated his delegation's support for draft resolution A/SPC/L.325, relating to solidarity with the South African political prisoners, and urged the members of the Committee to adopt it unanimously. He hoped that pressure might in that way be exerted on the South African régime to free all political prisoners. He also invited all those members who had not yet done so to ratify the two conventions dealing with racial discrimination and with the crime of *apartheid*.

35. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria) said that, although there was evidence of unanimity in the condemnation of *apartheid* by virtually all Governments, unfortunately a wide gap persisted between the statements of the representatives of many countries and the actions of their Governments. It was difficult to comprehend that position of verbal condemnation and actual support for a régime that violated daily every fundamental human right and was made up of a group of inhuman and callous racists whose only concern was to keep themselves in power by committing systematic genocide on the non-white population of South Africa.

36. Last year, the General Assembly, by denying the racist delegation the right to continue participating in its deliberations, had taken a first positive step to rid itself of that canker. Nevertheless, three permanent members of the Security Council had prevented, by the use of their veto, the complete isolation of the South African régime. Thus, *apartheid* was being maintained by the collaboration of several countries which found it repugnant to their conscience but not to their pockets. Neither Nigeria nor OAU had allowed themselves to be deceived by the stratagems of

Vorster or by his promises of "dialogue" and "détente", since there was clear evidence that the South African régime was in fact stepping up its repressive actions. Much as Nigeria would welcome any initiative for a peaceful solution to the problem, it believed that Vorster should first prove his sincerity by starting talks with the non-white population of South Africa on a basis of equality. It would be a good beginning to release the political prisoners. The ruthless application of the many repressive laws promulgated by various South African Governments since 1948, which deprived the African people of their fundamental rights and their lives, had created special human problems for the international community, whose duty it was to assist the families of the unjustly persecuted patriots. In that regard, his delegation wished to express its appreciation to those countries, organizations and individuals which had contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, and to appeal to all Member States to make donations to it.

37. Nigeria was of the opinion that the active economic and military collaboration with the racist régime in South Africa—on which the Special Committee against *Apartheid* had published substantial documentary evidence—had helped to buttress *apartheid*. Countries like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Switzerland and Japan had invested extensively in the mining and industrial sectors of South Africa, and international agencies like the World Bank and IMF had participated in the South African economy on a large scale. It was also an irony of history that Israel, whose citizens had suffered at the hands of a racist and Fascist Government, currently found itself an ally of the South African régime, and that the United States which considered itself to be a bastion of democracy, maintained economic relations which were contrary to the tenets enunciated in its Constitution. Although the South African régime spoke of "dialogue" and "détente", it was in fact building up its military power. Since the United Kingdom had imposed an arms embargo on South Africa in 1964, France had become the main purveyor of arms to the racist régime. Much as his delegation welcomed the announcement by the President of France that arms for continental use would not be sold to South Africa, it felt that the French Government should end completely the sale of any kind of arms to the South African régime.

38. The Federal Republic of Germany had also increased its military collaboration with the South Africa régime and reports had even been received of its involvement in South Africa's nuclear programme. His Government had stated its total opposition to such co-operation, which would allow the South African régime to engage in nuclear blackmail. Moreover, South Africa was not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accordingly would have no compunction about using its nuclear power for military purposes in violation of General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX), which called upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

39. His delegation regretted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might be actively involved with South Africa militarily, as for instance, in Project *Advokaat*. Some members of NATO affirmed that the purpose of such collaboration was security in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans; the fact that South Africa was

becoming the major Power in the Southern hemisphere posed a real threat to the coastal States in the zone.

40. The United Nations had the duty of removing that threat to international peace and security by firm and effective action. It should call upon all the States involved to comply with United Nations resolutions and to desist from any military and economic co-operation with the *apartheid* régime. The embargo on arms to South Africa must be tightened, an oil embargo should be advocated and any form of co-operation with that country in the field of nuclear energy should be forbidden. The United Nations should support the oppressed people of South Africa by even further isolating the *apartheid* régime, condemning the policy of "bantustans" by widely publicizing the evils of *apartheid*, and urging Member States not to recognize any of the so-called independent "homelands". Moreover, consideration should be given to the possibility that South Africa might be represented by the authentic representatives of its people. His delegation considered that the Unit on *Apartheid* could achieve outstanding results if greater resources were placed at its disposal, and it accordingly joined the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in his appeal (951st meeting) to all Member States to contribute generously.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/SPC/L.324, A/SPC/L.325)

41. The PRESIDENT announced that Bhutan had joined the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325.

42. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) suggested that the Committee should adopt by consensus the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/SPC/L.324 and A/SPC/L.325, concerning the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and solidarity with the South African political prisoners respectively.

43. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) formally proposed that the two draft resolutions should be adopted by consensus.

44. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee adopted draft resolution A/SPC/L.324.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus.

45. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted draft resolution A/SPC/L.325.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus.

46. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had joined the consensus on the draft resolution relating to solidarity with the South African political prisoners (A/SPC/L.325) because it was inadmissible for any person to be persecuted for his beliefs or convictions. The Terrorism Act and other repressive legislation, to which reference was made in operative paragraph 2, were, in his opinion, a means of strengthening an abhorrent policy which prevented all the people of South Africa from taking part in the affairs of their country. Nevertheless, he had some reservations concerning the text. He supported the appeal for amnesty in so far as it referred to acts which did not constitute common crimes and understood that the references to struggle were limited exclusively to peaceful struggle.

47. Referring to draft resolution A/SPC/L.324, he said that, although his country had contributed in the past to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and continued to contribute to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and to the United Nations Fund for Namibia, it reserved the right to consider its future contributions independently of that draft resolution.

48. Mr. BROON (Netherlands) said that his delegation had joined in the consensus on the draft resolution relating to solidarity with the South African political prisoners (A/SPC/L.325) because it wanted to see an end to the persecution of people in South Africa for their opposition to the evil policy of *apartheid*. Although it totally rejected the system of *apartheid*, it stressed that the situation in South Africa was not a colonial one. Since expressions such as "liberation movements" and "freedom and self-determination" had a special meaning when used in a colonial context, his delegation wished first of all to point out that the South African movements referred to in the preamble of the draft resolution were internal movements whose objectives were emancipation and equal rights. Secondly, it stressed that the struggle of the South African people referred to in operative paragraph 2 was a struggle for political freedom and for full participation by all inhabitants, without distinction as to colour or ethnic origin, in determining the destiny of their country. Thirdly, repressive laws and practices in South Africa affected all opponents of *apartheid*, whatever their colour, and all of them therefore belonged to the oppressed people of South Africa referred to in the preamble and in paragraph 1.

49. Mr. RUDOLPH (Federal Republic of Germany) said that, although he had joined in the consensus, he had certain reservations concerning the wording of the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325. The wording used in those paragraphs would be appropriate for the problem of decolonization, but his country did not view *apartheid* in that context. He would have preferred the wording of the original draft, which had referred to all opponents of *apartheid* in South Africa. He nevertheless agreed with the basic idea and with the political objectives of the draft resolution.

50. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that, although his country had been a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325, its name did not appear in the list of sponsors.

51. The CHAIRMAN said that several countries, including his own, did not appear in the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325, but their names had been announced and recorded in the summary records of the Committee.

52. Mr. SIEV (Ireland) said that his delegation supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.325. The Government of South Africa had created a body of laws designed not only to punish those who violated the inhuman rules of the system of *apartheid* but also to repress those who were working to change the system. The world community was indebted to those valiant men and women who were trying to bring about changes in South Africa, even though they knew full well that they were exposing themselves to great suffering. The recent activities of the Government of South Africa

showed that it continued to believe that repression could stifle dissent. By denying the people an opportunity to express their opinions openly and to work for change through peaceful means, the Government of South Africa was running an ever greater risk of forcing them to have recourse to violence. His delegation considered that the liberation of political prisoners was an essential step required for the opening of talks between the representatives of all groups and all opinions in South Africa with a view to bringing about the necessary basic changes. His country did not condone acts of violence committed in the past and did not intend to encourage such acts in the future. Its support for the draft resolution, in which a clearer distinction might have been made between the situation in South Africa and a classic colonial situation, had been motivated by its belief that, if the South African authorities did not act in accordance with that resolution, the danger of violence in the future would be increased.

53. His delegation once again paid a tribute to the people who had been imprisoned for their beliefs and expressed the hope that the solidarity of the international community would help to give them strength in their unfortunate situation.

54. Mr. RENS (Belgium) said that, in joining in the consensus on the draft resolution relating to solidarity with the South African political prisoners (A/SPC/L.325), his delegation had been faithful to the view which it had held for years and which had prompted it to sponsor the draft resolution relating to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/SPC/L.324). It nevertheless had some reservations concerning certain paragraphs of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325. In operative paragraph 2, it would have been preferable not to refer to "self-determination", which had more to do with problems of a colonial nature. In paragraph 3, the type of struggle to which reference was being made could have been indicated and it should have been specified that that struggle must be waged in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In paragraph 4, the nature of "acts arising from" opposition to *apartheid* should have been defined. His delegation felt that such clarifications would have increased the moral value of the draft resolution, but it fully supported the humanitarian appeal made to the Government of South Africa and hoped that it would be heard.

55. Mr. QUENTIN (France) said that his delegation had already had occasion to express its serious reservations concerning certain paragraphs of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325. It had not, however, objected to the adoption by consensus of that text because it met France's concern, particularly on a humanitarian plane. His delegation again urged the Government of South Africa to free all the political prisoners who had been gaoled for their opposition to the policy of *apartheid*.

56. Mr. GALLAGHER (Canada) said that his delegation supported the appeal to South Africa to put an end to the persecution of black Africans, recognize their rights and permit their full participation. It had, however, supported draft resolution A/SPC/L.325 on the understanding that it referred to freedom fighters condemned under unjust laws, not to persons imprisoned for what a society which respected the freedom of its people considered to be crimes.

57. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) to address the Committee.

58. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) expressed his appreciation for the adoption of the draft resolutions on the South African political prisoners and on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and observed that the reservations expressed by some delegations concerning the wording of those draft resolutions represented support for the Government of Vorster, who could refer to them to show his supporters that they had nothing to fear from the United Nations because their Western friends would not abandon them. Vorster had stated that he would not change his policies, and it was his intransigence which was forcing the South African liberation movements to fight to the death to establish a democratic Government in that country.

59. If distinctions were made between common criminals and those imprisoned for their opposition to *apartheid*, that would mean that there was no demonstration of solidarity, because for Vorster there were only common criminals.

60. The question of the colonial nature of South Africa was a burning problem for the people of Azania. Those who had doubts about the colonial nature of South Africa should read a memorandum prepared by PAC for OAU, in which the legal status of South Africa was explained. The Unit on *Apartheid* had made that document available to the members of the Committee.

61. When the United Kingdom had transferred power to a small foreign white minority, it had not really granted independence but had merely placed colonial power in the hands of a minority. South Africa now intended to grant independence to a group of "bantustans" created for the convenience of the racist régime. Only a colonial State could grant independence to certain parts of its territory.

62. Although in private, doubts had also been expressed concerning the democratic representatives of PAC. Vorster had proscribed both PAC and the African National Congress of South Africa, but if the free exercise of democracy was permitted, it would be clearly seen who represented the majority. Finally, it should be recalled that Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau had achieved their objectives by using violence. Since the United Nations had admitted them as Members, it could not deny the right of peoples to use violence to gain their independence.

Organization of the Committee's work

63. The CHAIRMAN, noting that the list of speakers for the meeting was exhausted, said that some 60 delegations still had to speak in the general debate on the item under consideration. He suggested that, starting at the next meeting, there should be a single list of speakers who would speak in turn until the general debate was concluded.

64. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to that suggestion.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

961st meeting

Tuesday, 21 October 1975, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.961

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BENUZZI (Italy) reaffirmed his delegation's total condemnation of *apartheid* both in theory and in practice.
2. Despite South Africa's promises to the United Nations to carry out reforms in the *apartheid* system, the unjust pattern of life in that country remained unchanged and a wave of harsh repression had been unleashed on the non-white population and white liberals alike. After the régime's positive action with regard to the problem of Southern Rhodesia, such repression had come as a surprise and a disappointment.
3. Italy's position regarding *apartheid* was determined by its commitment to constitutional and democratic principles as well as to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. The imprisonment of thousands of human beings in South Africa for their political beliefs ranked among the tragedies of the contemporary era. His delegation sympathized with all political prisoners in South Africa and elsewhere.
4. His delegation noted with pleasure that the Special Committee against *Apartheid* had confined itself in its report (A/10022) to a consideration of facts and had refrained from imprecise allegations. However, while the report did mention the cancellation of sports events in Italy in which South African teams had been scheduled to participate, his delegation regretted that the report did not contain any mention of the recent closing of the immigration offices of the South African Government in Rome and Milan at the official request of the Italian Government. That important step reflected the decision of his Government to discourage emigration from Italy to South Africa. As a result of that decision, emigration had come to a halt except in isolated cases involving family reunions.
5. His delegation was also pleased to note the co-operation of Governments and non-governmental organizations with the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in the preceding year. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community in particular had co-operated with the Special Committee by providing it with information and clarifications on the occasion of the visit of its Chairman to Brussels in February 1975.
6. His Government complied fully with the voluntary arms embargo imposed against South Africa by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. It hoped that the pressure brought to bear on the Government of South Africa by the international community would soon produce tangible results. The white population of South Africa must come to realize that it was in their own interests to abandon the practice of *apartheid*.
7. Baron VON WECHMAR (Federal Republic of Germany) said that there were three separate facets to the question of South Africa, namely, South Africa's relationship with Rhodesia, its continued illegal presence in Namibia and its policy of racial segregation.
8. Since the attainment of independence by the former Portuguese colonies, there had been some change in South Africa's attitude towards Rhodesia. It had been, for example, at the insistence of Prime Minister Vorster that talks had been initiated between Ian Smith and the African National Council. His Government regretted the temporary breakdown of those negotiations and had encouraged South Africa to use its influence, including compliance with economic sanctions, to persuade the Smith régime to resume negotiations.
9. Although there had been some change in the situation in Namibia during 1975, his Government did not consider the constitutional conference proposed by South Africa to be an appropriate way of bringing about Namibia's independence.
10. Within South Africa itself, there had been little if any progress. Despite the apparent willingness of Pretoria to eliminate the worst aspects of so-called "petty" *apartheid*, it had not moved one inch on the key issue of granting its black population the right to participate in political decisions. Instead, it adhered to its "bantustan" policy, which offered no real solution to the problem. His country's Foreign Minister had taken advantage of the recent visit to Bonn of his South African counterpart to point out that delaying tactics would not lead to the gradual acceptance of *apartheid* but to the radicalization of the black population and the growing isolation of South Africa from the rest of the world.
11. Those who urged the use of force as the answer to South Africa's intransigence were counselling a course which was not only dangerous and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations but also futile, given the existing balance of power in South Africa. Nor was a complete economic embargo the appropriate way to bring about internal change in South Africa. An economic boycott would adversely affect the black population by forcing the white minority into an attitude of defiance. The international community should instead seek to encourage the

economic development of the black population and strengthen its share in population and strengthen its share in political decision-making. Continuous contact, not isolation, was the way to promote the realization in Pretoria that harmonious coexistence with its African neighbours and genuine détente were possible only if South Africa abandoned its policy of racial segregation. The attempts of African statesmen to overcome the barrier of distrust had therefore won the respect and admiration of his delegation.

12. Referring to the frequent criticism of his country in the United Nations for its economic relations with South Africa, he pointed out that trade was essential not only to his own country, which had limited resources in raw materials, but also to the very survival of the ever-growing world population. Maximum growth could be achieved only through unrestricted trade, which should be separated from politics. In that connexion, he noted that a large number of African countries also maintained trade relations with South Africa. His Government was therefore not sacrificing the interests of the black population in South Africa to its own economic interests but, on the contrary, had constantly attempted to strike an equitable balance between the two so as to translate into practice its disapproval of *apartheid*. Thus, his Government had refrained from encouraging investments in South Africa by expressly excluding that country from all investment promotion schemes. It had repeatedly urged its companies operating in South Africa to set an example by paying equal wages to black and white workers. It had also discouraged sporting contacts with South African teams which had not been formed in accordance with the Olympic principle of non-intervention.

13. It was the firm and established policy of the Federal Republic not to supply any arms to South Africa. Even before its entry into the United Nations, the Federal Republic had, pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council, placed an embargo on the export of military materiel to South Africa and had refrained from all military co-operation with that country. His Government regulated the export of arms and military equipment more strictly than any other highly industrialized country with an arms industry of its own.

14. Despite his Government's good record with respect to regulating military exports to South Africa, certain publications of dubious origin, such as the pamphlet entitled *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, had recently given currency to distortions and misrepresentations regarding collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa in the fields of nuclear energy and uranium enrichment. In that connexion, he emphasized that his country had renounced the production of nuclear weapons and in 1975 had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, it made approval for the supply of nuclear power plants to foreign countries contingent upon satisfaction of IAEA safeguards ensuring that such plants would not be used for military purposes. He emphasized that there was no co-operation between the Federal Republic and South Africa in the field of uranium enrichment. While it was true that the West German company STEAG and the South African company UCOR had conducted a comparative study of the South African and West German uranium enrichment processes in order to evaluate their respective technical and economic advan-

tages, the South African company had concluded that its own process was more suitable. The West German process for uranium enrichment was not classified and was readily accessible in technical journals, which in itself proved that the process had no relevance for military applications.

15. As to other allegations, he emphasized that the object of the international tender in which a West German company was participating was the supply of a normal nuclear power plant of the type already in operation in 15 countries. Furthermore, no applications for an export permit had been filed yet with the authorities of the Federal Republic by the firm in question.

16. The struggle against *apartheid* was a matter of concern to all, not only to Africans. Confrontation between African and Western European countries would therefore only serve the purposes of the Pretoria Government and should be avoided. His delegation welcomed the fact that the Committee had already adopted by consensus resolutions on the South African political prisoners and on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, to which his Government made a significant contribution.

17. Mr. KAPLLANI (Albania) said that the Committee's current debate on the policies of *apartheid* was taking place at a time when the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism was entering a decisive stage, as was demonstrated by the recent attainment of independence by the former Portuguese colonies. The peoples of Africa were strengthening their solidarity in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

18. *Apartheid* was the ugliest and most shameful manifestation of racial discrimination and imperialist slavery. Racial discrimination was unfortunately not simply a phenomenon confined to past centuries when white colonizers, a sword in one hand and a cross in the other, had occupied the lands of America and Africa to establish their "civilized" rule over coloured populations; it lived on in the form of *apartheid* in southern Africa. The Fascist régimes in Pretoria and Salisbury were forcing the indigenous populations of Azania, Namibia and Zimbabwe to live under concentration camp conditions that were reminiscent of Hitler's rule.

19. The peoples of the world had condemned racism and *apartheid* and the United Nations had imposed economic and political sanctions against the Vorster and Smith régimes. The General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session had rejected the credentials of the South African delegation (resolution 3206 (XXIX)). Such steps demonstrated the universal condemnation of the Fascist Pretoria régime and its policies of *apartheid*.

20. The Vorster régime nevertheless continued to flout such measures and world public opinion. It was encouraged to behave in that manner by the economic, military and political support it received from the United States of America and other countries of the aggressive NATO bloc. Those countries had substantial economic, political and military interests in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where they exploited both the abundant natural resources and the cheap labour of the indigenous population. They

regarded South Africa as an important strategic base from which to threaten the independence and freedom of African countries, as could be seen from the repeated provocations of the Pretoria racists against Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and other independent African countries.

21. It was not by chance that the United States imperialists who enforced discrimination against Negroes in their own country, were intensifying their collaboration with the racists of South Africa, nor did the close ties between the Israeli Zionists and the racists of South Africa come as any surprise.

22. The struggle of the peoples of Azania, Namibia and Zimbabwe was part and parcel of the struggle of all African peoples for national liberation against colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and imperialist hegemony. Despite their diabolical tactics of “détente” and “dialogue”, the white colonialists would succeed in deceiving only the naive. The imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists and their lackeys in southern Africa were doomed to failure because of the irresistible force of the African peoples’ struggle. His Government supported and would continue to support that struggle for national liberation and independence and for the eradication of *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

23. Mr. KASINA (Kenya) said that the racist régime in South Africa had continued to treat United Nations appeals with contempt and had even intensified the brutality with which it enforced *apartheid*. The African in South Africa was subjected to all forms of oppression and degradation and was denied the most basic rights. Arrests and detentions of opponents of *apartheid* were continuing under the so-called “Sabotage Act” and the Terrorism Act.

24. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism had, however, brought profound political change to southern Africa. The racist régime had responded to that change by intensifying political repression and pursuing its tactic of establishing friendly relations with African countries so as to divert world attention from problems inside South Africa itself. His delegation, for its part, had consistently rejected the notion of dialogue with the Pretoria régime, since it would harm the struggle of the African people for self-determination and give the seal of recognition to the racist régime and vicious policies of *apartheid*. That régime should instead initiate a dialogue with the black majority population within its borders.

25. “Separate development” was another of the régime’s slogans aimed at concealing its real intentions. The so-called “homelands” could not conceivably flourish as independent countries, since they were mere enclaves of unwanted land. Moreover, half of the African population did not live in the “homelands”.

26. The racist régime had ignored more than 150 United Nations resolutions, since it was secure in the knowledge that it had commercial, military, diplomatic and cultural relations with many Member States. His delegation had noted that certain NATO countries were involved in the construction of a highly advanced military communications system known as Project *Advokaat*, which was to have its

headquarters in South Africa. His delegation strongly appealed to those countries to comply with the trade and military embargoes imposed by the United Nations against South Africa.

27. In view of the persistent refusal of the South African régime to comply with United Nations resolutions, the Organization had no alternative but to maintain and strengthen military, economic, political, cultural and sporting boycotts against that régime. The Security Council should, as recommended by the General Assembly in resolution 3224 B (XXIX), take action under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure strict compliance by all States with the arms embargo. His delegation endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee, in paragraph 210 of its report, that the trade embargo should be extended to cover petroleum and other raw materials. Finally, the international community should provide all necessary support to the liberation movements of South Africa in their legitimate struggle against oppression.

28. Mrs. BERMUDEZ (Cuba) said that the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations was a fitting occasion to think about *apartheid*, one of the most persistent problems in the Organization’s history. The *apartheid* policy of the racist Government of South Africa represented not only a system of racial discrimination but also a form of colonialism based on the Fascist oppression of blacks by a white minority which denied them their basic human, political, economic and social rights. It was an attempt by the whites to change the ethnic composition of the native population and destroy its territorial integrity and cultural heritage. It prevented the native population from exploiting its own natural resources. It legalized the unequal distribution of land and provided a cheap African labour force for the country’s white economy. It meant permanent exclusion of the black majority from any political activity in the country. In pursuit of the same goals, the Pretoria régime was also accelerating the process of “bantustanization” in an effort to Balkanize the country and concentrate the largest and richest portion of it in the hands of the white minority. Resistance to such policies by the overwhelming majority of the South African people has been met by renewed and intensified repressive measures, including murder, imprisonment and torture.

29. Pretoria also had imperialist ambitions to extend its Fascist régime to Namibia, which it had been occupying illegally for decades. Its military aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was in keeping with the same policy. That policy was receiving economic, financial, military and diplomatic support from the United States of America and other Western Powers in defiance of many United Nations resolutions. Increasing capital investment in South Africa and Namibia by the transnational corporations of those countries was adding to the economic potential for repression and aggression by the Vorster régime. The United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and other NATO members should be especially singled out for their contributions to South Africa’s modern military establishment.

30. The condition of the peoples of southern Africa had remained the same for thirty years despite the categorical rejection of South Africa’s racism and expansionism by the

great majority of States Members of the United Nations, as expressed in many resolutions. Although implementation of those resolutions had recently been frustrated when the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France had vetoed a Security Council resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations, it could not be denied that the balance of power in Africa had been changing in a positive direction. The historic successes of the African national liberation movements, which had begun with the universal recognition of the legitimacy of armed struggle, the decision of the United Nations to give their representatives observer status and the liberation of the former Portuguese colonies, were all evidence of that and portended the eventual and inevitable triumph of the liberation forces in South Africa and Namibia. In addition, the Pretoria régime and its imperialist allies were becoming totally isolated as various international bodies and anti-*apartheid* movements all over the world voiced condemnation of the *apartheid* system as a crime against humanity.

31. She wished to warn, however, that an especially dangerous moment had arrived. The Vorster régime had changed its strategy and initiated an all-out diplomatic offensive marked by apparent concessions which in no way modified its racist doctrine. *Apartheid* was a more serious threat than ever to international peace and security. The international community should therefore not be deceived by diversionary manoeuvres and should not agree to compromises or so-called dialogues with the racist régime. It must instead maintain and strengthen an economic, political, cultural and sports boycott until the South African system was completely destroyed. In her country, whites and blacks had joined in the struggle of oppressed peoples everywhere, whether they be South Africans, Namibians, Palestinians or Puerto Ricans, and it would feel honoured to act as host to one of the forthcoming meetings of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

32. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that his delegation regretted the fact that the South African régime was persisting in its policy of *apartheid*; he noted that his Government had consistently supported measures to exert pressure on South Africa, to isolate it and to deprive it of its seat in the United Nations until it could be replaced by a legal and representative Government. His delegation had supported many anti-*apartheid* resolutions, and it condemned all those countries which were still co-operating with the South African régime. It commended the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for its ceaseless efforts to isolate that régime.

33. He noted that there was a resemblance between *apartheid* and zionism and that the Special Committee had therefore condemned the equally inhuman régimes of South Africa and Israel and denounced co-operation between them. He quoted resolution 77 (XII), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its twelfth ordinary session, held in Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, to the effect that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and the racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa had a common imperialist origin, the same racist structure and a common policy aimed at repression. He noted that the collaboration between those racist régimes had been documented in detail in a report submitted by the Special Committee against *Apartheid*

entitled "Recent developments in the relations between South Africa and Israel".¹ That report referred specifically to the military, diplomatic, economic and cultural co-operation between South Africa and Israel. In view of the importance of the developments outlined in the report, his delegation called upon all those who had not yet done so to join the overwhelming majority of States in implementing the decisions of the international community against *apartheid*.

34. Mr. GHELEV (Bulgaria) said that it was discouraging to note that the problem of racism in South Africa still confronted the United Nations even after 30 years of great progress on other international issues. The situation in South Africa unfortunately continued to threaten peace and security in Africa and throughout the world despite the improvement in the international climate since the days of the cold war, when the forces of imperialism and reaction had found it much easier to defy the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and oppose the aspirations of peoples to self-determination. Despite the victory of revolutionary and democratic forces in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Portugal, any serious attempt to usher in lasting peace in Africa was inevitably doomed as long as the racist Government of Pretoria and the illegal minority régime in Salisbury were left to pursue their ruthless policy of racial and colonialist domination. Commendable as they were, United Nations efforts to call public attention to the degrading conditions imposed by the racist régimes on the African population and to condemn them had to be supplemented by practical steps in support of the courageous struggle of that oppressed people.

35. In that connexion, his delegation whole-heartedly supported the recommendations contained in chapter II of the excellent report prepared by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022). The Committee had very properly recalled General Assembly resolution 2775 F (XXVI) of 1971, which had stated that the tactics then being employed by the racist Government of South Africa in pursuance of its so-called "outward policy" were designed primarily to obtain acquiescence in its racial policies, to confuse world public opinion and to hinder assistance to the liberation movements by the international community. His delegation fully agreed with the Special Committee that what had been true in 1971 was still true today. South Africa's current propaganda campaign was designed to counteract its isolation by deceiving public opinion with references to so-called reforms; that was a delaying tactic which could deceive no one. It could, nevertheless, still be dangerous to the extent that it blocked international efforts to isolate the Pretoria régime and diverted the United Nations and the international community from the vital need to increase their moral and material support of the national liberation movements. In fact the military, economic and political isolation of the racist régime in South Africa by the international community was the best way to help the South African population in its fight for freedom and should be given the highest priority. For those very reasons it was extremely important to note that certain States and certain economic

¹ Document A/AC.115/L.411 of 23 July 1975.

groups were continuing to maintain and in some cases intensify their co-operation with the South African régime. The United Nations could make a most effective contribution in the struggle against *apartheid* by denouncing categorically that deplorable and dangerous policy. For years certain States had condemned *apartheid* in words but continued to co-operate in fact with the régime which practised it. That policy must be strongly denounced. Paragraphs 70 to 77 of the report of the Special Committee deserved special attention because they pointed to the most dangerous kind of co-operation with South Africa, that is, military and nuclear co-operation. The report offered striking proof of the real intentions of the Pretoria régime and the serious danger to peace and security it presented.

36. The South African racists had made it clear that both ideologically and politically they were the successors of Hitler. However, *apartheid* was not merely an ideology and a policy. It was also a system of segregation, oppression and social exploitation based on racial discrimination. It was a modern form of slavery and the foundation of the whole political and economic structure of South Africa. It was therefore essential that the United Nations should focus its attention on the most important aspect of the problem, namely the fact that the criminal policy of the South African régime was based on the political, military, economic and financial support of imperialist forces and transnational corporations.

37. In view of the intransigence with which the Pretoria régime continued to defy the United Nations and world public opinion, it was more necessary than ever that the international community should show determination and energy in supporting the legitimate struggle of the people of South Africa and its liberation movements.

38. Mr. RITTO (Portugal) said that the concept of *apartheid* was abhorrent to all civilized persons and noted that expressions of distaste for that policy grew more vehement every year. Although it might seem difficult, if not impossible, for a régime to ignore world opinion, the South African régime had maintained and even consolidated its policy of *apartheid*.

39. The situation in South Africa had often been cited as proof of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, but the resolutions of the General Assembly showed that it had not abdicated its role and responsibilities. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* described the increasing isolation of the South African régime and the negative repercussions which were starting to be apparent. Had that isolation not been brought about by the United Nations? Mozambique's accession to independence and the forthcoming independence of Angola had been rightly singled out as recent positive developments. The United Nations had helped to lead those countries to sovereignty, and their attainment of independence should have major repercussions in South Africa. In addition to the initiatives taken by the United Nations and the courage and sacrifice of the freedom fighters, it should be noted that a basic factor in the liberation of Mozambique and Angola was the goodwill and enthusiasm shown by the new leaders of Portugal in pursuing a policy of complete decolonization. Those recent developments gave grounds for some hope about the evolution of the situation in South Africa, and his country

believed that it had made a useful contribution to the course of events. Today, it could only associate itself fully in the vehement condemnation of *apartheid*, a policy completely unacceptable to the people of Portugal.

40. Mr. EHSASSI (Iran) said that the determination of the United Nations to bring about a change in South Africa had been matched by South Africa's determination not to relent. In fact, the racist régime in South Africa has continued to enact even more aggressive laws and has denied basic freedoms to millions of people. The dangers inherent in the South African situation were immense, and yet South Africa had ignored them and refused even to accept the prerequisites for a peaceful solution. While talking about a peaceful settlement, it had greatly accelerated the buildup of its military power. Spurning all General Assembly resolutions, the régime had imprisoned thousands of people, hundreds of them under the Terrorism Act. His delegation condemned South Africa's continued policy of repression and fully supported all those who had been imprisoned for calling for an end to a system which excluded the majority of people from the exercise of their right to self-determination.

41. His Government rejected the policy of "bantustans", which was aimed at keeping the oppressed majority of the people perpetually divided and totally dependent economically on Pretoria. The "bantustans" would serve only as a reservoir of cheap labour to sustain the white economy and would not give any real freedom to the black people of South Africa. Only the repeal of such legislation as the Terrorism Act and the granting of self-determination to all the peoples of South Africa would bring peace to that country.

42. International opposition to *apartheid* had strengthened and international activities against *apartheid* had greatly increased during the past year. Even in South Africa itself, many whites were beginning to speak out on the issue. The role of the United Nations in harmonizing and inspiring the struggle had been pivotal, and much credit was due to the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. His delegation believed that the international community had a commitment to eradicate racial discrimination in South Africa, and Iran contributed to various United Nations funds designed to assist the victims of *apartheid*.

43. Racism had had no place in Iran's long history; the people of Iran had always condemned racial discrimination and human degradation of any kind, as they condemned the policy of *apartheid* which was today being inflicted upon millions of people.

44. Mr. SENGHOR (Senegal) observed that the enthusiastic welcome given by the United Nations to the four new Member States had not led the Organization to overlook the disquieting situation in the Republic of South Africa. In fact, the Special Political Committee had the benefit of the presence of representatives of the liberation movements who supplemented, with a frankness that did them credit, its information on the odious system of *apartheid*.

45. Senegal was preparing to act as host to a major conference from 5 to 8 January 1976 on Namibia and human rights, which should bring about a better under-

standing of the Namibian problem and make for progress towards a speedy and enduring solution of the Namibian question. In taking that initiative, his country was once again demonstrating its continuing and unreserved support for the South African liberation movements, which could always be assured of its assistance and solidarity.

46. The so-called policy of “détente” proclaimed by South Africa was unacceptable and would continue to be so until the Pretoria racists conceded equal rights to the population as a whole in a declaration to that effect and entered into negotiations with the liberation movements, which unquestionably represented the aspirations of the majority of the population.

47. It was the duty of the United Nations to make known all the crimes of the *apartheid* régime, and his delegation highly appreciated the work of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and its objective and excellent report on that subject.

48. His delegation endorsed the Special Committee’s condemnation of the manoeuvres of the Pretoria régime, which was preparing to grant a semblance of independence to the Transkei and other “bantustans”, hoping in that way to present the international community with a fait accompli. Senegal called upon all States Members of the United Nations to take effective measures to foil those manoeuvres, which deceived only those who were willing to be deceived.

49. The international community must support the struggle of the overwhelming majority of the South African population to exercise its right to self-determination. Senegal attached the utmost importance to the implementation by the international community of effective measures for the isolation of the South African racist régime in the military, economic, political, cultural, sporting and other fields. It endorsed the conclusions contained in the report of the Special Committee; the latter, while noting the progress achieved during the preceding year in the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa, also noted with regret that the Security Council had failed to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 3324 B (XXIX).

50. Nothing could stand in the way of the will of a people determined to regain its freedom and dignity. His country was convinced that the difficulties of the liberation movements would prove to be only temporary and that *apartheid* would disappear for ever as justice triumphed in that part of the African continent.

51. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) noted that the item under consideration called for a further condemnation of racial discrimination and racism, as embodied in the policy of *apartheid*. Racial discrimination and racism were alien to Chile’s humanistic traditions and its cultural and historical background; it therefore categorically rejected *apartheid* and had consistently supported the struggle against racism and racial discrimination within the United Nations. It wished to congratulate the Special Committee against *Apartheid* on its work, which had the full support of his delegation.

52. His delegation believed that it was important to reaffirm the unity which had been expressed in the Committee regarding its total rejection of racial discrimination and *apartheid*. It would like to associate itself with the comment by one delegation to the effect that it was a mistake to give undue emphasis to differences of opinion within the Committee. To point out differences did not help the cause that the Committee was seeking to promote. A display of solidarity would enable the Committee to defeat the political manoeuvres by certain States which were using the Committee’s work as a pretext for making political attacks on other States. For that reason, his delegation did not propose to answer some of the attacks directed at it but wished to point out that, of the 29 countries which maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa, only a few, including Chile, had been singled out. He wished merely to state that Chile had no accredited diplomatic envoy in South Africa and that its relations with that country had not changed for many years. In conclusion, Chile whole-heartedly supported the action taken by the United Nations regarding Namibia and Southern Rhodesia and against racial discrimination and *apartheid*; it had therefore supported the draft resolution A/SPC/L.324 and A/SPC/L.325, which had been adopted at the previous meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

962nd meeting

Wednesday, 22 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.962

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that nobody who had listened to the debate on *apartheid* could fail to have been impressed by the way in which the international community had condemned that policy. His delegation had repeatedly expressed its repugnance against that pernicious system and would therefore confine itself to a few specific points.

2. First, he wished to restate the fundamental opposition of his Government to the racial policies of South Africa. Members of the Government had made it specifically clear in their contacts with South African leaders that in voting against the proposal to expel South Africa from the United Nations the United Kingdom delegation had been motivated by respect for the principle of universality and not by a desire to protect or condone *apartheid*.

3. In accordance with its position, his Government had taken certain positive measures in the past year. For example, at the end of 1974 the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had announced that the embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa would be reimposed and that an overhaul of the licensing arrangements for arms sales had been completed to ensure that British policies were fully in line with its international undertakings.

4. The United Kingdom Government had also announced, late in 1974, that it intended to review the question of the Simonstown Agreements, since it was nearly 20 years since they had been signed and some of their provisions were no longer appropriate. On 16 June 1975 those Agreements had been terminated, thereby ending any special relationship which might have existed between the two countries in the naval sphere. At the same time it had been made known that in future there would be no joint exercises of the South African Navy and the Royal Navy.

5. In the field of sporting exchanges, the United Kingdom had adopted a position consistent with its general attitude to *apartheid*. That position had been explained in September 1975 in a letter addressed to the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

6. With regard to investments by foreign companies in South Africa, the United Kingdom Government had made contact with all British companies which had subsidiaries or joint venture companies in South Africa, reminding them of their special duty to non-white workers who were prevented by *apartheid* regulations from defending their interests. The Government felt that the stresses of economic growth were a powerful force for change within South Africa. Economic expansion was already obliging—and would increasingly oblige—the white population to accept that black South Africans must be allowed to perform more skilled and better-paid jobs if expansion was to be maintained.

7. With regard to the appeals to the international community to provide development assistance to the countries neighbouring South Africa, his Government was proud of its record of help to the countries concerned, and, in addition, had indicated its willingness to provide assistance to the newly independent State of Mozambique.

8. He hoped that his desire for brevity would not be taken as a sign that his Government did not disapprove of the politics of racial segregation. If that was true it would not be contributing to the various United Nations funds for southern Africa. It was clear that all members of the Committee agreed that *apartheid* should be eliminated; they disagreed only on the methods for achieving that object.

9. Mr. BAH (Guinea) said that both the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners and the statements made during the debate had demonstrated the profound dedication of the international community to the ideals of liberty, justice and independence and its unshakable determination to spare no effort to end the situation prevailing in southern Africa.

10. It was clear that the South African rulers continued to be unrelenting and that on both the political and administrative levels the South African Government had taken a whole series of extremely strict measures against the opponents of the sinister policy of *apartheid*. The leaders of the liberation movements had been the first victims and everyone knew what tortures they were subjected to.

11. At the same time, the social situation of the rest of the black population was extremely critical, for although Vorster proclaimed that the inhabitants of South Africa had the highest standard of living, the sad truth was that the infant mortality rate among the black population of South Africa was the highest in the continent. It was enough to recall, on the other hand, the wretched situation of the black workers in the South African gold-mines. In the meantime, the population in the “bantustans”, which made up 13 per cent of the territory of South Africa, was being decimated by epidemics and hunger. It was unnecessary to recall that blacks were not entitled to move freely in the cities and that their children were educated—when they received any education at all—according to a system that sought to undermine from the tenderest age their feeling of belonging to one single nation.

12. Against that background Vorster was now proclaiming that the Transkei was going to achieve independence. It was unfortunate to see some tribal chiefs acting as accomplices in those manoeuvres, whose sole aim was to perpetuate racial segregation. Nevertheless, he was firmly convinced that the liberation movements would not tolerate that duplicity and would take every step that was needed. Meanwhile, he appealed to all peace-loving countries not to recognize those puppet States.

13. Now Vorster and Ian Smith were trying to make people believe that they were prepared to introduce changes in southern Africa, their sole intention being to divide the African States and weaken OAU. It sufficed to recall that Vorster had advised Smith to agree to meet with the representatives of the liberation movements to discuss majority rule, while in his own territory he was resorting to every conceivable stratagem to prevent that majority from coming to power.

14. With regard to Namibia, it was clear that Vorster continued to consider it as South West Africa and, despite all the United Nations resolutions and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,¹ “bantustans” continued to be created in Namibia in accordance with a plan to destroy the country’s territorial integrity. The measures of the racist régime to consolidate

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971, p. 16.*

Namibia's annexation by South Africa constituted another challenge to the international community, since only the United Nations was entitled to watch over the interests of Namibia until power was transferred to the Namibian people, whose sole authentic representative was the South West Africa People's Organization.

15. Unfortunately, the exploiters were not alone; they had the moral, economic, financial and military support of the great Powers, whose monopolies turned a deaf ear to the appeals of the United Nations. Their attitude was disappointing.

16. As President Sekou Touré had said, it was clear that the time had come for the international community to face up to its responsibilities in respect of the crimes committed by South Africa. The international community must take energetic steps and present a united front to the minority which had challenged it. In the middle of the twentieth century there should be no place for *apartheid* and racial segregation. Guinea for its part would continue its struggle until that scourge, which the Guinean people detested with unparalleled hatred, was eliminated once and for all.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

17. Mr. ALLAF (Syrian Arab Republic) said that on celebrating its thirtieth anniversary, the United Nations could be proud of what it had achieved in the sphere of colonialism, since, with its help, the third world had gradually liberated itself from that evil and there now remained only a few strongholds such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Currently, the main purpose of the United Nations was to fight the régimes that still practised racial discrimination and to isolate them from the international community.

18. Unfortunately, as was clear from the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022), the situation in South Africa had not improved and although Pretoria had sought to give the impression that it wanted détente it was clear that it was only trying to divide the ranks of its opponents. That was understandable following the defeat of colonialism in the neighbouring countries. Finding itself isolated, the *apartheid* régime was resorting to propaganda to persuade the international community that it was changing when, in fact, with the help of the imperialists, it had doubled its military budget in less than one year, and was developing nuclear technology and trying to produce uranium—all of which developments were exceedingly dangerous.

19. The international community had condemned the racist régime of South Africa on countless occasions. Following its expulsion from the General Assembly at the twenty-ninth session, the racist régime had not dared to appear at the current session, and would be prevented from participating until the legitimate representatives of South Africa were able to occupy their seat in the Organization. It followed that the participation of the representatives of the two liberation movements in the Committee's debates was no more than a natural step towards the achievement of the desired objective. Nevertheless, the United Nations should not be satisfied with rejecting the credentials of the representatives of the racist régime of Pretoria, since the

only method of confronting that régime was to implement the provisions of Chapters II and VII of the Charter.

20. Apart from that, it was obvious that the racist régime would not have dared to defy the United Nations without the support of various imperialist countries and racist entities which resembled it. Those countries, led by some of the great Powers which were permanent members of the Security Council, had ignored the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and had set themselves up as defenders of the racist régime. Furthermore, they had abused the privileges originally conferred on them by the Charter to facilitate the fulfilment of their special responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. The fact that they had used their right of veto on more than one occasion to protect racist, expansionist and aggressive régimes and to prevent the admission of free and activist States should be taken seriously by the United Nations, inasmuch as those Powers had exploited their prerogatives in order to serve colonialist and racist interests.

21. The great Powers, however, were not the only ones aiding the racists. It was sufficient to note that the General Assembly, in its resolution 3324 E (XXIX), had condemned the strengthening of political, economic, military and other relations between Israel and South Africa, despite which Israel had continued to increase its co-operation with the racist régime to such a point that the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, in an eighteen-month period, had prepared three reports on the matter, issued as documents A/AC.115/L.383, A/AC.115/L.396 and A/AC.115/L.411, dated 29 April 1974, 14 October 1974 and 23 July 1975 respectively.

22. The figures quoted in document A/AC.115/L.411, paragraph 7, on the export-import trade between South Africa and Israel were particularly revealing. Even more serious, however, was the fact that Israel was offering certain elements of the European Economic Community the opportunity of benefiting from evasion of trade sanctions (paras. 9 and 10). With respect to the military co-operation between Israel and South Africa, there were innumerable examples both in the reports he had mentioned and in various press articles.

23. There should be no amazement at the co-operation between the Tel Aviv régime and that of Pretoria, since both were racist régimes. The white invaders in South Africa had gained control of the majority through cruel means, in the same manner as the Jews in Israel. The Palestinians in Israel, like the Africans in South Africa, were third-class citizens. Furthermore, in order to exist, both régimes needed the support of the great imperialist Powers. If the United Nations wished to eliminate racism, it should condemn that connivance and inform public opinion of the relations between the two régimes.

24. The Syrian Arab Republic had always opposed all racist régimes wherever they existed and its policy reflected the solidarity of the Arab peoples with the oppressed people of South Africa. The Syrian Government was fighting on all fronts against racism and, together with the other Arab countries, had advocated the imposition of an embargo against supplying oil to South Africa. Despite the

difficult situation it was facing owing to its conflict with Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic had contributed to the United Nations Special Fund. Furthermore, it had signed and ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and supported all the draft resolutions on the racist policies of South Africa. It condemned South Africa's "bantustan" policy, favoured international action against the Pretoria régime and supported the Security Council resolutions on the arms embargo. The Syrian Arab Republic appealed to the Committee to seek the expulsion of South Africa so that it could not continue working within the United Nations.

25. The Syrian Arab Republic recognized the liberation movements as the sole legitimate representatives of the South African people. Furthermore, it believed that the cause of peace and freedom was indivisible and required the freedom of all oppressed peoples. Its position on the problem of South Africa was motivated by its own struggle against discrimination and colonialism and the need to confront imperialism and racism, whatever they were called and wherever they arose.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) resumed the Chair.

26. Mr. HAYNES (Guyana) said that it was important to underline the fundamental fact that in South Africa, racism had been elevated to a political philosophy and that on the basis of the colour of their skin, the majority of the South African people were condemned to a life of degradation and serfdom and deprived of their humanity and fundamental freedoms. In the late twentieth century, when mankind had long advanced to the recognition of the right of peoples everywhere to freedom and dignity, it was a glaring anomaly that an inhuman system such as *apartheid* still persisted in South Africa. It was an affront to mankind and a challenge to the international community. The condemnation of *apartheid* was universal and had been reflected in the Committee's adoption by consensus of the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/SPC/L.324 and A/SPC/L.325 (960th meeting). However, resolutions were not enough; firm action by the entire international community was needed to wipe out forever that blot on the conscience of mankind. The time was opportune: the United Nations was observing its thirtieth anniversary and progressive forces everywhere, within South Africa itself as well, were clamouring for justice. The Pretoria régime, even though it had been forced to recognize that change was inevitable, now wore a double face: so-called détente abroad but the most ruthless repression within South Africa. Its objectives remained the same: the consolidation of the inhuman system of *apartheid* within South Africa and its extension beyond its borders. It was therefore time for certain Members of the Organization to match their words with deeds that were in keeping with their proclaimed support for the principles and ideals of the Charter of the United Nations. It was time for them to ignore the attraction of great short-term economic benefits and, in concert with the rest of the international community, take the necessary steps to rid the world forever of that brutal system which was also a serious threat to international peace and security.

27. The Government of Guyana remained unwavering in its denunciation of *apartheid* and white minority rule and condemned the herding of the masses of the population into "bantustans", the promotion of tribal rivalry and the exploitation of man by man. The tide of history had overtaken the racists of Pretoria; the Lisbon-Salisbury-Pretoria axis had been shattered and the end was inevitable. History demonstrated that no force on earth could keep in check forever the will of a people to regain their humanity and their freedom.

28. The Government and people of Guyana would continue to participate fully in international action designed to dismantle the institutions of oppression and repression in South Africa. On 11 October 1974, they had joined the world community in observing the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, renewing and reaffirming their solidarity with the just struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa to free themselves from the inhuman policy of *apartheid*.

29. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his country regarded the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa as a serious threat to international peace and security and a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, the Pretoria régime practised *apartheid* not only in South Africa but also in Namibia, ignoring the United Nations resolutions which required that it end its illegal presence in that Territory.

30. Obviously, the racist South African régime could not continue to apply its policies without the moral, political and economic support of certain Western countries, especially the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the foreign economic interests that continued to plunder the natural resources of South Africa and exploit the black population with the consent of Pretoria.

31. The South African régime had resorted to a series of stratagems to confuse world opinion, to divide the African countries and to conceal its true intentions. It had promised that there would be changes and had proposed to embark on a dialogue with other African States, but the facts of the matter were that it had doubled its military budget, modernized its military bases and constructed new bases and had purchased arms from member countries of NATO.

32. The Soviet Union maintained no diplomatic, consular, commercial or other relations with the South African régime, implemented United Nations resolutions and recommendations relating to South Africa and supported those who were fighting against colonialism, imperialism, racism and *apartheid*. Colonialism, neo-colonialism and *apartheid* were totally opposed to Leninist principles of foreign policy and the ideals of the Socialist state; consequently, the Soviet Union had supported the African liberation movements and had endeavoured to step up the action in the United Nations against the evils of *apartheid*.

33. From the time when the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had

been adopted 15 years ago, many resolutions and decisions had been adopted the implementation of which would make it possible to put an end to colonialism and *apartheid*. The positive changes which had taken place at the international level—the relaxing of tension, the normalization of relations and the historic decisions of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975—made it possible to entertain fresh hopes that those objectives would be attained. In spite of the fact that many former colonial countries had achieved independence, decolonization was not over, and although it was a very complex process, victory was at hand.

34. A previous speaker had endeavoured to minimize the value of détente and its effects. Nevertheless, the debates in the General Assembly had shown that the overwhelming majority of the international community was in favour of détente and had welcomed the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. That speaker had said that détente was impeding the struggle for national liberation, but the facts gave the lie to that statement. During the cold war, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire would have been inconceivable. The independence of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tomé and Príncipe was proof of the positive influence of détente, as were also the victories of the people of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The isolation of South Africa and its exclusion from any participation in the work of the United Nations would also have been not only impossible but unthinkable during the cold war.

35. His delegation supported the appeal of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* that decisive measures should be taken to achieve the eradication of the evil of *apartheid*. It also agreed with the African States and OAU that it was necessary to adopt new measures against *apartheid* on all fronts in order to put an end to that régime and to racism and colonialism in southern Africa.

36. Mr. JOB (Yugoslavia) said that the United Nations had been dealing with the problem of *apartheid* and racial discrimination for 25 years and had adopted numerous resolutions and decisions, but the situation in South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia had remained unchanged. The racist régime in South Africa was resorting to increasingly brutal measures against the majority of the population; international action was not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem and its ramifications not only in Africa but also in the world at large.

37. However, in two major aspects, there had been changes. In the first place, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the subsequent profound anti-imperialist developments—both in the former colonial Territories and in Portugal—had changed the political map of Africa and the deployment of pressures round southern Africa, and had opened up new possibilities of action. Secondly, the struggle of the national liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe had intensified owing to increased support and recognition by the international community. Those two positive aspects had caused the racist régime of South Africa to endeavour by all means to break out of the isolation in which it found itself as a result of the suspension, at the twenty-ninth session, of

its right to participate in the work of the General Assembly (2281st plenary meeting). Before that step had been taken, the representatives of the Vorster régime had declared that they were in favour of détente and were ready to negotiate with the liberation movements and the representatives of some neighbouring countries, with a view to improving the situation of the majority. Nevertheless, the international community had soon had an opportunity to test the racists' real intentions.

38. The Pretoria régime had remained closely linked with international imperialism and reaction and continued to receive economic and political support from some transnational corporations which exploited the oppressed people and the natural resources of South Africa. The news that a Frankfurt company had offered to build a nuclear reactor in South Africa, in collaboration with some other Western countries, was particularly disturbing. His delegation hoped that the respective Governments would prevent that action, which would have unforeseeable repercussions on international peace and security.

39. In the Security Council debates on South Africa and Namibia, attempts had been made to deny that the situation in those Territories constituted a threat to international peace and security; that argument had been used to justify the triple veto. But the data on military co-operation between some Western countries and the Pretoria régime and the important military role assigned to South Africa in a strategic region bounded by three oceans, clearly revealed the real reasons why those countries had opposed the mandatory embargo on the sale of arms. There had been steps in the right direction, such as the termination of the Simonstown Agreements by Great Britain and the French decision to limit supplies of arms to South Africa, but, in general, the situation was becoming increasingly dangerous. Co-operation between the Israeli and South African authorities, besides revealing to the world the true nature of their policies and collusion, constituted another dangerous element with wider implications.

40. His delegation believed that the international community could no longer tolerate the existence of the South African racist régime and should demonstrate its effective solidarity with the oppressed people and their national liberation movements. In accordance with the recommendations made by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, his delegation endorsed the view that the liberation movements recognized by OAU should be granted the status of permanent observers in the General Assembly and that the seat of South Africa should remain vacant until it was taken by the genuine representatives of the South African people. It also considered that an embargo should be placed on supplies of petroleum and other raw materials to the South African régime; the argument that the embargo would harm the oppressed people themselves and therefore should not be applied was unacceptable, since it was the people themselves who had repeatedly asked for the struggle to be intensified in order to put an end to their tragic situation. The argument that the embargo was harmful to world trade and development was also false and was inadmissible because it hindered the use of an effective weapon against the régime of oppression.

41. The draft resolutions adopted by the Special Political Committee (960th meeting) were in harmony with the objectives of the Decade of Action to Combat Racial Discrimination and *Apartheid* and his delegation fully supported them. During the Decade, great efforts were being made in Yugoslavia to inform the public about the evils of racial discrimination and *apartheid* in southern Africa, about the struggles waged by the national liberation movements and about United Nations activities in that connexion. All the resolutions relating to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the boycott of the racist régime were being strictly enforced. Yugoslavia had ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and was lending support and material assistance to the African liberation movements and to the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Such activities were consistent with Yugoslavia's declared policy.

42. Mr. PINTÉR (Hungary) said that in the 30 years the United Nations had been in existence, it had never been more clearly evident that the political efforts aimed at the artificial maintenance of the South African racist régime were meant to serve certain economic and strategic interests. Some countries regarded the existence of the South African régime as a guarantee for the realization of their political concepts and plans regarding the African continent. For that reason, special attention must be paid to a problem which constantly arose, namely, that although the Member States were united in condemning the racist régime while considering the humanitarian aspects of the matter, several States declined to take due account of the political motivations involved.

43. It was an established fact that, were it not for external support, South Africa would not be able to continue its policies of *apartheid*; as they grew more aware of that fact, an increasing number of States were demanding more effective measures. Thus, the United Nations resolutions which previously had been limited to fact-finding and condemnation, had come to include sanctions and measures to isolate the South African régime. Similarly, the recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* offered an effective instrument and Hungary hoped they would be endorsed by the General Assembly.

44. Hungary had been a member of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* since its establishment and its position on the question under consideration was well known. Hungary had been one of the first States to sign the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and the first to ratify it. The earliest possible ratification of the Convention would be a significant step towards the international isolation of the South African régime.

45. His Government's official position on the questions of racism and colonialism enjoyed mass support, a fact demonstrated by the statement issued by the Hungarian Committee of Solidarity and the Hungarian United Nations Association on the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. The document expressed indignation at the violations committed by South Africa and demanded the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions which called on Member States to discontinue the sale of

weapons to the South African régime and to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions. It also deplored the fact that, in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France continued to regard South Africa as a NATO outpost in the southern hemisphere.

46. At the meeting in which the Special Committee against *Apartheid* had been awarded the Frederic Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal by the World Peace Council, his delegation, on behalf of the group of Eastern European States, had recalled the important role played by the World Peace Council, in common with other non-governmental organizations, in the implementation of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Those organizations were conducting an intensive campaign aimed at bringing about an end to military co-operation with the South African régime.

47. The Hungarian People's Republic, which fully agreed with the recommendations of the Special Committee, had always done its utmost to give political, moral and material support to OAU, the liberation movements and the progressive forces of Africa in their struggle for the elimination of the policy of *apartheid*.

48. Mr. ALEMAN SALVADOR (Ecuador) extended a most cordial welcome to the representatives of Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, who would undoubtedly make a positive contribution to the work of the Committee. Similarly, he welcomed the participation in the Committee's deliberations of the liberation movements of Azania, authentic representatives of the oppressed people of that region.

49. *Apartheid* was a problem which had been considered since the first session of the General Assembly in 1946; it could not have been otherwise, since that hateful practice was contrary to all the purposes and principles of the Organization and violated the solemn commitment entered into by States Members to ensure universal respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race.

50. The work of the United Nations in that respect had gone beyond mere words to the point where concrete objectives were being achieved. Thus, the many resolutions of the United Nations and the intensive campaign conducted by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* were encouraging landmarks in the unrelenting struggle against that shameful form of racism, which could be compared only to the Nazi doctrine.

51. However, the Organization was still far from reaching the goal sought. To do so, it had to increase its efforts to obtain the total liquidation of that harmful practice, since there could be no compromise with or concession to *apartheid*. *Apartheid* would disappear either by persuasion or through the means which the people of Azania were legitimately using, with the support and sympathy of the concerned segment of the international community, which could not continue to be an idle witness to the increased measures of repression and persecution inflicted by a racist régime on those who aspired to live in freedom within the borders of their own country.

52. It had been clearly demonstrated that peoples fighting for their dignity could not be shaken in their resolve; that justice did not submit to political, military or economic power; and that, as a result of their pride and their faith, societies fighting to regain control over their destiny succeeded in overcoming the aggression or violence to which they were subjected. The few countries which failed to see or did not wish to see that reality should understand the serious responsibility which they were incurring by co-operating with and helping to maintain the racist régime, which was responsible for the cruel mistreatment suffered daily by the large majority of the population of Azania because of the colour of their skin. It was to be hoped that those Powers which were indifferent to the tragic situation in South Africa would place their noble traditions above the defence of secondary interests of an economic or other nature and add their voice effectively to the universal demand for the final and speedy eradication of *apartheid*.

53. In the United Nations, Ecuador had always rejected the policy of *apartheid* and had fully supported all resolutions on the question. Ecuador would never accept that a country which claimed to be "civilized" should seek to raise to the category of a crime the colour of a person's skin, or to convert into a philosophy and State policy the oppression and exploitation of the majority of its population. Consequently, his country maintained no relations whatsoever with the racist Pretoria régime and would support any measure designed to isolate that régime from the international community until it abandoned its odious practices. Ecuador had been one of the first countries to sign the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and one of the eight countries which had so far ratified that instrument. Moreover, it endorsed the recommendations and conclusions of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* contained in its report (A/10022).

54. Mr. ZEMAN (Czechoslovakia) pointed out that although the question of *apartheid* had been on the General Assembly's agenda since the establishment of the United Nations, there had been no great change in the situation in South Africa. South Africa not only ignored the appeals and resolutions of the Organization, but had improved the machinery of *apartheid*, a policy which his country condemned as contrary to the Charter and as a threat to international peace and security. However, the peoples of Africa who were fighting against *apartheid* and colonialism had been able to obtain powerful allies, including the Socialist countries.

55. Since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)), considerable changes had taken place on that continent and free Africa had been extended to the very borders of South Africa. It was for that reason that the racist régime was seeking to strengthen its ties with the Ian Smith régime and, in order to break out of its isolation, claimed it was opening a dialogue with free Africa and promised to "liberalize" the régime of *apartheid*. At the same time, it was attempting to take advantage of the policy of détente, divesting it of its true nature; but it would not succeed because there could be no détente with the racist régimes of Vorster and Smith. It was now essential to support the peoples of Africa who

were fighting to achieve the complete and final liberation of that continent.

56. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, as well as other documents of the United Nations, showed clearly the true situation in South Africa and the growing resistance of the South African people; it also contained proposals which would accelerate the process of liberation. One of the most important resources for the struggle against the racist *apartheid* régime was the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. It was necessary to establish a general boycott and to achieve the total isolation of the racist régime in all spheres, as called for in the resolution in question.

57. Czechoslovakia noted with regret that various States Members of the United Nations, some of them members of NATO, were not respecting the United Nations resolutions, as could be seen clearly from paragraphs 70 to 77 of the report of the Special Committee. Not only did co-operation with South Africa in the military field harm the struggle of the South African people for their freedom, but it also endangered the security of the neighbouring African countries and frustrated efforts aimed at eradicating *apartheid*.

58. The foreign firms which exploited the African workers and thus obtained huge profits were collaborating willingly with the *apartheid* régime. The cases of close co-operation with South Africa were numerous and the issue was essentially political in nature. A way must be found to induce Governments to put an end to all forms of economic and military co-operation with South Africa. The problem which the Committee had to face was therefore that of implementing existing United Nations resolutions and adopting new measures capable of compelling the Vorster régime to abandon its policy of *apartheid*.

59. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic complied with all its obligations and implemented all the decisions of the United Nations aimed at eradicating *apartheid* and assisting the oppressed people of South Africa. That conduct was in line with the policy of his Government with regard to the struggle against colonialism. In 1975, Czechoslovakia had signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. In response to the appeal issued by the United Nations in 1963, his country had severed all links with South Africa and it would continue to support the liberation struggle of the African people of South Africa by providing moral, political and material assistance. In 1975, for example, it had provided fellowships for students belonging to the oppressed peoples. His Government and non-governmental organizations in Czechoslovakia had provided material and humanitarian assistance to the peoples of southern Africa and contributed with every means at their disposal to the struggle for the elimination of *apartheid*.

60. Mr. GUTIERREZ MACIAS (Mexico) noted that the item under discussion had been on the agenda of the General Assembly since its first session. The numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations had, however, not succeeded in preventing the leaders in Pretoria from firmly implanting their discriminatory policy—a failure which diminished the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of world public opinion. The Pretoria régime con-

tinued to flout the resolutions which expressed the condemnation of its policy by almost every country, while its power was being reinforced with the support and assistance it received from a number of Powers. Such support had once again been demonstrated in the triple veto in the Security Council which had, in that instance, constituted a denial of the most basic principles of international democracy. The Powers concerned maintained trade relations with South Africa, while a number of firms under their jurisdiction were increasing their involvement in the South African economy. Transnational corporations were also continuing to intensify their activities in South Africa. Thus, foreign economic interests were becoming increasingly involved in the perpetuation of *apartheid*.

61. Mexico vigorously and emphatically condemned the policy of *apartheid*, the conduct of South Africa and all other forms of racial discrimination in any part of the world. Countries which, like Mexico, sought to strengthen the United Nations could not ignore the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly condemning the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. Moreover, they had an obligation to denounce the injustice suffered by the peoples of southern Africa so as to hasten the day when a universally condemned and repugnant policy would cease to exist.

62. Miss BENNATON (Honduras) said that her country's opposition to the racist system of South Africa was a direct consequence of the provisions of its own legislation and social structure, since the people of Honduras were racially mixed. Honduras had not maintained, and did not now maintain, relations of any kind with the Government of South Africa. Its people and Government condemned any policy which, like the "bantustan" policy, sought to reinstitute slave labour. Honduras had become independent in 1821 and the first action of its Congress had been to abolish slavery. At that time the freedom of every human being in Honduras had been proclaimed and the defence of the freedom of slaves from Belize had led to numerous armed confrontations with the forces of the Governor of Belize.

63. She drew attention to General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) which was, in her opinion, an historic landmark, and to the resolutions adopted in previous years by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations organs, in which South Africa was called upon to release all persons imprisoned for their opposition to *apartheid*. The Pretoria régime's response to those resolutions had been to enact increasingly repressive legislation and to broaden the scope of its persecution of the opponents of *apartheid*. Nevertheless, the system of *apartheid* remained an anachronism and there was no doubt that its days were numbered.

64. Her Government identified itself increasingly with those who were struggling to obtain the right to self-determination for the people of South Africa and to put an end to *apartheid*. It shared their sufferings and hopes and was convinced that the people of South Africa would soon be free.

65. Mr. DE PRAT GAY (Argentina) pointed out that the equality of all human beings had prevailed in Argentina

since the very beginning of its history. His Government had repeatedly condemned racism as an isolated practice. When racism was institutionalized as an abhorrent State policy, however, it was necessary to go beyond mere statements of intent and to act on one's belief. Thus, at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly (2281st plenary meeting), Argentina had voted with the majority to suspend South Africa's right to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly.

66. The Government of South Africa must comply totally and absolutely with the mandatory resolutions of the United Nations, since only thus could the international community be based on the rule of law. His Government attached great importance therefore to the activities of the United Nations and, in particular, to those of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, which it firmly supported. In that spirit, his Government had signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* on 6 June 1975. In June 1975, the Argentine authorities had also received the visit of a mission of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, at which time important talks had taken place with his country's President and with representatives from all areas of national life. As a result of that visit, in September 1975, Parliament had approved a declaration condemning the policy of *apartheid*, and urging the Government of South Africa to abandon its practice of *apartheid* in accordance with the principles and rules set out in United Nations resolutions. The members of the House of Deputies had placed on record their firm opposition to *apartheid*, which constituted an affront to justice, to democracy and even to world peace and security.

67. His delegation stressed that the members of the Security Council had a special responsibility with regard to the struggle against *apartheid*. The non-permanent members of that organ must continue to work diligently and with resolution and imagination to find ways and means to strengthen the rightful position of the United Nations, and the non-aligned countries should be in the vanguard of that struggle. Finally, he expressed the hope that in the coming year the Security Council would take a genuine step forward by adopting mandatory measures the application of which would convince the South African régime that time was working inexorably against racism and inequality.

68. Mr. MARMULAKU (Yugoslavia) said he was pleased to introduce a draft resolution entitled "Special responsibility of the United Nations and the international community towards the oppressed people of South Africa", which would be circulated the following day as document A/SPC/L.326. The draft resolution, which had received the support of the group of non-aligned countries, expressed the objectives of the Programme for the Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, which had been proclaimed three years earlier.

69. The main purpose of the draft was to consolidate all the forces combating racism, a task which had assumed greater importance than ever on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

963rd meeting

Thursday, 23 October 1975, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.963

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.326):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. MITCHELL (United States of America) noted that throughout its history the General Assembly had rightly concerned itself with the problem of *apartheid*. His delegation agreed with OAU that few social or political systems were as offensive as the policy of *apartheid* implemented in South Africa. That system of legislated racial discrimination was a continuing affront to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Despite some changes made by the South African minority régime, *apartheid* remained today as repugnant to those who cherished the principles of justice and equality as it had been 30 years before, when the United Nations had been established.

2. His country had stated its strong opposition to *apartheid* in numerous debates in successive sessions of the General Assembly. As a democratic nation committed to the principle of equality of all men and women, the United States found the system of *apartheid* odious and abhorrent, and it had condemned on many occasions the philosophical premises of the system and its brutalizing effects on all the people of South Africa, whether black, Coloured or white. It would also be recalled that the United States had maintained an arms embargo against South Africa since 1962.

3. The Government of the United States had actively sought to bring about in South Africa a peaceful change to policies which would ensure the exercise of basic human rights by all South African citizens, regardless of race. To that end, it had adopted a policy of impressing upon the Government of South Africa its opposition to *apartheid*, signalling its unequivocal support for changes in the political and social systems in South Africa, and maintaining contacts with all members of the South African population, including those not permitted to participate in the governing of that country. The United States believed that South Africa should be exposed to the relentless and unceasing demands of the international community to eradicate the system of *apartheid*. It deplored the detention of persons whose only offence was opposition to the system of *apartheid* and felt that the South African Government was courting disaster when such repressive measures had the effect of closing off all avenues for peaceful change.

4. Before concluding, he wished to address the Committee on behalf of the people of the United States, in connexion with the attempt to equate zionism with *apartheid*. He was well aware of the struggle for freedom waged in the past by the countries today represented in the United Nations. He wished to say that although the United States and the Soviet Union had different approaches to economic matters, the people of the United States were deeply appreciative of the gallant efforts of the people of the Soviet Union to stem the tide of an invader who had been seeking to impose racism on the world. He wished to assure the representatives of Latin America that the grand traditions of those countries, such as the early abolition of slavery, were well known and cherished in the United States. He wished to assure the representatives of the Arab countries that the world was aware of its indebtedness to their ancestors and contemporaries for their great contribution to the sciences. He felt, however, that it was an error to view zionism as merely a recent phenomenon in human history; it was 2,500 years since the people of Israel had been deported to Babylon, but they had carried the memory of their home through long years of persecution from the earliest times, through the Middle Ages, down to the extermination camps, where people of the Jewish faith had been persecuted simply because of their religion. They had held on to the noble ideal that one day they would return to their home and they did not return as overlords but as a people who were willing to work and to till the fields. He therefore pleaded with the international community not to equate a religious goal, even though it might be critical of those who pursued that goal, with an odious system which degraded members of the human family. He wished to make a special plea to the new nations of Africa not to lend themselves to such an initiative or at least to ensure that it was deferred until the next session, so that it might be considered in a more mature way. He hoped that they would not disappoint the many thousands of Americans who had looked forward to the day when the nations of Africa would take their place in the world family and who looked to them for a new brand of statesmanship that would be a credit to the whole world. There was a tremendous outpouring of world opposition to *apartheid*. To inject an element on which there was disagreement into the Committee's discussions and to equate zionism with *apartheid* might well serve the cause of those who were the exponents of *apartheid*. The two issues should be kept distinct, so that the international community could wage a more effective struggle against the evil of *apartheid*, which polluted the world.

5. The Government of the United States urged the Government of South Africa to bend before the wind of change blowing through southern Africa, to recognize that its repressive racial system was indefensible and to end *apartheid* and racial injustice. It called upon that Government to realize that such a change was not only inevitable but was in the interests of all South Africans.

6. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) to address the Committee.

7. Mr. NZO (Observer, African National Congress of South Africa) said that he wished to congratulate all those who had contributed to the preparation of the illuminating report by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022).

8. It had become obvious that the world had seen through the bluff which the Vorster régime had perpetrated a year ago. It was not surprising that Vorster's fraud had been readily acceptable to the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, whose Governments had continued to defend the *apartheid* régime by every possible means. The real power behind those Governments was the international monopolies, which were interested only in continuing to amass profits from the cruel exploitation of cheap black labour in South Africa. As long as the conditions existed for the monopolies to continue their economic plunder, their Governments would do everything possible to defend and buttress the Fascist régime in South Africa.

9. During the preceding year, the *apartheid* régime had again demonstrated its determination to maintain the *status quo* in South Africa, but the situation had shown further deterioration in a number of areas. The report of the Special Committee had focused on certain important areas, but his organization would like to refer to certain other aspects which were a cause of continuing concern to the democratic forces in South Africa and all over the world.

10. Three decades ago when German fascism had been at its height, the guidelines of the existing educational system in Africa had been laid down in a document published by the Institute for Christian National Education. The document had stressed the principles of trusteeship, non-equality and segregation; it had emphasized that native education must be grounded in the life-view and world-view of the whites, and more especially of the Boer nation, as the senior trustee of the natives. Race studies had been introduced in many South African schools as a subject for the purpose of presenting the African as being in a state of perpetual cultural backwardness whose continuation was ensured by the *apartheid* régime. The magazine *Africa*, issue No. 48 of 1975, pointed out that both blacks and whites were affected by that system of indoctrination, lies and mystification, the chief aim of which was to prevent children from thinking for themselves or questioning authority which was supposedly God-given. The article went on to say that *apartheid* was thought of as God's plan for man, and the whites were portrayed as innocent Christians who had colonized an almost empty land from which black "savages" had later tried to drive them. Subsequently, the whites had built up a prosperous, God-fearing country, had magnanimously Christianized and civilized the "heathen savages", and were continuing to save them from the "evils" of communism. One need hardly emphasize that such an approach was intended to have, and had, disastrous effects on the developing mind. Race prejudice was being manufactured on a massive scale and the worst features of Nazi Germany were reappearing in South Africa.

11. As reflected by the recent 17.9 per cent devaluation of the rand, the economic situation of the black people and of South Africa as a whole had worsened. On 4 October 1975, the *Rand Daily Mail* had publicly admitted South Africa's economic problem and had predicted that inflation would skyrocket after the devaluation. As usual, the repercussions of the economic situation would be felt most keenly by the impoverished portion of the South African population which was condemned to perpetual slavery and social degradation by *apartheid*. The *Rand Daily Mail* had said that hunger loomed for those who were close to or below the poverty line and had warned that unless there were substantial pay increases, an angry and despairing reaction could be expected. The effects of the new economic situation had already been felt with particular force by the African workers in the drastic increases in public transport charges. A bus boycott by Africans had been reported from Newcastle in Natal, where police had fired on African demonstrators, causing some fatalities.

12. The demonstrations in Newcastle reflected the growing anger and impatience of the oppressed African majority with the mounting savagery of the *apartheid* régime. It was common knowledge that South Africa had been rocked by continuing strikes for the preceding three years, and the end of that revolutionary upsurge was not yet in sight. By the same token, there had been growing militancy in other oppressed sections of the population, such as the young people who swelled the ranks of the revolutionary movement, having concluded that nothing short of armed revolutionary struggle would solve their political and social problems.

13. There was mounting evidence in support of the charges of increasing military collaboration by the imperialist countries with the *apartheid* régime. ANC had recently revealed incontrovertible evidence of concerted efforts by the West German imperialist régime to enable the South African régime to produce nuclear weapons. Those efforts were not only a flagrant violation of international conventions limiting the spread of nuclear weapons but also constituted a real threat to the achievements of the African revolutionary movement and world peace. ANC had stated its belief that the régime which had not hesitated to use ruthless terror against the people of South Africa would not flinch from unleashing a holocaust upon the continent of Africa and the world. It felt that it was incumbent upon the nations of the world to examine closely the development of the armaments industry in South Africa, and in particular the implications of the establishment of a uranium enrichment plant which would produce uncontrolled concentrated fission material for nuclear weapons.

14. The international press had recently given full coverage to the plans of the United States Government to set up a base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom Government was also implicated in the scheme, and thousands of displaced persons from Diego Garcia had been dumped in Mauritius. Senior members of the South African military and naval forces had recently visited the United States, and since those visits South Africa had announced plans for the enlargement of the Simons-town naval base.

15. One must draw the conclusion that after the victories of the peoples of Viet-Nam and Cambodia and after the destruction of the Portuguese colonial empire by the revolutionary forces of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde, urgent preparations were under way for a last-ditch stand in defence of the remaining bases of aggression in southern Africa and the Middle East. A steel pincer was being constructed around the continent of Africa with focal points in Simonstown, Diego Garcia and Israel, the latter country having the task of keeping in check the Arab liberation movement. One of the objectives of that development was to ensure that the Fascist Republic of South Africa retained the necessary military, economic and political initiative over the whole of the independent African continent. The international forces of democracy would do well to draw the necessary lessons from recent developments and take the urgent steps necessary to defend world peace and security.

16. ANC noted with gratification that the international community continued to be aware of the fraudulent "bantustan" policies of the South African régime. It was confident that so-called "independence" for the Transkei "bantustan" would have no impact whatsoever on the determination of the international community to continue its struggle against the policies of the South African régime. It wished to stress that the "bantustans" were simply designed to ensure a perpetual supply of cheap labour. They were cesspools of poverty and ignorance, with an infant mortality rate as high as 400 per 1,000. The Transkei had been kept in a state of emergency since 1960 in an effort to intimidate its people and prevent them from participating in political activity.

17. The sagging morale of the régime which persisted in that policy was being bolstered by certain countries which continued to support it even while voicing opposition to its *apartheid* policy. In spite of that, the isolation of the Vorster régime was growing and the international community should be vigilant against its attempts to break out of that isolation. He was also astonished at the arguments presented by certain States to justify their economic contacts with the *apartheid* régime. States which had never hesitated to impose an economic boycott against Cuba or to threaten to impose one against Portugal nevertheless opposed the use of the boycott as a political weapon against South Africa. There could be no justification for flagrant violations of decisions aimed at isolating the *apartheid* régime. Special urgency attached to an effective arms boycott of South Africa, particularly in view of that country's prospects for obtaining nuclear weapons.

18. Mr. KAYOPE (Zambia) noted that in the 30 years since the founding of the United Nations, while such scourges of humanity as foreign aggression in Indo-China and Portuguese colonialism were disappearing, South Africa's abominable policy of *apartheid* remained unchanged. His country had categorically condemned that system as the greatest evil ever to be visited upon the majority of the people of South Africa. It had condemned the "bantustanization" policy as an attempt to deceive the international community by reinforcing a totalitarian system under the guise of establishing democracy.

19. At the same time, his country strongly advocated the peaceful elimination of *apartheid*. It called for the release of all political prisoners and the restoration of their right to engage in political activity. It whole-heartedly supported the Manifesto on Southern Africa, issued at Lusaka in April 1969¹ and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa issued at the ninth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of OAU, held from 7 to 10 April 1975, which called for using peaceful means to bring about majority rule in South Africa, with non-peaceful means kept as a last resort.

20. The South African régime should be reminded that history was full of examples of apparently invincible empires which had gone down to defeat in the face of the determination of a people to liberate itself. The triumphs of liberation movements in Indo-China and in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa were cases in point which showed what fate was in store for South Africa if it did not transfer power in that country to the majority of the people.

21. A year had passed since the Prime Minister of South Africa had promised to make changes in his country's *apartheid* policy, but instead repression had only increased. His delegation was convinced that further repression was doomed to failure. The Vorster régime should commit itself to internal reform and to the repeal of racial laws as a first step towards the realization of majority rule in South Africa.

22. At the same time, the United Nations should expand its arms embargo against South Africa, because as long as arms sales to that country continued its régime would feel a false sense of security because of its military might. Economic sanctions were equally important, and he called upon States Members of the United Nations to be prepared to make sacrifices in that regard. His country especially welcomed the pledge by the oil-exporting countries to suspend oil shipments to South Africa until that country abandoned its current policies. His delegation was convinced that properly controlled economic sanctions could bring an end to *apartheid* by the end of the 1970s. He called attention to the sacrifices his own country had made to aid the opponents of *apartheid* and appealed to the world community to lighten its burden with greater assistance.

23. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) welcomed the representatives of Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe to the United Nations and observed that the long struggle and heavy sacrifices of their peoples had helped greatly to speed the decolonization process in Africa and elsewhere. He also welcomed the peaceful attainment of independence by Papua New Guinea and commended Australia on the manner in which it had fulfilled its obligations in that Territory and on its co-operative attitude towards the United Nations.

24. Over a period of three decades, all efforts by the United Nations to put an end to South Africa's inhumane policy of *apartheid* had been unsuccessful, and more

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

effective measures were needed. The General Assembly and the Security Council had in the past adopted numerous resolutions calling upon the Government of South Africa to abandon its policy of *apartheid*, repeal all repressive laws and regulations and grant unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned for their opposition to *apartheid*. The South African Government had consistently ignored those resolutions and had enacted even more repressive legislation in open defiance of the United Nations. Further resolutions and condemnations would be pointless. Instead, emphasis must now be placed on the obligations of Member States under the Charter and on the record of those States which had failed to comply with General Assembly resolutions aimed at eliminating *apartheid*. It was essential to recognize that the United Nations had failed in its efforts largely because of a negative attitude and lack of co-operation on the part of certain Member States which continued to disregard their obligations under the Charter by maintaining military and economic co-operation with South Africa.

25. The South African Government, alarmed at the disappearance of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, had responded by publicizing so-called reforms and calling for "dialogue" with other African States, but such manoeuvres did not represent a real change in attitude since the fundamental roots of *apartheid* had not changed. The black majority was still deprived of its basic human rights and subject to discrimination and repression.

26. Concerted international action for the total elimination of *apartheid* should be further intensified. His delegation supported the recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, contained in chapter II of its report (A/10022), stressing the vital importance of a total arms and trade embargo against South Africa and the discontinuance of all military co-operation with the South African régime.

27. Afghanistan reaffirmed its support of the legitimate struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa for their right to self-determination. It again called upon the South African Government to grant unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid* and to repeal all repressive laws and regulations restricting the right of people to combat *apartheid*.

28. Mr. PAWLAK (Poland) expressed satisfaction with the condemnation by previous speakers of the criminal practices of the South African régime and its violations of the Charter of the United Nations. The white minority régime in South Africa was becoming increasingly isolated. Its policy of so-called détente and co-operation could not deceive the international community, because it was still maintaining and intensifying its criminal system of racism.

29. The Vorster régime's current efforts to break out of its growing isolation were unfortunately being abetted by certain Western States, most of them members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which were standing apart from the united international front against the white minority régime. Those countries maintained close political, military and economic ties with South Africa. In defiance of the embargo imposed by the Security Council (resolution 181 (1963)), they continued to deliver arms and equipment to South Africa and to co-operate with it

militarily. It was military help from outside that gave South Africa the means to pursue its repressive policy, and the first step in any effective struggle against *apartheid* must therefore be to deny South Africa all military co-operation. Equally important were intensified international efforts to put an end to the co-operation of transnational corporations with South Africa. The States and corporations involved in such co-operation claimed that their economic activity would help to eliminate *apartheid* by furthering a process of "evolution" in South Africa's economy. In fact, however, the contrary was true. The influx of foreign capital had only helped the régime to perpetuate an economic system based on the exploitation of cheap labour and on racial and social injustice. Under those circumstances a peaceful solution to the problem of racial segregation in South Africa was not possible, and his delegation supported the continued struggle of the liberation movements.

30. He recalled that his delegation had participated in the drafting of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* and that Poland had signed the Convention and begun the process of ratification. His delegation felt that it was vitally important for the Convention to be signed and ratified at an early date by a greater number of States, because it was an important legal instrument in the world-wide struggle against *apartheid*.

31. His country had always given unreserved support to the cause of the South African black majority in its struggle for human rights. Its solidarity with all nations which were still oppressed by racism and colonialism and deprived of those fundamental rights stemmed from its deep conviction that freedom and progress were inseparable. His country had therefore consistently given material, moral and political assistance to the heroic people of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and it would continue to do so.

32. The Polish delegation endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in chapter II of the report of the Special Committee and would support all constructive resolutions that were introduced in the Special Political Committee.

33. Mr. GHEORGHE (Romania) said that the progress made in international relations, in decolonization and in moving towards universality of the United Nations since the last session showed clearly that the historical process of liquidating the remnants of the colonial system was nearing completion. The Romanian people welcomed the attainment of independence by the four new States Members of the United Nations. The independence of the largest, Mozambique, represented a victory both for the Portuguese people over fascism and for all progressive forces over colonialism and neo-colonialism. His country had always given political, material and diplomatic support to the fight for liberation from colonial domination.

34. His delegation congratulated the Special Committee on the award made to it by the World Peace Council and welcomed the participation of the representatives of ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in the work of the Special Political Committee. It was strongly in favour of international recognition for the national libera-

tion movements and of active participation by the true representatives of the oppressed peoples in international meetings at which questions concerning them were discussed.

35. With progress in the decolonization of southern Africa, the South African Government was becoming increasingly isolated. The Special Committee, whose recommendations his delegation supported, had made a significant contribution to the intensification of propaganda against *apartheid*. An increasing number of States had also signed or ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.

36. In the face of increasing internal and international pressure, the Pretoria Government had recently initiated a diplomatic offensive of so-called "détente" with the neighbouring African States and of propaganda designed to deceive world public opinion and distract attention from its racial policies. In fact, however, it was constantly intensifying its *apartheid* policy and its terrorist activities against its opponents. Its flouting of United Nations resolutions, the establishment of "bantustans", its massive arming, increased repression against the black population and inhuman treatment of political prisoners were clear proof of the continuation of its policies. The documents published by the Unit on *Apartheid* and those before the Committee showed that the Pretoria régime had launched a new wave of arrests and savage repression of the leaders of the liberation movements and all opponents of *apartheid*. The Romanian people supported and admired the heroic fight of the South African people for social justice and the exercise of their right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter, which not even the Draconian measures adopted by the racist régime could prevent. His delegation was firmly convinced that the United Nations and all peace-loving peoples would continue to support that struggle against an anachronistic policy which constituted a denial of human dignity.

37. Because of its firm opposition to all policies of force and its devotion to the principles of international law and of the Charter, Romania had consistently condemned the policy of *apartheid* as the most dangerous form of colonial oppression, which infringed the principles and purposes of the Charter and represented a permanent source of tension on the African continent and a threat to international peace and security.

38. The anti-*apartheid* struggle could not be effective without participation by all States, not merely in words but in joint international action through the United Nations. Romania therefore considered that the role of the Organization should be strengthened and adapted to contemporary realities in order to increase its effectiveness in solving international problems. In the year of its thirtieth anniversary, the United Nations, and through it the whole international community, should assume special responsibility for the liquidation of *apartheid*, the defence of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and the support of the national liberation movements. Decisions were by no means lacking; they must now be implemented. In accordance with the United Nations resolutions, Romania had no diplomatic, political, economic, sporting or other relations with the racist South African régime. Its delegation was

ready to co-operate with other delegations to carry out the recommendations of the Special Committee and was certain that the draft resolutions adopted by the Special Political Committee would be supported by all States conscious of their responsibilities and of the need to put a final end to that shameful anachronism, *apartheid*.

39. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) expressed the aversion of the Government and people of Canada for the odious *apartheid* régime, which, because it was based on denial of the fundamental human rights and civil liberties of the vast majority of the inhabitants of South Africa, carried within it the seeds of its own destruction. Like other Governments concerned at that situation, his Government felt that all reasonable means should be taken to hasten the inevitable end of *apartheid*. The Canadian Government's actions had always been in complete accord with its policy of promoting social justice and its conviction that the maintenance of peace and security for the benefit of all peoples should be the main concern of Canada and of all the countries which wished to preserve world peace. It had therefore always supported positive, practical measures designed to bring about a speedy peaceful solution to the South African problem and had rejected any hasty action which might unnecessarily complicate the international situation without leading to fundamental change.

40. During the preceding year, there had been significant developments in southern Africa. The former Portuguese colonies had attained independence, and the Presidents of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Mozambique, and Botswana had together tried to find a solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Although their efforts had been in vain, that co-operation had raised hopes that the barriers to the self-determination of the inhabitants of southern Africa were at last beginning to give way. However, despite the part played by the South African Prime Minister in the discussions on Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the bastion of racist oppression, had remained essentially unaffected by recent developments.

41. Since the situation in South Africa might deteriorate and lead to racial violence or civil war, the Canadian Government, with other States Members of the United Nations, had tried to adopt policies and measures designed to encourage and support the black majority in that country in its desire for self-determination. Those countries had also tried to make the white minority and its Government understand that the only way to a peaceful solution of the racial problem in their country lay in the participation in political life of all South Africans on an equal footing. His Government had always considered it essential that the parties to the conflict should not become so estranged that they could not co-operate in seeking such a solution. It had therefore adopted several practical measures to show its repugnance for *apartheid*. Its financial contributions to United Nations and other international funds which offered black South Africans the education and training of which they were deprived in their own country totalled \$800,000 for the current financial year, and it had just pledged a contribution of \$100,000 to the Institute for Namibia. In addition, in co-operation with Canadian non-governmental organizations and other international organizations, it supplied direct aid for the realization of medical, educational, agricultural and other projects

by groups in southern Africa. Canada's bilateral aid programme to the independent African countries of southern Africa was also considerable and would total over \$60 million in the form of loans and grants in the financial year 1975/76. Its main objective was, of course, to encourage the economic and social development of those countries, but Canada also wished to express its disapproval of the racist ideology of *apartheid* by helping to increase the stability of those independent countries.

42. Another important question was the exclusion of South Africa from international sporting events. In a letter to Canadian sporting organizations, the Minister of Health and Social Welfare had said that the Canadian Government's policy was to refuse any financial assistance to athletes wishing to visit South Africa in order to take part in sporting events. Naturally, the final decision was left to the individual or sporting federation concerned. The Minister had also informed the sporting organizations, that, as from July 1975, the Canadian Government would give no moral or financial support to any sporting event held in Canada to which South African athletes were invited. A similar attitude had been adopted by several other nations in the hope that growing isolation would encourage the South African Government to abandon its policy of segregation. That recent stand by his Government was particularly timely, since the Olympic Games were to be held in Canada in 1976. After careful study of the situation, the Canadian Government had decided that the South African manoeuvres to give the impression of an absence of racial discrimination in sport reflected no fundamental change in that country's discriminatory sporting policy.

43. In 1963, the Canadian Government had imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa, and in 1970 it had banned the export of spare parts for the military equipment covered by the embargo, thus conforming to the provisions of Security Council resolution 282 (1970).

44. Although his country was delighted at the repeal of oppressive legislation such as the Masters and Servants Acts and at the changes made in the Bantu Labour Act of 1964, it was astonished to note that most *apartheid* legislation had not been greatly changed. Recourse to repressive laws such as the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act to punish and imprison indefinitely people whose only crime was their opposition to *apartheid* was particularly reprehensible. The judicial system in South Africa must be strongly condemned for the excessive delays in bringing such cases before the courts and for questionable legal tactics such as the substitution of new charges for charges judged unacceptable by the courts. His Government condemned the separate development policy, which gave 13

per cent of the country's territory, mostly barren land, to 80 per cent of the population; that was a flagrant denial of the right of the majority to an equitable share in the country's wealth.

45. His Government realized that any transformation of the racial situation in South Africa must come from within the country. The means employed in bringing about that transformation were a matter of grave concern to his Government. Recourse to violence to bring about the necessary changes could not be encouraged, and Canada was pleased that OAU continued to advocate peaceful means of solving the problems of southern Africa; his Government welcomed the statements by several African leaders that the maintenance of peace and security in that region was of great importance. The United Nations should resist the temptation to resort to extreme measures which might reverse the progress made so far. That was why his Government had opposed the expulsion of South Africa at the twenty-ninth session. It regretted the absence of the South African delegation at the thirtieth session, because it believed that the easiest way of bringing about the desired change in South Africa was constantly to expose the latter's Government and inhabitants to the international community's condemnation of its policies and practices. In that connexion, the Special Committee was to be congratulated on its efforts to draw attention to the injustice inherent in the *apartheid* régime. That was the course to take rather than measures inspired by despair.

46. Mr. ALLISON (Nigeria) requested that the text of the statement by the representative of ANC, which had so clearly described the situation in Azania, the collaboration of certain States with the racist régime and the determination of the people to fight resolutely for their inalienable rights, should be circulated, *in extenso*, to members of the Committee.

47. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee, in accordance with the authorization granted by the General Assembly at its 2353rd plenary meeting, adopted the proposal of the representative of Nigeria.

It was so decided.²

48. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegations of Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guyana, Laos, Liberia, the Niger, Senegal and Zambia wished to become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.326.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

² The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.963.

964th meeting

Friday, 24 October 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.964

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/
10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.326):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*
(A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic had asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply at the end of the preceding meeting, following a statement by another delegation. As the other delegation had withdrawn its name from the list of speakers, he had not called upon the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic. However, the latter had asked to reply to the representative of the United States of America at the current meeting on behalf of his own and other Arab delegations. Although the right of reply was supposed to be exercised at the end of meetings, in the absence of any objection he would take it that the Committee wished to accede to that request in the case being considered.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. EL SHEIBANI (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply on behalf of the Arab group of countries, said it appeared that the representative of the United States of America was new to the Committee because he had raised a matter which had been discussed in the Third Committee. His enthusiasm for Zionism had no doubt made him forget the rules of the General Assembly. He was apparently joining in the propaganda which was being directed against the United Nations in the United States because of the fact that the Organization did not follow the directives of the United States and its ally, Zionism. However, his attempt to defend Zionism was doomed to failure. Members of the Committee were well aware how closely the Zionist régime was linked with South African racism. The United States representative seemed unaware not only of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly but also of the nature of Zionism. There was a great difference between Zionism as a racist theory and Judaism, which was recognized by the Arabs as a divine faith on the same footing as Christianity. The sufferings of Jews had been caused by Western countries and never by Arabs. Moslems, Jews and Christians had coexisted throughout history until Zionism had emerged as a fanatical racist movement similar to South African racism. In his enthusiasm to defend the Zionist entity, the United States representative seemed to have overlooked the references in the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022), particularly in paragraphs 66 and 205, to the

relationship between that entity and the South African racist régime.

3. He would leave it to the members of the Committee to judge the increasingly close relationship between Tel Aviv and the racist régime in Pretoria, which was being strengthened in all fields. The increasing bonds between those two régimes, which ignored United Nations resolutions, showed the morality of Zionism.

4. It was not surprising that the United States representative had asked members of the Committee not to draw a comparison between the Zionist régime and that of South Africa. What was surprising was that that appeal should be made on behalf of a country which knew full well what its responsibilities were towards an international organization which had condemned racism, oppression and the debasement of man. If the United Nations condemned countries which collaborated with the South African régime, it must likewise condemn those which collaborated with similar régimes, such as the Zionist one.

5. The co-operation between Arabs and Africans was a historical, cultural and religious bond in their fight against racism. The Arabs supported the liberation movements in South Africa, which were also supported by the United Nations and the international community, in their fight to eliminate racism.

6. His delegation wished to maintain the right of reply to the United States representative until it had read the summary record of the preceding meeting.

7. Mr. KATZEN (United States of America) said that he wished to reserve his right to comment on the Libyan representative's remarks at a subsequent meeting.

8. Mr. MOHAMMED ALI (Oman) said that the *apartheid* policy of the white minority in South Africa was a challenge to the United Nations, whose Charter and resolutions upheld the principles of the independence of peoples. All countries were opposed to the odious policy of discrimination on the basis of race and colour. In the discussion on the item, representatives of most countries in the world had expressed indignation and had called upon the United Nations to see that the international community instituted strict sanctions and other measures to oblige South Africa to renounce that policy.

9. There was a great similarity between the racist régime in South Africa and that in Israel, which was committing the most barbarous crimes against the Arab people of Palestine, depriving them of their fundamental rights just as the white minority was depriving the black majority of theirs in South Africa. Israel was defying the United Nations resolutions condemning the policy of oppression and racial

discrimination which it pursued against the Arab citizens of Palestine. The close co-operation between the two régimes was clear proof of the similarity between them.

10. He supported the appeals by previous speakers calling upon all countries to halt military and economic aid to the Government of South Africa, since such aid enabled it to pursue its discriminatory policies.

11. In Oman there was no discrimination whatsoever. All people had the same rights and duties. The same should be true of all peoples in southern Africa, who should live together in peace and harmony in order to build a society where all had equal rights.

12. His country had always supported the United Nations resolutions condemning the South African régime. It had no political or economic relations with that régime and would not allow its citizens any commercial or social contacts with it.

13. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that, despite repeated appeals by the United Nations for unconditional amnesty for all persons imprisoned or subject to restrictive measures for their opposition to *apartheid*, the Vorster clique was consolidating its cynical régime, which debased the black man in the land of his ancestors. The recommendations made by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in Chapter II of its report, concerning that régime's policy of so-called détente, the need to step up international action, the special responsibility of the United Nations to the people of South Africa, the recognition of the right of self-determination, condemnation of the "bantustans", the need for sanctions against South Africa, and assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements were fully supported by his delegation. The World Peace Council's award of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee showed its appreciation of that Committee's work to maintain international peace and security.

14. The attainment of independence by the four new States Members of the United Nations was cause for satisfaction to the whole of Africa and a just recompense for their heroic fight against colonialism.

15. Thirty years after the establishment of the United Nations, the white minority régime of South Africa, which took its inspiration from the racist ideas of nazism, still ignored the recommendations and decisions of the United Nations, strong in the support of many Western countries, including the great Powers belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, as permanent members of the Security Council, were responsible under the Charter for maintaining international peace and security. The contributions made by the science and technology of those Western countries enabled South Africa to assert itself as a military and even an atomic Power. The Committee should continue to denounce the dangers inherent in the supply of arms to South Africa. The embargo on trade with that country and, above all, on arms deliveries, should be total, because *apartheid* was not only a denial of the intrinsic value of man but also a crime against humanity. The United Nations should also call upon Governments to point out to Western firms the danger to

international peace and security constituted by their continued trade relations with South Africa.

16. The South African Prime Minister's campaign of charm showed that he realized that the days of the *apartheid* régime were numbered. Zaire respected the positions of other sovereign African States with regard to that campaign, but, for its part, it considered that any dialogue with Zaire should start with a dialogue between the blacks and whites in South Africa itself.

17. The Vorster clique's pledge to announce the independence of the Transkei "bantustan" in 1976 deceived no one. The establishment of "bantustans" merely continued the *apartheid* policy by dividing Azania into small States which were not viable and would always be at the mercy of the white minority régime. His delegation therefore felt that the Committee, in another resolution, should again urge those specialized agencies and governmental and non-governmental organizations which had contact with the blacks in South Africa to develop among them a spirit of brotherhood in order to awaken them to national consciousness, which alone could prevent the Balkanization of their country. The indigenous inhabitants of Azania must realize that they belonged to a single nation. Zaire's own experience showed that the lack of a sense of nationhood was the source of many of the internal upheavals from which various third-world countries suffered.

18. Zaire's position with regard to the unhappy lot of its Azanian brothers had been clearly expressed by its President when he had said at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly (2140th plenary meeting) that his country could not be happy so long as its South African brothers were suffering under the yoke of the South African racists. Zaire also unconditionally supported the Azanian liberation movements in their fight to regain their freedom. In the light of the failure by the white minority and its friends to recognize the fundamental human rights of all of the country's inhabitants, the independent African States and their friends had no choice but to help the people of Azania in their armed struggle for freedom, even though they had constantly told white South Africans that they had nothing against the coexistence of whites and blacks in Azania. Zaire remembered with gratitude the financing by the United States of the United Nations operation in 1960, which had prevented the secession of the copper zone. It was therefore disappointed that that friend of its early days appeared to have no African policy apart from the maintenance of the *status quo*. That freedom-loving country, which had fought for its own independence, had done nothing to help Africa to free itself from colonialism and *apartheid*. It was the Africans themselves who, in a bitter struggle, had overcome the anachronistic Fascist power of Portugal and won the liberation of all that country's African possessions. In some cases, the United States had even worked against the interests of Africa. Zaire for its part, however, would continue to shoulder its responsibilities to its brothers who were victims of *apartheid*.

19. Mr. RASOLONDRAIBE (Madagascar) said that the discussions on the agenda item under consideration showed that, despite its obstinacy, the racist régime could not hope to win by exhausting its opponents. All the speakers had

shown their determination to support the legitimate cause of the non-white inhabitants of Azania. His delegation strongly supported those statements and wished to reaffirm its active solidarity with those people and the liberation movements, whose representatives it was pleased to see taking part in the debates.

20. For the States members of OAU, political independence would not acquire its full meaning until the continent had been freed from all forms of racist, colonial and foreign domination. It was frustrating that the independent African countries were obliged to devote time to such political problems when they would have preferred to concentrate their efforts on their own development. They were also sorry to see their relations with countries on other continents poisoned by those problems.

21. It had often been said that Africa was a young continent which could make a valuable contribution to building a better world, but it would be unable to fulfil that vocation so long as racism, *apartheid* and colonialism existed on its soil. On the other hand, its victory over those forces of evil might constitute its most important contribution to the work of the United Nations. The fight against *apartheid* should be a joint effort of the whole international community from which no country in any part of the world should hold back. It was because that principle was not yet fully understood that the action of the international community, and especially that of the United Nations, had so far been disappointing. Not only had the Organization constantly disagreed on what should be done, but it had also permitted a small group of countries to prevent the establishment of a true collective will to rid the world of a racist, anachronistic, illegal régime. The first and greatest mistake was to have permitted the South African racist régime to become a founder Member of the United Nations. It was difficult to understand how a nation could take part in formulating the lofty principles of the Charter and sign and ratify that document while hoping to profit indefinitely from the misery of its black population. Admittedly, other delegations, too, had endorsed the principle of the right to self-determination while their Governments remained determined to repress anti-colonial movements. Those countries' recourse to the provisions concerning "domestic jurisdiction" had later shown that they shared South Africa's restrictive manner of interpreting the Charter of the United Nations.

22. Another failure lay in the inability to make all United Nations organs admit the illegal nature of South African domination. The votes at preceding sessions of the General Assembly showed the existence of an overwhelming majority determined to proceed beyond the simple condemnation of *apartheid* to practical measures under Chapter VII and Article 6 of the Charter, but three permanent members of the Security Council had succeeded in thwarting the will of the majority. Those countries should be reminded that it was essentially from them that a number of Member States had learnt the ideas of legality, democracy and universal suffrage which they were calling for in Azania. They should also be reminded that the Vorster régime, owing to the way in which it had been elected, its social and economic domination and the practices and policies which it pursued, could not claim to represent the people of South Africa and

therefore had no legality. By maintaining their political, diplomatic, military, technical and economic relations with the Vorster régime, those countries were helping to strengthen it and to increase *apartheid's* chance of survival. The most obvious illustration of that fact had been given at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, when the three Western permanent members of the Security Council, through their vetoes and in the name of the principle of universality, had succeeded in keeping in the United Nations 4 million whites and leaving 20 million non-whites outside. Now that South Africa had itself chosen no longer to participate in the work of the Assembly, those delegations might more easily agree to vote for the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council in 1974, thus ending 30 years of political and juridical stalemate during which there had been endless discussions on whether South Africa would be more susceptible to diplomatic pressure within or outside the Organization. In fact, the South African racist régime was in no way prepared to give up power either voluntarily or under the pressure of its friends.

23. It had been repeatedly stated in the Committee's discussions that all were agreed in condemning *apartheid* and on the need for change and only differed on the method to be followed to obtain that result. However, the choice of methods seemed very limited. His delegation was not willing to yield to the attempt to blackmail the African countries and destroy their unity by telling them that if they did not adopt a certain strategy they would lose the support of other countries or groups of countries. Agreement must be reached on the illegality of the existing régime in South Africa and on the changes which should be made in that country. The principal question to be resolved immediately in South Africa was one of power and democracy. His delegation endorsed all the recommendations made by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* particularly those concerning a mandatory arms embargo and condemnation of the "bantustans", the aim of which was to perpetuate white supremacy by dividing the blacks.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)* (A/SPC/L.326)

24. Mr. HAYNES (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, proposed that a vote should be taken on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326.

25. The CHAIRMAN said that the delegations of Afghanistan, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Mali, Morocco and Romania had become sponsors of the draft resolution.

26. Mr. AL-HADDAWI (Iraq) said that his delegation would also like to join the sponsors.

27. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326.

At the request of the representative of Jordan, the vote was taken by roll-call.

* Resumed from the 960th meeting.

The Congo, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chad, Chile, China.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 90 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

28. Mr. VONUTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany) said that it was with regret that his delegation had had to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. The United Nations had dealt with South Africa and the problem of *apartheid* since 1946 because it was one of its foremost tasks to eliminate all forms of discrimination on grounds of race, religion or political convictions anywhere in the world. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, that after 29 years of heated debate a "special responsibility" was being established for the United Nations with regard to South Africa. His delegation had tried to ascertain what that "special responsibility" could imply. There were two possibilities: it either confirmed a situation which had been known to all for many years, in which case a draft resolution was unnecessary, or it was intended to create something new, and in that event one might wonder about the nature of that new element.

29. The wording of the draft resolution reminded his delegation of the terminology used to describe the relationship between the United Nations and Namibia. As all were aware, the United Nations had assumed direct responsibility for Namibia under General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. Did the draft resolution on which the Committee had just voted seek to establish a similar relationship between South Africa and the United Nations? Some of the terms used in its preamble seemed to suggest that, especially the references to the "liberation movements" and the right to "self-determination". Such terms were normally used in connexion with dependent Territories.

30. His Government did not view South Africa and the problem of *apartheid* in that context. South Africa was a

sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. The formal assumption of a special responsibility by the United Nations for parts of the population of a Member State was not envisaged in the Charter and would exceed the Organization's authority.

31. Accordingly, the Federal Republic of Germany, which, like other States, categorically rejected the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa, had been unable to lend the draft resolution its support.

32. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that the affirmative vote cast by his delegation on the draft resolution should be viewed against the background of Denmark's firm and consistent opposition to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations, his delegation wished to join in the international community's demand that the Government of South Africa should end its policy of *apartheid*. His Government looked upon the proclamation as a reaffirmation of a moral responsibility which the United Nations and the international community must feel towards the people of South Africa as a whole.

33. Mr. VROON (Netherlands) said that his Government had consistently expressed its repudiation of the system of *apartheid*, which it considered to be a violation of basic human rights. The statement made by the representative of his country in the Committee (955th meeting) and his delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325 on solidarity with the South African political prisoners could leave no room for doubt with regard to his Government's position. However, at the Committee's 960th meeting his delegation had made it clear that his Government did not consider the situation in South Africa to be a colonial one. Consequently, it had serious doubts about some of the expressions used in the draft resolution that had just been adopted; they seemed to indicate that the situation in South Africa was comparable to a colonial situation.

34. Moreover, his Government doubted the appropriateness of proclaiming a special responsibility towards the people and organizations mentioned in paragraph 1. On the one hand, the United Nations had the responsibility of upholding human rights whenever and wherever they were being violated, and *apartheid* had been a major concern of the United Nations for many years. On the other hand, if the purport of the draft resolution was to equate the situation in South Africa with the situation in Namibia, it should be borne in mind that the special responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia was unique in character in view of the particular international status of that Territory.

35. For those reasons, his delegation had been unable to support the draft resolution.

36. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in order to acknowledge, on the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, the special moral responsibility of the United Nations and the international community for all the people of South Africa. In practical terms, the United Nations had recognized that responsibility by creating the United

Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

37. His delegation would have preferred to see the draft resolution make a clear distinction between the special situation in South Africa and a classic colonial situation, and acknowledge the role to be played by many different kinds of organizations in the task of ending *apartheid*—a task which, in the view of his delegation, could be undertaken only in accordance with the principles laid down in the Charter.

38. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said that his country was fully and firmly committed to the struggle against *apartheid* and shared the views of all countries that were concerned with ensuring respect for fundamental human rights. It was therefore with deep regret that his delegation had been obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. To begin with, it considered that the language used in the draft resolution was inappropriate in the context of the Committee's work. The draft resolution embodied some elements that would be more pertinent in the framework of decolonization. The reference to the "leadership" of the liberation movements in the third preambular paragraph and to "self-determination" in the fourth preambular paragraph were out of place in a discussion of *apartheid* which was in no way connected with the problems dealt with in the Fourth Committee.

39. Yet, his delegation would have been glad to support the draft resolution if its difficulties had been limited to its wording. Unfortunately, its very concept was unacceptable, because there could not be such a thing as a "special" responsibility of the United Nations towards anyone in the field of human rights. By its very nature, the United Nations was committed and responsible whenever and wherever fundamental human rights were threatened. Any other attitude would be discriminatory. The idea of a "special" responsibility introduced a very dangerous and misleading element because it called to mind different problems, like Namibia, and might imply a sort of "ordinary" and therefore diminished responsibility by the United Nations elsewhere and towards others.

40. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) said that although his delegation had supported the draft resolution, it felt that the language of operative paragraph 1 was somewhat vague. The debates conducted in the United Nations over a period of 30 years and the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa had surely indicated that the Organization had a special interest in and responsibility for efforts to put an end to *apartheid*. Similarly, the language of paragraph 2 might have been clarified to ensure that terminology relating to decolonization was kept distinct from that relating to *apartheid*.

41. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that his Government's consistent opposition to *apartheid* and racial discrimination in South Africa remained unchanged. His delegation had, however, abstained in the vote on the draft resolution because some of its wording was inappropriate and contained far-reaching implications which his delegation could not support.

42. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that, although his delegation had voted for the draft resolution, it felt that some of its language, especially in paragraph 2, was much too broad.

43. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that, like others, his delegation would have liked to join in a resolution condemning *apartheid* but had abstained on the draft resolution in question because it had had difficulty in accepting a number of points in the text. The United Kingdom did not endorse the principle of armed struggle and therefore could have voted for the draft resolution only if the references to "the courageous struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa" in the third preambular paragraph and to "their legitimate struggle for self-determination" in the fourth preambular paragraph had been interpreted to mean peaceful struggle by non-violent means. Nor could it accept any implication of support for armed struggle in operative paragraph 2. As far as the reference to self-determination was concerned, while his delegation fully endorsed the aspiration of the whole population of South Africa to take part in the political process, the United Kingdom recognized the Government of South Africa and its sovereign status. Finally, with regard to paragraph 1, his delegation did not understand the concept of special responsibility in what was a non-colonial situation, nor did it believe that the Charter of the United Nations conferred any special responsibility on the United Nations in respect of South Africa. The objective of the United Nations should be to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms wherever the need arose, anywhere in the world.

44. Mr. QUENTIN (France) said that although his delegation supported some of the objectives of the draft resolution and was sympathetic to the humanitarian concerns which the latter expressed, it had been obliged to abstain in the vote because of its very serious reservations about the text. It felt that the concept of a special responsibility of the United Nations towards the liberation movements of South Africa had no basis in the Charter and that the draft resolution was likely to commit the Organization to actions not in keeping with the purposes for which it had been established. France condemned the policy of *apartheid* and was sympathetic to the efforts of the South African people to end it, but it could not give its endorsement to methods which might not be peaceful. Moreover, it did not seem altogether justified to envisage a solution to the problem of *apartheid* on the basis of criteria which were better suited to decolonization. His delegation therefore regretted that, on the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, it had been unable to support the initiative taken by the sponsors of the draft resolution.

45. Miss JAUREGUIBERRY (Argentina) and Mr. PINTO-BAZURCO (Peru) said that they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution had they been present and would support it in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

46. The CHAIRMAN said he understood that Cyprus, Nepal and Qatar would also have voted for the draft resolution had they been present.

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

47. Mr. DORON (Israel) noted that his country had been accused by Arab delegations and certain others of having a special relationship with South Africa. He repeated his delegation's categorical rejection of such allegations. The stories of arms deals and military co-operation between South Africa and Israel were pure fiction.

48. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had itself provided figures showing that South Africa's volume of trade with Israel represented a minute fraction of its trade with other countries, and yet it was Israel which had been singled out for special treatment in the report of the Special Committee. The purpose, of course, was to divert attention from the trade being conducted with South Africa by the Arab countries themselves. For example, on 27 June 1974 the *Nairobi Daily Nation*, had quoted President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania as saying that the oil-producing Arab States were spending millions of dollars buying gold from South Africa instead of using that money to develop their own countries or helping African liberation movements. He then quoted an article entitled "Arabs expand trade with South Africa" which appeared on 18 March 1975 in *The Observer* of London; it stated that, despite the decision taken by the League of Arab States in 1973 to impose an oil embargo on South Africa, there was evidence of growing trade relations between the Arab States and South Africa. The article went on to say that Saudi Arabia was negotiating gold purchases in South Africa and had recently sent a trade mission there to discuss the importation of food and prefabricated building materials. The same article spoke of forthcoming South African business ventures in Egypt and Jordan, and noted that a number of Persian Gulf States were trading openly with South Africa. It was clear, then, that the Arab States were primarily motivated by the shrewd promotion of their own business interests.

49. Furthermore, whatever perverse and ridiculous resolutions might be adopted in the United Nations, the whole world knew perfectly well that the Jewish people had for centuries been the victims rather than the perpetrators of racial persecution and discrimination. Racial discrimination in any form was abhorrent to Israel and contrary to its fundamental beliefs and policies despite all hypocritical Arab assertions to the contrary.

50. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.

51. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that those countries which had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326 were still longing for the days before decolonization. They claimed that the oppressed millions of South Africa were not colonial subjects because the United Kingdom had given independence to the régime in South Africa. However, the latter was a minority régime and granting it independence had been an arbitrary act. The real issue was not terminology or semantics, but rather the fact that some Governments did not want the people of South Africa to enjoy the same international support that had been given to Namibia. The term "decolonization" was not irrelevant, because transfer from British colonialism to South African colonialism was not liberation.

52. It was particularly ironic that Italy, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany were prominent among the abstaining Powers. The Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, in view of its own history, ought to have done everything in its power to combat the régime of Hitler's ex-underling, Mr. Vorster. France should also be reminded that its own Maquis had been in effect a national liberation movement.

53. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the Israeli representative's quotation from President Nyerere was irrelevant and was designed to sow discord between the Arab and African States. It would have been better if the Israeli representative had been able to deny the existence of relations between his country and South Africa instead of offering quotations out of context. The support of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Arab countries in their just struggle against Israel was unequivocal.

54. Mr. HENDAWY (Egypt) said that, in voting for the draft resolution, 90 members of the Committee had recognized the special responsibility of the United Nations with regard to *apartheid*. Yet Israel, which had not even been present during the vote, had returned to the conference room armed with press clippings designed to show among other things, that Egypt was playing host to South African businessmen. The source of those allegations might perhaps have been his own imagination. There was no split between the African and Arab States despite Israeli efforts to sow discord. The Israeli representative had also mentioned the policies of the oil-producing States; but in fact their attitude had been praised in the Committee. The fact was that Israel had not broken off relations with South Africa or closed its consulates there. His delegation stood by the documents of the Special Political Committee.

55. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Dahomey) said that, speaking on behalf of the African Group, he wished to denounce Israel for trying to sow confusion in its ranks. The solidarity between the Arab and African States remained firm. He categorically rejected the allegations made by the Israeli representative; the African States knew how to defend themselves and their principles without any instructions from imperialist States like Israel. With regard to the specific issue under discussion, a colonial Power had given the South African minority régime its independence and a colonial situation was therefore involved. If that situation did not change, an armed struggle would be necessary.

56. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) said that the Israeli representative only wanted to justify his country's racist attitude and its continued relations with South Africa. The attitude of the Arab countries was clear-cut despite Israeli efforts to distort it. Israel's efforts to divide the Arab and African countries would fail.

57. Mr. DORON (Israel), referring to the Egyptian statement that he had possibly invented the articles he had quoted, observed that he had indicated where and on what dates they had been published. Anyone could find them and see that nothing had been quoted out of context.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

965th meeting

Monday, 27 October 1975, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.965

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.327):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking on a point of order, said that, although he had not been present personally at the 964th meeting of the Committee because of illness, he had learned that the representative of Israel had accused his Government of trading with South Africa. While the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic had replied to the Israeli remarks at that meeting, he wished to exercise his delegation's right of reply at the current meeting.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to grant the request of the representative of Saudi Arabia.

It was so decided.

3. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the policy of his Government with regard to South Africa was quite clear: it did not maintain or permit relations of any kind with the apartheid régime. While it was always possible that isolated individuals might occasionally succeed in carrying on relations with South Africa illicitly, his Government's opposition to such relations remained steadfast. By way of example, he pointed out that a number of years earlier his Government had even refused a request by the South African Government for permission to set up an office in Saudi Arabia to handle arrangements for South African Moslems who wished to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. As to allegations that Saudi Arabia was purchasing South African gold, he pointed out that when purchases were made on the open market it was not possible to ascertain the country of origin of the gold acquired.

4. The representative of the United States of America had described the United Nations as being anti-Semitic because of the adoption by the Third Committee at its 2134th meeting of a draft resolution¹ which determined that zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination. A systematic campaign was being conducted in the United States to castigate the Arabs as anti-Semites and to buy

African votes in the United Nations with the promise of economic assistance. The Arabs could not possibly be anti-Semitic, being Semites themselves. Their quarrel was not with Judaism but with zionism. As a doctrine invented by the descendants of Europeans who had been converted to Judaism, zionism was a foreign element in the body politic of the Middle East. The Zionist colonialists had brought discredit on Judaism by emptying it of its religious content and giving it geographical form. The Oriental Jews were brothers of the Arabs. The European Jews could also be brothers of the Arabs, but never at the expense of the Palestinian people, who were the indigenous inhabitants of the area. If Israel wished to survive in the Middle East, therefore, it must seek to do so with the acceptance of its neighbours and not in defiance of them.

5. Numerous elected officials and representatives of the United States Government were seeking to besmirch the good name of the Semitic Arab nations. They castigated the Arabs as terrorists, while they conveniently forgot the Stern Gang and other Zionist groups. They should be reminded that there was no discrimination in Islam, while, despite being rejected in theory, discrimination was still practised in the United States. The United States was a relative newcomer to civilization and should not presume to lecture the Arabs, without whom there would not have been a Renaissance in Europe, in the ways of civilization.

6. The United States and certain European States were attempting to drive a wedge between Arabs and Africans on the issue of zionism. It should be recalled that he had personally waged a successful campaign in the United Nations to have the principle of self-determination recognized as a full-fledged right, not for the benefit of the Arab States, most of which had already been independent at that time, but for those in Africa and Asia who were still under colonial rule. The representative of the United States had falsely accused the Arabs of seeking to destroy the United Nations by pressing for a resolution which equated zionism with racism. It was however, the Zionists who would destroy the United Nations by forcing the United States into a third world war. The Arab States rejected the notion of racial purity and exclusivity embodied in zionism and had accordingly supported the resolution on zionism in the Third Committee.

7. Finally, he said he had been relieved to learn that the perpetrators of the bombing which had taken place at the United States Mission that morning had identified themselves as Puerto Ricans, since otherwise it would have automatically been assumed that Arabs were responsible for the incident.

8. Mr. ALLISON (Nigeria), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.327 on behalf of its sponsors, said that *apartheid*, whether it was termed "separate development" or "separate

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 68, document A/10320, para. 27, draft resolution III.

freedom”, was a crime against humanity. That doctrine so permeated South African society that every individual in the country was officially classified according to race. Now, through a deliberate policy of the South African Government, the vast non-white majority were to be relegated to a mere 13 per cent of the land, where they would have to eke out a meagre living. Moreover, the Africans would be required to obtain passes in order to work in the white areas and would be exploited as cheap labour. Thus, they had paradoxically become migrant labourers in the land of their birth, deprived of all political, economic and social rights. Contrary to the contention of the South African Government, therefore, the “bantustans” would mean greater dependence for the African people of South Africa and were the worst manifestation of *apartheid*.

9. He drew attention to the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, which reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people under the leadership of their national liberation movements. Operative paragraph 2 exposed the “bantustan” policy as an attempt to Balkanize Azania and violate its territorial integrity. Paragraph 3 called on all Governments and organizations not to recognize the bogus independence of the “bantustans” in accordance with the established principle of law whereby it was impossible for a Government to delegate authority which it did not legally possess.

10. The CHAIRMAN announced that Jamaica wished to become a sponsor of the draft resolution. He then pointed out that two corrections were to be made to the Spanish text in order to bring it into line with the English original. The corrections would be circulated as document A/SPC/L.327/Corr.1.

11. Mr. CHAUDHURY (Bangladesh) said that the struggle against *apartheid* had two dimensions—a humanitarian one and a basically political one—which were indivisible. To regard the problem as merely one of human rights was incompatible with the actual situation and served to shore up the frantic diplomatic offensive which the South African régime had belatedly initiated to counter its total isolation. His delegation fully agreed with the repeated emphasis placed by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* on the essentially political nature of the problem. It therefore welcomed the participation by the representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the true representatives of the South African people, in the Special Political Committee’s discussion of the item on *apartheid*.

12. The human rights dimension of the problem of *apartheid* was fully documented, and the anguish and unequivocal condemnation of the international community could not be appeased by anything short of the total eradication of that abhorrent policy. It was gratifying to note that the great majority of speakers had not been deceived by South Africa’s attempt to mask its real intent. In a world in which the interdependence of all nations had been repeatedly recognized, the existence and condoning of *apartheid* constituted a serious obstacle to international co-operation and a potent threat to international peace and security. There could be no peace without justice, and peace must be based on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

13. While his delegation welcomed and whole-heartedly supported the intensification of the struggle against *apartheid*, it noted with concern that South Africa’s intransigent attitude was still supported by many of its economic and military partners who were the ones best able to influence its actions. That support remained the major obstacle to the eradication of *apartheid*. The Vorster régime continued to create further obstacles: the doubling of its military budget in 1974/75; the intensification of repressive measures directed against all opponents of *apartheid*, whether white or black; the continued detention of political prisoners; and the tightening of repressive legislation. Perhaps its most heinous move was the rapid implementation of its “bantustan” policy. It seemed incomprehensible that any plan to relocate the majority of the inhabitants to one seventh of a country’s area could be justified as a solution that would end racial discrimination and bring about self-determination.

14. South Africa’s attempts to break out of its isolation by launching a new diplomatic and publicity offensive to explain its policy, offering economic assistance to African States and attempting to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem, bore witness to the success of international pressure and of the persistent and courageous struggle of the oppressed people in South Africa itself. Those attempts must inevitably fail because South Africa was contending against the collective conscience of mankind. There could be no compromise with racism. The international community had clearly indicated the need for unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners and refugees, the repeal of all repressive legislation, and the exercise by the South African people as a whole of their right to self-determination in accordance with principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It was now necessary to consider the means of attaining those objectives.

15. Recent welcome signs of change had set a new stage for the campaign against *apartheid*. Within South Africa, the determination to resist had gained strength despite mass arrests and deportations. Abroad, the decision of the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session (resolution 3206 (XXIX)) to reject the credentials of the South African delegation and its call to the Security Council to take up the issue (resolution 3207 (XXIX)) had been a reminder of the need to safeguard the moral authority of the United Nations. The change of régime in Portugal, leading to the independence of that country’s former colonies, had broken the back of the unholy alliance in southern Africa. The termination of the Simonstown Agreement of 1955 and the French decision of August 1975 to prohibit the sale of arms for continental use were hopeful though hesitant indicators of South Africa’s military isolation.

16. In the year of the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, States Members of the Organization must collectively and individually reaffirm and renew their efforts, by all possible means, to end racism and discrimination. His delegation fully endorsed the recommendations contained in Chapter II of the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) and would support them within the limits of its capacity. The President of Bangladesh, in his first address to the nation, had stated that his country would continue its policy of opposing racism, *apartheid*, colonialism and neo-colonialism as laid down in its Consti-

tution. Opposition to oppression was enshrined in the traditions of the Bengali nation, which believed in the supreme status of man and in the inherent equality of all men. The people of Bangladesh were determined to eradicate the most glaring manifestation of oppression in the world today—*apartheid* in South Africa.

17. Mr. FEZZANI (Tunisia) said that the untiring efforts of the Special Committee had succeeded in informing world public opinion of the horrors of the policies of the racist régime in South Africa. The representatives of the South African liberation movements had shown in their statements that conditions were even more tragic than the Special Committee's report indicated. It was hard to understand how a State which had ignored the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations could still remain a Member. The General Assembly's refusal at its twenty-ninth session to recognize the credentials of the delegation of the *apartheid* régime had reflected the position of an overwhelming majority of Member States and had accentuated South Africa's isolation in the international sphere. In the Security Council, most speakers had denounced *apartheid* as an obnoxious system contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it was only the vetoes of three permanent members of the Council that had saved South Africa from exclusion from the Organization. The wave of condemnation in 1974 had led the representative of South Africa to make promises and statements to the effect that his Government would do everything in its power to eliminate discrimination based on race and colour. However, a few days later, on 12 November 1974, the South African Minister of the Interior and Information had clearly stated that it was out of the question to expect South Africa to give up its policy of separate development in order to conform to majority rule and ensure integration. On 16 November, the Prime Minister had informed black leaders that the principle of "one man, one vote" would never be applied in South Africa. Consequently, there could be no misunderstanding about the real intentions of the Pretoria régime. His delegation had long been convinced that that régime would not give up its *apartheid* policy out of concern with justice or respect for the international community. The President of the Tunisian Republic had always strongly denounced the *apartheid* policy and drawn attention to the dangerous situation in South Africa, which threatened peace not only in Africa but throughout the world. On the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, he had reaffirmed the active solidarity of the Tunisian Government and people with all peoples that were victims of oppression and racial discrimination, particularly those in South Africa and Palestine, in their heroic fight for freedom and their legitimate rights.

18. *Apartheid* was based on the Nazi doctrine of the hierarchy of races. That anachronistic classification was an attack on the dignity of man which all Africans felt to be an insult to the whole African continent. The Arabs of Africa and Asia, educated in the lofty values of Islam and Christianity, in the spirit of tolerance and the equality of all men, shared the feelings of brother victims of *apartheid* particularly because they, too, had been suffering in Palestine for over 25 years from another, more complex form of racial discrimination based on an identical phi-

losophy, zionism. It was therefore not by chance that relations between Israel and South Africa were becoming stronger. The Special Committee's report described the increasingly close links between the two régimes in violation of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth sessions. The Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, had declared its great concern at the increasing military, political, diplomatic, economic and cultural co-operation between those two racist régimes. The policy of the South African régime was hostile to the whole of Africa. Feeling its increasing isolation after the end of Portuguese domination in southern Africa, the régime had increased its military budget from R305 million in 1971/72 to R948 million—3.7 per cent of gross national product—for 1975/76, because it considered itself the guardian of southern Africa. Its increasingly well-equipped army was used inside the country to maintain and consolidate the power of the racist minority, especially to enable it to set up "bantustans". His delegation believed that those artificial entities were being established for the purpose of dividing the Azanian people and threatening the territorial integrity of South Africa. Externally, the South African army was maintaining the illegal occupation of Namibia and supporting the shaky Smith régime in Zimbabwe, and it constituted a permanent threat to the young States of southern Africa especially the former Portuguese colonies. The racist régime had been able to carry out that policy because the sanctions decided on by the United Nations had not been applied by all Members. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia had said at the 2369th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 1 October 1975, peace-loving and freedom-loving countries must put an end to all activities likely to strengthen the political, military or economic potential of the South African régime and should exercise pressure on it to negotiate with the liberation movements.

19. During the year of the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, his delegation hoped that all Member States without exception would fully realize the challenge to the whole of Africa represented by the continuation of *apartheid* and the grave dangers inherent in the intensive arming of the Pretoria régime. Unanimous, unceasing pressure, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and the heroic struggle of the South African nationalists would cut short the sufferings of the Azanian people and compel the Vorster régime to free political prisoners and to put an end to its policies of *apartheid* and separate development. Dialogue with the leaders of ANC and PAC, the only legitimate representatives of the majority of the population, would lead to the establishment of a South Africa in which all men, irrespective of colour, race or belief, would participate in building a united, democratic, non-racial country.

20. Mr. DAGBA (Togo) said that his Government continued to be concerned at the alarming situation in South Africa, which constituted a permanent threat to peace in that region and to international security. World public opinion, showing a complete want of understanding of Vorster and his clique, had long cherished the hope that the urgent appeals by the United Nations to South Africa would be heeded and that a peaceful solution and a policy of reason would prevail over South Africa's obduracy and

criminal instincts. Vorster's reply in the form of diversionary tactics of so-called "détente" or "dialogue" had not been well received, and his attempts to win over the African countries had met with little success.

21. It now seemed clear that the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe, the elimination of *apartheid* and the ending of the "bantustan" policy could only be brought about by pursuing the course advocated in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, issued by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its ninth extraordinary session, held at Dar-es-Salaam from 7 to 10 April 1975. His delegation agreed with the Special Committee against *Apartheid* that the policy of "separate development", designed by Pretoria to create confusion, must be condemned. On the occasion of its thirtieth anniversary, the United Nations should remember that the situation in South Africa was continuing to deteriorate; for that reason, his delegation wished to appeal once more to all peace-loving countries and peoples to give full support to the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the racist régime. It urged all countries and all the great Powers to set aside their individual selfish interests and to refuse to collaborate with that régime.

22. His Government was doing all in its power to bring about the triumph of the democratic ideal and the advent of majority rule in South Africa. It supported all recommendations to that end and gave its full support to the courageous freedom fighters, the oppressed peoples of South Africa and the political prisoners of the racist régime who were fighting and dying for a just and noble cause.

23. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland) said that the Committee's debate had again illustrated the international community's concern at the maintenance in South Africa of an institutionalized system of racial discrimination designed to uphold minority rule. His Government's abhorrence of the policy of *apartheid* was well known and had been made clear on many occasions. In the circumstances, his delegation did not propose to analyse in detail the system of *apartheid*, but would instead examine recent developments and current prospects.

24. The declarations made by the leaders of the South African Government at the time of the impending transfer of power to the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese rule had given grounds to hope for fundamental changes in South Africa's policies. There had been some shift in South Africa's approach to the problems of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, although there was as yet no evidence of change sufficient to meet the legitimate demands of the United Nations and the world community. In relation to South Africa itself, the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* clearly showed how little change there had been. The South African Government's own declared intention of putting an end to all unnecessary and purely irritating discrimination had not been fulfilled. The majority of the changes had merely been designed to change the appearance of things and not the reality. In fact, they served only to highlight the full extent of the body of discriminatory legislation and regulations in force in South Africa. The discrimination that the South African Government regarded as necessary was the foundation of the basic inequalities and injustices of the system. The fundamental

injustice of the system of "separate development", under which four fifths of the land area was assigned to a minority of one fifth of the population, resulted directly in other injustices. The system of "bantustans" was based on a fraud, and the intention of the South African Government to grant "independence" to the "bantustans" must be condemned. Finally, the attempt to maintain the system of *apartheid*, with its inherent injustices and inequities, led to the savage repression of all who worked to change the system.

25. His Government did not share the view that there was no choice between despair and recourse to violent means of changing the situation. It believed that recent developments had shown that the South African Government and the dominant white community did react to changing international circumstances and to international pressure, no matter how insufficient or misconceived that reaction had been to date. It felt that the international community must do all in its power to increase the exposure of influential white South Africans to world opinion. An attempt to isolate the entire white community along with the South African Government would lead them to even more extreme attitudes, which would inevitably bring about a reaction on the part of the oppressed majority and a tragedy for all communities in South Africa. His delegation believed that exposure to world opinion might well bring about a change in the attitude of white people in South Africa. The South African Government had shown that it was concerned about world opinion and, in particular, public opinion in those countries with which it had the greatest amount of contact; in fact, the very propaganda activities to which the Special Committee had rightly drawn attention in its report showed the South African Government's sensitivity in that regard. Furthermore, developments within South Africa itself gave grounds for guarded optimism. There were signs within the white community of the development of an opposition which rejected many fundamental aspects of the system. Within the black community there had been, despite the continuation of bans on political organizations and the prosecution of individuals, a certain development of political consciousness. The representatives of the banned organizations had also attested to the growth of political activity inside and outside South Africa.

26. The problem which the United Nations faced was how to bring the pressure of world opinion to bear most effectively on the South African Government and on white public opinion in order to persuade them of the urgent need for changes of substance rather than of form. Those changes must, in the view of his Government, lead ultimately to a society in which every individual would have equal rights and in which those who were currently inhabitants of South Africa could participate on the basis of individual equality.

27. The maintenance of contacts could be justified only if they were used to emphasize opposition to the system and to bring pressure to bear for change. For example, an area where action was required on grounds of principle and was effective as an instrument of pressure was that of sport. Believing that South Africa had brought politics into sport by segregating teams and sports activities generally, his Government had constantly supported the Olympic prin-

ciple that no discrimination could be permitted in sports events on grounds of race, religion or political affiliation, and had drawn the attention of Irish sports organizations to the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly. While maintaining that it was for the sports organization concerned to determine its attitude, the Irish Government had publicly opposed participation by Irish athletes in events organized in violation of the Olympic principle and had made known its views to the organization concerned whenever the issue of a sports event with a South African team had arisen. Sports organizations throughout the world had increasingly declined to participate with South African teams and such action was an effective way of bringing home to white South Africa their feelings of repugnance for the system of *apartheid*.

28. While advocating the maintenance of contacts in order to press for change, his delegation recognized that in certain areas a co-ordinated attitude by Governments was appropriate and indeed necessary. In the light of the South African Government's policies of internal repression and its possession of modern arms, which made it able to resist change, his Government had constantly supported and strictly observed the embargo on arms to South Africa. It welcomed the decision of the French Government to limit the sale of military equipment to South Africa and that of the United Kingdom Government to terminate the Simons-town Agreement.

29. The treatment by the South African Government of those who worked to change the system required a particular response from the advocates of peaceful change. His delegation had already made clear its solidarity with the political prisoners; it had gladly associated itself with the consensus on the draft resolution concerning that question (A/SPC/L.325) and on the draft resolution dealing with the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/SPC/L.324), to which it had made annual contributions in recent years. It had been honoured that the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, one of the principal bodies through which the Trust Fund worked, had chosen to hold its annual conference in Dublin.

30. The United Nations had a particular role to play in the campaign to bring to an end the system of *apartheid* by making the world aware of its evil nature. His delegation applauded the work of the Special Committee and of the Unit on *Apartheid*, as well as that of the many national voluntary organizations. The mobilization of public opinion in States Members of the United Nations would have its effect in demonstrating to white South Africans the extent of international concern.

31. Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic) said that his country supported the struggle for the elimination of all forms of racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* by whatever means were necessary and rendered all possible political, moral and material assistance to oppressed peoples. It maintained no relations with the racist régime in South Africa and scrupulously complied with all relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. It considered solidarity with the national liberation movement to be a decisive factor in the struggle for the elimination of the *apartheid* régime.

32. The German Democratic Republic had been one of the first States to sign and ratify the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, and it urged all States to become parties to it. It welcomed the recommendations of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in chapter II of its report (A/10022), with a view to further intensifying the struggle against *apartheid*. His delegation was prepared to co-sponsor and support all resolutions aimed at ending the anachronism of *apartheid* and would implement them scrupulously.

33. Events since the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly had clearly shown that the inhuman *apartheid* régime was, in violation of international law, seeking to remain in power by the use of pressure, slander, terror and hypocritical assurances, and by exploiting foreign assistance. The anachronistic nature of the racist régime in South Africa, whose practices were reminiscent of the worst periods of Hitlerite fascism, became more obvious as the last bastions of colonialism collapsed and imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist oppression and exploitation ended. However, the Vorster régime, as in the past, was seeking to halt the course of history. By promises of "détente", and by such devices as the "bantustan" policy, it sought to gain time and to distract attention from the true situation in South Africa. However, in the view of the overwhelming majority of States, the tensions in South Africa could be eased only by the elimination of the racist *apartheid* régime and the granting of self-determination to the oppressed peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

34. Like other enemies of international détente, the racist régime had in recent years greatly increased its military budget. During the fiscal year 1974/75, its military expenditures had doubled by comparison with those for 1972/73. It was an undeniable fact that the régime played an important role in the strategic plans of imperialist circles and was meant to serve as a link and bridgehead for the military bases in the Indian Ocean. His delegation therefore supported the demand for a binding embargo on arms to the Pretoria régime. His delegation was also deeply concerned about South Africa's access to nuclear arms, which clearly increased the danger to peace and security in southern Africa. Any activity by a State Member of the United Nations enabling that régime to have access to atomic know-how and equipment prejudiced the efforts of the United Nations to eliminate the racist régime.

35. As was well known, diplomatic, consular and trade relations were inseparably linked; the trade policy pursued by Western countries towards Portugal in recent months showed how trade could be used as a means of influencing political developments. His delegation believed that a strict economic embargo against South Africa by all States Members of the United Nations would contribute effectively to ending racist domination in that country, whereas any co-operation with the régime strengthened it and violated United Nations resolutions. South Africa also received support in other forms, such as loans, which had enabled it to set up its own arms industry. The régime sought to induce foreign banks to invest in the public sector, thus establishing ever closer ties between those banks and the racist régime. His delegation welcomed the

proposal to undertake a thorough study of the activities of transnational corporations and felt that the Information and Research Centre of the Economic and Social Council's Commission on Transnational Corporations should be instructed to examine their activities.

36. Thirty years ago, Hitlerite fascism had been defeated by the heroic struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the anti-Hitler coalition. That historic victory had strengthened national and social liberation forces through-

out the world and had accelerated the collapse of colonialism and racism, enabling many peoples to follow successfully the path of peaceful development and social and economic progress. The South African régime represented a threat to international peace and security, and both States and transnational corporations that co-operated with it in the military, economic or financial field were responsible for the continuance of *apartheid*.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

966th meeting

Monday, 27 October 1975, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.966

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.327):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) to address the Committee.

2. Mr. MAKOTI (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that the policies of the South African Government had been discussed in the United Nations for 30 years. They had been discussed in Azania for more than 300 years. In view of what had been done in the United Nations in particular and at the national, regional and international levels in general, it might have been thought that the Government of South Africa would have been persuaded to succumb to the pressure of international public opinion and the internal opposition of the South African people. But that had not been the case, perhaps because there seemed to be a tendency in all bodies where the policies of South Africa were discussed to regard them as a matter of conscience rather than of coercion. Yet a matter of conscience was a matter of conference and co-operation, whereas South Africa's policies involved conflict and confrontation, coercion and colonialism. South Africa would yield only to measures which took that fact into account.

3. Referring to the history of the creation of South Africa and to various aspects of British colonialism, he said that the struggle of the black population had not started when the administration of the Territory had been entrusted in 1910 to a white coalition government of the former British

colonies in southern Africa. The form of the struggle had changed but its fundamental nature and character had remained as before. The only change which had taken place had been the form of colonial authority. For that reason, the African people of Azania did not accept the claim that South Africa was an independent sovereign State. A people discriminated against racially was not considered an independent people. The granting of so-called independence to the white coalition government had not constituted an act of decolonization, but had been merely a transfer of colonial authority. The oppressed majority of South Africa's population was therefore determined to fight for its right to self-determination within the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a fundamental principle of international law in so far as it related to the political status of indigenous peoples on their ancestral land. Denial of the right to self-determination was the manifest expression of a colonial situation.

4. He referred to the recent statements of the South African Government concerning its discriminatory policies and particularly those relating to political prisoners. That Government said that there were no political prisoners in South Africa. The confusion arose from its legislative and judicial policies. Under the South African laws, any legitimate political activity constituted a criminal offence. Therefore, any participation by citizens in the defence of their human, civic or political rights made them common criminals and thus common prisoners and not political prisoners. All the statements by the Vorster Government concerning changes which might be made in the legislation on which the *apartheid* régime was based were quite worthless and could be only misleading if one overlooked the deeply-rooted prejudices which had led to the establishment of that policy and which were still reflected in all aspects of society in South Africa. It should also not be forgotten that the whole series of measures and policies apparently designed to strengthen racial discrimination were, in essence, policies of deprivation. The African people had been deprived of their land, of their property and of their status in order that they might submit consciously and voluntarily to the exploitation of their labour as cheap labour and to the sapping of their will to resist and their

right to respect and recognition of their personal dignity. That was why his organization maintained that the elimination of the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination was a matter not of conscience but of coercion. It was important not to be led astray by the ambiguous rhetoric of those who were perpetrating those policies with growing intensity.

5. The history of colonialism was the history of aggression against foreign nations and invasion of their territories. The development of capitalism involved at a certain stage the invasion of weak countries which had rich natural resources and the subjugation and exploitation of the local peoples. Racial discrimination and cultural aggression were the inevitable products of colonialism, and were only the forms and not the essence of the system. If the manoeuvres of the racist South African régime were examined in the light of those concepts, it would be seen that the régime admitted its colonial authority over the black people and proposed a programme of decolonization through the "bantustan" scheme. It wanted title to the land of the local people and the so-called "bantustan" leaders were prepared to sign the title deed in exchange for a personal reward. No one had any right to Balkanize South Africa for any reason. In addition, those plans were not limited to South Africa but were spreading to all the States of southern Africa, particularly Namibia and Zimbabwe. The so-called "homelands" were simply reserves of cheap labour for capitalism.

6. The Vorster Government had embarked on a so-called campaign of détente which concealed a manoeuvre designed to make South Africa, with the help of its imperialist allies, into a great Power, the undisputed leader of the whole continent, and a policeman in Africa. The campaign had three phases: the first consisted in finding enough African States that were prepared, in exchange for certain benefits, to form a powerful bloc which could guarantee peace for the racist régime in the near future; the second phase was ethnic independence for the "bantustans"; and the third phase had started with a congress for southern and equatorial Africa on so-called economic détente, to which South Africa would be able to contribute its technical proficiency in various areas and the capital to promote economic advancement throughout the region. That imperialist conspiracy to deny the African people their national right to self-determination in a unitary and sovereign State posed a threat to the security of the peoples of Africa in general and those of Azania in particular. South Africa was not an independent and sovereign State because it represented not the political will and the real independence of its people but the supremacy of its sectarian legislation. *Apartheid* was the symptom of a serious disease—colonialism. Nothing would be achieved by eliminating only one of the manifestations of that evil. In order to eradicate it, it would be necessary to destroy the monopoly of armed force which was at the exclusive disposal of the existing South African régime.

7. Mr. AMISSAH (Ghana), speaking on a point of order, noted that the Pretoria régime had launched a large-scale propaganda campaign and had even sent a puppet delegation from Namibia to some European countries in order to preach to the world the inherent values of *apartheid*. At the same time, that régime had intensified its campaign of terror and oppression of the black population. The inter-

national community should not be led astray and should offer every possible assistance to the national liberation movements which were struggling to bring down the obnoxious system which was endangering international peace and security. As part of that support, his delegation proposed that the statement made by the representative of PAC should be reproduced in full as a document of the Special Political Committee.

8. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the General Assembly, at its 2353rd plenary meeting, had authorized the Special Political Committee to obtain on request transcriptions of some of its meetings, or portions thereof. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that the statement made by the representative of PAC should be reproduced in full.

*It was so decided.*¹

9. Mr. AL-DEHIM (United Arab Emirates), speaking on a point of order, said that he had been absent when the representative of Israel had stated that Abu Dhabi, one of the States in the United Arab Emirates, was trading with South Africa. He reserved the right to reply on another occasion.

10. Mr. PASHKEVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted that, although the problem of *apartheid* had been considered over a number of years, it was still topical and it was increasingly necessary to take concerted action in defence of peace. Man had been created to be happy and, despite the scepticism of certain people, the many revolutionary upheavals which had led to peace, democracy, socialism and the downfall of the colonial system were manifestations of progress towards that ideal.

11. Although it was far away from Africa, the Byelorussian SSR was extremely interested in that continent and kept abreast of everything that happened there. The people of the Byelorussian SSR, who before the October Revolution had known suffering and oppression, welcomed the victories of Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe, and hoped that Angola would soon occupy its rightful place in the United Nations. Against that background of favourable changes, *apartheid* stood out as a detestable phenomenon and an insult to human dignity, contrary to all the norms of international law and to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. By its disregard for the basic concepts of civilization, it was comparable to Hitlerite fascism. The Byelorussian people, who had endured three years of Hitlerite occupation, knew the horrors of fascism.

12. Pretoria and its henchmen were trying to portray *apartheid* as a doctrine based on South Africa's special situation. Under the pressure of world public opinion, Vorster had resorted to the ruse of toning down certain measures, but a study of the so-called reforms showed that they were only a sham to mislead the world. There was no hope that the South African racists would change of their own volition. Vorster himself had stated that the black people would never have equal political rights.

¹ The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.966.

13. Racism was a very dangerous ideology, especially when it was a state policy and the basis of the relations of a State. The Pretoria régime sought to follow in Hitler's footsteps and impose its ideas on the world. South Africa was not only a racist State, but also an aggressive State whose military power, which was increasing daily with the help of certain Western countries, was already greater than that of all the countries of Africa south of the Sahara put together.

14. As for the tragic situation in Namibia, he believed that there was nothing more to be added since, in his view, it showed beyond any doubt that Pretoria was continuing to apply an aggressive policy and was not letting up. For that reason, when Vorster spoke of "dialogue" it was important to try to understand what his real intentions were. In his view, Vorster was merely attempting to divide his opponents. It was only to be hoped that his perfidious plans would fail completely.

15. The United Nations had condemned *apartheid*, had declared it a crime against humanity and had adopted numerous resolutions on the subject. It was clear that if those resolutions were to be implemented, great progress would be made towards victory. But, in practice, some Governments had not assumed their share of the responsibility. Some Western countries had demonstrated unparalleled hypocrisy, since, while they condemned the racist régime in international forums, they gave it assistance of every kind. As things stood, it was quite evident that if *apartheid* continued to exist, it was because it had so many protectors, including some countries that were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One had only to read the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to realize that. The criminal alliance of the foreign monopolies which sustained the régime must also be ended. It was essential to ensure that the régime ended up in a condition of total and complete crisis, but with half-way measures nothing would be achieved. In that connexion, he pointed out that chapter II of the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) contained specific recommendations which his delegation fully supported.

16. Finally, he pointed out that the General Assembly, in its resolution 3328 (XXIX), had recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples trying to free themselves from colonialism and had invited the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to organize assistance to the liberation movements. He expressed his full solidarity with the liberation movements of South Africa and said he was convinced that, with the support of progressive forces throughout the world, they would attain their objective. The Byelorussian SSR complied with all the resolutions of the United Nations, and on 16 October 1975 had ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. It was prepared to contribute by all possible means to the elimination of racism, colonialism and *apartheid*.

17. Mr. ZERAIA (Algeria) welcomed the delegations of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, and Papua New Guinea and assured them of his co-operation. He also congratulated the genuine representatives of the people of Cambodia on the struggle they had waged against

the forces of imperialism until its destruction in that part of the world.

18. In the very near future, another African country, Angola, would achieve the full exercise of national sovereignty. Algeria was gratified to see that Africa was daily freeing itself from the colonial yoke and thus strengthening its economic and political potential. He noted with sorrow, however, that part of the African continent was still subjected to the domination of a racist régime which continued to defy the international community.

19. He pointed out that, at its twenty-ninth session (2281st plenary meeting), the Assembly had decided to exclude the representatives of the racist régime from its deliberations and that, but for the triple veto of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the Security Council, South Africa would have been expelled altogether from the United Nations.

20. In his view, one had only to read the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to realize the true situation prevailing in South Africa. The racist régime continued to make a mockery of international public opinion. Both its intention of creating "bantustans" and the fact that its armed forces had invaded part of the territory of Angola showed that the régime had no thought of changing its attitude completely. It had also been shown that its defiance had been made possible only by the support which some Western Powers gave to the racist white minority. When those countries that were helping to perpetuate *apartheid* voted in favour of United Nations resolutions condemning the régime, the ridiculous vied with the odious. In that connexion, mention might be made of the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had just helped the Pretoria régime to establish a nuclear industry.

21. Those Western countries, however, were not the only ones to assist the racist régime. The many links of every kind between the racist régime and Israel showed the colonial and imperialist character of both régimes, both created by the imperialist West. He observed that, in 1971, Professor Richard Stevens had said that, of the decisions of the Western world which had been detrimental to the future of the peoples of the third world, none had revealed so clearly the very essence of Western ethnocentrism as the two decisions taken in London in 1909 and 1917: the first, on the constitution of the Union of South Africa, and the second, in the Balfour Declaration. Thus, in the name of British liberalism, the peoples of Palestine and South Africa had lost not only their lands but also their most fundamental rights. And, in view of the similarity in the roles they were fulfilling, it was easy to understand why Tel Aviv and Pretoria felt that they were united by the same destiny, a destiny based on religious discrimination in the case of Israel and on racial discrimination in the case of South Africa.

22. History had taught the peoples of the world that only by armed struggle could they put an end to imperialism. Therefore, his delegation, which had experience of that struggle, invited the liberation movements of South Africa and Palestine to redouble their efforts, since their victory was certain and it was now merely a question of time. Algeria assured them of its constant and unfailing support.

23. Mr. ABDULAH (Trinidad and Tobago) said that he had been unable to be present during the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326, but that if he had been present he would have voted in favour of it.

24. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* clearly showed that no significant progress had been achieved in the eradication of *apartheid*. It was also clear that the efforts of the United Nations were being constantly frustrated by the support which many industrialized Western countries and their transnational corporations continued to give to the South African régime. Their desire for economic gain led them to provide assistance of all kinds and, what was worse, to strengthen the military capacity of the régime, while at the same time they were hypocritically proclaiming their opposition to *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

25. He was not convinced by the argument advanced by those States that the answer to the problem of *apartheid* was to maintain contact with South Africa at all levels to induce it to abandon its odious policies. Many of the speakers who had preceded him, however, had noted that the changes and reforms promised by Pretoria had not materialized and that repression had increased. That confirmed him in his conviction that South Africa should be completely isolated and that support should be given to the liberation movements.

26. Much of the strategy for the isolation of South Africa already existed in the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, with which Trinidad and Tobago faithfully complied. It also supported the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and deplored the failure of the Security Council to approve that measure because of the vetoes of some States. It associated itself with other delegations which had proposed that the matter should be considered once again by the Security Council.

27. Two developments had occurred which made it more urgent than ever to impose an arms embargo against South Africa. The first was the increase of 36 per cent in South Africa's military budget for the financial year 1975/76. The second was the withdrawal of Portugal from its colonial empire in Mozambique and Angola. Those new independent States were being subjected to military pressure by South Africa, which showed that the Pretoria régime constituted a threat to international peace and security.

28. As a result of the changed political situation in southern Africa, South Africa had intensified its diplomatic and propaganda campaign with a view to convincing Western public opinion that it intended to introduce positive changes in its policy of "separate development". But the creation of "bantustans" was designed solely to provide an inexhaustible supply of cheap labour. Trinidad and Tobago rejected the policy of "bantustanization" and declared that it would not recognize any "homeland", or deal with its authorities.

29. To counteract the South African propaganda, the Special Committee, in paragraph 227 of its report, had proposed that information activities should be expanded, and for that purpose the Unit on *Apartheid* would have to be strengthened. In that connexion, his delegation wel-

comed the establishment of the Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3151 C (XXVIII), as a means of facilitating the expansion of the Unit's work, and in the future it would make a contribution to that Fund.

30. One area in which some success had been achieved in isolating South Africa had been that of sport, although there were some sports bodies which showed a lack of concern for upholding the Olympic principle of non-discrimination. There had also been other encouraging signs of progress. For example, at the 961st meeting, the representative of Italy had announced that his country had closed the South African immigration offices in Rome and Milan, and at the 962nd meeting the United Kingdom representative had indicated that the Simonstown Agreements had been terminated. It was to be hoped that those two countries would take the additional measures recommended by the General Assembly.

31. The report of the Special Committee showed that there was much that could and should be done to eliminate *apartheid*. In that connexion, his Government was keenly aware of the need to assist the liberation movements, particularly in the field of education and training, and he pointed out that it had granted fellowships to members of the liberation movements and had contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

32. Mr. MARTYNENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the problem of eliminating *apartheid* must be solved once and for all. As a result of world détente, the prospects were currently favourable for isolating the racist régimes and for the struggle of peoples against colonialism, one of whose most loathsome manifestations was *apartheid*. The new atmosphere prevailing in Africa after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism also held out new possibilities and confirmed the fact that colonialism and racism were doomed by history. However, they would not simply fall of their own weight.

33. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* showed clearly that the racist régime was continuing to disregard the resolutions of the United Nations. Of late, Pretoria, confronted with the growing national liberation movement, had been resorting to various manoeuvres in an effort to deceive world opinion and create the appearance of change in the system of *apartheid*. The South African authorities were attempting to gain recognition of the "bantustans", in order to entrench racial, political and social inequality and secure a source of cheap labour for the South African economy. Employing ever more insidious methods, it was trying to destroy the liberation movements and shatter the unity of the African countries in their struggle against colonialism. The purpose of those manoeuvres was to divert the attention of world public opinion, bring to nought the measures undertaken by the United Nations and gain time to strengthen South Africa's military power and its policy of "bantustanization". Pretoria was still occupying Namibia and intensifying its repressive measures, and had turned the country into one great torture chamber. Because of the aid it received from certain NATO countries, South Africa was supplying its army with modern weapons and increasing its military expenditures. The effort of the South African regime to

create a potential for the production of nuclear weapons was a matter of justified concern. That posed a threat to all the peoples of Africa, particularly since South Africa had not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

34. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, had declared that the racist régime constituted a serious threat to the peace and security of the continent and had condemned those who encouraged and strengthened that régime.

35. Western investments in South Africa—which had shown a vast increase in 1974 and 1975, particularly in certain key sectors—were actually investments in *apartheid*, aimed at the preservation of that system as the source of the huge profits reaped by foreign investors, and were at the same time an instrument for oppressing and exploiting the workers. During the discussion, it had been contended that trading with the racist régime and investing in its economy actually benefited the African population. However, it had been shown very clearly that those links not only did not improve the condition of the Africans but, under *apartheid*, brought them more suffering and deprivation. The wealth of South Africa was being created by African workers, who constituted 80 per cent of the country's labour force. Their back-breaking work was the source of the super-profits being squeezed out of the country by hundreds of Western monopolies feeding off the racist system.

36. The Ukrainian SSR was strictly complying with all United Nations decisions aimed at eradicating racism and *apartheid*, and was fully supporting the peoples of South Africa in their just struggle for liberation. On 15 October 1975, it had ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. His Government also supported the proposals of the African and other States calling for effective action and the imposition of sanctions for the purpose of completely isolating the racist régime and compelling it to comply with United Nations decisions, including those relating to Namibia.

37. His delegation felt that an important role would have to be played by increased exposure of the manoeuvres of the supporters of *apartheid*, by the struggle to put an end to all co-operation with the South African racists, and by the cessation of all military, political, economic and other help and support from their well-known protectors. Anti-*apartheid* movements and progressive public organizations, especially the World Peace Council, were making a great contribution to that cause.

38. In that connexion, his delegation also greatly appreciated the work of the Unit on *Apartheid* of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, which was making an important contribution to publicizing the valiant struggle of the South African patriots and the international movement against *apartheid*, and to exposing the manoeuvres of the South African racists and their accomplices.

39. Mr. PINTO-BAZURCO (Peru) observed that since the signing of the Charter of the United Nations 30 years

earlier, the Organization had been dealing with the problem of *apartheid*, which, paradoxically, still existed because of the support provided by certain Powers that had helped to found the United Nations in order to uphold ideals the South African Government was currently failing to respect. The attitude of those Powers, which did not hesitate to hold human dignity up to scorn when it was a question of defending their strategic, military and economic interests, recalled the other forms of exploitation which existed in various parts of the world and which had caused the countries of the third world to join forces in fighting for a more just order.

40. His delegation identified itself with the peoples who had achieved their political liberation and had joined together in the struggle for economic liberation. He drew attention, in that connexion, to the agreements reached at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, in which the latter had expressed their opposition to *apartheid* and their concern at the support the racist South African régime was receiving from the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom.

41. His delegation had enthusiastically welcomed the recommendation made by the Special Committee in paragraphs 223 and 224 of its report that a conference or seminar on *apartheid* should be held in 1976 in Latin America, and supported the proposal that the conference should take place at Havana.

42. Peru's opposition to *apartheid* and to all forms of exploitation and discrimination was a reflection of its national thinking and of the ideological basis of the Peruvian revolution, i.e., a doctrine of humanism which regarded man as an end rather than a means and called for the complete fulfilment of the human person.

43. Mr. ABDEL-LATIF (Sudan) said that the international community did not appear to be learning much from history. The recognition of the People's Republic of China, the attainment of independence by Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, and the victory of the people of Viet-Nam should make it clear that, however long and uneven the struggle might be, the inevitable outcome was victory for the people.

44. It was a pity that some countries continued to give lip service to the cause of the Azanian people while at the same time obstructing United Nations efforts to isolate the racist Pretoria régime. It was incomprehensible that countries which preached democracy, freedom, equality and justice should continue to aid a régime which was an affront to human dignity.

45. When his delegation had called for a review of the Charter, it had been told that that was unnecessary since the problem lay in the manner in which the Charter was implemented. It appeared that the countries in question wanted to prove their point by their behaviour.

46. The world community had not advocated violence but the isolation of the racist régime. The countries which had opposed that course had offered as an explanation that they did not want to harm the interests of the black

population. It was time to put an end to that hypocritical, paternalistic attitude. The proposed measures for isolating the régime were nothing new; similar methods had been employed during the cold war and on many other occasions, and he therefore did not see what objection there could be to applying them.

47. In spite of the attitude taken by the Western countries in question, the countries of Africa had continued to co-operate with them, since they were aware that confrontation would jeopardize their goal, and the Arab countries had initiated a dialogue for the same reason. That reflected a genuine desire to co-operate with the Western countries, and it was to be hoped that they would reciprocate.

48. The statements made in the Committee showed that the countries of Africa would never agree to détente with South Africa. The countries which supported Vorster had failed to offer any indication that there had been changes in the policy of the racist régime, and they should change their attitude towards that régime if they really believed in equality and justice. His delegation had listened attentively to the statements made by the representatives of those countries, but it had been disappointed in its hope of seeing a change in their attitude. In that connexion, he expressed appreciation of the statements made by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand at the 958th and 956th meetings respectively. At the same time, he noted that the Zionist régime had raised its representation at Pretoria to the ambassadorial level; that was not accidental, since the two régimes had a great deal in common, namely degradation of human dignity and values. Both had been repeatedly condemned in the United Nations and in other international forums because they were defying world public opinion and endangering peace. Some argued that zionism was a religion or a liberation movement that had played its role some decades ago. However, the Committee would soon be discussing the atrocious practices of the Zionist régime in the occupied Arab territories, and it would be clear how similar the two régimes were.

49. He had begun by addressing certain countries because he was convinced that without their support the racist régime would not survive. It was essential to mobilize public opinion in those countries so as to bring about a change in their policy towards that régime. An intensified effort should also be made to enlighten the white minority in southern Africa. He suggested that a radio station should be installed in one of the neighbouring countries. It might thus be possible to influence the people of South Africa so that the same thing would happen as had occurred in the case of United States policy in Viet-Nam or Portugal's policy regarding its colonies.

50. It was also essential to aid the neighbouring countries so that they could withstand pressure from the racist régime. It was already known that the latter was sending forces to Angola in an effort to delay that country's independence. His delegation also appealed to certain countries that were supplying the racist régime with oil to refrain from doing so.

51. The international community must do its best to ensure that additional generations did not grow up filled with hatred and bitterness, for the vengeance of the oppressed was severe and what the world was witnessing today was but an example of that.

52. He was convinced that if the South African régime was isolated it could not survive, and the international community would then have shown that it was still true to its principles.

53. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Congo, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Republic of Cameroon, and Zambia had joined the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.327.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

967th meeting

Tuesday, 28 October 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.967

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.327):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to grant the

request made by the representative of the United Arab Emirates at the preceding meeting to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. AL-DEHIM (United Arab Emirates), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that at the 964th meeting the representative of Israel had attempted to create suspicions regarding relations between the United Arab Emirates and South Africa. His delegation wished to reaffirm that the United Arab Emirates was resolved to carry on the struggle against South Africa with every means

at its disposal. His country fully complied with the embargo on the sale of oil and had taken measures to prohibit the import of goods from South Africa.

3. The firm position of the United Arab Emirates with respect to South Africa was well known. Representatives from his country had participated in the debates of the Security Council on the question and had called for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations on the grounds that it was not worthy to be a Member of the Organization.

4. Mr. CISSE (Mali) said that the Pretoria régime had replied to the decisions and appeals of the United Nations and other peace-loving and justice-loving organizations by putting forward specious legal arguments based on a deliberately dishonest interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations. Its attitude, which was contrary to the principles of the Charter, was based on the Fascist ideology of a system which was seeking to convince the world that the destiny of the various races living in South Africa depended on the implementation of the policy of "separate development".

5. The debate on the item and the excellent report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had exposed the stubbornness with which the Pretoria racists pursued their policy of oppression and exploitation. During the preceding year, in order to deceive public opinion, the régime had modified some of the "petty" manifestations of *apartheid* while at the same time stepping up its application of the more serious manifestations of racism and oppression. The "bantustan" policy, the sole purpose of which was to divide the territory and destroy the identity and national unity of the people of Azania, had entailed expelling 10 million blacks from their lands and relegating them to the poorest areas of the country. Given that situation, the people of Azania had no other choice but to intensify their armed struggle against *apartheid* under the direction of their national liberation movements.

6. The *apartheid* régime, condemned by the international community and weakened by the dissolution of the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon axis, was seeking to project a new image through its "dialogue" with independent African States. It was reassuring to note, however, that few States had been taken in by Pretoria's ploy.

7. Despite its condemnation by numerous international bodies, the Pretoria régime, defender of the privileges of the minority and faithful servant of the interests of certain Western Powers and transnational corporations, persisted in its refusal to implement the provisions of the Charter. It was therefore necessary to intensify the struggle against *apartheid* and above all to take measures against the arms policy of South Africa, whose military budget for 1975/76 was 36 per cent higher than that of the previous year. The racist Government was purchasing modern weapons and, according to reliable sources, was preparing to acquire atomic weapons. It had also been demonstrated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was arming and protecting South Africa for the obvious purpose of using that country as a bridge-head on the shipping routes of the Cape.

8. The immigration policy of the racist régime, which, through the application of selective criteria, had promoted the influx of a significant number of white settlers into the country should also be condemned anew.

9. The intensive propaganda campaign waged by the South African régime could not make the world forget the sufferings of the peoples of Azania and Namibia. His delegation condemned once again the partition of Namibia into "bantustans", the policy of repression and intimidation, the mass arrests, the public floggings and summary executions inflicted on the Namibian people and their national liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization. It reiterated its condemnation of the activities of foreign interests which were plundering the material and human resources of Namibia and reaffirmed its unconditional support for the people in their struggle against the expansionist usurper régime of Pretoria.

10. South Africa had concluded agreements with the rebel régime of Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of destroying the national liberation movements of southern Africa and creating a climate of perpetual insecurity in the region. But that alliance would not withstand the opposition of the peoples who were struggling for their freedom and of the peace-loving and justice-loving members of the international community.

11. The absence of South Africa at the current session of the General Assembly was having no effect on the normal course of its deliberations, nor did it diminish the principle of universality. The example of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, whose presence enhanced the current session, should encourage all Member States to intensify the struggle against colonialism and *apartheid* by complying scrupulously with the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations and other international organizations. In that connexion, he commended those States which were contributing to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and those which had publicly refused to collaborate with the Pretoria régime in the economic, commercial, cultural and sporting spheres.

12. The concerted efforts of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and anti-*apartheid* movements were serving to increase the isolation of the racist régime of South Africa. His delegation was confident that the long and heroic struggle of the people of Azania under the leadership of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) would inevitably lead to final victory.

13. Mr. N'DESSABEKA (Congo) assured the representatives of ANC and PAC of his country's solidarity with them and its total support in their struggle against the inhuman *apartheid* régime. The victory of Mozambique and the imminent triumph of Angola in the southern part of the African continent should be a source of encouragement to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

14. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) and the statements of the representatives of ANC and PAC had proved the collusion of certain NATO

members with South Africa. The resolutions of the United Nations could have been implemented if the three colonial Powers which were members of the Security Council had not used their veto to assist the racist régime. In 29 years, the United Nations had adopted almost 150 resolutions condemning the policy of South Africa, and during that time the Western Powers had supplied the régime with the most modern arms, which were being used against the progressive peoples of Azania.

15. His delegation believed that reactionary violence must be met with revolutionary violence and was in favour of intensifying the armed struggle, since it was the only language which the colonialists and imperialists could understand.

16. The Western imperialist régimes had always opposed the liberation struggle of the peoples. For the People's Republic of the Congo, the total elimination of racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa was a principle which admitted of no exceptions, and it therefore opposed any dialogue or détente with the racist régime in South Africa, since those were merely imperialist manoeuvres to divide OAU. One of those colonialist countries had announced its intention of reviewing its policy regarding the sale of arms to the Fascist régime in South Africa. However, it was known that that country's trade policy was based essentially on the sale of arms and that the orders placed by South Africa would be sufficient for more than 15 years. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany should also review its policy with regard to South Africa, since its collaboration with the racist régime in the sphere of nuclear technology could have incalculable consequences. Fortunately, thanks to the activities of the national movements against *apartheid* and especially to those of United Nations bodies, and ANC and PAC, the peoples of the Western capitalist countries were increasingly opposed to the relations of their Governments with Pretoria.

17. The implementation of the policy of "bantustans" was another problem causing concern to his delegation. The changes promised by Vorster almost a year earlier had proved to be completely fraudulent, since they had consisted of the establishment of puppet States to perpetuate injustice and oppression. Accordingly, the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo condemned the proclamation of the independence of the Transkei, a creation of Vorster, and would oppose any recognition of it.

18. Mr. AUGUSTIN (Haiti) said it was highly probable that the thirtieth session of the General Assembly would be concluded without a positive answer being received from the racist régime of Pretoria. The Vorster clique seemed unwilling to modify its odious policy of *apartheid* in any way, despite general disapproval.

19. His delegation fully endorsed all the views expressed in the Committee with regard to the South African régime's so-called policy of "détente". It was obvious that South Africa was persisting in its open defiance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that it had not kept its promise to introduce constitutional reforms of substance.

On the contrary, the South African Government had chosen to stabilize and strengthen the policy of *apartheid* through the "bantustan" system and was, as before, deliberately excluding the entire non-white population from the activities of South African society, while subjecting to increasingly cruel punishment the leaders of the black organizations whose only crime was their opposition to the heinous system of *apartheid*.

20. In such a situation, which constituted a serious threat to international peace and security, especially in southern Africa, it was useless to apply sanctions by halves. The United Nations could strengthen some aspects of its activities, by demanding, for instance, that in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Security Council, all countries should forthwith cease deliveries of arms to the Vorster régime.

21. The people and Government of Haiti were firmly opposed to the policies of *apartheid*. Haiti had been a member of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* from the outset and consequently supported the conclusions and recommendations contained in chapter II of its report to intensify the isolation of Vorster's racist régime. It also believed that the General Assembly should adopt even more effective measures to provide more practical aid to the masses in South Africa and reaffirm the legitimacy of the Azanian people's struggle for liberation. His delegation felt concern at the Vorster clique's "bantustan" policy and was confident that the appeal made by the General Assembly in its resolution 3324 E (XXIX), paragraph 10, when it called upon all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institution or authority established in the context of that policy, would be heeded.

22. South Africa should know that it would meet a united front of opposition to its racial policy. It should also know that it had embarked upon a path which could lead it nowhere but to disaster and that the independence of Portugal's former African colonies and their admission to the United Nations had created favourable conditions for the struggle against *apartheid*. Accordingly, it was to be hoped that the white minority would finally agree to a form of government and a society in which everyone enjoyed freedom and equality, without distinctions of race or colour.

23. Mr. JATOI (Pakistan) said that the international community, which had been dealing with the problem of *apartheid* since 1946, had demonstrated beyond any doubt its total opposition to that policy, which violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concern and indignation with regard to racism in South Africa had been voiced not only in the United Nations but also in other international forums, such as the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, at its sixth session, held at Jidda from 12 to 16 July 1975. Perhaps the most unequivocal expression of the world community's repudiation was South Africa's vacant seat in the United Nations, the result of the measures adopted by the General Assembly against that country in 1974.

24. Growing isolation, the struggle of the national liberation movements, the pressure of world public opinion and

the pressure of socio-economic factors had recently forced South Africa to introduce some modifications in its system of *apartheid*. Nevertheless, despite South African propaganda, it was obvious that those changes had been restricted to the “petty” aspects of *apartheid* and that the other manifestations of *apartheid* remained unchanged. It was pointed out in a paper entitled “The Changing Situation in Southern Africa” by Tami Hultman, Reed Kramer and Don Morton¹ that blacks in South Africa were still being torn from their land and forced to take employment in the white areas as migrant workers. They were being separated from their families, subjected to discriminatory laws and deprived of their trade union rights, and their freedom of movement was severely restricted. Fifty per cent of the black children born in the “homelands” died of malnutrition before the age of five. There were numerous political prisoners, and hundreds of persons were banned, detained, held incommunicado and tortured. Furthermore, to consolidate its repression and control, the régime had increased its military budget.

25. The peripheral nature of the reforms and the statements made by the leaders of the South African régime made it clear that South Africa had no intention of ending the system of *apartheid*. Vorster himself had said that blacks would never have equal political rights in the white parliament. However, the Pakistan delegation believed that the pressure of inexorable forces gave reason to hope that the collapse of *apartheid* might be imminent. The racist régime was finding it increasingly difficult to repress the yearning for freedom on the part of the majority of the population of South Africa and their determination to achieve their human rights. Even economic forces were proving too strong for South Africa to avoid fundamental changes in its system. The international community had an important part to play in that process and was duty-bound to take any action it could to save the South African people. He hoped that a mandatory arms embargo would soon be put into effect. He also endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee, contained in paragraph 210 of its report, that the Security Council should consider the desirability of an embargo on the supply of petroleum to South Africa, an embargo which the Arab countries were already applying.

26. Moreover, the world community should increase its assistance to the people of South Africa and the liberation movements. The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa was a useful instrument for providing that assistance and Governments would doubtless continue to make generous contributions to the Fund. But that was not enough; there was also an urgent need for an intensified United Nations information programme to counteract South African propaganda designed to confuse world public opinion. A campaign should be launched to expose those countries which continued to collaborate with the South African régime.

27. Pakistan's position in the matter was well known. It had never maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa and had suspended all cultural and sporting contacts with that country. Moreover, it had imposed a complete trade boycott on South Africa and had forbidden the sale

of arms and any kind of military and strategic materials. Pakistan's ports and airports were closed to South African vessels and aircraft. In keeping with that position, Pakistan would continue its efforts to ensure that power was transferred to the people of South Africa.

28. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey), after welcoming the representatives of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, said that the views of his delegation on *apartheid* were well known. However, he wished to emphasize that mere words could not overcome that system or alleviate the sufferings of the peoples of Azania and Namibia. Turkey opposed any kind of racism and racial discrimination; starting from those premises, it had not established any diplomatic, economic, cultural or other relations with the régime in Pretoria and would not do so until *apartheid* was eradicated. Turkey was a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia and had supported all international measures against colonialism and *apartheid*. It also contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Fund for Namibia, of which Turkey was a trustee.

29. Such modest steps by a country might, at first glance, seem insignificant, but he believed that if every country did the same, more progress would have been made.

30. The report of the Special Committee portrayed the tragic situation in South Africa in detail. One thing was clear: the racist régime had no intention of submitting to the call of reason. The intensification of oppression in South Africa was a clear indication of the growth of the anti-*apartheid* forces. His delegation reiterated its solidarity with those forces and with the oppressed masses of Azania and Namibia.

31. Mr. K. B. SINGH (Nepal) said that the collapse of autocratic government in Portugal and the fact that Mozambique had attained independence and Angola was about to do so had totally destroyed the unholy alliance between the Pretoria régime, the Ian Smith clique and the Portuguese colonialists. South Africa's immediate response to the new political situation had been the so-called “détente” with African States. South Africa was obviously trying to camouflage the reality of an obnoxious system by resorting to ignominious propaganda on the removal of “petty” *apartheid*, with the aim of convincing the world of its good intentions. However, OAU had not been hoodwinked and had demanded the dismantling of the institutions of oppression and repression against the non-white population. Otherwise, “détente” with South Africa would mean tolerating the oppression and degradation of the African people.

32. As the *apartheid* régime felt increasingly insecure, it was intensifying the persecution of its opponents and was becoming an even graver threat to international peace and security. Despite all Vorster's promises, it was obvious that he was hoping to build up around South Africa a group of States similar to the “homelands”, which would be so economically dependent on South Africa that they would be unable to assist in any way in the liberation of their fellow Africans. Obviously, Vorster was hoping to include among such States Namibia and perhaps even Southern Rhodesia.

¹ Unit on *Apartheid*, Notes and Documents, No. 14/75.

33. If South Africa wished to avoid confrontation, with all its frightful consequences, then it must act and act quickly by granting an unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned for their opposition to *apartheid*, repealing all repressive laws restricting the right of the people to strive for an end to racial discrimination and enabling the people of South Africa to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In short, it must comply immediately with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3324 C (XXIX), as a preliminary step towards a peaceful solution of the problem of *apartheid*. But the peace that the Pretoria régime appeared to be offering was not one which would avoid confrontation.

34. He firmly believed that the United Nations and the international community had a special responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements and towards those who were suffering because of their struggle against *apartheid*, which had been declared a crime against humanity. The time had therefore come to intensify the fight to eradicate *apartheid* once and for all. There could be no compromise solution. It was imperative that the international community should take decisive and concerted action against *apartheid*, above all during the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and should provide all types of assistance to the liberation movements.

35. It was highly regrettable that the Security Council had failed to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 3324 B (XXIX). His delegation urged the immediate application of those measures to bring about the speedy end of *apartheid*.

36. Mr. PIETINEN (Finland) regretted that the presence of the new Member States of Cape Verde, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe—a convincing proof of the decolonization process—had not convinced the Government of South Africa that peace could only be secured in southern Africa through the abolishment of the inhuman system of *apartheid*, based on institutionalized racial discrimination. Both the documents before the Committee and the statements in the discussion revealed, on the contrary, that South Africa had intensified the repression of its opponents.

37. The people and Government of Finland firmly opposed the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and rejected any form of racial discrimination. His Government had repeatedly stated that the policy of *apartheid* was a continuous danger to the development not only of that region but also of the world as a whole, and that its elimination must therefore be one of the central objectives of the United Nations.

38. The report of the Special Committee showed clearly that despite some minor adjustments, the Government of South Africa had not expressed any intention to make fundamental changes in its cruel system of *apartheid*. On the contrary, the efforts to speed up relocation of the African population in “bantustans” had been intensified. The so-called independence to be enjoyed by those “bantustans” could not deceive world public opinion. The sad results of the policy of “bantustans”, which was designed to divide the African people and consolidate white domination in South Africa, were already known.

39. His delegation considered that the substantial increase in the South African military budget indicated the fear and uncertainty the South African Government must be experiencing due to its persistent policy of racial discrimination. The Finnish Government had been complying with the arms embargo recommended by the Security Council in its resolution 181 (1963), which was a step towards increasing international pressure against South Africa.

40. One of the most tragic examples of South Africa's defiance of the decisions of the United Nations was the application of the system of *apartheid* in Namibia and the “bantustanization” of that Territory. The first step the Government of South Africa should take towards justice and peace in southern Africa would be the withdrawal of its illegal administration from Namibia.

41. It was vital to keep world public opinion constantly informed of the measures adopted against *apartheid* and of the practically unanimous condemnation of the racist régime in the United Nations. For that reason, his Government had been the first contributor to the Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund established by the Secretary-General in January 1975 in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3151 C (XXVIII), and intended to continue contributing to that Fund. In that connexion, the importance of the international campaign against *apartheid* in sports should not be overlooked. Even though sports organizations in Finland were private bodies, they had been requested by the Government to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI). A committee consisting of representatives of the Government and sports organizations had been established in Finland to discuss questions concerning international sports relations; contacts between Finnish and racially selected South African teams had subsequently become practically non-existent.

42. Finland had supported all the international humanitarian action taken for the defence of the victims of *apartheid*. In the current year, it had contributed \$86,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, and would continue to contribute in the future. It had also contributed \$48,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia. Moreover, realizing the importance of the national liberation movements in the strife against racial discrimination, Finland had in the current year channelled more than \$41,000 for humanitarian assistance through the OAU Assistance Fund for the Struggle against Colonialism and *Apartheid*.

Organization of the Committee's work

43. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in the absence of any objection, the meeting should be adjourned in order that the group of non-aligned countries could meet to complete their preparation of some draft resolutions on the item under discussion. The Committee should be able to conclude its consideration of item 53 during the current week and begin consideration of item 50 the following week.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

968th meeting

Wednesday, 29 October 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.968

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.327, A/SPC/L.328):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. WOLF (Austria) said that as a sponsor of the two draft resolutions on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (A/SPC/L.324 and A/SPC/L.325), which had been adopted by consensus at the 960th meeting, his delegation welcomed the fact that condemnation of *apartheid* in all its forms was now world-wide. It also was pleased that the activities of the United Nations had, in one form or another, had an effect on world public opinion and had thus played an important role in overcoming that policy. The importance of that process should be seen in the context of the significant developments which had occurred recently on the African continent, developments which would undoubtedly have a positive influence on the situation prevailing in South Africa and Namibia. He hoped therefore that the Government of South Africa would adopt policies conducive to peaceful change. Furthermore, the new situation would be an encouragement to those who were directly involved in the struggle for political freedom and equality and to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in its commendable work.

2. In 1975, Austria's contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa had been increased by more than 100 per cent in comparison with its 1974 contribution. His Government would also increase its 1976 contribution by 5 per cent and would continue to support the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

3. His delegation shared the view that the struggle for political freedom in South Africa was not the concern of Governments alone. The public at large, non-governmental organizations and especially trade unions must also play a substantial role in efforts to influence Government policies directly. His Government had always firmly and unequivocally rejected any policy based on human inequality. No one could fail to recognize that human dignity was indivisible and must be defended by all. He therefore appealed to the South African authorities to put an end to their sinister policy of *apartheid* before it was too late. The granting of amnesty to political prisoners would be a first step in that direction.

4. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) was wider in scope than in previous years and demonstrated more clearly than ever the world-wide activities of the Committee in its struggle against the system of *apartheid*. The Special Committee had concluded that Vorster was continuing his attempts to perpetuate the white-minority rule in disregard of United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, the events of the preceding year provided some grounds for hope, however remote, that the situation would improve. In that connexion, his delegation welcomed the advance of decolonization in southern Africa. The attainment of independence by Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, and also by Papua New Guinea—whose delegations he welcomed to the Committee—would undoubtedly stimulate the struggle against *apartheid* in South Africa. He expressed the hope that Angola would soon take its place among the independent nations of Africa.

5. As a result of those developments, South Africa now found itself at a cross-roads and had to choose between abandoning or pursuing its policy of *apartheid*. If it chose to do the latter, it ran the risk of creating a situation that would have consequences too terrible to contemplate.

6. The United Nations, for its part, must exert pressure on South Africa in accordance with the Charter. Denmark had repeatedly asserted that universally applied sanctions imposed by the Security Council were the most effective means of achieving a peaceful solution. It was of overriding importance therefore that all Member States should, as Denmark itself did, strictly comply with the arms embargo against South Africa.

7. In addition to political action, the international community must intensify its efforts in the humanitarian field, for repression was increasing. Denmark and the other Nordic countries were among the largest contributors to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. In 1975, Denmark had contributed approximately \$284,000 and it hoped that all Member States would make generous contributions. Similarly, it trusted that the resolutions concerning *apartheid* would receive the widest possible support.

8. Mr. TOWO-ATANGANA (United Republic of Cameroon) said that the problem of *apartheid* was a matter of deep concern to his country, not only because of the intolerable suffering endured by millions of people in Azania but also because the international community seemed incapable of wiping out a doctrine identical with that which had caused such misfortune to mankind some 30 years ago. *Apartheid* was a successor to Hitler's nazism, and its authors did not even take the trouble to deny it. Consequently, the international community had con-

demned *apartheid* and proclaimed that it was a crime against humanity. However, one might wonder what had been the result of that condemnation. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* provided extremely valuable data in its report.

9. The report, *inter alia*, confirmed that there were many Governments, non-governmental organizations and trade-union federations which continued to oppose the shameful Pretoria régime. Thanks to their efforts, Vorster's representatives had been expelled from the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth Session despite the misuse of the veto by some major Powers in the Security Council.

10. The South African Government was now almost totally isolated. In Azania itself, the freedom fighters continued to organize, and around Azania the safety belt provided by the Portuguese colonies had disappeared. Faced with that new situation, the Vorster régime was becoming increasingly fierce and, instead of opening negotiations with the liberation movements, was redoubling its manoeuvres. It even claimed to be urging Ian Smith to act with moderation while providing him with all the economic and military means to persist in his obstinacy. In fact, the sole purpose of Vorster's so-called "détente" was to sow confusion and division among the African States.

11. Consequently, the situation in southern Africa had become increasingly explosive in view of the indifference and virtual complicity of those who, under the Charter of the United Nations, had special responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Perhaps the countries which, a year earlier in the Security Council, had asked that South Africa be given time to modify its policy now realized that all Vorster's promises had been empty. The changes which had been made in the *apartheid* policy were not only very slight but were designed to strengthen white domination. The best example of that was the so-called consultations with the black population.

12. In fact, the black "leaders" with whom the South African régime had announced with much fanfare that it was going to open negotiations had turned out to be the puppet leaders of the "bantustans", appointed by the régime itself. Similarly, the sole purpose of granting autonomy and even independence to a few "bantustans" was to perpetuate the existing situation under which the white minority occupied four fifths of the rich land of Azania.

13. For those reasons, the United Republic of Cameroon had always tried to avoid doing anything that might help to maintain that oppressive system. It had no relations of any kind with the racist régime and had forbidden aircraft flying to or from South Africa to pass over its territory. It had difficulty in understanding how other Governments could take an attitude towards South Africa that was diametrically opposed to the statements they made in international debates. Some even went so far as to cynically justify their collaboration with Pretoria on the grounds of economic necessity. In addition, he rejected the subterfuges of those who justified their own immoralities by citing those of their neighbours. The massive economic and military assistance which the Western Powers gave to the

white minority in Pretoria could not be justified by referring to the maintenance of trade relations with South Africa by some countries, including African countries. It was no accident that South Africa was part of the so-called defence system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nor was it a coincidence that those who, in the Security Council, called for an economic embargo against Pretoria came up against a wall of vetoes. He did not wish to condemn anyone but felt that the responsibilities of some Powers were a decisive factor in the persistence of *apartheid* in South Africa. He therefore appealed to the friendly Governments of Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom not to continue to ignore the lessons of history. History had shown that the march of peoples towards freedom and dignity was irreversible. The peoples of Azania and Namibia would not be an exception.

14. Mr. BHATIA (India), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.328 on *apartheid* in sports, recalled that the General Assembly in its resolution 2775 D (XXVI) had declared its unqualified support of the Olympic principle that no discrimination should be allowed. He was pleased to see that many countries had acted upon that resolution. For example, Mexico had refused to play against the South African team in the Davis Cup tournament, Australia had cancelled its cricket tour of South Africa, New Zealand had reaffirmed its opposition to sports exchanges with South Africa, and other countries such as Canada, Guyana, Malaysia, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago and Japan had taken similar action, as described in the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. India, for its part, also had no relations of any kind with South Africa.

15. Nevertheless, he expressed regret that the Davis Cup Nations Committee, meeting in London in July 1975, had rejected by 24 votes to 22 a motion by Australia to expel South Africa. He hoped that those who continued to permit participation by South African teams in sports events would realize the need for concerted international action on the matter.

16. Meanwhile, the South African authorities were resorting to all kinds of manoeuvres in order to gain acceptance in international sports events and had included a few non-whites in their teams, which they now called "multinational". The non-racial sports federations in South Africa had themselves rejected those manoeuvres. He therefore hoped that the international community would not let itself be deceived.

17. He read out the text of the operative part of the draft resolution and said that the delegations of Chad, the Congo, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Honduras, Ireland, Mauritania, Mauritius, Qatar, Togo, Uganda and the United Republic of Cameroon had joined the sponsors. Finally, he expressed the hope that the draft resolution would win the Committee's approval.

18. The CHAIRMAN announced that Honduras had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.327.

19. Mr. RENS (Belgium), speaking on behalf of his own delegation and those of Luxembourg and the Netherlands, said that, acting upon instructions from their Governments,

they had submitted some amendments¹ to draft resolution A/SPC/L.327, concerning the “bantustans”, which they considered necessary if the draft resolution was to be adopted by consensus.

20. Thus, the third preambular paragraph would be replaced by the following:

“*Reaffirming* the legitimacy of the struggle in South Africa, irrespective of race, colour and creed, for the total eradication of *apartheid* and any form of racial discrimination”.

21. In order to emphasize that the South African régime and it alone was responsible for the situation prevailing in that country, he proposed the addition of an operative paragraph 4 reading as follows:

“*Calls on* the Government of the Republic of South Africa to cease all efforts to establish “bantustans” and to conform to the principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations”.

22. He hoped that his initiative would be viewed as a constructive act and that it would receive general support. He would like the Committee to wait 24 hours before taking a decision on the amendments.

23. Mr. AMISSAH (Ghana) pointed to the artificiality of the system prevailing in South Africa and added that, however intense the oppression and repression might be, they would never succeed in depriving the non-white majority of its freedom, dignity and human identity.

24. Some of the previous speakers had attempted to explain away certain actions which his Government believed had contributed to the maintenance and perpetuation of *apartheid*. Those attempts had been made by certain trading partners and military allies of South Africa, mostly Western countries, and also Japan. In some of those statements, his delegation had discerned elements of paternalism, hypocrisy and insensitivity. Paternalism, because those countries seemed to be telling the African countries that they must not be too insistent, since they were being given money and other forms of assistance, which, they said, depended largely on their continuing to trade with South Africa. They also pointed out that the situation in South Africa was delicate, that it was essential to proceed with moderation, that changes had taken place and that *apartheid* would disappear one day. They pointed out, in particular, that the use of force would not help to solve the problem. Hypocrisy, because those countries distorted history when they said that recourse to force had never produced results. History provided abundant evidence that the use of force had been inevitable in order to effect positive changes in society and that the much-vaunted Western standards of democracy and freedom had cost many lives. Furthermore, the European colonial régimes had succeeded in establishing themselves in many areas of the world, particularly Asia and Africa, through the use of violent force, but on the pretext of imposing civilization and Christianity. At the Brussels Conference in 1876 and at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, King Leopold II

and his henchmen had put a seal on the European partition and exploitation of Africa. King Leopold had become a promoter and an exploiter of forced labour in the Congo region, which had been his possession. At the same time, in other areas of Africa, the European settlers had begun the exploitation of mines and had seized the most fertile and desirable agricultural lands. The Africans, overwhelmed and enslaved by the force of arms, had been compelled to work for miserable wages.

25. It was clear that those historical facts had not induced Europe to change its attitude towards Africa, since the plunder and pillage were continuing. The system of *apartheid* in South Africa, installed by the white minority with the assistance of the United Kingdom, combined elements of colonialism, slavery and serfdom. The system was being supported and perpetuated by the economic and military links between South Africa and her Western friends and Japan. Some tried to rationalize those relations by asserting that any break in them would aggravate the situation of the black majority; they seemed to overlook the fact that the blacks were only a peripheral force in the economic set-up and that the only real beneficiaries of the system were the whites.

26. The activities of the Western European countries left no room for doubt regarding their true intentions. A book entitled *White Media and Black Britain*, published in London, stated that British capitalist interests in southern Africa were strong and that British newspapers, television and radio were fostering a racist society in the United Kingdom and were prone to accept *apartheid* as less horrifying than nazism because it was directed against blacks. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany had said that South Africa was far too important a trading partner for his country to break off economic relations with it. He himself was convinced that the maintenance of economic relations with South Africa was dictated by the huge profits accruing mainly as a result of the exploitation of the cheap labour source which the black population constituted and not for altruistic reasons. In recent years, some Western countries, particularly the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, had adopted a nonchalant attitude towards the problems caused by South Africa's *apartheid* system. It was frustrating to note, that, after years of exploitation, the former colonial Powers—the United Kingdom and France—had turned their backs on their former African colonies. In their use of the veto, in their general voting pattern and in their approach to African problems, they demonstrated that their interests in Africa had ended with the end of the colonial era.

27. The statement by the United States representative at the 963rd meeting had not been sufficiently forceful to exert pressure on the Government of South Africa. The “contacts” which the United States maintained with all members of the South African population were, in his opinion, contacts with persons approved of by the racist régime and not with any leader of the liberation movements or with genuine opponents of the system. The United States, more than any other country, had the capacity, the resources and the influence to promote fundamental and acceptable changes in South Africa. However, its interest in South Africa was primarily economic and military, and it

¹ Subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/L.329.

had refused, on flimsy pretexts, to establish contacts with genuine African leaders, including heads of State. The United States, which was the principal advocate of the principles of freedom and human rights and which, moreover, had a large black population of African descent, should adopt a position in accordance with those principles.

28. He pointed out that another disturbing aspect of the relations between South Africa and its Western allies was the increase in military and other ties which could transform South Africa into a military threat to the rest of Africa. The United States decision to build a naval base in the Indian Ocean, on the island of Diego Garcia, was disturbing because it could lead to an arms race in the area. Project *Advokaat*, under which the NATO defence code had been made available to the Pretoria régime for the codification of the equipment and spares of the project, was also a matter for some concern. He reiterated the dangers inherent in military collaboration between South Africa and NATO, and expressed the hope that the members of the Western military alliance would heed the appeal made to them to reconsider their attitude. Equally disturbing to the African Governments was the fact that South Africa, with the unofficial assistance of the Federal Republic of Germany, had been able to acquire a nuclear capability. He called on the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and those of the countries of the other foreign companies involved in bidding for the supply of nuclear reactors to South Africa to prevent those companies from participating in the transaction.

29. The attainment of independence and sovereign statehood by Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe could occasion a renewed attempt on the part of the Western alliance to fortify South Africa with the aim of reversing the decolonization process. However, history had shown that a people's desire for freedom and dignity could not be vanquished. The insidious and beguiling nature of Vorster's proposals for "détente" and "dialogue" was quite clear. A number of Western countries had hypocritically accepted that propaganda, but his delegation was more disturbed by the fact that a few African countries, ignoring the sufferings of the black population in South Africa, without regard for their national pride, and against the highest principles of morality, had accepted South Africa's offer of economic and other assistance and, therefore, its friendship. Even the most abject poverty could not justify such behaviour. He therefore appealed to those African countries to return any amount they might have received from South Africa and to sever relations with the racist régime.

30. His delegation deemed it a duty to expose the evils of *apartheid*, but that should not be regarded as preparing the ground for a confrontation between Africa and Western Europe. His delegation also considered it essential to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations to make it a more effective body, in order to avoid the application of a double standard which clearly suggested insensitivity towards problems involving the black man. The situation in South Africa could explode at any moment. Africa did not need more violence; it needed peace to build itself, and it was essential that all should help to achieve a peaceful solution to the continent's problems.

31. He expressed gratitude to New Zealand, Australia and Canada for their assistance in the rehabilitation of the victims of *apartheid* and expressed the hope that other countries would follow their example. He reiterated his country's support for the imprisoned political leaders and paid a tribute to those who had sacrificed their lives in the struggle against oppression. He reaffirmed his country's commitment to continue the struggle which had been begun so that those sacrifices would not have been in vain.

32. Mr. KIDANE MARIAM (Ethiopia) said that South Africa continued to defy General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and, while endeavouring to convince the world that it was carrying out a process of liberalization, it was increasing its military power, aided and abetted by its generous suppliers, in order to reinforce and perpetuate *apartheid*.

33. As had been said by His Excellency Brigadier-General Teferi Bante at the twelfth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, which was held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, South Africa was the buttress of colonial resistance in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe and Namibia were its outer defences. South Africa's strategy seemed to lie in giving signals that it would be prepared to make concessions regarding Zimbabwe and Namibia if it were allowed to maintain its racist policies in South Africa. Independent Africa should make it clear to South Africa that the inalienable national rights of the South African people could not be bargained away for meaningless concessions in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

34. South Africa was intensifying its propaganda in order to gain its ends, but it would deceive nobody in attempting to present *apartheid* as a humane system designed to enhance the welfare and preserve the culture of the African people. *Apartheid* was none other than a system for the exploitation of the non-white population through the mechanism of discriminatory laws.

35. The United Nations should bring about the total eradication of *apartheid* as soon as possible. The objectives of the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination should not remain empty words. The United Nations must go to the assistance of the non-white population of South Africa and enable it to recover its human dignity and fundamental freedoms. To do that, concerted action against *apartheid* must be stepped up. The General Assembly, in its resolution 3324 B (XXIX), had already asked the Security Council to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and it was disappointing that the Security Council had failed to apply the numerous resolutions of the Assembly against South Africa.

36. The measures proposed by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in chapter II of its report and, in particular, the embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products and other raw materials, could be effective in the struggle against *apartheid*.

37. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Dahomey) said that the prime objective of independent Africa, as of all peoples who loved peace and justice, was the complete elimination of *apartheid* and the transfer of political power to the oppressed people of South Africa. There had been universal denun-

ciation of *apartheid*, the racist system and official political doctrine of South Africa, as a grave affront to the non-white citizen, a crime against humanity and a challenge to the United Nations.

38. Although the measures taken by the United Nations had brought about an increasing isolation of the South African régime in the diplomatic field, there had been little actual change in the racist policies. The Pretoria régime had been able to stay in power thanks to the military and financial assistance of international imperialism, led by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France. But that shameful policy was doomed to failure because of the inherent contradictions which would destroy the fabric of *apartheid*. The close co-operation in all spheres between imperialism, zionism and *apartheid* was self-evident. The imperialist transnational corporations, lured by easy profits, continued to invest money in South Africa and to exploit the South African people.

39. The imperialist Powers who were helping Vorster should wake up to the new situation in southern Africa and see that Vorster and his racist clique came to their senses before it was too late. Otherwise the South African freedom fighters, supported by independent Africa and by all justice-loving peoples, would be forced to take up arms.

40. The policy of “détente” advocated by Vorster and his allies was a trick to sow confusion among African States and to perpetuate the racist régime in South Africa. The policy of “bantustans” was another farce which would not deceive the international community. United Africa must frustrate those policies by its determination to struggle against *apartheid* until it was completely eliminated.

41. Combat should be engaged against all racist régimes, whether they were called *apartheid* or zionism, if the world was to progress. All friends of Africa who were continuing to maintain any kind of relations with the *apartheid* régime should break off those relations and unreservedly support the African cause as an essential condition for the solidarity of the peoples of the African continent.

42. Those countries and peoples which supported the struggle against *apartheid* must intensify their efforts to fight against Vorster until racism in all its forms had been eliminated.

43. His delegation had faith that the oppressed people of South Africa, united and mobilized for action, would finally triumph over *apartheid*.

44. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) said that throughout the many years during which the question of *apartheid* had been discussed, France had repeatedly recorded its total opposition to that doctrine, which went against its concept of humanity. His delegation had never accepted and never would accept the system of *apartheid*, which must be condemned as quite intolerable, and the minor modifications recently made would not change that opinion, which was held by France and by all Frenchmen. He was steadfast in disapproval because he thought that moral condemnation still had an effect and because France had taken part in the drawing up of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In that spirit, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, in his statement to the General Assembly

at the current session (2364th plenary meeting), had said that the President of France had placed the strictest limits on the policy of selling armaments to South Africa. On 9 August 1975, in the Republic of Zaire, the Head of the French State had amplified and confirmed the declaration contained in his message of 30 May 1974 to the French Parliament, to which the French delegation had referred in its statement in the Special Political Committee in November 1974 (940th meeting). New restrictions had been placed on the sale of armaments to the authorities in Pretoria. All new sales of land and air weapons to South Africa were prohibited and future arms sales would be limited to naval equipment excluding river craft and landing craft. That could not be seriously regarded as a threat to the countries and peoples of Africa.

45. Mr. VON UTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, referred to the statement of the representative of Ghana who had spoken of military collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa, particularly in nuclear technology. As the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany had stated in the Special Political Committee, at its 961st meeting, there was no military co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa. In 1963, long before the Federal Republic of Germany had become a Member of the United Nations, the Government had imposed an embargo on the supply of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and so on, and had said that it would not co-operate with South Africa in any way. The position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the sale of armaments was much more restrictive than that of any other arms-producing country. The same principles applied to co-operation in nuclear technology. Ever since its formation, the Federal Republic of Germany had eschewed the production of nuclear weapons. It had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and took its obligations thereunder seriously. Nuclear power stations were being built in conformity with the safeguards of IAEA, which was concerned to see that such installations were not used for military purposes.

46. A company in the Federal Republic of Germany had submitted a bid in response to an international call for tenders for the construction of a nuclear power station in South Africa. Nuclear power stations were gradually replacing the traditional coal-fired or oil-fired power stations and there were 117 of them in 15 countries. They had no military application and, although his Government could understand the doubts of the African countries, the accusations of military co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa were totally without foundation.

Organization of the Committee's work

47. The CHAIRMAN said that the general debate on the item had thus been concluded and expressed the hope that at the meeting on Friday, 31 October, it would be possible to vote on the draft resolutions submitted by the group of non-aligned countries. The Committee would then begin its consideration of agenda item 50, on the effects of atomic radiation.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

969th meeting

Thursday, 30 October 1975, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.969

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/
10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.327-329):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*
(A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)* (A/SPC/L.327-329)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the meeting would be suspended so that members could enter their names in the list of speakers to explain their votes before or after the vote on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

2. The CHAIRMAN announced that Ethiopia had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.327 and that Ethiopia, Jamaica, Liberia, Turkey and Yemen had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.328.

3. Mr. ZERAIA (Algeria), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries, appealed to the delegations of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to withdraw the amendments (A/SPC/L.329) which they had submitted to draft resolution A/SPC/L.327.

4. The CHAIRMAN, after reading out rule 128 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, invited the Committee to vote on the amendments.

The amendments contained in document A/SPC/L.329 were rejected by 69 votes to 25, with 11 abstentions.

5. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.327.

At the request of the representative of the German Democratic Republic, a recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Ice-

land, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 100 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

6. Mr. VROON (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in explanation of their votes after the vote, said that those delegations deeply regretted having had to abstain on the draft resolution because the Committee had not adopted their proposed amendments. Their Governments rejected the policy of *apartheid* because it constituted a grave and systematic violation of human rights, and they opposed the establishment of "bantustans" which indeed represented a consolidation of that inhuman policy.

7. On the other hand, the three delegations had always opposed the general tendency to equate the position of the black people in South Africa with that of a population living under colonial rule. Of course, colonial history had left its traces in South Africa as in many other countries which were now independent, but it was the task of the United Nations to shape contemporary history to the goals defined by the Charter. That was why the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands could not agree that the white population of South Africa, which for the most part had been rooted in South African soil for as long as the black population, should be equated with foreign overlords. That would be a distortion of history and would lead to discrimination against the white natives, many of whom were also bitterly opposed to *apartheid* and were suffering for their convictions. To deny that South African society was a multiracial one could lead the United Nations to actions incompatible with its own standards and ominous for the future of the South African people as a whole.

* Resumed from the 964th meeting.

8. The three delegations' reservations on the wording of the draft resolution applied in the first place to the third preambular paragraph, because they considered South African society to be a multiracial one in which all races should have the right to live peacefully together on the basis of equality. In their view, the reference to the Charter in operative paragraph 2 was legally unfounded and paragraph 3 should not be interpreted as excluding every type of contact with "bantustan" authorities or institutions, since the barring of such contacts would not contribute to the eradication of *apartheid*. The Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands rejected the inhuman policy of *apartheid* and the "bantustan" idea but also rejected violence as a means of overcoming that policy.

9. Mr. PIETINEN (Finland), speaking on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, said that those countries were firmly opposed to the system and the methods used by the South African régime to impose its inhuman policy, including the establishment of "bantustans", and had therefore voted for the draft resolution. However, they had reservations regarding the phrase "by all means possible" in the third preambular paragraph, since it could be interpreted as meaning that the use of force was legitimate.

10. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) explained that his delegation had had to abstain in the vote despite its agreement with much of the draft resolution because it had a number of problems with the text. First, with regard to the third preambular paragraph, his Government considered that the references to the struggle "by all means possible" should not be regarded as endorsing recourse to armed struggle or violence. The same paragraph also referred to "self-determination", an expression which was suitable for a colonial situation but did not apply in the case of South Africa, which was a sovereign State whose Government the United Kingdom recognized.

11. The difficulties over operative paragraph 2 were basically of a legal nature. His Government's view was that there was nothing in the Charter which required any sovereign State to maintain its territorial integrity or which precluded it from voluntarily giving autonomy to part of its territory. With regard to paragraph 3, the "homelands" and "bantustans" formed an integral part of the Republic of South Africa and his Government was not convinced that it would serve the interests of those living in them to refuse to have any dealings with them.

12. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that, by voting in favour of the draft resolution, his delegation had confirmed its strong opposition to *apartheid* and the system of "bantustans", but it had certain reservations regarding the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights said that "it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law". The United Nations should strive with all its might to avoid recourse to that "last resort"; consequently, it should avoid the use of such expressions as "by all means possible". Moreover, although Australia did not recognize the "bantustan" system, it wondered whether it was desirable to cut off all contact with the broad spectrum of the African

people and leaders of all races and political persuasions and hoped that was not the aim of the draft resolution.

13. Mr. WOLF (Austria) said that he had voted for the draft resolution because Austria fully associated itself with the struggle of the people of South Africa and strongly believed that those people must be given the possibility of exercising all their rights as a matter of urgency. However, his delegation considered that the expression "by all means possible" in the third preambular paragraph referred to all the peaceful means set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, because it could in no way advocate the use of force.

14. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia) said that his delegation repudiated and condemned not only the treatment of political prisoners but also and especially the inhuman policy of *apartheid*. It had voted for the amendments (A/SPC/L.329) to the draft resolution because it felt that it would be better not to include the words "by all means possible" in the preamble. Although it had voted for the draft resolution, his delegation did not wish its vote to be interpreted as accepting terrorism and violence as a method which could be adopted, since it considered them just as repugnant as the *apartheid* system itself.

15. Miss MORALES (Costa Rica) said that her delegation had voted for the draft resolution, as it had done for all the resolutions aimed at the elimination of *apartheid*. She reiterated her support for the liberation movements but had reservations with regard to the phrase "by all means possible" in the third preambular paragraph, because its scope was so wide that it could be interpreted as giving support to acts of violence and terrorism of every kind. Costa Rica's peace-loving policy precluded it from encouraging such acts.

16. Mr. MATSUMOTO (Japan) said that his delegation, which was firmly opposed to the policies of *apartheid*, had voted for the draft resolution in spite of the difficulties it had with the wording of the third preambular paragraph and of operative paragraph 3. As his delegation understood it, the phrase "by all means possible" did not imply the use of force and a solution must be found by peaceful means. Japan understood paragraph 3 as appealing to States not to take action which might lead to the recognition of the South African Government's "bantustan" policy but as not prohibiting contacts and talks with the leaders of "bantustans" with the aim of solving the problem of *apartheid*.

17. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) said that he had voted for the draft resolution because he was opposed to the policies of "separate development". Nevertheless, he thought that the language of paragraph 3 was somewhat too rigid. There were millions of South Africans bound up, without their consent, in the "bantustan" system. Countries both in Africa and elsewhere would inevitably have to have certain contacts with those people and their leaders. His delegation felt that such contacts might assist in undermining the very structures of *apartheid*. With regard to the third preambular paragraph, Canada could not accept the endorsement of the use of force to bring about a solution to the difficult racial problems of South Africa.

18. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland) said that he had supported the amendments contained in document A/SPC/L.329 because

he thought that they would have improved the draft resolution. His vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.327 reflected Ireland's categorical opposition to the policies of *apartheid* and the "bantustans". However, that did not imply that Ireland's position had changed; it maintained that in a United Nations resolution the phrase "by all means possible" referred only to such peaceful means as were compatible with the Charter.

19. Mr. WHISTLER (United States of America), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had reservations about paragraph 3 in view of its policy of keeping open channels of communication to all elements of the South African population, regardless of race.

20. Mr. VON UTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany) said his delegation regretted that it had been unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution. Although the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany did not regard the "bantustan" policy as an appropriate way to solve the *apartheid* problem, it did not agree that all contact with the "bantustan" leaders should be avoided, as called for in paragraph 3. In his Government's opinion, it was necessary to seek contact with all parties involved in a conflict. His delegation also had reservations with regard to paragraph 2, since it felt that a Government which divided its own territory could not be held to have violated the principles of the Charter.

21. His Government's position regarding the phrase "struggle . . . by all means possible" was well known. The Federal Republic of Germany had renounced the use of force as a means of safeguarding its own interests, and it could not concede to others what it denied itself.

22. It was unfortunate that the amendments submitted in document A/SPC/L.329 had not been accepted. It would be desirable next year for the African group to get in touch with the Western countries as well in order to work out a generally acceptable wording.

23. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said that Italy had always opposed the "bantustan" policy, which was a deceptive action aimed at perpetuating discrimination, dividing the black population of South Africa and splitting the nation in order to consolidate the system of *apartheid*. At the twenty-sixth session, his delegation had supported General Assembly resolution 2775 E (XXVI) on the policies of *apartheid*. Nevertheless, it had had to abstain in the vote on the current draft resolution on "bantustans", not because its position had changed but because the wording had been altered. Once again, in speaking of the leadership of the national liberation movements and the right to self-determination, the language of decolonization had been used in the context of *apartheid*. His delegation also found it difficult to accept the expression "struggle . . . by all means possible", which sounded like an encouragement to the use of violence. It also had reservations about the assertion in paragraph 2 that the establishment of "bantustans" represented a violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter. If the amendments proposed by the delegations of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had been accepted, the text of the draft would have been improved and his delegation would have been able to vote for it.

24. Mr. MATHABA (Lesotho) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution which had just been adopted even though its language was not fully acceptable.

25. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Liberian delegation had informed him that if it had been present during the vote, it would have voted for draft resolution A/SPC/L.327.

26. Mr. RAO (India), speaking on a point of order, said that from the statements which had been made and from the measures adopted by Governments it was clear that there was total opposition to the policy of *apartheid* in sports; he therefore proposed that draft resolution A/SPC/L.328 should be adopted by acclamation.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.328 by acclamation.

The draft resolution was adopted by acclamation.

28. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China), speaking in explanation of vote, said that the Government and people of the People's Republic of China had consistently supported the struggle of the Azanian people against the South African colonialist authorities and white racists. His delegation had therefore voted in favour of the draft resolution. However, the Olympic principle of non-discrimination was mentioned in the text, and his delegation deemed it necessary to explain its position regarding the International Olympic Committee. Although Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, a handful of reactionaries on the International Olympic Committee continued to deprive the legitimate representatives of the People's Republic of their rights; they had not expelled the Chiang clique and stubbornly pursued the policy of "two Chinas". That situation was abnormal and intolerable and was doomed to failure.

29. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) said that freedom of expression and organization were principles enshrined in the Norwegian Constitution; his Government therefore had limited power to exert influence over private organizations. Nevertheless, the text of the draft resolution which had just been adopted would be communicated to sports organizations for their information so that they might take whatever measures they deemed appropriate.

30. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that his Government had always been opposed to *apartheid* in sports but, for constitutional reasons, it had no way of prevailing upon sports organizations or other private organizations to refrain from contact with South African teams.

31. Mr. VROON (Netherlands) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution but that the Netherlands Government had no legal means of intervening in the affairs of sports organizations, which were private and independent entities.

32. Mr. BERG (Sweden) said that in his country sports organizations were private entities and that the influence which the authorities could exert on them was therefore very limited.

33. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution because it was

opposed to *apartheid* in sports as to all other manifestations of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, although his Government did not encourage matches between French and South African teams, it had very limited power to forbid such matches.

34. Mr. BUTLER (Bahamas) said that if his delegation had been present it would have voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.327 and A/SPC/L.328.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.

970th meeting

Friday, 31 October 1975, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.970

AGENDA ITEM 50

Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/10267, A/SPC/L.330)

1. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/SPC/L.330.

2. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for the current year (A/10267) was very brief, being essentially a progress report pending submission of the next comprehensive report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. Consequently, draft resolution A/SPC/L.330 was in general terms and followed the lines of previous resolutions on the question. Although it was not explicitly mentioned in the draft resolution, his delegation would like to see increased co-operation between the Scientific Committee and UNEP, and it had referred to that at the 1675th meeting of the Second Committee on 22 October 1975.

3. His delegation attached great importance to the work of the Scientific Committee, which had made and would continue to make important contributions to the welfare of mankind. It therefore hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus.

4. Mr. FREEMAN-GREENE (New Zealand) said that his delegation's sponsorship of draft resolution A/SPC/L.330 demonstrated the importance his Government attached to the work of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. His delegation noted that the Scientific Committee had made decisions regarding the treatment of a number of subjects, including the genetic and somatic effects of atomic radiation, and it looked forward to receiving the next comprehensive report. For its part, New Zealand would continue to forward data from its monitoring system to the Scientific Committee.

5. His delegation would like to see greater co-operation between UNEP and the Scientific Committee, and regretted that nowhere in the report of the Governing Council of UNEP,¹ or in the introductory statement of its Executive

Director at the 1672nd meeting of the Second Committee on 20 October 1975 was there any indication that the Scientific Committee had been invited to contribute to the work of the Programme. He therefore hoped that it would be asked to participate in UNEP activities at an early date.

6. In previous years, his delegation had expressed concern in the Special Political Committee about the increased levels of atomic radiation from nuclear tests. It was encouraging now to learn that during 1974 the average deposition of strontium 90 on New Zealand and its Pacific neighbours had been the lowest since measurements had begun in 1960. His delegation was confident that the Scientific Committee would continue to carry out its task as effectively as it had done thus far, and hoped that the draft resolution would receive unanimous support.

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

7. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegation of Turkey had requested him to inform the Committee that it had been absent from the 964th meeting for very pressing reasons but wished to place on record that it would have voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.326.

8. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) introduced a draft resolution entitled "Situation in South Africa",² sponsored by 51 countries. The statements made in the Committee reflected the deep concern of the international community over the sufferings of the oppressed people of South Africa and the threat to world peace and security arising from the policies and practices of the racist Pretoria régime. *Apartheid* was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and was contrary to standards of human ethics and morality.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 25.

² Subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/L.331.

However, despite the efforts of the United Nations over a period of 30 years, the racist régime continued to enforce its criminal policies in disregard of the wishes of the international community, as the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) clearly showed. It was therefore necessary for the United Nations to take further measures to put an end to that evil. That was the reason for the draft resolution. Its sponsors were aware that the world of today was better than the world of yesterday

because of the efforts of the United Nations, and they hoped that the world of tomorrow would be better still.

9. Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic) said he wished to point out that his country was one of the sponsors of the draft resolution introduced by the Libyan Arab Republic.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.

971st meeting

Monday, 3 November 1975, at 11.10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.971

AGENDA ITEM 50

Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (concluded) (A/10267, A/SPC/L.330)

1. Mr. FAKTOR (Czechoslovakia) said that his country attached great importance to the work of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, at the twenty-fourth session of which the representative of Czechoslovakia had served as Vice-Chairman, and noted with satisfaction that the transfer of the Scientific Committee's secretariat to Vienna had enabled the latter to work in closer co-operation with IAEA.

2. The documentation considered by the Scientific Committee on the amounts of strontium 90 and caesium 137 found on the earth's surface showed that those amounts were tending to decrease; that was a consequence of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,¹ which had been signed in Moscow in 1963.

3. However, for a number of years increased levels of iodine 131 had been detected both in the northern and southern hemispheres, a development corroborated by observations made in Czechoslovakia. It must be emphasized in that regard that the only way to reduce radioactivity would be to put a halt to tests which countries that were not parties to the Moscow Treaty continued to carry out. Furthermore, the countries which had not yet done so should accede as soon as possible to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the IAEA system of guarantees.

4. At the current session, the First Committee was considering several important questions on disarmament, all of which were related to the work of the Scientific Committee. It should also be pointed out that, on the initiative of the USSR, a new item had been inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly concerning the

cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (agenda item 122), which would have the result of eliminating the principal source of atomic radiation. The downward trend of radioactivity on the earth's surface from strontium 90 and caesium 137 noted by the Scientific Committee could thus continue.

5. The Scientific Committee would pursue its work and report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. It was against that background that his delegation had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.330, the purpose of which was precisely to accelerate the work of the Committee.

6. Mr. NANDAN (Fiji) said that ever since it had become a Member of the United Nations, Fiji had expressed its deep concern at the effects of nuclear testing, on levels of radiation in the human environment, all the more so since the South Pacific had in recent years been the testing ground for nuclear weapons. His delegation had read with care the brief report of the Scientific Committee (A/10267) and had noted from paragraph 2 that the Committee planned to present a comprehensive report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

7. In paragraph 4 of its report the Scientific Committee indicated that it had received no request to set up a group of experts from among its members to carry out the additional responsibilities authorized by General Assembly resolution 3154 C (XXVIII). His delegation had stated in the Special Political Committee at the twenty-ninth session (925th meeting) that it was patently unjust to expect a country victimized by nuclear tests conducted by a country outside its region to foot the bill for a group of experts invited by its Government to conduct an independent investigation. It would be more logical, particularly in the case of a developing country, for the costs to be paid by the culprit or by the United Nations. His delegation had also asked the Secretariat to indicate the approximate cost of such a mission of inquiry.

8. His delegation attached considerable importance to the work of the Scientific Committee and supported the continuation of that work. It had also devoted substantial

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

attention to draft resolution A/SPC/L.330 and regretted that it did not record the fact that nuclear weapon tests had continued since the previous session of the General Assembly; those tests were the largest single source of radioactivity released in the environment, and the draft resolution in question should have condemned them. Underground testing did not solve the problem, for the hazards of radioactive pollution of the environment were merely diverted, not removed. In the South Pacific a series of underground tests had taken place in 1975 on small atolls which were no more than tiny pinnacles jutting sharply out of the deep sea-bed. If it was borne in mind that in the case of most underground tests conducted on a continental land mass vertical seepage of radioactive pollution had been observed, it would be evident that the danger increased tremendously if underground nuclear explosions occurred on a small oceanic pinnacle, where, to the danger of vertical seepage was added the threat of horizontal seepage, which could contaminate the surrounding ocean. The gradual pollution of the marine environment was not readily detectable, nor could it be detected by monitoring atmospheric radiation. Such pollution nevertheless presented a real danger to the people of the South Pacific, who might eat fish that had become highly radioactive, as had occurred after the explosions on Bikini. There was a need for long-term independent monitoring of the effects of nuclear tests on levels of radiation in the marine environment of the South Pacific. It was no comfort to his delegation that there had been a reduction in the levels of radiation in the atmosphere, where most of the monitoring done thus far had been carried out.

9. The countries of the South Pacific were concerned that the French Government continued to conduct nuclear tests. In July 1975, the South Pacific Forum, a regional body comprising the heads of Government of Australia, the Cook Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Western Samoa and Fiji, after their meeting in Nuku'alofa, had issued a communiqué indicating their strong opposition to nuclear weapon tests in all environments and emphasizing the importance of keeping the South Pacific region free from the risk of nuclear contamination. The countries and peoples of the South Pacific were sick of being treated as the garbage can in which Europe buried nuclear debris, which posed a great hazard for posterity. If it was true that those tests were being conducted for the prestige and protection of a European Power, then those tests should be conducted on its own territory and its people should be exposed to the same risks.

10. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Dahomey) said that his delegation had taken note of the succinct report of the Scientific Committee and thanked the members for their efforts to publicize the terrible effects of atomic radiation. The Scientific Committee's monitoring role was of major interest to his country, which was impatiently awaiting the report to be submitted by the Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, which, it was to be hoped, would provide new information in that field.

11. The harmful effects of atomic radiation were sufficiently familiar to be considered dangerous and formidable. A major source of radiation was the nuclear tests which were the product of the frenetic arms race in which the

super-Powers were involved. Apparently, the détente which was so often mentioned had not succeeded in creating the climate of trust which would make it possible to halt that race. It was the small countries, which did not have the means to join the race, that paid the price of the selfish policy of the great Powers. It must be noted that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was outmoded and that other means must be considered to put an end to the arms race. His country was therefore prepared to endorse any measure adopted to that end.

12. The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes constituted a second source of atomic radiation which should also be monitored.

13. Miss JAUREGUIBERRY (Argentina) recalled that the Scientific Committee had been established, 20 years earlier, to meet the concern of peoples about the dangers inherent in the use of atomic energy. The Argentine delegation considered that, since its establishment, the Committee had performed its task effectively and objectively—and it had a very important task, since it was required to survey the effects of various radiation sources on all forms of life. If the United Nations had evaded its responsibilities and had not undertaken to collect and analyse the data on the subject, such data might have been interpreted in a tendentious way, to suit the interests of industry or certain Governments whereas, thanks to the work of the Committee, the international community continually had useful and up-to-date information at its disposal. Argentina had been a member of the Committee since its establishment and had always promoted its work, both by supporting it in United Nations forums and by providing it with a variety of studies and data. The activities of the Committee's secretariat and Scientific Secretary were particularly commendable and, at the twenty-fourth session of the Committee, her delegation had joined the delegations which had unanimously congratulated the authors of the substantial documentation on which its proceedings had been based. While awaiting an opportunity to study the detailed report which the Committee was to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session and to which Argentina, which had a programme for the establishment of nuclear power stations, attached particular importance, her delegation would continue to co-operate with the Committee and support its strictly scientific activities.

14. Mr. KULAK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that, since 1955, when the Scientific Committee had been established, the General Assembly assessed the dangers of radiation every year and considered recommendations submitted to it every year regarding the continuation of the Committee.

15. Whenever a resolution was adopted on the subject it was emphasized that the increase in artificial sources of radiation for human beings called for the utmost vigilance, since the somatic or the genetic effects of radiation might not be immediately apparent. Since its creation the Scientific Committee had submitted six reports to the General Assembly on general or specific questions relative to atomic radiation. In its sixth report,² in 1972, the

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 25 and corrigendum.*

Scientific Committee had dealt with environmental radiation, medical and occupational exposure, the genetic effects of radiation, the effects of radiation on the immune response and radiation carcinogenesis. In the same report the Scientific Committee had considered, for the first time, the role of nuclear reactors and of nuclear fuel plants. It had estimated the radiation levels that might exist in the year 2000, particularly in connexion with pollution from the elements tritium and krypton 85, whose concentration in the atmosphere was increasing.

16. The Scientific Committee would make further efforts to identify radiation levels in view of their importance in assessing the dangers of atmospheric tests. Since 1972, data had been gathered on radiation doses and studies had been made on their biological and medical effects. On the basis of that documentation, the Scientific Committee would be able to study dose contributions from various sources, as well as the genetic and somatic effects of radiation and the ratio between frequency of occurrence of those effects and intensity of doses. In fact, any appreciable change in the doses found in human tissues and in the correlation between those doses and the effects noted could necessitate a reassessment of the dangers of atomic radiation.

17. His delegation had repeatedly stressed the need to put an end to tests in the atmosphere, regardless of their height or location. In view of the work done by the Scientific Committee in September 1975 in considering the latest data on the genetic and somatic effects of radiation, the USSR had proposed,³ at the current session, the conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of all tests. It hoped that its proposal would receive wide support.

18. Since the Scientific Committee had indicated that it would continue its studies with a view to submitting a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, the Soviet delegation, appreciating the importance of the Committee's activities, recommended that it should be authorized to continue its work. It wished, however, to emphasize that the question of environmental pollution from various sources presented the Committee with new problems regarding the study of exposure to radiation and exposure doses.

19. The CHAIRMAN announced that the general debate on the effects of atomic radiation was now over and proposed that, unless any delegation wished a vote to be taken, draft resolution A/SPC/L.330, of which Japan, Venezuela and Swaziland had just become sponsors, should be adopted by acclamation.

The draft resolution was adopted by acclamation.

20. Mr. WHISTLER (United States of America), explaining his vote, said that his delegation appreciated the work of the Scientific Committee and was looking forward to its next report, which would no doubt add to mankind's knowledge of the important subject of the effects of atomic radiation.

21. Mr. SCALABRE (France) said that he had no intention of engaging in polemics, since draft resolution A/SPC/

L.330 was hardly controversial and the French delegation had gladly joined in the consensus by which the Committee had adopted it. However, since the French Government had been specifically mentioned, he felt it his duty to recall that his Government, out of a concern to dispel misgivings on the part of friendly countries, even though such misgivings had seemed unwarranted, had gone to considerable expense to devise underground installations for nuclear tests. Those installations enabled tests to be carried out at a considerable depth where they were quite incapable of causing any atomic pollution. He also pointed out that the Bikini tests, to which reference had been made, had been carried out in water, on the ground or in the air and therefore could not be taken as a point of comparison. In any case the Special Political Committee was not required to engage in a direct discussion of nuclear weapons tests since that topic would be considered by the First Committee. France was in favour of the cessation of such tests, but within the framework of effective nuclear disarmament, which it was prepared to support.

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.331):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued) (A/SPC/L.331)

22. The CHAIRMAN said that Czechoslovakia and Jamaica should be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.331. Moreover, the list of sponsors should be amended in the Arabic, Chinese, English, Russian and Spanish texts of the same document since "Gambia" ought to be replaced by "Ghana".

23. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) said that his country did not appear in the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in the French version of the document.

24. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) noted that many sponsors of the draft resolution were not mentioned in the French text, although they all appeared in the English text.

25. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that in all 51 sponsors were listed in the English text of the draft resolution whereas only 40 were listed in the French text. He also announced that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.331.

26. Mr. DORON (Israel) noted that in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution the Assembly would condemn "the strengthening of relations and collaboration between the racist régime of South Africa and Israel". His delegation had already on many occasions in the past and at the current session of the General Assembly rejected and refuted all allegations concerning military co-operation between Israel and South Africa. It had also made it clear that the volume of trade between Israel and South Africa was a minute fraction of the total volume of South Africa's trade. The report (A/10022) of the Special Committee

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 122, document A/10241.

against *Apartheid* itself and available statistics showed that many countries, all over the world, carried on trade with South Africa to a far greater degree. The fact that Israel was singled out for condemnation was a sufficient indication of the way in which facts were distorted for the sole purpose of giving the Arab delegations a chance to score, as it were, another point against Israel and to cover up their own activities.

27. In the course of his statement in the exercise of the right of reply (964th meeting), he had read from an article in *The Observer* which mentioned a number of Arab countries that maintained trade and other relations with South Africa. Some of the Arab delegations had then sought to dilute the effect of that article by exercising their right of reply. One such delegation had denied that its country was selling oil to South Africa or maintaining relations with the Pretoria régime, thus refuting allegations which neither he himself nor the article in question had ever made. Another representative of an Arab country had stated that there was no discrimination in his country. That was a completely meaningless statement. The representative

in question might just as well have said that his country did not discriminate against polar bears, because there was simply no racial minority in existence in that country, just as there were no polar bears. Yet a third Arab representative, while denying the report in *The Observer*, had in fact conceded that there was trade between "some persons" in his country and South Africa and that his country was actually laying in some reserves of gold, without caring where the gold came from.

28. Yet, of course, no mention was made in the draft resolution, in any shape or form, of a single Arab country although a separate paragraph was devoted to condemning Israel. He wished to draw the attention of the Committee to that blatant display of hypocrisy and he reserved his delegation's right to speak again in explanation of its vote.

29. The CHAIRMAN said that draft resolution A/SPC/L.331 would not be put to the vote until the following day.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

972nd meeting

Tuesday, 4 November 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.972

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*continued*) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.331, A/SPC/L.332):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*) (A/SPC/L.331, A/SPC/L.332)

1. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation had the honour of introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.332, entitled "Programme of work of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*", and he wished to announce that India, Mali, Senegal, the Sudan, the Upper Volta and Zambia had joined its sponsors. The draft resolution commended the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and the Unit on *Apartheid* for their efforts in the past and outlined their work programme for the coming year. It also set forth the specific action to be undertaken by the international community and the role of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in promoting the international campaign against *apartheid*. In conclusion, his delegation wished to remind the Committee that the effectiveness of the Special Committee depended on the support of the international community as a whole.

2. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.331.

At the request of the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Laos, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Laos, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait.

Against: Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United

States of America, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan.

Abstaining: Lesotho, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Australia, Barbados, Colombia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Iran.

The draft resolution was adopted by 83 votes to 15, with 13 abstentions.

3. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy), speaking on behalf of the European Economic Community (EEC) and its nine member States, said that he would like to reaffirm their attitude towards the policy of *apartheid*. As had been said on other occasions, those countries' traditions of democracy, freedom and equality led them to condemn unreservedly the legal system and policies of South Africa. Their attitude could not be modified by the superficial changes introduced in the policy of *apartheid*, whose principles remained unchanged.

4. However, the members of EEC had been compelled regretfully to vote against the draft resolution because of the serious and varied objections to which it gave rise. Those objections were mainly concerned with the fact that the basic principle of the universality of the Organization was being questioned; he felt that it would not be helpful to deal with the objections in detail since they stemmed from points of view which the delegation of EEC had stated on a number of occasions in the course of the Committee's work.

5. Since the Committee was dealing with a doctrine as universally condemned as *apartheid*, the countries of EEC felt that a larger number of delegations could have been associated in the preparation of the draft and were deeply convinced that the condemnation of the international community would have more effect on South Africa if it had been unanimous.

6. Mr. KAMOSHIDA (Japan) said that his delegation was firmly opposed to the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Government of South Africa but had been compelled with regret to vote against the draft resolution. It had done so because it had difficulty with a number of the paragraphs which contained specific references to certain States and because it felt that references such as the one to his own country in operative paragraph 3 did not contribute positively to the common action against *apartheid*. If the draft resolution had been formulated differently, his delegation would have been happy to vote for it.

7. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that the representative of Italy, speaking in his capacity as President in office of EEC and on behalf of the nine member States, had already made an explanatory statement with which his delegation whole-heartedly associated itself. That statement had made clear the total opposition of all nine States to the abhorrent policy of *apartheid* while at the same time noting that the draft resolution just adopted was unacceptable for a variety of reasons. His delegation would like to make it clear that it did not accept those parts of the text which asserted that a situation existed in South Africa which would justify the application of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) said that, in addition to objecting to the attack on the principle of universality in the United Nations to which it remained deeply attached, his delegation could not accept the reference to Chapter VII of the Charter in operative paragraph 16 of the draft resolution.

9. Mr. BJARNASON (Iceland) said that the position of his delegation in the past had clearly demonstrated his Government's opposition to the policy and practice of *apartheid* in South Africa. It was therefore regrettable that his delegation had been unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution because of what it considered to be its inappropriate and objectionable wording. Indeed, if a separate vote had been taken on operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, his delegation would have had to vote against them. However, it had chosen to abstain in the vote in order to indicate its sympathy with the basic thrust of the draft resolution.

10. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) said that it had been with great regret that his delegation had found itself unable to support the draft resolution. The attitude of the Swedish Government and people towards the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa was well known. They abhorred it and had made that attitude abundantly clear time and again.

11. However, his delegation had unfortunately found a number of important points in the draft resolution which it had been unable to accept. It had been unable to support the manner in which the draft resolution had singled out specific countries for condemnation, since it felt that only concerted action in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, which Sweden was prepared to support, would have any chance of proving effective. Furthermore, it did not believe that the United Nations should, even by implication, legitimize the use of violence. Finally, his delegation had always insisted on the principle of universality in the United Nations, in the sense that all Governments exercising control over their territory should be represented in it even when their policies gave rise to strong disapproval, as in the case of South Africa. At the twenty-ninth session, the draft resolution on the situation in South Africa adopted by the Committee and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 3324 E (XXIX) had called, *inter alia*, for the total exclusion of the South African delegation from participation in the work of the United Nations, and his delegation had been compelled to vote against it. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.331 made no mention of any such total exclusion, but the wording of the text was ambiguous in that regard and, in the circumstances, his delegation had abstained in the vote. It went without saying that his delegation concurred in the strong condemnation expressed in the draft resolution of the racist régime in South Africa.

12. Mr. PIETINEN (Finland) said that his delegation's position on the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa was well known. The people and Government of Finland rejected racial discrimination in any form, since that practice affronted their sense of justice and was completely incompatible with their concept of human rights based on the equality of the individual. They were strongly opposed to the cruel system of *apartheid* and the policies practised by the South African Government in

defiance of United Nations resolutions, in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in contravention of South Africa's obligations under the Charter. They believed that the elimination of the system of *apartheid* must be one of the main objectives of the United Nations and were ready to participate in any measures to achieve that aim by peaceful means.

13. His delegation appreciated the significance of draft resolution A/SPC/L.331 and thought it most regrettable that it had been unable to vote in favour of it. Some of the paragraphs were not in line with its views on the principles embodied in the Charter, and if a separate vote had been taken on operative paragraphs 5 and 6, his delegation would have voted against them. It would also have abstained in the vote on a number of other preambular and operative paragraphs. On the other hand, it had not cast a negative vote on the text as a whole because it shared with an overwhelming majority of delegations the view that the main objective of United Nations policy on racial discrimination should be the total elimination of the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Government of South Africa.

14. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that his delegation was disappointed that it had not been able to support the draft resolution which had just been adopted, since it had wished to express once again in a major resolution its condemnation of *apartheid* and of South Africa's defiance of United Nations resolutions on South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

15. Australia's objective was to ensure that pressure was maintained against the South African Government in order to induce it to change its policies. In the view of his delegation, the most appropriate forms of pressure were those provided under the Charter, which had often in the past brought about changes of a dramatic nature.

16. His delegation had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution because a number of its provisions ran counter to Australia's objectives. In particular, his delegation could not agree with the provisions of the draft resolution which prohibited all collaboration with the régime, condoned the use of force and singled out specific countries instead of dealing with South Africa's external policies as a whole. Finally, the affirmation contained in operative paragraph 6 was unacceptable to his delegation.

17. Mr. FREEMAN-GREENE (New Zealand) said that his Government had made its opposition to the intolerable policies of *apartheid* quite clear and had informed the Committee of specific steps it was taking in order to persuade the Government of South Africa to abandon those policies. His delegation therefore regretted that it had not been able to support the draft resolution which had just been adopted because it contained a number of features which did not, in the view of his delegation, advance the efforts of the international community to eradicate *apartheid*.

18. The eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 were among the provisions with which his delegation could not agree, and, had separate votes been taken on those paragraphs, his delegation would have voted against them.

19. Mr. WHISTLER (United States of America) said that his Government abhorred the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and consistently opposed them. However, his delegation had well-known reservations about characterizing the situation in South Africa as a threat to international peace and security and about the call for sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. Moreover, it disagreed with the condemnation, contained in the draft resolution of those States which maintained normal contacts with South Africa, for it continued to believe that such contacts were essential to a positive evolution of the situation in South Africa.

20. Mr. SAGHIYYAH (Lebanon) said that in accordance with his Government's traditional policy on *apartheid*, his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.331. Had a separate vote been taken on operative paragraph 3, however, his delegation would have abstained.

21. Miss TABATABAI (Iran) said that her Government condemned all forms of racism and racial discrimination and accordingly maintained that the system of *apartheid* must be abolished. Her delegation had abstained in the vote, however, because the draft resolution contained a number of points which did not further the aims of the international community in its struggle against *apartheid*. Had a separate vote been taken on the various paragraphs of the draft resolution, her delegation would have voted against several of them. It had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole, however, in order to indicate its sympathy with the over-all thrust of the text.

22. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) said that his Government was and always had been strongly opposed to *apartheid* in all its manifestations and that its attitude had been demonstrated time and again by its consistent support of all constructive efforts by the United Nations to bring about a peaceful change in South Africa towards a multiracial society based on equal rights for all, irrespective of race, creed or colour.

23. The draft resolution, and more particularly the fourth and eighth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 4 and 6, contained certain elements which his Government could not support. In its view, the draft resolution might give rise to doubts concerning South Africa's right to participate in the work of the United Nations. Norway had on many occasions and in various forums made its position quite clear on the question of the expulsion or suspension of a Member State from the United Nations. It had always upheld the principle of universality of the membership of the United Nations and would continue to do so. For that reason, his delegation had been compelled to vote against the draft resolution.

24. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) recalled that his delegation had been a sponsor of the draft resolution on solidarity with the South African Political Prisoners (A/SPC/L.325) and had voted in favour of all the other draft resolutions under agenda item 53 already adopted by the Committee. It had done so in order to demonstrate its opposition to *apartheid* and its desire to promote an early and peaceful change in the situation in South Africa, even though it had found it necessary to place on record its interpretation of the specific language used in a number of those draft reso-

lutions. In the case of draft resolution A/SPC/L.331, his delegation disagreed with, or had reservations concerning, five preambular and nine operative paragraphs. Both in tone and in content, the draft resolution was contrary to the approach adopted by the Canadian Government, and his delegation had therefore been compelled to vote against it. He drew the attention of the Committee to the full account of the Government's policy on *apartheid* contained in the earlier statement by his delegation during the general debate on agenda item 53 (963rd meeting).

25. The CHAIRMAN said that the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic had requested him to announce that the Syrian delegation would have voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.331 had it been present at the time of the vote.

26. Mr. BUX (Bangladesh) said that his delegation, too, would have voted for the draft resolution had it been present.

27. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) to address the Committee.

28. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, expressed the gratitude of PAC and the people of Azania to those countries which had voted in favour of the very crucial draft resolution on the situation in South Africa which had just been adopted. He regretted that a number of countries which had until now been closely identified with the struggle against *apartheid* had not voted in favour of the draft resolution. He regarded as fallacious the arguments which they advanced to justify their position. To those who invoked the principle of universality, he pointed out that

universality would best be served by putting an end to the illegal rule of the white minority in South Africa. The argument that contacts should be maintained with South Africa in order to promote peaceful change was hopelessly idealistic. The enactment, year after year, of ever more repressive legislation by the South African Fascist régime led to the conclusion that contacts merely served to embolden the régime. That conclusion was also borne out by the statements of the South African Prime Minister to the effect that South Africa was far too important to the Western countries for them ever to support any punitive action against it.

29. As to the argument that the situation in South Africa did not constitute a threat to international peace and security, he pointed out that South African troops were at present deployed in Zimbabwe and were occupying parts of Angola under the pretext that South Africa had the right to pursue African freedom fighters across the border into neighbouring countries. Should the Government of Angola, after independence was attained, attempt to expel the South African troops from its territory, war would inevitably ensue. The battle lines were drawn in southern Africa, and support had been pledged to the African liberation movements from many quarters. He therefore appealed to those delegations which had not voted in favour of the draft resolution to reconsider their positions and to recognize that the time had come to take exceptionally firm action against the South African régime.

30. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegations of Cuba, Mauritania, Morocco and Oman had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.332.

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.

973rd meeting

Thursday, 6 November 1975, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.973

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (concluded) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.332, A/SPC/L.333):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/SPC/L.332, A/SPC/L.333)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegations of Egypt, Iraq, Mauritius, Qatar and Tunisia had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.332; he drew the

attention of the Committee to the note by the Secretary-General (A/SPC/L.333), which set out the administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution.

2. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) expressed the gratitude of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania for his kind words in introducing the draft resolution on its programme of work at the preceding meeting of the Committee. He also thanked the sponsors of the draft resolution and the many delegations which had commended the work of the Special Committee. He then read out the text of a telegram addressed to the Secretary-General by Mr. Oliver Tambo, Acting President-General of the African National Congress of South Africa, which stated that the victims and genuine opponents of South Africa's inhuman

policies warmly acclaimed draft resolution A/SPC/L.327, adopted by the Committee at its 969th meeting, rejecting the “bantustans” and the so-called “independence” of the Transkei and that the Committee’s decision justified the faith of the vast majority of the world’s peoples in the United Nations as a promoter of just causes and a defender of human rights.

3. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee wished to adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.332 by consensus in view of the absence of facilities for mechanical voting in the conference room.

4. Mr. VON UTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his delegation had received instructions not to join in a consensus on draft resolution A/SPC/L.332.

5. Miss BENNATON (Honduras) suggested that, in the absence of mechanical means of voting, the Committee should proceed to a roll-call vote on the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call on the draft resolution.

Senegal, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Barbados, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

The draft resolution was adopted by 98 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

6. Mr. YANG Ming-liang (China) said that his delegation had consistently supported the concerted efforts of the international community to expose the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and it accordingly agreed in principle with draft resolution A/SPC/L.332. His delegation had, however, outlined its position of principle regarding the World Peace Council at the 951st meeting of

the Committee and did not believe that the Special Committee against *Apartheid* should have any relations with that body.

7. Mr. VON UTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany) expressed the regret of his delegation at not having been able to vote in favour of the draft resolution. While the wording of the text was more moderate than the resolution on the same subject adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session (resolution 3324 D (XXIX)), his delegation none the less had difficulties with the language used in the fourth preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 1 (a). In the view of his delegation, the struggle against *apartheid* was unrelated to the process of decolonization and a distinction should therefore be drawn between them in the draft resolution. His delegation’s main objections were to operative paragraphs 1 (c) and 3. His delegation did not feel that the holding of a seminar, which was to take place in Havana, to formulate a co-ordinated strategy of action against economic collaboration with South Africa was an appropriate means of helping the oppressed population of South Africa. The character and outcome of that seminar, the estimated cost of which, according to the administrative and financial implications in document A/SPC/L.333, would be about \$100,000, was easily predictable and in view of the scarcity of resources for other activities his delegation felt that the amount involved might be better used for another purpose. As his delegation had already stated at the 961st meeting, during the general debate on *apartheid*, the struggle against *apartheid* was a matter of concern to all, not only to Africans, and confrontation between African and Western European countries over the path to follow in striving for the elimination of *apartheid* would only serve the purposes of the Pretoria Government.

8. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in order to give expression once again to its support for the struggle against *apartheid*. Nevertheless, his delegation had reservations regarding operative paragraph 1 (c) because it believed that that struggle should be directed against the Government of South Africa and not against countries which, like his own, maintained consular relations with South Africa that in no way implied approval of its policies of *apartheid*.

9. Mr. KAMOSHIDA (Japan) said that his delegation had an abiding respect for the work carried out by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and had voted in favour of the draft resolution in order to demonstrate support for the basic goals set out in that text. Nevertheless, his delegation had difficulties with the fourth preambular paragraph and with operative paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (d).

10. Mr. VROON (Netherlands) said that his delegation sincerely regretted not having been able to vote in favour of the draft resolution, particularly because it was less controversial than the resolution adopted the previous year on the same subject (General Assembly resolution 3324 D (XXIX)). In the view of his delegation the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1 (a) might be suitable when dealing with a colonial situation but were not appropriate to the situation in South Africa. Furthermore, his delegation could not support operative paragraph 1 (c) because it did not believe that the severing of all ties with

South Africa would contribute to the eradication of *apartheid*. His delegation hoped that a common effort would be made by all Member States the following year to reach a consensus on the Committee's draft resolutions on *apartheid* so as to underline the universal opposition to that inhuman policy.

11. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in accordance with its strongly held view that the United Nations had a particular role to play in the campaign against *apartheid* by making the world aware of the evils of that system. However, his delegation had reservations regarding operative paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (c) and also regarding the proposal contained in paragraphs 223 and 224 of the report of the Special Committee (A/10022). As his delegation had stated on previous occasions, the struggle against *apartheid* must be conducted in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and contacts with the Government and white community of South Africa should be used to convey to them the views of the international community. Finally, his delegation would have preferred to see a clearer distinction drawn between the situation in South Africa and a classic colonial situation.

12. Mr. WHISTLER (United States of America) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote because of its reservations concerning the language of several operative paragraphs. In particular, paragraphs 1 (c) and 3 might lend themselves to arbitrary interpretations and misuse. His delegation also had misgivings about language in the draft resolution which seemed to condone the use of violence against the South African régime.

13. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that the draft resolution would have been acceptable to his delegation had the text not posed certain familiar problems. Specifically, it contained language which could suitably be applied to a colonial situation, but not to the situation in South Africa. Moreover, his delegation had doubts whether the apparent call for a campaign against trade with South Africa in operative paragraph 1 (c) was appropriate in a draft resolution whose main purpose was to promote publicity about the practice of *apartheid*. The projected increase in expenditures which the programme of work would entail was a large one in view of the scarcity of funds available for other worth-while purposes. Finally, his delegation hoped that the Committee would be able to reach a consensus on the draft resolutions it adopted on *apartheid* the following year.

14. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution because of its firm opposition to *apartheid* and its desire to manifest its understanding for the feelings and aspirations of the non-white population of South Africa. It had done so despite the fact that it had certain difficulties with the wording of the draft resolution, because it wished to underline its agreement with the philosophy which underlay the work of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*. Nevertheless, his delegation continued to believe that the struggle against *apartheid* would be best served by focusing attention on *apartheid* itself and not on issues which had, at times improperly, been considered in connexion with it. His delegation also regretted that the Special Committee had on occasion shown a lack of objectivity by overemphasizing the contacts of certain Western countries with South Africa, and he hoped that the Special Committee and the Unit on *Apartheid* would bear that in mind in 1976 when they organized the seminar and campaigns envisaged in operative paragraphs 1 (c) and 3. His delegation was concerned at the financial implications of the proposed international seminar and also had reservations regarding the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1 (a) because of their wording. It would have preferred to see the draft resolution make a clear distinction between the situation in South Africa and a typical colonial situation and recognize that the campaign against *apartheid* should be conducted in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

15. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution because it recognized the value of the work performed by the Special Committee in drawing the attention of the international community to the inherent injustices of *apartheid*. It had reservations, however, regarding the concept of "collaboration" contained in operative paragraph 1 (c). Canada traded in non-military goods with all countries in the world without regard for political considerations and did not consider such trade to be a form of "collaboration".

16. The CHAIRMAN said that the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Haiti had requested him to announce that, had they been present during the vote, they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution. He then stated that the Committee had thus concluded its consideration of item 53.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

974th meeting

Tuesday, 11 November 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.974

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Sir John RENNIE (Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, introduced his annual report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975 (A/10013 and Corr.1). It was on the same lines as previous reports and its preparation had involved the usual consultations, although he himself took full responsibility for its contents. The introduction to the report referred briefly to the origins of the Agency and political developments of importance to its work, and dealt at greater length with its financial difficulties. It also mentioned important aspects of the Agency's operations, with special reference to health and education programmes, and acknowledged the assistance given by other United Nations organizations and by various non-governmental organizations. Chapter I gave a more detailed account of the Agency's programmes and developments in them during the period under consideration, while chapter II dealt with budgetary matters.

2. During the period dealt with in the report, many Palestine refugees had continued to live in difficult conditions. Their situation had been aggravated by the further outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, which had disrupted the Agency's activities, not only in Lebanon itself, but in the Syrian Arab Republic and in Jordan, too, since Beirut was the main port of entry for supplies. For several weeks, the port had been virtually at a standstill and alternative routes had had to be used, which frequently involved extra expense. It had, however, been possible to distribute the bulk of the rations and field stocks had been sufficient to cover requirements, but once those stocks were exhausted there would be an acute shortage.

3. The effect on work in the Agency's headquarters had been severe: it was estimated that from the beginning of January to the end of October 1975, more than 17,000 man-days had been lost. The work of the Budget Division and the Data Processing Division was far behind schedule, as was the work of all departments dealing with personnel

and administrative matters. In the field of education, plans for 1976 had been delayed and, in health activities, the difficulties encountered in ensuring the provision of medical supplies and in supervising activities might adversely affect the long-term efficiency of the programme.

4. The Lebanon Field Office and the Central Lebanon Area Office had been closed nearly every day for the past eight weeks. In the camps, it had not been possible to implement maintenance and improvement programmes and no progress had been made with shelter reconstruction. Most of the schools had been closed and those which remained open, in the northern and southern parts of Lebanon, had not been able to receive instructional material, new textbooks in particular. Courses at the Siblin Training Centre had had to be interrupted for six weeks and it had been impossible to select trainees for the first-year intake for 1975/76. Travel difficulties had hampered first aid, the evacuation of the injured and the dispatch of surgical supplies; camp medical staff had been reduced to a skeleton basis, the lack of beds in the government and private hospitals had hindered the hospitalization of the seriously ill, and camp sanitation conditions were a cause of concern.

5. The Agency could do little to improve its operations in Lebanon, despite the dedication of its staff, which had been sorely tried. It must maintain its services in the other areas which it served—the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—but all received guidance from Agency headquarters where vital services were provided on a centralized basis. An attempt had been made to solve the problem by redeploying professional staff on extended mission to the field, but if the situation did not improve in Beirut, he would be obliged to take more radical measures. If it became necessary to move staff temporarily on any large scale in order to enable Agency headquarters to perform its functions, the estimates of expenditure given in chapter II of the report would have to be changed significantly.

6. It was in those conditions that UNRWA had been going through the worst financial crisis in its history. Paragraph 7 of the report described briefly the Agency's financial situation in 1975 and indicated that at the beginning of September, when the report had been completed, there was a deficit of about \$13 million and that the level of income was inadequate to maintain the programmes in full until the end of the year. At the end of September the situation had been unchanged; there had been a danger that the Agency would default on its obligations as a result of lack of funds and he himself would then have been in breach of the Agency's Financial Regulations, as he had indicated in paragraph 13 of the report. He had therefore come to New York on 7 October and, after discussions with members of the Secretariat, he had submitted a special report to the

Secretary-General informing him that if the Agency did not receive sufficient additional contributions by 15 November, it would have to cease operations on 30 November, with all that that would entail in hardship for the refugees, the termination of thousands of employees, and serious repercussions on the stability of the host countries.

7. It would certainly be absurd if the Agency's operations were to cease for lack of \$13 million when its budget was over \$120 million. Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the report described the background to the financial situation, which comprised three distinct but related problems: insufficiency of income to meet expenditure, insufficiency of cash to meet cash expenditures which were due, and insufficiency of assets to cover liabilities.

8. The first of those problems could only be resolved by an increase in income, by a reduction in expenditure or, since the Agency had no reserves, by meeting the deficit at the end of the financial year from working capital. Borrowing was out of the question; the Agency had no authority to borrow and no security to offer, and pledges not yet made for the following year could hardly be regarded as security for a loan to meet expenditure for the current year, particularly when there was every reason to think that the income for the following financial year would also be insufficient. The working capital was now almost exhausted and by the end of 1975 would have been entirely consumed.

9. The only solution was to reduce expenditure, which could be done through reductions in services, reductions which would have to be all the more drastic the later they came in the financial year, when the deficit was greater. It would therefore seem logical to act as soon as it was felt that there was reason to believe that the necessary resources would be lacking. But, as could be seen from paragraphs 11 to 14 of the report, there would be strong resistance from host Governments and from members of the UNRWA Advisory Commission, who would feel, not without reason, that the Commissioner-General was prejudging the outcome of fund-raising efforts and would refuse to co-operate with the Agency in putting the reductions into effect. That would lead to even broader repercussions. It was therefore axiomatic that the funds should be on the point of running out before reductions were considered, with the consequence that the reductions would then assume dramatic proportions.

10. Other practical difficulties were due to the fact that the Agency operated ongoing programmes of a quasi-governmental nature. How could one reduce an education programme? How could one eliminate schools or classes at random? How could one reduce a health programme which was already rudimentary and of which the only financial elements were medical care and basic environmental sanitation installations? As for nutrition, the supplementary feeding programme for young children and other vulnerable groups was not financed under the budget but by a special contribution from the European Economic Community (EEC), and rations had already had to be temporarily reduced in 1975 because of the supply difficulties which he had mentioned. Since it had inadequate working capital, the Agency was unable to hold large stocks of commodities, and ordering had had to be done on a hand-to-mouth basis.

Contingency plans for cuts in rations had, however, been worked out, but, in view of the serious repercussions which such measures would have and the progressive improvement in the Agency's financial situation, he had deferred a decision.

11. Lastly, the insufficiency of assets to cover liabilities was complicated by the existence of contingent liabilities that fell due if staff had to be discharged because of reductions in services. At the time when the special report to the Secretary-General had been prepared, it had been estimated that potential liabilities on 30 November 1975 would amount to \$32.2 million, with assets amounting to \$35 million, of which \$10.2 million would be non-cash assets and \$9.8 million would be funds allocated for 1976. The liabilities included \$10.5 million for termination indemnities which the Agency would have to pay to local staff, for the reasons given in paragraph 243 of the report for 1973/74:¹ in the event of a cessation of operations the Agency could not hope to find alternative employment for even one half of its staff. Under the contracts signed, provision also had to be made for one month's salary in lieu of advance notice. The non-cash assets consisted mainly of commodities, whose full conversion into cash could not be guaranteed. If he were to continue operations beyond 30 November 1975 without sufficient additional income, he would be violating the Agency's Financial Regulations.

12. Since the time when the special report to the Secretary-General had been submitted, approaches had been made to potential contributors and the situation had improved slightly. On 20 October, the United Kingdom had announced an additional contribution of a minimum of £200,000, which would be increased up to 10 per cent of the total of additional contributions pledged by other Member States since the appeal made on 24 June, with a maximum of £1 million. The United Kingdom contribution might therefore amount to over \$2 million, if the other additional contributions reached \$20 million. Additional contributions had been pledged by: Sweden, \$675,000; the United Arab Emirates, \$2 million; EEC, 5,000 tons of cereals for 1975, providing about 3,600 tons of flour, valued at over \$900,000; and the Netherlands, \$380,000, representing double its additional contribution announced in August. He wished to express his deep appreciation for those contributions, which had already reduced the deficit to \$7.2 million. He expressed the hope that they would be followed by further contributions on a sufficient scale to enable the Agency to avoid ceasing operations, but stressed that for that purpose the contributions must be pledged very soon.

13. The Agency would, of course, make every effort to avoid what would be a disaster for the Palestine refugees and for the region generally. But its financial situation was so precarious that it would be imprudent to use funds pledged for 1976 to meet operating expenses in 1975. At the end of 1974, working capital had amounted to about \$7.2 million, of which \$2.8 million had been temporarily reserved to cover a capital investment loss on the local Staff Provident Fund assets, leaving an unreserved balance of about \$4.4 million. That working capital had represented

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13* and corrigendum.

the excess of assets over liabilities at the end of the year, but the liabilities had provided for termination indemnities for only 50 per cent of the staff. The amount of working capital had been extremely small in relation to an expenditure budget for 1975 estimated at \$129.9 million—later reduced to \$121.8 million, mainly because of a reduction in flour prices—especially for an organization which had to purchase food-stuffs and other supplies on a large scale some months in advance of their utilization because of the time needed for delivery. The cash in hand at the beginning of 1975 had been little more than \$5 million, which was less than one month's cash expenditure. Thanks to the assistance given by Member States that paid their contributions early in the year, the Agency had been able to meet its obligations, but the danger of running out of cash would persist as long as working capital was so meagre.

14. The prospects for 1976 were also alarming. The increase in expenditure, due mainly to the effect of inflation, was estimated at \$139.7 million; however, that figure was much less than the increase for 1975, because of lower flour prices. Chapter II, paragraphs 197 to 200 and 202, of the report gave details of the estimates, which were prepared on the basis explained in the introduction, paragraph 11. Since Member States frequently made special contributions to the Agency, it would be extremely helpful if they could incorporate into their regular contribution for the next year the amount of special contributions made during the previous year or, alternatively, pledge similar special contributions at the time of pledging their regular contributions.

15. The estimated deficit for 1976 was \$55 million—\$9 million more than the estimated deficit at the beginning of 1975, which had not yet been fully eliminated. It would be very dangerous to use in 1975 funds pledged for 1976, without any assurance that it would be possible to balance the budget in 1976. Apart from being financially unsound in principle, such a course could very well precipitate a cash crisis immediately in 1976. Assuming that the Agency were to continue operations in 1976, there was a risk that lack of funds might make it necessary to reduce services to refugees in order to avoid breakdown or cessation. It would be clear from his report and from his statement that he would go to great lengths to avoid such reductions.

16. He drew the Committee's attention to paragraph 13 of his report, in which he referred to a questioning of the authority of the Commissioner-General to make reductions in programmes in any circumstances. He had then requested the opinion of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations; the text of that opinion was reproduced in annex IV. The Agency had no governing body other than the General Assembly, to which the Commissioner-General reported directly, and not through the Secretary-General, although he was appointed by the latter. If the Commissioner-General did not have the authority ascribed to him by the Legal Counsel "to establish the level of UNRWA services within the resources available to him to carry out those services", the General Assembly would have to give him directions as to what he should do if funds became insufficient. Either the Assembly's resolutions would have to be more specific in that respect than they had been so far, or else some other authority would have to be established to assume that responsibility. The Advisory

Committee gave advice to the Commissioner-General but had no executive power. That matter should be given attention, because the risk of a breakdown in the Agency's operations increased yearly. It could be only narrowly averted in 1975, and the prospects for 1976 were not very encouraging.

17. The remedy was to provide greater financial stability to the Agency. In paragraph 16 of his report, he made some suggestions on the subject, which he hoped would be of assistance to the Special Political Committee and to the General Assembly. In the absence of mandatory financing, the only solution would be some consensus among contributors; if such a consensus were effective, it would already be a vast improvement. If there was any way in which he could help in that respect, he was at the entire disposal of delegations.

18. The Agency had been providing services to the Palestine refugees for over 25 years. During that long period, the emphasis of the programmes had changed. The Agency had not only tried to maintain the physical well-being of the refugees, with the assistance of WHO; in co-operation with UNESCO, it had also succeeded in establishing a system of education and training for over a quarter of a million refugee children. The UNRWA programmes in the region could be regarded as a form of technical assistance until such time as the political problems involved could be solved. The Agency was trying to make its programmes more effective, as could clearly be seen from the report. For example, with regard to instruction, the education development centres, which were the local adjuncts of the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education, had made a good start. In health activities, UNRWA was also concerned to improve the quality of care and to make the maximum use of its limited resources by co-operating with governmental and other agencies. In projects for the improvement of camps, reliance was placed on projects in which the Agency and the refugees, and frequently also central or local government agencies, co-operated. In his report, he had expressed appreciation for the assistance received from host Governments and from the Palestine Liberation Organization. More of that constructive work could be done if the Agency were not preoccupied by the chronic financial problem, which was currently compounded by problems of administration and organization arising from the threat to the viability of the Agency's headquarters. If UNRWA were to be plunged into financial crisis again from the beginning of 1976, it might not be able to tackle those problems.

19. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway), speaking as Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, introduced the report of the Working Group (A/10334). By its resolution 3330 (XXIX), the General Assembly had in the previous year requested the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of UNRWA for a further period of one year.

20. The Working Group's report was divided into four main chapters. Chapter I gave a brief description of the origin and terms of reference of the Working Group and of

the consideration of its previous report² by the Special Political Committee and the General Assembly at the twenty-ninth session.

21. Chapter II contained a resumé of the activities of the Working Group during the preceding year as well as the results of fund-raising efforts on behalf of UNRWA in 1975. In its previous report, the Working Group had pointed out that extraordinary efforts by all concerned would be required to enable the Agency to continue its operations through the coming year at their present level. At the start of 1975, the working capital of UNRWA had amounted to less than the equivalent of one month's expenditure, and the Agency had been confronted with an estimated deficit of \$46 million. Despite a special additional contribution of \$10 million from the United States Government in early March, the Agency's financial situation was becoming increasingly desperate. The Secretary-General, in a statement issued on 10 June 1975 (A/10114), had declared that unless additional contributions were forthcoming it would be necessary to reduce or suspend Agency programmes for the second half of 1975. Thanks to a special donation of \$6 million from the United States Government and special contributions from Saudi Arabia in July—\$10 million—and the Netherlands in August—\$385,000 approximately—the deficit had been reduced to about \$13 million. However, as no other sizable contributions had been forthcoming, the Working Group had issued a special report (A/10268) in September 1975 stating that in the absence of additional contributions the Commissioner-General would be compelled to begin a reduction in services, which might entail a partial, selective or even complete termination of food rations and cuts in the educational programme for refugee children. Since the publication of the special report, the United Kingdom had announced an extra contribution of £200,000 and had promised to increase that offer up to 10 per cent of other additional contributions, with a ceiling of £1 million. Subsequently, additional contributions of \$765,000 from Sweden and \$2 million from the United Arab Emirates as well as a contribution in kind valued at about \$750,000 from EEC had helped to reduce the deficit to approximately \$8.3 million at the time of publication of the Working Group's report (A/10334) in November.

22. The Working Group pointed out in chapter III, paragraph 25, of its report, that the sharp increase in expenditure in 1975 was primarily due to three factors: local and world inflationary pressures on costs, sharply increased costs for flour and other food-stuffs, and unfavourable local rates of exchange against the United States dollar. Although there had been a considerable increase in income—about 20 per cent over 1974—the increase in expenditure had been even greater. As the Commissioner-General had pointed out, the Agency's deficit had been somewhat reduced, but it could not be met from working capital and UNRWA was therefore near collapse.

23. In chapter IV, in the concluding remarks at the end of its report, the Working Group first of all reiterated its assumption that as long as a just and lasting solution of the problem of the Palestine refugees was not achieved, the services of UNRWA remained indispensable.

24. The second conclusion stated that a complete suspension of the Agency's services for lack of funds might become inevitable unless additional contributions were forthcoming in the immediate future. Although income had more than doubled between 1971 and 1975, expenditure had risen faster during the same period and that increase in expenditure was not due to any expansion in the services offered to the refugees, as no new programmes had been developed. The increase in expenditure was primarily due to price increases, currency instability and inflationary pressures.

25. The Working Group then expressed its belief that any reductions in the services provided by the Agency would have very serious implications for the refugees themselves, for the countries in which they lived and for the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The Group would therefore view reductions or suspension with grave concern and appealed to members of the United Nations for urgent contributions to solve the Agency's immediate crisis.

26. The Working Group had noted the suggestions made by the Commissioner-General in the introduction to his annual report (A/10013 and Corr.1) with regard to the longer-term problems of securing the Agency's operations. The Commissioner-General had pointed out that the estimated deficit for 1976 was \$55 million, which was \$9 million more than the estimated deficit at the beginning of the year. The Working Group agreed that continuation of the services of UNRWA was an obligation of the United Nations acting on behalf of the international community and that the Agency's financing should be put on a firmer basis. It believed that the situation in which a small group of countries bore the major burden of financing the UNRWA budget was inconsistent with the terms of General Assembly resolution 3331 A (XXIX), which had been supported by an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations and by the terms of which the Agency's mandate had been renewed for a further three years.

27. The Working Group believed that the provision of relief assistance, health services and educational facilities to the Palestine refugees was a common responsibility of all States Members of the Organization. If the financial position of UNRWA was to be improved without any reductions in its services, it was imperative that Member States should follow up their verbal support of the Agency with increased contributions. Consequently, the Working Group urgently requested in paragraph 33 of its report (A/10334) that those Governments which had not contributed in the past and those Governments which had so far contributed inadequately should now be willing to reconsider seriously their position and contribute generously to the common effort.

28. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) commended the Commissioner-General and the Rapporteur of the Working Group on their excellent reports, whose pessimistic tone was unfortunately only a reflection of their realistic outlook. The agency's current plight resulted from the world-wide economic crisis, which some in the Organization itself had anticipated and even predicted. That crisis, which was due to such factors as continuing inflation, the

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 38, document A/9815.

exhaustion of countries' resources, and monetary instability, recalled the collapse of the 1930s in Europe and could not but give rise to a feeling of helplessness.

29. His delegation had repeated over and over again that a political solution must be found to the problem of the Palestine refugees in the Middle East. The situation there was the result of the partition of Palestine and the setting-up of a foreign State in that territory. The causes rather than the effects must therefore be attacked, and the great Powers which bore direct responsibility, namely the United States of America and the United Kingdom, must make a joint effort to find a final solution. Those Powers, particularly the United States, must also stop providing Israel and other States in the area with military assistance which only added to the existing instability.

30. So long as that type of military aid continued, a real solution to the Palestine problem would not be found by regularly increasing the contributions to UNRWA. The United States did not accomplish much when with one hand it made a huge contribution to the Agency and with the other it helped to maintain the chaos prevailing in the Middle East. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a budget of some \$16 billion, whereas \$2 billion would be enough in any other country to maintain very comprehensive intelligence services. Moreover, part of that budget was known to be used for the purpose of engineering coups d'état or stirring up abnormal situations, although it could be used for aid to the Palestine refugees.

31. The United Kingdom also had a certain moral responsibility towards Palestine. However, it was currently facing very grave economic problems and was probably doing the best it could.

32. Like the United States, the USSR spent huge sums on its intelligence service, the KGB. It, too, could use part of that money for assistance to the Palestine refugees. The Scandinavian countries, for their part, were doing their best, but they should urge the United States to change its attitude.

33. It had been said that the Palestinians were Arabs and that it was the Arab countries which should come to their

aid. Although in no sense responsible for the situation existing in Palestine, Saudi Arabia had, for its part, made major contributions to the Agency.

34. The Zionists, like the others who were responsible for the present situation, seemed unwilling to acknowledge that the Palestine problem could have only a political solution. They refused to comply with the numerous resolutions in which the United Nations had called for the refugees to be permitted to return to their homes. While it would not in itself represent an immediate solution to the Palestine problem, the implementation of those resolutions would at least be a first step. Tracing the history of the various waves of conquest in the Middle East, he observed that the Zionists, too, were invaders and that it was only because of their doctrinaire fanaticism that they believed that right was on their side. There would be no peace in the area until the Palestine refugees could return to their homes. All countries recognized that fact—even a country as far away as Japan.

35. Détente would accomplish nothing unless it was based on a completely new attitude, and unless the Powers concerned drastically changed their view of international affairs and abandoned the old concept of a balance of power and spheres of influence, which had caused so many wars.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

Organization of the Committee's work

36. The CHAIRMAN asked those members of the Committee who wished to do so to put their names on the list of speakers for the general debate on the item under consideration and to give the officers of the Committee as soon as possible any draft resolutions they wished to submit to the Committee. He recalled that the Committee was already somewhat behind in its work and also, in accordance with the General Assembly's request, contained in a letter dated 11 November 1975 from the President of the Assembly (A/SPC/178), had to hear the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus at its next two meetings.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

975th meeting

Wednesday, 12 November 1975, at 10.55 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/PV.975*

AGENDA ITEM 125

Question of Cyprus (A/10242, A/10256-S/11825, A/10276-S/11840, A/10282-S/11844, A/10283-S/11845, A/10292-S/11847, A/10305-S/11854, A/10310-S/11859, A/10322-S/11860, A/10323, A/10343-S/11875, A/10351, A/L.769, A/L.773, A/SPC/175, A/SPC/178)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): This meeting has been called pursuant to two decisions adopted by the General Assembly on agenda item 125, entitled "Question of Cyprus". The first, which was adopted at the 2367th plenary meeting, held on 30 September 1975, was

* Verbatim record (see para. 1 below).

mentioned in the letter addressed by the President of the General Assembly to me [A/SPC/175]. The second decision of the Assembly was adopted at the 2041st plenary meeting yesterday. In connexion with that decision the President of the General Assembly addressed a letter to me [A/SPC/178] in which he states the following:

“As you know, the General Assembly, at its 2355th plenary meeting, held on 22 September 1975, decided that item 125, entitled ‘Question of Cyprus’, would be considered directly in plenary meetings. At its 2367th plenary meeting, held on 30 September 1975, the General Assembly also decided that when considering the item it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views, and that it would then resume its consideration of the item taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

“At its 2401st plenary meeting, held today, the General Assembly decided to invite the Special Political Committee to meet on Wednesday, 12 November, for the purpose of hearing the views of the representatives of the Cypriot communities, on the understanding that verbatim records would be kept of those meetings of the Committee. The General Assembly also decided to resume consideration of this agenda item in plenary meeting on Thursday, 13 November, in the morning.”

2. In response to that letter from the President of the General Assembly, I announce to the Committee that verbatim records will be kept of the proceedings of today's meetings and will be annexed to the report that the Committee will transmit to the General Assembly.

3. The first speaker on my list is Mr. Celik, representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, on whom I call.

4. Mr. CELIK (Turkish Cypriot community): At the unilateral request of the Greek Cypriot side we are once again before this Committee. We believe that it would have been more useful for all of us had we continued intercommunal negotiations as prescribed by the resolution adopted last year [*General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX)*]. Nevertheless, we are glad that we have been given a chance to hear the Greek Cypriot view and to answer it, so that the realities of Cyprus cease to be distorted.

5. I was very disappointed yesterday when I listened to Mr. Christophides' address before the General Assembly [*2401st plenary meeting*]. Indeed I was more than disappointed, together with others who had expected the Greek side to come to the United Nations with more realism and with some regard to truth. Instead we heard Mr. Christophides' appeal on behalf of Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike for remedies which, if granted, would help the Greek Cypriot leaders to bring to a successful conclusion their 12-year-old attempt to catch the Turkish Cypriot partners unprepared and unprotected and to give to them the final blow in the name of union with “mother Greece”.

6. As we listened to Mr. Christophides and heard him expound his views on Cyprus—in complete disregard of the

Turkish Cypriot view and of the suffering of the Turks during the last 12 years—our hopes for a speedy solution waned.

7. His statement that Turkey's duty was to restore the 12-year-old unconstitutional rule of Archbishop Makarios does not infuse us with any confidence in the Greek Cypriot administrators. Naturally they are sorry that they were prevented from continuing to run the country on their own—as they did for 12 years—having destroyed 103 Turkish villages, having rendered one fourth of the Turkish community homeless and workless, and having excluded all Turks from the benefits of the budget of Cyprus for 12 years.

8. I do not intend to reopen these pages again here. It is sufficient for me to see that the Greek Cypriot leaders have not repented an inch for what they have done to us for the last 12 years.

9. It is a great eye-opener for us to see that what the Greek Cypriot leadership is seeking to get is the chance to destroy us completely in Cyprus. To us Mr. Christophides' statement to the General Assembly yesterday and the draft resolution [A/L.769] which he has submitted mean nothing else.

10. I shall not go into a detailed reply at this stage because the debate will be in the General Assembly, and Mr. Denktas, the leader of the Turkish community and the negotiator at the intercommunal talks, is here to take part in that debate.

11. I feel sure that, especially after hearing Mr. Christophides' accusations levelled against the Turkish leadership, Mr. Denktas will be given a chance to reply. Indeed we feel that this is a necessity of natural justice if justice is to be done. We also feel that the natural result of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) necessitates the hearing of the two sides. Otherwise, how can you expect Mr. Denktas to take part in intercommunal negotiations, on the basis of equality, when he has not been heard here?

12. The Greek Cypriot negotiator has the right to speak at the plenary meeting. His non-appearance at this time is no ground for refusing a hearing to Mr. Denktas. We claim that we are given the right to give our side of the story. Otherwise we believe justice cannot be done.

13. This 12-year-old pretence that the Greek Cypriot side represents Cyprus must cease. We expected Mr. Christophides himself to own that there was a Turkish side to the problem of Cyprus, but he chose to speak for the Turks of Cyprus also—those Turks whom he did not see for 12 years, and who chose once and for all to move to the north in order to escape the life which had been tailored for them for 12 years by the Greek Cypriot administrators.

14. This is making fun of the 12-year-old tragedy of the Turkish community. It is adding insult to injury. We cannot accept this ridiculous position of being represented here by a Greek Cypriot whose whole policy had been to destroy our independence and to destroy us, as a political entity, with it.

15. We have appeared before this Committee, despite these reservations, not because we believe in the usefulness of heated acrimonious discussions, but because we believe that it will be a disservice to the principles of justice and to our community if we allow the Greek Cypriot side to be seen as the sole arbiters of the problem which they themselves created back in 1963. We are convinced, however, that far from facilitating an early settlement of the problem, polemics on the issue will only aggravate the situation and render a solution all the more difficult.

16. The current debate will produce yet another resolution but not a solution. We shall still have to go back to the negotiating table and try with goodwill, sincerity and patience to find a just and durable solution to a problem which has been outstanding unnecessarily for 12 years.

17. So why are we here? What is the position of the two sides? Why are we not engaged in serious negotiations trying to find a just and durable solution to our problems? Why have the intercommunal talks, which were conducted under the auspices of the Secretary-General, been interrupted? In short, why has the Cyprus problem not been resolved so far? And how can this Committee and the General Assembly contribute to the speeding-up of a peaceful solution?

18. The two communities have very widely diverging views on the Cyprus question.

19. For the Greek side, the Cyprus problem started in 1974 with the Turkish intervention. In all public statements by the Greek Cypriot leadership an effort is made to present the Cyprus problem, not as an intercommunal problem which started back in 1954 over *enosis*, but as an international issue between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots.

20. The Greek Cypriot side is trying to present the problem as a Turkish aggression, as a Turkish occupation of Greek Cypriot land, as a simple land dispute or a simple refugee problem which, when solved, would solve the problem of Cyprus and turn the island into a paradise. But the truth must not be concealed or ignored.

21. For the Turks, the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974. It started in 1954. The problem cannot be solved by putting the clock back to the pre-intervention days of 1974, thus leaving the Greek Cypriot leadership free to complete its programme against the Turks. And, to judge from his address yesterday to the General Assembly, that is exactly what Mr. Christophides wants. The problem is an important political problem resting on the question of what to do with an independence, brought about under agreed terms by two national communities, which the Greek side attempted to destroy.

22. Fundamentally, the Cyprus problem is that of ensuring the continuation of the bicomunal, biregional independence of the island. It is the problem of guaranteeing the status and security of the life and property of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has suffered innumerable hardships and misery trying to preserve the independence of the island.

23. As so often stated, the Turkish side stands for the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. No one can

question this in the light of our resistance to Greek Cypriot attempts to unite the island with Greece over the last 12 years.

24. We stand for territorial integrity—in the sense that the island shall not be united, in whole or in part, with any other country—as provided by our Constitution of 1960; and we stand for non-alignment, which we regard as a sincere aim and not a means of uniting the island with Greece. Within that framework we ask for biregional federation, and hence political equality, which is embedded in all federal arrangements, so that the past cannot be repeated at our expense.

25. Our proposals at the intercommunal talks have been motivated and dictated by past experience. Our main objective is to create a new structure which would prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate past. We want a set-up which will encourage respect and co-operation between equals. Cyprus is unique in many respects and unless the problem is diagnosed very carefully and correctly the solution, if achieved, will not be effective or lasting.

26. The Turkish Cypriot community still considers the intercommunal talks to be the best, in fact the only, method for solving the Cyprus problem. But the talks must be taken seriously and political propaganda must cease. There can be no meaningful negotiations, and certainly not on terms of equality, if the Greek Cypriot leaders consider themselves completely free to usurp all procedural rules in order to achieve, in international forums, one-sided resolutions which run completely contrary to and contradict everything said and done at the intercommunal talks.

27. Again, there can be no meaningful negotiations while the Greek Cypriot side's sole aim continues to be to treat the Turkish community as non-existent in the island and while the problem of Cyprus is looked upon not as a problem which has arisen from the policy of *enosis* followed by the Church in Athens but as a problem which will be solved the moment Turkey abandons all Turkish Cypriots to the mercy of the *enosis*-bound Greek Cypriot community and its murderous underground organizations.

28. The Greek Cypriot leaders, who for 12 years did nothing to solve the problem but, on the contrary, did everything possible to aggravate the situation in order to erode the rights and status of the Turkish Cypriot community with a view to removing all impediments to union with Greece—and, for this purpose, led the island from crisis to crisis—those who closed their eyes to the destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the existence of 24,000 Turkish refugees for 12 years, and all those who are solely responsible for the present unfortunate state of affairs in Cyprus cannot now demand a solution in a few months.

29. Greek Cypriot leaders must see the realities of Cyprus. My distinguished Greek Cypriot counterpart, Mr. Christophides, was not on the moon when the notorious Akritas Plan was prepared, when secret Greek armies were formed and when Turkish Cypriots were attacked in 1963. Mr. Christophides is an intelligent and literate friend. He cannot pretend ignorance of repeated *enosis* statements made by his leader, Archbishop Makarios. He cannot ignore repeated *enosis* statements made by his Greek colleagues.

He cannot plead ignorance of the fact that as late as May 1975 his leader publicly reaffirmed that he had not deviated at all from his oath of 1950 that he would work for *enosis*.

30. That truism, that self-criticism on the part of the Greek Cypriot leaders, is a must if we are going to talk peace.

31. We also need time, patience and statesmanship. We need goodwill, sincerity and good faith to reorganize the bicomunal state, so that what has happened to us and what has befallen our State in the name of *enosis* cannot be repeated in the future when the Greek Cypriot leaders decide—as they did in December 1963—that international agreements which had solved the problem should no longer be honoured by them, just because they had never looked upon the bicomunal, binational independence as a desired end in itself but merely as a means to an end, namely, union of Cyprus with Greece.

32. If the problem of Cyprus had not been resolved it is not because the differences between the two sides are irreconcilable but because one side, namely, the Greek Cypriot side, is not in favour of an agreement.

33. During the period from 1968 to 1974 there was no solution to the Cyprus problem because Makarios refused to sign an agreement which would close the door to *enosis*. In a statement made public by Archbishop Makarios himself, through his Public Information Office, in May 1975, he said:

“If the talks continue . . . the mistaken impression will be formed that the Cyprus problem is merely a dispute between the two communities and the problem will shift from its present international basis, shrinking to the dimensions of an internal problem of the island.”

34. Archbishop Makarios is also on record as having said that he did not reach an agreement with the Turks in order to prolong his political life. He made that statement to Lawrence Stern of *The Washington Post*, and it was published in the summer 1975 issue of *Foreign Policy*.

35. It is significant to note here that during the last 12 years Archbishop Makarios, as the so-called President of Cyprus, refused to recognize, to meet and/or consult with his Turkish Vice-President; that the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole received no dues, no money, no direct or indirect benefits from the Cyprus budget during that period; and that the Turkish community has had to maintain 26,000 refugees while 103 Turkish villages were in ruins and Turkish-Cypriot-owned land and properties were illegally utilized and exploited by the Greek Cypriots. All foreign aid received by Cyprus was usurped by the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community was not allowed to benefit. That is why Makarios has refused to settle the Cyprus problem for 12 years. He had everything to gain by prolonging the issue.

36. The objective of the Greek Cypriot side in resorting to this discriminatory treatment and to delaying tactics was to achieve the internal collapse of the Turkish Cypriot community, which was deprived of all its legitimate and

constitutional rights and was left without any administrative or economic base. Time, for the Greek Cypriot side, was a new weapon to be used against the Turkish Cypriots. While time ran against us, the Greek Cypriots put in an appearance at every international forum as “the Government of Cyprus”—we saw a repetition of this play-acting yesterday. Our protestations that they represented no one except themselves were effectively nullified by their well-known propaganda tactics. Negotiations continued but with no result, because we were told that in order to get our financial dues from the budget of Cyprus, in order to enable our refugees to return to their homes in 103 destroyed villages, and in order to be able to live in Cyprus in comparative peace, we should first accept the Greek Cypriot concept of a settlement.

37. That Greek concept was that we should forgo our co-founder partnership status in the independence of Cyprus. We heard Mr. Christophides yesterday. He continues to believe that Makarios is Cyprus. If Makarios occupies the presidential seat, no matter how, all is well for Cyprus; even the past 12 years’ misrule seems to have been quite in order. The Greek Cypriots wanted us to agree to a form of independence which, according to Makarios, would be “the feasible solution, a presently attainable solution for the Greek Cypriots”. This “attainable” or “feasible” solution was defined for the Greek Cypriot community as “a solution aimed at attaining better conditions for the full realization of the national aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus without excluding union with Greece”.

38. That was the main reason why no solution was found to the Cyprus problem during the period from 1963 to 1974. We, as the Turkish Cypriots of Cyprus, were in a very bad position, but we knew that if we bowed to the policy of the “feasible solution” which Archbishop Makarios was trying to force upon us, we would lose our freedom, and our inalienable rights in the independence of Cyprus would be destroyed for ever.

39. We chose to resist, at great cost and sacrifice, this attempt to destroy our independence. The Greek Cypriot leaders went around the world pretending that all was well with Cyprus except that there was some trouble with the extremist Turkish Cypriot elements—that is how Mr. Christophides tried to present the case yesterday. To their own people each week they preached that the present state of affairs—namely, a Greek Cypriot administration getting away with the deception that it represented the whole of Cyprus—was the nearest thing to *enosis* and that the “feasible solution”, when achieved, would not in any way bar *enosis*. Yesterday we heard nothing from Mr. Christophides about *enosis*. He spoke a great deal about his country and independence but said not a single word about an independence closed to *enosis*.

40. Archbishop Makarios, however, was able to state publicly that he would never sign a new agreement which barred *enosis*. But in the meantime the world was told that the Turkish Cypriots were intransigent and were resorting to delaying tactics. The same accusation was levelled against us yesterday by Mr. Christophides.

41. The negotiator of the Turkish Cypriot community, the person directly concerned with the whole problem, is here.

If he is not allowed to address the plenary meeting of the Assembly, how will you decide on these issues? Mr. Denktaş is here in New York waiting for a chance to put before you all the facts, the true facts about Cyprus. If Mr. Christophides is not afraid of the truth, why is he shielding himself behind rules and regulations in trying to stop the Turkish voice from being heard?

42. Everything that was said and proposed in the three rounds of talks in Vienna, and in the fourth round of talks in New York—which, incidentally, was sabotaged by the Greek side for ulterior political motives—is on record with the Secretary-General. In any case, some of it has already been made public.

43. In Vienna, contrary to wilful Greek propaganda, progress had been achieved, and had the Greek side continued negotiations, more progress would have been made. We might in fact have been very close to a final settlement today. Why have the intercommunal talks been interrupted? Mr. Denktaş is here to give you all the facts. Will you not hear him? If you do not hear him, how will you ask him to continue the negotiations in the future “under conditions of equality”?

44. The reason behind the sabotaging of the talks is really very simple. So long as Makarios is the one that runs the show and so long as he remains faithful to his 1950 oath to realize *enosis* during his lifetime—and he says he has never deviated from that oath—he will not come to any agreement with us on a biregional federation, a federal State which is closed to *enosis*. That would be too much of a compromise in view of his holy oath. Even as late as 1974 Makarios declared: “. . . To me independence is a compromise. In other words, if I had a free choice between *enosis* and independence, I would support *enosis*.” How does one arrive at a fair settlement with a leader so apathetic about realities as that?

45. If the Cyprus problem is still outstanding, if the talks have been interrupted, the Greeks have only themselves to blame, and no one else. It is the Greek side which took the talks lightly and preferred international propaganda to serious negotiations. It is the Greek side which kept running from one international forum to the other, trying to deceive the world about the true nature of the Cyprus problem. It is the Greek side which has always insisted and still insists on ignoring present realities and demands a solution which disregards the past.

46. It is easy for the Greeks to utilize their effective propaganda machinery and make use of the well-known Greek lobby to influence various Governments and world public opinion; but that sort of approach cannot and will not solve our problem. If we want a political settlement, we have to be realistic. It is no use trying to ignore the Turkish Cypriot community. It is no use trying to deny the present realities.

47. And what are these realities? Is the Akritas Plan for the destruction of our independence not a reality? Is the December attack on the Turkish community with intent to abrogate the 1960 Agreements not the main reality? Is the resistance to all this by the Turkish Cypriot community not a reality? And are we to forget the thousands of Turks who

have been killed or maimed and the thousands of homes that have been destroyed, all in the name of *enosis*?

48. Yesterday, Mr. Christophides talked of destruction, of war, of homes destroyed and of refugees. Are we to forget that he is now shedding crocodile tears about those and forgetting that for 12 years Turks stood on the receiving side? How can he disregard the fact that what happened in July 1974 was the direct result of a 12-year-old attempt to destroy the Turkish community, remove the impediments to *enosis* and unite the island with Greece? How can we shut our eyes to the fact that but for our resistance and for Turkey, Greece would have colonized the island several times in the past?

49. Mr. Christophides may feel sorry that Turkey, acting within its rights, cut short—after a 12-year wait—this *enosis* movement. Makarios may be very upset that the Turkish Cypriot community, which he always depicted as “a national and religious enemy”, has been saved and strengthened. But all these are our reasons for joy and for thanksgiving. And in that you can see the paradox of Cyprus.

50. Mr. Christophides cannot make even a child believe that once Turkey pulls out of Cyprus all will be well. If Turkey’s withdrawal is untimely and takes place before a satisfactory settlement, we know what will befall us. Mr. Christophides must know that my community has been waging a struggle for survival against Archbishop Makarios since 1950—when he declared that he would achieve *enosis* during his lifetime—and since 1955 members of our community have actually been dying in order to arrest this *enosis* policy. How can he ask us now to believe him or his leader? How can he pretend that the two communities can live in peace and harmony by putting the clock back to the pre-coup days of 1974?

51. These are the present realities which must be taken into account if we are to have a settlement at all, and if we are to maintain the independence of the island.

52. What is Makarios doing to bring about a political settlement? What is he doing to prevent further separation from becoming deeper and more permanent? Has he considered the Turkish community’s proposals for a transitional joint federal Government [A/10256-S/11825, annex, appendix I]? Has he accepted the Turkish community’s proposals for normalization of everyday life in as many fields as possible by running some services jointly, with a view to easing tension and paving the way for a political settlement? Has he responded to our sincere call for a political truce, to put an end to heated acrimonious discussions in international forums, which only help to make positions more rigid and inflexible?

53. On the contrary, he is doing just the opposite. He is doing all he can to bring about further separation and mistrust between the two communities. He is doing everything to push the Turkish Cypriot community into further and deeper separation. Makarios has repeatedly and publicly declared that he will not sign an agreement within the framework of the present realities—an agreement which will legalize the present *de facto* situation on the island.

54. The following are only a few examples of Greek Cypriot policy and determined action to isolate the Turkish Cypriot community, cut it off from the outside world and ultimately render it stateless.

55. Within the framework of the transitional joint federal Government, we officially asked Mr. Clerides, at the third round of talks in Vienna and the fourth round of talks in New York, to give us a few thousand Republican passports for use by the Turkish Cypriot community, and agreed to submit regular returns showing to whom the passports have been issued and when. The Greek Cypriot representatives refused. But when we issued our own travel documents to enable members of our community to travel abroad, they wrote to all foreign Governments asking them not to recognize those travel documents, and thus denied freedom of movement abroad to the Turkish Cypriots.

56. Likewise, they have officially approached all foreign Governments and made attempts to block all exports originating in North Cyprus from entering the world market, by putting out false propaganda and trying to create the wrong impression that all agricultural produce exported by North Cyprus is or was Greek-owned. This they did forgetting that almost half of the grapes—the biggest single agricultural product in South Cyprus—grown in the South are from Turkish-Cypriot-owned vineyards, and have for the last two years been harvested and marketed by the Greeks or utilized in Greek-Cypriot-owned wine production.

57. They have declared all ports and airports in North Cyprus "illegal" and threatened to take legal action against all vessels and aircraft using them, thus trying to cut us off from the outside world.

58. For the past 12 years they have refused postal services to all Turkish towns and villages, but when as an act of necessity we issued our own stamps and established our own postal services, they blamed us for wanting separation.

59. The Greek Cypriot administration still continues to pocket all foreign aid received by Cyprus from outside, and North Cyprus is not allowed to benefit from it.

60. Makarios went as far as to threaten to freeze all deposits of the Turkish banks with the Central Bank of Cyprus. If he does that and in consequence we are forced to issue our own currency, who will be working for more separation?

61. If this state of affairs is allowed to continue and we are forced to take appropriate measures to rectify this anomalous situation, can this possibly be considered as a unilateral move by the Turkish Cypriot community towards further separate or full independence?

62. Forgetting all the inhuman treatment which they have inflicted on the Turks for the last 12 years, the Greek Cypriots are trying to present the Cyprus problem as having started in 1974, and to use the legitimate and justified Turkish intervention as a pretext for rendering us "stateless", as an excuse for continuing their policy of discrimination and for continuing to ignore the very existence of the Turkish Cypriot community.

63. We are constantly being pressed to make a choice between withdrawal of Turkish troops, and suffering the continuation of Makarios' above-cited policy and actions, in other words, "Greek aggression". Well, the Turkish Cypriot community has made its choice. The Turkish Cypriot community has the right and the status to determine its own future—the right of self-determination. The Turkish Cypriot community will never agree to a state of statelessness. We shall never abandon or concede our right of equality as a co-founder partner of the Republic of Cyprus.

64. In our view, therefore, this recourse to the United Nations was not necessitated by facts or developments. It was made as a result of a political decision by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

65. The question is, therefore, whether the United Nations will encourage Archbishop Makarios to continue with the process of internationalizing the Cyprus problem at the risk of destroying all chances of meaningful negotiations or whether the international community will support the intercommunal negotiations so that the two communities share the responsibility of rearranging their home on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Equality and respect cannot be established while one side, taking full advantage of procedural rules, is allowed to carry on its campaign of maligning the other partner.

66. We have come to New York with an open mind, hoping that a constructive debate would be conducted and some positive elements would emerge in the course of the debate which would facilitate the resumption of the intercommunal talks and contribute towards an early settlement.

67. To our great surprise, however, the Greek Cypriot delegation has submitted a draft resolution [A/L.769] which completely ignores present realities on the island and directly contradicts what has been negotiated and agreed upon in principle during the intercommunal talks in Vienna. This shows that the Greek Cypriot leadership is still determined to follow its policy of the last 12 years which was to disregard the Turkish Cypriot community, render it stateless and try, in time, to suppress or eliminate it by all means possible.

68. This draft resolution shows that the attitude of the Greeks to the Cyprus problem has not changed. The aim continues to be international propaganda. A sincere desire to find a solution to the problem does not exist. If this draft resolution is adopted by the General Assembly, if this approach of the Greek Cypriot side to the problem is endorsed by the world body, especially before the Turkish Cypriot side, an equal co-founder partner of the Cyprus Republic, is even heard at all levels, I regret to say that it will kill negotiations and render a final peaceful political settlement very difficult, if not impossible.

69. I do not intend to elaborate on the draft resolution, or touch on any fundamental issues in my statement today because the draft resolution and the substance of the Cyprus problem will be debated at the plenary meetings in the next few days and Mr. Denktas, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkish Cypriot negotiator in the intercommunal talks, is here in New York and has asked to

be allowed to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on Cyprus, to present the Turkish Cypriot view on the Cyprus problem at the highest level and in the most authoritative manner.

70. I do hope that in the name of natural justice, he will be afforded equal treatment with the Greek Cypriot side and be given the opportunity to address the plenary meeting and answer any questions raised during the debate so that the final draft resolution will be adopted after both parties to the problem have been heard.

71. Resolution 3212 (XXIX) of the General Assembly calls upon the two communities to continue negotiations, with a view to finding a final settlement, "on an equal footing". This just and reasonable request will no doubt be repeated this year. But how can the two communities negotiate on terms of equality when one of them can continue to pretend that it represents Cyprus as a whole at all international forums? How can that degree of goodwill so necessary for the continuation of the talks be generated when one of the parties under an assumed authority can tell the world that the Turkish community is politically non-existent on the island?

72. The status of equality of the Turkish Cypriot community must be reaffirmed and proved by the General Assembly in word as well as in deed, by allowing that community to participate in the deliberations of the Assembly on Cyprus; otherwise, the Greek Cypriot leadership will grow more intransigent and continue to seek new excuses for abandoning the intercommunal talks and running to the United Nations.

73. If Cyprus is to have peace and tranquillity again, if the island is to continue as an independent island, the equal status of the two national communities must be reconfirmed and Makarios should be given to understand that he is not, and cannot be, the sole representative of Cyprus. He forfeited this right when he armed the Greek Cypriots to

the teeth and attacked the Turkish Cypriot community, a part of his people, with the sole aim of forcing us into submission and achieving *enosis* in 1963.

74. Disregarding the past, while resolving on the present, can only compromise the final settlement and the independence of the island. Had we, for example, received in 1963, and thereafter, the interest and understanding of the United Nations which we partially receive today, the history of Cyprus would most probably have followed a different course from its present one.

75. The Greek Cypriot leadership, seeing that the problem was being tackled in its present perspective, would not have been as intransigent as it has been; the Turkish Cypriot community would not have suffered as much as it has done; Turkish rights on the island would not have been as harshly violated; the Greek appetite for annexing Cyprus would not have grown out of all proportion and the unfortunate coup of July 1974—in which Greeks killed more than 2,000 Greek Cypriots—would not have taken place. Most probably there would be a happy, prospering island today and the General Assembly would not have been burdened with a thorny problem, artificially created with a view to destroying an independence by misapplying all United Nations principles.

76. We hope that the General Assembly, through its present deliberations and the draft resolution it adopts at the end of the current discussions, will prepare the necessary ground and atmosphere for the resumption of the intercommunal talks, and pave the way for an early peaceful settlement.

77. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker on my list has a statement of approximately one and a half hours' duration; we shall therefore adjourn now and hear him this afternoon.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

976th meeting

Wednesday, 12 November 1975, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/PV.976*

AGENDA ITEM 125

Question of Cyprus (*concluded*) (A/10242, A/10256-S/11825, A/10276-S/11840, A/10282-S/11844, A/10283-S/11845, A/10292-S/11847, A/10305-S/11854, A/10310-S/11859, A/10322-S/11860, A/10323, A/10343-S/11875, A/10351, A/L.769, A/L.773, A/SPC/175, A/SPC/178)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Pursuant to the decisions adopted by the General Assembly [2367th and 2401st plenary meetings] on agenda item 125

entitled "Question of Cyprus", the Committee heard, at this morning's meeting [975th meeting] the views of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. I now invite the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, to make his statement.

2. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): I am very grateful for having this opportunity to address the Special Political Committee on the true facts about Cyprus and for having been allowed to attempt to clear up and to

* Verbatim record (see 975th meeting, para. 1).

dispel several of the myths and distortions of the truth that have been attempted here and elsewhere.

3. The General Assembly, in its wisdom and after long and protracted consultations between all parties, has already decided [*2367th plenary meeting*]¹—and it was announced by its President as a decision of that body—that the full views of the two main communities of Cyprus should be heard by the Special Political Committee, which was convened for that purpose. That is in fact why the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community and myself are both here today and this is the opportunity that we have to give a full account of our views and to state our respective positions.

4. It is difficult therefore, to reconcile this view with the claim, made so persistently and at length, for Mr. Denktaş to appear and address the General Assembly. If he wanted his views to be heard, why is he not here? Is Mr. Çelik not expressing the Turkish Cypriot views? If not, whose views is he expressing before this august body? Is it really by chance that Mr. Denktaş is asking to air the views of the Turkish Cypriot community, that he is asking so persistently to be allowed to address the General Assembly, or is it something else?

5. We have heard a rather incomprehensible view, or should I say a muted threat, that if Mr. Denktaş is not permitted to address the General Assembly, he will be led to further separatist and partitionist attitudes, and therefore, in order to preserve the unity of Cyprus, Mr. Denktaş, we were told, must appear and speak in the General Assembly. But is not his very presence there, in the capacity in which he has asked to be present, a living symbol of the very partition that theoretically he is trying to avoid by seeking the right to address the General Assembly? Is he not asking to be in the Assembly in order not to air the views of the Turkish Cypriot community—since they have indeed very eloquently been expressed here this morning—but in order just to stress the fact that there exist now in Cyprus two separate States, and therefore his presence there will be the very living symbol of that view?

6. The very choice of the title that he is using for exercising that right is also very revealing. Apparently he is signing the request, to be so permitted to address the General Assembly, as Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. Yet, there are scores of letters and documents—and I am sure I need not remind the representatives here of that—which have been circulated on his behalf, and these documents of the United Nations are signed by him as the President of the Turkish Federated State. The agility in choosing titles as they fit circumstances or aims should not be lost upon the representatives here.

7. It is this selective choice of roles, this selective choice from the Constitution of Cyprus, this selective choice of parts of resolution 3212 (XXIX) which is glossing over the real issues behind the Cyprus question. That is what is tending to confuse the issue and make an otherwise clear issue appear as a rather complicated problem. This is so because the underlying issues are purposely confused in order to gloss over the starkly clear issue before the Assembly. This issue is singularly clear, and I am asking the representatives, in their deliberations, to bear in mind what

the real issue, the real question of Cyprus, is. It is a question of aggression by a powerful and expansionist country, Turkey, against a defenceless, small and non-aligned country, Cyprus. There exists in Cyprus today, and continues to exist in Cyprus as we are talking here, a military aggression which threatens the very existence of Cyprus as an independent State and as a non-aligned country. If the occupation of Cyprus by a powerful and important NATO [*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*] ally, Turkey, is allowed to continue, then the survival of Cyprus as an independent State must be considered as untenable.

8. Nobody must have any illusion that the Greek Cypriot population can for long hope to preserve Cyprus as an independent State against the pressure of Turkish military might, which is in occupation of 40 per cent of the most productive and best developed area of Cyprus. Sooner or later, Cyprus will be subjugated and subjected to unbearable pressure, and Cyprus will face new attempts to absorb it by one or another of the groups seeking support for its independence and the safeguarding of its non-alignment.

9. Just over a year ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 2275th plenary meeting on 1 November 1974,¹ considered the Cyprus question as item 110 on its agenda and unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX).

10. It should be stressed that in that unanimous vote, the vote of Turkey was also included, because Turkey, together with all other nations, solemnly, and I assume after due consideration, gave its affirmative vote to that resolution. Turkey, like every other Member State of the United Nations, by virtue of being a Member, is bound by the Charter of the United Nations to respect and implement United Nations resolutions and, more particularly so, resolutions which are adopted unanimously and for which it votes.

11. Members will recall that that resolution was the outcome of a very laborious effort by the Contact Group of Five of the non-aligned group of countries, and after consultation with all interested parties, it was made possible, through the untiring efforts of that Group—to whom our thanks must go—to reach a consensus of opinion. We accepted that resolution, though it fell short of pointing out the stark truth, that of the Turkish aggression, because we were taught, and we accepted it, that it was more important at the time to find a consensus of opinion, a resolution for which Turkey also would have voted, so that Turkey would have also been bound by it. In the operative part of the resolution, it must be recalled, the General Assembly, among many other things, calls upon all States “to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it”. It also urges “the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs”. It also considers “that all the refugees”—and I stress “all the refugees”—“should return to

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2275th meeting.*

their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end”.

12. The problem of Cyprus was also considered at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries,² and its Declaration,³ in similar but stricter terms, asked for the immediate withdrawal from Cyprus of all military forces and for the urgent and unconditional return of all the refugees to their homes.

13. Over 12 months have elapsed since the unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), and several months since the Lima Declaration, and naturally and legitimately we are here again before this august body, as the people directly concerned with resolution 3212 (XXIX), to pose some questions to all those who voted for it, and that means, all the Member States: What happened to that resolution? Has the determination expressed through the unanimous adoption of that resolution been heeded? And, if not, what do they intend to do about it? Are they to be indifferent, or perhaps sympathetic observers, watching such an expression of their considered opinion and intention being so arrogantly and provocatively trampled upon and ignored? Are they going to disregard such effrontery and contempt for their decisions?

14. That is why we are here today, and this is my answer to the question “What are we doing here instead of being at the negotiating table of the intercommunal talks?”

15. These are the questions Cyprus now poses to the world Assembly. These are the questions which Cyprus poses to the non-aligned group, to all those who believe that the solution of international disputes must be sought and pursued through meaningful negotiations, through peaceful means and not through the threat and exercise of armed force.

16. Much was said and heard this morning in this debate; but when all the statements are stripped of their political nomenclature and of double-talk and diplomatic niceties, the basic issue and the stark reality of the problem is revealed, and all it boils down to is this: Has Turkey complied with that resolution? Has Turkey complied with the resolution it voted for, which was unanimously approved on 1 November 1974, or not? What has Turkey's attitude been towards that resolution and all the resolutions of the Security Council? Unfortunately, sadly, the only answer that can truthfully be given is that Turkey's attitude has been one of contemptuous disregard for and non-compliance with any of the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and of all the subsequent resolutions of the Security Council. There has been no withdrawal of any Turkish troops from the island, speedy or otherwise. No measures have been taken to return the refugees to their homes, urgent or otherwise. In fact, not a single one of the approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees has been allowed to return to his home and property. There has been no cessation of Turkish military interference in Cyprus, and no respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

That phrase has become a cliché. For Turkey, it has become a meaningless cliché that for us amounts almost to sarcasm; for how can a country, especially Turkey, speak of respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus when Turkey's military forces exercise full and absolute control over 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus and over the Turkish Cypriot population residing there? How can a country, especially Turkey, speak of respect for the sovereignty of Cyprus and in the same breath advocate solutions contrary to that sovereignty, and actually impose such solutions on Cyprus by the force of its arms? How can one speak of respect for such sovereignty, when Turkish military forces prohibit entry into 40 per cent of the area of the Republic not only to officials and officers of the Republic of Cyprus for the purpose of carrying out the attributes of sovereignty, but even to the indigenous inhabitants of such areas, the legal and lawful owners of the houses and properties in the occupied 40 per cent of the area who have been driven away from their homes by force of arms?

17. Here in this assembly we have heard the Turkish Cypriot representative welcome, not condemn, the occupation of Cypriot land by Turkish troops. He almost expressed satisfaction and was gloating over the fact that the military intervention is continuing and is likely to continue until such time as Turkey, not the Turkish Cypriots, is satisfied that a satisfactory solution to the Cyprus problem may be found.

18. But this selective choice of words from resolutions and decisions has also been exhibited in many other ways. We have heard about negotiation. We were asked whether it would not be more useful to have been at the negotiating table for the talks, rather than being here. We have been told we should view these negotiations with an open mind, and yet in the same breath, almost in the same phrase, we were told that if a resolution is adopted, then that would be the sure death of those negotiations.

19. Why this fear of publicly airing views? Why this reluctance to have international bodies consider the true facts about Cyprus? Because some people prefer behind-the-scenes negotiating, where it is not truth and principles which decide the outcome but might and military force.

20. It has also been said that if we continue to “internationalize”, as it was called, the Cyprus issue, then the Turkish Cypriot community will feel free to proceed to a unilateral declaration of independence. Well, it is strange that, of all the five main items that were included in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), only the part which deals with the intercommunal talks was selected for reference here, and, not even on that part—either now or earlier—has any firm proposal been made as to how the talks should proceed, or as to how they were expected to reach a fruitful solution.

21. How can one refer to the talks out of context, as if the other part of the resolution did not exist? How can one expect that a free and substantive resolution aiming at reaching a solution freely accepted by the parties, which will take note of the legitimate and fundamental rights of both communities, can be implemented when one of the sides is threatening at any unfortunate turn of the talks, at

² Held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975.

³ See document A/10217.

any hint of an impasse, the use of military might in order to assure the choice of a solution that has been predetermined? Indeed, in operative paragraph 4, resolution 3212 (XXIX) calls for continuation of the negotiations, but the words “with a view to reaching freely a mutually, acceptable political settlement, based on their”—that is, the communities—fundamental and legitimate rights” must not be forgotten.

22. Under a later resolution of the Security Council, resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, such talks were placed “under his [*the Secretary-General's*] personal auspices and with his direction”.

23. In pursuance of these resolutions there have indeed been negotiations between representatives of the two communities in Cyprus, or should I perhaps say that those negotiations were turned by the Turkish side into a mockery. The Turkish side has turned the negotiating procedure into a travesty, and it was given to procrastination rather than to negotiation. There have been three rounds, three attempts at such talks in Vienna, or perhaps four, if one is to include the abortive round in New York in September 1975. At the New York round, the negotiators simply met only once face to face, and that was just in order simply to agree that they had disagreed, or, perhaps more accurately, in order to be informed of the text of the Secretary-General's statement—not even an agreed communiqué—which said, “. . . A formal meeting was held on 10 September. In the absence of concrete proposals, the talks were adjourned. The Secretary-General will remain in contact with the two parties as regards further action.”⁴ This statement to the press on the so-called negotiations accurately sums up the result of these efforts and is in every respect very illuminating. After one whole year and after four rounds of talks, there are not even concrete proposals and not even a basis was found on which to commence serious and meaningful negotiations.

24. The Greek Cypriot side did submit its proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem on 10 February 1975 and, at later rounds of talks, the Greek Cypriot side submitted detailed documents, outlining its views further on certain points of the said proposals. Those proposals are languishing in files and have never been the subject of any meaningful negotiating. So when there are no “concrete proposals” on the negotiating table, the blame cannot be laid on the Greek Cypriot side.

25. At three of these four meetings, the Turkish Cypriot side was asked to submit its proposals on all aspects of the problem, and on each and every occasion a clear and unequivocal promise, a commitment, was given that such proposals would be forthcoming. On each and every occasion the Turkish Cypriot side, although firmly committed to placing its proposals on the negotiating table, always failed to do so, and instead of putting forward proposals it put forward pretexts and excuses as to why it had failed to do so or why it was impossible to do so. On one occasion it was the continuation of the arms embargo, since lifted, which the United States Congress had imposed

on military aid to Turkey, on another it was the indecision of the military leaders in Turkey; on yet another it was the then forthcoming elections in Turkey, since carried out and concluded. Be that as it may, until this day, no Turkish Cypriot proposals on all aspects of the problem—and I stress the words, “all aspects of the problem”—have been submitted. It is very significant that the excuses given for such a failure were never related to the Turkish Cypriot community as such, or to any of its problems or to its own circumstances, but were always related to the internal and external political situation of an outsider, that is, Turkey.

26. The views expressed at the meetings by the Turkish Cypriot side, even in response to the suggestions of the Secretary-General and his gestures of goodwill towards implementation of that part of resolution 3212 (XXIX) which related to the desire “that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety”—implementation of which is, of course, not negotiable but mandatory, since resolution 3212 (XXIX) was endorsed by the Security Council [*resolution 365 (1974)*—were not decided upon by the Turkish Cypriot leadership but by the Turkish Government in Ankara.

27. So much for the much-heralded and oft-declared respect of Ankara and Turkey for the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus demanded by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 367 (1975).

28. At the third round of talks in Vienna the Turkish Cypriot representative firmly committed himself to submitting full and complete proposals prior to the holding of the fourth round in New York and, in answer to direct questions by the Secretary-General, a firm commitment was given that there would be no further delays and that proposals would definitely be submitted prior to the meeting so that serious and meaningful negotiations would be possible in New York. We all know what happened in New York in September, and the aforementioned press statement is quite revealing. No proposals were submitted and no negotiations were carried out, and yet we heard here this morning that there had been progress in Vienna. Again, an opportune choice of words. Progress achieved in Vienna did not relate to the eventual solution of the Cyprus problem but to side issues, or should I say it was progress towards the implementation of the designs of Turkey for the total separation of the population and the total partition of the island. Yet if it is stated here that there had been progress, then I find it hard to understand how the Secretary-General, under whose personal guidance and auspices these talks are being carried out, could publicly state that he is not prepared to participate any longer in such negotiations unless a concrete basis for them is found.

29. So much for the negotiations which, as I have pointed out, are the only point of resolution 3212 (XXIX) that the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community chose to refer to.

30. It is very relevant and very important, however, to try to identify the true reasons why the type of negotiations called for in the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions are and will remain impossible. Those reasons must be identified. They must, if possible, be eliminated so

⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1975, document S/11789/Add.1.*

that meaningful and constructive negotiations may become possible. We hope that they will be so identified, and a great contribution towards their elimination will be made if, by another resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, they are identified clearly as the continuation of the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, the continued presence in Cyprus of Turkish invading troops and their use in carrying out the type of *faits accomplis* which we have been witnessing in the last 12 months—the true reasons why the negotiations cannot possibly culminate in “reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement”.

31. As long as Turkey seems interested in carrying out talks for the sole purpose, as it seems to be doing, of legitimizing through our signature its military invasion and occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus, as long as Turkey is using the Turkish troops on the island to make us “accept the new realities”—obviously realities imposed by armed force—and as long as it is using its forces on the island fully to control and even oppress the Turkish Cypriot community and as a permanent threat of further military action against the Greek Cypriots, the negotiations are not and cannot be constructively and freely carried out “with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights”, that is, of both communities.

32. It was said this morning, and we were told in no uncertain terms, that the current debate will produce yet another resolution, but not a solution. That is indicative of the importance that the Turkish Cypriot side—and of course Turkey—attributes to the debate in the United Nations. They are questioning the very existence of the United Nations and the usefulness of any debate being carried out in this august body under any circumstances. This attitude of mind and the reasons on which this frame of mind is based are the true reasons why the negotiations have not until now truly started and cannot do so in the future, let alone progress.

33. These reasons must be correctly identified and appreciated in all their ramifications and categorically rejected in the General Assembly resolution.

34. For intercommunal talks to progress and, hopefully, reach a mutually acceptable political settlement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of both communities on the island, there must be the withdrawal of all foreign troops, as resolution 3212 (XXIX) has urged—and we have yet to hear an unconditional commitment that there will be compliance with that part of the resolution; and all refugees must return to their homes and urgent measures to that end must be taken by all the parties concerned, as resolution 3212 (XXIX) has called upon the parties to do. The policy and tactics of trying to consolidate the occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus through *faits accomplis* effected and supported and made possible only by the presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus must be rejected as a method of reaching a negotiated settlement. The two communities in Cyprus must be left alone, without any outside interference, to conduct meaningful negotiations. This is the substance of the draft resolution submitted by Cyprus [A/L.769] which is now pending before the General Assembly.

35. Why is it so offensive? Why should it be “the grave of any further negotiations”, when that resolution asks, in effect, for nothing more than a reaffirmation of the unanimous view taken by this Assembly last year, and only adds that *faits accomplis*—and the now attempted colonization of Cyprus is one such *fait accompli*—cannot be accepted as a method or as an avenue for reaching a freely and mutually acceptable political settlement? I could understand it if the resolution was offensive and unacceptable to Turkey, because it is Turkey’s aggression that the resolution identifies as the real reason why progress cannot be made. But why should it be objectionable to the Turkish Cypriots?

36. Turkey has not complied with any of these principles. Furthermore, never once has it expressed itself as being firmly committed to complying with those principles which have been incorporated, by the unanimous decision of the General Assembly, in its resolution 3212 (XXIX), and in Security Council resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) which, since they are Security Council resolutions, are mandatory. They have not been complied with because there was never any intention of complying with such principles, because Turkey has other designs and other aims in mind concerning Cyprus.

37. The Cyprus question is not one of a constitutional dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It is not over what happened 20 or 10 years ago. It is what happened last year and what is happening now that are the crux of the matter. Certainly the Cyprus question did not start last year, but the campaign for the abolition of the Cyprus State commenced last year.

38. Furthermore, the very nature and conduct of the Turkish military operation in Cyprus were and are contrary to the declared purposes of the Treaty of Guarantee,⁵ which was used by Turkey as a pretext for invading the island, because they are directed at destroying, instead of protecting, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; they are aimed at abolishing the constitutional order and the *status quo* established by the Constitution and which, under the Treaty of Establishment⁶ and the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had undertaken to uphold and support. Even if Turkey’s initial pretensions did confuse some people, its continued occupation of Cyprus and the policies it has been following since then must be held to reveal to all that the invasion had nothing to do with the re-establishment of constitutional order or the protection of Turkish Cypriots. More and more Turkey’s true nature and intentions are becoming clear to all.

39. Now, almost 18 months later, not only has the constitutional order—which Turkey had guaranteed and which, allegedly, it aimed through its invasion to re-establish—not been accepted by Turkey, but Turkey is openly and publicly advocating other constitutional orders; it is openly declaring the total abolition of that constitutional order and promoting its replacement by a new constitutional order which, whether it is disguised as bizonal federation or, whether it is more truly the pursuit of a

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475, p. 3.

⁶ Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5476, p. 8).

confederation, or whether it is referred to under any other name, amounts only to partition, which partition, by the said Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey is bound to prevent.

40. The solution advocated by Turkey is nothing else but partition of the island into two separate and distinct zones which are, however, not pre-existing zones, but zones that can only be brought about by the forcible and heartless uprooting of about 300,000 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, that is, just over half of the total population of Cyprus. And once this heartless and forcible uprooting has taken place and the separate zones are thus technically created, we are told, we shall attempt to reconnect the zones under some sort of agreement, the transparent aim of which is to disguise the actual partition which is already in process of being implemented.

41. But it has also been said that another aim of the invasion was to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. It has already been pointed out that under the Treaty of Guarantee Turkey had simply guaranteed the *status quo*, the constitutional order of Cyprus. Under that guarantee, Turkey is not the protector of any one individual or of any one community on the island, but it is the guarantor of the constitutional order for the whole population of the island, because none of the three guarantors is the guarantor of any one of the communities on the island: Greece is not the guarantor of the Greek Cypriot community, neither is Britain the guarantor of the British nationals residing on the island. The guarantee has nothing to do with the rights of the individuals; it has to do only with the preservation of the *status quo*. The extent or nature of that guarantee, or how the powers under that guarantee may be exercised is a different matter, and I shall not labour the point any further.

42. However, anybody—and there are very few—who may be allowed to enter the occupied areas of Cyprus will testify that the first to suffer occupation and oppression by the Turkish invading forces are the members of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Opposition Turkish Cypriot newspapers are replete with complaints and reports of that tragic situation under the conditions of occupation. These people are uprooted from their homes, they have been forcibly installed in the looted houses which the Greek Cypriots were forced, also by the use of arms, to abandon—without any consideration of their social and economic needs, their preferences, their skills or their training. Their movements are restricted as much as anybody else's; unemployment is rampant; and their safety, security and property are at the whims of the military Turkish leadership.

43. We have heard before, and we heard again this morning, the repetitions of wholly unsubstantiated allegations against us—these clichés—that in the 12 years since December 1963 the Turkish Cypriots have been the victims of suppression, the victims of discrimination by the Government, and that they were compelled to be segregated in enclaves, deprived of their freedom of movement and of opportunities of economic advancement. All those are false charges, made with the obvious political propaganda purpose in mind of presenting the Turkish Cypriots as suffering at the hands of the Greek Cypriots and thus requiring the military intervention of Turkey to restore their rights.

44. Those false accusations have been persistently made in the past, and if the motive and reason for making such statements seemed to be incomprehensible at the time they were made, since the Turkish invasion it has become obvious: the reason was to lay the foundation and, by pre-emptive justifications, to demonstrate the necessity for the morally, politically and legally unacceptable Turkish invasion.

45. The same false accusations are still being made because now there is an even greater need to justify the same invasion and its continuation, which is in such dire disregard of international world opinion; the latter demands the immediate cessation of the invasion that has continued in utter disregard for and flagrant violation of resolution 3212 (XXIX).

46. In the first place, I should like to mention that the falsity of these charges has been incontrovertibly disclosed and exposed in the past, and I do not think I need elaborate unduly on what should be obvious and manifest to all members of the Assembly. I wish only to refer to some extracts from reports that must be held by all to be incontrovertible and undeniable since they emanate from no less high and independent an authority than the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself.

47. The first quotation is the following:

“... the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation.”⁷

48. I now quote from another report by the Secretary-General:

“The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents.”⁸

That report goes on to say:

“Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy.”⁸

And the report continues:

“The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots. ... the hard-

⁷ Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964, document S/5764, para. 113.

⁸ Ibid., Twentieth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1965, document S/6426, para. 106.

ships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file.”⁸

49. So much for the often-repeated allegation that the seclusion of some of the Turkish Cypriots—because there were never more than 40 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot population so secluded—into enclaves was imposed on them by the Greek Cypriots or that it was made necessary by the attitude of the Government of Cyprus.

50. It should be obvious from what I have said that it was the Turkish leadership that had always pursued and imposed a policy of apartness and segregation, because only through such a policy could the foundations of the partition of the island be laid and the policy made plausible. The acts and policy of Turkey since the invasion and the tactics of creating new realities, as they have been called, through *faits accomplis* are a continuation of that same policy, consistently followed throughout, pursued in disguise through the so-called federal system—which in fact is a confederal system. That appears undeniable. That is exactly what Turkey is pursuing through its policy—a confederation, not a federation. First, they are uprooting people by force from their homes and property, and once two separate zones are thus created, they loosely join them under the guise of a confederate system. Again we encounter the same selective choice of words. That is why we constantly hear so much of the propaganda slogan of “partnership in equality”. Here again is a very deliberate choice of words with a double meaning.

51. We are all for equality. We, the Greek Cypriot side, now demand equality, full and absolute equality of the people, of the individuals. When one has a minority of 18 per cent seeking to separate the land in equal shares, with the vast majority of 80 per cent of the population being restricted to 60 per cent of the land—which is mostly uncultivable and undeveloped—one has inequity and inequality among the people. That is the kind of “partnership in equality” that is well known, I think, to many Member States here, and particularly to the African States. It is this “partnership in equality” which the minority régime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia is preaching and trying to implement by the use of force. Smith also asks the vast majority of the population to join him in a form of “partnership in equality”, to run the affairs of the country “normally”, as he calls it. For the majority to have equal rights, to have also a determining voice in the affairs and the fate of the country, to have also the right to enjoy their property and their houses is not running the affairs of the country normally.

52. We observe this same strange frame of mind regarding the use of the term “fundamental and legitimate rights”—not “equal rights”—for the Greek Cypriots. It seems that the Turkish Cypriot leadership wishes to present the picture as though it were only the Turkish community in Cyprus that has rights which have to be safeguarded. We heard that very phrase this morning. We heard that it is not possible to reach a solution in the negotiations “until the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community are safeguarded”. What about the rights of the Greek Cypriot majority?

53. The idea is sometimes put forward that the Turkish community in Cyprus, which amounts to only 18 per cent

of the total population, a community which owns only 12.6 per cent of the privately owned land—according to records prepared by the British Administration—is fully within its fundamental and legitimate rights in usurping and taking by force 40 per cent of the most fertile, the best, the developed part of the island, while the majority of the population, the 82 per cent of the population, the Greek Cypriot community, the lawful and legal owners of most of the usurped land, have no similar fundamental and legitimate rights.

54. When the Turkish Cypriots are freely given the land usurped, they are exercising their “legitimate” rights. When the Greek Cypriots who own this land, who developed this land with their own money and labour, refuse to accept such *faits accomplis*, when they refuse to accept the usurpation of their lands and properties and of the investments they have made on such lands, where they have lived and prospered for centuries, they are called “intransigent”, they are called slow to accept the new realities of Cyprus.

55. It is perfectly “legitimate”, it is the exercise of the fundamental rights of any Turkish Cypriot, no matter in which part of the island he previously resided, to be allowed, as it has been claimed and granted, freely to move into the occupied area. It is also asked that they should be freely allowed to reside in houses which do not belong to them but which belong to their Greek Cypriot compatriots.

56. The usurpation and exploitation of lands and properties which belong to Greek Cypriot compatriots is being accepted as the exercise of the fundamental and “legitimate” rights of Turkish Cypriots. But for 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to want and to demand nothing more and nothing else than to be allowed freely to return to their homes and properties, which belong to them, in conditions of safety, as resolution 3212 (XXIX) requested, is considered by Turkey to be unacceptable, to be a denial of the present realities of Cyprus.

57. It is the exercise of the legitimate and fundamental right of the 18-per-cent Turkish-Cypriot minority to ask for a 50-per-cent participation—as it is euphemistically termed, “partnership in equality”; but for the Greek majority of 82 per cent, to ask for their fundamental and legitimate rights, including the right to have a say in the fate of their country, is a denial of the realities created by the invasion. I find this a peculiar frame of mind, a peculiar use of words, with different meanings according to whether they refer to Greek Cypriots or to Turkish Cypriots; it seems that there are legitimate rights, there are fundamental rights, but they belong exclusively to the Turkish Cypriots; the same rights cannot be asked for and cannot be granted to the Greek Cypriots.

58. It is in that sense that we also view the much-heralded proposal for a so-called transitional Government [*A/10256-S/11825, annex, appendix I*]. The Special Political Committee may have noticed that the proposal was not for the establishment of “a transitional Government” to govern the island, to exercise its legitimate and sovereign powers over the whole area of Cyprus; it was to be a legitimate Government, a transitional Government which, however, would have a very limited objective: to run certain common

services—nothing more. This is not a proposal for setting up a Government; it is not a first step towards a Government; it is a first step towards undermining the very existence of the Cyprus State.

59. In that respect I should like to quote the statement made by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Clerides, in reply to that proposal, when it was made:

“The Turkish Cypriot proposals for the creation of a transitional joint federal Government, which were sent to me at 5 p.m. this afternoon, and almost immediately released to the public, are totally unacceptable and cannot even form the basis for negotiations. They are aiming at the abolition of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which has international recognition, and a continuation of the occupation by the Turkish forces of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic. No transitional federal Government is possible whilst the Turkish military continue to occupy territories of the Republic.

“Furthermore, the Turkish proposals are so designed as to prejudice the solution of the Cyprus problem by compelling the Greek Cypriot side to accept not only the principle of a biregional Federal State but also the equal representation of the two communities in the central Government, ignoring the fact that the Greek community constitutes 82 per cent of the total population of Cyprus, whilst the Turkish community constitutes only 18 per cent.”

60. Very briefly, I refer to two points raised this morning about the alleged refusal to issue passports to Turkish Cypriot citizens. There is no such refusal. I categorically state that they can obtain passports at any moment that they want by simply applying to any of the appropriate Government authorities. What is objectionable is that the wholesale issue of thousands of passports should be given to the Turkish Cypriot administration for issue at will—and for very good reason, which I hope to explain later in my statement.

61. As for the banks and the alleged threat to freeze the deposits of Turkish depositors with the Central Bank, suffice it to say that no less than three banks are freely operating within the occupied areas, without any restriction whatsoever.

62. Turkey did not invade Cyprus, as Turkey initially alleged and wanted the world to believe, in order to re-establish the constitutional order that Turkey had guaranteed. Nor did Turkey invade in order to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The senseless coup of the defunct Greek military junta was used as a pretext to set in motion an old plan—the old plan of partition of the island of Cyprus into a Greek and into a Turkish zone as a first step, and when the opportunity arose in the future, to annex the whole island. That this was an old plan which Turkey had been following with unique consistency is very obvious from the statements made as far back as 20 years ago by Turkish politicians, by Turkish ministers, and even by one Turkish Prime Minister, and by the statement of the Turkish position on the solution of the Cyprus problem given to the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, and

included in his report to the Secretary-General.⁹ Reference has often been made to these statements and so I shall not unduly tax the patience and time of the Committee by referring to many of them; I shall confine myself to three of them—the most revealing.

63. As early as 1955 the then Foreign Minister of Turkey, the late Mr. Zorlu made no secret at the official forum of the Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held in London in August-September 1955 that Turkey had claims on Cyprus. Mr. Kemal Satir, former Prime Minister of Turkey, in a public statement in 1964 said: “Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey”. In June 1964 Mr. Erkin, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, clearly spelled out the real intentions of Turkey when he said in a newspaper interview: “The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Adriatic coast, to Turkey”.

64. Hardly three months later, on 8 September 1964, the former Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ismet Inonu, addressing the Turkish National Assembly with reference to the Geneva talks of that year, said: “We officially promoted the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the treaties”—meaning the treaties by which the Republic of Cyprus was established.

65. So for each reference that may be made here as to statements made by the Greek Cypriots about *enosis*, I could counter with an equal number of statements made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and by Turkey about partition. The only difference is that while the Greek Cypriots were simply talking about it, Turkey has acted on its pronouncements. It is not the brave talk of the Greek Cypriots about *enosis* which brought the Turkish army to Cyprus. And let us clear up this question of *enosis* once and for all. It is no secret and it is not unknown to this body that the fight was waged against the British colonial administration of the island for the right of self-determination, which was aiming at *enosis*. At least five times recourse was had to the Assembly to achieve it. But precisely because we were realists, precisely because we realized that self-determination was unattainable, we accepted independence.

66. Archbishop Makarios, who is presented here as the great protagonist of *enosis*, indeed led the struggle for the self-determination of our country. There is nothing to be ashamed of and it is nothing that we believe gives any right now for the invasion of the island, because it was that same man, Archbishop Makarios, who fought and won three elections since 1960 against opponents who had as their platform *enosis*, while he was against it. His last opponent in an election, a man who was advocating *enosis*, is here with us in the Cyprus delegation. He managed to get 3 per cent of the popular vote.

67. An attempt at a coup was made against Archbishop Makarios and he nearly lost his life, because he was accused of not pursuing *enosis*. Even the leaders of that coup, stupid and senseless though it was, after they came to

⁹ *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253.

power never proclaimed that they were fighting for *enosis*, but that their aim was for continuation of the talks for reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

68. Last year in the Assembly the Cyprus delegation submitted a draft resolution, dated 26 October 1974.¹⁰ The seventh preambular paragraph read as follows:

“Noting the position of the Government of Cyprus that it is opposed to the annexation of the Republic of Cyprus or any part of it by any other State, or to the merger of the Republic of Cyprus or any part of it with any other State, or to its partition or division in any form”.

The draft resolution, which was submitted by the Cyprus delegation, was not accepted by the Turkish delegation. It was therefore the old established plan of partitioning the island that brought the Turkish army into the island. It is the implementation of that plan that we now see unfolding in Cyprus. It is that plan which the Turkish invading forces had executed, following to within a few miles in accuracy the plan proposed by them to Mr. Galo Plaza.¹¹ It is the legitimization of that plan which Turkey wants to obtain through the intercommunal talks, and for Turkey there will never be progress in the negotiations unless it is progress towards the legalization of that plan, and this is exactly what the Greek Cypriot side will never accept. We cannot—and nobody is entitled to ask us to—agree to become parties to an agreement which will simply legalize the Turkish invasion and its horrible aftermath, thus laying the foundation for the third round, the final partition of our country through the forceful eradication of the indigenous population and through a change of the demographic structure of Cyprus.

69. It is this reality which must be identified through the discussions in the Assembly and it is this reality which must be clearly rejected by this international community as a feasible alternative and as being morally, legally and politically contrary to the fundamental and legitimate rights of both communities on the island. Only then, when the ultimate imperialistic plans of Turkey become known and exposed may we hope that the negotiations will be placed on a different and constructive footing, only when it becomes obvious that the world will not accept the theory that might creates right, only when the cessation of the invasion becomes a reality and the return of all the refugees to their homes is implemented, as demanded by resolution 3212 (XXIX), may we hope for the carrying out of the meaningful negotiations envisaged in that resolution with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of both communities.

70. Turkey is using the military might of its invading army in Cyprus to shield its continuing *faits accomplis*, and to put us before the following bleak and tragic dilemma: “Either the Greek Cypriot community agrees to concede by its signature the permanent occupation of 40 per cent of its

land, or the Turkish invading army will continue the military occupation of that same area, which in addition it will turn, through colonization and other measures, into a province of Turkey.” That is the dilemma before which the Greek Cypriot side is now placed. That is for Turkey the only acceptable outcome of the intercommunal talks. That is the outcome which they ask us to accept *a priori*, before we even begin the talks and before they put their proposals on the negotiating table. They want us publicly to accept the underlying principles of this dilemma. That is why the negotiations have become a travesty and that is why no complete proposals have thus far been submitted by the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot side, because they themselves know that their real aims and intentions about Cyprus, which are reflected in those proposals, will be revealed through them and will meet with a world-wide outcry as being totally unacceptable.

71. We definitely and utterly reject the dilemma posed before us as illegal and immoral. We shall never accept the theory that might creates right, that war and military invasion can ever create legitimate rights. War and the use of arms as a means of solving international disputes are internationally, and also by the Charter of the United Nations definitely and categorically rejected. Turkey is promoting the idea that the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, is the obstacle to any such agreement being reached. They could not be more wrong. There is no Greek Cypriot leader, indeed there is no Greek Cypriot, who will accept this dilemma or be prepared to add his signature to such a shameful capitulation.

72. We may have been militarily defeated by Turkish military might, but we are not vanquished. As a State we may have lost everything through a hopeless war, but we still have our dignity as human beings, and our dignity is not to be bartered and we shall not sign our unconditional surrender as is being demanded of us. We place our hopes in the United Nations, even if some people think that it is useless to debate any international problems before the United Nations, even if it is claimed that this debate “will produce yet another resolution but not a solution”. The support that we get from world opinion may not be much, but it is our only hope. We still believe—I hope I am not wrong—that no country, not even Turkey, is big or strong enough to ignore so contemptuously the expressed determination of this world assembly that the solution of the Cyprus question must be found through negotiations and not through the use of military might or the threat of its use.

73. No country, not even Turkey, is big or strong enough to ignore the principles laid down in unanimous United Nations resolutions or to pursue unilaterally policies that totally ignore the fundamental and legitimate rights of all the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots.

74. The fact that Turkey has managed to convince a number of States and well-meaning people all over the world that the dispute over Cyprus is a constitutional dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is already a major political victory for Turkey. Turkey does not want to upset this image by actually proceeding now, without any provocation, to a military occupation of the

¹⁰ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 110, document A/L.738.

¹¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253, para. 109.

rest of the island. But it aims at achieving its same territorial expansion policy through colonization of the island of Cyprus. And colonization is really what Turkey is now steadily implementing.

75. This is the newest and most ominous development with regard to Cyprus. This one development, if it succeeds, will be presented later to the world as being incontrovertible, as being an irreversible new reality that we shall again be asked to accept. There is already undeniable evidence that Turks from the mainland of Turkey are being transported from Turkey into Cyprus and are already settled in several of the villages, in the occupied areas, in houses and properties of the forcibly evicted Greek Cypriots.

76. Members of UNFICYP, members of foreign diplomatic delegations, have already submitted reports of their having witnessed this wholesale settlement and colonization of Cyprus by Turks from the mainland of Turkey. Foreign correspondents have seen these people and reported on the latest developments. Suffice it to mention a few quotations from reputable international sources.

77. On 27 October 1975, Mr. Caglayangil, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a report made to the Ankara Radio, Domestic Service, was quoted thus:

"Answering a question, Mr. Caglayangil said that those who, allegedly, have been sent from Turkey to settle in the Federated Turkish State of Cyprus, are actually workers who have gone to Cyprus to meet the labour needs of the Turkish sector."

Mr. Caglayangil also said that "thousands of Turkish Cypriots who were forced to leave the island because of the pressure applied on the Turkish Cypriots earlier wanted to return to where they were born".

78. On 15 October 1975 a statement by Mr. Orek, another Turkish Cypriot leader, was published in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Zaman* and *Halkin Sesi*: "... A limited number of workers is coming to Cyprus from Turkey in order to meet the demands of seasonal employment. ...".

79. Those were the statements made by a Turkish official and a Turkish Cypriot official when the colonization became apparent and could no longer be denied. As to the explanations given, I shall have some more words to say in a minute. But in the meantime, an investigation conducted on the spot by the respected newspaper *The Guardian* was published on 18 October 1975:

"Migration of Turks to the northern Turkish occupied part of Cyprus is taking place on a scale that will soon radically alter the racial balance of the island and could seriously affect the chances of a political settlement.

"... The recent removal of several hundred Greek Cypriots from the north of the island was ordered specifically to create space for immigrants.

"... The immigration is taking place in considerable secrecy. There has been no mention of it in the Turkish Cypriot press and only rare, oblique references in Turkish mainland papers.

"... Investigation has disclosed that most of these immigrants (from 10,000 to 15,000 persons, according to Turkish Cypriot sources), are Lazs from the northern Black Sea coast of Turkey. The Laze immigration seems to have begun in March or April.

"... According to figures given by Turkish Cypriot sources, the rate of migration appears to be between 1,500 and 2,500 persons a month. With an estimated force of 40,000 Turkish soldiers in the north, it would take one year (at the higher figures) and just over two years (at the lower figures) for mainlanders to outnumber Turkish Cypriots."

80. The following is an extract from the reply of the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, dated 14 July 1975, to a communication of the so-called "Bar Association of the Turkish Federated State":

"... the actions of the Turkish authorities are going far to create a situation of faits accomplis by setting Turkish immigrants (in violation of paragraph 6 of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949) in the homes from which Greek Cypriots were driven or fled at the time of the invasion by the Turkish armed forces."

81. According to the London *Financial Times* of 15 October 1975, immigration from Turkey to Cyprus is intended to reach the figure of 80,000. I mention that because in this very room there are two representatives who have been told in the last two days by Turkish Cypriot representatives that it is not true that the wholesale colonization of Cyprus is in the offing. "Only 84,000 Turks from the mainland of Turkey will be added to the 120,000 indigenous Turkish population of Cyprus," they said.

82. But let us consider the explanations given for the migration of "workers" as they are euphemistically called.

83. I hope it is appreciated that, since no Greek Cypriot is allowed into the occupied area of Cyprus and since even the freedom of movement of UNFICYP is strictly and drastically restricted, it is not possible for us to collect just yet, and lay before the Committee, concrete evidence of this horrible, inhuman and illegal plan.

84. It is, however, well known, and it is openly reported in the Turkish Cypriot press, as well as in the Turkish press, that within the occupied territory of Cyprus there is currently unemployment at an unprecedented level, reaching the rate of 25 per cent of the economically active Turkish population. It is also well known that the Turkish labour force was previously mainly engaged in agriculture and in services—that is, in hotel, catering and other tourist activities. It would indeed be a very peculiar and entirely novel method of solving one's unemployment problem—which, in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, is so acute that 25 per cent of the economically active population are unemployed—to have about 30,000 Turkish Cypriots, mainly agricultural workers, unemployed, and yet to import from abroad an equal number of agricultural, semi-skilled or unskilled workers to "meet the demands of seasonal employment".

85. But it has also been said that the settlers are in fact Cypriot subjects returning from abroad, and this also must

be taken up. I have with me, at the disposal of any interested person, the population and vital statistics for Cyprus from the year 1881, based on the registration and census of population—not concocted by any Greek Cypriot but carried out until 1960 by the British, who, with their well-known passion for statistics and accurate accounting, might be expected to have kept good accounts.

86. Throughout those years, the population percentages for Cyprus and figures for immigration and emigration have remained constant, with very slight fluctuations. Furthermore, the total number of Turkish Cypriots who emigrated from 1955 to 1963 to various countries—mainly to Britain, Australia and Germany, and some to Turkey—was only 10,625, and for the period from 1963 to 1974 only 6,539. It is significant that during that same period the number of Greek emigrants from the island was 50,956—that is, a higher rate than that corresponding to the population distribution. If, therefore, the total number of Turks who have emigrated from Cyprus is only 6,539, and if none of them has died, and if all of them were well within the child-bearing age group and very active and fertile in that field, and if all of their children are alive and well, it still remains for me an insoluble biological problem how they have managed to multiply to 80,000 strong and able-bodied seasonally employed workers within the brief spell of 10 years, or to have descendants and descendants' descendants who, as we are sometimes told, now amount to 300,000 persons of Turkish Cypriot origin who are likely to come to Cyprus "to assist with the seasonal employment needs". I confess I cannot give an explanation for this biological miracle. Had the statement not been made seriously, I might have been tempted to doubt its veracity.

87. Of all such unilateral actions, of all such faits accomplis, none is more ominous, none is more clearly contrary to international law and to the spirit and letter of United Nations resolutions than the colonization of Cyprus.

88. Colonialism has almost been eradicated, and the world has sacrificed many lives and undergone much suffering in setting in motion the process of the final eradication of colonialism from the face of the earth. We hope the world cannot and will not remain indifferent to the only instance in the twentieth century world in which colonialism is being revived. Therefore our recourse to the United Nations, which Turkey so much disdains, the point of which is being questioned, aims at nothing more than asking the General Assembly to reaffirm its resolution 3212 (XXIX) and to make it clear to all that resolutions—whether unanimous or otherwise, whether endorsed by the Security Council or otherwise—are adopted with the intention of their being implemented, and that Member States have an overriding duty to implement such resolutions. Furthermore, we ask that the process and tactic of the fait accompli be rejected as a method of reaching a solution in Cyprus. A solution cannot be freely reached as long as the invading forces are on the island. Furthermore, this new and hideous development, neo-colonialism, cannot leave this house unmoved.

89. Before I end my address I am obliged to raise one more tragic aspect of the tragic problem of Cyprus. It is the question of the missing persons; it is the question of the undeclared Greek Cypriot prisoners of war and missing

persons from both communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These are subjects that we definitely—I stress that, "definitely", and want it to be clearly placed on record—want separated from the political issues of the Cyprus question. It is a humanitarian problem the solution of which should be actively and incessantly pursued by enemies and friends alike, by Governments, organizations, institutions, and generally by human beings of goodwill all over the world.

90. Seventeen months after the complete cessation of hostilities and warlike activities in Cyprus, the fate of 2,107 persons, mostly Greek Cypriots, and a number of Turkish Cypriots, remains totally unknown. Some of these people were soldiers, but many are civilians of various ages, including women and children. During the past year tireless efforts have been made to trace and obtain the release of undeclared prisoners and missing persons, but without success. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives participated in the work of joint committees and sub-committees, together with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations, to consider the problem in order to collect and verify information and to study ways and means of tracing and obtaining the release of those who are alive or establishing the fate of those whose death is feared. All these efforts have failed to yield any result, mainly because the Turkish military authorities in Cyprus are refusing freedom of movement and search either by joint committees or even separately and singly by representatives of the United Nations and of the International Red Cross.

91. The agonizing problem thus remaining is reflected in the anguished voice of parents asking to know, as they are entitled to under any legal and moral law and under any local or international law, about the fate of their loved ones. I need not elaborate, and indeed words fail me in describing the tragedy of a parent condemned to live the rest of his life in doubt as to whether his child is dead or alive.

92. This agony of not knowing for sure gives perhaps greater pain and suffering than even the sure knowledge of the death of relatives and loved ones. Once more we appeal to the humanitarian feelings of the Turkish Government and of the Turkish military authorities in Cyprus to heed the voice of the anguished, the imploring of the parents of the missing persons, and to assist, to facilitate or at least not to obstruct the efforts to trace such people. For our part, on the Greek Cypriot side, we are prepared to give every facility and to reach any agreement for the tracing of such people. We furthermore state categorically that no effort will ever be made to gain political advantage or make political capital out of such a humanitarian issue, even if it were to be admitted that all or any of such people were killed in cold blood after the hostilities ended.

93. There was a bloody and ruthless military attack on Cyprus and thousands of defenceless and unarmed civilians were caught in the storm of the invasion. It is understood that in such circumstances it is mainly the innocent, mainly the powerless, who suffer. In the hours of armed combat soldiers of all nations tend to shoot first and ask questions later. Many of those missing and unaccounted for may have perished in those few hours of actual fighting or even in the

aftermath of the advance of the Turkish forces. But there are hundreds of these people who are now missing and unaccounted for who for many hours, even days, even weeks, after the last shot was fired were seen or known to be alive and in the hands of the Turkish authorities. The joint committees previously referred to have worked for many days, weeks and months, and compiled detailed dossiers of not less than 70 cases of such persons who were undeniably alive and in the hands of the Turkish forces or authorities long after the hostilities ended. Those dossiers have been submitted, but no reply has yet been forthcoming as to the outcome of the investigations promised. When I say that such persons were known to be alive and in the hands of the Turkish authorities, I am referring to clear and uncontradicted objective evidence of the fact. For the purposes of this debate I shall mention but a few examples.

94. There are 15 persons who spoke over the Turkish radio station in Cyprus, "Bayrak", as late as the end of August 1974, that is, 40 days after the invasion and 15 days after the last shot was fired. They identified themselves, giving their rank and number. They stated that they were well treated, and there are tape recordings of their voices. There are persons who were in prison or in prisoner-of-war camps, and who were visited by representatives of the Red Crescent who distributed food and other necessities of life to them. Pictures of these people being visited by such officials, together with captions giving their names, were published in official Turkish bulletins and magazines. The publications indicate that such visits took place as late as 4 September 1974, so they were then still amongst the living. As late as 19 September 1974 the Turkish magazine *Hayyat* published photographs of lines of Greek Cypriot prisoners being sent for transportation to Turkey; several of them who were clearly identified are still missing. There are several other photographs of people; several hundred other people who have been seen in prisons and have been spoken to by relatives and friends who knew them, and a few people who were named in the lists of those to be released on 6, 7 and 8 November 1974, that is, four months after the invasion, are still missing. They have never been released.

95. We want to know the fate of those people. It is not for us to recriminate or to ask for punishment of those people responsible for the loss of many such persons. We only want to know. We have a right to know. The Turkish authorities are obliged by man-made and divine law, by all rules of war and of peace, on clearly humanitarian grounds, to account for such people. We repeat once more that it is not our intention to make political capital out of such an issue, and none will be made. We are prepared to set up a commission, a joint commission, under the chairmanship of the International Red Cross or of United Nations officials, to carry out investigations in both regions for Greek Cypriots and for Turkish Cypriots, from the last known point of detention or arrest of missing persons, to take statements from those who were last known to be in charge of such persons, and to trace the whereabouts or the fate of the missing people.

96. Those who may be traced alive should be forthwith released. For those who have met with their death, no matter under what circumstances, we want to establish finally the fact that they are dead. We do not even want the

names of those who killed them. We do not want to know even if they were killed in cold blood. We do not want to know the names of those who killed them or to hear of them. Let their own consciences be their most effective tormentors and punishers, because it is not for us to mete out retribution. We are even prepared to accept that efforts of this nature should be undertaken exclusively by Red Cross or by United Nations officials, without the participation of anyone from the Greek Cypriot side, and we shall accept their findings without question.

97. The tragedy of uncertainty must be ended. The families of the missing persons can no longer bear this crushing uncertainty as to the fate of their children. This aspect is not an aspect of the Cyprus problem only; it is a problem for the world community, for the conscience of all civilized persons and for all countries.

98. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I should like to make some brief comments in connexion with the statements of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives. I shall not take up the points raised by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community. The other representative of the same community who spoke in the General Assembly yesterday [2401st plenary meeting] made, of course, the same points. I shall therefore give an answer to both of them in a plenary meeting. With the proliferation of Greek delegations, each wearing a different hat, this will help to shorten the debate.

99. I notice, however, that the Greek Cypriot representative—the one who spoke here today—objected to the proposal requesting that Mr. Rauf Denktaş should be given the right to make a statement at a plenary meeting of the Assembly. If I understood him correctly, he expressed some doubts about the title of Mr. Denktaş as Vice-President of Cyprus. He should know that over the ruins of the Constitution destroyed by the leaders of his community 12 years ago, Mr. Denktaş is as much Vice-President of Cyprus as Archbishop Makarios is President.

100. The Greek Cypriot representative made some comments regarding the internal structure of the Turkish community. I would think it is none of his business. The Turkish community is and will remain as free as the Greek community to regulate its domestic affairs.

101. I also noticed that the Greek Cypriot representative, not satisfied with encroachments upon the internal affairs of the Turkish community, presumed to pass judgement on Turkish internal affairs. He spoke of "military rulers in Turkey". He must be confusing Turkey with another country whose military rulers directly caused the recent tragedy of Cyprus which he lamented so bitterly.

102. The Greek Cypriot representative also seemed very surprised that the Turkish community preferred what he called "the Turkish aggression" to the Greek embrace. But it is not for me to give an answer to that; the Turkish community will, I am sure, take care of that point.

103. The Turkish Cypriot representative, Mr. Çelik, has once again presented the true nature of the problem we are called to discuss in this debate. The problem is basically a conflict between the two communities which encompasses not only constitutional matters but also the very future of Cyprus.

104. The source of the sufferings of Cypriots since 1963 is nothing else but a double attempt by the Greek Cypriot community to destroy the Constitution and to relegate the Turkish community to the status of a defenceless and powerless minority and for Greece to annex the island in connivance with the Greek Cypriot leadership.

105. The Greek Cypriot leadership has successfully carried out its attempt to crush the state structure and the fundamental rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Greece almost succeeded in its attempt to take hold of the island, preferring a protracted veiled *enosis*, through creating a second Greek State over the shambles of the bicomunal State of Cyprus. Until *enosis* could be safely proclaimed, it was convenient for Greece to allow for the continuation of a dual Greek political existence. The fiction of an independent Cyprus was therefore maintained, the more so since the Turks had been totally eliminated from the Government and administration of Cyprus and were no longer in a position to influence the policies of the so-called independent Republic of Cyprus.

106. Within that game, there was also a contest for power, a dark and sinister struggle, a network of intrigues and conspiracies among Greeks, so complex and complicated that only those who are versed in the subtleties of Byzantine reasoning can understand all its ramifications. Basically, this intra-Greek struggle evolved around the ambitions of Archbishop Makarios to extend his power beyond reach and to manipulate the *enosis* aim accordingly; but it involved also the intricacies of the domestic politics of Greece. That was not a struggle about *enosis*; the participants in that game were all agreed about it. It was a struggle about how and when *enosis* would be achieved, to the benefit of whose passion it would be carried out.

107. That was the situation until the military junta came to power in Greece. The junta, representing the more reactionary and chauvinistic elements among Greeks, immediately embarked upon a policy of instant *enosis*.

108. When Turkey rebuffed the Greek Government and refused to negotiate on any other basis than the independence of the island, the Greek Government attempted to intimidate Turkey and the Turkish community by having its armed forces occupying Cyprus launch direct military attacks upon Turkish Cypriot settlements all over the island. This recourse to the use of force in 1967 provoked a crisis which eventually compelled the Greek Government to accept, for the first time, direct negotiations between the two communities of Cyprus.

109. Turkey then hoped that this willingness on the part of Greece to transpose the problem into the intercommunal framework signified that Greece had at last renounced the aim of *enosis* and accepted the upholding of the independence and sovereignty of the island. The Turkish community for its part vainly nurtured the hope that Archbishop Makarios would seriously negotiate a state structure which would safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of both communities.

110. The intercommunal negotiations lasted for six years, in vain. During all that time it never occurred to the Greek Cypriot community, negotiating from a position of

strength, that time was passing. It is because it faces a relatively equal negotiating party today—the Turkish community—that it shouts “time is the essence”. During all these years, the Greek Government under the guise of supporting the intercommunal talks continued to strengthen consistently its military colonization of Cyprus, culminating in the well-known coup of July 1974.

111. I have made this brief historical outline with a view to showing how consistent the policy of *enosis* has been throughout the years and how justified are the misgivings of Turkey and the Turkish community in this respect. We cannot close our eyes to the bitter lessons of the past. We know only too well that the passion of *enosis* is bound to be resurrected whenever the chances are perceived to be real.

112. It was therefore with a feeling of incredulity that we heard no mention of this fundamental issue by Mr. Christophides in his statement yesterday [*ibid.*]. Today Mr. Papadopolous mentioned this fundamental issue by saying that all the pronouncements about *enosis* were just talk. He said that it was, of course, innocent talk; but whenever Turkey spoke of partition that represented a militant policy.

113. In support of their allegations, the Greek Cypriot representatives yesterday and today cited certain statements of politicians and governmental figures in Turkey. In all those statements to which they referred, the idea of partition is taken up as a defensive argument. Partition has never been a political objective of Turkey vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus. It has always been used to counter the idea of *enosis*. The best proof of this is that, despite the situation created last year, despite all its consequences and despite the *de facto* situation in the island today, Turkey has never considered implementing a policy of partition.

114. We are dedicated to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus because we believe that destruction of the independence of any country in the world would create a most serious precedent which would only be detrimental to peace and security throughout the world. We are dedicated to the ideal of independence because it represents an important factor for the stability and tranquillity of the eastern Mediterranean. We stand for an independent Cyprus where there would be no strategic weapons and no forces capable of carrying out strategic operations. We stand for a real non-alignment of Cyprus, not a parody of it as has always been the case.

115. Those are the reasons why, despite the discouragement and the pessimism that the Turkish community has accumulated over the years in its unyielding attempts to live side by side as equal citizens with the Greek community, we have urged and still urge it to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

116. My intention is not to make a long statement at this stage. I just wanted to elucidate who has stood and still stands for the independence of Cyprus and who has consistently been against it. We want the members of this Committee who unanimously support the independence of Cyprus not to be misled on this crucial point.

117. The Turkish delegation will reply in due time in a plenary meeting of the Assembly to the slanders uttered yesterday to the extent that they call for a reply from Turkey. As for the other allegations of Mr. Christophides and Mr. Papadopoulos, Mr. Çelik is taking care of them.

118. What is discouraging is not that these slanderous accusations are levelled against Turkey—for we were expecting exactly that, since we have long come to the conclusion that aggressive and abusive rhetoric is second nature to Greek Cypriot representatives. But we had expected, as I am sure all the members here did, to read between the lines a readiness to work for a peaceful settlement and a willingness to respond to the Turkish community's desire for continued negotiations. Now it is not clear to us what the Greek objectives are. I can only hope that this Greek tragedy has not gone so far as to prevent them from conceiving their own best interests.

119. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on Mr. Çelik, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

120. Mr. ÇELİK (Turkish Cypriot community): Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling on me a second time so that I may elaborate on a couple of issues raised by the Greek Cypriot representative this afternoon.

121. Mr. Papadopoulos has argued that Mr. Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader and the negotiator in the talks, should address the Special Political Committee and not a plenary meeting of the Assembly. He asked me what views I represented here. Well, I do not think he should have any doubt about whose views I represent. I clearly represent the views of the Turkish Cypriot community.

122. But I am not surprised to see the Greek Cypriot representative unhesitatingly continuing to attempt to prevent us from being heard and to present us as second-class citizens. To the Greeks it is justified that they should speak in the General Assembly, that they should speak here, that they should speak anywhere, in any international forum that they can possibly have access to. But when it comes to us, we should be barred from speaking; we should be prevented from speaking. Why are they so afraid of the world hearing the Turkish views? I think the answer is obvious to everyone in this room.

123. I do not want to go into details on this subject. I stated my views on it this morning. But we feel that in the name of justice we should be given an equal say. There are serious, legitimate, justified reasons for Mr. Denktaş to be heard in the Assembly. The draft resolution submitted by the Greek side will be debated there. The substance of the matter will be debated there. Therefore, we feel it appropriate, indeed essential, that both sides should be heard before a draft resolution is adopted which, it is expected, will be binding on both sides and which will be designed to bring us together around the negotiating table. I think that the very opposition sounded here furnishes yet another moral reason for Member States to support our application for a hearing in the General Assembly.

124. Once again we have witnessed an attempt here by the Greek side to present the legitimate and justified Turkish

intervention in Cyprus as aggression. There was no aggression, there could be no aggression on the part of Turkey. This intervention—a justified intervention—was not aggression but an attempt to prevent the consolidation of aggression that had been set in motion back in 1963 by joint Greek mainland and Greek Cypriot forces in order to destroy the independence of Cyprus. What the Turkish invasion was designed to prevent was the attempt which had culminated in July 1974 in the well-known coup that caused so much bloodshed to both Greeks and Turks alike. That cannot be presented here as aggression; the world body cannot be asked to issue a condemnation of it.

125. We are asking the world totally to reject the contention that there is a Turkish occupation of Cyprus. But for the presence of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus I would not be here to defend my community's rights. Total massacre was programmed for us. Even Archbishop Makarios had to testify to the existence of such plans when he spoke in the Security Council on 19 July last year.¹²

126. The very men who planned all this, who caused the death of 2,000 Greek Cypriots and forced Turkey to land in Cyprus are all free in Cyprus, quite free, fully armed, roaming about with their gunmen and publishing papers advocating union with Greece.

127. This allegation of unjustified occupation has come from an EOKA leader, a pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriot leader: my colleague here. That very circumstance shows how flagrantly the facts can be distorted and misrepresented. No mention is made here of secret Greek armies in Cyprus—Sampson's army, Lyssarides's army. Lyssarides is another Greek Cypriot leader, and he is probably in this very room today. And there are other secret armies; I do not know how many—but they know.

128. Mr. Papadopoulos has tried to claim that the process of the abolition of the Cyprus State started last year. By doing that, is he trying to reassert the legitimacy of the *enosis* movement, from which Greeks have suffered as much as Turks? Mr. Papadopoulos has not stated here whether he is still faithful to his *enosis* oath. His leader, Archbishop Makarios, says that he himself still is. We do not know whether the other Greek leaders are still faithful to the oath or not. We never hear anything about it.

129. Incidentally, we have not asked the Greek Cypriots for their unconditional surrender. We have asked only for the establishment of equality in Cyprus.

130. Another matter which is constantly and harshly exploited is the question of refugees in Cyprus. The question of refugees is not new—and it is not new especially to us. We have suffered from a refugee problem for the past two decades. We have had to maintain 26,000 refugees for the past 12 years, in very difficult conditions, including very extreme measures taken by the Greek side, to the point of asking that import duties be paid on subsidies, on food aid coming to us from Turkey. When we applied to international bodies for help in rehabilitating our refugees, in rehousing them, we were rejected because, it was claimed at the time, refugees could not exist in Cyprus, since persons could not be refugees in their own country.

¹² *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Year, 1780th meeting.

131. In saying that, I do not intend at all to underestimate the question of refugees. There is a question of refugees, and I think we have to examine it here.

132. In 1963, 26,000 Turkish Cypriots were uprooted—some of them for the second time, because they had been uprooted back in 1957. In 1974, more than one half of the Turkish Cypriot community, 60,000 persons, were uprooted from the south and had to flee to the north for safety. About an equal number of Greeks, afraid of the Turkish military intervention, chose to go to the south—some 80,000 to 90,000 persons. The number given for Greek Cypriot refugees has been constantly increasing. To start with, it was 60,000. It became 80,000. Then it became 100,000, and then 160,000. Very recently we have heard a figure as high as 220,000.

133. But it is not difficult to ascertain the number of these persons. We know the villages that they evacuated. There is an official Greek census which gives the figure for these refugees. By even the most exaggerated estimate, the number of these persons cannot possibly exceed 100,000. Why put forward these figures here when we have Greek authorities themselves to cite? I have with me an extract from “The Legal Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Cyprus”, prepared by the Greek Cypriot Attorney-General himself, Mr. Criton Tormaritis. He claims that there cannot possibly be more than 120,000 Greek refugees in Cyprus. And that is the figure given by a Greek who was trying to present his case. His claim is included in an official record.

134. The refugee problem is naturally a very important problem, a very human problem, a problem which must be resolved. How is this problem going to be resolved? We have had 84,000 refugees, some of them have already been accepted, some of them are in the process of being rehabilitated. An equal number of Greek Cypriots have been resettled in Turkish houses and on Turkish properties in the south. There are still 5,000 to 8,000 Greek refugees who are being kept in tents as a showpiece for propaganda purposes. They are being kept there for political exploitation. Even the Greek papers are constantly criticizing the Greek Cypriot administration for not rehabilitating these people, since they have the opportunity to do so and the means to do so. They have kept these refugees in order to ask for foreign aid; incidentally, they have gone on record again, they are writing in their own press, that there is today a two-year stock of food received as foreign aid for these so-called refugees which is being sold on the open market at half price in Nicosia. This is another proof that the number of refugees, as presented by the Greek side, is grossly exaggerated.

135. The allegations here that the Turkish side did not come forward with any constructive proposals during the intercommunal talks is untrue; it is unfounded; it is political propaganda. During the talks we suggested a joint federal central Government to the other side. We have also put forward concrete proposals for the structure of the central Government and for the powers and functions of the central federal Government which we hoped would be set up. These proposals are contained in a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council, issued on 19 September 1975 [A/10256-S/11825].

136. It is claimed here—as it has always been claimed by the Greek side—that the reason the negotiations were interrupted was that we did not come forward with concrete proposals on the question of territory. This again is untrue.

137. At the third round of the talks in Vienna, Mr. Clerides had agreed in principle to abide by a federation, a loose central Government, and participation of the two communities in the central Government on the basis of equality. In return, reciprocal marks on geographical boundaries would be compared from 1 to 6 September and attempts would be made to bridge the gap of the differences between the two sides and then the two negotiators would come to New York with the maps ready for both sides.

138. But as soon as he returned to Cyprus, Mr. Clerides was attacked so much that he had to default. He made public statements saying that he would not prepare his map. As a result of that, Mr. Denktas also had difficulties in preparing his own map. Nevertheless, Mr. Denktas came to New York and brought with him an agenda—known to the Secretary-General—of 8 to 9 items, including concessions on calculations of approximately 240 square miles of land, readjustment of roads so that freedom of movement could be afforded to thousands of Cypriots, and other relevant matters. But Mr. Clerides would not negotiate on this, claiming that his directives from Cyprus were such that he could not negotiate unless Mr. Denktas submitted concrete proposals.

139. Mr. Denktas' plea to Mr. Clerides that he could not know whether Mr. Denktas had brought any concrete proposals with him until they started talking, was of no avail; he had his instructions. Not even for the sake of preserving the atmosphere of optimism which prevailed among the two communities, would he sit down and negotiate. I do not think I need elaborate on this any further.

140. As regards the allegation that the Turkish side is for partition, this, again, is wrong. Partition, or double *enosis*, as it is called, has always been the antidote to *enosis*. We have always spoken of partition when the Greeks pressed and fought not only us but also each other for *enosis*. We said that if *enosis* comes, it must be on the basis of self-determination, applied to both communities equally, and if both communities opt for double *enosis*, then double *enosis* we shall have. We have never come forward with a partition policy in the past except when the Greeks have pressed for *enosis* themselves.

141. We are quoted as having asked Mr. Galo Plaza for partition. I believe that our feeling of insecurity, our worries about our lives and property in Cyprus, have been fully justified by recent events in Cyprus. If we had wanted partition, we could have proclaimed it last year. If we wanted partition, we could proclaim it today. We do not, because we do not want it. If we wanted partition, we would agree with Makarios and negotiate on territory, and nothing else. But because we do not want partition, we do not give priority to negotiation on the territorial aspect of Cyprus. We insist on, and we want to settle, the constitutional problem, the federal set-up, the structure, the

participation of the communities, and then, naturally, the aspect of territory will also be taken up, and naturally it will be the subject of negotiation. If we wanted partition, we would not have proposed to the Greek side a joint central federal Government which would unite, not divide, the island.

142. I want to put on record once again that we are against partition, we are against double partition, we are against *enosis*, and the Turkish Cypriot community will try, with all its means, to prevent any unilateral annexation of any part of the island.

143. I meant no disrespect to the United Nations when I said this morning that the present discussions, the present debate on Cyprus, would produce yet another resolution, but not a solution. What does resolution 3212 (XXIX) say? It says in the clearest of terms that the constitutional problem of Cyprus is primarily the concern of the two national communities on the island. And it calls upon the two sides to come together at the negotiating table and negotiate a peaceful settlement on an equal footing. I cannot understand, therefore, why the Greek-Cypriot representative here was so angry with me when I said that after this resolution he would still have to go back to the negotiating table and try to negotiate a settlement—a peaceful solution.

144. The allegation that Cyprus is being colonized by Turkey is again most unjust, most unfair and most unfounded. Turkish mainland labour, skilled or unskilled, and for that matter Greek mainland labour, skilled or unskilled, is exported—we know it—to Belgium, to France, to Germany and to many other European countries, and no one raises a voice about it. It is quite normal. South Cyprus, the Greek part of Cyprus, is exporting labour to other countries today. That is no problem. But when a few hundred skilled or unskilled labourers come from Turkey, then suddenly the political mechanism starts working, the Greek lobby starts working and this is presented as if Turkey were colonizing Cyprus.

145. I assure all the members of this august body that there is no colonization of Cyprus. My official letter to the Secretary-General, dated 24 October 1975, which has been circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council [A/10310-S/11859] contains our official reply to these unfounded allegations.

146. With reference to the statistics which we have heard from the Greek Cypriot representative here, all I can say is that they are Greek statistics and they are Greek to us.

147. Even at this late hour we see an unceasing attempt on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership to present the Cyprus problem here in this august body as a question of minorities and majorities. As we have stated clearly on many occasions before in the United Nations, the question of Cyprus is not a question of minorities and majorities. Minorities can only exist within a nation, and since there is no Cypriot nation—and the Greeks themselves, their very leaders, accept that—there can exist no minority community in Cyprus. There are two national communities, two equal co-founder partners of the Republic of Cyprus. And that equality we mean to maintain and we shall insist on our equal rights.

148. We have been most unduly and most unjustifiably branded both here this afternoon and in the plenary meeting yesterday [2401st plenary meeting] as being the instruments of Turkey. Why? Because being fewer in number and having suffered so much at the hands of the Greeks, we always rely on our motherland—Turkey—for financial support, moral support and military support.

149. Is that being an instrument? How much we need that support is evident from the very events of the last years. We cannot understand all this effort to try to draw parallels between the Greek Cypriot relationship with motherland Greece and the relations of the Turkish Cypriot community with motherland Turkey. I should like to quote from the Greek *Cyprus Bulletin* concerning what Archbishop Makarios said when he was asked to comment on a recent statement made by the Greek Premier that Greece should have a role as leader and not as follower in Cyprus. The date of this is 7 November 1973. Makarios replied that the Greek Government had always had an important say in the handling of the Cyprus problem, taking all general national interests into consideration, and in no case had its position been limited to the role of mere follower.

150. Again asked about a meeting that he had with the Greek Ambassador in Nicosia, Makarios said that during the meeting they had reviewed developments in the Cyprus problem and added that he regarded the Greek Ambassador to Cyprus as an adviser of his and that he exchanged views with him on many matters. "Naturally," he said, "we discussed the internal situation". Ambassadors may be advisers on foreign relations, but not on internal matters. From this I think it is obvious which side is an instrument and which side is not.

151. The Greek Cypriot representative, Mr. Papadopoulos, has very generously offered to issue us, the members of the Turkish Cypriot community, with passports if only, he said, we would bother to cross the line and apply to the Greek Cypriot Government for such passports. I believe that Mr. Papadopoulos came to New York from Cyprus and that he knows what the actual situation there is. He was not on the moon. He knows that politically that is not possible—but that is not important. He knows that physically that is not possible either. We know how the 60,000 Turks lost their lives—they were beaten, they were harassed, they were deprived and robbed of their money and so forth while trying to save their skins by going to the north. I wonder whether Mr. Papadopoulos can assure me or any other Turkish Cypriot that I can return safely to the north if I ever dared to cross the Green Line into the Greek-controlled area of Nicosia. I do not think that needs any further clarification.

152. One final matter which I should like to touch upon is the question of missing persons. This is a humanitarian problem which should be treated in a most humane way. The Greek side, however, is constantly exploiting this very humanitarian issue for strictly political purposes. In Nicosia, Mr. Denktas had informed Mr. Clerides that there were no Greek Cypriots or mainland Greek detainees in the hands of the Turkish side. We do not have them. They do not exist. Mr. Clerides was asked to make declarations to that effect, but he said that to do so would harm him politically and he did not come up with any declaration concerning the reply that he received from us.

153. The same matter was discussed in Vienna. The Greek side was told that no detainees were held by the Turkish side. And yet, as if nothing had happened, the question of political detainees always comes up, to the great suffering of those who have lost their beloved ones one way or another. We have made official statements to this effect also in the deliberations of the Security Council here in New York.

154. The Greek side claims to have 2,000 missing persons—in other words, there are 2,000 dead for whom it cannot account. We know that in last year's bloody coup the whole world international press estimated the number of Greeks that were killed by Greeks to be approximately 2,000 men. That statement was confirmed by Archbishop Makarios himself when he went to the Security Council on 19 July 1974 and addressed the Council.¹³ He said that the military régime, through its coup in Nicosia, had caused much bloodshed and taken a great toll of human lives.

155. I should also like to quote yet another religious leader in Cyprus, Papatsesto, a priest, speaking to Makarios after his return to Nicosia after his exile:

“During the coup we buried several people who were still alive.

“There were five big graves, 7 by 20, at the Nicosia new cemetery. Beside lay 22 bodies. An EOKA man came along and ordered the digging of another bigger grave. It was completed within 3 hours. Bodies of 54 National Guards, police officers and others were buried. There then came in truckloads of other bodies: 75 people later, including a baby, a young girl, soldiers and policemen. They were all buried.

“At Lakatamia 17 more bodies were buried in a similar grave. They were brought in nylon sacks in a truck.”

This is an account Papatsesto gave to Archbishop Makarios when he visited the Nicosia Greek cemetery, and this was published in the Greek Cypriot press itself on 18 December 1974. This very quotation comes from *Ta Nea*, a Greek Cypriot newspaper.

156. I have no other comments to make.

157. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I am quite conscious of the late hour. I am not going to take any time because, really, not much time is needed to show the absurdity that is presented by the very distinguished representative of Turkey, who comes here to speak again about *enosis* or other tittle-tattle, Byzantinism, and other things, and does not say a word of what his position is regarding the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted last year, with the vote of Turkey, calling for the evacuation of Turkish forces from Cyprus, for the cessation of the intervention and for the return of the refugees to their homes. This was intended for Turkey to comply with, and Turkey voted for it; it is now showing such disregard and disrespect for its own vote and continuing the occupation, although the element of urgency was mentioned in the resolution, both for the withdrawal of the

forces and the return of the refugees. And nothing was done.

158. What was the explanation given? None. The Security Council endorsed that resolution, made it mandatory under resolution 365 (1974) and called upon the parties concerned, and therefore upon Turkey, to implement the [General Assembly] resolution. It entrusted the Secretary-General with the duty of following up that implementation and reporting to the Security Council.

159. The Secretary-General, acting in accordance with his duties, sent a note verbale [dated 24 January 1975] to Turkey asking what it had done and what it intended to do for the implementation, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. Turkey postponed and evaded replying and, finally, made no response. But instead of that, it declared a separate State, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

160. This was stated yesterday [2401st plenary meeting] by my Foreign Minister. And the first occasion that the representative of Turkey has had to speak about it was here, the first time he has taken the floor, and he said nothing about it. He tried to give a little petty talk about one little thing or another.

161. Now, both he and the so-called representative of the Turkish community, Mr. Çelik, spoke about *enosis*, as if there was any danger of *enosis*. There is not a single member of the international community, or of the United Nations or anyone in this chamber or outside it, who thinks even for a moment that *enosis* is at all a live problem today, was one or yesterday. It has not been a problem for many years, but particularly now there is no problem. And they pretend that there is a problem of *enosis*. But this pretence is so ridiculous that it only emphasizes their inability to reply, to deal with the issue.

162. The issue is one which concerns the whole international community: of aggression, invasion of the worst kind, conforming with every word of the definition of aggression that was adopted last year [General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), annex], and adopted with the participation of Turkey in the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Yet, three months after the adoption of the definition, Turkey made an attack upon Cyprus, which fitted in with every word of the definition of aggression. And the two speakers who preceded me disregard that. They do not have to answer.

163. Our concern is for Cyprus, of course, fundamentally, primarily. That is also our concern as members of the international community and of the United Nations, which will crumble if there can be no international security at all, if any bigger Power can attack a smaller country and destroy it and then come and say that it was not really aggression; no, it was merely a right of intervention. A napalm bombing of Cyprus—napalm, a prohibited weapon—destroying citizens, hospitals and everything else, and an invasion of the country, are not aggression. What are they? And not only did Turkey invade, but showed its purpose. What was the purpose? To partition Cyprus by changing by force its demographic character and evicting its population from the invaded territory by the hundreds of

¹³ *Ibid.*

thousands. Now Mr. Çelik says: "No, no, the figure is not 200,000; it is 125,000". What difference does it make? The population has been violently and unlawfully uprooted from its homes, from its lands, from its property. And those who have done it get so used to this crime that they say: "We have brought in labourers to cultivate the usurped lands". It is really a deprivation which is unparalleled in history, and particularly in the era of the United Nations.

164. It seems abominable that such arguments are brought in here to justify what cannot be justified. And not a word is said about finding some excuse or making some promise that these troops will be taken away, that the invasion will stop.

165. That is what I wanted to say, and I wanted also to add this. There is all this talk about Archbishop Makarios, about his desire for *enosis*, about his being the obstacle to all the solutions because of his *enosis* proclivities. Well, the junta coup was said to be a coup for *enosis*, yet its only target at the time was to destroy Archbishop Makarios as the man who did not stand for *enosis* but for independence—because when he was elected his platform was an independence platform, and the platform for *enosis* was defeated, as Mr. Papadopoulos has said.

166. So what reasoning is there in saying that Archbishop Makarios was the man of *enosis*, when he was resented, was attacked, was to be killed, by those who sought to attain *enosis*? But at the same time that coup did not declare *enosis*, did not molest a single Turk. It was a coup against the so-called non-*enosis* in Cyprus, but not intended to molest the Turks at all. All that we heard about deaths and killings was about Greeks, not about Turks.

167. But Turkey took advantage of this outside interference in Cyprus which had brought about by means of the coup. It was engineered from outside, quite engineered from outside, and was used really to promote the objectives of Turkey. And now the representatives of Turkey come and speak about it as the reason for their invasion and attack on Cyprus, which is ridiculous. But even if it were so—and it is ridiculous to say such a thing—why did they continue the invasion after the Government in Greece was changed, and why did they start upon a new invasion on 15 August?

168. This is quite enough to show the unsubstantial position of Turkey in opposition to our claim concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

169. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): I wish to say a few words in reply to what has been said by the representative of Turkey regarding my country, since on the point under discussion, the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Papadopoulos, and the representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, have adequately dealt with the substance.

170. I categorically reject the idea that Greece has ever attempted to annex Cyprus. Had that been the case, Greece would not have come to the United Nations as early as 1954 in order to present the case of Cyprus in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter, a procedure to which Turkey bitterly objected at the time.

171. It is well known that Turkey has long been threatening military intervention in Cyprus, and I need not remind representatives how a Turkish landing in Cyprus did not materialize in 1964, although the plan was kept in being so that it could be carried out on the first possible pretext—namely, in July 1974, despite the fact that the pretext Turkey used for the invasion in Cyprus ceased to exist within a few days.

172. As regards the esoteric observations of the representative of Turkey regarding my country's complications, I shall merely say that it would be more advisable for him to look into the internal affairs of his own country. After all, it is the Turkish side that is claiming, all over the world, that its own internal political complications and difficulties prevent substantial negotiations in Cyprus and, consequently, implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions to which Turkey fully subscribed.

173. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): The representative of Turkey need not complain about the so-called proliferation of Greek Cypriot delegations here, since apparently he chose to leave the task of explaining away the aggression of Turkey to his other representative; for that purpose, the Turkish Cypriot representative spoke.

174. I note with some regret that he has said nothing in this Committee about the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) by his country or about the aggression. We were not told what he now terms it. In the past we have been told that it was a peace-keeping operation. This morning it was described as an intervention. Again we have this, to my mind, peculiar and selective choice of words. This selection of words is not limited to the question of aggression. I am very saddened to see that the same selective choice of words to suit the arguments put forward is being exhibited by the Turkish Cypriot representative. Thus, when we speak about the question of the missing persons, that is exploitation. When he speaks about the alleged sufferings of the Turks, that is stating the facts.

175. But we have heard more of that. In the Vienna communiqué about the missing persons, the actual phrasing was, "No detainees are officially held by the Turkish side". There is a distinct difference between "officially held" and "unofficially held". Had he been more patient with my statement on the missing persons, he would have noticed the very distinct difference that I have stressed. I said that for those who have lost their dear ones the suffering of uncertainty is perhaps greater than knowing for certain that they have lost their lives. If the Turkish side is not holding them, at least let us find out where they are buried. Let us learn their fate. I am very distressed at his flippant effort to write off 2,107 missing persons as having been killed in the coup and buried. All those killed and buried are accounted for, listed and named. How can one claim that people who were killed in the coup of 14 July were healthy, alive and grateful six weeks later, speaking from the "Bayrak" station, or were alive and about to receive medicaments and the necessities of life from the Turkish Crescent about two months later? How could they be alive and listed among those to be released four months later, on 6 November? Again, this is another biological problem.

176. We were also told—and it is an improvement on the selective choice of words—we now have a distortion of words to describe situations to suit our purposes. It was said that the Greek Cypriot population of the North, being “afraid of the Turkish military intervention”—not “the peace-keeping operation” this time—chose to go to the South. It was a really broad choice they were given: to be slaughtered or to flee. And if they then chose to go to the South, now that they choose to go to the North, are they permitted to do so? Why this great disdain on the part of my friend the Turkish Cypriot representative as to whether there are 125,000 or 100,000? Does the number 100,000 make the moral issues involved less urgent? Does it render less mandatory the Turkish obligation to comply with the relevant section of resolution 3212 (XXIX)? Why? Whatever the number may be, let them go to the North. Is the Turkish side prepared to allow them to go to the North, no matter how many they are?

177. We have been told there are only 8,000. Well, as anybody who may have visited Famagusta may know, the town had a population of 50,000. How that number was reduced to 8,000 I do not know. It is a mathematical problem I cannot understand. But even if the number is 8,000, is the Turkish side prepared to let them go back to their homes? Is it now willing to accept that whatever the number may be—and it is one of the most easily established of statistics—they should return to their homes and villages? The less there are the better I suppose it would be for the Turkish aims in Cyprus. And why should there be such a great dispute as to the actual number of refugees? Are you disputing the UNRWA figures? Are you disputing the United Nations figures? Are you disputing the Red Cross figures?

178. All right. Let us have a committee. Is the Turkish side prepared to allow a fact-finding committee to visit the island and establish the facts? We are ready for it any time, with any composition and with any terms of reference. But the point remains, whether there are 8,000 or 100,000 or 125,000 or 200,000, the refugees have an inalienable right to return to their homes and we hope that those rights will be recognized, rather than having debates as to how to resettle them.

179. What is this new theory we hear, of equating the importation into Cyprus of Turkish seasonal workers with the exportation from Cyprus of workers who have become unemployed and are without the chance of earning their living so that they have to emigrate and work outside Cyprus? Are we now equating importation with exportation? This surpasses even the tactical choice of words. This is using a different word to describe completely the contrary situation and equating the two. Indeed, I believe that it is unfair to this Committee to have to listen to such allegations as that when a Turkish labour force goes to Germany there is no problem but that when it goes to Cyprus there is a problem. When Turkish workers go to Germany—and I do not know whether it is to the east or west,—I am sure the Germans would not allow them forcibly to uproot the Germans from their homes and settle there, and I am sure that the German authorities—of whichever State—would not permit them permanently to settle there, eradicating the indigenous population.

180. It is, however, heartening to some extent to hear the assurance that Cyprus is not being colonized. I hope that is true. I honestly hope that it is true, otherwise, as has been stated earlier, the finding of an acceptable solution to the Cyprus question will become an impossible task. But if it is so, I hope, in fact, I am sure, that there will be no difficulty in agreeing on the inclusion of that phrase in the draft resolution. If there is no colonization and no intention of colonizing the island, then on that point at least we both agree and I hope that that agreement will be reflected in the draft resolution when it is debated in the General Assembly.

181. Again I notice this great difficulty in accepting the true meaning of words. We were told that there is no question of “a minority and a majority community” in the island; but further on in the statement of the representative of the Turkish Cypriots he admitted that there is “one bigger and one smaller” community. Very well. I accept the terminology. I am prepared from now on to say that the Greek community is four times bigger than the Turkish community which is four times smaller, if that would ease the problem at all.

182. We were also obliquely and tacitly referred to resolution 3212 (XXIX), and some surprise was expressed why I was so concerned that there was no implementation of the resolution, since, we were asked, What does resolution 3212 (XXIX) say? It says that the constitutional system is the concern of the communities in Cyprus. I am afraid that not even the explanation of selective choice of words will fit this instance. Now it is selective memory which is being exhibited. We are forgetting that there are three other vital and important points in that resolution. No mention is made of the aggression, no mention of the cessation of military intervention and no mention of all the refugees being allowed to return to their homes. All we are being told is that the negotiations are the concern of the two communities.

183. Well, I have given my views on the progress and outcome of these negotiations and I am surprised that the proposals—which we are told Mr. Denktas was going to submit but did not submit, which are known to the Secretary-General and yet are not known to us—have not been put on the negotiating table. I do not know whether my information from Mr. Clerides is correct or not, but my information is that the request that the negotiations should be postponed until after the Turkish elections was made by Mr. Denktas; but since this is the first time we have heard it, at least this debate has done some good. It has at least marked the time when the Turkish Cypriot side agrees partly—to my mind a very small part, but partly—to comply with the commitment which it had so clearly given in all three rounds of talks in Vienna that it would have full proposals, covering absolutely every aspect of the Cyprus question, to put on the negotiating table a week before the negotiations were to take place in New York. At that time it obviously could not know whether Mr. Clerides would sit down to the negotiations or not; why were the proposals not given eight days beforehand, as it had firmly undertaken to do? So firmly, that it said it would submit them one week before, so that clarifications could be asked for from either side, so that when the talks were held in New York substantial and meaningful negotiations could be carried out.

184. We heard about the alleged existence of secret armies among the Greek Cypriots. There are no such armies, but if there were, and if we are trying to effect the withdrawal from Cyprus of all armies, I would say that there is one marked difference: even if such an army existed, it would be a Cypriot army, not a Turkish army. The Turkish Cypriot community may regard the Turkish forces as armies of its own motherland, and that community is free to choose its relations with its motherland as long as it does not do so at the expense of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, but Turkey is still a foreign country to Cyprus.

185. We heard something else which must be mentioned. If, we were told, Turkey had wanted to advocate a policy of partition, it could have done so, and if the Turkish Cypriot community had wanted partition it would have had it by now. Well, I have my doubts as to whether it will be so easy, whether the legal fiction they have used as a pretext for invading the island in pursuance of the Treaty of Guarantee will stand the test, if partition were the solution that either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots were to pursue. What is more, I have a feeling that there are several countries which have until now been reluctant to take an active role in Cyprus, but which would not view with the same, let us say, favourable indifference the dismemberment of Cyprus, the complete abolition of the independence of Cyprus and its absorption into the NATO camp by being turned into one part Turkish and the other part Greek. That may—just may—be one of the reasons why, publicly or officially, the policy of partition is not being advocated. But why should it be advocated? The way things are now Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have the best of both worlds. They have partition in fact, whilst they have their freedom to use the legal pretext that Cyprus is independent, and thereby legalistically to comply with the call for the respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. When all is said and done, and when we get away from the political nomenclature, the true facts remain that Cyprus is divided by a military line manned by a foreign army, and there is no interchange of people, there is no freedom of movement, there is no freedom of government in what is an integral part of the Republic of Cyprus. So, as it has been repeatedly stated, both on the map and in reality the partition of Cyprus has been implemented.

186. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I wonder whether they have finished or whether there is a fourth Greek representative in the room? Mr. Papadopoulos has said that I should not complain about the proliferation of Greeks in the Committee, but I am rather embarrassed because I do not know to which one of them I should give an answer at the moment.

187. I think I should start with Ambassador Rossides, who extolled the virtues of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and accused me of not going into the essence of the problem and not indicating how this resolution was going to be implemented by Turkey. He spoke not only as the representative of the Greek Cypriots but, as usual, he postured as the conscience of the United Nations and presumed to teach me how I should write my speeches and with which subjects I should deal.

188. Turkey has nothing to fear from resolution 3212 (XXIX). The main recommendation in that resolution is that the two communities should discuss the problem between them, that the two communities were the main parties to the conflict; and, indeed, with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the two communities held four rounds of talks. There is no other way to implement resolution 3212 (XXIX) than through intercommunal talks. We all know that, and everybody accepts that. The Security Council has also expressed the same view in its resolutions on the Cyprus problem.

189. The really worrying part of today's speeches is that Mr. Papadopoulos said that the Cyprus conflict is not a conflict between the two communities, that it is not a constitutional conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, that the problem is a different one and that it would fade away immediately the Turkish forces are withdrawn from the island. I wonder what would happen then.

190. He constantly said that the Greek Cypriots represented 82 per cent of the population and that the Turkish Cypriots represented only 18 per cent. But we also know something of the recent history of Cyprus and of the use of force by one community against the other. If the Greek Cypriots say that they do not want any intercommunal talks and that the Turkish forces should withdraw from the island, this means only that they would like to solve the Cyprus problem then, in the absence of the Turkish army, in the way they have done in the past.

191. Mr. Papadopoulos has said that there are no private Greek Cypriot armies on the island and that there never were. I shall now quote from the statement of a Greek representative in the Security Council. Ambassador Panayotakos said the following in the Council, on 19 July 1974, when speaking about Archbishop Makarios:

“In February 1972 he turned a deaf ear to Athens' last advice for the formation of a Government of national unity. In reply, he created and armed his own paramilitary units of Praetorians instead—namely, a bunch of SS zealots. He persecuted his political opponents and torture was used systematically against them as a means of extorting confessions, according to a recent official survey. They were also excluded from political life and all public offices.”¹⁴

That is what Archbishop Makarios has done to Greece. I wonder what he is preparing for Turks when the Turkish army leaves, as requested?

192. The representative of Greece has said—if I correctly understood him, because there was a profusion of speeches—that Greece has never attempted to achieve *enosis*. I think that Archbishop Makarios is not in agreement with him. I shall quote Archbishop Makarios, who, on 19 July 1974, said the following when he addressed the Security Council:

“The military régime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus. Without a trace of respect

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

for the democratic rights of the Cypriot people, without a trace of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus."¹⁵

He said also:

"The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus."¹⁶

I do not have to qualify this action described by Archbishop Makarios. The Greek representative says, apparently, that this is not an attempt at *enosis*.

193. I also wonder why suddenly he decides to take upon himself the defence of what the Greek junta has done? In doing so the Greek representative also referred to some Turkish internal difficulties because I mentioned the intricacies of Greek politics. He said that he was spreading the word around that because of our internal difficulties, because of our elections, we cannot negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus problem. That is not true at all. First of all, it is not Turkey which is negotiating on this issue but the Turkish Cypriot community with the Greek Cypriot community, and Turkey has always said that it would be ready to accept any settlement agreed upon between the two communities. So Turkish political developments, the difficulties we may encounter in Turkey within our democratic framework, have nothing at all to do with the solution of the Cyprus problem.

194. I wish to say something more about the question of partition. Mr. Papadopoulos has referred to this question and said that we were indeed following a policy of partition. I do not know what the Turkish Government has to do to convince them that we are not at all following a policy of partition. We are dedicated to the independence of Cyprus. We solemnly declared, each time we spoke in the United Nations, that we want a solution of the problem based on the independence of Cyprus, on the sovereignty of Cyprus, on the territorial integrity of Cyprus, and also that we wish to see Cyprus follow a policy of non-alignment.

195. So far as the other questions are concerned, we have time and again stressed that once a settlement has been agreed upon between the two communities Turkey will do what is expected of it.

196. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community.

197. Mr. ÇELİK (Turkish Cypriot community): The United Nations and this Committee have been hearing the Greek stories for the last 12 years. Therefore, I do not intend to reply to each and every allegation raised in these chambers this afternoon. I should like to put on record only that we have a joint committee in Cyprus—consisting of Turkish Cypriot representatives, Greek Cypriot representatives, United Nations representatives and Red Cross representatives—which deals with humanitarian problems,

including missing persons. All files which have been referred to us by the Greek side have been answered, and we are always willing and ready to help on this humanitarian issue.

198. I should also like to put on record that we, the Turkish Cypriot side, have more than 800 missing persons, lists of whom have been given to international bodies. They have been given to the Greek side, whom we have asked to come forward with official statements concerning the whereabouts or fate of those persons, but it has not bothered even to reply. And, incidentally, Mr. Papadopoulos is a member of that committee.

199. Mr. Papadopoulos says that there are no secret armies in Cyprus; the Greek Cypriots have never heard of them. But, if there are no secret armies, why are the so-called Greek Cypriot administrators, with their President and all that, afraid to go to Sampson and question him regarding the whereabouts of their 2,000 missing persons?

200. Why are they afraid to go to Sampson and question him about the coup that he carried out last year and that caused so much bloodshed? Why are they so afraid, if there are no secret armies, if there are no terrorist organizations in Cyprus, even to carry out a purge of their very civil servants who actually participated in the coup last year? The question is before their Parliament. It has been debated for the past 12 months. But no one dares to come forward with a resolution—let alone implement a resolution—calling for the purging of these people or taking them to court, or at least for measures to ensure that such a calamity does not befall Cyprus again.

201. Some of the points that have been raised here can be solved only within the framework of the intercommunal negotiations, which we hope will resume. I would not wish, therefore, to go into any details on those points here.

202. But I should like to put it on record once more that as a community that has been deprived of all governmental funds, facilities and services for the past 12 years, we are determined to defend our rights in Cyprus. In an independent and sovereign Cyprus our rights are equal and cannot be apportioned. We sit here as a community which resisted the Greek Cypriot leaders who were struggling for *enosis* and which therefore saved the independence of the country. We shall continue to be an insurmountable obstacle to the *enosis* movement of the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Greek mainland Government.

203. I do not agree with—and I should like to have the record straight on this—the statement made by Ambassador Rossides this afternoon that the *enosis* movement was something that concerned only the junta and that since the junta is no longer in power the Turkish Cypriots need have no worries about *enosis*. Well, it is obvious how untrue that statement is. The *enosis* movement did not start with the junta. It started back in the fifties when Caramanlis's democratic Government was in power in Greece. We thought we had solved the problem with the Zurich and London agreements,¹⁷ with our new Constitution in

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, Cmd. 679 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).*

1960.¹⁸ But the crisis started again during Papandreou's democratic rule in Greece. So it is no use blaming the junta for something that had been going on for decades before the junta came to power in Greece in 1967. And Makarios is still on record as speaking of the "feasible", the "attainable", which, as I tried to explain this morning, does not exclude *enosis*.

204. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): First I wish to object to the use by the representative of Turkey of the words "Greek delegations in this room". There is only one Greek delegation in this room, and I have the honour to be its representative. There is the delegation of the Greek Cypriot community and there is the delegation of Cyprus, a State Member of the United Nations, recognized as such by everyone—with the exception, perhaps, of the Turkish delegation. I object to the words "Greek delegations in this room". I do not use the words "Turkish delegations". I hope that we are now clear on that point.

205. Secondly, I wish to draw the attention of the Special Political Committee to the fact that the statement that was quoted [*para. 191*] was made by Mr. Panayostakos on 19 July 1974, which makes it part and parcel of the shameful coup d'état perpetrated by the junta against the legitimate President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. It cannot be taken out of context and presented as a Greek statement. It is not a Greek statement. It is a statement belonging to that shameful coup d'état, which, as I said on 8 October last in replying to the representative of Turkey in the General Assembly, was condemned from the outset by everyone and, above all, by my country.¹⁹

206. The three days that elapsed between the invasion of the Turkish troops on 20 July 1974 and the collapse of the junta on 23 July 1974 are being used as a pretext, as a justification for that invasion—an invasion which continues to this day—and for the non-implementation of very clear General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. That is a tactic upon which I do not need to dwell.

207. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Greek Cypriot community.

208. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): I do not expect, of course, that with the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus the problem will automatically be solved. What I am saying is that without such a withdrawal we can never hope to have a solution which is freely arrived at by the two communities and which will take account of their fundamental and legitimate rights.

209. With regard to the existence of Greek armies and the statement which was made in the Security Council and which was referred to out of context here, as the representative of Greece has just said, I would point out the following. We did have under contract in Cyprus a number of Greek officers—about 350. They helped carry out the ill-famed coup in Cyprus and it is to them that reference

was made in the statement about an invasion from Greece into Cyprus. It was proved that they did not carry out the duties of loyalty to the Cyprus Government but, rather, that they were serving the interests of persons outside Cyprus. The service in Cyprus of those officers, however, should not be regarded as something sinister that was done by the Government of Cyprus. Let me mention that a far larger number of Turkish officers—2,000, we hear—were at the time serving with the unofficial Turkish Cypriot army. Proof of that is a recent law adopted by the so-called Turkish Federated State granting Cypriot citizenship to those officers who had served in Cyprus since 1959—even before the independence of Cyprus was declared—and to their descendants.

210. I shall be even briefer with regard to the comments made by the Turkish Cypriot representative. Indeed, we do have the joint committee to which he referred. It has not met for the past four months because there is no interest by the Turkish Cypriot side in the matters on that committee's agenda. It is true, too, that on the files compiled by the International Committee of the Red Cross about 12 replies were given, all of them brief and all of them the same, that is, "No further details are available." I do not know whether they can really be regarded as replies.

211. As for Sampson and his clique, I wish only to inform the Turkish Cypriot representative, who seems to be following the deliberations of the Parliament of Cyprus very closely, that two resolutions have already been adopted by the Parliament condemning the coup and those who took part in it and authorizing the purging from the civil service of those who exceeded their duties and took an active part in the coup with guns—not the ordinary civil servants who were merely performing their duties under the person who was apparently in authority at the time. I hope that very soon this aspect also will be settled properly.

212. I think that in the meantime for every Cypriot, whether in the Government or outside it, the paramount duty, the paramount interest, is how to assist Cyprus to survive as an independent State, how to resist the Turkish invasion of the island, which is still continuing—rather than to engage in a witch hunt and to try to determine who was and who was not responsible for that infamous coup.

213. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The representative of Turkey—I wish to address him in the proper way, I do not want to create confusion by even calling the names of the representatives—solemnly said here that Turkey stands for the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-alignment of Cyprus. The emptiness and hypocrisy of these words is proved by the actions of Turkey. After having destroyed the independence of Cyprus and continuing to destroy it by military occupation, it pretends that it stands for its independence, while we see such violent occupation and invasion as exceptional in the recent annals of history.

214. And then there is the question of "territorial integrity". But territorial integrity is being destroyed every day by expulsion and colonization. What else is that but destroying territorial integrity by partition?

215. Mr. Denktaş, acting under the directions of Ankara, and with its blessing, comes at every moment with a

¹⁸ *Constitutional and Parliamentary Information*, 3rd Series, No. 44 (October 1960), p. 141 and *ibid.*, No. 45 (January 1961), p. 1 (Geneva, Inter-Parliamentary Union).

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2380th meeting.

blackmail threat, saying that unless this or that is done he will declare a separate, independent State of Cyprus tomorrow; what is that but partition—the separate, independent Turkish State of Cyprus? And this is done with the blessing of Turkey and of the representative here: unless the Turkish Cypriots speak in the plenary meeting of the Assembly they will declare an independent, separate State; unless talks resume within a very short time, there will be a declaration of an independent, separate State. This means that a policy of partition is there, already prepared, and they are waiting for the moment and the occasion to implement it.

216. Therefore, I should like to ask the General Assembly, which is a representative body, not to heed these soothing words; they are more fitting for children when we see the acts of Turkey, which mean that, for it, Cyprus is destined for partition and eventual annexation.

217. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

218. Mr. ÇELİK (Turkish Cypriot community): First of all, I should like to put our views on record, or rather correct the record, in view of the allegations just made by Mr. Rossides.

219. Mr. Denktaş has never said that he was going to declare independence tomorrow. We only complained that we are being rendered stateless by the so-called Greek Cypriot administration. We claimed—and we still claim—that we are being deprived of many essential services in Cyprus, that we are being treated as second-class citizens, that we are being cut off from the outside world, that we are being pushed towards separation—which we do not

want—and if this continues we are afraid that we may have to take measures to rectify this anomalous situation which will be considered, we are afraid, as a move towards separation or full independence. But, as all the representatives here have witnessed, Mr. Denktaş is being constantly criticized, he is being constantly attacked, allegations are being directed against him, and I think it is morally all the more important and essential that he should be allowed to speak, to reply in person, in the plenary meeting tomorrow.

220. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to express our gratitude to the representatives of the Cypriot communities for participating in our work today; the verbatim record will be submitted to the General Assembly and, I am sure, will be very helpful in finding the best means of solving the difficult problem that confronts Cyprus at this moment.

221. As I have no more speakers, it is my intention to adjourn the meeting. But, before doing so, I should like to inform the Committee that, in conformity with the decision adopted by the General Assembly on 30 September [2367th plenary meeting], we have to submit a report to the General Assembly, in time for it to be available to the Assembly when it resumes its consideration of the Cyprus question tomorrow morning. If there are no objections, we shall so decide.

It was so decided.

222. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Committee will resume consideration of agenda item 54 on Friday, 14 November 1975.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.

977th meeting

Friday, 14 November 1975, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.977

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*)* (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

* Resumed from the 974th meeting.

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)*

1. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) said that the item under consideration was an important one, since it related to the humanitarian and technical responsibility of ensuring the livelihood, health and education of the refugee population of Palestine. In his report (A/10013 and Corr.1), the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had appropriately noted that, despite some achievements, notably the preservation of the health of the refugees and the development of an impressive education system, the perpetuation of refugee status could be no occasion for celebration. The Committee was confronted with a further dimension of the Palestinian tragedy, namely, the direct needs of some 1,632,000 registered refugees, and the report before it was an

objective portrayal of the condition of the refugees and the efforts of the Agency to carry out its mandate under circumstances of the utmost difficulty and gravity.

2. The most outstanding feature of the Agency's financial status was a persistent chronic deficit. At the end of the current year, there would be a deficit of \$7.2 million. The basic reason for the situation in which UNRWA found itself was the tendency in international circles to envisage its operations, and in fact the entire problem of the refugees, in essentially repetitive and static terms. There was no genuine effort to achieve meaningful progress towards a solution to their problems, nor was there any adequate attempt to ensure that, pending such a solution, elementary and legitimate needs were maintained.

3. It has been estimated that expenditures for 1976 would be \$139.7 million, an increase of \$17.9 million over the adjusted budget of 1975. Inflation accounted for \$13.8 million of the total increase, and the remaining \$4.1 million would cover the minimum normal increase for the programmes. The income anticipated for that period was \$84.7 million, leaving the Agency with a deficit of \$55 million for 1976.

4. The total number of refugees registered with the Agency conveyed a striking picture of the extent of the problem, as well as an answer to Israeli allegations that the existence of a large refugee problem was a myth kept alive by self-seeking Arab politicians. The sum of \$56.1 million of the 1976 expenditure was allocated to relief, in the form of the basic ration, compared with \$51.5 million in 1975. Only 50.7 per cent of the refugees received the monthly ration, which did not constitute a balanced diet; the non-recipients had been excluded because of ration ceilings. The Agency had continued to provide health care, with the emphasis on preventive medicine, and under that heading \$15.6 million had been allocated for 1976, compared with \$13.5 million in 1975. Education, including vocational and teacher training, was the largest item in the Agency's 1976 budget, accounting for \$65.8 million for 1976, compared with \$53.5 million in 1975.

5. In the face of its current financial crisis, UNRWA had the following alternatives: the elimination of the ration and supplementary feeding programmes plus the cessation of the preventive health activities; the closure of the schools and training centres; the reduction of all the services by \$55 million. Any of those measures would involve the dismissal of some or all of the 15,500 Palestinian staff.

6. A breakdown in UNRWA operations would have tragic implications, not only for the area in which they took place, but also for world peace, since the Agency's financial crisis was undeniably the result of a political will which had chosen to downgrade and depreciate the magnitude of the problem for so many years. Billions of dollars were made readily available whenever policy-makers in rich and powerful countries decided to espouse causes dearer to their hearts, even if less humane, just or justified. Yet everyone recognized that the problem of the uprooted and displaced Palestinian people had been the core of the Middle East situation and the consequence of an ill-advised political decision a quarter of a century before.

7. The Committee could give very little indeed in the way of advice and guidance to the Commissioner-General on operations that were already reduced to the minimum. However, its collective duty was to provide what was needed to sustain them.

8. Jordan, as host to the majority of the refugees and a small country with limited resources, had a clear conscience regarding the size of the burden it shouldered. Direct governmental assistance covering the period from July 1974 to June 1975 had totalled \$23 million, that being the cost of services and commodities contributed in diverse fields. However, there were limits to what the host countries could do and a clear need for an increased share in contributions by the international community, which had helped to create the problem.

9. He wished, on behalf of his Government, to express appreciation to the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for its efforts to provide the funds that were necessary for the work of the Agency. He endorsed the Commissioner-General's view, expressed in para. 16 of his report, that the only certain means of ensuring that the necessary funds were provided would be the levying of an assessment on all Member States. His Government would also support a proposal to include the cost of the local staff of UNRWA in the regular budget of the United Nations, thus alleviating the burden resulting from the shortage of funds.

10. In conclusion, his delegation wished to stress that the problem of the Palestinians was a question not only of refugees, but of the restoration of the inalienable rights of a people, including national independence and self-determination and also the right of return for all those who had been displaced and dispossessed. The task of ensuring their welfare and existence was an important one, and the international community could not abdicate its responsibility in that regard without making a constructive over-all solution infinitely more difficult.

11. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to address the Committee.

12. Mr. AQL (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) said that he would like to express his organization's deep appreciation to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff for their dedication and unceasing efforts.

13. PLO was the sole representative of the people of Palestine, who were struggling to liberate their homeland from imperialist occupation and racist Zionism. The granting of observer status to PLO (General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX)) and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) had enabled it to deal with all matters relating to the problem of Palestine within the United Nations framework. With the help and support of friendly peoples who categorically rejected and condemned the subjugation of one people by another for reasons of race or religion, PLO would continue its struggle until the people of Palestine returned to their homeland and exercised as a political community their right of national self-determination.

14. Since large numbers of Palestinians continued to live in refugee shelters, the work and services of UNRWA were of great importance. The Commissioner-General had referred in his report to PLO co-operation with UNRWA, and he wished to assure him that PLO looked forward to further co-operation with the Agency in its humane task.

15. The financial difficulties of UNRWA should be a source of concern to all who saw, felt and understood the injustice inflicted on the Palestinian refugees. PLO firmly believed that responsibility for the current financial crisis of UNRWA lay first of all with Israel, because it had forcibly expelled the indigenous Palestinian population; secondly, with the United Nations, because it had created Israel and had thus far allowed it to flout all relevant United Nations resolutions; and thirdly, with the Western Powers, because they had supported Israel both materially and morally, thus enabling it to maintain its control over Palestine and perpetuating the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Those who had created the problem of the Palestinian people should see to it that UNRWA operated without handicaps, financial or otherwise, until the Palestinian people were able to exercise their inalienable right to return to their homeland.

16. Israel's repeated attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and UNRWA installations in Lebanon inflicted further punishment on the Palestinian refugees in their wretched life and created further problems for UNRWA.

17. Until Israel understood that it could not ignore the existence of the Palestinian people, who had gained even more support from friendly countries during the current session of the General Assembly, turmoil and tension would continue to mount in that part of the Middle East.

18. As the sole representative of the Palestinian people, PLO would continue to pursue its aims until the rights of the people of Palestine were restored and the will of the international community was respected.

19. Mrs. BERMUDEZ (Cuba), speaking on a point of order, said that the statement made by the representative of PLO represented the voice of the Palestinian people who were victims of Zionist racism and aggression. In view of the importance of that statement, she proposed that it should be reproduced *in extenso* in the records of the Committee.

20. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the decision of the General Assembly at its 2353rd plenary meeting to again authorize the Special Political Committee to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings, or portions thereof. The Committee could therefore avail itself of that possibility. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to do so in the case of the statement made by the representative of PLO.

It was so decided.¹

21. Mr. LOPEZ HERCE (Spain) commended the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, the Secretary-General and the other individuals and bodies that had reported on the

situation of the Agency and the refugees, and on the efforts to alleviate that deplorable situation.

22. His delegation remained convinced that the solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees was to be found not in alms-giving or charity but in final settlement of the broader question of the situation in the Middle East. In its statement in the Committee at the twenty-ninth session (946th meeting), his delegation had expressed its concern over the progressive deterioration of the purchasing power of contributions made to UNRWA and the effect of the world economic crisis on the ability of States to contribute to the Agency.

23. The Spanish Government had made a contribution of \$1 million in the form of food-stuffs to the Agency in 1975. Thus, Spain had ranked fourteenth among donor countries in 1975 and thirteenth in terms of its total contribution to the Agency since 1950. His Government was contemplating making a contribution in the same amount for 1976 as in the preceding year. His delegation appealed to all countries to contribute as generously as possible to the Agency in the coming year in order to enable it to carry out its important mission of assistance to the Palestinian refugees, always bearing in mind that the refugee problem could be solved only through an over-all political settlement of the Middle East situation.

24. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) commended the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for his comprehensive report (A/10013 and Corr.1) and the Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for his presentation of the Working Group's report (A/10334).

25. His delegation appreciated the anxiety felt by those responsible for administering the Agency's projects and programmes; despite the generous contributions which had reduced the projected deficit of \$13 million for 1975 to \$7.2 million, the prospects continued to be alarming and the deficit for 1976 was estimated at \$55 million. The Philippines had consistently supported the humanitarian operations of UNRWA and endorsed the Working Group's recommendation, expressed by the Rapporteur at the 974th meeting, that Member States should implement their verbal and political support with generous and increased contributions. His Government had pledged a further increase in its voluntary annual contribution to UNRWA, from \$1,500 to \$1,750; that amount should be viewed in the context of his country's support for United Nations programmes of humanitarian assistance and against the background of its own economic difficulties.

26. His delegation felt that the international community had the responsibility of ensuring that the relief, health and education services for the 1,632,000 registered refugees were not disrupted or curtailed. It agreed with the Commissioner-General that the Agency's financing deserved to be placed on a firmer basis, and that UNRWA services in the form of relief, assistance, health care and education remained indispensable in the absence of a just and lasting settlement of the question of Palestine. His delegation wished to join the Working Group in its appeal to Governments which had not contributed in the past and to those which had thus far contributed inadequately to reconsider their position.

¹ The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.977.

27. While unequivocally supporting UNRWA, his delegation agreed that the problem of the Palestinian refugees could be resolved only in the context of a permanent solution of the question of Palestine which would recognize the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of the people of Palestine. Accordingly, his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX), 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX).

28. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) said that his delegation wished to express its appreciation to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff at a time when the Agency's responsibilities had become very onerous.

29. In his report (A/10013 and Corr.1) and in his statement to the Committee at the 974th meeting, the Commissioner-General had clearly stated the financial difficulties besetting UNRWA, which in turn had repercussions on the Palestinians who received assistance from the Agency. The Commissioner-General had indicated that the services provided by the Agency might have to be curtailed, or in some cases eliminated. Since those services did not meet the minimum needs of those for whom they were intended, his delegation believed that it was particularly dangerous to envisage the possibility of reducing them still further and felt that the international community should guarantee the resources needed to enable UNRWA to continue its work.

30. A definitive solution must be found to end the sufferings of the Palestinian people. The Agency had been established as a temporary measure; its resources were limited and it could only do so much.

31. It was important to bear in mind the scope of the plot which had been carried out against the people of Palestine by international imperialism and zionism, with the full knowledge of the international community. The decision taken by the United Nations in 1947 (General Assembly resolution 181 (II)), which was in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and had no legal basis, had been adopted as a result of the pressure brought to bear by the great Powers and had forced an entire people to become refugees and to seek shelter under the aegis of UNRWA or elsewhere. The Zionists sought to create the impression that the people of Palestine had chosen exile voluntarily, but such a lie could not deceive enlightened world opinion. On the other hand, an article published in the *Jewish Newsletter* in January 1959 had admitted that the Jewish settlers in Palestine had driven the native Arabs out of cities and villages by force of arms or by deceit, lies and false promises, and had turned them into tragic refugees.

32. The formula for the solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees was to be found in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations; it was therefore only a question of securing compliance with them. The right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and their right of self-determination were unassailable; the crimes perpetrated against them constituted crimes against humanity; their cause was therefore just.

33. The report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA provided a clear picture of how the Zionists regarded

United Nations resolutions. Moreover, Zionist terrorism was not confined to well-documented attacks on refugee shelters but also took the form of incursions into the territory of sovereign States. The determination of the Palestinian people to regain their homeland nevertheless remained unshakable. History would vindicate them and would not soon forgive the Zionists and their friends, such as the United States, whose political and material aid made Zionist terrorism possible.

34. The financial crisis of UNRWA had become chronic and, despite the laudable efforts of the Working Group, remained difficult. The General Assembly should take steps to ensure that the necessary level of services continued to be provided. He emphasized, however, that the relief provided by UNRWA was only of a temporary nature; only when the provisions of the Charter and the relevant United Nations resolutions were fully implemented would a permanent settlement be found. There was no doubt as to the rights involved, and the United Nations now had to choose between good and evil.

35. Mr. VON HERTZEN (Finland) said that, since its establishment by the General Assembly in 1949 (resolution 302 (IV)) UNRWA had not only assumed the main burden of providing relief for the essential needs of the Palestine refugees but had also made a more lasting economic, social and educational contribution which would be of service to them in their future life. With the passage of time, the needs of the refugees had increased while the possibilities of the Agency's meeting them had decreased. Throughout its existence, the financial situation of UNRWA had been far from satisfactory, but the situation had never been more desperate than it was currently. The increase of 20 per cent in the Agency's total income over that for 1974 had not matched the increase in expenditure. His delegation fully shared the deep concern expressed by the Commissioner-General in his report at the fact that, in the absence of adequate income, the existing budgetary gap could only be eliminated by reductions in services, which would obviously produce widespread suffering for the 1.6 million refugees who had no other form of assistance. In order to avoid that, the Secretary-General, the Commissioner-General and all Member States should make every effort to place the Agency's finances on a sound basis.

36. The Agency's financial problem was both immediate and long-term. There was only one solution to the immediate problem, namely, to increase the amount of voluntary contributions considerably. Finland sincerely hoped that countries which were already contributing to UNRWA would make an additional financial effort and that those which so far had not participated in the financing of the programme would decide to do so. Pending a just and lasting settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees, the provision of relief assistance as well as health and educational services for the refugees should be jointly shouldered by the international community. The Government of Finland had contributed to UNRWA annually and would announce its contribution for 1976 at the forthcoming meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA, to be held on 26 November.

37. With regard to the long-term problem, the comprehensive study of the finances of UNRWA should be

continued in order to prevent any recurrence of the financial crisis. Since, in 1974, the General Assembly by its resolution 3331 A (XXIX) had extended the mandate of UNRWA for a further three years, States Members of the Organization were under a moral obligation to see that it could carry out its humanitarian task for the benefit of the refugees in the Middle East.

38. Mr. KATHIRAMALAINATHAN (Sri Lanka) said that for 27 years the Palestinian people had been forced to live on the charity of the international community, away from the land that was rightfully theirs and forcibly deprived of the means to a decent life. UNRWA had recently completed 25 years of service to the refugees and, while anniversaries usually called for congratulations and celebrations, the perpetuation of the refugee status of the Palestinian people provided no occasion for rejoicing. Moreover, as the reports of the Commissioner-General and the Working Group on the Financing of the Agency made clear, because of the absence of stable arrangements for financing the Agency's operations, steps might have to be taken to curtail its services. The 1.6 million refugees now faced despair unless international charity once again came to their rescue.

39. For too long the humanitarian aspects of the problem had been confused with its political aspects. The physical survival of the refugees was indeed a humanitarian problem and, as such, had been seen as temporary, awaiting a final political solution. Such a solution could not be reached as long as those who had made refugees of the Palestinian people showed no willingness to let them return to their homeland or to compensate them for the property they had left behind, if they chose not to return. That had been the essence of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), to which his country had subscribed.

40. His delegation was perplexed by those who said that the way to solve the refugee problem was to create a new homeland for the displaced peoples in the Arab territories. Peter had been robbed once to pay Paul, and now it was being suggested that he should be robbed again to accommodate Paul. Sri Lanka, for its part, was not suggesting that all the territory which was now Israel should be restored to the Palestinians; it also subscribed fully to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which affirmed the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; what it sought was Israel's acknowledgement of the same principle, and fulfilment by that country of an equally vital element of the same resolution, which called for the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict.

41. Until a political solution was found, the refugees would continue to need assistance from UNRWA, and additional resources would be needed to enable the Agency to fulfil its mandate. While the eradication of human distress was an international concern and responsibility, justice demanded that the authors of the calamity which had befallen the refugees should at least accept a greater share of the responsibility. Despite hardships, developing nations like his own had made contributions, if only token ones, to the Agency, and it was difficult for them to justify further contributions if the money donated was diverted to the repeated rebuilding of shelters and other essential facilities which were continually destroyed in the name of

defence and security. Some examples of that wanton waste were described in paragraph 12 of the report submitted by the Secretary-General (A/10253) in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3331 D (XXIX).

42. His delegation did not consider the current debate to be an occasion for castigating anyone. One should not lose sight of the basic aspects of the problem, namely, the financial difficulties of the Agency and the need for an equitable sharing of the financial burden. The problem of the Palestine refugees had been perceived from the very beginning as a temporary one, and the United Nations could not postpone indefinitely the search for a permanent solution. The Organization had an impressive record of dealing with the problem of colonialism and should not fail to deal with the more recent phenomenon of the semi-permanent refugee status which condemned more than one and a half million human beings to a life of dependence on international charity. The current debate was not the occasion to judge the rights and wrongs of past events, but to attempt to ensure that the wrongs were not perpetuated and the mistakes of history were not repeated.

43. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) pointed out that both the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271) contained references to the general situation prevailing in the Middle East and linked the solution of the refugee problem to the solution of the Middle East problem as a whole, which also included the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

44. At its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 3331 D (XXIX), had called on the Government of Israel as an occupying Power to take steps for the return of displaced inhabitants and to desist from all measures that obstructed their return, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories. The same resolution had also deplored Israel's terrorist attacks on refugee camps and called upon it immediately to desist from such attacks. It appeared that Israel had not complied with that resolution; the Palestinian refugees continued to be harassed by Israel's terrorist forces, and Israel had also resorted to indiscriminate bombing of refugee camps. Reports still indicated that Israel had no intention whatsoever of permitting the displaced persons to return to their homes.

45. As described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/10253), Israel continued to tamper with the property of refugees; in some cases, homes belonging to them had been destroyed on one flimsy pretext or another. The Secretary-General also reported many cases of punitive demolition of refugee camps and shelters recognized and financed by UNRWA. Despite the protests of UNRWA to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Agency's claims for compensation remained unpaid. His delegation fully shared the concern of UNRWA at that Israeli practice and found the failure to pay compensation to be unacceptable. Further attacks had been perpetrated on refugee camps in Lebanon, costing the lives of many refugees and causing the complete destruction of shelters and facilities built by the Agency. Such facts served to highlight the gravity of the situation, bearing in mind the unhealthy financial situation of the Agency.

46. His delegation commended the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the impressive programmes the Agency managed to carry out in behalf of the refugees in spite of its difficult financial position. The Israeli authorities should be held responsible for the Agency's financial crisis because of the acts of sabotage they had committed against the Palestinian refugees, and the General Assembly should demand prompt compensation to enable the Agency to continue its humanitarian programmes. His delegation called upon Israel to abandon its obstructionist attitude toward UNRWA; that attitude was the main stumbling-block to any meaningful programmes for the Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, UNRWA programmes would always be in jeopardy as long as Israel continued to occupy Arab lands by force and refused to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

47. The solution to the refugee problem lay in finding a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The establishment of UNRWA in 1949 had been prompted by the explosive situation created by Israel in the Middle East, and year after year the reports of UNRWA had drawn attention to the link between the refugee problem and the general situation prevailing in the region. Therefore, if Israel wanted peace in the Middle East it must implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and accept the restoration of the sovereign rights of the Palestinian people.

48. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) said that 26 years had elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) establishing UNRWA. During that time, many more resolutions relating to the catastrophic situation of the Palestinian people had been adopted by the General Assembly. That situation was the work of the Zionists, who had used some of the most savage methods known in modern history to force the Palestinian people out of their ancestral home. With the assistance of the Western imperialists, the Zionists had built up their State and had attempted to liquidate the Palestinian people, and even to destroy their national personality. Moreover, not even the faintest hope now existed that the situation would soon be ended and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations implemented.

49. Israel's entry into the United Nations had been made contingent upon its willingness to accept the repatriation of the refugees, whose continuing status as such was a threat to peace in the Middle East. The Zionists, however, were not interested in peace and persisted in their refusal to accept the principle of repatriation because it was at variance with their concept of Jewish life in the promised land.

50. The crimes perpetrated by the Zionists against the Palestinian people were reminiscent of those committed by the Nazis against the Jews. The British historian, Arnold Toynbee, had not failed to note the irony in the fact that the Jews had emerged from their experience of the holocaust in Europe only to imitate the Nazi crimes once perpetrated against them.

51. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), the United Nations had consistently recognized the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes. Despite its obligations under the Charter, Israel had flouted that resolution and subsequent ones reaffirming the rights

of the Palestinian people. That situation should no longer be allowed to continue. The responsibility for the refugee problem lay squarely with Zionism. Israel therefore had certain obligations vis-à-vis the refugees. By refusing to discharge those obligations and by disregarding United Nations resolutions, Israel had forfeited its right to membership in the United Nations.

52. The financial deficit of UNRWA was disquieting and might even jeopardize the Agency's ability to provide essential services to the refugee population. A curtailment of services would have a serious impact on the lives of the Palestinian people, especially in view of the fact that the level of services was already inadequate. The United Nations had an obligation to ensure a minimum standard of living to the refugees, since their plight was the direct result of a mistake committed by the Organization and by certain Member States which had pressed for the creation of Israel, knowing full well its implications.

53. His delegation remained convinced that, as long as Israel refused to accept the repatriation of the refugees and to recognize their legitimate rights, the international community, and especially those States which had been responsible for the situation, would have an obligation towards the Palestinian people. Chief among those States were Israel and the countries which supported its policies of aggression and expansion by providing it with economic, political and military assistance. As long as the international community failed to ensure compliance by Israel with the resolutions of the United Nations, it would have an obligation to ensure the provision of essential services to the refugees. His country had decided to make a contribution of \$1 million to UNRWA in order to assist it in making up its financial deficit. However, the problem would not be resolved by remedying the financial difficulties of UNRWA, but only by providing a radical solution to the situation of the Palestinian refugees as a whole.

54. Mr. FITZ (Austria) said his Government hoped that UNRWA would continue its important humanitarian task until a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem, including a just and lasting settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees, could be reached. He had been instructed to announce that, subject to parliamentary approval, the Austrian contribution to the Agency for 1976 would be 1,320,000 schillings, which represented a further increase over his Government's contribution for 1975.

55. The increase in its contribution reflected Austria's firm intention to help the Agency over its current financial crisis. A study of the report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (A/10334) and of the Commissioner-General's report on the activities of the Agency (A/10013 and Corr.1) led to various conclusions. The first was that the Agency must not be forced to reduce its services, which were already at a minimum level and complemented each other to form a coherent programme for the refugees. The second was that UNRWA could meet its immediate short-term problems only if countries which had not already done so, and especially those particularly associated with the fate of the refugees, made financial contributions. The third was that, in the long term, the entire financial basis of the Agency must be reconsidered. The scope of the operation was such that a small group of

countries could no longer carry the financial burden alone. That would be not only inconsistent with the large number of votes by which the mandate of the Agency had been renewed in 1974 (General Assembly resolution 3331 A (XXIX)), but also in contradiction with the international community's duty to alleviate the suffering of innocent people. The contributions to the UNRWA budget must truly reflect the joint efforts of all Member States and their responsibility in that regard, irrespective of their geographical situation and their political attitude to the Middle East question. The problem of the Palestine refugees was not a regional but a global problem which tested mankind's sensibility to human misery and suffering. His delegation therefore earnestly hoped that the appeals of the President of the General Assembly and the Commissioner-General would not remain unheard.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

56. Mr. EHSASSI (Iran) said that, unlike other anniversaries, the twenty-fifth anniversary on 1 May 1975 of the beginning of UNRWA operations was not an occasion for celebration. Although intended to operate for a short period of time, the Agency, after 25 years and after having spent nearly a billion dollars, had taken on the aspect of a permanent institution. The reasons were inherent in the problem itself, for the mandate of UNRWA was humanitarian while the problem of the Palestinian refugees must be seen within the context of a political solution.

57. On the basis of the reports before the Committee, the prospects for solving the problem of the Arab refugees remained as elusive as ever. After a quarter of a century, the right to return, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 194 (III), had never been offered either to the original refugees or to those, many of whom were refugees for the second time, displaced after the 1967 hostilities: UNRWA achievements reflected the tenacity and loyalty of its staff. It was also encouraging to note that United Nations specialized agencies, in particular WHO and UNESCO, had continued their collaboration with UNRWA and in some cases increased their contribution. Enrolment in the UNRWA/UNESCO educational project had risen considerably and the modest programme of school-building had not ceased. Reference should also be made to UNDP financial assistance to the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education and to the Agency's comprehensive and integrated health programme.

58. No particular aspect of the Palestine refugee problem could be tackled in isolation, but, pending a just and lasting political solution, the international community must give as much assistance as possible to enable the Agency to continue its essential services. A hopeful trend over the past year was the increase in assistance provided by voluntary agencies, non-governmental organizations and individuals, and it was to be hoped that they might be encouraged to expand their valuable contributions. The Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1) stated that the Agency might be forced not only to curtail its services but even to cease completely to operate. His delegation agreed with the Commissioner-General that any reduction in services, which were already at a bare minimum, would have serious implications for the refugees themselves, for the countries in which they lived and for the prospect of a

peaceful settlement in the Middle East as a whole. UNRWA must be placed on a sounder financial basis. It could not function rationally while continuously facing a crisis. The Commissioner-General's comments and recommendations in paragraph 16 of the report could no doubt prove useful.

59. In view of the Secretary-General's appeal, the Government of Iran had decided to increase its contribution to UNRWA from \$18,000 to \$30,000. In addition, the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society and the World Health Foundation of Iran continued to give assistance to the Agency. It should, however, be remembered that the goal was not the indefinite extension of the Agency's mandate but a just settlement of the refugee problem and the attainment of a viable peace in line with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) resumed the Chair.

60. Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia) said that, in every discussion on the previous reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, the Czechoslovak delegation had emphasized that the humanitarian aspects of the problem of the Arab people of Palestine were not the only or the decisive ones. The substance of the problem was political; it was a question of rectifying a historical wrong which for decades had been done by Israel to the Arab people of Palestine, who had been driven out of their homeland by terror and violence. His delegation had taken an unequivocal stand on that matter when the question of Palestine had been discussed in the General Assembly. Acceptance of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to return to their homes, their right to self-determination and to a State of their own, as defined in General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) was the only way to a lasting solution of the pressing problem. Regrettably, however, such a solution was hampered by the obstinacy of the Israeli leaders. The only way of terminating the suffering of the Arab people of Palestine was the implementation of United Nations resolutions dating as far back as General Assembly resolution 194 (III), according to which Israel must permit the Palestinians to return to their homeland, restore to them their property and provide compensation to those who decided to settle in other countries or were unable to return.

61. However, as shown in the latest report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1), Israel continued to discriminate against the Arab people of Palestine and to persecute and attack them even in territories of other States, recklessly violating the sovereignty of the latter and inciting unrest within those States. Evidence of the destruction of the Palestinians' camps, which had been built with the assistance of the international community, and the killing of their defenceless inhabitants could be found in a number of documents, including the Commissioner-General's report.

62. His delegation was aware that the humanitarian work of UNRWA and the assistance of the international community helped to mitigate the suffering of the Palestinians, who persisted in their heroic struggle to achieve full respect for their legitimate rights. It fully supported the untiring efforts of PLO, whose Chairman had been warmly welcomed in Prague in 1975. The Czechoslovak people were determined to continue the material and humanitarian

assistance provided by their Government and by Czechoslovak non-governmental institutions and organizations to the Arab people of Palestine along bilateral lines, not only to alleviate their plight but also in order that the struggle of peoples for justice and freedom might be crowned with final success.

63. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statements made by a number of Arab delegations at the current meeting were in the tradition of similar statements made by the representatives of the same countries on the item on previous occasions. Everyone knew what one of those countries, the Libyan Arab Republic, stood for. Its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security must have been outstanding, as required by Article 23 of the Charter, since it had recently become a member of the Security Council. Had it given to UNRWA the prize of \$5 million it had awarded to the murderers of the Israeli sportsmen at Munich, the Agency's deficit would have been almost eliminated. The statements that had been made were part and parcel of the systematic campaign of Arab political warfare against Israel and were replete with deliberate falsehoods, distortions and misrepresentations.

64. His delegation would make a detailed statement on all the aspects of the item under discussion in due course. Meanwhile, it wished to place on record its complete and utter rejection of the allegations made against Israel by those representatives. It was a pity that their Governments had learnt nothing over the years. It was their attitude, and that of other Arab Governments, which had caused and was causing continuous bloodshed in the Middle East. The foul murder committed near Zion Square in Jerusalem on the previous day by agents of PLO was a case in point. The official press service of PLO, operating, of course, from Beirut, had published a statement admitting responsibility for that dastardly crime, although it had presumed to call it a "heroic and daring operation". That murderous attack on

innocent people had been carried out on the anniversary of Yasser Arafat's appearance at the United Nations, apparently as some kind of "celebration" or "commemoration" of that shameful event. Spokesmen of PLO had been saying for the past year that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly sanctioned their murderous activities against Israel; no doubt the three new resolutions adopted on 10 November 1975 (General Assembly resolutions 3375 (XXX), 3376 (XXX) and 3379 (XXX)) would provide them with further encouragement.

65. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement by the preceding speaker did not even deserve a reply. It was ludicrous to hear a Zionist spokesman speak of respect for the Charter. That was both arrogant and impertinent since all States Members of the United Nations knew who had violated the Charter and lacked respect for the United Nations. In 1974, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel had personally presided over a ceremony during which the United Nations flag had been burnt in front of his ministry. Those who spoke on behalf of Zionism in the General Assembly had also torn up texts of General Assembly resolutions.

66. The spokesman for Zionism was perfectly aware of the Libyan Arab Republic's attitude to the United Nations, and all members of the international community knew what principles his (Mr. Sahad's) country defended. It felt no shame for its support of liberation movements throughout the world, which it knew represented a just cause. Freedom was the greatest gift bestowed on mankind, and his country's support for all who fought for freedom stemmed from its faith that the forces of evil could not prevail. Only the allies of racists, and those who subjugated and colonized other peoples, condemned that position.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

978th meeting

Monday, 17 November 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.978

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. AHMED (Egypt) said that the problem under consideration, that of the fate of 1.5 million Palestinians who had been deprived of their property and basic rights and forced to leave their countries to live in refugee camps, was the most acute and bitter problem in world history. What was even more painful for the refugees was that the situation had continued for over 25 years. The international community must no longer temporize but must attack the core of the problem and find a solution urgently. His delegation had repeatedly said that until a just solution was found through the restoration of the fundamental rights of

the Palestinian people, there would not only be no peace in the Middle East but the whole of international peace and security would also be threatened.

2. The problem was becoming increasingly complex because of the financial difficulties of UNRWA, difficulties which would soon make it impossible to provide essential services even at a minimum level. Moreover, new waves of refugees were entering the camps and would require an expansion of services. All the documents on the question showed that any reduction in those services would have political as well as humanitarian consequences. The correlation between the problem of the refugees and the political situation in the Middle East was shown in paragraphs 4 and 30 of the Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1).

3. As the Commissioner-General had said, in paragraph 2 of his report, UNRWA had completed 25 years of service, but its twenty-fifth anniversary was, unlike other such anniversaries, no occasion for celebration. Eight years had passed since a new wave of refugees from Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights had entered the camps and had again seen the right to return denied them. Those refugees, like their predecessors, were still vainly awaiting Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories. The crux of the problem, therefore, was a just and equitable political solution. That had been recognized by the international community in General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) and again in General Assembly resolutions 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX), in which the international community recognized the Palestinian people's right to return to their homes, to self-determination and to national independence.

4. Egypt's attitude had always been that law and morality must prevail and that those responsible for evil must pay for its consequences. In particular, the countries which had been responsible for the action which had originally brought about the situation had the major responsibility for seeing that it was rectified. Yet, year after year the United Nations adopted resolutions whose implementation it could not bring about.

5. His delegation fully appreciated the dedicated work of the Commissioner-General and his staff, despite the Agency's financial crisis and the current political climate, to provide the basic necessities to people who had been deprived of their rights and had seen their territory fall under military occupation.

6. Special attention should be drawn to the constructive role played by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which had greatly helped UNRWA in its work. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Commissioner-General's report showed the close links between the Agency and PLO, the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which had been granted observer status by the General Assembly and was working towards peace in the Middle East. It was therefore logical that any matter concerning refugees should be dealt with in collaboration with PLO.

7. It was regrettable that the United Nations should allow the finances of UNRWA to be in a state of constant crisis. It was ironical that the Agency should be facing a deficit of \$7 million when Phantom jets were being given to certain

countries. He invited countries to compare the amounts they had given to Israel over the past 25 years with those they had contributed to enable UNRWA to keep alive 1.6 million Palestine refugees. The Commissioner-General and his staff must be able to plan on the basis of a stable budget, which would never be achieved with the present system of financing. While voluntary contributions were of inestimable help, they could not be expected to cover all UNRWA expenses, which should come out of the regular budget of the United Nations. It was illogical that a few States Members of the United Nations should bear the major share of UNRWA financing while others—or the same ones—were providing the military equipment to enable Israel to carry out fierce attacks on innocent women and children, causing extensive destruction in the camps and depriving children of essential education, as was shown by paragraphs 24, 123 and 124 of the Commissioner-General's report. The report also noted, in paragraph 27, that the Agency's financial situation was further complicated by devaluations of the Israel pound and by increased costs due to inflation.

8. The United Nations must take serious steps to put an end to Israel's attacks on the refugee camps and to ensure that Israel paid compensation for the damage caused. It should be remembered that the Arab countries in which the refugee camps were situated made large contributions towards their maintenance both in cash and in kind either directly to the refugees or to UNRWA. That was in addition to the voluntary and supplementary contributions made by other Arab countries. Therefore, the Arab countries were shouldering a major part of the burden caused by the refugees' inability to return home.

9. Despite the repeated calls upon Israel in resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly to permit the refugees and persons displaced after the 1967 hostilities to return to their homes, Israel continued to defy those resolutions, although, at the twenty-eighth session of the Assembly, the Israeli representative had informed the Committee on 9 November 1973 (881st meeting) that his Government had permitted the return of over 50,000 refugees and displaced persons. The Israeli Government had attempted to give that lie an official flavour by instructing its representative to state in reply to a note verbale from the Secretary-General, dated 29 January 1975, that the total number of displaced persons who had returned to their homes since 1967 currently stood at 55,000. However, in the beginning of the same paragraph of that reply, the text of which was reproduced in paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's report (A/10253), it was stated that the prevailing situation did not permit a large-scale return of those displaced persons. In paragraph 4 of the report, however, the Secretary-General mentioned that he had been informed by the Commissioner-General that, on the basis of the information available, the figure of 8,000, given in the latter's report for 1974¹ as the estimate of the number of displaced refugees who had returned to the occupied territories since June 1967, had increased by only a few hundred. Israel's attempts to obtain the sympathy of Member States and well-intentioned private individuals by assertions of the kind he had referred to would be vain if it

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13*, and corrigendum, para. 9.

continued to destroy shelters as reported in paragraphs 28, 69 and 175 of the Commissioner-General's report for the current year (A/10013 and Corr.1) and in the report of the Secretary-General (A/10253). Despite the protests of UNRWA, Israel continued its demolitions and had paid no compensation so far.

10. With regard to the refugees, Israel maintained a position peculiar to itself, which was in contradiction with the spirit of the Charter and impeded all efforts to help them. It was impossible to alleviate their plight by inventing new political concepts. The only solution was to permit them to return to their homes in full implementation of United Nations resolutions.

11. Any slackening of the progress towards finding a peaceful and just solution in the Middle East—a solution which inevitably involved the return of the Palestinian people, their recognition by the international community and a full withdrawal by Israel from occupied Arab territories—would only add to the human tragedy and create an explosive situation to the detriment of the region and of all mankind. He was certain that anyone who appreciated the history of Egyptian civilization would join with his country in the hope that the principles of justice and human values would prevail. If not, the international community would be held responsible by future generations.

12. Mr. BÁNYÁSZ (Hungary) said that, during the Committee's consideration of the item before it, two main points in the General Assembly's discussion on the question of Palestine should be borne in mind. The first was the basic principle, which had always been upheld by the socialist countries, that the question of Palestine was primarily a political issue. Furthermore, PLO should have the final say in any question related to the situation of the Palestinian Arabs.

13. The second was that the vast majority of Member States and world public opinion were utterly dissatisfied with the very slow progress made in the Middle East question and its key problem, the question of Palestine. Frequent stalemates made for increased tensions in the area and gave rise to justified concern by Member States, which could not be dismissed airily with lectures or threats.

14. However, until a final political settlement was reached, and probably for some time after, humanitarian action was needed in order that the hopes placed in the United Nations would not be disappointed. For various reasons, the work of UNRWA, which was an essential part of the groundwork for a just and peaceful pattern of relations in the Middle East, had been carried on during the preceding year under far more difficult conditions than previously. The problems of funding UNRWA programmes would be solved at once if those who were responsible for the plight of the refugees assumed material responsibility for them. That was both a legal and a moral duty. No country could rely for its security solely on an excessive military build-up or always rely on the help of a remote big Power; all must win their neighbours' goodwill and respect.

15. His country, in co-operation with the friendly Arab countries and PLO, had long given direct humanitarian aid

to the victims of aggression and would continue to do so. The time had come for all countries to seek a final solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees in accordance with the resolutions of the current session and to give the long-suffering inhabitants of the refugee camps not only bread but also the hope of a secure, peaceful future.

16. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic) expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Commissioner-General, his aides and the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, and thanked those States, organizations and individuals who had contributed to the Agency's costs.

17. It was noticeable that the reports of the various Commissioners-General since the establishment of the Agency had dealt with the Palestine issue from the point of view of the problems of shelter, clothing, food and education, rather than as a political problem caused by the colonialist, imperialist, expansionist invasion of Arab lands by racists and Zionists. The Committee was currently being asked to deal with a situation for which the racist, Zionist entity and its allies and supporters, notably the United States of America and certain Western States, were fully responsible. If the various Commissioners-General had gone to the root of the problem, it would have been possible to put an end to the suffering, poverty and deprivation of 3 million Palestinians. His delegation believed that no complete solution would be found to the problem unless it was presented in all its political and international dimensions and unless the United Nations used every means to ensure the implementation of its own resolutions and to bring about the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories and the restoration to the Palestinian people of their homeland.

18. The financial deficit referred to in the report of the Commissioner-General was merely a technical one. Why did not Israel, the United States and those Western States which had supported the establishment of Israel cover the Agency's deficit? The alleged Israeli contribution to the costs of the Agency scarcely exceeded \$10.5 million, which was about 21 per cent of the total costs. The provision of voluntary contributions was only a partial and temporary solution, since such contributions could increase or decrease and were in fact inadequate to meet all the needs. The Agency's budget must be incorporated into the United Nations regular budget or made the subject of a special budget. Alternatively, the salaries of local employees could be paid by the United Nations like those of international employees. If the United Nations implemented any of the solutions referred to in the Commissioner-General's report, the Agency's financial difficulties could be easily dealt with.

19. It should be pointed out that any measure to reduce the level of services would aggravate the tense situation in the Middle East, as was confirmed in paragraph 7 of the special report of the Working Group (A/10268). The Israeli contribution to the expenses of the Agency was too small, particularly when considered in relation to the value of the Arab lands which had been usurped by Israel.

20. World public opinion had been dumbfounded by the vicious Israeli aggression on the Golan heights and the

destruction wrought by Israel before its withdrawal from Quneitra in 1974. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Secretary-General's report (A/10253) clearly showed that Israel was pursuing a campaign of destruction of refugee camps in Gaza and Lebanon. The Committee should consider those facts in their true light, namely, as evidence of the criminal and aggressive intentions of Israel towards Golan and towards refugees and camps in other countries. The Agency's claims for compensation for destruction of its property by Israel had met with intransigence.

21. The United Nations should seriously consider implementing international economic, cultural and political sanctions against the Zionist, racist entity, and establishing a special time-table for the implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to the solution of the Palestine question and the Middle East conflict in the event that Israel continued to disregard United Nations resolutions and defy the will of the international community.

22. Mr. AL-DEHIM (United Arab Emirates) welcomed the PLO representatives to the Committee.

23. The discussion of the question of Palestine in the General Assembly had focused the attention of the international community on the issue. The resolutions that had been adopted had confirmed the desire of Member States to observe the provisions of the Charter, had reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and political existence, and had demonstrated the racist and aggressive character of the Zionist presence in Palestine.

24. The report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1) painted a tragic picture of the living conditions of the Palestinian people and showed that Israel, not content with expelling them from their homeland, launched air and naval attacks on the Palestine refugee camps and practised all forms of oppression against them.

25. The Commissioner-General's report showed that in 1976 the Agency's deficit would increase to \$55 million and that, even if the deficit for 1975 was totally eliminated, the Agency would still encounter severe financial difficulties early in 1976.

26. His delegation rejected the proposals to reduce the services of UNRWA. The level of relief currently provided by the Agency was already at its minimum level. Any reduction in those services would not only inflict increased suffering on the refugees but would also cause the political situation in the region to deteriorate. In that connexion, he drew the attention of the Committee to paragraph 30 of the report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (A/10334). The maintenance of the relief programmes was a commitment under the mandate given to the Agency by the General Assembly. The only way in which that mandate could be terminated was to return the refugees to their homeland or compensate them fully if they decided to live elsewhere, as provided in General Assembly resolution 194 (III). As the report of the Commissioner-General showed, no progress had been made in the implementation of that resolution in more than 25 years.

27. The Agency currently found itself in a serious financial situation which posed a threat to its very existence and was due to inflation at the regional and international levels. In response to the Secretary-General's appeal, several States, including the United Arab Emirates, had pledged additional contributions which had reduced the deficit to a little more than \$8 million. In providing its modest contribution to the Agency, his Government had stipulated that it should be spent on education. That contribution had not been intended to cover the deficit of the Agency, since the responsibility for the Agency belonged to the United Nations and not to the Arab countries alone.

28. A final solution to the question would be to consider the Agency's budget as part of the United Nations regular budget, rather than to rely on voluntary contributions. The United Nations should fully cover the salaries of locally recruited employees, as was the case for international employees. Furthermore, the level and extent of relief should be such as to fulfil the basic requirements of the refugees.

29. The responsibility for the situation fell on the racist Zionist régime in Israel and on the States which provided it with military, political and economic support. The Palestine refugees must be provided with relief as long as Israel continued to disregard United Nations resolutions and until the international community forced it to renounce its intransigent attitude.

30. Mr. PETNIČKI (Yugoslavia) congratulated the Commissioner-General and his staff on their work in providing essential services, particularly relief, health protection and education, to over 1.5 million Palestinians who had been expelled from their homeland and reduced to the status of refugees. UNRWA must be in a position to continue its useful humanitarian work as long as there was need for it. It was to be hoped that, thanks to additional voluntary contributions by Member States, it would be able to overcome its serious financial difficulties. In a situation where the basic question of the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine had not been solved, a curtailment of the scope of the Agency's activities, to say nothing of a cessation of its operations, would inflict great hardships on the Palestinian people and would also negatively affect the efforts to solve the Middle East crisis.

31. As in the past, Yugoslavia would continue to support UNRWA and would announce its contribution at the forthcoming meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA. It had, however, never been in any doubt that the question of the Palestine refugees was primarily a political problem and must be solved as such. Yugoslavia firmly believed that a lasting solution to the Middle East question could be based only on the complete withdrawal of Israel from all the territories it had occupied after June 1967 and on its recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to establish their own State.

32. Mr. ABDULLA (Oman) noted that 25 years had elapsed since the Agency had begun its work. No one had thought that it would go on for so long, and one might well wonder how much longer it would have to continue its

existence. In an era of radical political changes when many countries were attaining independence, it was quite unacceptable that the Palestine tragedy was continuing without any solution in sight. Material assistance to alleviate the sufferings of the Palestinian people was commendable, but one must also reflect on the origin of the tragedy which had driven a whole people from its country. Those responsible for the situation of the refugees were the European Jews who had come to Palestine and had taken vengeance on the Palestinian people instead of on the Nazis who had oppressed them. The people of Oman knew what it was like to be forced to live in exile, and before the revolution of 1970 over a million of them had lived in Africa. They well understood the bitterness and pain of the people of Palestine.

33. His delegation believed that the Palestine tragedy was above all a political one; those countries which had assisted in the creation of Israel and accorded it international recognition must rectify their historical error.

34. Mr. GREGORIADES (Greece) said that the item under consideration was of concern to the people and Government of Greece for two reasons. First, the Palestinians belonged to the great Arab nation, with which Greece had ties of special friendship and whose progress towards independence and whose enhanced international stature it supported. Secondly, the item related to refugees, and any situation which involved the forcible uprooting of a people must elicit his country's wholehearted sympathy and concern. Greece was therefore participating in the search for a settlement based on justice and dignity.

35. It was both regrettable and disquieting that the General Assembly was considering the question of the Palestine refugees for the twenty-sixth year. It ought not to be considering the question of the operations of UNRWA, because the Palestinians should long since have gone home. Although it was essential to continue to provide them with assistance, the problem was in essence not that of humanitarian assistance; the point at issue was a political problem and related to the return of the refugees to their homes.

36. As if it was not bad enough that, in the current day and age, the Palestinians had become refugees, they were reproached for not having become "integrated" after so many years—as if time, instead of aggravating the situation, which was what in fact had happened, conferred on those who had forcibly expelled the Palestinians the right to have dispersed them.

37. Instead of the customary draft resolutions on the item now before the Committee, his delegation would have liked to have a draft resolution noting the return of the Palestinians to their homes and the winding-up of the Agency's operations.

38. His delegation wished to express its deep appreciation to the Commissioner-General and his colleagues for the manner in which they discharged their task. His country was shouldering a very heavy financial burden caused by another refugee tragedy, that of the 200,000 Cypriots who had fled to the southern part of their country. Consequently, its means were limited, but it agreed with all who recognized that, regardless of the country to which they

belonged, refugees who were the victims of a military invasion were the concern of the entire international community. In that spirit, Greece was responding to the appeal launched by UNRWA for additional contributions and, over and above its financial contribution, would make available additional food-stuffs for delivery to the Agency before the end of the year.

39. Mr. AL-ATIYYAH (Iraq) said that year after year the Committee met to consider the activities of UNRWA and the report of its Commissioner-General detailing the difficulties constantly besetting the Agency.

40. The creation of UNRWA had been a direct consequence of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the Zionist State by a resolution adopted by the General Assembly (181 (II)). At the time of that decision, the Organization had been under the sway of the Western Powers, which represented only a small minority of the world's peoples. Instead of rectifying the error which had been made, the United Nations had then created UNRWA at the behest of the Western countries and the United States, which had perhaps been suffering from a guilty conscience. That action was tantamount to striking a man down and then administering first aid to him. The Western imperialists led by the United States had made the additional mistake of assuming that the refugees would eventually settle down and become integrated in the host countries. He emphasized that the Palestinian people were no different from the other Arab peoples who had attained their independence; they were determined to continue their struggle to preserve their national existence and realize the legitimate rights which had been recognized by the United Nations in numerous resolutions, including resolution 3236 (XXIX), which had laid to rest once and for all the idea that the question of Palestine was merely a refugee problem. The General Assembly at its thirtieth session had already adopted a resolution condemning Zionism and identifying it as a form of racial discrimination (resolution 3379 (XXX)), a decision which further confirmed the legitimacy of the rights of the Palestinian people.

41. Of late the imperialists had taken to saying that the Arabs should bear the financial burden of UNRWA operations. The Arab States had in fact borne a large part of that burden despite the fact that they had no responsibility whatsoever for the expulsion of the Palestinian people from their homeland. Such humanitarian assistance as was already provided by the Arab States should not be used as a pretext by those who wished to shirk their responsibilities for the Palestine refugees. His delegation continued to believe that the Western countries should bear the lion's share of the Agency's operating costs. Any attempt to curtail the activities of the Agency would have adverse effects on the situation in Palestine. In the final analysis, however, a final solution to the Palestinian problem depended upon the ability of the United Nations to enforce its resolutions upholding the natural rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination.

42. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Egypt and others had stressed what they called the right of the refugees to return to their country. It was interesting to note, however, that they had remained silent regarding the implications for

Israel of such a return. Statements made by various Arab spokesmen over the years were quite revealing on that score. For example, the then Foreign Minister of Egypt had stated in October 1949 that in demanding the restoration of Palestine to the refugees the Arabs had intended that the Palestinians should return to their homeland as masters and not as slaves, and that it was the intention of the refugees to annihilate the State of Israel. A resolution adopted by a conference of refugees held in Syria in July 1957 had declared that any discussion aimed at finding a solution to the Palestinian problem which did not recognize the refugees' right to annihilate Israel should be regarded as a desecration of the Arab people and an act of treason. The late President Nasser of Egypt had said in a newspaper interview in September 1961 that if the Arabs returned to Israel, Israel would cease to exist. In April 1966, the then Prime Minister of Lebanon, addressing the national Parliament, had declared that the realization of the Arab hope for the return of the refugees to Palestine would mean the liquidation of Israel. It was clear, therefore, what Israel's Arab neighbours held in store for it when they clamoured for the return of the refugees. Statements of that kind had been made time and again by Arab leaders and were still being made today. It was obvious, therefore, that an over-all solution to the refugee problem would have to await a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. Israel's efforts to that end were a matter of record, and, given the circumstances, his country had done everything that was possible or could be expected.

43. The representative of Egypt had questioned the accuracy of the figures provided by the Israeli authorities concerning the number of displaced persons who had returned. It should be pointed out that the discrepancy between the Israeli figure of 55,000 and the figures contained in the reports of the Commissioner-General and the Secretary-General was due to the fact that the latter had based their statistics on UNRWA records regarding requests by returning refugees for retransfer of rations to the areas to which they had returned. As was stated in paragraph 4 of the Secretary-General's report (A/10253), the Agency would therefore not be aware of the return of any refugees who did not make such a request.

44. The Egyptian representative had also stated that the work of UNRWA had been facilitated by PLO. That was a strange, even cynical remark, since PLO was using the refugee camps as training bases, ammunition dumps and convenient places to plan its acts of aggression. It was precisely because of that situation that Israel had carried out a number of defensive actions against the camps. If PLO would leave the camps and stop hiding behind the skirts of refugee women, Israel would have no reason to take such actions against the refugees in the camps. The true character of PLO was revealed by the fact that the Voice of Palestine, in a broadcast originating in Lebanon, had openly admitted that a group belonging to PLO had carried out the latest terrorist attack in Jerusalem in which six children in their teens had lost their lives.

45. Turning to the statement made by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, he said that that country's attitude regarding the problem of the Middle East must be viewed in the light of its position on the mandated territory of Palestine. According to the Syrian Arab Republic the

whole of that territory belonged to it, and President Assad had stated as recently as 8 March 1974, on the eleventh anniversary of the Syrian revolution, that Palestine was not only a part of the Arab world but was the principal part of "southern Syria". The expansionist designs of the Syrian Arab Republic were not limited to "southern Syria" alone, however, but also extended to "western Syria", which comprised three sovereign States Members of the United Nations. The Syrian Arab Republic was not interested in solving the refugee problem but merely wished to use the refugees and their plight to further its designs for territorial expansion. It had never accorded full diplomatic recognition to Lebanon, since to do so would diminish the credibility of its claim to that part of "western Syria", and it might even intervene militarily in that country if changes there were not to its liking. It was, therefore, ludicrous to pay any heed to Syrian accusations regarding defensive military actions carried out by Israel against the refugee camps.

46. He noted that, according to paragraph 65 of the Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1), the casualties among registered refugees and damage to UNRWA facilities in Lebanon caused by disturbances in that country, in which the Syrian Arab Republic had had a hand, far outnumbered those caused by any defensive actions carried out by Israeli forces. Moreover, the statistics contained in that document did not cover more recent months during which an increase in death and destruction had been registered in that country.

47. As to the charge that Israel's contribution to UNRWA was negligible, he pointed out that it was in fact greater than the contribution of most Arab States. Furthermore, everyone knew who and what were the causes of the displacement of the Palestinians in the first place.

48. He drew the attention of the Committee to a statement made by the Syrian Minister of Defence to the National Assembly of that country in December 1973 in which he described the valour of a Syrian soldier who had killed 28 Jewish soldiers with a hatchet and who was rewarded for that deed by receiving the Medal of the Republic.

49. As to the statement made by the representative of Iraq, that representative had once again made a completely unconstructive statement full of venom and hatred. A country which had committed genocide against the Kurds and brutally treated its Jewish citizens and even its Arab population could not be taken seriously in any discussion of humanitarian problems.

50. Sir John RENNIE (Commissioner-General, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), referring to the statistics regarding returned refugees, pointed out that both his report (A/10013 and Corr.1) and the report of the Secretary-General (A/10253) took account only of displaced persons who were registered with UNRWA. No doubt other refugees existed, but the Agency had no certain information regarding them. He had every reason to believe that the figures contained in his report were accurate.

51. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to address the Committee.

52. Mr. AQL (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) said that one wondered, in view of Israel's own record of wild statements, how the Israeli representative had the audacity to quote Arab statesmen and officials as having made statements which jeopardized the existence of Israel. He would remind the Israeli representative that Theodor Herzl had said in his diaries as early as 1897, when Moslem and Christian Palestinians had constituted about 98 per cent of that country's population, that he was thinking of devising a plan whereby the population could be driven across the frontiers of Palestine. Chaim Weizmann had revealed in his memoirs that as early as 1917, when Moslem and Christian Palestinians had formed 90 per cent of the population, he had wanted Palestine to be as Jewish as England was English and France was French. Golda Meir, in an interview reported by *The Sunday Times*, had denied the existence of the Palestinians, and their existence continued to be denied by the present ruling military junta in Israel. Israel's record was replete with statements which denied the existence of the Palestinians and which revealed Israel's expansionist designs regarding not only Palestine but the whole Arab homeland.

53. With regard to the incident in Jerusalem which had been referred to by the Israeli representative, PLO was a national liberation movement which would continue to combat Israel militarily, politically, culturally and socially until the right to self-determination of the people of Palestine was restored. Bloodshed was deplorable anywhere and everywhere, but the Israeli representative would do well to remember that intransigence bred intransigence and violence bred violence. As long as Israel ignored United Nations resolutions concerning the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland, their liberation movement was left with no alternative but to continue to fight until it achieved its aim. The crux of the entire problem was the plight of the Palestinian refugees and their return to their homeland, and the Committee had heard from the Israeli representative only a series of statements designed to divert its attention from the substance of the problem. Despite the injustices inflicted upon them, the people of Palestine had their vision of the future and aspired to the establishment of a non-sectarian Palestinian State in which both Arabs and Jews could live together without racial and religious prejudice.

54. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had not expected a meeting at which the Committee was discussing the reports before it in a constructive manner to degenerate to the level it had reached with the insolent remarks made by the representative of Israel.

55. In October 1973, military and civilian organizations alike in the Syrian Arab Republic had risen to liberate the occupied territories and purge them of the Israeli forces. In alleging that the Syrian Arab Republic had expansionist designs, the representative of Israel had failed to mention that it had a mutual defence agreement with Lebanon and all of the fraternal countries of the League of Arab States. Arabs in whatever country were one people and one only. He pointed out that Israel currently occupied an area five times as large as that given it by the 1947 resolution of the General Assembly (181 (II)) which had created the State of Israel. Moshe Dayan was reported to have said that even in

the event of peace there was no question of Israel leaving the Golan heights. Who then, he wished to know, had expansionist designs?

56. Many political changes had occurred in the world since the creation of Israel, and the United Nations had decided to rectify its initial error by finally recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The most recent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly further accentuated that tendency. It was obvious that Israel felt itself threatened by such developments.

57. Finally, it was strange that at every meeting at which the Arab States called for the implementation of United Nations resolutions the representative of Israel rose to make his impertinent remarks. He emphasized that the Palestinian problem and the broader question of the Middle East could be settled only on a just and equitable basis.

58. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he would certainly prefer the Committee's discussion of the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to be conducted in a businesslike manner. However, if Arab spokesmen took the opportunity to purvey their slanders and distortions, his delegation had no choice but to reply. The aggression and intransigence of the Arab States was the cause of the current situation, and only when those States had had a change of heart would the situation be resolved.

59. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that he would like to draw the attention of the Committee to an article in the Israeli daily newspaper *Hamishmar* on 28 March 1975, which had drawn attention to a booklet published by the Central Command Headquarters, Israeli Army Chaplaincy. The author of one of the chapters of that official publication had been a military rabbi of the Israeli Central Command who had asserted that in war one was not obliged to distinguish between the enemy's soldiers and civilians, that one should not, according to religious law, trust a Gentile, and that one should be aware of the possibility that a peaceful civilian might aid the enemy. The military rabbi had stated that during a war, when the troops of Israel were charging the enemy, they were permitted and obliged, according to religious law, to kill even good civilians. The author of the article had commented that the worst anti-Semite could not slander Jewish religious law more effectively. After the appearance of the article in *Hamishmar*, the Israeli Chief of Staff had ordered the booklet to be withdrawn from circulation.

60. Mr. AL-ATIYYAH (Iraq) said that his Government believed that all national ethnic groups had the right to self-determination and autonomy, and it accordingly recognized the autonomy of the Kurds. They had their own autonomous region and an executive council which was responsible for dealing with all their problems. The Kurds were also represented in the Government. The north of Iraq had now been pacified after an insurrection by a small group which had not been representative of the Kurds as a whole. Foreign imperialist Powers had supported that insurrection, and the Zionist entity had even sent arms and agents into the north of Iraq to sow discord in that region. The national forces had brought peace, and it was a matter of pride to Iraq that all its people and ethnic groups enjoyed peace and stability. The Zionist entity levelled

accusations against others without replying to the question always put to it, namely: what should be done about the situation of the Palestine refugees? It was not necessary for the Zionist representative to quote Arab leaders and ministers; he could find a reply in the frequently repeated statement by PLO that the solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees was the establishment of a democratic State of Palestine.

61. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he had made inquiries about the pamphlet referred to by the representative of Kuwait and had been informed that there was no such official publication. The representative of Kuwait himself had stated that the pamphlet had been withdrawn by the Israeli authorities. In other words, if it had ever existed, it had been repudiated. He could, however, quote many official publications and direct orders from Arab military authorities containing instructions on what should be done to Israelis on the field of battle or Israeli prisoners of war—instructions, which had been complied with by the Arab armies and which had never been withdrawn. With regard to the statement by the representative of Iraq, he could reply using the words of a fellow Arab, the spokesman for the Government of Egypt, who had said that the Iraqis were known for their inaccuracies. That was certainly a very polite understatement.

62. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that it was extremely surprising that a booklet which did not exist had first appeared in an Israeli magazine called *Ha-olam Hazeh* on 15 March 1974, had then been reproduced in another Israeli magazine *Viewpoint* in July 1974, and had subsequently been quoted in *Hamishmar* in March 1975. A non-existent booklet had seldom manifested its existence in a more peripatetic manner. The Israeli Defence Ministry had withdrawn it from circulation on 6 May 1975 after it had been in circulation for a year. However, it had not been

because of any disagreement with its contents, but because the Chief Military Rabbi had stated that the pamphlet dealt with an abstract question of religious law rather than a relevant practical matter. That non-existent pamphlet had existed and continued to exist, although it had been withdrawn from circulation because it seemed to be a source of embarrassment for Israel.

63. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he had never asserted that the booklet did not exist. He had merely said that it was not an official publication. When its existence had been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities, it had been withdrawn. He had never heard of any criticism in Arab newspapers of orders issued to Arab armies not to take Israeli prisoners of war or of the withdrawal of such orders.

64. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) observed that it now developed that the non-existent booklet was not non-existent, but only unofficial. However, the fact that it had been published by the Central Command Headquarters, Israeli Army Chaplaincy, seemed to indicate that it was an official document.

65. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that as soon as the Israeli Army Headquarters had heard of the paper, it had been withdrawn.

66. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said that the document had changed from non-existent to unofficial, from unofficial to official but unauthorized, and then had been withdrawn.

67. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that he had merely stated that the pamphlet had no existence as an official document.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

979th meeting

Tuesday, 18 November 1975, at 3.05 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.979

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268, A/SPC/L.334, A/SPC/L.335):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan), speaking on a point of order, said that some delegations had noted that the statement made by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA at the 974th meeting had not been reproduced in full, as was the usual practice. In view of the importance of that statement and of the statement at the same meeting by the Rapporteur of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, introducing the report of the Working Group (A/10334), he requested that, in accordance with the usual practice, both should be reproduced in full.

2. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, at its 2353rd plenary meeting, the General Assembly had decided that it would continue to allow the Special Political Committee to obtain verbatim records of its debates, or of part of its debates. Accordingly, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided that the statements in question should be reproduced verbatim, as requested.

*It was so decided.*¹

3. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy), speaking on behalf of the nine States of the European Economic Community (EEC), said that until there was an over-all solution to the situation in the Middle East, the activities of UNRWA would continue to be essential, not only to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees, but also to maintain a favourable climate which would enable a solution to be reached. From the outset, therefore, the nine countries of EEC had been among the main financial contributors to UNRWA. In 1975, their national contributions and that of EEC itself had amounted to \$27.9 million out of a total budget of more than \$120 million. Moreover, some EEC countries had announced that they would make supplementary contributions in response to the appeals of the Secretary-General and of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA. For the same reason, EEC had decided to contribute 5,000 tons of grain at an estimated value of \$900,000. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had announced a contribution of not less than £200,000, which could be increased up to 10 per cent of the total amount of the additional contributions made since 25 June and which could amount to a maximum of £1 million. The Government of the Netherlands had also announced two supplementary contributions amounting to a total of \$760,000.

4. The nine EEC countries were gratified that other countries had responded so favourably to the appeals of UNRWA. As the Commissioner-General had said, however, the financial situation of UNRWA continued to be serious, since it still had a deficit of \$7.2 million.

5. The nine EEC countries deeply regretted that the activities of the Agency had had to be reduced, even partially. Moreover, the problem would be even more serious in 1976 since the Commissioner-General already envisaged a deficit of \$55 million (A/10013 and Corr.1, para. 10). The nine countries were resolved to continue to support the Agency's activities and to maintain their financial contributions at the current level and, as far as possible, to increase them. They also supported the conclusions of the Working Group, contained in its report, to the effect that the current situation, whereby a small number of countries provided the major part of the Agency's budget, no longer met the requirements of the time. All Members of the United Nations should show their solidarity with the Palestine refugees in a practical way. The nine countries therefore appealed to all Members of the United Nations to show an awareness of their international responsibilities and to participate, within the limits of their capabilities, in the effort in support of UNRWA.

6. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey) said that at the twenty-ninth session it had been said that UNRWA would probably face

its worst financial crisis in 1975. In full knowledge of that fact, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 3331 A (XXIX), by which the mandate of UNRWA had been extended for a further period, thereby demonstrating its conviction of the necessity of maintaining the Agency's services as long as the situation of the Palestine refugees in the Middle East persisted.

7. Events had subsequently shown that that financial crisis was unprecedented. UNRWA had started 1975 with a deficit of \$46 million. Currently, the Agency's future was still uncertain and, although he hoped that the 1975 deficit would not prevent the Agency from completing its work, experience did not allow it to be optimistic. The Commissioner-General had estimated a deficit of nearly \$55 million for 1976. There was reason to believe that part of that deficit would be covered by special contributions from some countries, as had occurred in 1975, but even then the outlook was not encouraging.

8. There was a general agreement regarding the need for UNRWA to continue its services, since, apart from the humanitarian aspect of the question—in other words, the future of over 1 million Palestinians—the international community was also aware of the political consequences which would result from the Agency's insolvency. In the face of such a situation, it was essential that the international community realize that it was not enough to ask the Agency to continue its work; in fact, it would be unfair to ask it to do the impossible. When the General Assembly expressed its conviction that UNRWA should continue its activities, it should also show it how to do so. His delegation hoped and, indeed, wished to see the next generation of Palestinians born not in refugee camps but in Palestine. But until that objective was achieved, it believed that it was the responsibility of each one of the Members of the United Nations to give every possible assistance to the Agency. He assured the Commissioner-General that he could count on Turkey's assistance.

9. Mr. DINKELSPIEL (Sweden) introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.334 and announced that the delegations of Canada, Denmark, India and Zambia had joined the sponsors. After reading out the operative part of the draft resolution, he said that, as it was similar to those adopted in previous years, he hoped that the Committee would adopt it by consensus.

10. The report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1) and that of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (A/10334) clearly showed that the work of the Agency was both necessary and difficult and that, given the scope of its activities, the costs were reasonable. At the same time, the unprecedented deficit which the Agency had faced in 1974 was most disturbing. Since then, the financial situation had in some respects deteriorated even further. In view of the circumstances, the Swedish Government had declared itself prepared to make a supplementary contribution of 3 million Swedish kronor for the current year, provided that other contributors also made a concerted effort to solve the Agency's current problems. In that connexion, he noted with satisfaction that some countries had declared that they were prepared to contribute, although not yet to an extent sufficient to cover the deficit expected for 1975.

¹ The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.974.

11. As for 1976, the Commissioner-General had been obliged to report that some further increase in expenditure was unavoidable unless current trends were drastically reversed. Sweden therefore appealed to all members of the international community to do everything possible to provide the Agency with the necessary financial resources. Sweden, for its part, would continue to support UNRWA and, in that connexion, he pointed out that in the past 25 years Sweden had contributed some \$31.5 million to the Agency, a figure which was exceeded only by the contributions of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, EEC and Canada.

12. Mr. LANGSLET (Norway) fully shared the opinion of the Commissioner-General that the fact that 1.6 million Palestinians were still refugees was, no occasion for celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of UNRWA. Given the scope and magnitude of the Agency's services, he also shared the view of the Working Group that those services would remain indispensable until a just and lasting settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees had been achieved and that any reduction in services would have serious consequences for the refugees, for the host countries, and for the prospects for peace in the area (*ibid.*, paras. 27 and 30).

13. Throughout its existence, UNRWA had managed to maintain its services without reductions as a result of voluntary contributions from a small group of donors who had financed the major part of the Agency's budget. In 1975, UNRWA was faced with a financial crisis of unprecedented proportions, which made both the short-term and the long-term situation extremely serious. With regard to the short-term problem, it was clear that it could be solved only if additional contributions were received immediately. In recent weeks, various countries had announced generous contributions; for instance, Qatar had pledged a contribution of \$1 million. For its part, the Government of Norway had decided to make an extraordinary contribution of \$100,000 for the current year, which would bring Norway's total contribution for 1975 to approximately \$1,850,000.

14. In his view, any discussion of the problem should be based on the premise that it was essential to maintain the Agency's services at their current minimal level. The great increase in expenditure was due primarily to currency instability and inflation and not to any expansion in programmes. Thus, it was extremely important that when deciding on their contributions for 1976, members keep in mind the fact that it was estimated that costs would increase by approximately 10 per cent. In other words, donor countries should increase their contributions at least in proportion to the increase in the UNRWA budget.

15. Lastly, he also shared the view expressed by the Commissioner-General that the financing of UNRWA should be put on a firmer basis. In that connexion, he pointed out that the Agency's financing was the joint responsibility of all the States Members of the United Nations, irrespective of their views on the political aspect of the Palestinian problem. He therefore appealed to all countries which had so far given token or inadequate contributions to the Agency to re-examine their position,

and he announced that in 1976 the Norwegian Government hoped to increase considerably its contributions to the Agency.

16. Mr. ZHIRI (Morocco) said that almost one year had elapsed since the General Assembly had adopted resolution 3331 D (XXIX), in which it had reaffirmed the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and had called once more upon Israel immediately to take steps for the return of those people and to desist from all measures that obstructed their return.

17. Twenty-six years after the establishment of the Agency, ways of eliminating its deficit were still being discussed. A whole generation of Palestinians had survived, thanks to UNRWA, and were still living in exile, while the aggressor was exploiting the riches of their homeland. Responsibility for that situation clearly lay with Zionism, which had driven the Palestinian people from their homeland and imported European Jews into Palestine, with the countries which were helping Israel and with the United Nations. But there was no point in continuing to condemn the guilty parties and in repeating the same concepts *ad infinitum*. The General Assembly had finally admitted its mistake and, at its twenty-ninth session, had adopted resolution 3236 (XXIX), in which it had recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In addition, a whole series of resolutions had been adopted over the years which, had they been implemented, would certainly have helped to alleviate the serious situation of the Palestine refugees. Although that situation had apparently deteriorated, he was confident that the cause of the Palestinians would eventually triumph, as all just causes triumphed. But faith in the future should not lead to neglect of the current sufferings of the Palestine refugees.

18. Morocco was concerned about the financial crisis facing UNRWA. That crisis should in no circumstances justify a reduction in the services provided by the Agency, because such a reduction would create very serious humanitarian and economic problems for the countries involved and for the entire region. The major Powers, which had supported the aggression, should increase their assistance to relieve the sufferings of the Palestine refugees and should assume responsibility for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. UNRWA should continue to exist; although Morocco fully realized who was responsible for the tragedy which had lasted for more than 50 years, it had contributed and would continue to contribute to the extent of its ability to alleviate the situation of the refugees, as a gesture of solidarity with its Palestinian brothers, who had the right to live like other people.

19. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the General Assembly had recently adopted resolution 3376 (XXX) in which it had, *inter alia*, recognized that the problem of Palestine continued to endanger international peace and security and expressed grave concern that no progress had been achieved towards the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty, or towards the exercise by Palestinians of their right to return to their homes and property. The Soviet Union shared that concern.

20. With regard to the origin of the problem, it should not be forgotten that it was the refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians which had made them into refugees, the victims of a cruel and unfair situation which had lasted for more than 25 years. In its latest resolutions, the General Assembly had recognized not only those inalienable rights but also the fact that the Palestinians should be one of the parties to any solution of the Middle East problem. Ever since the United Nations had stressed that the problem was basically a political one and that no partial solution, even at the humanitarian level, would help to solve the problem and to establish a just and lasting peace in the region. Such a peace was unattainable until the basic causes of the conflict were removed, until the Israeli troops were withdrawn from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and until the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to have their own State, were recognized. Only if those problems were solved would it be possible to have a lasting peace in the Middle East and to ensure security and progress for all the States in the region, including Israel.

21. Since the Soviet Union considered that the only sensible way of solving the problem was through the combined efforts of all the parties concerned, it had proposed that the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East should be resumed under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union, with the participation of all the parties directly concerned: Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, the Arab people of Palestine, represented by PLO, and Israel. A just political solution should be found on the basis of the relevant decisions of the United Nations and particularly of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX).

22. In response to those who wanted the problem of the financing of UNRWA to be solved in a way which would mean paying for acts of aggression and which, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, was unfair, he noted that since the very beginning of history the principle had existed that the consequences of aggression should be borne by the aggressor and by those who had supported the aggression. The idea that it was the victims of the aggression who should pay the costs was completely absurd, and the Soviet Union was therefore opposed to changing the system of voluntary contributions which had so far been followed. The Soviet Union would continue to help the Arab people in their struggle against aggression.

23. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that, in presenting his report, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had devoted the greater part of his statement to describing the precarious financial situation in which the Agency found itself and had mentioned the possibility that it might have to cease operations for lack of funds. Yet, despite that chilling prognosis for all who should have the welfare of the refugees at heart, the statements made by the representatives of the Arab States had again been devoted not to finding ways of alleviating the situation of UNRWA but to engaging in vituperations against Israel and everybody else who, in their opinion, had been responsible for creating the problem. Their slogan was "those who created the problem must solve it". That slogan was appropriate, provided that the Arab Governments and leaders acknowledged that it was

they who had created the problem and had prevented it from being solved long ago. It was they who had perverted the very purpose for which UNRWA had been established and they whose participation in its financing had been minimal. Year after year, the Arab representatives spoke at the United Nations of the responsibility for the Palestine problem, but all their assertions flew in the face of the facts. It was the Arab leaders themselves who had encouraged the Palestinian Arabs to leave their homes in 1948, as was proved by the passages from Arab publications which he had quoted in the Committee the previous year (946th meeting) in response to a challenge from one of the Arab representatives. That was also confirmed by the memoirs of the Syrian Prime Minister who had been in office in 1948 and 1949.

24. The problem of the Palestine refugees had not yet been solved because of the intransigence and callousness of the Arabs who had exploited the problem of the Arab refugees in their political and terror campaigns against Israel. In the preceding 30 years, tens of millions of people in many parts of the world had been displaced as a result of the military, political and ethnic convulsions which had shaken the world and, with the sole exception of the Palestinian Arabs, all the refugees had been integrated with people with whom they had shared national, ethnic and religious affinities and who had offered them hospitality. But the Arab Governments had refused their compassion and hospitality to people whom they called their brothers. That was why, 27 years after 1948, the United Nations still had to consider a problem created by the Arabs and artificially perpetuated by them.

25. It was absurd that, after so long a time, over one and a half million people were officially registered as refugees with an international agency and that a large proportion of them were officially entitled to relief and other services. Every year the Committee was told of the difficulties of providing a meagre diet and additional services to those people, who—despite the smoke-screen created by Arab Governments—were in fact not in such a bad situation. He emphasized the fact that, according to the Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1), the term "Palestine refugee" did not apply only to the Palestinian Arabs but also comprised Jewish residents of those parts of Palestine not included in Israel, who had lost their homes and property as a result of Arab aggression in 1948. But the fate of those Jewish refugees had been completely different from that of the Arab refugees, because the very idea that people living in Israel could be considered as refugees for generations was abhorrent to Jewish thought. It had been forgotten that for a short time UNRWA had had nearly 50,000 Jewish and Arab refugees in its care within the borders of Israel and that, by virtue of an agreement concluded in 1952 between the Government of Israel and UNRWA, the Agency had been relieved of all responsibility for those people. That had occurred at a time when Israel had been facing another human problem, that of the Jewish refugees from Arab countries who, in numbers probably greater than those of the Palestinian Arab refugees, had been obliged to leave their places of residence in order to escape from discrimination and persecution. They had never received any compensation for the property which they had had to leave behind. But all of them had settled in Israel and had

been integrated and rehabilitated without the assistance of United Nations agencies, solely through the joint efforts of Israel and of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. It should also be remembered that 85 per cent of all the Palestinian Arab Refugees had never left the area where they had lived but had simply moved a few miles, within the same area, inhabited in many cases by the same families and clans. What had really happened had been an exchange of ethnic communities, albeit without the benefits of formal treaties. Those refugees who had come to Israel had quickly become an integral part of the country; those who had moved to Arab countries had, officially at least, acquired the status of perpetual refugees. The Arab host countries had disregarded the numerous appeals to them by the General Assembly to permit the integration of the refugees. They had also refused to take over the administration of the relief programme and to permit the verification of the list of registered refugees. In addition, it was well known that there had been a flourishing black market in ration cards of the unreported dead as well as of others who did not need the rations and sold them to merchants. The report of the Commissioner-General contained a warning about the accuracy of the statistics concerning the refugee population (A/10013 and Corr.1, annex I, table 1, foot-note *a*) and about difficulties of verifying the ration rolls (*ibid.*, paras. 53 and 57). It was the Arab Governments' insistence that relief should continue, instead of being replaced by constructive programmes of rehabilitation through the provision of suitable employment as had been suggested at the time, which was placing such a tremendous financial and logistic burden on the Agency.

26. But there was another aspect with grave international implications which he could not leave unmentioned. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 53 of the Commissioner-General's report, read in conjunction with paragraph 25 of the previous year's report,² confirmed the existence of an incredible situation in which the head of a United Nations agency maintained contact with the leader of an organization of terror gangs, PLO, which had taken over the running of the refugee camps in Lebanon. The terrorists were using the camps, the services for which were provided at the expense of the international community, as a base for their activities and for training purposes. As for the "Israeli raids" and "Israeli attacks" mentioned a number of times in the report, he repeated that it was the natural and unavoidable consequences of a situation created by the terror organizations and actively connived at by the Government of Lebanon and other Arab Governments that Israel was forced to take action in defence of its population. Such action was taken against the bases and training camps of the terror organizations, which were seeking to protect themselves by hiding among innocent people in the camps. His Government sincerely regretted the fact that innocent people were hurt as a result of action taken against those centres of terrorism. However, the responsibility for such unfortunate consequences fell on the successive Lebanese Governments which had permitted the situation to continue.

27. In contrast to the totally negative attitude of the Arab Governments towards the refugees who lived in their

respective countries, the Government of Israel had done everything it could to restore the refugees' dignity as human beings and to enable them to gain a decent living and provide for their families. The situation in the Gaza strip was a good example. The 19 years of Egyptian misrule had been characterized by political and economic restrictions and by unemployment. Since 1967, however, as a result of the policy of the Israeli Government based on the belief that everyone had the right to participate actively in the productive life of his environment, there had been full employment and the whole outlook of the area had changed. That had not been to the liking of the terror organizations, which had set in motion a murder campaign in order to prevent development and cause a return to the previous situation, in which a cowed refugee population would be easy prey to terrorist propaganda. In the four years between June 1967 and August 1971, 239 innocent local Arab residents and refugees had been murdered by the terrorists and more than 1,300 Arabs had been injured by them. The overcrowded camps with their narrow lanes provided the murderers with easy escape routes and hiding places. It had been necessary to construct access roads through the camps, and as a result of that action, taken in the summer of 1971, it had been possible to put an end to the terror campaign. Instead of being lauded for its action in saving the lives of Arab men, women and children, Israel had been abused and blamed for it, especially for having dared to pull down a number of shelters in the process of widening the roads in the camps. Israel had done everything possible to provide proper housing for the inhabitants of the area. After some of the arrangements made had not proved satisfactory to the refugees, the Israeli authorities had carried out a joint survey with representatives of UNRWA. Israel had been taking action on the basis of the findings of the survey with a view to providing decent housing. A substantial plan for the construction of family dwellings had been initiated, and considerable progress had been made in spite of the last war launched against Israel and its economic implications. A number of shacks had been demolished to make way for the construction of a market, a bus station, a water reservoir and an industrial area in the Rafah camp, and the 228 families which had been dislodged had availed themselves of the offer to purchase new accommodation, on an instalment basis if necessary. Mention was made in the Secretary-General's report (A/10253, para. 6) of "the punitive demolition of refugee shelters". Those shelters had been used for terror activities and the storage of arms and explosives, and action against them had therefore been justified both under local and under international law. Such action was permitted by article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention,³ as could be seen from the Commentary on that Convention published by the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁴ The people involved in the criminal activities in the camps would have been shot out of hand in quite a few of the countries represented in the Committee. The Israeli authorities preferred not to resort to such measures, even at the risk of being censured for the demolition of a few shacks.

³ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

⁴ Jean S. Pictet, ed., *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958).

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 13* and corrigendum.

28. The report of the Commissioner-General also mentioned various new facilities constructed in the camps and other improvements whose cost had in large part been borne by the Israeli authorities.

29. The positive trends which characterized the situation in the Gaza strip applied to the west bank as well. Unemployment had disappeared, and signs of economic progress were discernible throughout the area, where some 36 per cent of the registered refugees lived outside the camps and had been completely integrated into the life of the region. Those refugees had benefited from the economic development and work opportunities in Israel, lived among the local population and were involved in municipal and social affairs. The Israeli administration had spared no effort to improve the infrastructure of the camps in the west bank.

30. Progress was also being made in the important fields of education and health. In addition to the vocational training provided by UNRWA, the Israeli administration had set up vocational training centres and workshops which were used by the local youth, including, of course, the children of refugees. Women, including refugee women, were also enabled to learn a gainful occupation and help to provide for their families.

31. The education budget for the areas administered by Israel had so far totalled 400 million Israel pounds. One-hundred-per-cent enrolment had been achieved in the west bank, and the Gaza strip did not fall very far behind. For the sixth year in succession, Egyptian school-leaving examinations had been held, enabling many young people to continue their education in neighbouring Arab countries. It was of interest to note that many of those students returned to spend their vacations in Gaza and Sinai.

32. In the field of health, services were provided by the Israeli authorities in addition to those furnished by UNRWA. Local medical personnel were trained in Israel, where they were taught the most modern methods. As a result of those improvements, there had been a significant drop in infant mortality and in the incidence of contagious diseases.

33. Israel could state sincerely that it had done everything that could be expected of a country in its position, and it did not fear comparison with any other country which had ever found itself in a similar situation. Israel's contribution to the UNRWA budget for the current year was \$1,123,713, and its total contribution amounted to \$6,776,726. In addition, as could be seen from annex I, table 18, of the Commissioner-General's report, Israel had made direct contributions to the refugees amounting to \$10,564,440. It should also be mentioned that a substantial part of Israel's annual budget for the administered areas was of benefit to the refugees, who constituted a large proportion of the population there. Since only a small share of that budget was contributed by the local inhabitants, the bulk of it was borne by the Israeli taxpayer.

34. Even a cursory comparison of those figures with the contributions of the oil-rich Arab countries showed the reason for the perennial financial difficulties of UNRWA

and how at least the financial problems could be solved. His delegation had pointed out that the contribution of a small fraction of 1 per cent of the Arab countries' oil income could change the financial situation of UNRWA. However, the attitude of the Arab Governments towards that humanitarian question had not changed and, although there had been an increase in the contributions of one or two Arab countries, the over-all picture was dismal. It was obvious that politics still prevailed over humanitarianism and enmity over minimal decency, even where the welfare of their own people was concerned.

35. In spite of that enmity on the part of Arab Governments, Israel had permitted the return of some 50,000 refugees of the 1948-1949 hostilities. Furthermore, since 1967 a total of about 55,000 persons had been permitted to return to the west bank and Gaza.

36. As part of its efforts directed towards normalizing life in the region, Israel had instituted a policy of "open bridges" under which the Jordan bridges had remained open to a two-way traffic of people and goods. In June 1975, 754,000 persons had crossed from Jordan and 623,000 had left for Jordan and other Arab countries. That freedom of movement of people and goods had been beneficial in promoting family, cultural and economic ties. That policy did not seem to be to the liking of those who opposed any kind of contact and peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs, although they exploited it for the purpose of smuggling explosives into Israel and infiltrating terrorists. Yet, despite the risks involved in that policy, Israel felt that, since it had nothing to conceal, it was best to let people see for themselves what Israel was. Perhaps that was one way to counter the endemic blindness which affected certain delegates at the United Nations when it came to voting on resolutions concerning Israel. An example was the resolution against Zionism adopted by the General Assembly on 10 November 1975 (resolution 3379 (XXX)). He hoped that those who had voted for that resolution would avail themselves of the open bridges to Israel and see what Zionism really meant.

37. He wished to recall in that connexion the statement made in the General Assembly on 30 September 1975 (2368th plenary meeting) by Mr. Yigal Allon, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.

38. Zionism was the modern expression of the ancient Jewish heritage and was the national liberation movement of a people exiled from its historic homeland and dispersed among the nations of the world. It was the revival of a language and a culture, the creation of a society which, however imperfect it might still be, tried to implement the highest ideals of democracy—political, social and cultural—for all the inhabitants of Israel, irrespective of religious belief, race or sex. Zionism was, in sum, the constant and unrelenting effort to realize the national and universal vision of the prophets of Israel.

39. It was to be hoped that, some day in the not too distant future, Arab leaders would come to understand that enmity and animosity towards Israel and towards Zionism, its ideological basis, would not bring peace any nearer, if it was peace they wished to bring about in the region.

40. Israel had from its inception proclaimed its desire for a just and lasting peace with the Arab States. Once that peace was achieved, the refugee problem would also have been solved.

41. Ms. WHITE (United States of America) said that the financial crisis affecting UNRWA should be heeded by every nation represented in the Committee, since what was at issue was not only the problem of a worthy organization but also something much more important, and potentially much more tragic, namely, the lives of 1.5 million refugees who depended directly on UNRWA. Unless strenuous efforts were made, the lives of those refugees would be affected by the reduction of UNRWA services, particularly educational services. The international community could not allow that to happen. UNRWA schools were attended by more than a quarter of a million children and over 4,300 vocational students, 92 per cent of whom would be employed upon graduation. The schools provided employment for more than 8,000 refugee teachers and for thousands of graduates and thus contributed to improving the lives not only of the direct beneficiaries but also of their dependants. Education was among the most vital services provided by UNRWA and it had therefore decided, with the support of the refugees, to concentrate its assistance on its schools, even at the cost of greater austerity in its other services, and it had spent on education approximately the same amount that it had spent on relief.

42. The Agency had made it possible for thousands of refugees to learn skills which prepared them to lead constructive lives and the Members of the United Nations must not allow that possibility to be destroyed. In 1975, half of those Member States, including many countries which were well able to give, had contributed nothing to UNRWA and others had made only nominal contributions. The Commissioner-General had asked that the Agency's chronic financial weakness should be ended, which meant that its income must rise annually to keep pace with inflation and devaluation. In 1975 the United States had made two special contributions, in addition to its regular pledge, and the total of its contributions amounted to nearly 40 per cent of all government contributions. However, all States Members of the United Nations should assume their share of the responsibility which their votes in the General Assembly for UNRWA resolutions had created.

43. Her delegation wished to introduce the draft resolution appearing in document A/SPC/L.335 in recognition of the gravity of the situation described by the Commissioner-General and called upon all States Members of the United Nations to make the most generous efforts to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

44. Mr. POROSHKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the key problem with respect to the situation of UNRWA was the solution of the problem of the Palestine refugees, which should be accompanied by Israel's withdrawal from the occupied zones and the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The problem was a political one, in other words, the problem of a people denied self-determination, despoiled of its property and expelled from its land.

45. The problem persisted after a quarter of a century. Israel was continuing to disregard the resolutions of the United Nations and world public opinion and to resort to violence, terror and destruction.

46. The Israeli expansionists had even gone so far as to make the absurd affirmation that the Palestinian people did not exist. But they had not disappeared as a historic entity and were committed to a struggle for liberation from their oppressor. An important factor in that struggle was PLO, which had received international recognition, including that of the United Nations.

47. The Byelorussian people understood the sufferings of the Palestinian people, for they had experienced similar sufferings under nazism.

48. The position of the Byelorussian SSR and other socialist countries was well known: Israel should withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 and guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to form a State. If that genuine political settlement was to be achieved, it was essential to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, with the participation of all interested parties, including PLO. Israel had delayed the reconvening of that Conference and had now stated that it would refuse to participate if participation by PLO was allowed.

49. His delegation wished to express again its complete support for the legitimate struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their inalienable rights.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) resumed the Chair.

50. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to address the Committee.

51. Mr. AQL (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he wished to refer in particular to two points raised by the representative of Israel. Firstly, Zionist propaganda tried to demonstrate that the Palestinians had abandoned their homes on instructions from the Arab leaders. One would think that that point had by now been clarified with the publication of the master plan of Israeli military operations and other material showing that the Palestinians had been expelled by force. However, even if the Arab leaders themselves had urged the Palestinians to abandon their lands, it should suffice to observe now that the international community, represented in the General Assembly, which included the Arab leaders, was currently demanding the return of those refugees to their lands.

52. Secondly, at the beginning of his statement, the representative of Israel had indicated that, according to the views of the Arab countries and those who supported them, responsibility for the financial difficulties of the Agency and, consequently, for the perpetuation of the sufferings of the Palestinian refugees rested with those who had created the problem of the refugees. Listening to the representative of Israel, one would have the impression that that responsibility lay with the Arab countries and particularly the so-called "Palestinian terrorists".

53. In 1917, zionism had begun to harbour the idea of having a national home; in 1947, with the aid of the United States of America, it had succeeded in taking over a large part of Palestine; and in 1967, it had brought the remainder of Palestine under its power. The Palestinians, having waited in vain for years, had finally decided to fight for their inalienable rights, recognized by the United Nations, and for that reason it was now being said that those responsible for the problem were the Arabs and the so-called "Palestinian terrorists". Obviously, it was disturbing to the representative of Israel to hear about the question of the Palestinian refugees because they were living proof of the crime perpetrated by Israel in 1948. That representative had had the audacity to say that Israel and the Zionist terrorist forces had not been guilty of the expulsion of the Palestinians, as though the process by which Israel had seized Palestine had been a peaceful one. For that reason, he found it necessary to state his position once again: as long as Israel refused to recognize the existence of 3 million Palestinians and as long as it did not respect the resolutions of the United Nations, tension in that part of the world would continue to increase. Finally, he reminded the representative of Israel that despite his oratory, less than a week earlier zionism had been condemned by the General Assembly as a form of racism and racial discrimination.

54. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it surprised him that the representative of Israel enjoyed repeating the same thing every year; he himself did not share that enjoyment.

55. In the first place, with reference to the Israeli representative's allegation that the Palestinian refugees had left behind all their property and abandoned their country simply because an Arab leader had told them to do so, human psychology itself showed how naive and absurd that affirmation was. The fact was that for more than 80 years zionism had been making it clear that in order to establish a Jewish State it was determined to expel all the non-Jewish inhabitants from the land in which it wished to establish that State. It should suffice to remember that ever since 1895, when Herzl had written his diary, zionism had had no other alternative: it had been a question of either giving up the Jewish State or expelling all non-Jews. When, in 1949, the first President of Israel had commented on the flight of the Palestinians, he had said that it was a miraculous simplification of Israel's task. However, even supposing that some Palestinians had abandoned their country because they had been ordered to do so, he asked whether the fact that someone fled during a struggle in order to save his life meant that he lost for ever his right to return to his country.

56. The representative of Israel had also said that the problem had not been solved because the Arab leaders had not solved it. But just as the Zionists had decided to ignore the existence of the Palestinians and their determination to return to their homes, the Israelis had underestimated the determination of the Palestinians to go back to their country. In his opinion, any Arab leader who tried to convince the Palestinians that they should settle somewhere else would have to fight against the Palestinians. The problem had not been solved because the Palestinians continued to be determined to return and because the

Israelis, faithful to their Zionist doctrine, were not allowing them to do so.

57. The representative of Israel had also said it was absurd that the Palestinians should continue to be refugees after 27 years, but it did not appear absurd to him to say that the Jews had been in the Diaspora, in other words, in exile, for 1,900 years. Reference had also been made to some Arab refugees in Israel whose problem had been solved, but it had not been said that they had not been permitted to settle in their own villages.

58. The representative of Israel had also spoken about the Arab Jews who had come from Arab countries as though it was a question of refugees who offset to some extent the importance of the Palestinian refugees. However, that was only one more aspect of the implementation of the Zionist ideology, which, while demanding the expulsion of the Palestinians, was also demanding that Jews should be imported from Europe and the Arab countries.

59. In taking measures to expel the Palestinians and take in Jews from abroad, Israel was applying two phases of one policy, namely the Zionist policy.

60. He would like to know what the representative of Israel had meant by saying that some Palestinians had only had to move a few miles away from the place where they had been living. The difference made by those few miles was the difference between living freely in one's own place of origin and being an exile without the right to self-determination; it was the difference between being in one's own country and being stateless, and it also meant the loss of property rights.

61. He would refer to the question of destruction of property when the Committee dealt with agenda item 52, concerning Israeli practices in the occupied territories. Meanwhile he asked the representative of Israel if he was willing to say that once peace had been finally restored, Israel would permit the return of the Palestinians.

62. Mr. DORON (Israel), exercising the right of reply, said that the representatives of the Soviet Union in the United Nations in 1948 and 1949 had been closer to the events when the Arab countries had launched their attack on Israel, and neither they nor the rest of the world had had any difficulty in determining who was the aggressor in the Middle East. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, had said in the Security Council on 21 May 1948⁵ that the Soviet delegation could not but express surprise at the position adopted by the Arab States in the Palestine question, and particularly at the fact that those States had resorted to such action as sending troops and carrying out military operations aimed at the suppression of the national liberation movement in Palestine. It would be noted that at that time the movement in question had been the Israeli liberation movement. Mr. Gromyko had gone on to say that there had been no known case of invasion of the territory of another state by the armed forces of Israel, except in self-defence. Since then the policy of the Soviet Union had changed,

⁵ *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 71, 299th meeting.*

although the historical facts had not changed, and the Soviet representatives were trying to adapt to the new trend in their foreign policy and denying the statements made by representatives of the USSR at the time when the events had taken place. When the representative of the USSR now spoke of the alleged “expulsion” of Palestinian Arabs in 1948 he was contradicting the words of Mr. Malik, who had stated on 4 March 1949 in the Security Council⁶ that there was no reason why the State of Israel should be blamed for the existence of the problem of Arab refugees. The Soviet Union had known full well at that time that the blame for the problem lay not with Israel but with the Arab States which had attacked Israel.

63. Mr. Gromyko had also said in 1948 in the Security Council⁷ that world public opinion had condemned the action of certain Arab circles who had attacked the Jewish State and occupied the territory allotted to the Arab State in Palestine. He (Mr. Doron) also quoted from the Soviet publications *Pravda* and *Novoe Vremya* of 1948, which mentioned that Soviet public opinion condemned the aggression of the Arab States against the State of Israel.

64. Recalling that the representative of Kuwait had said that he did not enjoy the repetition of the same arguments year after year, he wished to point out that he had not been the first speaker on the item, either in the current year or in earlier years, and if he repeated the same arguments it was because he was obliged to do so. The representative of Kuwait had used the same arguments as on other occasions in defence of his position, but seemed to have acknowledged that others were to blame besides Israel, which was a sign of progress. As for the statement that it was absurd that anyone should abandon his home and property because some political leader made him do so, he quoted passages from articles published in the press of various Arab countries—in the Lebanese newspapers *Kol-Chai* and *Telegraph* and the Jordanian newspaper *Falastine*—which said that the fact that refugees existed was a direct result of the measures taken by the Arab States or their false promises. Similarly, in 1963, the newspaper *Akhbar-el-Yom* of Cairo had stated that on 15 May 1948 the Mufti of Jerusalem had appealed to the Arabs of Palestine to leave the country at the time when the fighting had stopped and the danger had already passed.

65. Mr. SIBAH (Syrian Arab Republic), exercising the right of reply, said he first wished to correct some of the information submitted because he had received fresh information from his Government concerning the assistance it was providing to Palestine refugees. Annex I, table 18, of the Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1) indicated that the Syrian Arab Republic had made direct contributions amounting to \$5,789,426. The Syrian Government had also contributed \$6,324,117 for medical, educational, housing, and security services, general costs, and so forth, so that its direct contribution totalled \$12,113,543.

66. The representative of Israel had said that the Palestine refugees had left their homeland voluntarily. The representative of Kuwait had already replied to that statement,

referring to the inalienable political rights of the Palestinian people. He himself wondered how anyone could imagine that a people would willingly leave their country unless they were impelled by terror. That was what had happened in the case of the Palestinian people, who had been terrorized by the Israeli forces and obliged to leave their land. That was a historical fact which should be universally recognized.

67. Israel had said that the statements made by Arab representatives had not contributed to a solution but had made the problem of the refugees more complex, since they were proposing solutions in a political context. He had listened carefully to the statements made by the representatives of other Arab countries and had noted that some, but not all, had mentioned the need to find a political solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees before considering the financial problem of the Agency.

68. With regard to responsibility for the refugee problem, it was hard to see how Israel could speak of it when it was principally to blame for that unprecedented tragedy.

69. The representative of Israel had referred to those who were fighting to defend their homeland and laying down their lives for it as “terrorists”. While the representative of Israel was welcome to use that term, he (Mr. Sibahi) would like to know whether he would also apply it to those who were robbing a people of their land and property and desecrating all they held sacred.

70. In the past, Zionism and its allies had succeeded in deceiving the international community, but now the situation had changed. The international community had radically altered its attitude to the problem, as could be seen from the various resolutions adopted on the subject.

71. Mr. HENDAWY (Egypt), exercising the right of reply, noted that the representative of Israel had stated that about 55,000 displaced persons had returned to the territories that had been occupied since 1967, although only 8,000 were mentioned in the Secretary-General's report (A/10253). It was significant that no substantial evidence had been provided in support of that statement. What mattered, however, was not figures but the continual falsehoods emanating from Israel in the Committee.

72. Israel had said that under Egyptian administration the situation in the Gaza strip had been dismal, but had now changed. The situation certainly had changed; Gaza was an occupied Arab territory in spite of the United Nations resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israel.

73. Referring to the punitive demolitions in the Gaza strip, he said that Israel had sought to provide justification by quoting some passages of the Geneva Conventions, overlooking the fact that there were United Nations resolutions demanding an immediate end to such acts of destruction.

74. He insisted that the only solution to the problem was for all the refugees to return to their homeland.

75. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising the right of reply, said that he

⁶ *Ibid.*, Fourth Year, No. 17, 414th meeting.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Third Year, No. 93, 331st meeting.

reserved the right of reply to the representative of Israel at the following meeting, but wished to state at that point that the Soviet Union's position, which was well known, was based on two fundamental premises: first, the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all the territories occupied in 1967 and, secondly, respect for the rights of the Palestinians, including the right to create their own State. Without those two premises there would never be enduring peace in the Middle East and there would never be

favourable conditions for the development of any of the States in the region.

76. Through its actions Israel had become the aggressor and the Soviet Union would always support the victims of aggression. The representative of Israel had resorted to his usual demagogic tactics to distract attention from the true nature of the problem.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

980th meeting

Wednesday, 19 November 1975, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.980

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268, A/SPC/L.334-336):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

1. Mr. OULD SIDI (Mauritania) said that the financial difficulties that were currently being experienced by UNRWA were the most serious in its history and that the Agency would continue to experience similar problems until assessed contributions were established for all States Members of the United Nations. Moreover, it should be emphasized that in a continually changing world, with galloping inflation, it would be difficult to foresee exactly the size of the budget necessary for the operation of the Agency. While his country would not oppose any solution which would help to extricate the Agency from its financial difficulties, it felt obliged to point out that there was only one solution to the problem, a solution which was the most radical but also the most just, namely the restoration to the Palestinian people of their sacred and indivisible rights. His delegation, which agreed with those who had said that the Agency was not an end in itself but merely a humanitarian organization, believed that its problems would be resolved when an over-all solution to the Palestine problem was found.

2. The Palestinian people had been expelled from their ancestral homeland, and the Zionist State, not content with having condemned the Palestinian people to live in an ignominious and desperate situation for so long, was to persecute them even beyond its own borders, murdering innocent persons and demolishing their shelters, many of which had been built by the United Nations. He drew

attention to paragraphs 6 and 24 of the Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1), dealing with the situation in Lebanon and the refugee camps, and said that the attacks referred to in those paragraphs were not the only ones perpetrated by Israel during the year and that the Palestine refugees had been subjected, almost daily, to other, even more violent attacks.

3. Any attempt to curtail the functions of UNRWA, not aimed at securing peace, would have serious repercussions on the life of the Palestinians. The massive destruction caused by Israeli bombings of refugee camps afforded clear proof that one of the aims of the Zionist State was to neutralize the humanitarian activities of the Agency. And the United Nations, which had established the Zionist State on Palestinian territory and which was therefore largely responsible for the great suffering inflicted on the Palestinians, must find a prompt solution to that grievous problem.

4. Referring to the problem of racism in Israel, he drew attention to an article published in *Jeune Afrique* in October concerning the life of an eminent Jew, Mr. Israel Shahak, President of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, who had been persecuted for having written a book entitled *Racism in Israel*,¹ in which he contended that the Zionists had, ever since the creation of the State, been involving Israeli society in a process of nazification. He himself had no intention of vilifying anyone but simply wished to point out the racist nature of the Zionist régime. The time had come to take action to liberate the Palestinian people from Zionist nazism.

5. He said that his country would make a contribution to the Agency in an amount to be announced at the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA to be held on 26 November 1975 at the United Nations.

6. Mr. QURESHI (Pakistan) said that, in its 25 years of existence, UNRWA had symbolized both the commendable international co-operative effort to stave off hunger, disease

¹ Paris, Guy Authier, 1975.

and illiteracy for over one and a half million Palestine refugees and the ineffectiveness of the world community's attempts to secure Israel's compliance with paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which would enable the refugees to return to their homes and be compensated for their losses.

7. Ever since it had started its operations in 1950, UNRWA had done very useful work in meeting, albeit on a minimal scale, the needs of the Palestinian refugees in the fields of relief, education and health. In the discharge of its task, however, the Agency had seldom been without serious financial difficulties and in recent years such difficulties had been aggravated by inflation, increases in commodity prices and the weakening of the dollar. The Agency had been saved from breakdown so far by last-minute special contributions from some countries. Notwithstanding an increase in its income, the Agency faced a deficit of \$7.2 million in the current year and the prospect of a \$55 million deficit for 1976. Moreover, the reduction of the services of UNRWA would cause a serious disruption in them and would adversely affect the stability of the area. In recent months the situation had been further complicated by the tragic civil strife in Lebanon, which had inevitably affected the Agency's operations.

8. Funds to the tune of \$7.2 million must be found before the current year was out. In order to keep services at their present level—which was the bare minimum—Governments which contributed to UNRWA would have to increase their contributions, and those which had not contributed so far would have to bring themselves to do so. Obviously, the main obligation lay with those States whose political actions had led to the creation of the problem of Palestinian refugees in the first instance, although his delegation was not unmindful of the large contributions already made by some of them. Member States should also give heed to the suggestions made by the Committee at its 974th meeting.

9. While there were no two views about the need to ensure the continued functioning of UNRWA, the Agency was not and could not be an end in itself. It should not be forgotten that the Agency's creation had been conceived only as an interim measure to cope with the humanitarian problems arising out of the 1948 conflict. Member States must find the means of achieving a just and lasting peace in Palestine and the Middle East, the indispensable elements of which had been spelled out several times by the General Assembly and the Security Council—namely, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories and the full restitution to the Palestinian people of their rights, including the right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, as well as their right to return to their homes and property. Pakistan had always been deeply concerned about the Palestinian people's struggle. It had consistently espoused their cause and given them moral and material support. It would continue its efforts until the rights of the Palestinian people were fully restored.

10. Turning to the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271), he said that developments in the Middle East had encouraged the Commission to state in its report that prospects for the implementation of resolution 194 (III) might have im-

proved. However, as long as a just and lasting peace in the Middle East remained a distant hope, the services of UNRWA would continue to be essential, and the world community was in duty bound to maintain and even step up its moral and material support to the Agency.

11. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) welcomed the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the authentic representative of the Palestinian people and said that the granting of observer status to PLO by the General Assembly (resolution 3237 (XXIX)) brought closer the day when the representatives of the Palestinians would occupy their rightful place in the United Nations and other organizations. For, after more than a quarter of a century of struggle, the Palestinian people had proved that they lacked neither perseverance nor the ability to attain the goals they had set out for themselves. Although the fact that the tragedy of the Palestine refugees had lasted for 27 years was a blot on the conscience of mankind, he felt that the light at the end of the tunnel was already in sight, and he was confident that the United Nations would soon emerge into the light of day, with a full awareness of the tragedy and of the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people for their inalienable rights.

12. The Special Political Committee should once again take up the question of the refugees, which was in essence a political one despite its humanitarian dimensions. The drama of the Palestinians had begun with the Zionist and colonialist aggression which numbered among its goals the expulsion from its homeland, of a people whose chief offence was that its forefathers had converted partly to Christianity and partly to Islam. When the Zionist usurpers had invaded the lands of the Palestinians, a large portion of the indigenous population—both Christian and Moslem—had been expelled, and those who remained had become fourth-class citizens, subjected to cruel and arbitrary treatment which was incompatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

13. The United Nations had been obliged to establish a special committee to investigate Israeli practices in the occupied territories and the acts of terrorism, the torture and the bombing of refugee camps. Regrettably, it had been necessary, year after year, to renew the mandate of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

14. He observed that world public opinion had finally become aware of the true nature of Zionism and had condemned its acts, and the United Nations had officially declared that Zionism was a form of racism, (resolution 3379 (XXX)), which constituted a stigma for the Zionist State of Israel. Consequently, the international community must fight against Zionism as against Nazism and *apartheid*.

15. Referring to the Commissioner-General's report (A/10013 and Corr.1), he noted that the new censure of Israel was of special significance since it emanated from WHO. In its resolution WHA28.35 (*ibid.*, annex II), adopted in May 1975, the World Health Assembly, *inter alia*, called upon Israel to immediately implement the relevant United Nations resolutions. Yet Israel had already clearly demonstrated its contempt for United Nations

decisions. The clearest proof had been provided by the representative of Israel when, at the podium of the General Assembly he had torn up the text of a resolution adopted as a result of the affirmative vote of 72 States Members of the United Nations, representing four fifths of the world's population. He had not realized that in so doing he had morally annulled the resolution adopted with the support of 33 countries—representing less than a quarter of the world's population—whereby the State of Israel had been established. That resolution had provided Israel with a bridge-head for the extension of its domination to neighbouring regions. The Zionist State would not be happy until it had extended its domination to another important area, namely East Africa.

16. He recalled the United Nations resolutions which affirmed the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland and to recover their property, and especially General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), the text of which should constitute the basis for any consideration of the question of Palestine. In that resolution the Assembly reaffirmed also the inalienable right of the Palestinian people in Palestine to national independence and sovereignty. Yet the refugees, who constituted almost half the Palestinian people, were still living in temporary camps in the hope that the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, established by the General Assembly in its resolution 3376 (XXX), would ensure the implementation of resolution 3236 (XXIX), enabling the refugees to return to their homes.

17. The reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (A/10334) indicated that the budget deficit in 1976 would amount to about \$55 million. The Palestinian people had been dispossessed of their property by the Zionists, but there was a record of their property on microfilm, which could be used when the time came to settle accounts. Experts had calculated that the income derived from that property amounted to millions of dollars, and justice and logic demanded that that income should be used for the benefit of its lawful owners pending the full restitution of their property to them. If Israel had made available to the Palestinian people the income derived from that property over a period of 27 years, which amounted to an enormous sum, there would be no need to request aid from the international community. The administration of that property should have been supervised by the international community to ensure that the resulting income benefited the lawful owners while they awaited the opportunity to return to their land in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

18. His delegation was convinced that the question of the refugees could be solved only through an over-all settlement of the problem of Palestine and the problem of the Middle East as a whole. As soon as the rights of the Palestinian people were restored and peace was re-established, the people of that land would be able to live as brothers in Palestine. That could only be achieved by putting an end to the expansionist ambitions and the racial hatred of the Zionists.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

19. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) noted that the Committee had been considering the question of humanitarian assistance to the Palestine refugees for the past quarter of a century without having been able to provide for a political settlement of the problem or a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. During those years there had been dramatic changes in all fields, which had fundamentally altered mankind's approach to its problems. Yet the sufferings of the Palestinian Arab refugees, uprooted from their homeland as a result of the aggressive and expansionist policies of Israel, had not changed. The perpetuation of the refugee status of the people of Palestine, resulting from the defiant attitude of the Government of Israel, which had refused to comply with United Nations resolutions, would not contribute to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

20. His delegation, while expressing its appreciation to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff for their devoted efforts, maintained that UNRWA had been established as a temporary measure to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people, the innocent victims of the violent creation of the State of Israel. Consequently, the idea that the necessary funds should be provided through the levying of an assessment on all Member States in accordance with the formula used for the United Nations regular budget should not give the Agency the status of a permanent institution.

21. His delegation appreciated the efforts of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and was pleased to note that a number of countries had made special contributions which had helped to reduce the budget deficit; it was to be hoped that further additional contributions would make it possible to avoid any reduction in the services of UNRWA.

22. The Committee should draw the attention of the Government of Israel to the Agency's precarious situation, since the sooner the dispossessed Palestine refugees were permitted to return to their land, the sooner it would be possible to scale down UNRWA operations and overcome its financial crisis.

23. His delegation noted that, despite the financial constraints, the Agency had not reduced its services to the refugees. The international community had the duty of assisting the Palestinian people until their property and rights had been restored.

24. Afghanistan, which had always supported the fight of the Palestinian people, considered that the problem of the Palestine refugees was not primarily humanitarian in nature; it was a political problem which required a political solution. The presence of the PLO representative in the Committee as an observer was a great political and diplomatic victory for the Palestinian people and showed that the maturity of that organization as the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine was recognized.

25. A way must be found as soon as possible to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions so that the Arab people of Palestine could return to their homeland and exercise their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty.

26. Mr. ABDEL-LATIF (Sudan) said that the refugee camps were an insult to human dignity and morality, and wondered whether anyone who had not been in them could comprehend the meaning of the word "refugee". His delegation agreed with the statement by the PLO representative at the 977th meeting that the United Nations had created the problem of the Palestine refugees and therefore it was its responsibility to find a just and lasting solution and to maintain the refugees in a decent way until that solution was found. The artificial country that had been created in place of Palestine seemed dissatisfied with what it had; after uprooting the Palestinians, it was determined to wipe them out completely, as long as it had the blessing of the countries which were supposedly the custodians of world peace.

27. There could be no peace without justice. The repeated attacks on the refugee camps showed that the Zionist State wanted to create more problems for the Commissioner-General and to undermine the efforts of UNRWA. His delegation agreed with the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania who had said, also at the 977th meeting, that Israel must pay for the damage sustained by the refugee camps and cease its barbaric acts.

28. The reports of the Commissioner-General and the Secretary-General left no doubt that Israel had no respect for the United Nations, for world public opinion or for human lives and dignity.

29. At the preceding meeting, the representative of Israel had quoted a statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union in 1948. Reading out that document did not help Israel's cause because it showed that it had lost support which it had formerly enjoyed. Israel should compare the number of countries represented currently in the United Nations and in 1948 and study their positions, in order to realize how they varied from year to year. It was still not too late for those who had taken everything from the Palestinians to correct the situation.

30. His delegation appreciated the efforts made by the Commissioner-General and by the Working Group and shared the anxiety of other delegations regarding the financial difficulties of the Agency. However, it believed that the problem could not be solved by charity; it must be tackled at its roots. But, pending a just and lasting solution, the means of providing the necessary funds must be found. The Sudanese delegation appealed to all countries to help in meeting the deficit and to contribute generously in order to prevent a repetition of that situation. A reduction in the services provided by the Agency would have very serious implications for the refugees, for the countries in which they lived and for the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The Sudan would continue to contribute to UNRWA until a final solution was found.

31. Mr. CISSE (Mali) said that UNRWA had been established as a temporary agency to cater for the immediate needs of the Palestine refugees. However, the solution called for in General Assembly resolution 194 (III) had not been found and the Palestinian people were still living outside their country because Israel used every possible means to perpetuate their distressing situation.

32. Despite its limited and uncertain resources, UNRWA had been able to give that people the bare necessities and to provide them with other essential services. Unfortunately, the serious financial crisis which the Agency was facing was now endangering those programmes and threatening the very existence of the Palestine refugees. His delegation therefore endorsed the urgent appeals to Member States to redouble their efforts in order to avoid the financial collapse of UNRWA. The United Nations should increase its assistance; his delegation therefore supported the proposal that the cost of the services provided by the 15,000 Palestinian staff members should be included in the Organization's regular budget.

33. It was the duty of the United Nations to take effective steps to guarantee the survival of the Palestinian people until they could return to their homeland. It should therefore firmly oppose any action by Israel which prevented the normal functioning of UNRWA. It should also take up the challenge of the Tel Aviv Government, which refused to join with the parties concerned to find a solution to the Palestine question.

34. After the Israeli aggression in 1967, the Palestinian people had been displaced for the second time. Despite its statements, the Zionist Government was doing nothing to encourage the Agency's operations in the occupied areas and had made no effort to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 194 (III).

35. Israel was changing the physical structure and demographic composition of the territories it had usurped. Its bloodthirsty attacks on refugees in Lebanon were nothing but acts of terrorism. That same criminal attitude was evident in arbitrary arrests, unjust interrogations and restrictions on the freedom of movement of international civil servants protected by diplomatic immunity.

36. In the discussion on the question of the Palestine refugees, the Committee should take account of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) and the complementary measures set forth in General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX), as well as any proposals made by the PLO representative.

37. The time had come to give up the false, antiquated idea that the problem of the Palestine refugees was a purely humanitarian one. It was a political problem and its solution should also be political. The Palestinian people, led by PLO, their national liberation movement, refused to continue to live an uncertain life, and depend on charity, however generous, and were organizing themselves to reconquer their country.

38. Mr. ROSU (Romania) said that, in solidarity with the Palestinian people, Romania had continued to contribute bilaterally to help the Palestine refugees. In 1975, UNRWA was celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary of service and there had obviously been little progress in changing the situation of the Palestinian people in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Moreover, the Agency had serious financial difficulties. All that proved once more that the question of the Palestine refugees could not be solved without considering it from the political point of view within the framework of the Middle East situation,

without taking account of the national interests of the people of Palestine and without restoring their legitimate rights. If their aspirations and rights continued to be ignored, the Middle East conflict would merely be perpetuated and aggravated, threatening peace in that region and throughout the world. Israel should therefore understand that its security and independence were guaranteed only in so far as it recognized and respected the rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

39. Romania had been one of the first States to emphasize that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people could be fully ensured only by the establishment of an independent Palestinian State. As the President of Romania had pointed out, Romania saw in the legitimacy of the Palestinian State a practical confirmation of the sacred right of all peoples of the region to develop freely and independently and to enjoy the advantages of international co-operation.

40. For that reason, Romania had been one of the first States to recognize PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It was also in favour of participation by that organization in the Geneva Peace Conference on an equal footing with the other participants, because it considered that currently the conditions and prospects for peace in the Middle East were better than ever. He hoped that Member States would use all the political and diplomatic means available to them and would contribute to the international endeavours to resolve the situation in the Middle East in conformity with the aspirations and rights of the Palestinian people and all the other peoples of the region.

41. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) said that the wretched plight of the Palestine refugees had induced Canada to give humanitarian aid to UNRWA; its contribution since the establishment of the Agency totalled \$35 million. In any case, the Agency could not solve the problem of the people of Palestine and the international community must find a lasting solution, taking due account of the right to exist of all the parties concerned.

42. In the light of the serious financial difficulties of UNRWA, he appealed to the countries which usually contributed to it to continue to display generosity and invited the countries which had not yet contributed to do so, especially those whose financial situation had considerably improved over the past few years. It was to be hoped that they, like Canada, would be moved above all by humanitarian considerations.

43. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that the General Assembly had provided humanitarian assistance to the Palestine refugees for a quarter of a century. It was now clear that the refugee problem was closely interrelated with an over-all solution of the Palestine question and that it could be solved only when a just and lasting peace prevailed in the Middle East. Until then, UNRWA could continue to play its vital role in providing services for the refugees.

44. Japan made an annual contribution to UNRWA and would continue to endeavour to increase its co-operation every year, since the Agency's situation had never before been as critical as it was currently. The situation called for urgent and concerted action by the world community.

45. It was his country's view that the current level of the services provided by the Agency was the minimum permissible and should be maintained, since any reduction would have very serious implications for the refugees, the countries in which they lived and the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Throughout its history, UNRWA had relied mainly on voluntary contributions from Member States, and his delegation still believed that that was the only practical method to finance the Agency's expenditure. His delegation wished to express its satisfaction that some countries had made additional contributions and was especially encouraged by the new helpful trend in the attitudes of some Arab countries to contributions to the Agency. However, the current arrangement, with a small group of about 10 countries bearing 90 per cent of the expenses, was not satisfactory. He therefore supported the urgent request made by the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA in paragraph 33 of its report (A/10334) that, in conformity with their international responsibilities, those Governments which had not contributed in the past and those which had contributed inadequately should reconsider their position and make generous contributions.

46. Mr. ARNELLO (Chile) said that the work performed by UNRWA in 1975 highlighted the magnitude of its achievements during its 25 years of service. There was also no doubt that its continued existence reflected the United Nations failure to co-operate effectively in solving in a definitive manner the problem of the Middle East. The note of passion sounded in the statements by the parties to the conflict emphasized that the solution to the problem was political in nature; he felt, however, that the political aspect of the question could be considered in other forums and under other agenda items in the United Nations. It was the Special Political Committee's mission to co-operate in the work of UNRWA.

47. When considering the report of the Commissioner-General, one noticed that the greater part of the assistance provided to the Agency came from a comparatively small number of countries, while other countries gave insufficient assistance and 70 other countries gave none at all. That fact had to be faced, and the United Nations and the Special Political Committee should promote the idea of mobilizing the will of all members to co-operate in that humanitarian and just cause.

48. He hoped that his words would not be interpreted as an attempt to play down the political aspect of the problem. In his view, however, humanitarian assistance could not be tied to the political aspect. If that assistance was reduced, or if the refugees were deprived of it, they would once again become innocent victims of a conflict which would have awkward political repercussions.

49. Accordingly, he reiterated Chile's willingness to co-operate increasingly in the work of UNRWA to the extent of its possibilities.

Mr. Martínez Ordóñez (Honduras) resumed the Chair.

50. Mr. DRAMOU (Guinea) said that the debates which had taken place in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine had placed the problem in a proper perspective.

The Assembly had examined the problem on the basis of the recognition of the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland and their right to self-determination, and had recognized that there could be no viable solution that was not based on the need to rectify the injustices of which the peoples of Palestine had been the victims.

51. More than a quarter of a century ago, after having served as an instrument for depriving the Palestinian people of their homeland, the United Nations, assuming its responsibility, had created UNRWA as the best means of solving the human problem and political problem of the refugees. However, it had now realized that the problem, the humanitarian aspect of which was secondary, could not be resolved in that way.

52. The point at issue was not assistance for a people who had been the victim of a natural disaster, but assistance for people whose only crime had been that they had owned land coveted by international imperialism, which had dispossessed them in order to establish Zionism there. The responsibility of the United Nations was therefore not limited to the consequences of its own acts; the United Nations must take action to ensure that the Charter became a reality for all peoples. Only Member States could enforce respect for the Charter and some of them, which had contributed to the dispersing of the Palestinian people, currently opposed a just and durable solution to the problem, which could be based only on the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland.

53. Since the people of Palestine were victims of a decision by the United Nations, the international community and, in particular, those who bore responsibility for the injustice committed against them, must assume responsibility for the situation of the refugees. Israel, which was at the root of the problem, should not be surprised that the Palestine refugees intended to return to their homeland.

54. As well as testifying to an extremely gloomy financial situation, the report of the Commissioner-General confirmed other and even worse developments: they related to the loss of life in the refugee camps caused by Israeli attacks which, it was claimed, were directed against PLO, as if that organization could be separated from the people it represented. He also deplored the cost of repairing the installations damaged during those attacks by Israel, which helped to increase the Agency's heavy financial burden.

55. In view of the situation, a solution would have to be found for the difficulties of UNRWA, since any reduction in services would have deplorable consequences. In that regard, he noted with satisfaction that, in spite of its serious financial difficulties, the Agency had been able to maintain its relief programme. He was convinced that the humanitarian assistance provided to the refugees was a temporary measure only and, consequently, he would support any proposals to guarantee the Agency's financial stability.

56. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that none of the statements made during the current meeting by the Arab delegations and their supporters contained anything new and, consequently, they would not require a reply. They were mostly a rehash of allegations which his delegation had already rejected and

had shown as being completely baseless. However, when the representative of Yemen had spoken of the light at the end of the tunnel, his delegation had thought for a moment that he had at last something constructive to say, but obviously he had been referring only to the pernicious resolutions which the Arab bloc continued to have adopted in the General Assembly, for reasons which were known to all and had nothing to do with facts. As his delegation had said on other occasions, that kind of verbiage would not help to improve the situation. Israel had always desired peace and coexistence with its Arab neighbours, but the attitude of the Arab representatives towards Israel was very different, and their animosity was obvious. They in fact spoke of peaceful coexistence in a so-called "secular democratic State", but Israel knew what that meant, since in 1970, in a symposium held at Beirut, PLO had clearly admitted that that State was nothing more than a propaganda device, because the Western world did not like the idea of Jews being "thrown into the sea". Its real intentions had been demonstrated once again when the head of the PLO delegation, which claimed to represent the Palestinians, had said that Tel Aviv was considered part of occupied Palestine, which presumably meant that Israel would certainly have to give up Tel Aviv.

57. With regard to the remarks by the representative of Kuwait at the previous meeting and by the representative of the Sudan at the current meeting, his delegation had thought it had made its position quite clear. However, if the representative of Kuwait had not been satisfied with his reply, he could have looked at the relevant policy statements of the Government of Israel. That representative did not even recognize Israel's right to exist and at the 1897th plenary meeting of the General Assembly had said that to contend that recognition of the claims of Israel to the attributes and prerogatives of statehood was indispensable for the achievement of a just peace was tantamount to contending that the legitimization of a gross injustice was a prerequisite for the attainment of justice and peace, and had added that his Government had rejected and continued to reject Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Accordingly, he hoped that the representative of Kuwait would take that first step, as a token of his interest in peace.

58. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait) said, in exercise of the right of reply, that the representative of Israel had not answered his question and he asked him once more whether, if there was total peace in the Middle East, Israel would recognize the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes. He was aware that it was the policy of Israel not to allow the Palestinians to return even in those conditions, but he had hoped that the reply to his question would reflect some change in that policy. With regard to his statement in the General Assembly the representative of Israel had, for once, quoted his words correctly.

59. Mr. DORON (Israel), exercising the right of reply, said that his reply had been quite clear, and that he had no intention of repeating it, and he asked the representative of Kuwait to say whether or not his country had not accepted the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

60. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the Government of Kuwait continued to reject Security Council resolution 242 (1967)

which, moreover, was not directed at countries whose territories were not occupied.

61. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, reiterated that he had no intention of repeating the reply he had already given.

62. The CHAIRMAN announced that Trinidad and Tobago had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.334.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

981st meeting

Thursday, 20 November 1975, at 10.55 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.981

Tribute to the memory of H.E. Generalissimo Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Head of the Spanish State

1. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on behalf of the Committee and of his country, and on his own behalf, expressed condolences to the delegation of Spain on the death of the Head of the Spanish State, Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

2. Mr. LOPEZ HERCE (Spain), on behalf of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations and of the people and Government of Spain, acknowledged the expression of condolences on the death of the Head of the Spanish State.

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*) (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268, A/SPC/L.334-336):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/SPC/L.334-336)

3. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Committee had before it draft resolutions A/SPC/L.334 and A/SPC/L.335 which he intended to put to the vote forthwith. He would suspend the meeting briefly to enable delegations to place their names on the list of speakers, with a view to explaining their votes either before or after the voting.

The meeting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.05 a.m.

4. The CHAIRMAN, referring to draft resolution A/SPC/L.334, recalled that in previous years the Committee had adopted similar draft resolutions by consensus. If there was

no objection he would take it that the Committee agreed to adopt draft resolution A/SPC/L.334 in the same way.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the representative of Israel had requested that draft resolution A/SPC/L.335 be put to the vote.

The draft resolution was adopted by 79 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

6. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) expressed his delegation's condolences to the Spanish delegation on the death of the Head of the Spanish State.

7. He introduced draft resolution A/SPC/L.336, of which his delegation was a sponsor, concerning the refugees displaced as a result of the Israeli attack on three Arab States. Operative paragraph 1, which reaffirmed the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, used the word "camps" because the inhabitants who had been displaced from those territories had already been refugees when they were again driven out by the Israelis; they were now refugees twice over. The other operative paragraphs deplored Israel's refusal to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants and called upon Israel to take such action and to desist from all measures that obstructed the return; Israel was called upon once again to take steps immediately for the return of the refugees to the camps in the Gaza Strip and to desist from removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters; Israeli military attacks on refugee camps were condemned and Israel was called upon to desist from such attacks.

8. He announced that the United Republic of Tanzania had become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

9. Mr. PETNIČKI (Yugoslavia) introduced a draft resolution¹ concerning the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and announced that Austria, Belgium, Colombia,

¹ Subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/L.337.

Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Yugoslavia were sponsors of the draft resolution.

10. The CHAIRMAN said that the text of the draft resolution which Yugoslavia and just introduced was based on the draft resolution adopted by the Committee at the twenty-ninth session by consensus² and he hoped therefore that the draft resolution in question would be adopted in the same manner.

11. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that if his delegation had been present it would have joined in the consensus on draft resolution A/SPC/L.334 and would have voted for draft resolution A/SPC/L.335.

12. Mr. OULD SIDI (Mauritania) said that if his delegation had been present it would have voted for draft resolution A/SPC/L.335 and would have joined in the consensus on draft resolution A/SPC/L.334.

13. He announced that his delegation had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336.

14. Mr. DRAMOU (Guinea) said that his delegation had also become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336. If it had been present it would have voted for draft resolution A/SPC/L.335 and would have wished to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.334, which had been adopted by consensus.

15. Mr. DORON (Israel), referring to the remarks made by the representative of Jordan in introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.336, said that his version of the events of 1967 did not coincide with the truth. The representative of Israel had demonstrated a few days earlier, at the 2397th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that Israel had been the victim of Arab aggression and he had quoted from the published memoirs of the King of Jordan, in which the latter had frankly admitted that he had disregarded the message of 5 June 1967 which he had received from the then Prime Minister of Israel prior to the opening of hostilities. That message had stated that Israel would not initiate any action whatsoever against Jordan unless Jordan opened hostilities, in which case it would react with all its might. The Government of Israel had been informed that the message had been duly and faithfully conveyed and received. Nevertheless, Jordan had answered by opening heavy artillery fire along the whole front. Even after that the Government of Israel had attempted to localize the conflict, but Jordan had rejected those efforts. Apparently Jordan had thought that it would succeed in joining in the aggression against Israel. Those were the facts which the representative of Jordan persisted in disregarding. In draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 the enormous discrepancy between the alleged "facts" on paper and the real facts was even more evident than in similar resolutions adopted in previous years.

16. With reference to the return of displaced persons, he read out a note verbale dated 8 September 1975 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General, which was

reproduced in paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's report (A/10253), stating that the Government of Israel had continued to seek to reconcile its desire to facilitate the return of displaced persons—who had fled from the area of hostilities in 1967 at the instigation of the Arab Governments—with its responsibility for the safety and welfare of the population in the administered areas and in Israel, as well as the security of the State itself. The note went on to state that certain Arab Governments continued to furnish aid to terrorist organizations grouped under the Palestine Liberation Organization, which were established in and operated from their territory against Israel. Thus the prevailing situation did not permit a large-scale return of those displaced persons. Nevertheless, the Government of Israel had continued to facilitate the return of those persons. However, the facilities established by Israel were exploited by certain Arab Governments for purposes of subversion in order to facilitate the entry of terrorists and the transport of explosives into Israel-administered territory. Such actions obviously undermined any efforts to improve the situation.

17. In the circumstances there was no basis for reaffirming any alleged right of the displaced persons to return, or for deploring the refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants, as was done in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution.

18. Nor was there any reason for the call addressed to Israel in paragraphs 3 and 4. It was well known that Israel had taken no measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the areas under its administration and that it was taking all necessary steps to provide decent housing for refugees instead of the accommodation they had in the crowded camps. Israel had frequently explained the various considerations relevant to the matter, such as security and the improvement of the general situation and living conditions of the refugees.

19. As for paragraph 5, in a number of letters written to the Secretary-General and in statements made on various occasions, Israel had made it quite clear that it did not take action against refugee camps but only against bases and other installations of the terrorist organizations located in or near the camps. In that connexion he quoted from an article in *The New York Times* of 13 November 1975, stating that Lebanon was the only Middle Eastern country where the guerrillas had been relatively free to keep base facilities and to plan operations against Israel. Furthermore, numerous newspaper articles, as well as communiqués from the terrorist organizations themselves, bore witness to the fact that the targets attacked by the Israel Defence Forces had always been military installations of the terrorist gangs and that all possible steps had been taken to avoid injury to the residents of the camps.

20. The weekly magazine *Ila El Amam*, published by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, said in its issue of 13 March 1975 that the accuracy of the Israeli air raids on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon was not only the result of aerial photographs, because those could not provide accurate information on who lived in each house and where the equipment was hidden. He wondered how anybody could be asked to condemn the defensive action against terrorist bases which Israel was constrained to take,

² Adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1974 as resolution 3330 (XXIX).

and concluded by stating that the whole of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 was unacceptable, since it was misleading and not based on facts.

21. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he was not surprised that Israel was seeking once again to distort the facts.

22. In referring to the 1967 aggression against three Arab countries, the representative of Israel had so radically rewritten history that there was reason to suppose that, if he applied the same logic, he might say that the Arab countries were actually occupying a considerable portion of the territory of Israel, that one and a half million Israelis had been displaced by the Arabs in 1948 and were living in camps, and that the Committee was considering the displacement of thousands of Israelis as a result of the hostilities in 1967. However, all the members of the Committee knew that that had nothing to do with the truth. What the Committee was considering was the case of the Arab refugees who had been driven from their homes in 1948.

23. As for Israel's intentions towards the Arabs, no amount of quotations could obscure the truth. It was true that the Israeli leaders, just before a premeditated attack on their Arab neighbours, had talked of peace, but their actions had been diametrically opposed to their words. On the eve of the 1967 attack on Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, the Israeli Minister, Moshe Dayan, had said that diplomatic negotiations were continuing in an effort to resolve the conflict and that Israel would not resort to war. Similarly, in 1956, just before the attack on Egypt which had resulted in the occupation of vast areas, Ben Gurion had spoken explicitly and emphatically of peace.

24. In any case, the quotations in question and those of all the propaganda organs of the Israeli Government were irrelevant. The Committee was considering the question of the Palestinians and the future of those people who had been refugees twice in their lifetime and who were now living in temporary shelters because they had been expelled and displaced by Israel in 1967. The representative of Israel had said that his Government was allowing those persons to return by degrees, but it was common knowledge that the Government of Israel and the occupation authorities had taken strict measures which made their return virtually impossible. It would be interesting to know how many persons had been allowed to return to their homes.

25. With regard to the physical changes made by the Government of Israel, particularly in the Gaza strip, it was

typical that the representative of Israel should have spoken of improving living conditions, but there again, what he said had no bearing on the issue. It was not improvements in the accommodation of the population that were needed; it was necessary to preserve the physical integrity of that population, and that would only be achieved when all the displaced persons were able to return to their homes.

26. Mr. BARODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 only referred to the situation of the persons displaced from the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The representative of Israel repeatedly used the word "terrorists" when referring to the Palestinians, overlooking the fact that possibly even before he had gone to Palestine those who had begun to use terrorism for their own ends had been the Zionists of central and eastern Europe. In actual fact, the Jews of the east had been peaceful people who had never engaged in terrorism. The people of Palestine, whether they had been Christians, Moslems or Jews, had never given cause for concern to the Government of Istanbul because they were peaceful by nature and by calling. The problems had begun with the Khazars, who had not belonged to the Semitic race and had been converted to Judaism in southern Russia during the eighth century.

27. He often told the Palestinians that they should not use terrorism as Zionism did, and they replied that Israel had won its victories through terrorism. In actual fact, that was not so, because those victories were due to the assistance provided by the United States of America.

28. He thought that unless they changed their tactics, the Zionists would always continue to be a foreign element in the Middle East. If they wished to be accepted they must change their policy. Otherwise they would disappear, since they would have no future unless they won the acceptance of all the Arab peoples, of which the Palestinians were an integral part. Zionism was spreading its political and financial tentacles and seeking to appear as a helpless minority. It was to be hoped that it did not become a scapegoat; however, if that did happen he would be the first to defend the Zionists' human rights.

29. Mr. DORON (Israel), exercising the right of reply in connexion with the comments made by the representative of Jordan, said that he had no intention of trying to rewrite history but accepted it as written by the King of Jordan in his memoirs.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

982nd meeting

Friday, 21 November 1975, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.982

AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*concluded*) (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268, A/SPC/L.336-338):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*concluded*) (A/SPC/L.336-338)

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that Somalia had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 and that India, New Zealand, the Philippines and the Sudan had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.337. He said that if there was no objection, he would suspend the meeting before putting the two draft resolutions to the vote so that any representatives wishing to explain their votes could have their names placed on the list of speakers.

The meeting was suspended at 3.30 p.m. and resumed at 3.35 p.m.

2. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote, said that Ireland shared with its partners in the European Economic Community (EEC) a wish to see a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East which would recognize the rights of all the parties. In a statement issued on 6 November 1973, the members of EEC, including Ireland, had set out the principles which they felt should underlie such a settlement. In particular, all the States in the region, including Israel, had a right to exist within secure and recognized frontiers, and means must be found to enable the Palestinian people to give political expression to their right to a national identity.

3. As the representative of Italy had indicated in his statement on 18 November (979th meeting) the nine States members of EEC were resolved to continue to support the activities of UNRWA. Ireland had for many years contributed to the Agency to the extent that its resources permitted, and it would continue to do so.

4. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.336, which was before the Committee, contained two main elements. In the first place, it called for the return of the displaced inhabitants to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Since one of the basic principles contained in the joint statement made by the States members of EEC in 1973 was the need for Israel to end the territorial

occupation which it had maintained since the conflict of 1967, it was clear that his delegation was in favour of those paragraphs, which it regarded as central to the draft resolution.

5. In the second place, operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution condemned Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and called upon Israel to desist from such attacks. The year before, a similar paragraph in the corresponding resolution (3331 D (XXIX)) had "deplored" Israeli attacks, and his delegation had voted for that resolution. The new wording was clearly stronger than that of the previous year; moreover, the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 was taking place a short time after certain other votes in the General Assembly which had been widely represented as part of an unfair campaign directed against Israel. For those reasons, his delegation wished to be very clear and explicit with regard to its vote and the reasons for it. His delegation was aware that, in addition to the attacks by Israel mentioned in the resolution, there had been violent attacks, often indiscriminate in character, on the civilian population in Israel, and he understood that responsibility for such attacks was accepted by groups which wished to establish Palestinian rights; it had been charged that those attacks had been directed from certain refugee camps. His delegation rejected such violent methods without qualification.

6. However, draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 referred to attacks by Israel on the refugee camps. The reports of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1) and the Secretary-General (A/10253) indicated that Israel had accepted responsibility for those attacks. Although it had been said that the attacks had been carried out as retaliation and therefore had a certain justification, his delegation, irrespective of its views on the conflict in the Middle East, considered them to be wrong. Inasmuch as the attacks had continued despite appeals by the General Assembly, his delegation had no option but to vote for the draft resolution.

7. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 to the vote.

At the request of the representative of Kuwait, a recorded vote was taken by roll-call.

Kuwait, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socia-

list Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya.

Against: Swaziland, United States of America, Israel.

Abstaining: Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Iceland.

The draft resolution was adopted by 84 votes to 3, with 18 abstentions.

8. U OHN SEIN (Burma), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution because it shared the concern of the international community at the plight of the Palestine refugees and supported efforts aimed at alleviating their sufferings pending the settlement of political problems in the area. His delegation supported the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine to self-determination without external interference and to national independence and sovereignty. However, he wished to state for the record that his delegation had reservations with regard to operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution just adopted.

9. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that his delegation had abstained because the references in the draft resolution to Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps gave only one part of a complicated situation in which attacks took place from both sides of the borders.

10. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that his delegation had been unable to vote for draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 because the condemnation expressed in operative paragraph 5 of Israel's military attacks on refugee camps clearly represented an exacerbation in relation to what had been said in previous resolutions. Furthermore, the draft resolution did not mention terrorist attacks on Israeli settlements or cities, and that gave it an unbalanced character.

11. Mr. KAMOSHIDA (Japan) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution. With regard to paragraph 5, his delegation had listened carefully to the reasons given by the representative of Israel, but it could not recognize the idea of "defensive attack" in any circumstances. The Government of Japan was opposed to the use of force in international conflicts, with the exception of the cases specified in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

12. Mr. RUDOLPH (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the positive attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany towards UNRWA was well known. It was because of that attitude that his delegation had co-sponsored draft

resolutions A/SPC/L.334 and A/SPC/L.337 and had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.335. However, while it was deeply concerned over the sufferings of the Palestine refugees, it had been unable to vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336, essentially for the same reasons which had led it to abstain the previous year in the vote on General Assembly resolution 3331 D (XXIX). Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution once again reflected a one-sided attitude, even more so because of the change in the wording.

13. Mr. BATTISCOMBE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote because it considered that the reference to Israeli attacks on refugee camps in paragraph 5 was one-sided and unbalanced in that it referred only to acts of violence committed by one side without mentioning those committed by the other side, which had provoked the raids it condemned. That did not alter the fact that the United Kingdom Government deplored the Israeli attacks, just as it deplored all acts of violence in the Middle East. If there was to be peace and a just and lasting settlement in that region, it was of vital importance that the cycle of violence and counter-violence should be brought to an end.

14. Mr. SHERER (United States of America) said that his delegation had voted against the draft resolution that had just been adopted because in paragraph 5 one of the complex and tragic problems arising from the conflict in the Middle East was treated in a one-sided manner and no mention was made of the acts of provocation. His delegation did not believe that unbalanced judgements could help to break the chain of reaction and counter-reaction which had caused so much suffering in the region.

15. Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway) said that his delegation was in general agreement with draft resolution A/SPC/L.336. Norway greatly appreciated the important work done by UNRWA and deplored the acts of violence committed by the parties, which made that work more difficult. However, it had abstained in the vote because it considered that paragraph 5 presented the problem of violence in a one-sided manner, in that it confined itself to condemning Israel instead of considering the problem in a wider and more appropriate context.

16. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it supported the right of the refugees displaced after the war of 1967 to return to their homes. It had, however, reservations concerning paragraph 5, which it considered unbalanced, since it reflected only a partial view of the situation. His delegation wished to place on record that, while it condemned the Israeli military attacks on the refugee camps, it had the same attitude towards every other act of violence and, therefore, towards the acts committed by guerrillas against innocent civilians in Israeli territory. His delegation felt it was currently inappropriate to refer to the general problem of the crisis in the Middle East, but it wished to reiterate that, in order to achieve a just and lasting settlement and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people, it was essential that all sides put an end to acts of violence.

17. Mr. DINKELSPIEL (Sweden) said that while his delegation recognized the plight of the Palestine refugees

and their right to return to their homes in the territories occupied as a consequence of the 1967 hostilities, it had abstained in the vote because of the atmosphere prevailing in the Committee with regard to the question of the Middle East. His delegation deplored all acts of violence, including those mentioned in paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336. It felt, however, that the paragraph in question was even more unbalanced than a similar paragraph in the resolution adopted at the twenty-ninth session by the General Assembly (3331 D (XXIX)). No mention was made of other acts of violence and only one side was condemned.

18. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia) said that his delegation reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to recover the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and that Israel should give back those territories and return to its recognized frontiers. It deplored the sad plight of the Palestine refugees, a plight which should be brought to an end by means of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. His delegation had, however, abstained in the vote because of the atmosphere in which the debate had taken place, because of the unjust and violent attacks against the people and nation of Israel which did not help to create conditions conducive to peace, and because of the wording of paragraph 5 of the draft resolution which one-sidedly condemned Israel and remained silent about the acts of violence and terrorism to which the Israeli population had been subjected, acts which deserved equal condemnation.

19. Mr. FITZ (Austria) said that his delegation was in agreement with much of draft resolution A/SPC/L.336. The Austrian Government deplored the sufferings of the refugees and had frequently helped to mitigate them. In keeping with its humanitarian policy, Austria supported the right of the Palestine refugees displaced in 1967 to return to their homes and had asked for steps to be taken towards that end. Furthermore, the Austrian Government had always deplored any act of violence, especially when it was directed against innocent civilians. Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution that had just been adopted, however, condemned one party without taking into account the fact that violence engendered violence and that all concerned should desist from such acts. Accordingly, his delegation had abstained in the vote in order to make it clear that the draft resolution was unbalanced and was not conducive to creating the atmosphere necessary for a solution to the problem of refugees in the Middle East.

20. Mr. MAGONGO (Swaziland) said that his delegation was in favour of peaceful negotiation. It had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.336 because it did not believe that it was just to condemn only one side.

21. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/SPC/L.337 to the vote and said that, if there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee adopted it unanimously.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

22. Sir John RENNIE (Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

Refugees in the Near East) thanked all those who had commended the work of UNRWA and said that he would convey their words to the staff of the Agency, who had worked under great pressure. He pointed out that the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA would be held on 26 November and drew the Committee's attention to paragraph 5 of the annex to the letter sent by the Secretary-General to all Governments concerning the Agency's needs for 1976. In that paragraph the Secretary-General pointed out the serious consequences that could result if sufficient funds could not be found to meet those needs.

AGENDA ITEM 51

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/10366)

23. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the list of speakers on the item under consideration should be closed at the end of the following meeting. If there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee agreed to his suggestion.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE

24. Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt), speaking as Rapporteur of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, first of all expressed his regret that, as indicated in paragraph 6 of the report (A/10366), it had not been possible to make further progress in the completion of agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations. That lack of progress was not due to any lack of effort; the task of achieving agreed guidelines was a difficult one since the issues involved were fundamental. As a result, important differences of opinion had arisen between some members of the Working Group concerning basic political and institutional problems which needed further negotiations.

25. Despite that, he did not wish to express a pessimistic view regarding the future. He was sure that many members of the Special Committee shared his opinion and were determined to redouble their efforts to achieve concrete results. As indicated in paragraph 7 of the report, the members of the Special Committee felt that more time and greater accommodation were required to overcome existing differences and to reach agreement. In that same paragraph, it was stated that the Special Committee felt that special attention should be paid to the consideration of specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations. That introduced a new concept which might provide a good basis for debate.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

983rd meeting

Tuesday, 25 November 1975, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.983

AGENDA ITEM 51

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (*continued*) (A/10366)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. WALDENSTRÖM (Sweden) said that the role of the United Nations was indispensable in preserving and strengthening international peace and security and that its peace-keeping operations were significant and unique. Sweden's co-operation in those operations was therefore an essential part of its over-all United Nations policies, and it had consistently contributed both personnel and funds to them. It also maintained a stand-by force for service with the United Nations and was thus able to respond at short notice to requests from the United Nations. More than 35,000 Swedes had served in United Nations forces over the years and at present over 1,100 men were serving with UNEF, UNDOF, UNTSO, UNFICYP and UNMOGIP.
2. His delegation noted with regret from the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/10366) that its Working Group had not been able during the current year to complete agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations, but agreed that more time and greater accommodation were required to overcome existing differences and to reach a final agreement on the guidelines (*ibid.*, para. 7).
3. His delegation noted with great satisfaction that the Special Committee felt that the Working Group should devote its attention to the consideration of specific questions related to the practical implementation of peace-keeping operations. As a troop-contributing country, Sweden considered it most important to take note of the practical experience gained from participation in UNEF and UNDOF, the logistics and administration of which had been most difficult, especially in the early stages.
4. The immediate availability of specially trained personnel was an important prerequisite for United Nations peace-keeping forces. Only if such personnel were available from different parts of the world could the desirable broad-based composition of peace-keeping forces be achieved. Accordingly, Sweden considered that more attention should be given to training, and felt that the Working Group might give attention to that aspect of United Nations peace-keeping. A simulation exercise had already been held under the auspices of UNITAR in May 1975, and his delegation believed that a study of the problems involved would pave the way for more practical training activities. In that regard, Sweden was ready to share its experience of peace-keeping operations with the Working Group. It looked forward to continued work by the Special Committee and its Working Group and hoped that the special study on the Nordic stand-by forces for United Nations peace-keeping operations would contribute to their work.
5. Readiness among Member States to make financial contributions was a further prerequisite for peace-keeping operations, and in that regard his Government continued to favour the principle of collective financial responsibility. It fully shared the view expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization¹ that adequate financial support, particularly when operations continued for a number of years, could be a serious problem which, if not solved, imposed an undue burden on the Governments providing contingents. UNFICYP reimbursements were in some cases years behind their payment schedules, and even in the case of UNEF, financial problems made it difficult for the United Nations to meet its obligations in time. An equitable solution of the depreciation scales for contingent-owned equipment still remained to be found.
6. A solution to the problem of reimbursing the troop-contributing States was therefore a matter of vital importance in maintaining the efficiency of peace-keeping operations. His delegation wished to request the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to make available to the Organization the financial resources needed for the maintenance of those operations. Without the necessary resources, the financial burden on small countries might become so heavy that they would be precluded from making a contribution.
7. Mr. KARHILO (Finland) said that his delegation shared the feelings of those Member States which had voiced disappointment that guidelines had not yet been agreed for the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. While the talks on the guidelines for future peace-keeping operations had been at a standstill, the United Nations had been called upon to set up new peace-keeping forces, in situations of extreme urgency. In the absence of an agreed formula on peace-keeping forces or similar services, the international community had been unprepared to meet those situations. The United Nations had been compelled to resort to hasty improvisations in order to provide the services required by certain conflict situations. His delegation fully shared the view of the Secretary-General expressed in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization¹ on the practical difficulties arising from the *ad hoc* nature of the peace-keeping operations.
8. His Government had taken a strong, active and consistent interest in the United Nations peace-keeping opera-

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A, sect. X.

tions and, in accordance with its policy of neutrality, Finland supported the United Nations as the primary instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. It had assisted the United Nations in all its peace-keeping activities by means of financial contributions or by placing military personnel at the disposal of the Secretary-General, or both. Furthermore, in 1968, the Finnish Government had agreed with the Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden to establish a stand-by contingent and to make other arrangements designed to enable it to respond promptly and effectively to any request for its services in a United Nations peace-keeping operation. Those arrangements had enabled the Finnish Government to act immediately when the Secretary-General had made a request for troops. Thus far, approximately 12,000 Finns had served in the United Nations peace-keeping forces. At present 1,127 men were serving with UNFICYP, UNEF, UNTSO and UNMOGIP.

9. Finland had not entered into discussions on the constitutional issue of peace-keeping, preferring a pragmatic approach which had led it to concentrate on operations initiated by the Security Council. His delegation considered it important that particular note should be taken of the practical experience gained in UNEF and UNDOF in any efforts to achieve agreed guidelines for future operations. That experience showed, *inter alia*, that the immediate availability of the appropriate national contingents and adequate preparations for the organization, training and use of peace-keeping forces were of crucial importance.

10. The principle of broad geographical representation was essential to the political balance of peace-keeping operations, and some progress had been made in that respect in recent years. Attention should also be given to opportunities for potential observers and contingents in all geographical regions to obtain training for peace-keeping work. His delegation supported the idea that the United Nations should be given a special role in facilitating and co-ordinating the training efforts of potential participating countries.

11. Finland considered the establishment and operation of the United Nations forces to be a collective undertaking. His Government had consistently held the view that the principle of collective responsibility must prevail in the financing of peace-keeping operations, and it was satisfied with the basic method of financing UNEF through the budget, as agreed upon by the Security Council and the General Assembly. It had always held the view that the expenses of the Force should be apportioned among the Member States on an equitable and fair basis in the same way, in principle, as all the other expenditures of the United Nations.

12. The financing of peace-keeping operations was closely linked to the basic principle of reimbursing the costs involved to the troop-contributing countries. The results achieved through consultations on the question of reimbursement seemed to be generally acceptable to Member States, including troop-contributing countries. The application of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment in the context of reimbursement would unquestionably cause difficulties for several countries, including

Finland, but his delegation believed that all supported the idea of equal reimbursement. In that connexion, Finland noted that the reimbursements due to the troop-contributing countries were in some cases running behind their actual payment schedules. Finland's dues from the United Nations amounted to \$15.5 million, and that state of affairs was bound to have a serious impact in the long run on a small country's ability to make commitments to the United Nations peace-keeping operations.

13. Current financial difficulties were such as to endanger the political basis of UNEF, namely, equitable geographical distribution in the selection of troops. Determined efforts should therefore be made to strengthen the positive potential in favour of peace-keeping in all countries, including the small States. In the light of those considerations, his delegation fully supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to strengthen the political and financial basis of the United Nations peace-keeping operations.

14. The role of small countries in the maintenance of international peace and in United Nations peace-keeping operations might be modest, but it was still indispensable. His delegation was convinced that the small countries were prepared to do their fair share, and it was in the common interest to maintain that willingness and even to strengthen it, and not to create conditions where the share and burden of the small countries became materially, and therefore politically, unbearable. His delegation therefore hoped that the finances of the United Nations peace-keeping operations could be placed on a solid and secure basis.

15. In supporting the renewal of the mandate of the Special Committee for another year, his delegation wished to urge it to make a supreme effort to achieve substantial progress towards agreement. It also wished to emphasize the need to give careful thought to making the task of the Special Committee more manageable so that existing difficulties might be eliminated or at least alleviated. The need to reach an agreement on guidelines for the United Nations peace-keeping operations, including their financing, presupposed the need for the political will of all Member States to support collectively those operations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

16. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that, in the view of his delegation, the Special Political Committee must endorse the conclusions set forth in the candid and clear report of the Working Group of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/10366, annex). All must concede that the task of achieving agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations was difficult especially since the issues before the Working Group were fundamental. His delegation did not believe that the fact that certain important differences had arisen between certain members of the Working Group concerning basic political and institutional problems was a cause for despair, and it remained optimistic that any differences that existed were not insuperable and could be overcome, given more time and greater accommodation. It accordingly supported the conclusion that efforts towards the submission to the General Assembly of agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations should be continued, having due regard to circumstances likely to lead to further progress. It also endorsed the Special Committee's recommendation, in

paragraph 7 of its report, that the Working Group should also devote attention to the consideration of specific questions related to the practical implementation of the peace-keeping operations.

17. His delegation wished to reaffirm its Government's continued support for the United Nations peace-keeping operations and to express the hope that the Special Committee and its Working Group would soon complete agreed guidelines that would be practicable, financially equitable and effective, as well as responsive to the changed circumstances of the contemporary world and the needs of the 143 sovereign Member States of the United Nations.

18. His delegation urged the Special Political Committee to endorse the recommendations and conclusions of the Working Group and to recommend the renewal of the mandate of the Special Committee.

19. His delegation wished to point out that suggestions had been made in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Charter of the United Nations that the reports of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be submitted to it for consideration in the context of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate to review the Charter and to strengthen the role of the Organization in the promotion of international peace and security and the development of co-operation in relations between States. It might be a good idea for the Special Committee and the *Ad Hoc* Committee to establish some sort of liaison to co-ordinate proposals and suggestions on the question of peace-keeping and of strengthening the role of the United Nations in general.

20. Mr. MITCHELL (United States of America) said that he could only note with regret that the hard work of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had not resulted in any significant progress towards agreement and, in fact, had revealed deep-seated differences of principle concerning the key issues of the peace-keeping operations. On the other hand, the positive approach and suggestions made by members of the Committee in a spirit of compromise had been encouraging notes in its proceedings.

21. His Government had been gratified at the Security Council's successful actions in the realm of operational peace-keeping and felt that it had demonstrated its ability to maintain and support peace-keeping forces operating under the most sensitive circumstances. It had been particularly heartened by the extension of UNEF for one year (Security Council resolution 378 (1975)), which would make for more rational planning in the operation of that force.

22. His Government continued to believe that the peace-keeping function of the United Nations was highly important in preventing the outbreak of hostilities and in providing the opportunity for the peaceful settlement of disputes. On the basis of United Nations experience in establishing and successfully operating peace-keeping forces in various critical areas of the world, his Government was convinced that a high degree of flexibility was required to allow the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the peace-keeping force commander to deal with the unique circumstances involved in each case. It consequently continued to believe that guidelines must be general in nature.

One of their major purposes should be to define in broad but clear terms the division of responsibility between the principal United Nations organs involved. While the Security Council had primary responsibility for authorizing peace-keeping operations and determining the major direction for any peace-keeping force, the Secretary-General should have sufficient authority and flexibility to ensure the effective functioning of those forces. The Security Council could maintain its over-all and continuing responsibility by receiving regular reports from the Secretary-General, by periodically reviewing the work of the peace-keeping force, and, if it considered it advisable, by establishing an advisory or consultative committee.

23. In view of the practical successes of the various United Nations peace-keeping forces, one ought not to be unduly disheartened over the long term by the failure to reach agreement on generalized guidelines. The experience of the Special Committee and its Working Group during the preceding year indicated the need for further reflection on the best approach to the problem. The Committee might even wish to consider whether, in the interest of achieving eventual success in its task, some hiatus in its drafting efforts would be wise, to give it time to explore possible approaches. In any case, his Government could only conclude that the current time was appropriate for reflection, since it remained convinced that peace-keeping continued to be a vital function, in fact one of the most vital functions of the United Nations, in resolving disputes and promoting peace in the world.

24. Mr. CABRAL DE MELO (Brazil) said that the report of the Special Committee was not a heartening document, especially for delegations like his own which had asserted for many years the need for an accepted framework of rules for the implementation of peace-keeping operations in the context of a revision of the Charter of the United Nations. The Minister for External Relations of Brazil, addressing the General Assembly, had already pointed to the need for co-ordinating the efforts of both the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Charter of the United Nations (2355th plenary meeting). His delegation felt that during the work of elaborating a set of guidelines for peace-keeping operations one should not lose sight of the work being performed by other organs and in other areas of the United Nations with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its goals.

25. Unfortunately, the political situation had not been particularly helpful in that respect. The report of the Special Committee indicated some of the obstacles that had been encountered and the reasons for them. They were issues of a fundamental nature and had given rise to certain important differences between some members of the Working Group concerning the basic political and institutional problems which needed further substantive negotiation. Thus, the main problem was the existence of divergent conceptions of a constitutional nature. Although his delegation recognized the difficulties arising from such issues, it felt that the Special Committee should continue in its task and that the controversy could be reduced to a few basic elements.

26. His delegation also believed that the elaboration of guidelines did not necessarily exhaust the Special Commit-

tee's usefulness or its mandate. Other areas of agreement could be explored, such as, for instance, the consideration of specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations. A question of paramount importance was, of course, contingency planning and preparedness on the part of Member States which, like the Nordic countries, for instance, were ready to co-operate in future peace-keeping operations.

27. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland) said that his delegation's interest in United Nations peace-keeping operations and the attempt to place them on a more satisfactory permanent footing was based both on his Government's support of the concept of United Nations peace-keeping and on its participation in the various peace-keeping forces. Ireland's concern for that concept had led it to make proposals in the mid-1960s to place the financing of peace-keeping operations on a more permanent and sounder basis and to participate in most of the forces set up since it had joined the Organization. His Government regretted having had to withdraw the Irish contingent from UNEF in May 1974 for domestic reasons but regarded its commitment to the Force as continuing. Irish officers continued to serve the United Nations in the Middle East and in Cyprus.

28. His delegation had noted with particular interest the Secretary-General's remarks in the introduction to his latest report on the work of the Organization¹ in which, while underlining the limitations of peace-keeping operations on an *ad hoc* basis as so far conducted, he noted that they had proved extremely useful in certain conflict situations. The Secretary-General had also drawn attention to the difficulties presented by the logistics and administration of the operations, especially in the early stages, in the absence of permanent peace-keeping establishments, and to the problem of providing adequate financial support when the operations continued for a number of years.

29. His delegation had welcomed the decision in 1973 (Security Council resolution 340 (1973)) to set up the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East on the basis of the collective responsibility of all Member States. It had hoped that that would give an impetus to efforts within the United Nations system to develop permanent guidelines for the establishment and conduct of a peace-keeping operation when circumstances required; it still hoped that other forces could be established on a similar basis and particularly that UNFICYP could be placed on that basis. Operations in the Middle East and Cyprus had provided practical experience which could form the basis for more general conclusions. His delegation was therefore unable to agree that the endeavour to find agreement on more permanent peace-keeping arrangements could currently be terminated or suspended. It was acutely disappointed at the lack of progress by the Special Committee, especially in view of the guarded optimism aroused by the preceding year's report.² That disappointment implied no criticism of the members of the Special Committee or of the Working Group, who should not give way to despair. The low-key nature of the Special Committee's activities and of the discussion in the Special Political Committee should not lead to the conclusion that problems would disappear if they were ignored. While by no means overcoming the

financial difficulties of the United Nations, the establishment of UNEF on its existing basis had somewhat lessened the fears that future peace-keeping operations would undermine for ever the finances of the Organization. It was not therefore unreasonable to re-examine the immediate objectives of the Special Committee, its method of attaining them and even its composition. Areas within the Special Committee's broad mandate on which it could make definite progress should be identified. They might be peripheral to its central concern, but should help to restore the Special Committee's morale and enable it to tackle the basic issues with renewed vigour. His delegation therefore endorsed the proposal that the Working Group should devote its attention to specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations, in particular training for such operations, drawing on experience gained in existing operations, while the Special Committee itself remained concerned with the elaboration of agreed guidelines.

30. Mr. PAWLAK (Poland) said that, in view of international détente and the growing role of the United Nations, effective means of settling conflicts peacefully must be found. As an active Member of the United Nations, Poland had always paid great attention to questions of peace within the international community and had been a member of the Special Committee since its establishment. According to the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly could deal with problems related to international peace and security, but only the Security Council could authorize action. It was therefore obvious that all decisions concerning peace-keeping operations should fall within the exclusive competence of the Council, whose role in such operations had been widely recognized. The creation of UNEF and UNDOF had been a turning point in the conduct of peace-keeping operations because of the recognition not only of the role of the Security Council but also of the principle of collective responsibility and the application of the principle of equitable geographic representation. Poland's participation in UNEF and UNDOF was an expression of its firm support of the provisions of the Charter and its desire to contribute to the safeguarding of international peace and security, which was in keeping with the general line of its foreign policy and that of the Socialist community. Through that participation, Poland had acquired considerable experience in the practice of peace-keeping operations. Although the United Nations forces were protecting peace in the Middle East, their presence should not be permanent or be used as a pretext for prolonging the current situation. An over-all solution must be found on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions; there could be no lasting peace in the region until Israel withdrew its forces from all Arab territories and until the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to their own statehood, were recognized. The United Nations forces in the Middle East could only play their role fully if all units enjoyed non-discriminatory freedom of movement. Israel's denial of such freedom of movement to UNEF and UNDOF contingents whose countries of origin did not maintain diplomatic relations with it was a serious obstacle to the efficient performance of their task.

31. His delegation regretted that the mandate entrusted to the Special Committee and its Working Group by General

² *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 39, document A/9827.

Assembly resolution 3239 (XXIX) had not been fulfilled. It appealed to members of the Working Group to show restraint and political imagination in order to achieve understanding on the basis of the common aim, especially in view of the continued existence of conflict areas in several parts of the world. The Polish delegation agreed with the Special Committee that more time and greater accommodation were required to overcome existing differences, but that time should not be unnecessarily prolonged. It would be ironic if the Special Committee became involved in sterile discussions while the latest peace-keeping operations in the Middle East were proving so successful. The stalemate in the Special Committee was chiefly due to obsolete modes of thinking by certain delegations, which found it difficult to adjust to the rapidly changing realities of international life.

32. Mr. LANGSLET (Norway) said that his Government firmly believed that the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations could play a unique role in strengthening international peace and security. Norway had therefore participated in peace-keeping operations, established stand-by forces and paid voluntary financial contributions to peace-keeping operations, and it would continue to support all efforts aimed at strengthening the United Nations peace-keeping machinery in the future. While his delegation regretted the lack of progress made by the Special Committee despite the positive developments indicated in the Working Group's eighth report,³ that should not be used as an argument against the continuation of its work. The Norwegian delegation supported the Working Group's suggestion in paragraph 7 of its ninth report (A/10366, annex) that it should devote its attention to the consideration of specific questions related to the practical implementation of peace-keeping operations. No efforts should be spared to make those operations more efficient and to activate the interest of all Member States in their importance for the maintenance of peace and security.

33. His delegation also wished to stress the importance of training and preparedness, so that the personnel of potential contributors had the best possible background for carrying out their duties and responsibilities. One of the prerequisites for the effective functioning of such operations was the existence of stand-by or similar forces.

34. In view of the need to avoid in the future the financial problems created by past peace-keeping operations, the Special Committee should pay attention to the financial aspects of the matter. His Government maintained its attitude regarding the principle of collective financial responsibility.

35. Mr. McGHIE (New Zealand) said that his delegation shared the regret that the Special Committee had made no progress during the preceding year, despite the optimism expressed at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. Since the early 1950s, the United Nations had struggled with the problem of how to provide the necessary funds to finance its peace and security operations and how to control those operations. The problem was fundamentally political, reflecting the various attitudes of Member States towards the United Nations and what they

considered to be its legitimate role. What was in dispute was not merely whether the General Assembly could oblige all Member States to contribute to the cost of peace-keeping operations but, what was even more important, whether it was entitled to initiate and control such operations or whether those functions should be the prerogative of the Security Council.

36. Although not a member of the Special Committee, New Zealand had always taken a close interest in United Nations peace-keeping activities. Besides providing troops for the United Nations enforcement action in Korea, it had had military observers with UNTSO and UNMOGIP for many years, had contributed civilian policemen to UNFICYP for three years and had made financial contributions to peace-keeping operations in the Congo, the Middle East and Cyprus. As a demonstration of its continuing interest, the Minister of Defence had announced in 1974 that New Zealand would introduce training for all branches of the armed forces as part of the Government's policy that the Services should be available to undertake peace-keeping duties. Such training had been introduced from the beginning of the 1975/76 training year and was being given greater emphasis in promotion courses at various levels.

37. Even with the Organization's long experience in peace-keeping operations, it was important that the rules and principles developed through that experience should be set out in a scheme of clear and effective guidelines to enable the United Nations to act quickly in situations requiring urgent action. Although the Special Committee could not yet report progress, his delegation felt that, because of the pre-eminent position given in the Charter to the maintenance of peace, the mandate of the Special Committee should be renewed in the hope that a further period of study would bring the required measure of agreement.

38. Mr. MARTINEZ (Venezuela) said that peace-keeping operations were vitally important in the fulfilment of one of the fundamental tasks of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security, and therefore had his delegation's full support. Venezuela attached great importance to the work of the Special Committee and the Working Group and shared the optimism of the Rapporteur of that Committee concerning the future. It was disappointing that despite the efforts of various members of the Working Group, no agreement had been reached because of fundamental differences between some members. However, his delegation endorsed the opinion expressed in paragraph 7 of the Special Committee's report that the mandate of the Working Group should be extended because more time and greater accommodation were required to overcome existing differences.

39. The experience acquired in United Nations peace-keeping operations during the preceding few years gave rise to the hope that the Special Committee might be able to complete its task in the future. It was therefore essential that its work should continue and that the Working Group should devote its attention to specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations. His delegation was certain that the Special Political Committee would, as in previous years, adopt a draft resolution calling for renewed efforts by the Special Committee to reach agreement on that important matter.

³ *Ibid.*, annex.

40. Mr. GREGORIADES (Greece) said that, since peace was the purpose of the United Nations, the practical means of ensuring it, and particularly the guidelines governing peace-keeping operations, went to the very heart of the Organization's mission. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece had said in the General Assembly (2362nd plenary meeting), the United Nations had played a positive role in preventing armed conflicts, especially in terms of localizing foci of confrontation and separating the adversaries. Greece attached special importance to the strengthening of that role. The Secretary-General was justly paying special attention to the functioning of the peace-keeping forces, in which he could be assured of Greece's full co-operation. His delegation was in complete agreement with the remarks made concerning those operations in sections XI and XII of the introduction to the Secretary-General's report on the work of the Organization.¹ Since peace-keeping operations played an important part in maintaining calm in the regions in which they were conducted and since they created a suitable atmosphere for negotiations, a greater role should be given to them. Certain principles were essential for the success of such operations. The United Nations forces must be sufficiently strong and effective, any attack or pressure on them by national military forces should be forbidden, a system of international sanctions should be provided for in order to implement that policy, and the forces must in no way be hindered in the task assigned to them by the Security Council. In order to preserve their representative character, the United Nations peace-keeping forces should be composed of contingents as widely and equitably representative of the international community as possible and should be financed by all Member States, for the maintenance of peace was a common responsibility.

41. He wished to reiterate the deep appreciation of the Greek Government for the sense of mission and responsibility with which UNFICYP was performing its important task under difficult and often dangerous conditions.

42. Mr. DE PRAT GAY (Argentina) said that his delegation attached great importance to peace-keeping operations because they were an essential component of the activities of the United Nations. His delegation was therefore concerned that the Working Group and the Special Committee had not been able to meet the request made in General Assembly resolutions 3091 (XXVIII) and 3239 (XXIX) to renew efforts towards the completion of agreed guidelines for the conduct of such operations. The United Nations was faced with a paradoxical situation in which its emergency forces were playing a highly important and effective role in a number of areas while the Special Committee remained unable to reach agreement as to how to place peace-keeping activities on a firmer basis.

43. If the last two reports of the Working Group were compared, it became evident that the momentum gathered in 1974 had regrettably been lost and that the progress made in that year had perhaps even been undone in 1975. No progress had been made with regard to proposals put forward. In that connexion, he pointed out that the four non-aligned States which were members of the Working Group—Argentina, Egypt, India and Nigeria—had submitted a document pertaining to the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Security Council in accordance with Article 29

of the Charter in the hope that it might provide a basis for agreement. Unfortunately, however, agreement had not been reached.

44. It was a positive sign that the Working Group had singled out "important differences" between some members as the cause of the deadlock within the Group. It was also encouraging that the Working Group, while calling for greater accommodation among its members, had recognized that the existing realities must be taken into account if it was to make progress in its difficult task. In that connexion, his delegation emphasized the special responsibility of those Members of the United Nations which had reserved for themselves the power of the veto. Détente should be translated into a reality within the United Nations. The time had come for the great Powers to recognize that for a large majority of its Members the United Nations was the most appropriate place for the building of a flexible and effective system able to ensure that, when the necessity arose, the Organization would be able to fulfil its peace-keeping functions.

45. Views and suggestions regarding the conduct of peace-keeping operations should be sought from those Governments which were currently participating in such operations.

46. The notion that the Working Group should also devote attention to the consideration of specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations was very much to the point. In so doing, the Working Group would improve United Nations peace-keeping activities even further and ensure the requisite speed in that area.

47. Particular attention should also be given to the preparation of contingents, and in particular to the training of personnel to participate in peace-keeping operations. The principle of broad geographical representation should always be applied to the composition of peace-keeping forces, as the Secretary-General had recognized in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization.¹

48. His delegation endorsed the suggestion made by the Canadian delegation that the Special Committee and its Working Group should plan their work in a more functional manner. Consideration should also be given to ways of enabling particularly interested countries to participate more directly in the deliberations of the Working Group, and the latter should report more frequently to the Special Committee. Such an arrangement was all the more relevant in view of the fact that the developing countries, which accounted for two thirds of the membership of the General Assembly, represented only a minority of the 13 members of the Working Group, two of which were super-Powers.

49. Mr. ROSU (Romania) said that his delegation attached great importance to strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to fulfil the fundamental purposes of the Charter, namely the elimination of sources of conflict and tension and the maintenance of international peace and security. In that connexion, his delegation had recently submitted to the Sixth Committee a number of proposals for the improvement and democratization of the activities of the United Nations and the strengthening of its role in

achieving co-operation among all States, without distinction as to social system, in building a more just and a better world and in securing a durable peace.⁴ As was emphasized in that document, his Government attached major importance to peace-keeping operations as a significant means of ensuring international peace and security. The provisions of the Charter pertaining to such activities, however, had so far not been translated into clear rules and principles governing their effective implementation. Whenever United Nations military forces had been established in the past, their mandates had been agreed upon by the Security Council on the basis of each individual situation and without the benefit of any precise criteria established by the General Assembly.

50. In the light of such considerations, his delegation believed that the Special Committee should move forward with the preparation of specific proposals concerning the method of establishment, the powers and the legal provisions governing the operation of peace-keeping forces. All Member States should have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to participate in the establishment of United Nations military forces. The Charter should confer on the General Assembly the right to lay down guidelines for the utilization of military forces organized under United Nations auspices and should also stipulate that States parties to a conflict should agree in advance as to the national composition of United Nations forces. In view of the fact that one of the functions of United Nations peace-keeping forces was to bring the parties together and thus contribute effectively to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the prior consent of the parties concerned regarding the composition of the United Nations forces represented a fundamental factor in determining the success or failure of a mission. The experience gained through the establishment of United Nations forces in Cyprus and the Middle East could provide the Special Committee with the means to complete its mandate.

51. In its resolution 3239 (XXIX), the General Assembly had requested the Special Committee to work out guidelines for carrying out United Nations peace-keeping operations in conformity with the Charter for submission to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. It was a matter of regret, therefore, that the Special Committee had not been able to fulfil its mandate. It was, moreover, surprising that, instead of emphasizing the necessity of speeding up its work, it had intimated in its report that it might not even be possible to submit the agreed guidelines to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

52. Owing to the existing deadlock, the Special Committee had held only two meetings in 1975. His delegation took the view that the main negotiations concerning agreement on strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes should be conducted in the Special Committee itself, which should meet in normal sessions. The relatively small membership of the Special Committee should enable it to serve as a negotiating body, while working groups could be used to deal with specific aspects which, in the general view, would be best dealt with in that manner.

Participation in such working groups should be open to all members of the Special Committee.

53. Finally, his delegation agreed that the General Assembly should renew the mandate of the Special Committee in order to enable it to complete its work on agreed guidelines for carrying out peace-keeping operations.

54. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria) said that, despite the definite progress made in 1974, the Special Committee had been unable to build upon that progress in 1975. At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the United Nations had enjoyed considerable practical success in the field of peace-keeping with its forces in Cyprus and the Middle East. Why had such practical success not been paralleled by success in the search for an agreed doctrine on peace-keeping? In the view of his delegation, the stalemate in the Special Committee was due to the fact that the roles of various United Nations organs in the field of peace-keeping operations were sometimes portrayed as being in conflict with each other, an approach which was not conducive to a satisfactory solution of the basic problem. The supposed rivalry between the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the area of peace-keeping had given way to the concept of partnership; the functions of the Security Council for policy control and the responsibilities of the Secretary-General for day-to-day operational management should be complementary.

55. His delegation endorsed the opinion expressed by the Special Committee in its report that greater accommodation was required if existing differences were to be overcome and an agreement on guidelines for peace-keeping operations reached. The Working Group might therefore aim at reaching a common denominator by limiting itself to a few principles and by using broad and general wording. After all, such principles had to be not only generally acceptable but also generally applicable to all kinds of situations at different times and in different places. A pragmatic and flexible approach represented the only hope for progress; the Special Committee should therefore continue to work on basic but general guidelines to serve as a framework which could be improved as further experience was gained.

56. The establishment of UNEF, in which his country had participated from a very early stage, had represented the clearest acknowledgement to date of the collective responsibility of all Members of the United Nations for peace-keeping operations. The joint financing of the operation and the wide participation in it of troops from every regional group had been major factors in strengthening the operation and the political consensus on which it had to be based.

57. The concept of UNEF would continue to be viable as long as the political consensus existed and the financial needs were met. Unfortunate delays in payments, however, had caused considerable difficulty to the financial management of the peace-keeping operations. Despite its shortcomings, the system of voluntary financing for UNFICYP was based on the recognition of collective responsibility for financing the operation.

58. While the completion of agreed guidelines was a very important task, other aspects of peace-keeping needed to be

⁴ Document A/C.6/437 of 3 November 1975.

thoroughly examined by the Special Committee as well. The latter could consider, for example, specific questions related to the practical implementation of peace-keeping operations, including such ideas as models of arrangements with host countries and potential troop contributors, an inventory of troops and equipment to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations in case of need, and the maintenance of a roster of potential commanders of peace-keeping operations.

59. As a troop contributor, Austria attached great importance to the safety of peace-keeping troops, and had submitted a draft resolution on that subject to the Security Council, which was subsequently adopted as resolution 359 (1974). The matter was perhaps worthy of further consideration with a view to drawing up a catalogue of measures to assure the maximum safety and security of troops.

60. Training was another key to successful peace-keeping operations. Co-ordination and collaboration between different contingents created specific problems, and it might be useful to identify the main areas of friction and devise methods for ensuring smooth operations. Several international seminars had been organized in Vienna to deal with such problems, and special programmes had been developed to prepare Austrian soldiers to meet the particular requirements of international peace-keeping operations. Austria was, of course, ready to share its experience in the field of training and preparation with the Working Group should it decide to examine such questions.

61. Peace-keeping operations represented one of the pillars of the United Nations and often paved the way for the settlement of issues and the establishment of general peace. In view of the close link between peacekeeping and peace-making, his delegation would continue to support the Special Committee and its Working Group in their efforts to ensure maximum efficiency and success for those operations in the future.

62. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Dahomey) said that his delegation considered the preparation of agreed guidelines for carrying out United Nations peace-keeping operations to be a question of paramount importance. It regretted the failure of the Special Committee to complete those guidelines owing to the important differences between some members of the Working Group concerning the basic political and institutional problems involved. Hobbled by contradictions throughout the 10 years of its existence, the Special Committee had not yet been able to fulfil its mandate. Now

it was said that the Working Group needed more time and greater accommodation to overcome the existing differences and to reach agreement on guidelines for peace-keeping operations.

63. In the view of his delegation, the work of the Special Committee and the Working Group would be advanced by providing an honest answer to the fundamental question: who was responsible for creating breaches of the peace? The answer was: the neo-colonialists and the unrepentant imperialists who openly pursued their selfish interests and did not hesitate to fan local conflicts for their own purposes. An example was the Middle East, where Zionism, the protégé of United States imperialism, denied the Palestinian people the right to exist and prevented the Arab countries from regaining the occupied lands. Thus, a permanently tense situation had been created which required the presence of United Nations forces. Such was also the case in South Korea, where the continuing presence of imperialist forces caused a serious threat to the peace of the region. The hegemony of the super-Powers was the cause of such breaches of the peace as those States sought to consolidate their spheres of influence or gain new ones.

64. Once that fundamental question was answered, certain other questions which currently frustrated the Special Committee, such as the question of financing peace-keeping operations, could be dealt with in a forthright manner. His delegation maintained that those responsible for breaches of the peace should face up to their responsibilities by bearing the entire cost of peace-keeping operations. The responsibility for providing military contingents, on the other hand, could be shared on an equitable basis among all the Members of the United Nations. The acceptance of those principles would give a new direction to the work of the Special Committee and the Working Group and could lead to agreement on guidelines for the carrying out of peace-keeping operations.

65. Mr. N'DESSABEKA (Congo) pointed out that his country had never been the theatre of any peace-keeping operations, since it had always been at peace. When the representative of New Zealand had stated earlier in the meeting that his country had participated in peace-keeping operations in the Congo, he had been referring to the former Belgian Congo, which was now Zaire. His country had good relations with its neighbour, Zaire, but wished to avoid any confusion regarding the identities of the two countries.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

984th meeting

Tuesday, 25 November 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.984

AGENDA ITEM 51

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (continued) (A/10366)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. LOPEZ HERCE (Spain) said that he had already expressed regret, in the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, of which his country was a member, that that Committee had been unable to make any progress in considering the subject because some extremely complex problems had arisen. As the Special Committee had stated in its report (A/10366), there were important differences of opinion, and further substantive negotiations would be needed if the General Assembly at its thirty-first session was to be able to activate the necessary machinery to facilitate real progress on an issue which was so directly related to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. He thought that the Special Political Committee should support the work of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and adopt a draft resolution which would encourage it in its efforts to reach agreement on guidelines. His delegation would support such a draft.
3. Mr. CHAVEZ (Peru) said that the maintenance of international peace and security was one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations and recalled that, throughout its history, mankind had never been free from the dangers of conflict. Some of those conflicts had persisted since the early years of the United Nations and it must be admitted that others had been caused by the Organization itself. Conflicts between States were currently a matter of concern to all, and United Nations intervention was essential.
4. The peoples of the world had been disconcerted and disappointed to see how the great Powers attempted to settle between themselves the conflicts which had arisen between the countries of the third world, ignoring the specified task of the United Nations and forgetting the basic purpose for which it had been created. If any great-Power policy in that field was successful, the success would only be transitory and partial, because a final settlement of disputes could only be achieved through the intervention of the United Nations. Besides, direct intervention by the great Powers was only designed to serve their own interests and it was evident that only the United Nations could direct its efforts to cover all spheres.
5. His delegation had taken note of the report of the Special Committee and had listened with attention and concern to the statement made by its Rapporteur at the 982nd meeting, but shared his optimism about the possibility of overcoming existing differences of opinion. It also shared the view of the Special Committee (*ibid.*, para. 6) that the task of preparing guidelines was difficult and called for further negotiations. In that connexion, it believed that it would also be appropriate to consider a system of rotation or an increase in the membership of the Special Committee, as that would be a way of helping to resolve differences and furthermore, since the Committee had been established in 1965 only one of its members had changed.
6. Peru was keenly interested in peace-keeping operations, as could be seen from the fact that it had been one of the first to send a contingent to form UNEF in the Middle East. Moreover, the representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus was a Peruvian diplomat. Peru attached great importance to the work of the Special Committee because it believed there was a need to strengthen United Nations machinery to prevent inappropriate and self-seeking intervention by countries in the settlement of disputes. It had welcomed the policy of détente and believed that it was a means of keeping the peace, although it also felt that it was a precarious means, and difficult to maintain. It therefore considered that, in addition to promoting the economic and social development of all peoples, it was necessary to ensure that United Nations peace-keeping operations were made really effective.
7. Mr. DABIRI (Iran) said that the maintenance of international peace and security was a cornerstone of the United Nations and the Organization must be given the necessary means of accomplishing that mission. Iran's contribution to United Nations peace-keeping measures was well known. It was evident from the report of the Special Committee that no progress had been made in the preceding year on the preparation of guidelines. In his delegation's view, it was not a matter of failure but of slowness in the Committee's work, due to the extreme complexity of the task confronting it.
8. At the current crucial stage of its work, the Special Committee had no alternative but to continue to broaden the area of agreement, but it would obviously succeed only if its members were inspired by the will to compromise, to which reference was made in the report. He shared the view that the General Assembly should renew the Special Committee's mandate and request that it redouble its efforts to overcome the differences which hindered the preparation of guidelines on peace-keeping operations.
9. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) said that the fact that Canadian contingents had participated in all peace-keeping missions and that Canada had made financial contributions to each of those missions was the best indication of the importance Canada attached to those operations. Because of its

commitment to peace-keeping, his Government had been disappointed that the Working Group had failed to develop guidelines. He recalled that, at the twenty-ninth session, the report submitted by the Special Committee¹ and the content of the statements made had given cause for some optimism and, at the 933rd meeting of the Special Political Committee, the representative of Canada had expressed the hope that the differences of opinion on the respective functions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General would be overcome so that the Special Committee could achieve further progress. The situation was particularly discouraging in that the main reason for optimism remained: namely, the successful supervision of the agreements between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and Syria by UNEF and UNDOF respectively. The success of UNEF had helped to create the atmosphere in which a further important step towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East had been made possible.

10. There was no doubt that the remarkable success of the peace-keeping operations in the Middle East could be of great value to the Special Committee. The failures of the Working Group in no way detracted from the importance of the Special Committee's work. Suffice it to recall that the Committee had been established in 1965 and that during those 10 years the atmosphere of the discussions had evolved considerably. For all those reasons, and because he felt that the Working Group should devote some time to the consideration of practical questions, his Government would not wish its work to be discontinued. However, it could not assent to the continuation of the Working Group's efforts unless there was some prospect of success and improvement in its working methods. He therefore, with some reluctance, supported the Special Committee's proposal that the Working Group should continue, but only under circumstances which were likely to lead to further progress. The Group should deal first of all with problems on which there was some reasonable expectation of success, and should also change its *modus operandi*. Members of the Committee should receive documents in sufficient time to obtain instructions from their Governments and the Special Committee should meet for limited periods of time, not exceeding one or two weeks.

11. With regard to matters of substance on which there would be a reasonable expectation of success, he drew attention to a proposal on the creation of a training programme on the practical aspects of peace-keeping operations which his delegation had made at the 933rd meeting of the Special Political Committee during the twenty-ninth session. He doubted whether there had ever been such a wealth of knowledge and practical experience of the establishment and operation of peace-keeping forces, and felt that it would be a waste not to take advantage of it. His Government therefore recommended that the Working Group, in co-operation with UNITAR and the countries contributing contingents, should deal with the practical question of establishing such a training course, to the extent that available financial and human resources permitted.

12. In his view, the United Nations could avail itself of many means of participating, as it always had done, in the organization of peace-keeping operations. One such means, in particular, was the periodic meetings of representatives of Governments providing contingents; the meetings constituted effective machinery whereby the countries concerned could continue their consultations on the practical problems inherent in peace-keeping operations. Furthermore, the decisions taken at them set precedents for the conduct of such operations and, in the long run, the experience would provide the Special Committee with practical guidelines to which it could refer when formulating the principles which would govern those operations in the future.

13. He stressed that he was not proposing that the activities of the Special Committee should be discontinued, but that they should be suspended until there was a basis for their resumption in a more promising atmosphere. He reiterated the proposal his delegation had made in the Special Committee at its 66th meeting on 17 November 1975,² to the effect that the Chairman of the Committee, in consultation with the four Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, should review the situation periodically so that the work could be carried forward when conditions were more propitious.

14. Mr. JACOVIDES (Cyprus) said that there could be no doubt that the maintenance of international peace and security lay at the very foundation of the United Nations and that, since the collective security system provided under the Charter had proved ineffectual, the subject of peace-keeping operations had acquired increased importance. He was disappointed that the Special Committee had made no progress in the preceding year but he believed that the importance of its task was such that it must continue its effort, especially since more time and greater accommodation were required to achieve results. However, he found solace in the fact that in particular situations where the necessary political, strategic and financial factors were present, peace-keeping operations had come into existence under the authority of the Security Council and had answered the specific needs of each situation. Undoubtedly, that pragmatic approach had its weaknesses and created problems, particularly problems of financing, but its importance should not be underestimated.

15. In his view, many lessons could be learned from such operations; perhaps the most important lesson was that where there was the political will the operations could be successful. The Special Committee might study such topics as a better system of financing based on collective responsibility, more equitable geographical distribution of forces, and clearer lines of authority, in order to develop a more rational system. But, meanwhile, the situation was not as bleak as it might at first sight appear.

16. There were other aspects which deserved careful attention; for example, the size of the force should be such as to be effective. Moreover, the authority of the Security Council was paramount, as was the balance between policy control and operational management. At the same time, the guidelines to be agreed upon should not frustrate the

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 39, document A/9827.

² A/AC.121/SR.66.

requirements of particular situations. Another factor which should never be forgotten was that the maintenance of peace was not an end in itself and that peace must be made between the parties.

17. Cyprus, like many other small and non-aligned countries which had recently attained independence and which were militarily weak, had to rely on the United Nations and its principles for protection and, from the very beginning of its existence, it had by choice made the United Nations central to its foreign policy. Thus he hoped that the experience of Cyprus would be given due consideration by the Special Committee, since it showed both the strong and the weak points of United Nations peace-keeping operations. In his view, and he believed that many others shared that view, UNFICYP had worked well in discharging its mandate, and he took the opportunity to express his sincere gratitude to all those who had made that operation possible. It was no coincidence that the General Assembly, in paragraph 9 of its resolution 3395 (XXX), had called upon all parties to continue to co-operate fully with UNFICYP.

18. Accordingly, his delegation would support the recommendation that the Special Committee should continue its work in the hope that more substantial results could be achieved.

19. Mr. COUSTE (France) noted that the report of the Special Committee acknowledged its failure and that, despite the commendable efforts which had been made, nothing had been achieved. His delegation, for its part, had made conciliatory proposals which the opposing parties had not accepted, although they had recognized their merits. His country had tried in vain to overcome the differences between the two schools of thought whose opposition had for years held up the preparation of guidelines. However, those differences had turned out to be paradoxical and it was hard to see their *raison d'être*. Indeed, the progress of détente and the interest of all nations in the maintenance of peace should have enabled the various difficulties to be overcome, and it might have been hoped that the political developments would have led to a situation in which differences could be resolved and the theological discussions about operations whose necessity everyone acknowledged could be set aside. But what was most surprising was that the peace-keeping operations were proceeding well, as various speakers had pointed out, while no progress whatsoever was being made in the preparation of the principles which were supposed to govern them. Both in the Middle East and in Cyprus, United Nations troops had been performing their task satisfactorily under difficult conditions.

20. One might be tempted to consider that all that mattered was practical results, and putting an end to the theoretical discussions which had yielded no results in recent years. But his delegation thought that, although thus far the operations had been successful thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General and the agreement of all parties to set aside old quarrels in the interests of the effectiveness of the United Nations forces in the Middle East and Cyprus, it should be borne in mind that political conditions might be less favourable in other conflicts. The Security Council should therefore anticipate such situations by establishing rules of conduct, on the proposal of the General Assembly,

to avoid any confusion when it was necessary to act without delay.

21. Furthermore, outstanding as the efforts of the Secretariat might be, the Security Council should be able to oversee those efforts, since it had supreme authority in the matter. It was not a question of restricting the Secretary-General, since he was responsible to the Security Council and had to take the necessary initiatives. But the Security Council needed to be kept informed, in greater detail and more regularly, of the Secretariat's activities so that it could discharge its own responsibilities and place its authority behind the Secretary-General.

22. The Security Council, at the meetings at permanent-representative level, dealt with crises and the adoption of the major political decisions necessary for international security. It therefore could not give close attention to all the operational aspects of the activities of the United Nations forces. On the other hand, it would seem advisable that Governments which provided contingents for a United Nations force, and often were not members of the Security Council, should be kept better informed of the operations and have an opportunity to express their views. His delegation was thus particularly interested in the establishment of a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, under Article 29 of the Charter, which might include members of the Council itself and representatives of Governments providing contingents for the operation in question. The subsidiary organ would meet at regular intervals to consider periodic reports by the Secretariat on the progress of operations. Its function would be to study the reports, approve them by consensus or, if it could not approve them, refer them to the Council with its comments, after hearing the comments of the Secretariat. The organ need have no connexion with the study of general guidelines, which had made no progress for such a long time.

23. His delegation hoped that the success of the operations now in progress would help to narrow the area of disagreement on those important questions of principle, and that traditional differences would gradually be dispelled by the persuasive force of the facts. The pragmatic solutions adopted in the Middle East and Cyprus did not constitute jurisprudence, any more than those adopted in the past with less success. However, important lessons could be learned from them.

24. The effort should not be slackened or abandoned, but should be actively pursued. It was to be hoped that the improvement in the general political situation in the world, the satisfactory experiences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the goodwill and interest of all concerned would enable the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to make considerable progress the following year in the fulfilment of its mandate.

25. Mr. PLÁŠEK (Czechoslovakia) said that his country, one of whose representatives was a Vice-Chairman serving on the Special Committee and its Working Group, had repeatedly stated its position of principle on peace-keeping operations. At the 66th meeting of the Special Committee held on 17 November 1975,² his delegation had again stressed that its position was based on the decisive authority of the Security Council in such questions of

principle as the establishment, direction, supervision, method of financing, scope and practical functioning of the command in peace-keeping operations. If, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, it was recognized that the Security Council had supreme authority in the field of maintaining international peace and security, then it must be provided with adequate means, in other words, with the full authority to decide all questions of major importance, including the delegation of its authority or the establishment of subsidiary bodies. The Charter also laid down other important principles, such as non-discrimination among the countries contributing troops and equitable geographical representation in a given operation.

26. His delegation had always attached great importance to the question of peace-keeping operations. The issue was directly connected with United Nations activities in the sphere of maintaining international peace and security and embraced a number of politically and legally sensitive questions. Despite positive progress in the process of détente, every day showed not only that threatening conflicts must be averted by peaceful means but also that the threat of open conflicts had increased in some parts of the world in which the United Nations troops should and could play a positive role.

27. The United Nations should concentrate its efforts on the attainment of its primary goal, the maintenance of peace and security. In that regard, the decisive step would be to establish a permanent, effective and reliable mechanism within the United Nations system, based on agreed principles in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and free of any improvisation. Such a mechanism could be established and made operational only if it was based on compulsory guidelines for future peace-keeping operations. As far as the elaboration of the agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations was concerned, it was disappointing to read in the report of the Special Committee that no decisive progress had been made during 1975. Nevertheless, the positions of some countries had been brought closer together, although there continued to be important differences of principle and concept. Bearing in mind the complexity and sensitivity of the matter, on the one hand, and the importance and need for agreed guidelines, on the other, his delegation associated itself with the spirit reflected in the report. It agreed that more time and further intensive efforts were needed for the Special Committee to carry out the task assigned to it. It therefore believed that a renewal of the Special Committee's mandate was essential. The Special Committee would then have an opportunity to consider, from the point of view of their applicability, all the suggestions made during the debate of the Special Political Committee.

28. His delegation had always supported and would continue to support all efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security throughout the world. If the Committee decided to note that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had not succeeded in fulfilling its mandate, it should ask itself to what extent the United Nations as a whole had been successful in fulfilling its mandate. One would have to admit that, despite difficulties and failures, the United Nations had made a great contribution to all mankind. However, its existence would be meaningful only as long as it could guarantee the attain-

ment of the goals established 30 years earlier and set forth in the Charter. That applied to all the organs of the United Nations, which formed an integral part of the Organization.

29. Mr. KORNEYENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) observed that the favourable changes recently brought about by détente had created the right climate for the United Nations to intensify its activities in the area of peace-keeping. There could be no doubt that peace-keeping operations gave rise to fundamental problems which required careful study. The basis for peace-keeping operations was laid down in the Charter, which specified that only the Security Council could take action on behalf of the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and security. Only the Security Council could take decisions regarding the armed forces of the United Nations, their numerical strength, their role, their financing, and so forth. Strict application of those principles of the Charter was the only guarantee that the flag and the armed forces of the United Nations would be used solely to protect the Organization's interests.

30. His delegation regretted that it had not been possible to reach an agreement on the guidelines for peace-keeping operations and realized that redoubled efforts would be necessary to overcome existing differences of opinion. It shared the view of other delegations that the terms of reference of the Special Committee and of its Working Group should be renewed so that they could continue their work with a view to establishing, under the supervision of the Security Council, guidelines which were in keeping with the provisions of the Charter.

31. Mr. JOB (Yugoslavia) said that the statements made by many of the delegations which had participated in the discussion on the item constituted a veritable vote of confidence in the Special Committee. So far the verdict of the majority, which his delegation supported, was that the Special Committee and the Working Group should continue their work without interruption.

32. Yugoslavia regarded the Special Committee as the operational instrument representing the position of the overwhelming majority of Members that peace-keeping and peace-making were of constant, equal and indivisible concern to all Members and that all had a role to play in that respect. What was of universal importance must be a universal responsibility. Since the Special Committee was the only organ of the General Assembly in which all Members were represented on a basis of complete equality, its existence and activities were of extreme political significance. The suspension of its work would signify that the international community was prepared to delegate the responsibility for peace-keeping operations and other related matters to a few members. That would be contrary both to the spirit and to the trend of the contemporary world.

33. Many speakers had observed that the lack of progress in the preparation of guidelines, and even the relapse during the preceding year, although regrettable, did not in themselves justify a reconsideration of the Special Committee's and the Working Group's reason for existence. Furthermore, the Special Committee by its work helped to disseminate information on peace-keeping operations to the

Members of the United Nations, kept them informed about what was happening in areas of conflict, and thus enabled them to make a more positive contribution in the quest for solutions. It had been the eight non-aligned members of the Security Council, supported by the non-aligned movement, which, in October 1973, when the great Powers had been locked in growing confrontation, had submitted resolution 340 (1973), which not only had defused the immediate crisis but had opened up a new phase in the history of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

34. A number of previous speakers had pointed out that peace-keeping operations achieved important results in practice, but that fundamental differences of opinion remained as to the guidelines on which they should be based. He believed that the Special Committee and its Working Group might be given the task of preparing an analytical, historical and comparative report on the basic problems and features of peace-keeping operations, for deeds influenced reality far more than statements of position.

35. The Special Committee might also attend to certain practical questions connected with peace-keeping operations, such as comparative studies, manuals, and so forth. Likewise, other suggestions regarding the organization of work of the Special Committee and of its Working Group, such as a time-table of work, periodic reviews of progress and longer intervals between meetings, should be explored. The Working Group might be enlarged so as to bring its composition more into line with the realities of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee and to ensure an input of fresh ideas and experience.

36. Mr. LAY (Italy) said that the task of the Special Political Committee was, first of all, to assess the report submitted by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and to decide whether to recommend the renewal of its mandate. His delegation felt that the decision should not depend exclusively on the assessment of the results achieved by the Special Committee. Indeed, the lack of progress during the past year was necessarily related to the fact that the strengthening of the Organization's role in maintaining peace was perhaps the most difficult task of all.

37. So far peace-keeping operations had proved extremely useful, and they had been remarkably successful on many occasions. It should not be forgotten, however, that peace-keeping was an expedient that could only be used when consented to by all the parties to a conflict. Peace-keeping operations were usually organized at very short notice in response to a crisis and lacked a permanent structure. While those limitations in no way detracted from the usefulness of the operations, they restricted the situations in which peace-keeping was possible.

38. The problem of facilitating the use of peace-keeping forces was both political and practical. The requisite exercise in diplomacy and negotiation was especially delicate when there was an urgent situation to be faced. Improvisations in such matters could never be as satisfactory as a well-prepared long-term plan.

39. The lack of progress in the establishment of a more durable framework for peace-keeping operations, with

agreed guidelines, might affect the confidence of the United Nations in its ability to deal adequately with conflict situations in the future. The cause stemmed from political and constitutional obstacles which had so far stood in the way of reaching an agreement. That in itself, however, was not sufficient reason to discontinue the work of preparing guidelines, which had been under way for several years. His delegation believed that efforts to reach agreement should be continued.

40. The Italian Government's actions clearly demonstrated its support for United Nations peace-keeping operations. Italy had participated in the activities designed to make peace-keeping more effective, had actively worked in the Special Committee and had followed closely the activities of the Working Group. It was disappointed that the Working Group had still not been able to develop guidelines, for it had hoped that the draft formulas³ on peace-keeping operations could have been agreed upon in 1975. The lack of results was particularly regrettable inasmuch as, during the year, some Member States—particularly the four non-aligned States members of the Working Group—had endeavoured to narrow their differences of position and to overcome the difficulties which had arisen, particularly on the question of establishing a subsidiary body under Article 29 of the Charter. In that regard, the positions of the major Powers remained fundamentally unchanged. His delegation might understand the reasons which had prompted certain Powers to suggest that the mandate of the Special Committee be suspended until political circumstances were more propitious for agreed guidelines. However, it adhered firmly to the belief that the Special Committee should continue its work, because the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations were one of the Organization's main instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security.

41. Peace-keeping operations had thus far been remarkably successful, particularly in creating the conditions essential to the search for a lasting settlement. However, their future effectiveness could be called into question in the absence of agreed guidelines. The operations could not continue on a totally pragmatic and improvised basis; the Committee's work should be speeded up so as to formulate general principles and guidelines which could provide the Security Council with the means to act promptly in any situation which endangered international peace.

42. The experience gained could be of great value to the Special Committee, but it was now more than ever essential that Member States show the necessary political will and support the fulfilment of that objective.

43. In his Government's view, a more flexible and pragmatic approach should be adopted. Without questioning the primary responsibility of the Security Council, it might perhaps be appropriate to consider, *inter alia*, the establishment of a suitable subsidiary organ under Article 29 of the Charter. The Special Committee had before it documents and specific proposals which should facilitate the formulation of agreed guidelines, since the problems raised, however difficult and delicate, could and should be

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 39, document A/9827, annex, appendix.

overcome, particularly if it was borne in mind that it might be necessary to initiate new peace-keeping operations at any moment. His delegation therefore recommended that the Committee approve the report before it, in the hope that the Special Committee and its Working Group would be able to complete their task by the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

44. Furthermore, his delegation felt that the Working Group should improve its working methods and submit its report to its main committee more frequently. Some crucial matters should be discussed more frequently at plenary meetings of the Special Committee so that Member States could have detailed information regularly on the progress of work. With regard to the question of the competence of the Security Council, it would, in his delegation's view, be advisable for the Chairman of the Special Committee to consult with members so as to ascertain whether any of them wished to hold plenary meetings in order to state their views before convening the Working Group. Furthermore, the Working Group could devote some of its time to specific items to which members could then give their full and undivided attention. In subsequent plenary meetings of the Special Committee those delegations which were not members of the Working Group could voice their views and submit proposals. That would permit close contacts between all members of the Special Committee, a broader exchange of views and perhaps the possibility of reaching a consensus on the controversial questions more easily.

45. Mr. JATOI (Pakistan) said that the Government and people of Pakistan had always supported United Nations initiatives for the preservation of international peace, because they were convinced that the world community in general, and the developing countries in particular, needed a long period of peace and tranquillity to work together towards the establishment of a new, just and equitable order that would make it possible to eliminate all vestiges of alien exploitation in the third world and ensure a better future for its people.

46. At the same time, the members of the world community could not ignore the existence of crisis areas that obliged the United Nations to intervene to preserve peace and security. However, such peace-keeping operations, though important, would lose their essential purpose and utility if they merely helped to fossilize the *status quo* or tried to provide a substitute for the political activity needed to eliminate the causes of conflict. The long experience of the United Nations in that field and the national experience of Pakistan reinforced the conviction of the people and Government of Pakistan that the preservation of peace required an effort to keep peace wherever it was threatened and parallel action to rectify the abuses which gave rise to such threats.

47. His delegation had looked forward to progress in the preparation of general guidelines in 1975 and regretted that its endeavours as a member of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and the latter's Working Group had fallen short of its expectations. In that context, he referred to the records of the Special Committee, particularly the summary record of its 66th meeting, held on 17 November 1975.²

48. In paragraph 6 of the report of the Special Committee (A/10366), reference was made to the existence of important differences between some members of the Working Group concerning the basic political and institutional problems which needed further substantive negotiations. His delegation was confident that the members of the Special Committee were willing to persevere and that an understanding would be reached in time. To that end, the Special Committee's mandate must be extended. He therefore urged the Special Political Committee to support the suggestion to that effect in paragraph 7 of the report, as well as the idea of devoting attention to specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations.

49. Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic) said that the question of peace-keeping operations was particularly important in view of international détente and the need to find ways and means to achieve a peaceful solution to conflicts. Such operations should be carried out on the basis of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations without giving any country or geographical group special advantages or disadvantages. The United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Middle East were an example; there, the creation of UNEF and UNDOF had marked a turning-point for operations of that kind. The role of the Security Council in peace-keeping operations had finally been recognized, and the principle of collective responsibility for peace-keeping and that of equitable geographical distribution were respected. His delegation fully agreed with other speakers concerning the great responsibility of the Security Council not only for the preparation but also for the implementation, organization and control of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Given the importance of such operations, the machinery of the Security Council should be used for that purpose. It was only the authority of the Council and of the organs and committees established by it under Article 7 of the Charter that guaranteed a broad basis for the implementation of peace-keeping operations. The new guidelines to be formulated must be based on the principles of the Charter, since otherwise the Charter would be weakened and the effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for the safeguarding of international peace and security would be questioned.

50. The German Democratic Republic regretted that the Special Committee and its Working Group had not yet been able to fulfil the mandate entrusted to them and felt that only a patient and determined search for mutually acceptable solutions, based on the Charter, could lead to a positive outcome. His delegation therefore agreed with the opinion expressed in the report of the Special Committee that more time and greater accommodation were required to overcome existing differences.

51. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the thirtieth session of the General Assembly was taking place in an atmosphere that was favourable to the strengthening of peace, because the latest developments showed that détente, which was growing ever stronger, was the main feature of international relations. The principal task of the United Nations was the maintenance of international peace and security, and the Charter provided a series of instruments for that purpose, including the possibility of carrying out peace-keeping operations.

52. The Special Committee and its Working Group were approaching the task of establishing guidelines for such operations on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Charter. In that field, the main responsibility lay with the Security Council, since it was the only United Nations organ with the power to act to maintain and restore peace. The strict application of the principles established in the Charter was the only guarantee that peace-keeping operations would never be carried out to the detriment of any country, particularly the small countries.

53. Turning to the report of the Special Committee, he said that the Special Committee and the Working Group had undoubtedly tried to reach agreement on the guidelines, but their efforts had been unsuccessful. One reason was that the Working Group had not conformed as it should have done to the practice adopted by the Security Council on the subject. At its 1754th meeting on 2 November 1973, the Council had confirmed the need for the composition of troops to be based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution, and on 22 July 1975⁴ it had reaffirmed the importance of strictly observing that principle, to which the Working Group had not attached sufficient importance.

54. The work of preparing agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations was obviously complex, and more time was needed to overcome the differences and reach an agreement. The Working Group and the Special Committee should persevere in their work, adhering closely to the provisions of the Charter. Member States could then help to make the United Nations an effective instrument for the maintenance of peace.

55. Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had played an active part in the work of the Special Committee since its inception and had hoped that the guidelines on peace-keeping operations could be established during the current year. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to overcome important differences concerning basic political and institutional problems, which had been largely reflected in the Working Group's discussions on the establishment of a committee under Article 29 of the Charter. However, in recognition of the importance attached to the question by some delegations, his delegation had been prepared to afford it greater priority. It therefore deeply regretted the lack of progress on that question, since the non-aligned members of the Working Group had submitted a working paper which could have provided the basis for formulation of a satisfactory guideline. The lack of progress—which was symptomatic of more important differences—meant that there could be no easy solution of the difficulties confronting the Special Committee on the question of guidelines. The Committee had already tackled the subject in various ways, and his delegation did not believe that further progress would be made unless there was some diminution in the doctrinaire attitudes which had prevented consensus on texts which had had virtually unanimous support in the Working Group. For that reason,

his delegation attached particular importance to the penultimate sentence of paragraph 7 of the report of the Special Committee (A/10366), which stated that “effort towards this end should be continued, having due regard to circumstances likely to lead to further progress”. Given the profound and important differences between delegations and the fact that every political avenue by which they might be circumvented had proved to be a blind alley, it was useless for the Special Committee to persist such fruitless efforts. His delegation had sought a compromise and had repeatedly stated that the negotiation of guidelines would simplify both the establishment and the conduct of peace-keeping operations. It was willing to resume negotiations if they seemed likely to lead to concrete results. His delegation did not take the view that it would not be useful for the Special Committee to consider other aspects of peace-keeping, and welcomed the suggestion in the Special Committee's report that it could devote its attention to the consideration of the practical aspects of peace-keeping operations. He recalled that in 1974, at the 934th meeting of the Special Political Committee, his delegation had proposed the elaboration of a training manual for peace-keeping operations which could be used in the military training programmes of national armies.

56. If such work was to be successful, the Working Group must take to heart the remarks made by the representative of Canada earlier in the meeting on its programme of work. If there could be some improvement in that area, his delegation believed that the Working Group would have a better chance of enjoying more fruitful discussion in the future than in 1975.

57. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) said that, as indicated in the report of the Special Committee, the negotiations on agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations had reached a deadlock because of certain basic political and institutional problems. However, the current international situation merely served to confirm the urgent need for such guidelines. As a member of the Special Committee, he had already pointed out, at the 66th meeting of that Committee, on 17 November 1975, that, in view of the lack of progress, the General Assembly might decide to adopt another approach to the matter instead of automatically renewing the Committee's mandate. In his view, if the United Nations was to deal effectively with any situation that was a threat to peace, there must be constant harmony between the authority of the Security Council and that of the Secretary-General.

58. Afghanistan had always supported every effort to strengthen the Organization in matters relating to peace and security. It had therefore also supported United Nations resolutions which recognized the need for the Organization to play an effective role in peace-keeping. In his view, resolution 3239 (XXIX), in which the Special Committee was requested to renew efforts towards the completion of agreed guidelines, had been adopted on that understanding. Lastly, he hoped that the Special Committee would be able to report some progress when the item was considered by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

⁴ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1975, document S/11768.

985th meeting

Wednesday, 26 November 1975, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.985

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka), speaking as the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, introduced the Special Committee's report (A/10272) and referred to the genesis of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,¹ especially the fourth, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.² Those Conventions had been the product of the reaction of mankind to the excesses committed during the Nazi occupation in the Second World War, and it was therefore a matter of tragic irony that the first country whose conduct as an occupying Power should have come under investigation after the adoption of those Conventions was precisely Israel, whose co-religionists had been the victims of the régime of violence under that occupation. Moreover, he wished to state quite clearly that he did not in the least presume to compare the Israeli occupation with the Nazi occupation during the Second World War.

2. The fourth Geneva Convention was based on two assumptions: the first being that the occupation would be only temporary and the second, that there would be the least possible interference by the occupying Power with the life and customs of the occupied country. Unfortunately, the first of those assumptions had not been justified in the case of Israel, since the occupation of the Arab territories had already lasted for eight years.

3. He did not intend to go into detail regarding the presentation and content of the report—which spoke for itself—but stressed that the Special Committee had performed its task dispassionately and had not allowed itself to be distracted by emotional considerations. The report was based on facts and facts alone, and he challenged anyone to point to a single statement in it that could be described as a figment of the imagination. Secondly, it was based largely on information from Israeli sources, especially descriptions of facts and policy declarations by members of the Israeli Cabinet, as published in the Israeli press, and it described the situation prevailing in the occupied territories, particu-

larly as it affected the civilian population. He therefore felt that the report should be considered as an accurate and true document, and that there was no justification for the criticisms of those who had offered no co-operation to the Special Committee and had not allowed its members to see for themselves on the spot whether the Israeli press had misrepresented the policy and practices of the Government of Israel in the occupied territories.

4. When dealing with violations of human rights, it was facts alone which counted; consequently, he was not interested in the legal quibbling of those who questioned the work of the Special Committee because of its composition. Moreover, he could understand the reaction and criticisms of the Government of Israel, but not those of countries that claimed to be champions of human rights and spoke of amnesty for political prisoners and condemned atrocities committed elsewhere. It should be noted that the Special Committee did not say that atrocities were being committed in the occupied territories. It had deliberately avoided arriving at any finding on allegations of torture, because such allegations were very difficult to establish unless supported by reputable direct evidence or medical reports. The Special Committee had concentrated on aspects of the occupation that were much more serious, namely, acts and policies tending to make the occupation permanent and alter the geographic character and demographic composition of the population, such as the settlements being established in violation of the provisions of international law prohibiting such practices. The Special Committee was especially concerned about the plans for the establishment of new settlements near Jerusalem, application of a similar policy of annexation and settlement in the Gaza strip, the Golan heights, the west bank and Sinai, and the destruction of towns, as in the case of Quneitra (*ibid.*, paras. 167-171), which had been deliberately destroyed by Israeli forces before they withdrew in accordance with the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces.³ He could not accept that the exactitude and objectivity of the report with regard to Israeli settlements, the demolition of houses, and mass arrests as measures of reprisal should be questioned. That information had been confirmed by the annual report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)⁴ and by articles in the Israeli press.

5. He wished to draw the attention of the Special Political Committee to two matters. First, it had not been possible to complete the survey requested in General Assembly resolution 3240 C (XXIX) in time for the Special Com-

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

² *Ibid.*, No. 973, p. 287.

³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1974*, document S/11302/Add.1, annex I.

⁴ *Annual Report 1974* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975).

mittee to submit a complete report on Quneitra to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, because the Special Committee had been unable to find the expert assistance needed to deal with so serious a question (*ibid.*, paras. 171 and 187). The Special Committee would complete that task in the near future. Secondly, if the mandate of the Special Committee was renewed it would be necessary to strengthen the staff which serviced it. Despite the efficiency and diligence of the staff of the Division of Human Rights, it was obvious that as the volume of work increased the staff would have to be strengthened.

6. The Special Committee offered no apology or excuse for having discharged what it considered to be its duty. At no time had the work of the Special Committee been aimed at harassing the Government of Israel. The Special Committee had confined itself to performing the task entrusted to it, especially with regard to violations of the Geneva Convention affecting the welfare of the population of the occupied territories. It had been said on various occasions that the Arab population was happier under Israeli rule than it had been under Arab rule, but he himself believed that happiness was no substitute for freedom.

7. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking on a point of order, requested that the statement by Mr. Amerasinghe be reproduced in full. Secondly, supported by Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq), he moved that the debate be suspended so that the film mentioned in the report could be shown.

8. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the General Assembly at its 2353rd plenary meeting had again authorized the Special Political Committee to request verbatim transcripts of some of its meetings or portions thereof. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed that the statement by Mr. Amerasinghe should be transcribed in full.

It was so decided.⁵

9. Mr. DORON (Israel) observed that he was the next speaker on the list, and said he was opposed to his statement being deferred until the debate was resumed.

10. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Kuwaiti representative's motion to suspend the debate so that the film could be shown immediately.

The motion was adopted.

The meeting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.

11. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories had been established by the General Assembly by a unilateral resolution and had been set up under irregular procedures of doubtful legality. Its members represented countries that had no diplomatic relations with Israel and had always voted against Israel and had not hesitated from the outset to express their preconceived ideas about Israel.

⁵ The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/SPC/PV.985.

12. In a 48-page statement delivered the previous year (928th meeting), Israel had shown up case by case the way in which the Special Committee's report⁶ had misrepresented the truth. Nevertheless, encouraged by the resolutions automatically adopted the previous year, the Special Committee had produced another report (A/10272) which was no more reliable than the preceding ones. Consequently, he had no alternative but to invite the Special Political Committee to take a close look again at what was said in the report and what was omitted from it. It was of course impossible in such a limited statement to examine each allegation and, if his delegation did not mention any particular point, that did not mean that it agreed or had nothing to say on the subject.

13. Paragraph 27 (a) of the report (*ibid.*) contained the assertion that one of the unchanged aspects of the occupation was the measures of economic exploitation, in particular the use of the labour force of the occupied territories as a source of cheap labour within Israel. Anyone who had been acquainted with the conditions obtaining on the west bank and in the Gaza area before 1967 would be impressed by the improvements, or rather the transformation, which had occurred there in every sphere of life. Unemployment, which had been rampant, had virtually disappeared. The gross national product had increased in both areas at an annual rate of 18 per cent; *per capita* income had increased in eight years by 80 per cent on the west bank and by 120 per cent in the Gaza strip. Agricultural output had increased by an annual average of 12 per cent as a result of the introduction of better farming methods and the use of modern techniques, due partly to Israel's aid in field instruction. All those were Israeli "practices" which were not mentioned in any way in the report, although the relevant information was available from those same sources that the Special Committee used to denigrate Israel. Private disposable income had tripled between 1968 and 1972 and had continued to increase. Private *per capita* income had also risen at an annual rate of 12 per cent and the quality of the "average food basket" had improved in respect of protein content and other nutritive ingredients. *Per capita* consumption on the west bank had been larger in 1973 than the forecast made by FAO for 1985 for all of Jordan. The area under construction on the west bank and Gaza had increased from 88,000 square metres in 1968 to 690,000 square metres in 1974. The number of motor vehicles, refrigerators and television sets had also increased.

14. With regard to the so-called "source of cheap labour", certain facts should be noted. Arab workers from the areas administered by Israel received wages identical to those of Israeli workers with the same qualifications. They were entitled to the same social benefits in accordance with the relevant laws and collective labour agreements, but were exempt from the financial liabilities of workers resident in Israel. Arab workers had mutual insurance, insurance against work accidents, paid vacations and sick leave, severance pay and all other benefits enjoyed by Israeli workers. Arab workers who were employed in Israel through the labour exchanges of the Israeli Employment Service and who received their wages through those exchanges were statutorily protected. They were also

⁶ Document A/9817 of 4 November 1974.

protected, within the compass of collective work agreements, by the Israel General Federation of Labour. In addition, Israel fulfilled all the requirements of the relevant conventions of the ILO.

15. Although that situation was the general rule, there were some cases of unorganized employment of Arabs in Israel. In those cases, the workers concerned were in the same position as some Jewish workers who, for reasons of their own, had remained outside the regular organization of labour.

16. The workers within the areas were organized in their own trade unions there. Neither the military authorities nor the General Federation of Labour interfered in the unions' activities.

17. It was alleged in paragraph 27 (b) that prison conditions had worsened. Since that allegation was repeated automatically in every report of the Special Committee, he wished to place the relevant facts on record. Arabs from the areas were imprisoned under the same conditions as Israeli prisoners. Security prisoners were lodged separately from ordinary criminals, but in the same conditions. Following imprisonment, particulars of each security prisoner were sent to ICRC, whose representatives were able to visit prisoners and talk with them without witnesses. Many prisoners studied during their term. In addition, they received visits from their families, were allowed to write letters and were free to practise their religion.

18. All those facts had been confirmed time and again by various responsible and competent visitors, such as the Chairman of the International League for the Rights of Man and various Arab notables.

19. Paragraph 27 (d) demonstrated again that the Special Committee relied on its own earlier reports to corroborate its unwarranted allegations. The Special Committee should know that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict,⁷ did not prohibit archeological excavations and that there could therefore be no violation of the Convention, as alleged in that paragraph.

20. The Special Committee claimed that there was a continued policy of annexation and settlement, and based that assertion on a string of brief, contradictory and incomplete quotations from Israeli newspapers. They were contradictory, because a rapid reading revealed that many of them referred to the same item, but contradicted each other on important details; they were incomplete because they stopped short before the end of the article from which they were taken. The reader of the report could not become aware of those manipulations unless he obtained the complete newspaper. For example, paragraph 46 of the report stated that 1,530 families had been evacuated since 1972, but omitted to say that the Israeli authorities had spent 20 million Israel pounds on the resettlement of those people, or that their leaders and spokesmen had expressed their thanks and desire to co-operate. Paragraph 62 contained mention of a complaint by the inhabitants of a

village in the northern Golan heights, but the quotation omitted the significant fact that the villagers had not simply made a complaint but had instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Israel against the expropriation of part of their land for a nature reserve. Before 1967, such persons would not have been able to petition any court, but they could currently turn to the Supreme Court of Israel and bring actions against the Israeli authorities. That had no precedent in the history of territories administered by another State as a result of an armed conflict.

21. All the assertions in the report regarding an alleged policy of annexation and settlement by Israel were completely *ultra vires* as regards the mandate of the Special Committee. All the allegations, insinuations and conclusions of the Special Committee on that matter were as baseless and misleading as those contained in its previous reports.

22. He had already explained at the twenty-eighth session (881st and 890th meetings) the true situation concerning Israeli settlements established in the administered areas since 1967. In the first place, there were no sinister designs, as insinuated by the Special Committee; the settlements were of great importance as part of Israel's defence network, as had been proved by recent events; the number of Israelis living in the settlements represented approximately 0.3 per cent of the population of the areas, so that all allegations of physical, geographical and demographic changes were obviously ludicrous; Israel hoped for peace, and in that expectation it had refrained from changing the political and juridical status of the administered territories and thus all the suspicions and conclusions of the Special Committee were totally unfounded and outside its mandate.

23. With regard to chapter IV, section B of the report, he said that it could again be seen how the Special Committee reached its preconceived ideas and then purported to bolster them by means of misleading quotations from Israeli newspapers. Contrary to the impression conveyed by the report, the situation in the administered areas was one of progress and development, and of peaceful contacts between the local population and Israelis. Only a few weeks previously, the population had elected village councils, contrary to the desires and notwithstanding the threats of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the statement made by his delegation at the 979th meeting of the Committee, a detailed description had already been given of the situation in the administered territories. Incidents which occurred were the result of the subversive activities of terror agents.

24. The approach of the Special Committee to the cases of Dr. Hanna Nasir, of Bir Zeit College, Mr. Toubassi, member of the Ramallah municipal council, and Mr. Mustafa Milhem, Mayor of Halhul, was typical, since it assumed that those men were completely innocent and that their deportation was totally unjustified. In fact, they had been engaged in unlawful activities and their deportation had simply meant that they were being returned to the people for whom they had been acting as agents of subversion.

25. As for the quotations from the Israeli press cited in the report of the Special Committee in support of its thesis

⁷ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215.

that there had been mass arrests, he read out various press articles which had been cited, in order to show that only parts of those articles had been quoted in the report of the Special Committee while others which would have clarified the situation had been omitted. It sufficed to say that the Special Committee had not found it necessary to quote the part of those articles in which it was explained why certain persons had been arrested, and failed to mention that the authorities quickly released the majority of the suspects detained and those against whom there was not sufficient evidence.

26. In chapter IV, section C, of its report, the Special Committee used the same technique of distorting the facts and in section D, entitled "Other allegations", it had taken it upon itself to justify Arab allegations concerning the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. In that connexion, he pointed out that at the twenty-eighth session (890th meeting) his delegation had set out the relevant facts and had stated, *inter alia*, that from time immemorial Jews had resided in Hebron where they had venerated the Holy Cave of Machpela until, in 1929, 68 Jews had been brutally murdered by their Arab neighbours, while others had been wounded and the rest had been forced to flee. At the same meeting, his delegation had further explained that the resumption by the Jews of prayer in a place which was holy to them did not interfere with the right of the Moslems to worship in the same place. Once again, however, the Special Committee had arrogated to itself the right—a right which it did not have—to express its opinion with regard to the measures adopted by the Israeli authorities and had declared that they contravened article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention. The Israeli Government held that that Convention did not apply in the administered areas for a number of legal reasons and it reserved its position on the matter. In any event, the conclusion reached by the Special Committee in paragraph 182 of its report was completely wrong and was not based on any valid reason. Although the Special Committee stated in paragraph 161 that it had taken note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General (A/10204-S/11809), in which all the relevant facts were set out, it did not appear to have taken very much account of it and had again reached a postposterous conclusion.

27. The second allegation dealt with in section D was that of ill-treatment of detainees and the conclusions of the Special Committee in that respect appeared in paragraphs 183 to 185. The manner in which the Special Committee dealt with that subject was a good example of its tortuous way of thinking. For example, in paragraph 183 the Special Committee stated that it had been unable, as in previous years, to reach a conclusive finding, but it went on to say that interrogation procedures very frequently involved physical violence, and in paragraph 185, it stated that a *prima facie* case of ill-treatment had been established in the case of Mrs. El-Hawari and that it based its conclusion on the corroboration of two witnesses who had appeared before the Special Committee in 1970. He found it hard to understand how evidence given in 1970 could corroborate a complaint made in 1975 and he therefore explained to the Special Political Committee the case of Mrs. El-Hawari, who, after having pleaded guilty to some of the charges against her—because the proof was overwhelming—had been found guilty and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. As

she had been sick, she had received medical treatment in prison until she had submitted a petition asking to be sent to Jordan. Her petition had been granted and when she had arrived in Jordan she had spoken for the first time of the alleged ill-treatment to which she had been subjected during her detention in Israel, when for the five years during which she had been under treatment in Israel she had had only words of praise for her doctors. What had happened in the case of Mrs. El-Hawari was a repetition of the notorious case of Mohamed Derbaz.

28. Continuing to deal with the question of ill-treatment, the Special Committee, in paragraphs 165 and 166 of its report, mentioned other cases, all incorrect; in one of those cases the Israeli authorities had not even known of the existence of one of the people referred to, and in others the figures quoted were totally incorrect.

29. In chapter V, entitled "Quneitra", the Special Committee took note of an anti-Israeli article appearing in a newspaper published in Ontario, Canada, on 26 November 1974 (see para. 168). It could, however, have taken note of other articles published by *The Washington Post* or *The Times* of London, which were much better known newspapers and which expressed a view contrary to that quoted by the Committee. But why should the Special Committee mention anything that looked favourable to Israel? As for chapter VI, entitled "Conclusions", he did not think there was any need for him to go into details since he had already covered most of the ground.

30. There were, however, a few points which he would like to touch on, for example, the report of the destruction of houses, on which the Special Committee quoted from the annual report of ICRC, which apparently held that such destructions were contrary to the provisions of articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. In his delegation's view, the measures taken by the Israeli authorities in that respect were permitted by the reservation appearing in article 53 of the Convention and, in that connexion, he referred to the Commentary published by ICRC on the fourth Geneva Convention.⁸ In that case, too, however, it was obvious that, although the Special Committee had had the ICRC report in its hands, it had decided to overlook some very important points in that report. For example, it did not appear to have read that ICRC delegates had been allowed to speak with detainees without witnesses being present, that it was noted that the Israeli authorities complied to a large extent with ICRC recommendations, or that a medical mission had made a survey of the measures adopted by the health services of the occupation authorities to counter the shortage of medical personnel and the deterioration of equipment and hospitals. It had not even taken note of the fact that the ICRC report stated that the Israeli Government had communicated its views to ICRC and had agreed that a further visit by ICRC would take place in 1975.

31. In view of the foregoing, he wondered whether the lack of interest displayed by the Special Committee was

⁸ Jean S. Pictet, ed., *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958).

due to the very obvious fact that it was interested solely and exclusively in anything that appeared, or could be made to appear, to denigrate Israel. But the Special Committee had not confined itself to that; it had taken the liberty of expressing its views on cases which were not within its competence. He did not therefore consider that there was any need to enter into any kind of legal or other discussion and would merely categorically reject all the allegations and conclusions of the Special Committee concerning such matters.

32. He believed that at least some of those present would agree with him that the current report of the Special Committee was as unreliable as its previous reports, since the Committee had been guided by preconceived ideas, had demonstrated a total lack of objectivity and had shown itself determined to present the Israeli authorities in the most negative way possible. He did not therefore intend to speak again on the item under consideration, unless he considered it necessary to do so.

33. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that at the proper time he would make a statement referring to the evidence submitted by the Special Committee, but he wished to ask two or three questions.

34. First, in the light of what had been said about Quneitra, he would like the representative of Israel to explain what his Prime Minister had meant when he had said, according to *The New York Times* of 6 October 1975, that, in implementing the agreement with Egypt, Israel would have to pass two tests: the first would be to ensure the smooth transfer of the oilfields to Egypt, and the

second would be to try to ensure that there was not another Quneitra.

35. Secondly, in the light of the constant denial by the representative of Israel that Israel was pursuing a policy of annexation, it seemed to him that in most countries it was the relevant governmental institutions which decided government policy and not the delegations to the United Nations. Consequently, if the statements by the representative of Israel contradicted the statements of the governmental authorities, and were contradicted by the latter, he felt that there was a conflict of constitutional competence or credibility.

36. He cited statements by members of the Israeli Cabinet, reported in the foreign edition of the *Jerusalem Post* of 25 February 1975 and in *Israel Digest* of 28 February 1975, which left no room for doubt that the policy of the Israeli Government was to maintain the settlements in the Golan heights. He also cited statements by Mr. Rabin to the effect that Israel would insist on a permanent presence in Sinai and would never withdraw from the Golan heights. He also mentioned the Allon Plan, which involved the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories along the banks of the Jordan, and other statements by high-level government officials reported in *The Christian Science Monitor*. He asked whether one should believe the representatives of the Israeli Government who denied that Israel was applying a policy of annexation, or the Ministers of that Government who asserted that such a policy existed. He reserved the right to continue his reply at the following meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

986th meeting

Friday, 28 November 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.986

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (continued) (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) said that the item under discussion was another aspect of the question of Palestine which had emerged when Israel had succeeded in forcibly expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homeland in 1947 and 1948. Since 1967, Israel had been engaged in a plan aimed at altering fundamentally the physical character and identity of the territories it had occupied in that year and was still holding. The plan

entailed a process of suffocation and piecemeal absorption in which the Zionist principle was carried to its logical conclusion. Nowhere had Zionism demonstrated its racist policies more ruthlessly than in its dealings with the people and lands which were its main victims. Its practices in the occupied territories were a continuation of the policies which had led to the uprooting and dispersal of the Palestinians and they must be more fully understood in the world.

2. As in earlier years, the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/10272) was factual and comprehensive, within the limitations imposed by Israel's refusal to allow it to conduct its investigations at first hand. It did not detract from the dignity of the Special Committee that Israeli spokesmen had subjected it to continuous vilification and slander; anyone who criticized Israel's policies could expect such treatment.

3. The policy of colonization and establishment of settlements embarked upon immediately after 1967 was one of the most serious and dangerous Israeli practices in the occupied territories. Israel had been systematically and feverishly carrying out that policy, and so far over 50 settlements had been established on the west bank of the Jordan and in the Golan heights, Gaza and Sinai. The report of the Special Committee indicated that 80 new settlements would be established by the Jewish Agency in Israel and the occupied territories during the next three years. An Israeli policy-maker had observed that each settlement was carefully considered and represented Government policy. It seemed obvious that a country which followed such a calculated policy of colonization and annexation did not sincerely desire peace.

4. The ferocity with which the occupation authorities had altered the physical features of the occupied territories was matched only by the ruthlessness with which Israel had devastated the city of Quneitra. Jerusalem was an example of the policy of unabashed expansion and annexation pursued by Israel in the occupied territories. Notwithstanding the many resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and despite universal condemnation, the Zionist occupation authorities continued to sequester Arab lands inside the occupied and annexed walled city and outside it, in order to build new Israeli quarters on the ruins of demolished Arab quarters. So far, 20,000 dunams of land had been confiscated in a plan clearly and unequivocally aimed at altering the demographic, historical and cultural character of the city and destroying its Arab identity. At the beginning of 1975 the Knesset had approved a master plan of Jerusalem to annex nine towns and 60 villages inhabited by 250,000 people on the west bank to Jerusalem; when the plan was implemented, the character and composition of the city would have been radically altered. Israel had infringed upon the Islamic Waqf and had demolished many of them, as well as mosques and venerated shrines. The Sharaf quarter, which contained 600 Islamic religious properties as well as four mosques and many unique historical sites, had already been taken over. So-called excavation had been undertaken in a spirit of vengeance and provocation under and around major Islamic sites like the famous Al Aqsa Mosque. If those excavations, which had already damaged one of its interior walls, continued, they would undermine its foundations and might cause it to collapse. Those actions fitted in with the pattern of attitudes and policies of the Israeli State towards the cultural legacy and rights of the victims of Zionism under Israeli occupation. Their religious sites had no sanctity and their cultural heritage was a barrier to Zionist cultural domination. In Hebron the occupation authorities had outraged the whole Islamic world and all enlightened humanity by their ruthless encroachments on the sanctity of the sacred Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi Mosque.

5. Another aim of the Israeli authorities was the absorption of the economy of the occupied territory. The Israeli representatives gave glowing accounts of the economic life and standard of living of the occupied territories. Could occupation or usurpation of a foreign land be justified on the grounds of alleged economic benefit to a people under foreign occupation? The Israeli argument itself, however, was refuted by the facts of the economy and material conditions in those territories. Israel had taken over a

prosperous and healthy economy in the occupied territories, particularly the west bank of the Jordan, and was now absorbing and exploiting it. Industrial and agricultural activity in the occupied areas was directed to meeting the needs of the Israeli economy, and the Government actively urged Israeli businessmen and industrialists to invest in permanent industrial projects in the occupied Arab territories, offering subsidies and tax exemptions for that purpose. Against the background of the Zionist policy aimed at eroding the national identity and natural historic character of the people under occupation and the physical environment of the area they had inhabited for centuries, there was little need to cite the comparatively lesser measures taken by the occupying Power involving individuals, their liberties and their political rights. The Israeli occupation was subtle and shrewd, in addition to being well-connected in the international networks of propaganda and image-making, particularly in the Western world. However, in view of the statements at the current session of the General Assembly describing Zionism as a liberation movement and Israel as a shining example of democracy, it was not irrelevant to point out that a prominent Israeli and spokesman for human rights, Professor Israel Shahak, had stated that oppression followed naturally from Zionism and was manifested in the large number of court cases involving offences against State security.

6. The identity and integrity of the people of the occupied territories must be protected against physical dislocation and cultural strangulation and their lands must also be protected, for peace could be established only on the basis of the physical integrity of those lands and the total liberation of their inhabitants.

7. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) said that the work of the Special Committee had an important place in the activities undertaken in connexion with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and implementation of United Nations resolutions concerned with human rights, respect for national sovereignty and the right of peoples to self-determination. Through the report the United Nations offered hope to the peoples of the occupied territories and expressed its solidarity with them. The Special Committee deserved the whole-hearted appreciation of the international community because it had been compelled to work in difficult circumstances arising out of Israel's defiant attitude and refusal to allow it to visit the occupied territories, although the Special Committee's terms of reference urged Israel to allow it to enter them. Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee and its refusal to apply the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949¹ in the occupied territories were evidence of its arrogance. Its attitude had been condemned by the international community in resolutions adopted by the United Nations, UNESCO, the ILO, WHO and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and in many regional and political meetings, particularly those of the non-aligned countries and OAU. The international community had asserted that the integrity of the occupied territories and the rights of their inhabitants were a matter of international responsibility, and it must assume that responsibility.

8. In resolution 3240 B (XXIX), the General Assembly had asserted what ICRC had already pointed out, namely,

¹ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

that the fourth Geneva Convention was applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. However, Israel had stubbornly refused to apply the Convention and had not given its reasons, although it was obvious to all that its refusal was due to the fact that it was continuing to apply expansionist policies and wished to confront the world with a *fait accompli*. In implementing those policies Israel used any and every illegal method in utter disregard of all civilized values, United Nations resolutions and international instruments. The report of the Special Committee (A/10272) described Israel's actions and the consequences that could flow from them unless the international community forced Israel to heed its resolutions on the occupied territories. Article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention was obviously designed to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territories against any effort to settle those territories, but Israel disregarded the Convention and continued to establish new settlements in the Golan heights, on the west bank and elsewhere. The report also described the terrorist measures taken by the Israeli authorities to subdue the Arabs and force them to accept the occupying forces. Those measures included repression, expulsion of Arabs, demolition of Arab property and houses and the forced transfer of the civilian population in violation of the Convention. In its report² ICRC had stated that the main problem with which it had to contend was the expulsion of individuals and the demolition of houses as a result of orders issued by the Israeli authorities in breach of articles 33 and 49 of the Convention. The report had concluded that the Israelis had committed consistent and deliberate acts of despoliation contrary to the principles of human rights, and acts of repression against the peoples of the occupied territories.

9. The Israeli occupation forces had not been content with settling in those new areas, destroying villages and towns, forcibly expelling their residents and making mass arrests. They had gone even further in implementation of their policy of Judaization of the occupied territories. Israel was seeking to eliminate the Arab identity by acts against educational establishments, national leaders, and Christian and Moslem cultural sites in Jerusalem, Hebron, Sinai and elsewhere, in violation of article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention, which called for respect for religious objects in occupied territories. Israel had not contented itself with occupying Jerusalem illegally, in violation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, including those calling for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Jerusalem, but, on the pretext of Jewish history, had carried out excavations which had damaged Moslem historical sites, particularly the Al Aqsa Mosque. By such measures, they intended to alter the cultural and physical character of Jerusalem in defiance of the international community and world opinion. Israel had already desecrated the holy Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, taking over part of the mosque and interfering with Moslem ritual.

10. Such acts were part of the Israeli policy of flouting all sacred values. The Israeli occupation forces had occupied Coptic churches in Jerusalem, beaten up worshippers and destroyed sacred objects; they had constantly persecuted Arab worshippers in Sinai. Such an attitude took no

account of Christian or Moslem religious values: it involved the destruction of Arab religious sites and the plundering of the Arab cultural heritage. In an attempt to transform Jerusalem into a wholly Jewish city the Israeli authorities were suppressing the observance of all other religions. There had been an outcry from the international community over Jewish activities in Jerusalem. To illustrate the point he quoted extracts from *The Washington Post*, *L'Osservatore Romano* and *The Times* of London.

11. Archbishop Capucci had been imprisoned for standing up to Israeli aggression. The Israeli decision to annex the Arab part of Jerusalem was contrary to international law and the establishment of the District Court of Jerusalem contravened article 47 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Thus the Archbishop had been tried in a court not properly constituted under international law. The international community must take immediate action to restore the Archbishop's lawful rights.

12. Israel was persisting in its policy of annexation and occupation of Arab lands. *The New York Times* had reported that the Israeli settlements were built to be permanent and had described how Israel saw its future frontier. Statements by the Israeli Minister of Housing and the Prime Minister, which had been reported in the Israeli press and quoted in the Special Committee's report, made it clear that Israel had no intention of evacuating the settlements at some later stage.

13. United Nations resolutions and international law required that the independence and territorial integrity of States be respected. The whole world knew that Israel's activities were not conducive to peace. However, the facts had demonstrated the truth of the Egyptian Prime Minister's affirmation that Egypt would never abandon the Arab lands or the rights of the Arab peoples. His delegation hoped that the debate in the Committee would lead to tangible results and that measures would be adopted to compel Israel to heed the United Nations decisions and to make that country understand that, unless it did so, it would remain isolated in the international community.

14. The international community could not accept the continued occupation of the Arab territories, the denial of the right of the Arab peoples to self-determination, and the Israeli violations of human rights. Action must be taken to put an end to Israeli persecution of the religious communities in Jerusalem: the holy places must be protected and the detainees, notably Archbishop Capucci, must be released. To that end, all the signatories of the fourth Geneva Convention must live up to their obligations. The Arab brethren languishing under Israeli occupation demanded justice and respect for their dignity and their right to live in security, free from aggression. All who cherished the cause of peace and human values would respond to that appeal.

15. Mr. AL-GARWAN (United Arab Emirates) commended the Special Committee for the objectivity with which it had fulfilled its mandate.

16. Under customary international law the population, resources and institutions of any militarily occupied territory must be protected. Moreover, the fourth Geneva Convention specifically provided for such protection. In its

² *Annual Report 1974* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975).

six previous reports, the Special Committee had concluded that Israel had failed to live up to its obligations under the Convention, and the current report, the seventh, indicated that the situation had not changed: Israel was still violating the rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories. Proof of that situation could be found in the statements made by responsible Israeli citizens and the Israeli press which were quoted in the report. The Special Committee had marshalled evidence of the policy of mass arrests, expulsion of prominent persons and torture of detainees. The Israeli authorities persisted in interfering in the social life of the Arab inhabitants, notably by forcibly transferring some of them to other areas. Furthermore, Israel was still expropriating Arab land, expelling the inhabitants and settling Jewish immigrants in their place. In the process many Arab homes had been destroyed and the inhabitants had been terrorized. The Israeli authorities were depriving the civilian population of the means of subsistence by preventing the opening of shops and markets when there was the least resistance to the policy of occupation. They had prohibited the export of agricultural produce and imposed new taxes in order further to impoverish the Arab population. They had interfered in higher education, notably in the financial affairs of Bir Zeit College. Israel had interfered in the life of Arab tribes in Sinai and had forcibly transferred many families there to other areas.

17. If Israel persisted in its violations of human rights and disregard of its obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention, it should denounce the Convention. It was indeed strange that Israel claimed to be observing the Convention in the implementation of its measures in the occupied territories.

18. The evidence adduced in the Special Committee's report was based on statements made by responsible persons and in the press. In the light of that evidence his delegation was astounded at the attitude of some other delegations which disregarded Israel's violations of the rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories, claiming either that there was insufficient proof or that the Special Committee had not been objective. If the proof provided in the report was not enough, then what kind of proof did those delegations require? They had never answered that question and their silence indicated that they did not wish to be convinced. As to the Special Committee's objectivity, if the quotation of Israeli sources and of articles in the Western press was not objective, then what was? Perhaps the investigation should be carried out by some other body? If so, his delegation would support the expansion of the Special Committee to include representatives of those delegations. But they would reject any such proposal. Their allegations of lack of objectivity had no foundation; they were merely an element in their support of Israel's violations of the rights of the Arab population. They operated under a double standard with regard to human rights: it was perfectly acceptable for the rights of Arab and third-world countries to be violated, but any violation of the rights of other peoples brought forth a loud outcry.

19. In view of Israel's refusal to comply with the United Nations resolutions, the General Assembly should adopt a new approach: Israel must be denounced as racist, just as zionism had been denounced as a racist policy. The strictest

sanctions provided for in the Charter must be imposed against Israel in order to put an end to its racist policy towards the Arab peoples. His delegation would support any resolution designed to achieve that end. Until Israel withdrew from all the occupied territories the General Assembly would have no alternative but to resort to coercive measures.

20. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to address the Committee.

21. Mr. AQL (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) commended the Special Committee on its dedicated search for the truth; as could be seen from paragraphs 26 and 27 of its report (A/10272), there had been little change in the situation since 1974. Israel continued to deny the Special Committee access to the occupied territories and was persisting in its policy of annexation and establishment of settlements. Israeli officials made no secret of their policy; 30 new settlements were to be established in the occupied territories during 1975, while 62 settlements were reported to have been established so far (*ibid.*, paras. 31 and 32). Israel's brutal practices in the occupied territories still included the establishment of settlements, confiscation of land, the eviction of prominent local inhabitants, demolition of houses, mass arrests, and obstruction of the intellectual development and academic and character formation of young people. In paragraph 41 of its report the Special Committee gave examples of such practices in the Gaza strip, while in paragraph 76 it described Israeli settlements on the west bank.

22. It would of course be possible to dwell at length on the details of Israel's destructive and ruthless practices in the occupied territories, but, in the light of the Special Committee's reports and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, all delegations must already be well aware of the situation. Although the current report delineated new repressive trends in the behaviour of the Israeli occupying authorities, the distinctive features of the Zionist occupation of Arab lands remained the same: the perpetuation of Zionist occupation, gradual territorial expansion, systematic destruction of the Arab character of the occupied territories, demoralization of the Arab inhabitants, and the eventual absorption of Palestinian territory after the Arab majority had been either forcibly expelled or compelled to leave in search of better living conditions. Was that the behaviour of a State interested in peace and did Israel think that with the lapse of time and prolongation of its occupation it could impose its will on the Palestinian people?

23. Despite eight years of Zionist occupation and colonization the Palestinian people in the occupied territories were holding fast and even resisting within the limits of the means available to them. The latest report received by his delegation spoke of demonstrations organized by the citizens of Halhul in the district of Hebron to express their rejection of the Zionist local and civil administration plan; enemy soldiers had fired at the demonstrators and attacked them with iron shields. The report also revealed that tension prevailed in Halhul and neighbouring villages, particularly as the occupation authorities had arrested 85

Halhul high school students and six prominent citizens. Most of the students detained were being given arbitrary sentences ranging from payment of fines to imprisonment. The mass uprising on the west bank, now in its third week, was spreading daily and, as a result, the occupation authorities had closed educational institutions in the area. Since the completion of the Special Committee's report 400 people had been arrested on the west bank, and five houses had been demolished in a village near Bethlehem.

24. It was against that background—of Israel's total disregard of the will of the international community and the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people—that PLO, being the sole representative of the Palestinian people, was waging its armed struggle against racist Zionism. For over 60 years it had been confronting that racist movement which sought to extinguish the Palestinian people as a political community and occupy its territory. The Zionists insisted that the ghetto form of existence was the most natural. They countered the Palestinian offer of inclusion with exclusion, of integration with racial purity. Their ideology was at best medieval and at worst primitive. The society known as Israel was based on discredited conceptions of medieval or tribal ancestry. In its struggle for a non-sectarian democratic Palestine PLO was not struggling just to free its own people from the oppression of Zionism but also to liberate the Jews, as well as human society in general, from the evils of an ideology which was simply violent, anti-historical and regressive.

25. Mr. BENHASSINE (Algeria) commended the Special Committee for its report; the fact that it had carried out its mandate conscientiously and with integrity had been underlined by the attempt by the representative of Israel to tear the report to pieces and discredit its authors.

26. The Special Political Committee had considered the question of the financing of UNRWA during its discussion concerning the Agency (agenda item 54) at its 974th and 977th to 982nd meetings and, by force of circumstances, the debate had not been of a merely technical nature. It was in fact impossible to consider the various elements of the Palestine problem in isolation and his delegation intended to speak its mind on the item under consideration. Indeed, on a question concerning the conscience of the international community there was some point in repeating what had already been said. His delegation was fighting for justice and it would not accept any argument that its method of proceeding was not the best means of gaining that objective, or that violence was to be condemned no matter what its origins, or that it should merely deplore rather than condemn.

27. While the Committee was indulging in its academic debates Palestine continued to suffer the martyrdom to which the international community had condemned it 27 years earlier, supposedly in the interest of a humanitarian principle. Now the representative of Israel was saying that it had been in the interest of civilization. The history of the world demonstrated what crimes could be committed with impunity in the interest of civilization and in the interest of peoples. The Palestinians could say whether Israel's civilizing mission fulfilled their hopes and whether their body could accept the new organ which had been grafted on to it despite the fact that they had been in good

health. The Palestinians could say whether they were happier now that they had been dispossessed of their homes, their possessions and their land and were living in conditions which shamed the international conscience. They could also say whether they felt better, whether the health of their old people, their women and their children was better since the napalm bombs had been falling on them and since they had been subjected to the most degrading tortures.

28. If he considered it necessary, the Israeli representative would not fail to repeat what he had recently said, that Zionism had been the deliverance of Palestine and had brought happiness and well-being to its population, quoting the example of Gaza as proof. The Palestinians, however, would call that happy Israeli peace a Roman peace and the inhabitants of Quneitra might have been tempted to say that it was the peace of the grave, if, in fact, the graves of Quneitra had been left in peace.

29. Cato had said that Carthage must be destroyed. The Israelis had said that if the Arabs wanted Quneitra, they might have it, but it would be destroyed, and had kept that criminal promise. Not only the town but also its human riches had been completely destroyed. Quneitra would certainly be rebuilt and would live again, but its tombs had been violated and its holy places were in ruins. Even the city of holy peace, Jerusalem, had been profaned, its Christian and Moslem holy places robbed and handed over to the tourists. It was an irony of fate that the land of peace should have been defiled, a peaceful people oppressed and humiliated, a 2,000-year-old civilization profaned by centuries guided by a racist, criminal doctrine, in the name of an ancient religion whose spiritual and moral values were undeniable. Members of the Committee could discuss the matter calmly because they had not suffered like the Palestinians, but the Palestinians would not await the result of discussions in the United Nations. Their reply was to fight until final victory. They would not tolerate pity for their lot or condemnation of their actions and even less would they tolerate advice on their conduct. They were present at the discussion to tell the Committee yet again that they would never cease fighting.

30. Algeria was a sovereign State, an esteemed member of the United Nations, due to a national liberation struggle which had lasted eight years and had entailed immense sacrifices. The Algerians had fought a colonial situation and therefore recognized their own struggle in the struggle of the Palestinian people. It was ironical that the United Nations should have created the colonial State, Israel, at the very time when the Charter had set forth the principle of decolonization. Rebellious, ungrateful children existed at all times, but it was to be wondered whether Israel would ever become adult.

31. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he wished to continue the statement he had not had time to finish at the previous meeting. The Israeli representative had dwelt at length on the beneficence of the Israeli occupation policy and authorities towards the population of the occupied territories, especially their economic life. It almost seemed that the Israeli authorities were part of UNRWA, their sole purpose being to feed and care for the welfare of the

population of those territories. The Israeli representative's statement illustrated the extent to which statistics, assumed to be honest and accurate, could be so manipulated as to serve to disguise the truth rather than to illustrate it. He wished to focus on one particular aspect of those statistics, the one which for the Israeli representative seemed to constitute the main part of the alleged benefits of occupation, namely the provision of work in Israel for the inhabitants of those territories. The Israeli representative, however, had omitted to say that labour from the occupied territories was used purely to remedy economic problems in Israel itself and employment depended entirely on fluctuations in the Israeli labour market. As the workers from the occupied territories were engaged on a daily basis, whenever there was a slowdown in the Israeli economy, they became unemployed, however great their need to work. The Committee had been told that those workers received equal pay, but not that the overwhelming majority—sometimes up to 95 per cent—were employed on manual work which the Israelis themselves did not wish to do. They therefore received equal pay for that type of work, which was lower than the average of workers' wages. Nor had any reference been made to the problem of child labour, which had even caused an outcry in Israel itself. No mention had been made of the harmful social and political effects in the occupied territories, the dislocation of labour and weakening of agriculture in those territories, which in a sense served Israel's own purpose.

32. However, even assuming that all that economic information was accurate, that there had been a real improvement in the economy of the occupied territories and that Israel's motives were purely altruistic, two important questions arose. The first was whether economic well-being could be an acceptable substitute for the enjoyment of dignity and freedom which was the birthright of the population of the occupied territories. The second, and even more serious, was whether catering for economic well-being could be used as an argument to justify depriving the population of those territories of all other aspects of well-being, particularly the enjoyment of self-determination, freedom and dignity. If the representative of Israel had been speaking at a fund-raising rally, those arguments might have been received without much scepticism, but he was speaking in the United Nations, where half the members belonged to countries that had rejected the colonialist argument that economic happiness was a substitute for freedom. That argument called to mind the statement by the South African representative at the 1800th meeting of the Security Council in November 1974,³ when he had first denounced the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* as being one-sided, uniformly hostile to South Africa, often completely unsubstantiated and emanating from persons and bodies known for their biased opposition to South Africa's policies. That statement was almost exactly the same as that made by the Israeli representative at the previous meeting, concerning the report of the Special Committee (A/10272). The representative of South Africa had also referred to the number of black workers from other African countries who voluntarily sought employment in South Africa, the vast sums spent on providing virtually free medical service to

blacks, the increase in school enrolment for black pupils and the sincere attempts by his Government to improve and develop the economic, social and political conditions of all people in South Africa. Members of the Committee should compare those themes with those invoked by the Israeli representative and ask themselves whether their similarity was pure coincidence.

33. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had hoped not to participate further in the discussion on the item, but the representative of Kuwait, under the guise of exercising the right of reply, had attempted in his usual insidious way to twist certain statements by the Israeli Prime Minister and other Israeli ministers and to give their words a sinister meaning and intention contrary to their true content. What the Prime Minister had said concerning the return of the oil fields to Egypt was that Israel would see to it that they would be returned in a manner which would preclude subsequent false allegations against Israel, as had happened concerning Quneitra. That was why he had said that there should not be another Quneitra.

34. There was likewise no contradiction or discrepancy between the statements by Israeli leaders concerning settlements in the Golan heights or Sinai and what he himself had said at the Committee's preceding meeting and earlier. There was no policy of annexation. There had been no change in the political and juridical status of the administered areas and the options for a negotiated peace remained open.

35. The so-called "questions" of the representative of Kuwait were not genuine questions which merited a reply, but purely malicious. The spokesman of a country which did not yet accept the right of the State of Israel to an independent and sovereign existence and which referred to that country on its radio as "Zionist gangs" was not a valid interlocutor on any subject concerning Israel.

36. His own replies to the Arab spokesmen had been given in his statement at the preceding meeting. Their baseless allegations contained nothing which deserved an additional detailed reply. However, he wished to voice the strong protest of his delegation against the irresponsible and malicious allegations made by the representative of Jordan at the current meeting, especially concerning religious matters. They were reminiscent of the fulminations of the Mufti of Jerusalem, as a result of which the ancient Jewish community of Hebron had been put to the sword. Furthermore, it ill behoved the representative of the country which during the 19 years of its illegal occupation of the old city of Jerusalem had deliberately destroyed and obliterated 34 of the 35 ancient synagogues and desecrated the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Discussing those desecrations, Mr. Eban had said in the United Nations on 4 July 1967⁴ that they were not the result of the recent fighting but the consequence of a policy adopted by the Jordan authorities over the past 20 years. That had been confirmed by the commander of the Jordanian forces that had seized the old city of Jerusalem in 1948, who had written in his memoirs, published in Cairo in 1959, that the

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, 1800th meeting.*

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1547th meeting, para. 94.*

operations of calculated destruction had been set in motion. That destruction had continued throughout Jordanian rule in Jerusalem. In 1966, for example, the Jordanian newspaper, *Falastine*, had reported that ancient memorial buildings in the old city had been destroyed and replaced by modern ones and commercial competition had even reached the Mount of Olives, where construction had been prohibited in the past. Furthermore, in open violation of its express obligation under the General Armistice Agreement with Israel of 1949,⁵ for the first time since the Roman conquest Jews had been prevented by Jordan from going to the Western Wall and from using other cultural, educational and religious sites, including the Mount of Olives and the humanitarian and educational institutions of Mount Scopus.

37. On the other hand, Israel's record concerning respect and consideration for the religious values and institutions of non-Jews spoke for itself and had been attested to by countless religious dignitaries of every persuasion, including Moslems. The Chief Imam of the Jordanian Army, after visiting the administered areas and Israel a few months earlier, had written in the visitor's book that he was full of admiration for the freedom of religion he saw there and the way Haifa mosque was kept and had expressed his hope that the Arab cities and Israel would henceforth know only peace and tranquillity. He wished to associate himself with that statement.

38. With respect to the Algerian representative's reference to the famous quotation from Cato, reference to Cato was also made in a book published by the Jordanian Ministry of Education and Instruction, which said that Arab boys and girls must cling to the slogan "Israel must be destroyed", as Cato had said about Carthage.

39. In a statement sent by 53 Christian and Moslem religious leaders and clergy living and working in Israel to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights after the adoption of its resolution on 21 February 1975 (6 B (XXXI))⁶ expressing concern at the alleged desecration of Moslem and Christian shrines, they had completely rejected those charges. They had said that the inviolability of the holy places was guaranteed by Israel's Law on the Protection of Holy Places, 5727 of 1967, and thousands of pilgrims who visited those holy places could testify to the care with which those shrines were protected. They themselves were qualified to deny the charges regarding the treatment of Christian and Moslem religious leaders. The Government of Israel had at all times behaved with courtesy and consideration towards them. The resolution implied that freedom of worship and protection of religious shrines and personalities did not exist. The truth was, however, that only since 1967 had all religions been free to worship at all the holy places in Jerusalem.

40. Another letter of protest had been sent to the Commission by the Executive Secretary of the Ecumenical Theological Research Fraternity in Israel expressing his shock at learning of the resolution and stating that the

allegations contained in it were groundless: his organization's observation over the years confirmed that Israel had consistently ensured freedom of worship and respected and protected the religious shrines and personalities of all three monotheistic faiths in Jerusalem; it was untrue that that had been done by all authorities throughout the centuries—for example, from 1948 to 1967, Jewish worshippers had been denied freedom of access to pray at the Western Wall; regarding the case of Archbishop Capucci, his organization repudiated the accusation of arbitrary imprisonment and ill-treatment and was convinced that he had received a fair and open trial.

41. After visits to Israel, the Head of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey, the Patriarch of the Russian Church in the USSR and the Philaret of East Berlin and Central Europe had all expressed satisfaction with the state of the holy places. It was perhaps not strange that all those reports in the *Jerusalem Post* had escaped the attention of the Special Committee.

42. With respect to the false allegations made by the representative of Jordan with regard to archeological excavation in Jerusalem, the French writer, Simone de Beauvoir, had stated in April 1975 that the excavations in Jerusalem were doing nothing to endanger the Arab part of the city and the research was in fact making a great contribution to universal culture by shedding light not only on the sources of Jewish culture but to a large extent on the roots of Moslem culture also. It was clear that the wording of the Commission's resolution was no more than a pretext. Arab Jerusalem had impressed her as a well-cared-for city, receiving serious attention from the municipality.

43. The representative of Jordan and other Arab representatives should be ashamed to make base and false allegations. The vicious diatribes against zionism voiced by Arab delegates might give the Committee the impression that while the rest of the world supported the Jewish national liberation movement, the Arab world was always hostile to zionism. That was not the case. Arab leaders had recognized the rights of the Jewish people and had fully endorsed the virtues of zionism. The leader of the Arab world during the First World War had written on 23 March 1918 in the daily paper of Mecca that he recognized that for the Jews streaming into Palestine from all parts of the world, the country was, for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland. His son, who had represented the Arab world at the Paris Peace Conference, had stated on 3 March 1919 that the educated Arabs especially looked with deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement and wished the Jews a hearty welcome home; they were working together for a reformed and revised Near East, and the two movements complemented each other; Zionism was national and not imperialistic. There was room in Syria for both and neither could be a success without the other.

44. Arab sentiments might have changed, but such a change could not alter historical truth as stated by prominent Arab leaders who were the ancestors of the Hashemite King of Jordan.

45. Mr. AL-SAYEGH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Israel had been

⁵ Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1.

⁶ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 4, chap. XXIII, sect. A.

understandably disconcerted by his questions. He would therefore ignore his intemperate remarks and personal abuse and concentrate on the substance of his statement. He had said that Israel had no policy of annexation but facts documented at the highest level stated the exact opposite. A policy was being implemented to establish settlements which the highest officials of the Israeli Government said were to remain part of the Jewish State, from which Israel would not withdraw. Everyone knew that East Jerusalem had been formally annexed by Israel, which was a contradiction of the Israeli representative's statements at the current and past sessions of the General Assembly. Although he had said that the juridical status of those territories had not been changed, courts applying Israeli law had been established in the occupied territories. Jewish emigrants sent to settle in the occupied territories were entitled to vote in Israeli elections. All those were acts of annexation, at least in the areas where settlements had been established, and showed that annexation was a fact and not mere conjecture.

46. With regard to Quneitra, he himself had not twisted the statement by the Israeli Prime Minister. He had quoted its objective interpretation by a United States news agency as a tacit admission that Israel had destroyed that town. It was true that the Israeli Prime Minister had subsequently authorized his office to issue a statement saying that he had made no such admission, but had merely meant that Israel wanted to make an orderly withdrawal from the oil fields in order not to leave itself open to similar accusations from Egypt. That in essence was what the Israeli representative had also said but it did not tally with the Prime Minister's initial statement, which was that Israel was facing a test. Surely he would not have used that word if he had been referring to alleged fabrications by the Syrian Arab Republic and Egypt. On 4 September 1975, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency had issued yet another interpretation: that although it had initially been denied by Israel, it had subsequently been learned that property in Quneitra had been destroyed without the knowledge of the Israeli authorities. It was that multiplicity of interpretations that had led him to ask the Israeli representative how he interpreted that very important statement by his Prime Minister.

47. Mr. GAMMOH (Jordan), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he would not refute the silly statement by the Israeli representative in detail. Israel's action in the occupied territories was familiar to the Committee and the world at large. However, with regard to the destruction of synagogues by the Jordanian Army in 1948, it was an accepted fact, which the Israeli representative well knew, that synagogues and churches had been destroyed in 1948 as a result of war and not deliberately. The only holy places deliberately destroyed and robbed were mosques and churches in the territories under Israeli occupation. With regard to access to holy places, it was also known to the Israeli representative and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine that Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic had expressed the wish that all people of all religions should have such access, but Israel had refused to allow that on the usual pretext of security. The reference to Jordan's occupation of Jerusalem was ridiculous. Jordan had never occupied the old city of Jerusalem but, when it had been part of Jordan, it had been kept intact and all people had been allowed to visit the holy places. The documentary film shown to the Committee in the course of the preceding meeting had given some examples of Israeli democracy and of the way it destroyed houses to build accommodation for Jews from all over the world. Those facts were described in the report of the Special Committee (A/10272), which gave the Committee more information than the Israeli representative could by twisting facts.

48. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the attempt by the representative of Jordan to deny historical facts was pathetic. It could not be considered "silly" to quote a statement by the Commander of the Jordanian forces, when describing the capture of the old city of Jerusalem in a book published in Cairo, that the operations of calculated destruction had been set in motion.

49. Mr. GAMMOH (Jordan) said that destruction of property was acceptable during war, but ever since 1967 the Israeli authorities had been deliberately demolishing houses, churches and mosques.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

987th meeting

Monday, 1 December 1975, at 3.35 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.987

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*continued*) (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. NEYTCHEV (Bulgaria) said that the General Assembly had recently concluded its consideration of the question of Palestine and had adopted new resolutions recognizing the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the fact that the attainment of those rights was an indispensable requirement for peace in the Middle East

(resolutions 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX). A burning issue was involved, which could not be reduced merely to the question of refugees, for it was part of the Middle East problem, a consequence of Israeli expansionism.

2. The report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/10272) contained proof of the violations of the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by Israel. The occupation of those territories since 1967 was in itself a violation of human rights. Although the Government of Israel had not permitted the Special Committee to enter the occupied territories, the Committee had gathered proof demonstrating that human rights had indeed been violated.

3. The Special Committee had indicated that the prevailing situation in the occupied territories had not changed. The population continued to suffer from the consequences of the occupation, which the Bulgarian people understood very well, since they had been the victims of a similar situation.

4. The Israeli Government had accelerated the implementation of its policy of annexation by building settlements in the Golan heights, Sinai and on the west bank and by altering the demographic composition of the occupied zones. The situation which had prevailed since 1967 continued to be a cause for concern; it had had a particular impact on young people, whose feelings of indignation and rage were increasing. Consequently, the number of incidents and arrests had also increased.

5. The population of the occupied territories continued to be economically dependent on Israel, which exploited it as a source of cheap labour. Plundering, including the plundering of the archaeological and artistic heritage, was also continuing, causing great indignation.

6. The Special Committee had been unable to complete its report on Quneitra on time; however, there could be no doubt that its destruction had been a deliberate act. Such acts were particularly disquieting because they reflected Israel's policy of annexation and the policy of the "fait accompli", which made it very difficult to reach a settlement on the Middle East problem.

7. His delegation agreed with the Special Committee that the occupying Power continued to behave in the occupied territories and to act towards the population of those territories in flagrant violation of the basic rights of the above-mentioned population and in defiance of relevant international conventions, and that the termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population of the occupied territories (*ibid.*, paras. 188 and 189). A just and lasting solution could be reached only with the withdrawal of Israel and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish their own State.

8. Now more than ever, it was essential to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference in order to find a definitive solution to the Middle East problem. The Palestine Libera-

tion Organization (PLO) should participate in that Conference on an equal footing.

9. Mr. GREGORIADES (Greece) said that his delegation had not been surprised by the report of the Special Committee, since the practices reported were part and parcel of military occupation and a deplorable anomaly inherent in the anomaly of military occupation. The occupation forces continued to deny the Special Committee access to the occupied territories, a fact which increased apprehensions concerning the situation.

10. The most serious question dealt with in the report was the policy of annexation and settlement carried out by virtue of the presence of the occupying military forces. The policy of population replacement ran counter to articles 47 and 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention¹ and to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and had therefore been strongly condemned by the international community.

11. Military occupation entailed opposition to all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; foreign military occupation was a denial of the very reason for the establishment and existence of the United Nations.

12. His delegation deeply deplored not only the practices resulting from the military occupation of the occupied territories but also the fact that those practices were being applied by a people which had suffered immensely throughout its long history. It was an anomalous state of affairs in more than one respect, a deplorable and dangerous chain of reactions.

13. Lastly, he said that on earlier occasions the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations had clearly stated the position of the Greek Government on the entire question of Palestine and the Middle East.

14. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Dahomey) said that the seventh report of the Special Committee (A/10272), like the reports it had submitted earlier, was an objective, clear and precise document, and he praised the members of the Committee for having conducted their work impartially.

15. The Israeli practices in the occupied territories—namely, the application of a policy of colonization and annexation, arbitrary mass arrests, inhuman conditions in prisons and other places of detention, banishment and expulsion, and the exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories—were flagrant violations of the human rights of the population.

16. Those Israeli practices would only step up the struggle against zionism, which was rightly considered a form of racism. The struggle against zionism must be intensified at all levels in order to compel Israel to implement the decisions of the United Nations, to withdraw from the territories it occupied by force and to recognize the Palestinian people, whose sole representative was PLO.

¹ Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

17. The inhuman practices of Israel in the occupied territories should be unanimously condemned by the international community.

18. Mr. SIBAH (Syrian Arab Republic) commended the Special Committee for the excellent work it had carried out despite Israel's refusal to allow it to enter the occupied territories, a refusal motivated by a desire to hide other more revealing proof of one of the most obnoxious crimes in history. That position of Israel was not surprising, for Israel had flouted the Charter, international agreements and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and did not abide by United Nations resolutions. The Israeli representative had attempted to justify that position by stating that the members of the Special Committee were nationals of countries that had severed diplomatic relations with Israel; however, at least two of those countries had had diplomatic relations with Israel at the time of the Special Committee's establishment in 1968. Moreover, the mission of the Committee had been entrusted to it by the international community, to whose will Israel should have bowed. It should also be recalled that Israel had refused to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General sent pursuant to Security Council resolution 259 (1968), a group of experts sent by the Commission on Human Rights to investigate violations of the Geneva Convention, and the mission authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 298 (1971) to investigate changes in the status of Jerusalem.

19. It was therefore obvious that the report of the Special Committee was the only vehicle whereby the international community could learn about Israeli practices in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories. That impartial report had exposed the imperialist, expansionist and colonialist sides of Israel, which confiscated properties and annexed territories to build settlements in the occupied territories. Those plans violated basic human rights and international law, in particular, the fourth Geneva Convention and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.²

20. The Israeli authorities persisted in destroying the Arab archaeological heritage in the occupied territories or in eliminating its Arab character. A case in point was the excavations by an Israeli archaeological mission to the west of the wall surrounding the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem: three Omayyad palaces had been discovered, and it was planned to demolish them. In a note verbale, dated 26 September 1975, his delegation had given the information to the Secretary-General and had asked the United Nations Secretariat, in consultation with UNESCO, to put an end to the destruction of the archaeological treasures of Arab civilization (A/10286). An international archaeological mission, recognized by the Arab side, could prepare a study to stop the implementation of all Israeli projects which affected those treasures in any manner.

21. The Special Committee's report also described the economic exploitation of the occupied territories, which the Israeli representative saw as constituting "reforms", whereas in fact it was merely a source of cheap labour for Israel. The report likewise revealed the retaliatory, oppres-

sive and terrorist measures and Nazi methods—administrative detention and mass arrests and military tribunals—used by the Israeli authorities to exert pressure on the nationalist elements. Paragraph 106 of the report gave a clear example of such repressive measures.

22. The report also revealed a bleak picture from the spiritual and religious angle. The measures taken with regard to the Ibrahimi Mosque—designed, according to the Israeli authorities, to permit its use by both Jews and Moslems—in fact constituted a violation of the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention.

23. It was necessary to examine the seriousness of the Israeli practices not only in relation to the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also with respect to the Geneva Conventions,³ which Israel had signed but then rejected, especially the fourth one. Israel's rejection of the fourth Geneva Convention was an attempt to free itself from its guilt complex for its inhuman practices and provided additional proof of its criminal intentions and its disregard for international resolutions and international law.

24. His delegation drew attention to the conclusion reached in the report that it was essential that the United Nations change its attitude with regard to the occupation problem. It was high time for the international community to think seriously about the possibility of imposing international sanctions in all fields against the Zionist racist entity existing in Israel, according to the provisions of the Charter, and for a time-table to be established for the implementation by Israel of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for an end to the occupation and aggression and for recognition of the inalienable rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

25. There were grounds for optimism in the fact that the United Nations had condemned the Israeli Zionist and racist presence in the occupied Arab territories and called for an end to the occupation and for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

26. In paragraph 33 of the report, an article in an Israeli newspaper was quoted; according to that, 800 million Israel pounds had been invested since 1967 in building settlements in the occupied territories, 44 settlements had been built and eight others were under construction. Since the Israeli representative had stated that Israel practised no policy aimed at expansion, settlement of territories or annexation, it might be wondered why all those settlements were being built and whether the territories were Arab or Israeli. Judging by the words of Prime Minister Rabin, who had said during a visit to the Golan heights that Israel would not have established those settlements if it was to withdraw from them later on (*ibid.*, para. 63), the settlements seemed to have been built with the sole aim of perpetuating the occupation. Similarly, the Israeli Minister of Housing had stated that the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories was the biggest settlement project since the creation of the State of Israel and that those settlements

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

were of vital importance not only for defining the boundaries of the State but also for strengthening its security (*ibid.*, para. 64). Moreover, the Defence Minister had stated that Israel would not relinquish the settlements built on the Golan heights even after negotiations (*ibid.*, para. 70). Those statements were merely a sample of many statements by Israeli leaders.

27. With regard to Quneitra, he hoped that the Special Committee would soon complete its investigation so that the United Nations would have decisive proof of one of the most obnoxious crimes ever perpetrated by foreign occupation forces. Israeli officials were currently denying the statements made by their Prime Minister to the correspondent of *The New York Times* in September 1975 when he talked of Israel facing two tests in its agreement with Egypt, the first being the systematic transfer of the oil fields to Egypt and the second that there should not be another Quneitra. Israeli officials were currently trying to justify the statements and saying that they knew nothing about the destruction of Quneitra or that their instructions had been misunderstood, although that would not free them from responsibility. In that connexion, he thanked the representative of Kuwait for his explanation at the previous meeting, clarifying the statement made by the Israeli Prime Minister in that regard. Israel claimed that the destruction of Quneitra had been the direct result of the acts of aggression perpetrated by the Syrian Arab Republic at various periods since 1967. The falsity of that allegation was demonstrated by the very scope of the destruction of Quneitra.

28. In its resolution 3336 (XXIX), the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. It appeared from the report of the Special Committee that the expert responsible for investigating the question of the destruction of Quneitra for the survey requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 3240 C (XXIX) had not completed his investigation. However, he had given oral evidence before the Special Committee (*ibid.*, chap. V).

29. In that connexion, the Syrian representative felt it was useful to draw attention to the fact that the total value of damage and losses suffered by the Syrian Arab Republic amounted to \$7,019,209, in addition to an annual loss valued at \$184 million since 1967 due to the loss of agricultural land. It sufficed to note that the losses resulting from the destruction of Quneitra and the agricultural damage resulting from the occupation of the District of Quneitra, in addition to the looted archaeological treasures and the assistance provided to the refugees since 1967, amounted to \$9,096,660.

30. The film shown at the 985th meeting reflected the historic tragedy of the City of Jerusalem and the Palestinian people. He hoped that the Special Committee would also give the Special Political Committee the opportunity of witnessing the destruction and damage caused by Israeli occupation forces in the Golan heights and Quneitra.

31. The most odious example of Israeli practices in the occupied territories was the case of Archbishop Capucci, who had been tried in a court that was not properly constituted under international law, as stated in the report of the Special Committee (*ibid.*, para. 186), and imprisoned on the basis of false charges.

32. The United Nations must continue its efforts to restore peace to the land of peace, to restore the sacred rights of the inhabitants of Palestine—whether Jews, Christians or Moslems—and to put an end to occupation and aggression, and take the necessary steps to ensure that the Charter was respected.

33. Mr. FEZZANI (Tunisia) recalled that in his statement at the 985th meeting the Chairman of the Special Committee had stressed the desire of the members of that Committee to submit a report based on irrefutable facts and information from Israeli sources. The report was indeed based on statements by high Government officials and other Israeli leaders and on articles published in Israeli newspapers, and all those sources confirmed the intention of the Israeli authorities to pursue and intensify their policy of partial or total settlement and annexation of the occupied Arab territories.

34. The film on Israeli practices in Jerusalem had provided the Special Political Committee with confirmation of the scope of the demolition operations in the occupied territories and the speed with which the inhabitants of those territories were expelled so that foreign Jewish immigrants could take their place. It was obvious that those changes and population movements were carried out in accordance with a planned policy designed to alter the physical and demographic character of the occupied Arab territories.

35. Since its establishment, Israel had consistently seized every pretext to implement its policy of hegemony and expansion. Arab inhabitants were expelled, Jewish settlers were installed, campaigns were organized to attract Jews from all over the world, and housing and industrial areas were established for the use of the new immigrants. Those changes had not even spared holy places, especially Moslem holy places. Moslems were submitted to arbitrary regulations which endangered their right to practise their religion freely. In those circumstances, it was understandable that the number of Arab political prisoners in Israel was constantly increasing. Nor was it surprising that those prisoners should be subjected to mistreatment, since the Zionist authorities could not be expected to have the slightest respect for the human person or human rights.

36. In his various statements, the representative of Israel had confined himself to making virulent attacks on the members of the Special Committee and then to defending the virtues of colonization. He had spoken, *inter alia*, of the rise in the living standard of the Arab population of the occupied territories, which was, to say the least, absurd. His language was strangely reminiscent of that which had been used by the colonial Powers to justify their domination. For the rest, the representative of Israel resorted to arguments which only the racist régime in South Africa currently ventured to use. He might think that in that way he could prevent Member States from condemning Israel's

colonialist policy. However, it was clear that that country could not escape the condemnation of history.

37. There was reason to believe that the Government of Israel would not put an end to those violations of human rights as long as it continued to occupy Arab territories, since that was the crux of the problem, nor did it appear to have given serious consideration to evacuating those territories. Accordingly, it was the duty of the United Nations to put an end to Israel's expansionist ambitions in conformity with the Charter. In that connexion, he recalled that the General Assembly of the World Jewish Congress, which was dominated by representatives of the World Zionist Organization, had been held in Jerusalem in 1975. The United Nations had a special responsibility towards the population of the occupied territories and could not remain indifferent to the flagrant violations of the Geneva Conventions and other international instruments. The Israeli authorities, for their part, should realize that membership in the United Nations imposed obligations upon them and that they could not continue to disregard the trend in international relations. They were greatly mistaken if they felt that they could erase centuries of history and pursue a colonialist policy of hegemony and expansion in an era of co-operation and détente.

38. Mr. KAPLLANI (Albania) said that the systematic policies of terror, violence and destruction pursued by the Israeli invaders in the occupied Arab territories was entirely consistent with the expansionist ambitions of the Tel Aviv ruling circles, which were seeking to break the will of the Arab peoples by means of terror.

39. The Albanian people, who unswervingly supported the just cause of the Arab peoples, denounced the expansionist and aggressive policy of the Israeli Zionists, who, with the support of the two super-Powers, were doing all they could to denationalize and annex those territories, while they denied the Arab peoples in general and the Palestinian people in particular their inalienable right to recover their usurped lands.

40. The Israeli Zionists proclaimed their desire to solve the question of the Middle East in a "peaceful way", but developments there proved the falsity of their words, since the Israeli Zionists were continuing the aggression and violence they had institutionalized and had no intention of abandoning. They were using every means available to them to displace the Arab population: torture and persecution, arbitrary detention and the destruction or confiscation of their property. As if that was not enough, the Zionists were trying to justify themselves by resorting to neo-Nazi propaganda which attributed to the Israelis a sort of genetic superiority over the Arabs. It was therefore clear that the Zionists had expansionist and colonialist ambitions and that they cherished the hope of building a "pure" Jewish State. However, nothing could stifle the resistance of the Arab peoples, since their strength lay in their desire to regain their homeland, and no kind of propaganda or demagoguery could cover up the crimes of the Zionists.

41. Naturally, in view of the situation, there arose the question of the source from which Israel derived the strength to perpetrate that policy of aggression. The answer was obvious: Israel obtained all the support it needed from

the United States imperialists as well as camouflaged aid from the Soviet social-imperialists. One of those super-Powers supplied Israel with weapons and military equipment, and the other furnished the human resources it needed. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel was a precious card in their gamble for hegemony in the Middle East. The United States imperialists were using Israel as a constant threat against the Arab world, and at the same time the Soviet social-imperialists were exploiting the Israeli threat to penetrate deeper and deeper into the Middle East, masking their hegemonistic designs in the guise of the "aid" and "support" they were allegedly providing to the Arab peoples.

42. Of late, the rivalry between the two super-Powers had been intensified, and that could only result in a worsening of conditions for the Palestinians and other Arab peoples. The alleged "concern" of the United States and the Soviet Union with solving the problem of the Middle East was nothing more than concern with maintaining a situation where there was neither war nor peace and which favoured their presence in the region.

43. Consequently, Albania held the view that the Arab peoples could not expect anyone to achieve their historic objectives for them. They could only achieve those objectives by resolute struggle. For its part, Albania wished to express its unreserved support for the just cause and the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples.

44. Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic) said that the report of the Special Committee (A/10272) clearly and unequivocally reflected the objectivity with which the latter had carried out its difficult task, a task which had been complicated even further by the fact that Israel had denied the Special Committee access to the occupied Arab territories. There was no need to recall all the resolutions of the General Assembly in which it had called upon Israel to permit the Special Committee to visit the territories; Israel's refusal to permit the Special Committee to enter the occupied territories was in itself a violation of the resolutions of the Assembly. The international community was now well aware of why the Zionists persisted in denying the Special Committee access to the Arab territories. First, they were trying to prevent the international community from obtaining direct knowledge of what was happening in those territories, so that the occupiers could continue to carry out, free from restraint, their criminal schemes for the attainment of the Zionists' expansionist ambitions. Despite that, the Special Committee had been able to present reports which clearly reflected what was happening in the occupied Arab territories. Thus, it was no longer possible to conceal the Zionists' racist crimes. He was certain that the Zionist speaker in the Special Political Committee was fully convinced of that, although he might not have enough courage to admit it. However, the fact that the world community was aware of the situation in the occupied Arab territories did not prevent the Zionists from continuing to perpetrate their crimes.

45. Another reason for denying the Special Committee access to the occupied Arab territories was to give the Zionist speaker a pretext for raising doubts regarding the validity of the information contained in the reports of that Committee. However, the Special Committee had relied on

statements and plans drawn up by the Zionist leaders, news reports in the Western and Zionist press, and facts established by other international organizations, such as the International Red Cross. Thus, the Zionist spokesman, in attempting to question the truth of the Special Committee's information, had resorted to fallacious arguments which could deceive no one.

46. The third reason for preventing the Special Committee from visiting the occupied territories had been to prevent the allies of the Zionists from finding themselves in an embarrassing situation vis-à-vis the world community, and, although that had perhaps been achieved, it was very difficult for those people, who talked so much of human rights, to silence the voice of their conscience.

47. In concerning itself with the conditions of the population of the occupied Arab territories, the United Nations was only assuming responsibilities proclaimed in the Charter as well as in other international conventions and instruments. Occupation in itself, whatever its origin might be, was a situation not approved by the Charter, which stipulated that the acquisition of land by force of arms was inadmissible. International conventions and instruments did not condone aggression and considered occupation to be a temporary and unnatural state. However, despite all the resolutions of the United Nations calling for the withdrawal of the Zionist occupation forces from the Arab territories, the occupiers continued to implement their plans, a part of which had already been carried out in the land of Palestine.

48. Zionism was a European racist and imperialist movement, alien to the Middle East region, which had used mythical interpretations of the history of the Old Testament in order to impose its authority in Palestine and the neighbouring countries. It had called and continued to call on all Jews throughout the world to congregate in Palestine and in other parts of Arab lands and was thus preparing for further aggression and expansion with each wave of imported immigrants. What had happened in Palestine and what was happening in the occupied Arab territories was the outcome of the racist ideology of Zionism, the objective of which was to expand at the expense of the Arab countries, to expel the Arabs from their homes and to destroy their identity.

49. The Special Committee's report had revealed beyond any doubt the following manifestations of Zionist occupation: annexation of parts of the occupied territories; demolition of Arab houses and towns, with a view to obliterating their features; confiscation or expropriation of Arab land; expulsion and deportation of the Arab inhabitants and denial of their right to return; administrative detention and mass arrests of Arab inhabitants; establishment of Zionist settlements in occupied Arab territories; restriction of the freedom of worship and interference in the observance of religious rites and family customs and traditions; the plundering of archaeological and cultural property in the occupied territories; and illegitimate exploitation of the human and natural resources of the occupied territories.

50. In fact, those manifestations covered all domains of the economic, social, political and private life of the

inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories. Besides being a violation of human rights and a crime against humanity, those practices constituted an overt violation of international conventions and instruments, in particular the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; they also contravened the relevant United Nations resolutions.

51. In that connexion, it should be pointed out that the Zionist speaker had once again stated that the Geneva Convention was inapplicable to the situation in the occupied Arab territories, in spite of the confirmation contained in General Assembly resolutions and other resolutions adopted by various international organizations, such as the International Red Cross.

52. The Special Committee's report reiterated that the Zionist occupiers were persisting in their criminal schemes and that the manifestations of occupation were unchanged. In paragraphs 31 to 102, the report presented evidence of the continued existence of a policy of annexation and settlement, which could be divided into three categories. First, the Zionist occupation authorities expropriated or confiscated Arab land; secondly, they established Zionist settlements on that land and elsewhere; thirdly, they removed Arab inhabitants from their residences or expelled them entirely from the occupied Arab territories. All those measures, which were undertaken "for security reasons" or under the pretext of "introducing improvements", merely assisted in attaining the goals of Zionist expansion.

53. Perhaps the most outstanding evidence of those repressive measures was that contained in paragraph 104 of the report, which referred to the measures taken against Bir Zeit College in order to inhibit the cultural life of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories, as well as the evidence contained in paragraph 137 relating to a policy of reprisal against civilians, a policy which included expulsion, demolition of houses, the closing of shops and businesses, prohibition of the export of produce as punishment for incidents, and mass arrests. All those measures were aimed at forcing the Arab inhabitants to leave the occupied territories so that Zionism could continue the policy that it had previously carried out in Palestine.

54. More than ever before, the United Nations was now aware of the true nature of those measures. For that reason, the General Assembly had year after year declared null and void all measures taken by the Zionist régime in the occupied Arab territories.

55. It should be pointed out that, although Zionism constantly violated United Nations resolutions, it still found support and help from some Members of the Organization. It was no secret that the United States was an accomplice of the Zionist régime and that the funds which it advanced were largely used for the establishment of settlements for new immigrants in the occupied territories. The Committee need hardly be reminded of the bill sponsored by Senator Muskie and adopted by the United States Senate which granted the Zionist régime assistance of more than \$70 million for the establishment of new settlements. With its aid, the United States was consecrating

the occupation and raising an obstacle to the return of the Palestinians and Arab inhabitants to their homes and the restitution of their property and land.

56. The United Nations could not fulfil its responsibilities without the co-operation and support of all its Members. History had taught that oppression, aggression and occupation were all destined to disappear and that the will of peoples to achieve freedom, equality and justice would finally triumph.

57. The Reverend Benjamin NUÑEZ (Costa Rica) noted that, on the basis of the report of the Special Committee, the Special Political Committee had to decide whether the State of Israel, which administered those territories as a result of a war into which it had been provoked, was respecting the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The Government of Costa Rica had always shown a keen interest in the effective implementation of human rights whenever those rights might be in danger. It had also indicated its concern for the living conditions of the peoples of the Middle East as a result of the conflicts in that region.

58. His delegation once more reiterated its position with regard to the composition and work of the Special Committee, a position which it had already stated at the previous session. It considered that the composition of that Committee violated the most elementary standards of legal equity and impartiality required of a committee which carried out investigatory tasks.

59. The Committee was composed of Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Senegal, three countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the State of Israel and which belonged to the bloc of nations which, despite the protest of a large section of world public opinion, had recently declared that the Zionist movement, with its goal of national rebirth, was a form of racism constituting a danger to world peace. He therefore wondered whether it was possible to maintain that the Special Committee's report was impartial, fair and worthy of being analysed. He also wondered whether the Arab countries would accept a situation in which a committee of Zionists submitted a report on the treatment that had been and was being given to the Jews who were still suffering within their frontiers.

60. Mr. RASOLONDRABE (Madagascar), speaking on a point of order, said that the representative of Costa Rica was passing judgement on the integrity of the members of the Special Committee and requested him to indicate whether his judgement was based on a reading of the report. If not, he would be setting an extraordinary precedent in the Special Political Committee whereby a representative referred to the integrity of a committee appointed by the General Assembly.

61. The CHAIRMAN replied that the delegation of Costa Rica had the sovereign right to express its views.

62. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking on a point of order, said that the Special Political Committee had no reason to reconsider a General Assembly resolution setting up a committee. The Special Political Committee was currently considering the report submitted by the

Special Committee, and the remarks of the Costa Rican delegation referred not to that report but to the composition of the Special Committee.

63. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to indicate to what his point of order referred.

64. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Committee should be discussing the Special Committee's report, not a resolution already adopted by the General Assembly. Any reconsideration of the decision taken by the General Assembly must take place in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.

65. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic under which rule of the rules of procedure he had raised a point of order.

66. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic) replied that the Special Political Committee was considering the Special Committee's report and that the representative of Costa Rica had referred to a decision adopted by the General Assembly several years earlier and had suggested that the composition of the Special Committee was illegal. His delegation maintained that the Special Political Committee had no right to reconsider a decision taken by the General Assembly.

67. As to the doubts cast upon the integrity of the members of the Special Committee, that question was not pertinent to the discussion now in progress.

68. The CHAIRMAN took the view that the representative of Costa Rica had violated no rule of procedure.

69. The Reverend Benjamin NUÑEZ (Costa Rica) said he wondered whether the Special Political Committee could make a judgement on the basis of a report prepared by a committee which had reached conclusions concerning the situation to be investigated before beginning its investigation. His delegation was ready to consider a report prepared on a fair basis by a committee made up of neutral persons who analysed the situation objectively. But Costa Rica could not accept the activities of the Special Committee unless the General Assembly changed its mandate to ensure that it was concerned with the fate of all human beings who had been victims of the various conflicts occurring in the area, and who lived under the jurisdiction of Israel or another State.

70. His delegation did not believe that the entire contents of the report were false, but felt that it was necessary to guard against half-truths.

71. He had been an eye-witness in Israel for more than two years and could attest to certain facts. There were no oil agreements or economic ties between Costa Rica and Israel, and the only bonds uniting them were their commitment to social democracy and to the same moral and spiritual ideals. In Israel he had seen Jews and Arabs coexisting peacefully, and had also seen the improvement in the living standards of the Arabs and in public health conditions. He had had complete freedom to visit the Christian holy places and had in his possession a declaration

signed by religious leaders in Israel indicating that there was freedom of worship and respect for all religions.

72. In the occupied territories the Arabs enjoyed freedom of expression and were employed on equal terms with the Jews. Furthermore, in contrast to the times when the Gaza strip had been administered by another Power, they had full freedom of movement. He thought that a committee, made up of persons not involved in the Middle East question and sincerely interested in ascertaining the truth, should visit the occupied territories and talk to the inhabitants. The current report would then be eclipsed.

73. His delegation was aware that the occupation was an abnormal, traumatic and painful situation which had to be ended, but he would not be doing justice if he did not state that the occupying Power had done its best to make that anomalous situation less painful. His delegation would like the leaders of the affected areas to meet in order to work out a solution, in a desire to achieve peace.

74. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, although it was not worth replying to many of the points raised by the representative of Costa Rica, he could not ignore that representative's attack on the integrity of the Special Committee. Everyone knew the bias which Costa Rica had always shown with regard to the Palestine question, and the Costa Rican representative should therefore be the last to talk about bias. That representative had said that he would like a more impartial and fairer committee to be established. It would be recalled that, years ago, the Security Council had requested the Secretary-General to appoint a representative to investigate Israeli practices. He wondered if the representative of Costa Rica also considered the Secretary-General to be biased. If that representative wished to establish another committee, he might recall that the Chairman of the Special Committee had said that anyone who thought that that Committee was biased should try to create another one, and the Costa Rican representative could, if he wished, submit a draft resolution proposing the formation of a new committee.

75. The representative of Costa Rica had apparently not seen, or had not wished to see, displaced persons, prisons, camps, expropriations, or confiscations in the occupied territories, yet he took the liberty of attacking the Special Committee's report, which was based on articles published in the press and on statements by Israeli leaders.

76. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to address the Committee.

77. Mr. TERZI (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Costa Rica had insinuated that the Special Committee's report was biased or that judgement had been passed *in absentia*. He wished to point out that paragraph 1 of the Special Committee's report (A/10272) stated that that Committee had been established by the General Assembly under resolution 2443 (XXIII) and that paragraph 18 stated that the Special Committee had continued its investigation of allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In

paragraph 19, the Committee stated that, although still denied access by the Government of Israel to the occupied territories to conduct its investigation on the spot, it had continued to follow, on a day-to-day basis, developments in those territories and reports of statements by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. If the representative of Costa Rica had read the Special Committee's report, he would realize that if that Committee had been allowed to enter the occupied territories no one would now be able to cast doubt on the accuracy of the report. For that very reason the Special Committee had been denied access, because otherwise the report would have been irrefutable.

78. He also drew attention to paragraph 186 of the report, which discussed the case of Archbishop Capucci, who had been tried by a court that had not been properly constituted under international law. He reminded the representative of Costa Rica of the appeals made by the Pope and of the concern expressed by the Pontiff about the fate of Christians and of the Christian holy places in the occupied territories.

79. The representative of Costa Rica was owed respect as a priest, but he must also be told the truth. The Palestinians still hoped to live in peace, and he recalled that in 1940 there had been quarters of Jerusalem in which Jews and Arabs had lived in peace and harmony.

80. Mr. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted that the representative of Costa Rica had spoken of peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews. Actually, there were Arab Jews, Christian Jews, Christian Arabs and Moslem Arabs. That representative had also spoken of Israeli administration of the occupied territories. That was a euphemism for a colonial area, the situation in which could well be considered by the Fourth Committee. The Costa Rican representative had also indicated that the Arabs living in the Gaza strip when it had been administered by another country—presumably Egypt—had not had freedom of movement. It should be pointed out that freedom of movement, as understood by the Zionist State, meant that the Palestinians could leave their homeland, never to return.

81. Mr. SENGHOR (Senegal), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, rejected the comments made by the Costa Rican representative reflecting on the integrity of the Ambassador of Senegal, a member of the Special Committee, who had taken part in the drafting of the report submitted by the Committee.

82. The Reverend Benjamin NUÑEZ (Costa Rica), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that when he had spoken of disqualifying the Committee he had not been referring to the ethics of its members. He had not accused the members of the Special Committee of lack of integrity, but considered that they lacked the legal capacity to perform that particular task.

83. Referring to the case of Archbishop Capucci, he said he was not familiar with the legal machinery of the State of Israel, but had read a letter signed by representatives of the Ecumenical Theological Research Fraternity in Israel rejecting the accusations concerning arbitrary imprisonment

and ill-treatment in the case of Archbishop Capucci and expressing the conviction that he had been fairly treated.

84. He wished to make it clear that, in his statement, he had only dealt with points that were never referred to in the Special Political Committee.

85. Mr. TERZI (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, reminded the representative of Costa Rica that the members of the Special Committee, in that capacity, no longer acted as representatives of their Governments. They should therefore be allowed access to the occupied territories as members of a United Nations committee.

86. The activities of the clergy were also, and indeed principally, concerned with the struggle against injustice, and the trial of Archbishop Capucci had been a case of injustice since the court that had tried him had not been legally constituted.

87. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of

Costa Rica had cast doubt on the qualifications of the members of the Special Committee because of their relations with the Arab States and their attitude towards Israel. He doubted whether the representative of Costa Rica, in view of his relations with Israel and his attitude towards the Arab countries, could question the Committee's qualifications.

88. If the Costa Rican representative was not satisfied with the report, he could propose something constructive, such as an investigation by the Secretary-General in the occupied territories, or he could submit a draft resolution.

89. The Reverend Benjamin NUÑEZ (Costa Rica), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he would be prepared to submit a draft resolution but would have to follow the instructions given him by his Government in the matter.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

988th meeting

Tuesday, 2 December 1975, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.988

AGENDA ITEM 51

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (*continued*)* (A/10366, A/SPC/L.339)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Madagascar and Senegal had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.339.

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*continued*) (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

2. Mr. PASHKEVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, if the situation in the Middle East was to be prevented from leading to a resumption of hostilities, it was necessary, as the Byelorussian SSR and other peace-loving countries had constantly demanded, to arrive at a final settlement based on the resolutions of the Security Council, which required the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all territories occupied since 1967 and respect for the

rights of the Palestinian people and of all the States and peoples of the region. The negative attitude adopted by Israel, despite a few trivial concessions, towards the implementation of United Nations resolutions must not discourage the peace-loving countries, which should show their solidarity with the population of the occupied territories in order to repel the aggressor.

3. The item under discussion related to one of the most important aspects of the question. The seventh report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/10272) afforded much information on the ideology underlying Israel's actions and highlighted the need to protect the occupied territories. It provided evidence of the deterioration of material conditions and the mental suffering imposed on innocent people. It contradicted the Israeli representative's statements to the effect that the authorities of his country would take every step to protect the rights of the population of territories which Israel was supposedly occupying solely for its own defence; as for exactions, if they in fact occurred, they were aberrant acts by individuals and were always severely punished.

4. If that was true, he wondered why, by refusing to allow members of the Special Committee to enter the territories, Israel itself gave proof of the contempt in which it held the resolutions of the United Nations.

5. There could be no talk of humanitarian acts in connexion with the situation prevailing in the occupied

* Resumed from the 984th meeting.

territories, where houses were destroyed and their occupants displaced without hope of return. The occupied Arab territories supplied Israel with cheap labour; any business enterprise by the Arabs was prohibited; not a few of them were subjected to long periods of detention and to torture; rights of legal defence were flouted. All those facts had led the Special Committee to the conclusion that the situation had become worse.

6. With the aim of bringing about a complete physical, geographical and demographic transformation, the Israeli authorities were hurriedly establishing settlements in the occupied territories. In its report, the Special Committee gave a convincing picture of the situation and concluded that international law was being flagrantly violated. His delegation endorsed the Special Committee's findings, including its conclusion that the termination of the Israeli occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population of the occupied territories (*ibid.*, para. 189).

7. The Byelorussian SSR, and all the socialist States and other peace-loving countries, would continue their efforts to bring about the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and the full implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations concerning a settlement of the Middle East problem.

8. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) thanked the Special Committee for its report. It could not be denied that Israel was pursuing a policy of colonization involving destruction of houses, large-scale arrests, imposition of a curfew and economic exploitation of the population, all of which were contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.¹ Israel's refusal, in 1975 as in other years, to allow the members of the Special Committee to enter the occupied territories was irrefutable proof of the reality of the situation described in the Special Committee's report and evidenced Israel's desire to conceal the truth.

9. One need only refer to the memoirs of Theodor Herzl to see that, from the beginning, the aim of the Zionist movement had been to take over Palestine by driving out the poor people living there, with the complicity of landowners who were lured by the price offered for their land. However, when the Zionists had found that that approach had only been able to put them in possession of 5.5 per cent of the land, they had turned over the task of realizing their expansionist policy to the movement's military machine. The result had been the two wars of aggression, in 1948 and 1967. Nor could any limits have been set to that expansionist policy, since Herzl had envisaged adapting it to requirements, or, in other words, to the number of immigrants. It was in the same spirit that, after the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan, recalling that Israel's aim was the setting-up of an exclusively Jewish State, had planned the expulsion of the population of the occupied territories.

10. Thus, the Israeli authorities' campaign to destroy Arab homes had the twofold objective of impelling the Pales-

tinians to leave and of preventing their return if Israel should at any time pretend, for political reasons, to facilitate it. Similarly, the Israeli authorities were proceeding with the plan for Judaizing Jerusalem by confiscating not only property whose owners had been absent since 1948 but also property whose owners had not left until 1967. All those actions were taken under laws that were contrary to the fourth Geneva Convention. In addition, the Israeli authorities removed from the Arab population of the occupied territories many lawyers, teachers, students and the like who had been politically active among the population, on the pretext that their activities endangered Israel.

11. Again, the school curricula and textbooks for young Palestinians were designed in such a way as to make them indifferent to their national cause. The intellectual and cultural oppression to which the Arab population was subjected was a far cry from the Israeli representative's claim that Israel was a home for democracy which, by imposing the most liberal occupation in history, gave the Arabs more freedom than they had ever had.

12. Since 1967, the Israeli authorities had intensified measures for the establishment of settlements throughout the occupied Arab territories to set the seal on the fait accompli of Zionist domination. That intention was apparent in the statements of the Israeli leaders themselves. Since 1967, 44 Zionist settlements and 60 factories had been set up in the occupied Arab territories. The Israeli budget for 1975/76 allocated 431 million Israel pounds for the establishment of 33 settlements.

13. No further evidence was needed to show that the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention were not being observed. International law, peace and security could not prevail in the Middle East so long as Israel maintained its position, so long as the Palestinian people were evicted from their homeland and so long as United Nations resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention were being flouted. Although the United Nations had thus far been unable to deal with a situation for which it was responsible, that did not mean that the violations of international law which Israel had committed were sanctioned by international law itself. On the contrary, international law recognized the right of peoples to defend themselves against any act of aggression.

14. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) recalled that the statement by his delegation on the report of the Special Committee (986th meeting) had dealt with the violations committed against the people themselves, the natural resources of the territories and their institutions.

15. The representative of Israel, at the 985th meeting, had again asserted that for a number of legal reasons the fourth Geneva Convention did not apply to the occupied Arab territories. Despite many questions addressed to the Israeli delegation on what those legal reasons were, the Committee had never been given an answer. The Israeli delegation's refusal to answer was indicative of its inability to cite any reason.

16. Israel, like the Arab States, was a signatory of the fourth Geneva Convention. As such, it had undertaken to

¹ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

respect and to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances (article 1). That was perfectly clear.

17. If it was not clear to the Israeli delegation, perhaps he should review the interpretation given in the Commentary on the Convention edited by Jean Pictet,² which stated that each State party to the Convention contracted obligations vis-à-vis itself and at the same time vis-à-vis others; the Commentary said that whether a war between parties to the Convention was “just” or “unjust”, whether it was a war of aggression or of resistance to aggression, whether the intention was merely to occupy territory or to annex it, in no way affected the treatment protected persons should receive. The Commentary even went beyond that, assigning obligations to all other parties to the Convention to see to it that the violator should respect the Convention.

18. Article 2 of the Convention, which provided that:

“... the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

“The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. . . .”

also imposed an obligation upon Israel. Under the terms of that article, the inhabitants of the occupied territories were under the protection of the occupying Power.

19. In his delegation's view, the two articles quoted prescribed the attitude and practices that Israel should follow with respect to the territories it occupied.

20. If the Israeli delegation was still not convinced, one could also examine Israel's obligation to apply the Convention within the context of the generally accepted principles of the interpretation of treaties.

21. The first principle was that of interpretation by plain and natural means, that is to say, a natural, grammatical and logical interpretation. To the International Court of Justice, which had concerned itself with that principle, the question in the interpretation of a legal text was not what its authors had intended it to mean but what its actual wording meant. In the light of that principle, articles 1 and 2 of the Convention were perfectly clear: when it was stated that all parties undertook to respect the Convention in all circumstances, the statement could not mean anything else. Similarly, article 2 provided that the Convention should apply to all cases of armed conflict between the parties and to all cases of partial or total occupation. The meaning of the words used was simple, evident and unambiguous.

22. The second principle was the principle of context. According to that principle, the words of a legal text should

be interpreted in relation to their context, unless such interpretation led to a result which was manifestly absurd or unreasonable. In the light of that principle, the first principle—that of plain meaning—should conform to the contextual evidence of the intention of the parties.

23. The intention of the parties to the fourth Geneva Convention was very clearly underlined in the Commentary already cited. Dismayed at the violations of human rights committed during the First and Second World Wars, and having recognized the inadequacy of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,³ the parties had wished to conclude a convention that protected civilians under all circumstances. The Commentary stated explicitly: “Besides, even if a State were to denounce the Geneva Convention, it would still be bound by the principles of that Convention, which are today the expression of valid international law in this sphere.”

24. The third principle of interpretation was that of recourse to the *travaux préparatoires*. The meaning of the Convention was clear enough not to require resort to that principle; however, an examination of the preliminary drafts and the comments, public statements and the like made by the participants in the preparatory work leading to the adoption of the Convention indicated that their intention had been to have the Convention applied by all parties, at all times, in all cases and under all circumstances.

25. The fourth principle of interpretation was the principle of major purposes. Generally, the terms of a convention could not be thoroughly comprehended unless they were read in the light of the purposes which had prompted its conclusion. In the case of the fourth Geneva Convention, those purposes were clear from the first articles or from a study of the various aspects of the Convention as a whole. In the light of those considerations, it was easy to see the objective aimed at by the authors of the Convention, namely, the protection of the human rights of civilians in occupied territories. That objective was outlined in the first articles of the Convention and could not be evaded by Israel or any other State party to the Convention.

26. Of course, international law provided each party to a treaty or convention with two ways of absolving itself, partially or in full, from its commitment. The first, which was partial, consisted in formulating, in accordance with article 14 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,⁴ reservations concerning the applicability of certain provisions with regard to one or more States. But Israel could not have made such a reservation without denying the very purpose of the fourth Geneva Convention and making it inapplicable. So far as he knew, Israel had not made such a reservation. The second way open to a State party to a treaty or convention for absolving itself from its commitment was denunciation. Article 158 of the fourth Geneva Convention reserved that right to all parties. But Israel had not denounced the Convention.

³ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

⁴ *Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.V.5), document A/CONF.39/27.

² Jean S. Pictet, ed., *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958).

27. It was thus clear from what had been said that Israel was obliged by international law to apply the Convention to the occupied Arab territories. Therefore, Israel's claim that the Convention was not applicable to those territories had no foundation whatsoever.

28. Not only law and jurisprudence but the will of the international community as well showed the applicability to the occupied Arab territories of the Convention, which was designed to protect persons, resources and institutions against the occupying forces.

29. In those circumstances, he found it hard to understand how the Costa Rican delegation, which had recently proclaimed its objectivity in the matter, could have abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) and 3240 B (XXIX). The distribution of votes on those resolutions was significant, since not only "the Arab States and their friends" but all the countries of Western Europe also had voted for them.

30. In conclusion, he again challenged the representative of Israel to inform the Committee of the legal reasons invoked by his country.

31. Mr. QURESHI (Pakistan) recalled that international law regulated the conduct of occupying Powers and their exercise of authority in occupied areas by means of a number of conventions, such as the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War⁵ and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, both of 1949, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.⁶ Those legal instruments were intended to protect, in so far as possible, the populations of occupied areas and their property. Following numerous reports about the violation of those rules by Israeli authorities, the General Assembly, in 1968, had established the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (resolution 2443 (XXIII)). Despite Israel's lack of co-operation, the Special Committee had been able to conclude over the years that Israel was pursuing its policy of annexation and maximum exploitation of the labour force in the occupied territories, without any improvement in the living conditions of imprisoned persons or in education programmes for young people. In its seventh report (A/10272), the Special Committee had in fact indicated that the annexationist policy was being intensified and that the civilian population appeared more and more frustrated and discontented as a result of the acts of violence resulting from that policy. The statements of Israeli leaders themselves left no doubt of their true intentions. The establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories had no other purpose than to ensure the presence there of the Jewish State. Moreover, one could not but be dismayed at the collective reprisals in the form of demolition of houses, mass arrests and forcible evictions and expulsions.

32. The people of Pakistan felt deep concern at those events. They were particularly distressed at the Israeli

actions to change the character of the Holy City of Jerusalem and other holy places such as the Al Aqsa and Al-Ibrahimi mosques. The Israelis were in fact intending to make excavations near the western part of the Al-Burak wall, on the pretext of expanding the area cleared in front of that wall in 1967. That project would necessitate the destruction of Arab houses and land in the Holy City, some of which had historical and religious value. The wall and the entire area surrounding it were Islamic property, as confirmed by the League of Nations in 1930, since they were part of the mosque square.

33. Israel had also taken steps which endangered the religious and physical integrity of the Al-Ibrahimi mosque, one of the most sacred and most venerated Islamic holy places. Its desecration, the prohibition of Moslems from going to pray there, the demolition of some parts of it, and its isolation had aroused a wave of indignation throughout the Islamic world. There had already been confrontations between the indigenous Arab population and the Israeli authorities, posing a new threat to peace and security in the area.

34. His delegation could not countenance such actions; they were contrary to the provisions of article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention, which guaranteed to protected persons respect for their religious convictions and practices and their manners and customs. In fact, all measures aimed at changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional character and economic aspects of the occupied areas were null and void under the terms of articles 47 and 49 of the same Convention. The Israeli authorities must without delay renounce such illegal and provocative practices, both currently and for the future. The gravity of Israeli actions in connexion with the Al-Ibrahimi mosque was in itself sufficient to warrant the adoption of a separate resolution by the General Assembly.

35. The concern of the world community had also been rightly aroused by the deliberate destruction of the town of Quneitra by Israeli forces before their withdrawal under the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974.⁷ The town had been reduced to a mound of rubble. It was that act which had impelled his delegation in 1974 to co-sponsor General Assembly resolution 3240 C (XXIX) on that subject. His delegation noted with satisfaction that a survey to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused to the town had been begun (*ibid.*, paras. 169 and 170), and hoped that it would soon be possible to apportion compensation.

36. The people under Israeli occupation were suffering doubly. Not only were they subjected to occupation but the occupying Power continued to violate their basic rights in defiance of all international conventions. His delegation fully shared the conviction expressed by the Special Committee that the termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population of the occupied territories (*ibid.*, para. 189), and would therefore continue to exert every effort for the elimination of all forms of

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215.

⁷ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1974*, document S/11302/Add.1, annex. I.

aggression from the occupied Arab territories and for the full recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Pending the attainment of that objective, it would lend its full support to every move seeking to ensure that the occupying Power acted and behaved in accordance with the law governing situations of occupation.

37. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) said that the report of the Special Committee and the statements by the representatives of many Arab countries had presented an abundance of irrefutable facts exposing the atrocities committed by the Israeli Zionists in the occupied territories, in flagrant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. His delegation wished to express deep sympathy for the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples and firmly supported the just position of the Arab and other third-world countries which strongly condemned Israeli aggression. It also wished to thank the Special Committee for the objectivity with which it had exposed the crimes committed by the Israeli authorities.

38. The problem which arose in the territories occupied by Israel was in essence a struggle between, on the one hand, the Israeli Zionists, who were carrying out a policy of aggression and expansion with the support of the super-Powers, and on the other hand, the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who were fighting against that aggression and expansion. That problem could only be solved by the termination of the illegal Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, the return of the occupied territories to the Arabs, and the recognition of the Palestinian people's national rights. However, the Israelis were not prepared to change their attitude. On the contrary, in 1975, while stepping up their repression of the people in the occupied territories, the Israeli authorities had been pushing a policy of "Zionization", forcing the Arab inhabitants to leave certain places and establishing many Jewish settlements. The Israeli leaders attached very great importance to the settlement of Israelis in the occupied areas, and hoped to use that situation to define their new boundaries. In June 1975 the ruling party had approved a map of the so-called final boundaries of Israel, which incorporated the Golan heights and the Gaza strip.

39. As was known to all, the Israeli Zionists were currently in a difficult situation both at home and abroad. At home, Israel was deeply in debt and riddled with inflation because of the constant increase in military expenditures. Internationally, Israel had been ceaselessly condemned, a large number of African countries had severed diplomatic relations with it, and it was currently isolated. One might therefore wonder why Israel, with its very limited resources and enormous difficulties, was pursuing its policy of aggression and expansion, thus incurring the enmity of over 100 million Arabs. An Arab leader had answered that question: Israel enjoyed the protection of the two super-Powers. In order to achieve hegemony over Europe and the whole world, and in order to overpower and weaken its rival, each of them needed to maintain an unstable situation in the Middle East. One super-Power had from the very outset given energetic support to Israel and continued to do so. The other acted in a more cunning manner. While styling itself a natural ally of the Arab world, it was resorting to the imperialist trick of "divide and rule" and was doing its utmost to undermine

Arab unity. It kept on boasting about its "tremendous" and "selfless" aid to the Arab countries, but many facts showed that that so-called aid was nothing but a means of interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and contending for hegemony in the Middle East. It ostensibly condemned Israeli aggression, but in fact was providing Israel with support which simply increased the aggressive arrogance of Israeli Zionism. It sent a steady flow of emigrants to Israel, despite the strong opposition of the Arab countries and the condemnation of world opinion. In five years it had sent over 100,000 emigrants to Israel. According to press reports, at least two divisions of the Israeli army were composed of Jewish immigrants who had come from that super-Power in recent years. The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at its sixth session, held at Jidda from 12 to 16 July 1975, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, and the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, had all condemned those countries which gave military, economic and manpower support to Israel. That super-Power had turned a deaf ear to all that. Moreover, at a time when Israel was becoming increasingly isolated internationally, that super-Power had overt and covert contacts with it, even going so far as to organize secret talks between the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs. That was a flagrant encouragement to the policy of aggression and expansion pursued by the Israeli Zionists and a shameful betrayal of the cause of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples.

40. The situation was clear: the struggle for hegemony was the root cause of the failure to achieve a settlement of the Middle East question and the question of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel. The Arab countries themselves, due to the experience they had acquired in their prolonged struggle, had now concluded that they could only achieve victory by linking their struggle against Israeli Zionism with the struggle against super-Power hegemony.

41. The Chinese Government and people had always firmly supported the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against Zionism and hegemony, to recover their territories and regain their national rights. That struggle was an important component of the third-world struggle against imperialism and hegemony. Despite the opposition of the super-Powers and the Zionists it was the Arab people, who numbered well over 100 million, who held the real power in the Middle East. Their struggle was difficult but the future was bright. His delegation was convinced that so long as the Palestinian and other Arab peoples persevered in unity and struggle, they would frustrate the plots and intrigues of the super-Powers, defeat the Israeli aggressors, recover their territories and regain their national rights.

42. Mr. DABIRI (Iran) thanked the Chairman and the other members of the Special Committee for their report (A/10272), which was excellent, and said that the Special Political Committee, in considering the annual reports of the Special Committee, consistently felt disappointed and frustrated. The latest report of the Special Committee painted a sombre picture of the situation in the occupied

territories. There was no sign of any change in the policy and practices of the Israeli authorities. Israel was pursuing its annexation policy without respite and the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories had continued unabated. Statements by Israeli leaders and articles in the Israeli press on that subject gave rise to the greatest concern.

43. The conditions in which the civilian population lived were likewise a source of serious concern. The report of the Special Committee showed that many violent incidents had occurred in the occupied territories in 1975, and that the occupying Power had responded to various manifestations of resistance on the part of the Arab population with implacable repression, even going so far as to destroy dwellings and workshops, as had been seen in the film shown for the members of the Committee during the course of the 985th meeting. His delegation considered that all those measures were contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations.

44. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose impartiality had never been questioned, had condemned those repressive measures and had stated in its annual report⁸ that they were contrary to the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention (*ibid.*, para. 180).

45. His delegation had tried to confine itself to analysing the facts brought out by the testimony given to the Special Committee, and those facts constituted damning evidence against Israel. That proved once again that recourse to violence in defiance of human rights made it even more difficult to find favourable conditions for the establishment of a climate of peace and harmony in the area.

46. His delegation endorsed the conclusion of the Special Committee that termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population of the occupied territories (*ibid.*, para. 189).

47. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) observed that for the seventh time the Special Political Committee was considering a report of the Special Committee. At each session, the United Nations condemned the usurping Zionist régime, which did not hesitate to violate human rights, ignored United Nations resolutions, disregarded the principles of the Charter and refused to apply the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention. In its latest report, as in earlier reports, the Special Committee described the fate reserved for all those who struggled against oppression and were subjected to various forms of ill-treatment and torture (*ibid.*, para. 163). It had collected evidence relating to a policy of reprisal against civilians (*ibid.*, chap. IV, sect. C), despite the fact that the occupying authorities had continued, in defiance of the decisions of the international community, to refuse to permit the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories. Although the Special Committee had therefore been able to collect only a limited amount of information and many crimes remained unrevealed, it had established clearly that Israel, defying the rules of international law and particularly the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention, continued to establish

settlements in the occupied Arab territories and to violate the human rights of the population of those territories. In its annual report for 1974, ICRC mentioned expulsions and the destruction of dwellings ordered by the Israeli authorities under the heading of repressive measures, in violation of articles 49, 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention and mentioned the concern it felt about the situation of the victims whose homes were destroyed by the Israeli army in the occupied territories, which was often aggravated by the arrest of one or more members of the family concerned (*ibid.*, para. 180).

48. ICRC had quoted many instances of such destruction and had reported that it had communicated its viewpoint to the Israeli authorities as to the principle of carrying out the destruction of houses and the deep concern it felt about such acts, and requested that steps should be taken to find homes for the victims (*ibid.*); for its part, the Special Committee had expressed the opinion that the large-scale arrests reflected a tendency towards communal or collective punishment as an alternative to proper investigation for the purpose of tracing the responsible parties (*ibid.*, para. 181) and that the measures taken by the Jerusalem occupation authorities and the imprisonment of Archbishop Capucci were contrary to the provisions of article 47, 64 and 66 of the fourth Geneva Convention (*ibid.*, para. 186).

49. The Special Committee had concluded from the evidence before it that the occupying Power continued to behave in flagrant violation of the basic rights of the population of the occupied territories and in defiance of relevant international conventions, and it reiterated its conviction that the termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of that population (*ibid.*, paras. 188 and 189). The violations by Israel of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories had therefore been confirmed by the Special Committee's report, by the statement of its Chairman, by the reports of ICRC and finally by the film recently shown to members of the Committee.

50. Nevertheless, the information media covering the work of the United Nations had failed to draw the attention of public opinion to the danger of those inhuman, immoral and illegal practices. However, when four fifths of the inhabitants of the globe, represented by 72 States Members of the United Nations, had expressed their conviction that the Zionist régime was a racist régime in the same way as nazism and *apartheid*, and had adopted a historic resolution condemning Israel, the information media and the other organs dominated by the Zionists had expressed their indignation. One could only regret also that when the United Nations, through its specialized agencies, condemned the Zionist régime for its repeated violations of human rights, which were irrefutably proved, the media, betraying their mission, failed to inform world public opinion and, in particular, public opinion in the United States. Thus, the American people were paying heavy taxes in order to provide millions of dollars for the Zionist régime and to support the violation by Israel of United Nations resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the will of the international community. In fact, if the American people knew the truth, they would certainly help the victims of aggression.

⁸ Annual Report 1974 (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975).

51. The Special Political Committee was therefore duty bound to reveal the truth which certain people were trying to hide, and to bring moral pressure to bear on Israel so as to put an end to the violations of human rights and the abnormal situation prevailing in Palestine, as the Special Committee had recommended. Obviously, it was necessary to extend the mandate of the Special Committee, which must be commended for the objectivity it had sought to maintain by resisting all pressures and for its desire to ensure that human rights were respected.

52. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) granting observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Committee had been able to hear not only the representatives of the occupation authorities but also the representatives of most of the victims of aggression through the voice of the representatives of PLO. He could find no better conclusion to his statement than to quote the words of a Palestinian poet who had said that those who committed injustice had exceeded the limit.

53. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) commended the conscientious manner in which the Special Committee had carried out its mission, in conditions made all the more difficult by the repeated refusal of Israel to co-operate with the United Nations and to authorize the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories. It was clear from the Special Committee's report that the conclusion of the agreements on disengagement of forces had brought about no noticeable improvement in the fate of the population of the occupied territories, where Israel, continuing its policy of annexation and colonization, had gone on establishing settlements. The construction of towns and villages could not be justified by security reasons. It revealed, rather, Israel's determination not to evacuate the occupied territories, in defiance of the expressed will of the international community, and it was legitimate to ask whether disengagement did not in fact represent a policy of deception designed to lull the righteous anger of the Arab peoples. One could only continue to condemn vigorously that policy of annexation which accorded neither with the principles which had always guided the United Nations and were at the very basis of its establishment nor with the aim of peace, for it could only make negotiations more difficult.

54. The report of the Special Committee also dealt with the violations of the human rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories. In a century in which nationalism was stronger than ever, it was obvious that that population had never accepted the Israeli yoke and history showed that any form of colonization was necessarily accompanied by a régime of terror directed against the civilian indigenous populations. However, the era of conquest and colonization had now passed; the international community was currently seeking more and more to be the guarantor of human rights, and had gone so far as to dispute that prerogative with Governments. Even in a time of armed conflict, those rights were protected by international legislation, in particular by the two Geneva Conventions—the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War—the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed

Conflict. It was extremely regrettable that Israel was not obeying the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention, which it had nevertheless signed, as its Arab neighbours had done, because of its so-called reservations to that Convention, and was continuing to take measures of collective repression which were contrary to the spirit of that Convention.

55. His delegation felt it was high time for the population of the occupied territories to recover its legitimate rights. That would not be possible unless those territories were completely evacuated by Israel, as the United Nations had requested on many occasions. In other words, the problem would not be solved except within the framework of a complete and final settlement of the Middle East question.

56. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that once more the representative of China had taken the opportunity to express outrageous slanders against the Soviet Union. It would seem that the tragic destiny of the Palestinian people concerned China only to the extent that it could use their fate as a pawn on its political chessboard. In its desperate battle against the Soviet Union, the representative of China had gone so far as to insult the allies of the Soviet Union, which had always supported the Arab peoples—particularly the Palestinian people—against Israeli aggression. That was indeed an important aspect of the foreign policy of the USSR. In order to refute the lying allegations of the representative of China, he would merely quote the words of Yasser Arafat, who had stated in an interview granted to the magazine *U.S. News & World Report* that the USSR was the faithful ally of the Palestinian revolution and of all the Arab peoples who were fighting to expel the Israeli invader from the occupied territories and to uphold the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

57. Mr. YANG Ming-liang (China), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that in its previous statement the Chinese delegation had exposed the hypocritical and double-dealing tactics on the part of Soviet social-imperialism on the Middle East question in its contention with the other super-Power for hegemony. It was futile for the Soviet representative to level vicious slanders against China while trying hard to whitewash himself, for the speech which the representative of China had made was based on facts which were more eloquent than the Soviet representative's statement or than his self-glorification. His delegation would cite one more fact. At its twenty-ninth session the General Assembly had adopted resolution 3240 A (XXIX) in operative paragraph 8 of which it reiterated its call upon all States to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in that resolution. Although it had voted in favour of the resolution, the USSR had continued to send emigrants to Israel, thus helping Israel to pursue its policy of "Zionization". Moreover, the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and Israel had entered into talks, and preparations had been under way for the resumption of diplomatic relations so as to help Israel free itself from its political isolation. Was that not a flagrant violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and a typical example of downright hypocrisy and duplicity? Apparently, at the current session, the General Assembly

would adopt a similar resolution and the Soviet representative would probably again vote in favour of it with impudence. But would the Soviet Union henceforth cease to render assistance to the Israeli aggressors and refrain from violating the resolutions of the General Assembly? The ugly performance of the Soviet Union on the Middle East question was determined by its social-imperialist nature which would never change.

58. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the members of the Committee had become inured to the constant anti-Soviet tirades of the Chinese representative and he himself would reply only with scorn except that the Chinese statements were inspired by sinister motives to which he would like to draw the Committee's attention. What was in fact the objective pursued by the Chinese representative in his perpetual attacks against the Soviet Union, regardless of the item being considered? The Maoists would like to spread the idea that a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States was inevitable and they were trying by every means at their command to provoke such a conflict, which in fact they desired, hoping to find thereby a means of asserting their hegemony. It was therefore logical that China should do everything in its power to aggravate the conflict in the Middle East and to keep repeating its slanders against the Soviet Union, which had become the champion of peace in the entire world, and particularly in the Middle East, where it was engaged in numerous initiatives to achieve a peaceful

settlement. Whereas the position adopted by China played into the hands of the Israeli aggressor, it was a well-known fact that, with the disinterested help which the USSR had never stinted, the Arab peoples had been able to fight against Israeli aggression. In spite of its pathological hatred of the USSR, a hatred which embraced all the Socialist countries, the representative of China knew very well that the Arab peoples were not fighting with slogans and vituperations, with which the Chinese representative was so lavish, but with arms provided by the USSR.

59. Mr. WU Tsien-min (China), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, as it was easy to foresee, the representative of the USSR had carefully avoided replying directly to the facts quoted by the Chinese delegation. He had tried to retaliate by accusing China of seeking to provoke a third world war, thus using the well-known diversionary manoeuvre of the robber calling for assistance. In fact, it was becoming more and more obvious that Soviet social-imperialism was the most dangerous source of conflict in the world and it was not through lies and sophistry that the USSR representative would succeed in hiding that fact.

60. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he reserved his right to exercise the right of reply at the next meeting of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

989th meeting

Tuesday, 2 December 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman. Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.989

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (*continued*) (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to address the Committee.

2. Mr. TERZI (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) said that he felt he should inform the Committee that a few hours previously, in the land of peace, which was under the domination of the Zionist régime, 30 Zionist aircraft had savagely attacked Palestinian refugee camps and villages in Lebanon with rockets, bombs and machine-gun fire. A primary school had been seriously damaged and many civilian houses destroyed. The aircraft had also

bombed the oil refinery at Tripoli, setting it on fire. The air raid, which had lasted 45 minutes, had left 57 dead and 110 wounded.

3. Mr. KORNEYENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/10272), contained many irrefutable facts showing that Israel, regardless of the Charter of the United Nations, international law, numerous resolutions and other international instruments, continued to violate the human rights of the Arab population of the occupied territories. The many examples recorded by the Special Committee, despite the difficulties created by Israel, had shown that the Arab population of the occupied territories was the victim of a policy of colonization systematically carried out by the Zionists, involving the use of such methods as demolition, expulsion, deportation and mass arrests.

4. Israel's policy clearly illustrated its expansionist designs. According to *The New York Times*, 55 towns had been created to mark the new frontiers of Israel. They provided

the *lebensraum* which Israel needed in order to transfer Jewish citizens there.

5. Israel was striving with increasing ferocity to stifle resistance, and in order to do so was resorting to ill-treatment, reprisals, torture and other shameful practices, in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.¹ That demonstrated beyond all doubt the premeditated character of Israel's violations, and it was for that reason that Israel opposed the work of the Special Committee, slandering it and not permitting it to enter the occupied territories.

6. From more and more quarters, Israel was being condemned for its acts. The World Peace Council, at its second session, had declared that Israel was violating international conventions in the occupied territories. Its acts reflected the ideology and practice of Zionism, which was a form of racial discrimination. At the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, Zionism had been condemned and equated with colonialism, neo-colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination. The Commission on Human Rights had also condemned Israel and described its violations of human rights as war crimes. It had condemned Israel for having deliberately destroyed Quneitra and for attempting to change the physical character of Jerusalem.

7. Previous speakers had already pointed out that the Israeli violations were a result of the continued occupation. For his part, he believed that it would be necessary to continue considering the question until there was peace in the Middle East. However, there could be no peace without the return of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and without recognition of the rights of the Palestinians, including their right to form a sovereign State. He pointed out once again that lasting peace would not be achieved through partial measures. In conclusion, he expressed solidarity with the Arab peoples in their just struggle against Israeli aggression.

8. Mr. VINCI (Italy), speaking on behalf of the nine member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), said that their position on the question of respect for human rights was well known. As far as the question currently before the Committee was concerned, they considered that the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention applied to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and consequently had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) and 3240 B (XXIX) calling on the Israeli authorities to respect and implement that Convention. It was that same concern which prompted the nine countries to exercise caution with regard to the sources of information used as a basis for evaluation of the facts, particularly in the case of a problem with sensitive political implications. In that regard, it must be recognized that the Special Committee had encountered obstacles which it had not been able to overcome, but as a result of which its report lacked the requisite authority.

9. The Special Political Committee had information on the situation in the occupied territories from unimpeachable

sources, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNRWA, which had access to those territories. The Special Committee, on the other hand, had not been able to carry out an on-the-spot check of the testimony on which its report was based. Furthermore, the nine countries had expressed reservations from the outset with regard to the setting up of the Special Committee, and had accordingly abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), establishing that Committee.

10. The nine countries agreed that certain acts committed in the occupied territories were deplorable. Similarly, with regard to the destruction of Quneitra, they had already expressed, at the twenty-ninth session (932nd meeting), their deep concern and solidarity with the inhabitants of that city. They regretted any actions directed against the normal and traditional exercise of religious practices and reaffirmed their belief that respect for the fundamental rights of the population of the occupied territories would not be ensured until the occupation of the territories was brought to an end as part of an over-all settlement. EEC fully supported all efforts designed to achieve that goal, and believed that everything possible must be done to put a stop to any actions that might stand in the way of a solution.

11. Mr. ZHIRI (Morocco) said that the Chairman of the Special Committee, introducing that Committee's report at the 985th meeting, had urged members of the Special Political Committee to refrain from recriminations and to try to formulate concrete and realistic proposals. Nevertheless, the representative of Israel had delivered the same diatribe as in previous years, completely denying the charges contained in the report, disparaging the Special Committee and extolling the Israeli occupation. The Moroccan delegation, which had not engaged in any polemics during the debate, wanted only to consider appropriate means of guaranteeing minimum rights for the population of the occupied territories, without being under any illusions, since the occupation was in itself a denial of justice and law.

12. For the sake of impartiality, the Special Committee had based its report entirely on information from Israeli sources. However, Arab sources could provide even more details on the inhuman practices of Israel in the occupied territories, including the destruction of Quneitra. He also recalled the destruction, in June 1967, of the Moroccan quarter of Jerusalem, where 400 families had been living. The Israeli Ministry of Defence had issued an evacuation order half an hour before the demolition. Even if one accepted the need for an open area in front of the Wailing Wall—which the Zionists claimed without having any right to—such extensive destruction had not been justified.

13. The purpose of the acts referred to in the Special Committee's report was to annex and colonize the occupied territories, to populate those territories with waves of foreign Jewish immigrants and expel the Arab inhabitants, and to wipe out every trace of Arabic culture in order to replace it with the culture of the occupying population. That much was confirmed by the statements of the Zionist authorities. It was obvious that the international community was faced with the greatest colonialist and racist undertaking in history.

¹ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

14. It was easy to allege that the report of the Special Committee was biased, because the three representatives of whom it was composed were from countries which did not maintain relations with Israel. However, the very fact that Israel refused to allow the Special Committee to enter the occupied territories indicated that the Tel Aviv Government wanted to cover up the truth. Consequently, the Special Committee had been compelled to use those sources which it considered unassailable, namely, Israeli sources. In that connexion, he commended the members of the Special Committee for their efforts to act objectively and impartially.

15. Listening to the representative of Israel, he had felt as though he was reliving events in Morocco 20 years earlier. At that time, the foreign proconsuls had never tired of repeating that the standard of living of the Moroccans had risen, that the population was happy and that social conditions had improved. Furthermore, the colonial Power had refused United Nations missions entry to Morocco. The situation had, of course, erupted in armed resistance which had forced the colonial Power to recognize Moroccan independence.

16. However, there were myths that were very difficult to destroy and had for long served the interests of the Zionist State, particularly the myth that opposition to Zionism was tantamount to anti-Semitism and the myth of the repression of Jewish communities in the Arab countries. Those myths would disappear, as had the myth of Israel as a lamb surrounded by wolves and the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army, the latter having disappeared for ever since the war of October 1973. As far as anti-Semitism was concerned, he would point out once again that Zionists from central Europe were not Semitic. With regard to the treatment accorded to Jews in the Arab countries, he emphasized that the Jewish community in Morocco had enjoyed their full rights and practised their religion in complete freedom since time immemorial.

17. His delegation fully supported the conclusions of the Special Committee and shared its view that the termination of the occupation would provide the surest guarantee of respect for the basic rights of the population of the occupied territories. The international community must denounce Israeli practices in the occupied territories and do everything in its power to force Israel to respect the obligations it had assumed under the Geneva Conventions of 1949² and the Charter of the United Nations.

18. Mr. HAGRAS (Oman) said that although the Israeli authorities had created all kinds of difficulties and prevented the Special Committee from visiting the occupied zones—which was convincing proof of the fact that they did not want the truth to be known—the Committee had submitted a full and objective report worthy of commendation.

19. His delegation was certain that the situation of the people in the occupied Arab territories would only be alleviated by the achievement of permanent peace in the Middle East on a basis of justice and recognition of the rights of the Palestine people. In the context of its policy of

annexation and Judaization of occupied territories, Israel had expelled the people from whole towns and prevented them from returning to their homes, in open violation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967), the Charter of the United Nations, the fourth Geneva Convention and other international instruments.

20. The demolition of dwellings, confiscation of property, evacuation and transfer of the population, mass detentions, despoiling of cultural sites, restrictions on freedom of worship, and illegal exploitation of natural resources were all violations of international instruments which Israel continued to commit in occupied territories. The Zionist enemy's criminal policy in the occupied territories had spared neither religious sites nor cemeteries in its haste to change the physical characteristics of the occupied territories. Israel's intentions could be summarized in a slogan written by Israeli soldiers on the only wall left standing in the town of Quneitra, which said "If they try to get back the town of Quneitra, we will leave it in ruins for them".

21. In view of the constant Israeli violations of human rights in the Arab territories the United Nations must take steps to defend the right of the Arab people of Palestine to return to their homes and their right to self-determination, which was recognized by the United Nations.

22. It was the duty of the international community to oppose injustice and the violation of human rights, not only in occupied territories but throughout the world. Israel had been condemned by the Security Council, ICRC, WHO and UNESCO. The international community must compel Israel to cease changing the demographic, physical and institutional structure of the occupied territories, and the United Nations must call upon all Member States not to recognize such changes.

23. He quoted a passage from the statement made by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of his country at the current session of the General Assembly (2374th plenary meeting) in which Israel was accused of being a racist Power obstructing the forces endeavouring to establish a just and lasting peace in the region.

24. Mr. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen) quoted paragraphs 19, 26 and 173 from the report of the Special Committee (A/10272) and stated that his delegation agreed with the Committee in its conclusion (*ibid.*, para. 173) that it saw no further purpose in furnishing the Assembly with more evidence of Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of occupied territories until and unless major changes took place in Israeli policies and practices in those territories. That conclusion was valid if the United Nations was not in a position to make—or was not willing to make—all possible efforts to find a means of bringing about such changes.

25. The refusal of the Zionist State to abide by the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 3240 A (XXIX) and 3240 C (XXIX) constituted a recognition that that State had violated the fourth Geneva Convention and particularly articles 33, 49 and 53, concerning destruction of houses and expulsion of inhabitants; 27, concerning failure to respect holy places and restriction of freedom of worship; 64 and 66, concerning arrest and torture; and 47,

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

concerning confiscation of property and annexation of territory.

26. The similarity between the atrocities committed by Israel and those which had occurred in other parts of the world over many years led to the conclusion that only if the United Nations and particularly the Security Council took firm collective measures against Zionist expansionism and imperialism would it be possible to put an end to the irresponsibility of the Zionist State, which endangered international peace and security.

27. Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia) expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Special Committee which, despite the difficult conditions in which it had done its work, had submitted in its report an objective description of a situation which again reaffirmed Israel's efforts to strengthen its supremacy in the occupied Arab territories while continuing to violate the basic norms of international law, particularly the fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel had acceded in 1951. The report also showed Israel's unwillingness to respect and fulfil the United Nations resolutions on withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Israel's policy impeded any political settlement of the dangerous situation in the Middle East, and was supported by imperialist and Zionist circles in the political, military and economic fields.

28. He referred to paragraph 63 of the report in which the statement of the Prime Minister of Israel on the settlements in the Golan heights was quoted, and to paragraph 174, in which the Special Committee expressed its deep concern regarding the consequences of the occupation for the daily life of the inhabitants of the occupied zones. He said that *The New York Times*, which was known for its extraordinary interest in Middle East questions, had recently published an article stating that Israel, which was to give up the petroleum deposits of Abu Rudeis belonging to Egypt, had begun to prospect for oil not only in Israel but also in the occupied Arab territories of the Sinai Peninsula and the Mediterranean coast, with the assistance of United States enterprises. That report indicated that Israel had no intention in the short term of withdrawing from occupied Arab territories and was trying to gain as much as possible before doing so.

29. His delegation considered that the basic prerequisite for the solution of the pressing situation of the Arab population in the occupied territories remained the complete withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from those territories in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The international organ established for that purpose was the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, convened for discussions between the parties concerned, which, in addition to the Soviet Union and the United States of America, were Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab people of Palestine represented by PLO, and Israel. That Conference was the only way to a final solution of the crisis in the Middle East in harmony with the basic principles of the United Nations and in accordance with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world who supported the preservation of international peace and security.

30. Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation, proceeding from the basic principles of the maintenance of world peace and the traditional ties of friendship and co-operation with the peoples of the Arab countries, fully supported that solution.

31. Mr. MARMULAKU (Yugoslavia) said that the report of the Special Committee was a valid and informative document supported by facts, which enabled the United Nations and the Special Political Committee to draw correct and impartial conclusions regarding the practices and measures of the Israeli Government in the occupied Arab territories. The fact that the Committee had been unable to visit the territories did not diminish the validity of the proof presented in the report.

32. By analysing statements made by representatives of the Israeli Government and articles published in the official Israeli press, the Committee had ascertained beyond any doubt that Israel had not renounced its aggressive policy, which was reflected in its continued occupation and annexation of Arab territories. Israel was continuing flagrantly to violate the Charter of the United Nations, the norms of international law and the provisions of numerous United Nations resolutions.

33. In connexion with the objections made at the 987th meeting by the representative of Costa Rica, he said that his delegation rejected all those unfounded allegations. With regard to the Costa Rican representative's observations concerning the policy of non-alignment, he felt that that representative, instead of expressing unfounded criticism of other delegations, should familiarize himself with that policy, with the place and role it played in the modern world in the promotion of understanding among peoples and States, and with the efforts of the non-aligned countries for the maintenance of international peace and security.

34. It was absolutely necessary for the United Nations and the international community to find a just and lasting solution to the Middle East crisis, a solution which ensured peace and security for all countries and peoples in the region. However, that objective could be attained only with the withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and with the full recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to establish its own State.

35. It was regrettable that Israel, reacting to the recent resolution adopted by the Security Council (381 (1975)), on the holding of a comprehensive debate on the situation in the Middle East, with the participation of PLO, had responded with new acts of aggression, such as its decision to establish new settlements in the occupied territories and to bomb Palestinian refugee camps. Such behaviour only increased the isolation of Israel and justified the conclusions of the Special Committee.

36. Mr. ABDEL LATIF (Sudan) said that his delegation had hoped that the Israeli representative would have indicated a change in his Government's policy, but, as usual, he had merely attacked the Special Committee and its report. It was sad and ironical that the same people who had been subjected to the worst physical and moral torture

in history were the ones who today were inflicting injustice on innocent people with whom they had coexisted for centuries.

37. The Israeli representative had spoken of the improvement in the standard of living and the increase in the number of cars and television sets; he had not indicated, however, what part of the population possessed those goods, for it was impossible for homeless and unemployed people to own them. He had also described life in Israeli prisons as if it were paradise; however, the Committee had seen a film showing the life of Palestinians outside prison, and surely it could not be worse.

38. Moreover, if what he was saying were true, why did his Government refuse to co-operate with the Special Committee and to apply the fourth Geneva Convention? The Israeli representative had kept on talking about terrorist organizations. He reminded him that the Israelis had been the first to introduce violence in the region. If the Palestinians who were fighting to regain their homes and identity could be classified as terrorists, then his delegation welcomed that classification. A number of countries in the Committee had gained their independence and their right to self-determination through the action of their freedom fighters, and the United Nations had acclaimed them because one of the major roles of the Organization was the achievement of freedom for the oppressed and colonized.

39. His delegation hoped that the documentary film which the Committee had seen during the course of the 985th meeting would be given the widest possible publicity, particularly in those countries which had spoken so much of Israeli democracy and justice. The Office of Public Information should collaborate to that end. Furthermore, his delegation proposed that a day of solidarity with the Palestinian people should be proclaimed, to be celebrated in 1976, and appealed to the members of the Committee to support that proposal.

40. The Palestinian question could either restore confidence in the United Nations and in the lofty ideals enshrined in its Charter or, on the contrary, could cause the Organization to disappear forever.

41. Mr. ZENKYAVICHUS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the report of the Special Committee showed that Israel had applied a deliberate policy of annexation of the occupied territories in contravention of the resolutions of the United Nations and the accepted norms of international law. The living conditions of the population of the occupied territories had not changed, and Israel continued to adopt measures which violated their basic human rights. His delegation agreed with the conviction, expressed by the Special Committee in paragraph 189 of its report, that the termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population.

42. The question of the violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories should be considered in the context of the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of Israeli aggression and territorial expansion. The occupation of those territories since 1967 in itself constituted a violation of those

rights. The policy of terrorism and oppression of which the inhabitants of the territories were the victims was part of the policy of annexation. Israel refused to withdraw its troops, carried out mass arrests, destroyed homes, refugee camps and property, altered the physical character and the demographic composition of the occupied areas and was plundering the national heritage. Owing to the forceful expulsion of Arabs to make room for Jewish immigrants, many thousands of persons had been made homeless and faced grave shortages. The colonization of the occupied territories was being stepped up and was increasingly becoming the official policy. Moreover, the Israeli Government had declared not only that it would not abide by Security Council resolution 381 (1975), but also that it would consolidate the occupation.

43. The Israeli authorities were pursuing a policy of terrorism and intimidation in order to isolate the resistance movements. Thousands of people had been imprisoned, many of them without a trial, or had been subjected to preventive detention. Israel had sought to portray PLO as a terrorist movement, but that organization was engaged in a just and legitimate struggle, in defence of the rights of its people. PLO had been officially recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestine people by the United Nations, which, in General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX), had conferred observer status upon it and allowed it to participate in its debates. The General Assembly, at its current session, had adopted resolution 3375 (XXX), calling for the invitation of PLO to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which were held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of resolution 3236 (XXIX).

44. Israel's policy of annexation was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the numerous decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The United Nations should react to the acts of violence committed by Israel in pursuance of that policy which, in any event, was doomed to failure. Only the ending of the policy of annexation would make it possible for peace to be restored.

45. The USSR condemned Israel's aggression against the Arab States and its criminal acts in the occupied territories. It was confident that the just cause of the Arab people, including the Arab people of Palestine, would triumph.

46. The USSR desired the conclusion of an agreement on the Middle East and believed that, to that end, two fundamental questions must be solved: the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied in 1967 and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people, including their right to form a State. Only then could there be a stable peace and the conditions for the peaceful development of all States in the region. Accordingly, the Soviet Union had proposed to the Government of the United States, as co-chairman of the Geneva Peace Conference, that that Conference should be reconvened. All the interested parties, namely, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, PLO as the representative of the Palestine people, and Israel, as well as the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, should participate in it

from the outset. The objective of the Geneva Peace Conference should be to achieve a settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations, especially Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and General Assembly resolution 2336 (XXIX).

47. Mr. IPSARIDES (Cyprus) pointed out that the explosive nature of the Middle East situation was increasing as time passed and the situation of the refugees and the general situation in the area deteriorated, as the report submitted by the Special Committee revealed.

48. The military occupation of those territories, which was contrary to the principles of the Charter, was culminating in a calculated policy of annexation, at the expense of the Arab people who were being expelled from their land. The Government of Cyprus had clearly indicated its opposition to the policy of annexation and the demographic dismemberment of countries.

49. The violations of human rights mentioned in the report not only infringed international law but also the basic concept of human relations. All those problems arose from military occupation, and the international community must resist the military occupation of territories by force and the changing of their physical character, demographic composition and institutional structure.

50. The world was passing through a turbulent period, with many national and international disorders, including anarchy. The international community must clearly denounce the division and oppression of peoples and countries. His delegation hoped that the United Nations would give expression to the world conscience and would take a just and necessary stand on the problem under consideration.

51. Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan) said that when the General Assembly had set up the Special Committee, no one had imagined that a State Member of the United Nations would be allowed to continue its illegal occupation of the territories of three other States, which were also Members of the Organization, for such a long period of time. However, Israel persisted in its defiant attitude and refused to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly calling on it to withdraw immediately from all the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war.

52. The violations of human rights in the occupied territories had intensified. The Government of Israel continued its policy of annexation and settlement and its

punitive actions and reprisals against civilians in the form of such measures as the demolition of houses, forcible transfer of population and expropriation of land. There had also been instances of detention without trial and of ill-treatment and torture of detainees. The report of the Special Committee contained irrefutable evidence of those contraventions by Israel.

53. Israel should respect the obligations incumbent upon it as a Member of the United Nations and a signatory of international conventions, but its acts in the occupied territories constituted continuing violations of the principles of the Charter and of those instruments.

54. The most serious aspect of the military occupation was the policy of annexation aimed at perpetuating the illegal occupation of the territories and confronting the world with a fait accompli. That attitude and policy of Israel were in contradiction with the alleged desire of its Government for a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem.

55. Israel should realize that the international community could not remain indifferent to its violations of the most basic rules of international conduct, and that there could be no peace in the Middle East in a situation of continuing occupation and expansion in which the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and national sovereignty was denied. Israel should immediately put an end to its illegal occupation of the Arab territories, to its policy of annexation, to all measures designed to alter the demographic character of the territories, and to its desecration of the holy places.

56. The report revealed that the policies and practices pursued by Israel in the occupied territories, in so far as they affected the human rights of the population, had not changed and that the situation continued to give cause for concern. Moreover, the report spoke of the continued exploitation of the labour force of the occupied territories. Israel's argument that its occupation was beneficial to the economic well-being of the population of the occupied territories was a colonial concept which had long since been rejected.

57. His delegation endorsed the conclusions of the Special Committee and shared the view it expressed in paragraph 173 of its report that there was no further purpose in furnishing the General Assembly with more evidence until and unless major changes took place in the situation.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

990th meeting

Wednesday, 3 December 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.990

AGENDA ITEM 51

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (continued)* (A/10366, A/SPC/L.339)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/SPC/L.339)

1. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.339 on behalf of the sponsors, which included the 33 members of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, said that throughout its history the United Nations, whose principal purpose was the maintenance of international peace and security, had often had to launch peace-keeping operations to deal with situations of armed conflict. The Organization could not continue to operate on the basis of *ad hoc* arrangements, especially as certain sections of the United Nations felt that the existing arrangements were susceptible of manipulation to make it possible to isolate them from peace-keeping operations, while others felt that the Secretary-General could collaborate directly with the Security Council—which would obviate the need for guidelines—and others again thought that the Special Committee should abandon that aspect of its work, in view of the futility of trying to reconcile doctrinaire views that were diametrically opposed when other, more practical aspects urgently required its attention.

2. During the 10 years for which the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had been considering the question in all its aspects, it had alternately made progress and run into difficulties. The year 1975 had been a difficult one. In its report (A/10366), the Special Committee confined itself to the facts and did not dwell on the obstacles it had encountered. Both the report and draft resolution A/SPC/L.339 focused on the question of the future of the Special Committee's work and on the need for agreed guidelines with a view to a solution in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The second preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 1 to 3 were quite clear. Paragraph 4 was a new departure, with its request for the consideration of specific questions related to practical implementation of peace-keeping operations; such questions included logistics, equipment or the training of national contingents, all of which further accentuated the need for guidelines.

4. The fact that the Special Committee was unable for the time being to reach agreement on guidelines should not prevent it from considering the other aspects of the

question, and accordingly the members of the Special Committee, particularly those which, as permanent members of the Security Council, had a special responsibility in the matter, must be asked to continue their efforts to reach agreement on the guidelines. He urged all delegations to vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.339, which, being based on the universally recognized principle of the maintenance of peace, should not give rise to any polemics.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to vote later on the draft resolution as it stood. He announced that the German Democratic Republic had become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (continued) (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370, A/SPC/L.340-343)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

6. Mr. AL-SHAKAR (Bahrain) commended the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its excellent report (A/10272), which, by highlighting the acts committed by Israel, constituted a clear condemnation of that country.

7. Despite the lack of goodwill displayed by Israel, the Special Committee had succeeded in collecting enough evidence to show that the situation remained unchanged and that the Israeli authorities were still refusing to implement the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, or the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949¹ by continuing their policies involving annexation of much of the occupied territories, destruction, confiscation and expropriation. Israel was trying to establish settlements for immigrants in the occupied territories, expelling and imprisoning the people who lived there, and was profaning Moslem Holy Places with a view to appropriating them along with the Moslem archaeological heritage. In addition, Israel continued to exploit natural and human resources which did not belong to it. Thus, it was clear that the Zionists had decided to carry to completion their plan for settling the occupied territories under a variety of pretexts.

8. His delegation was particularly incensed that Israel was making bold to profane holy places, both Moslem and

* Resumed from the 988th meeting.

¹ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

Christian, such as the Al Aqsa Mosque, the Church of the Resurrection and the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque. It regarded that as a criminal act of the utmost gravity, which would suffice in itself to justify a reaction by the international community. His delegation agreed with the views expressed by the Special Committee (*ibid.*, paras. 186 and 187) that the trial of Archbishop Capucci had been illegal, and that the value of the damage caused by the destruction of the town of Quneitra must be determined as soon as possible.

9. His delegation wished to state that it fully supported the liberation struggle of the Palestinians and that there could be no true peace in the region so long as injustice prevailed and the rights of the Palestinians were not recognized. In that connexion, he was gratified that the Security Council, by its resolution 381 (1975), had decided again to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in the debate on the Middle East problem to be held in January 1976. While he regretted Israel's refusal to participate in that debate because of the presence of the PLO representatives, he hoped that the Council's decision would facilitate the search for a solution to the Middle East problem and that, as a result, the rights of the Palestinians would be respected.

10. The CHAIRMAN announced that, although the Indian delegation was not on the list of speakers, it had asked for the floor to enable Mr. Sayid Muhammad, to make a statement to the Committee before leaving for India.

It was so decided.

11. Mr. MUHAMMAD (India) paid tribute to the members of the Special Committee, who had fulfilled the mandate entrusted to them despite lack of co-operation on the part of Israel.

12. He noted that the analysis presented in the Special Committee's report was based on evidence emanating from authoritative Israeli sources which had not been refuted by the Israeli authorities. The report presented a heart-rending picture of the persecution of the people in the occupied territories by the Israeli authorities. The eviction of Arab inhabitants and the construction of settlements to accommodate Jewish immigrants were creating growing restlessness among the civilian population, which had manifested itself in 1975 in a marked increase of incidents followed by reprisals by the Israeli authorities. Such reprisals had resulted in the demolition of houses, expulsions, and interference in the commercial life of the civilian population. The statements of the Israeli leaders ruled out any hope of improvement in the plight of the Arab population in the occupied territories. On the contrary, Israel was determined to make the annexed territories part of the Jewish State.

13. Those actions constituted a grave violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, but it was true that Israel had always maintained that the provisions of the Convention did not apply to the territories occupied by aggression in 1967.

14. Yet the people of Palestine had been going through untold suffering for over a quarter of a century, and a

whole generation had been born in refugee camps. The Government of India unequivocally condemned those persistent and flagrant violations by Israel of the basic rights of the population of the occupied territories, and fully shared the conviction of the Special Committee that the termination of the occupation would alone provide the surest guarantee of the restoration of the basic human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

15. The CHAIRMAN noted that the representatives of Mali and Kuwait, the last two countries on the list of speakers, were absent, and suggested that the meeting should be suspended for a few minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.

16. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had concluded the general debate on the item, and invited representatives to consider the draft resolutions.

It was so decided.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/SPC/L.340-343)

17. Mr. MAHMOOD (Pakistan), introducing four draft resolutions, said that they all dealt with the same question, namely Israel's violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Three of the drafts were similar to the ones adopted by the General Assembly in 1974. Only draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 dealt with a new issue—actions of the Israeli authorities to change the institutional structure and religious practices in the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Al-Khalil.

18. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.340 resembled General Assembly resolution 3240 A (XXIX) apart from the fact that the provision deploring Israel's continued refusal to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories had been moved to operative paragraph 2 and that instead of expressing the "gravest concern" at Israel's continued and persistent violations of the fourth Geneva Convention and other applicable international instruments, the General Assembly, in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution before the Committee "deplored" those actions. In paragraph 1, the General Assembly commended the Special Committee for its efforts, and in paragraph 3 it again called upon Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories. In paragraph 5 and the subsequent paragraphs, the General Assembly condemned Israel's violations of the fourth Geneva Convention and other applicable international instruments and declared that Israel's policies and practices constituted an impediment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace, declared them null and void and urged all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel and to avoid actions which might be used by Israel in pursuing those policies. In paragraph 11, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Finally, paragraphs 12 and 13 were self-explanatory.

19. The draft resolution summed up the work of the Special Committee, and in adopting it the General Assembly would be censuring Israel and keeping watch over its actions in the occupied territories.

20. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.341 dealt with the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem. The General Assembly, in its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) and 3240 B (XXIX), had affirmed that the Convention was applicable to that situation, and in the draft resolution before the Committee it reaffirmed that position and deplored Israel's refusal to respect the Convention. Israel had signed and ratified the Convention without any reservation, and it was bound under articles 1 and 2 of the Convention to implement the latter's provisions. In the Commentary on the Convention edited by Jean Pictet,² it was stated that the nature of a particular war or its purposes in no way affected the treatment that protected persons should receive from the occupying power. The Convention was applicable to all parties, at all times, and in all cases and circumstances. Accordingly, in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution the General Assembly once more called upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, under article 1 of the Geneva Convention, each contracting party undertook to respect and ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances; therefore, in operative paragraph 4, the Assembly urged all States parties to the Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions.

21. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.342 dealt with the destruction and devastation of the town of Quneitra by the Israeli forces before their withdrawal under the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974.³ The General Assembly, in resolution 3240 C (XXIX), had endorsed the Special Committee's conclusion that Israel was responsible for that destruction and that Israel's action was a grave breach of the Geneva Convention to which he had already referred. In addition, the General Assembly had, at the request of the Special Committee, instructed the latter to undertake, with the assistance of experts, a survey of the destruction and to assess the nature and extent of the damage. The Special Committee had not been able to submit a full report to the present session of the General Assembly. To enable it to do so in 1976, the General Assembly, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution before the Committee, requested the Secretary-General to continue to make available to the Special Committee all the facilities necessary in the performance of its tasks.

22. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 dealt with a question to which the sponsors attached special importance at the current session of the General Assembly. It related to the Israeli measures affecting the religious sanctity and physical

integrity of the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Al-Khalil. Completely ignoring the religious susceptibilities of Moslems, Israel had partitioned the mosque and assigned the larger area for the use of Jews. The Israeli authorities were preventing Moslems from going there to pray and perform other religious rites. In addition, the eastern staircase had been demolished. Those actions had gravely offended hundreds of millions of Moslems throughout the world and had already led to disturbances between the indigenous Arab population and the Israeli authorities. It was therefore essential for Israel to rescind those measures. Respect for the religious freedom and practices of people under occupation was protected by international law, and in particular by article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention. In operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution before the Committee, the General Assembly therefore called upon Israel to rescind and to desist forthwith from all such measures. Furthermore, in order to obtain a full picture of the situation, the General Assembly, in paragraph 3, requested the Secretary-General to investigate the situation by contacting all the authorities concerned and to report as soon as possible on Israel's compliance with the Assembly's request. Finally, in paragraph 4, the General Assembly called upon Israel to co-operate with the Secretary-General.

23. The sponsors of the draft resolutions hoped that the members of the Committee, realizing the importance and gravity of the questions dealt with, would vote for them.

24. He announced that Benin and the Comoros had joined the sponsors of all four draft resolutions; the Philippines had joined the sponsors of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.341, A/SPC/L.342 and A/SPC/L.343; Indonesia and Malaysia had joined the sponsors of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.340, A/SPC/L.341 and A/SPC/L.343; and Mali had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.341.

25. Mr. DORON (Israel), beginning his statement, said that repetition did not change the nature of the Arab delegation's tune, which was nothing but a tissue of anti-Semitic lies and nonsense.

26. Mr. FADHLI (Democratic Yemen) and Mr. SAHAD (Libyan Arab Republic), each speaking on a point of order, asked whether the Committee had in fact begun its consideration of the draft resolutions before it or whether the representative of Israel was exercising the right of reply.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that the draft resolutions were indeed under consideration and that all delegations had the right to express their views.

28. Mr. DORON (Israel) said that the tissue of lies to which he had referred now appeared in the form of four draft resolutions whose distortions exceeded even those of the report of the Special Committee on which they were supposed to be based. He noted that Senegal, a member of the Special Committee, was a sponsor of the draft resolutions; that showed how the members of the Special Committee understood their duties.

29. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.340 followed, and indeed went beyond, the language of General Assembly resolution 3240 A (XXIX), since its sponsors wanted the Assembly to

² Jean S. Pictet, ed., *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958).

³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1974*, document S/11302/Add.1, annex I.

"deplore" and "condemn" Israel's alleged short-comings, over which it had hitherto expressed its "gravest concern". Previously charged with "disregard" of certain international instruments, Israel was now said to have "violated" those same instruments. Since his delegation has refuted point by point the allegations made in the Special Committee's report, on which the draft resolutions now under consideration were based, there was no justification for the "condemnation" sought in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

30. The propaganda film which had been shown to the members of the Committee had proved nothing, for the same scenes of demolition could have been filmed in Damascus, where renewal projects had been carried out. One was asked to accept the systematic destruction of synagogues in the Arab countries, but improvements carried out by the Israeli authorities were depicted as sacrilege. Similarly, the taking over of houses by the Israeli authorities for the resettlement of Jewish immigrants whose property had been confiscated in the Arab countries from which they came was described as highly unfair.

31. The purpose of draft resolution A/SPC/L.342 was to have the United Nations support the fraudulent Syrian claims concerning Quneitra, whose destruction was the consequence of Syrian aggression and which the Syrian Government itself had chosen not to rebuild and resettle.

32. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.341, it sufficed to recall, first, that his delegation, ever since the establishment of the Special Committee, had continually stated that there was no point in engaging in theoretical debates, and that the question of the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention and any resolution on that point were irrelevant, and secondly, that Israel applied the provisions of the Convention in practice.

33. On the basis of spurious and biased allegations, which they presented as factual findings, the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 incited anti-Semitism and gave vent to inflammatory vituperations. In that connexion, his delegation rejected the childish reasoning that Arabs could not be anti-Semitic because they were Semites themselves. Anti-Semitism was universally understood to be directed against Jews and not against Arabs.

34. With regard to the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in the town of Al-Khalil, the statement by his delegation at the 890th meeting on 9 November 1973 and the letter dated 20 August 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/10204-S/11809) had demonstrated clearly that Jews had always lived in the town of Hebron and had always been able to worship in Ma'arat Hamechpela, situated in what the Arabs now called the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque, and that it was only in 1929, following the slaughter of the Hebron community by Moslems, that Jewish worship there had come to a temporary halt. The draft resolution ignored the fact that the burial site of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob had always been holy to Jews. As the representative of Israel had stated in his letter, Israel had always respected the right of free access to holy places by believers of all faiths.

35. Ever since a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session had conferred a certain status on the notorious PLO, the spokesmen of that terrorist organization had been attempting to justify the murders committed by its members by invoking the alleged recognition of the organization by the international community as implied by that resolution.

36. He hoped and trusted that the Committee would show its revulsion in regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 by rejecting it, that it would vote against draft resolutions A/SPC/L.340 and A/SPC/L.342, and that it would not support draft resolution A/SPC/L.341.

37. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he admired the patience of the members of the Committee, who were condemned to listen to the representative of Israel tirelessly repeating the same arguments. He himself would confine his statement to a very specific point: the representative of Israel, seeking to divert attention from the text of draft resolution A/SPC/L.342, which referred to the destruction of and the extent of the damage to the town of Quneitra, had mentioned certain so-called arbitrary measures which the Syrian Government had allegedly taken against Jews living in the Syrian Arab Republic. He would not dwell on the question of Quneitra, which the Committee would have an opportunity to reconsider at the thirty-first session, when it had before it the full report to be submitted on that subject by the Special Committee. The representative of Israel had alleged that the freedom of Syrian Jews and their enjoyment of their movable and immovable property were subject to arbitrary measures. He wished to deny those allegations in the most formal way. Judaism was respected in the Syrian Arab Republic in the same way as Christianity and Islam. No Jew was subject to restrictive measures of any kind, unless, of course, his acts were contrary to morality, public order or national security. No one, least of all the representative of Israel, was unaware that the Syrian Arab Republic was at war with Israel, whose leaders had contaminated the minds of Jews throughout the world by propagating the Zionist doctrine which the United Nations had condemned because of its discriminatory character. It was quite clear that it was the duty of the Government of a country at war to take all measures necessary to buttress its authority, affirm its sovereignty and protect the security of its territory and population.

38. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his observations would relate to draft resolution A/SPC/L.341, concerning the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention. The representative of Israel had contended that those were theoretical considerations and that the Convention was not applicable in the occupied territories because of the reservations formulated by the Israeli Government. How could one speak of theoretical considerations in connexion with the application of a Convention to which Israel was a party, as were the Governments of the Arab States whose territories it was occupying? The purpose of the Convention was precisely to regulate relations between the States parties in all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of one of them. The Convention had been drafted in very precise terms in order to avoid the ambiguities of

the Hague Convention of 1907⁴ which had preceded it, and it stipulated that it must be respected in all circumstances, in all cases, at any time and in any place. There was thus no doubt that it was applicable to the occupied territories, and it would be interesting to learn what reservations Israel had been able to invoke in order to contest it.

39. He therefore called upon the representative of Israel to indicate the nature of those reservations to the members of the Committee, who could then judge whether they were in fact likely to limit the applicability of the Convention. All the delegations represented in the Committee—and especially the Arab delegations—were entitled to know about those reservations which Israel was brandishing like a shield in order to conceal itself. He himself had demonstrated at the 988th meeting that the Convention was applicable to the occupied territories, by virtue of both its own provisions and the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of international instruments. The only valid reason that Israel could have for not applying the Convention would be to denounce it, which as far as he knew it had not done. He therefore challenged the representative of Israel to reveal to the Committee the content of those reservations.

40. Mr. DORON (Israel), replying to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, said it was notorious that the Jews in that country were subjected to restrictive and discriminatory measures and that they were, in particular, prohibited from leaving Syrian Territory. Since the Jews in the Syrian Arab Republic lived in an earthly paradise, why did the Syrian Government not give them the opportunity—which they would apparently have absolutely no reason to take—to leave the country? It would then be easy to determine who was telling the truth.

41. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) requested the members of the Committee to note that the representative of Israel had replied to the question he had posed solely by an eloquent silence.

42. Mr. DORON (Israel), replying to the representative of the United Arab Emirates, said that if that representative had sought a minimum of information he would know that that question had long ago received a reply, and that it would have sufficed for him to familiarize himself with it.

43. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates), said he believed he had been present at all the Committee's debates on the item, but all he knew about those celebrated reservations was that they were contained in a memorandum which the Israeli authorities had allegedly sent to ICRC. Why should those reservations not be made known? And if, as the representative of Israel stated, that had already been done, why should their provisions not be repeated? Many representatives who had been attending the Committee's debates for only a short space of time or who, like himself, lacked information, would certainly welcome clarification on that point.

44. Mr. GAMMOH (Jordan), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said it was paradoxical that Israel kept

making statements every year protesting its sincerity, good faith and innocence, while continuing to withhold from the representative of the Secretary-General and the members of the Special Committee the right to visit the occupied territories. What could Israel have to fear since, to judge by its statements, it was so convinced of the propriety and legality of the measures it was taking in the territories? It was difficult to see how the representative of Israel could question the veracity of the facts reported by the Special Committee without at the same time casting doubt on the Israeli sources on which the report was based. Was it possible that the Israeli press too was guilty of lying?

45. Mr. DORON (Israel) said, in reply to the representative of the United Arab Emirates, that the legal applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention was a question which concerned only the Israeli authorities and ICRC. The Committee's task was to consider the effective application of the Convention; it was not competent to consider the legal aspects. In reply to the representative of Jordan, he pointed out that the Israeli Government had explained on many occasions why it could not co-operate with the Special Committee, and a study of the successive reports of the Committee merely strengthened those convictions. He would merely add that the territories administered by Israel and the holy places were visited every year by hundreds of thousands of Christians and Moslems—whether Arabs or not—and that their number was growing each year. There was therefore no lack of testimony concerning the situation in the territories, and the representative of Jordan himself, if he so wished, would have no difficulty in going there also.

46. Mr. SIBAHI (Syrian Arab Republic) said, in reply to the representative of Israel, that the Syrian authorities did nothing to prevent Jews from leaving the Syrian Arab Republic and that many in fact had left. Those remaining were entitled to carry on their business and to practise their religion in complete freedom. The representative of Israel should compare, on the basis of statistics that he probably knew very well, the number of Syrian Jews who had immigrated into Israel with those who had emigrated from Israel; if he did so, he might perhaps not take up that question again.

47. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) said he regretted that the representative of Israel was contradicting himself. He had first claimed to have stated before the Committee the reservations of the Israeli Government and now he was asserting that it was a question which concerned only the Israeli Government and ICRC and was not within the competence of the Special Political Committee. He (Mr. Hammad) would merely point out that contradiction, since he did not wish to enter into polemics on that point.

48. He nevertheless opposed the argument that it was a question for discussion only between the Israeli Government and the ICRC. More than 100 States had acceded to the fourth Geneva Convention and many were represented on the Committee. They were certainly entitled to take cognizance of those reservations since they had undertaken "to respect and to ensure respect for" the Convention and since there existed contractual relations linking every State party to the Convention with every State violating its

⁴ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

provisions. Furthermore, at the two preceding sessions of the General Assembly, 120 and 121 countries respectively had called upon Israel to respect and to comply with the provisions of the Convention in the occupied Arab territories (resolutions 3092 A (XXVII) and 3240 B (XXIX)). Accordingly, under the provisions of the Convention and of the resolutions of the General Assembly, Israel was required either to apply the Convention or to indicate explicitly the reasons why it refused to do so.

49. Mr. GAMMOH (Jordan) said he did not understand why the representative of Israel rejected draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 in operative paragraph 3 of which the Secretary-General was requested to investigate the situation in the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque. He had nothing to fear from such an investigation since it would merely establish the facts which, according to him, would be favourable to Israel.

50. Mr. DORON (Israel) stated that he had never changed his position on the applicability of the Convention; he had always asserted that Israel had communicated its reservations to the competent authorities and that the Special Political Committee was empowered to consider the practical application and not the legal applicability of that instrument.

51. In reply to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, he said that it might have been possible in the past that Jews had been authorized to leave that country but if it was still true, it was difficult to understand why in 1974 four girls had tried to escape by illegally crossing the frontier and had been finally killed by the guard who was supposed to help them to flee. For its part, Israel was a free country which anyone could leave. However, it would be very interesting to verify from the statistics mentioned by the Syrian representative how many Jews had emigrated from Israel to the Syrian Arab Republic.

52. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) noted that the representative of Israel, who had asserted that the question of the applicability of the Convention had been studied by his Government with the competent authorities, seemed to be denying that competence to some 120 States Members of the United Nations which had twice expressed by their vote in the General Assembly the conviction that the Convention was applicable to the occupied territories.

53. Mr. BADAWI (Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the point raised by the representative of Israel was extremely important for it called into question the Charter of the United Nations itself and the legal principles embodied in international conventions. When the representative of Israel claimed that his country was free to determine whether the fourth Geneva Convention was applicable to the occupied territories or not and whether the United Nations had the right to intervene when it was a question of human rights or violation of the territorial integrity of States Members of the United Nations, it was tantamount to allowing an individual State to decide unilaterally whether or not it must respect the principle of international responsibility, a principle recognized by any Member State which respected the provisions of the Charter. That was very dangerous. The principle of territorial integrity and the principle of the illegality of any occupation which was the consequence of an aggression or

the use of force where clearly set out in the Charter. Moreover, the fourth Geneva Convention, which was designed to protect civilians in time of war, explicitly prohibited forcible transfers of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying Power. Those provisions had been prompted by the tragic experience of the Second World War, which the representative of Israel should be the last to forget. To admit the principle of the applicability of international instruments and the principle of responsibility before the international community was really a strict minimum.

54. The representative of Israel had claimed that the Committee was not competent to take cognizance of legal questions. That was a point which he (Mr. Badawi) would not debate with the Israeli representative. However, he wished to take up the argument by the representative of Israel who had thought he had said enough by stating he had given a valid response to the "competent authorities" in the person of ICRC. The wrong impression might therefore be given that ICRC was satisfied with that reply and that it was sufficient to have given a reply, whatever it was, for the question to be settled. However, ICRC had not accepted the position of the Israeli Government and the twenty-second International Conference of the Red Cross held in Teheran in November 1973, had upheld the applicability of the Convention to the occupied Arab territories. Moreover, the Special Committee in its report (A/10272, para. 180) had noted that ICRC in its annual report for 1974⁵ had stated that the main problems encountered by ICRC for which no satisfactory solutions had yet been found were those connected with expulsions and the destruction of dwellings ordered by the Israeli authorities under the heading of repressive measures, in violation of articles 49, 33 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. It was therefore clear that ICRC did not accept either the legal norms invoked by Israel or Israeli practices.

55. He recalled that, at the twenty-ninth session, the representative of Kuwait (930th meeting) had warned the Committee of the dangers of the principle of selectivity in international law and of allowing a State to choose to apply or refuse to apply certain provisions, depending on whether they were in conformity or not with its own interests. That would constitute a precedent which would prejudice the interests of the whole international community. It was not for a State party to an international instrument to decide on its applicability; such applicability must emerge from the provisions of the instrument itself. In fact, the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention established without any possible doubt that it was applicable to the occupied territories.

56. He had voluntarily confined himself to the above arguments, wishing merely to avoid any misinterpretation of the Israeli reply. His delegation would of course have much to add with regard to the relationship between the non-application by Israel of the provisions of the Convention and the situation prevailing in the occupied territories.

⁵ *Annual Report 1974* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975).

57. Mr. SIBAH (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the right of Syrian citizens, whether Jewish or not, to enter or leave the Syrian Arab Republic freely did not concern the representative of Israel and had nothing to do with the question under study. The representative of Israel knew very well that his country was at war with the Syrian Arab Republic, a fact which created a special situation requiring certain measures of restriction essential for the protection of the national territory and its population.

58. Mr. DORON (Israel) wished to point out, following the long statement by the representative of Egypt, that ICRC in its annual report for 1974, had also stated that Israel had offered to it its co-operation and assistance and had to a large extent complied with the recommendations of that Committee. He had already quoted the passages of

the report at the end of the statement he had made to the Committee at its 985th meeting.

Organization of the Committee's work

59. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Committee had completed its discussion of agenda items 51 and 52 and suggested that the Committee's next meeting should be postponed until Friday afternoon, 5 December 1975, so as to allow certain of its members to consult their Governments and thus be able to vote on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

991st meeting

Friday, 5 December 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.991

AGENDA ITEM 51

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (concluded) (A/10366, A/SPC/L.339)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/SPC/L.339)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that if there was no objection, he would briefly suspend the meeting in order that those speakers who wished to do so might have their names entered on the list for explanation of vote before or after the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.339. He also announced that the delegation of Kenya had become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

The meeting was suspended at 3.12 p.m. and resumed at 3.14 p.m.

2. The CHAIRMAN recalled that in 1974 a draft resolution very similar to the one now before the Committee had been adopted by consensus. Accordingly, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted draft resolution A/SPC/L.339 by consensus.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus.

3. Mr. AMISSAH (Ghana) said his delegation did not believe that the mandate of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations should be extended automatically. The fact that on the present occasion Ghana had agreed with the current decision to extend that mandate reflected Ghana's concern that the General Assembly should adopt clear and practical guidelines in order that the

United Nations might carry out its task in the sphere of peace-keeping operations authoritatively and effectively.

4. In Ghana's view, the Special Committee's inability to carry out its mandate could be attributed to a lack of political will on the part of some of the great Powers to delineate clearly the role of the General Assembly in peace-keeping efforts or to assume their proper responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations as members of the Security Council. The report of the Special Committee (A/10366) confirmed that view.

5. After expressing his full agreement with the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, at the 984th meeting, concerning certain important differences between some members of the Working Group of the Special Committee, he stated that in supporting the extension of the Special Committee's mandate, his delegation was endorsing the conclusion in paragraph 7 of that Committee's report to the effect that the Working Group should also give attention to the consideration of specific questions related to the practical implementation of peace-keeping operations. He also agreed with the statements by the delegations of Canada and the Nordic countries, at the 984th and 983rd meetings respectively, that greater attention should be given to the preparation of a training programme for peace-keeping operations which would seek to unify and co-ordinate the various national programmes.

6. At a time when tensions were mounting in already troubled areas, as was currently the case, it was more than ever necessary to review the function of the United Nations in peace-keeping operations, with particular attention to what the representative of New Zealand, at the 983rd meeting, had called the "legitimate role" of the United Nations. He also agreed with what the representative of

New Zealand had said concerning the role the General Assembly should play in the initiation and control of peace-keeping operations.

7. He appealed to all Member States, particularly the great Powers, not to introduce into the work of the Special Committee extraneous matters which only reflected profound political and ideological differences. He stressed the need for all Members, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, to become involved in all aspects of peace-keeping operations, with a view to achieving truly positive results, and he appealed for efforts to invite China to participate in the work of the Special Committee.

8. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Benin), after pointing out that his delegation had expressed its views in the matter at the 983rd meeting, said that it had joined in the consensus on draft resolution A/SPC/L.339, but with some reservations because of the fact that the Special Political Committee had not been able to examine thoroughly the problems raised by many delegations. The mandate of the Special Committee had been renewed without giving the question the careful consideration it deserved. Moreover, he did not believe that the draft resolution just adopted would help to promote the work of the Special Committee, and expressed considerable scepticism as to whether the Special Committee could really carry out its mandate.

AGENDA ITEM 52

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (concluded) (A/10074, A/10128, A/10163-S/11780, A/10164-S/11784, A/10174-S/11797, A/10178-S/11799, A/10204-S/11809, A/10272, A/10286, A/10370, A/SPC/L.340-345 and A/SPC/L.345/Corr.1)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/SPC/L.340-345 AND A/SPC/L.345/CORR.1)

9. The CHAIRMAN said that the notes by the Secretary-General (A/SPC/L.344 and A/SPC/L.345 and Corr.1) submitted in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, set out the administrative and financial implications of the adoption of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.342 and A/SPC/L.340 respectively. After announcing that the delegation of India had become a sponsor of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.340, A/SPC/L.341, and A/SPC/L.342 and that Afghanistan wished to be added to the list of sponsors of those three draft resolutions and of draft resolution A/SPC/L.343, he said that if there was no objection, he would suspend the meeting in order that those representatives who wished to do so might have their names entered on the list for explanation of vote.

The meeting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.24 p.m.

10. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the four draft resolutions before it and suggested that all explanations of vote should be made after completion of the vote.

At the request of the representative of Kuwait, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/SPC/L.340.

Ethiopia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt.

Against: Israel, Nicaragua, United States of America, Costa Rica.

Abstaining: France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Denmark.

The draft resolution was adopted by 81 votes to 4, with 20 abstentions.

At the request of the representative of Kuwait, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/SPC/L.341.

Belgium, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh.

Against: Israel.

Abstaining: Haiti, Malawi, Nicaragua.

The draft resolution was adopted by 106 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

At the request of the representative of Kuwait, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/SPC/L.342.

The United Arab Emirates, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: Israel, Nicaragua.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden.

The draft resolution was adopted by 84 votes to 2, with 24 abstentions.

At the request of the representative of Kuwait, a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A/SPC/L.343.

The United Arab Emirates, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey,

Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: United States of America, Costa Rica, Israel, Nicaragua.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Swaziland, Sweden.

The draft resolution was adopted by 78 votes to 4, with 26 abstentions.

11. Mr. ESCOBAR (Colombia), speaking in explanation of vote, reaffirmed his delegation's view that Israel should withdraw from the territories occupied since 1967 and that the Palestinian people had the full right to regain those territories. It would be desirable to achieve that through an over-all settlement of the Middle East problem that would guarantee the territorial integrity of Israel and ensure a just and lasting peace in the region.

12. Colombia had abstained in the vote on draft resolutions A/SPC/L.340, A/SPC/L.342 and A/SPC/L.343 because it believed that the allegations and charges made against Israel in those draft resolutions were not fully proved, since the Special Committee's report, on which they were based, was defective and unsatisfactory.

13. Mr. TELLMANN (Norway) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.342, in keeping with its traditional position concerning resolutions based on reports of the Special Committee, since it believed that the membership of that Committee was too narrow, not including any country that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel.

14. Mr. MUHONEN (Finland) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolutions A/SPC/L.340 and A/SPC/L.341 although it had some reservations concerning their wording. It was regrettable that the Special Committee could not have been established in a way that would have created better conditions for the discharge of its mandate. It was also regrettable that Israel had not allowed the Special Committee to enter the occupied territories.

15. His delegation had serious reservations with regard to operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/SPC/L.340, but had voted in favour of it because it reflected the concern his delegation felt at the living conditions of the population in the occupied territories. His delegation could not accept any changes in the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, referred to in paragraph 7, and emphasized the necessity of respecting human rights in those territories.

16. His delegation also recognized that it was essential to have a reliable and complete picture of the situation and wished once again to stress the importance of finding a just and lasting political solution to the problems in the Middle East taking into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

17. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy), speaking on behalf of the nine member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) said that they had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.341 because, in their view, the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949¹ applied to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and, accordingly, the Committee had the right to demand that Israel should observe and comply with it.

18. The States members of EEC understood the references to Jerusalem in operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 as applying only to the situation resulting from the 1967 conflict. They had abstained in the vote on draft resolutions A/SPC/L.340 and A/SPC/L.342 basically because of their reservations with regard to the report of the Special Committee, which had already been stated. They had also abstained on draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 because there seemed to be no reason to take a position on the situation with regard to the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and to ask at the same time that an investigation should be made into that situation.

19. Mr. SHERER (United States of America) said that his delegation had voted against draft resolution A/SPC/L.340 because it considered that the serious allegations made therein had not been sufficiently verified and because the resolution constituted an unbalanced treatment of a complex and many-sided situation. However, on the question of the fourth Geneva Convention, the United States had long held that it applied to the occupied territories and had therefore voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.341.

20. The United States regarded the destruction of cities in wartime as an extremely serious matter and believed that any such allegations should be investigated. However, his delegation had been obliged to abstain on General Assembly resolution 3240 C (XXIX) because it had objected to certain aspects of the Special Committee's terms of reference regarding a survey of the destruction in Quneitra, and at the current session it had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.342 for the same reason.

21. Draft resolution A/SPC/L.343 once again presented the difficulties of approaching a complex human problem from a single perspective. The draft resolution not only failed to take into account the needs of the followers of two distinct faiths but, in the preamble, also prejudged the question. Accordingly, his delegation had had to vote against it.

22. Mr. DINKELSPIEL (Sweden) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.341 on the understanding, however, that operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 4, as well as paragraph 2, referred only to the territories occupied in 1967.

23. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) said that his delegation had voted for the four draft resolutions just adopted for reasons of which the members of the Committee were well aware. He noted that only four delegations had voted against the first draft resolution, one against the second, two against the third, and four against the fourth.

24. His delegation believed that draft resolution A/SPC/L.341 was the basis for the other three draft resolutions, because the position a delegation took with regard to the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied territories would determine its attitude towards the other three drafts. His delegation had already made a statement concerning the legal and juridical grounds for applying the Convention (988th meeting).

25. Mr. DORON (Israel), speaking on a point of order, said that under the rules of procedure, the representative of the United Arab Emirates should confine himself to explaining his delegation's vote.

26. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of the United Arab Emirates to follow the rules of procedure.

27. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) said that the representative of Israel was mistaken, because he (Mr. Hammad) had indeed been explaining the reasons for which his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolutions. The representative of Israel was only manifesting a bad conscience because he had seen that the Committee had voted against his position.

28. Mr. DORON (Israel), taking the floor on a point of order, said that the representative of the United Arab Emirates must comply with the ruling the Chairman had made on the previous point of order he had raised.

29. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that he had not made any ruling but had only meant to say that the representative of Israel was, strictly speaking, correct, since an explanation of vote should be precisely that, but he had said nothing about any relationship there might be between the statement by the representative of the United Arab Emirates and the reason he had voted as he had.

30. Mr. HAMMAD (United Arab Emirates) reiterated that the results of the vote showed that the arguments put forward by his delegation with regard to the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention had been correct.

31. Mr. HEGRAS (Oman) said that he would like the record to show that, if his delegation had been present, it would have voted in favour of all four draft resolutions.

Completion of the Committee's work

32. The CHAIRMAN said that he had been honoured to preside over the work of the Special Political Committee and was grateful to all the members for the co-operation they had displayed. In his view, the Committee had had a difficult task to accomplish, in that it had been established precisely to deal with items that were vital but transitory, and that made the consideration of such items particularly difficult. He therefore owed special thanks to those delegations that were directly concerned with the matters the Committee had been considering.

33. He felt it worth mentioning that at the current session the Committee had shown much greater efficiency than could be expected of it, had thoroughly dealt with the items assigned to it and had produced satisfactory results.

¹ Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287).

34. Lastly, he expressed appreciation to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, as well as to the Secretary of the Committee and all the staff of the Secretariat who had enabled the Committee to bring its work to a happy conclusion.

After an exchange of courtesies, the Chairman declared that the Special Political Committee had completed its work for the thirtieth session.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

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