

population. It was time to put an end to that hypocritical, paternalistic attitude. The proposed measures for isolating the régime were nothing new; similar methods had been employed during the cold war and on many other occasions, and he therefore did not see what objection there could be to applying them.

47. In spite of the attitude taken by the Western countries in question, the countries of Africa had continued to co-operate with them, since they were aware that confrontation would jeopardize their goal, and the Arab countries had initiated a dialogue for the same reason. That reflected a genuine desire to co-operate with the Western countries, and it was to be hoped that they would reciprocate.

48. The statements made in the Committee showed that the countries of Africa would never agree to détente with South Africa. The countries which supported Vorster had failed to offer any indication that there had been changes in the policy of the racist régime, and they should change their attitude towards that régime if they really believed in equality and justice. His delegation had listened attentively to the statements made by the representatives of those countries, but it had been disappointed in its hope of seeing a change in their attitude. In that connexion, he expressed appreciation of the statements made by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand at the 958th and 956th meetings respectively. At the same time, he noted that the Zionist régime had raised its representation at Pretoria to the ambassadorial level; that was not accidental, since the two régimes had a great deal in common, namely degradation of human dignity and values. Both had been repeatedly condemned in the United Nations and in other international forums because they were defying world public opinion and endangering peace. Some argued that Zionism was a religion or a liberation movement that had played its role some decades ago. However, the Committee would soon be discussing the atrocious practices of the Zionist régime in the occupied Arab territories, and it would be clear how similar the two régimes were.

49. He had begun by addressing certain countries because he was convinced that without their support the racist régime would not survive. It was essential to mobilize public opinion in those countries so as to bring about a change in their policy towards that régime. An intensified effort should also be made to enlighten the white minority in southern Africa. He suggested that a radio station should be installed in one of the neighbouring countries. It might thus be possible to influence the people of South Africa so that the same thing would happen as had occurred in the case of United States policy in Viet-Nam or Portugal's policy regarding its colonies.

50. It was also essential to aid the neighbouring countries so that they could withstand pressure from the racist régime. It was already known that the latter was sending forces to Angola in an effort to delay that country's independence. His delegation also appealed to certain countries that were supplying the racist régime with oil to refrain from doing so.

51. The international community must do its best to ensure that additional generations did not grow up filled with hatred and bitterness, for the vengeance of the oppressed was severe and what the world was witnessing today was but an example of that.

52. He was convinced that if the South African régime was isolated it could not survive, and the international community would then have shown that it was still true to its principles.

53. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Congo, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Republic of Cameroon, and Zambia had joined the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.327.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*

## 967th meeting

Tuesday, 28 October 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.967

### AGENDA ITEM 53

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued)** (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.327):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to grant the

request made by the representative of the United Arab Emirates at the preceding meeting to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

*It was so decided.*

2. Mr. AL-DEHIM (United Arab Emirates), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that at the 964th meeting the representative of Israel had attempted to create suspicions regarding relations between the United Arab Emirates and South Africa. His delegation wished to reaffirm that the United Arab Emirates was resolved to carry on the struggle against South Africa with every means

at its disposal. His country fully complied with the embargo on the sale of oil and had taken measures to prohibit the import of goods from South Africa.

3. The firm position of the United Arab Emirates with respect to South Africa was well known. Representatives from his country had participated in the debates of the Security Council on the question and had called for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations on the grounds that it was not worthy to be a Member of the Organization.

4. Mr. CISSE (Mali) said that the Pretoria régime had replied to the decisions and appeals of the United Nations and other peace-loving and justice-loving organizations by putting forward specious legal arguments based on a deliberately dishonest interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations. Its attitude, which was contrary to the principles of the Charter, was based on the Fascist ideology of a system which was seeking to convince the world that the destiny of the various races living in South Africa depended on the implementation of the policy of "separate development".

5. The debate on the item and the excellent report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had exposed the stubbornness with which the Pretoria racists pursued their policy of oppression and exploitation. During the preceding year, in order to deceive public opinion, the régime had modified some of the "petty" manifestations of *apartheid* while at the same time stepping up its application of the more serious manifestations of racism and oppression. The "bantustan" policy, the sole purpose of which was to divide the territory and destroy the identity and national unity of the people of Azania, had entailed expelling 10 million blacks from their lands and relegating them to the poorest areas of the country. Given that situation, the people of Azania had no other choice but to intensify their armed struggle against *apartheid* under the direction of their national liberation movements.

6. The *apartheid* régime, condemned by the international community and weakened by the dissolution of the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon axis, was seeking to project a new image through its "dialogue" with independent African States. It was reassuring to note, however, that few States had been taken in by Pretoria's ploy.

7. Despite its condemnation by numerous international bodies, the Pretoria régime, defender of the privileges of the minority and faithful servant of the interests of certain Western Powers and transnational corporations, persisted in its refusal to implement the provisions of the Charter. It was therefore necessary to intensify the struggle against *apartheid* and above all to take measures against the arms policy of South Africa, whose military budget for 1975/76 was 36 per cent higher than that of the previous year. The racist Government was purchasing modern weapons and, according to reliable sources, was preparing to acquire atomic weapons. It had also been demonstrated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was arming and protecting South Africa for the obvious purpose of using that country as a bridge-head on the shipping routes of the Cape.

8. The immigration policy of the racist régime, which, through the application of selective criteria, had promoted the influx of a significant number of white settlers into the country should also be condemned anew.

9. The intensive propaganda campaign waged by the South African régime could not make the world forget the sufferings of the peoples of Azania and Namibia. His delegation condemned once again the partition of Namibia into "bantustans", the policy of repression and intimidation, the mass arrests, the public floggings and summary executions inflicted on the Namibian people and their national liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization. It reiterated its condemnation of the activities of foreign interests which were plundering the material and human resources of Namibia and reaffirmed its unconditional support for the people in their struggle against the expansionist usurper régime of Pretoria.

10. South Africa had concluded agreements with the rebel régime of Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of destroying the national liberation movements of southern Africa and creating a climate of perpetual insecurity in the region. But that alliance would not withstand the opposition of the peoples who were struggling for their freedom and of the peace-loving and justice-loving members of the international community.

11. The absence of South Africa at the current session of the General Assembly was having no effect on the normal course of its deliberations, nor did it diminish the principle of universality. The example of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, whose presence enhanced the current session, should encourage all Member States to intensify the struggle against colonialism and *apartheid* by complying scrupulously with the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations and other international organizations. In that connexion, he commended those States which were contributing to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and those which had publicly refused to collaborate with the Pretoria régime in the economic, commercial, cultural and sporting spheres.

12. The concerted efforts of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and anti-*apartheid* movements were serving to increase the isolation of the racist régime of South Africa. His delegation was confident that the long and heroic struggle of the people of Azania under the leadership of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) would inevitably lead to final victory.

13. Mr. N'DESSABEKA (Congo) assured the representatives of ANC and PAC of his country's solidarity with them and its total support in their struggle against the inhuman *apartheid* régime. The victory of Mozambique and the imminent triumph of Angola in the southern part of the African continent should be a source of encouragement to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

14. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) and the statements of the representatives of ANC and PAC had proved the collusion of certain NATO

members with South Africa. The resolutions of the United Nations could have been implemented if the three colonial Powers which were members of the Security Council had not used their veto to assist the racist régime. In 29 years, the United Nations had adopted almost 150 resolutions condemning the policy of South Africa, and during that time the Western Powers had supplied the régime with the most modern arms, which were being used against the progressive peoples of Azania.

15. His delegation believed that reactionary violence must be met with revolutionary violence and was in favour of intensifying the armed struggle, since it was the only language which the colonialists and imperialists could understand.

16. The Western imperialist régimes had always opposed the liberation struggle of the peoples. For the People's Republic of the Congo, the total elimination of racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa was a principle which admitted of no exceptions, and it therefore opposed any dialogue or détente with the racist régime in South Africa, since those were merely imperialist manoeuvres to divide OAU. One of those colonialist countries had announced its intention of reviewing its policy regarding the sale of arms to the Fascist régime in South Africa. However, it was known that that country's trade policy was based essentially on the sale of arms and that the orders placed by South Africa would be sufficient for more than 15 years. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany should also review its policy with regard to South Africa, since its collaboration with the racist régime in the sphere of nuclear technology could have incalculable consequences. Fortunately, thanks to the activities of the national movements against *apartheid* and especially to those of United Nations bodies, and ANC and PAC, the peoples of the Western capitalist countries were increasingly opposed to the relations of their Governments with Pretoria.

17. The implementation of the policy of "bantustans" was another problem causing concern to his delegation. The changes promised by Vorster almost a year earlier had proved to be completely fraudulent, since they had consisted of the establishment of puppet States to perpetuate injustice and oppression. Accordingly, the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo condemned the proclamation of the independence of the Transkei, a creation of Vorster, and would oppose any recognition of it.

18. Mr. AUGUSTIN (Haiti) said it was highly probable that the thirtieth session of the General Assembly would be concluded without a positive answer being received from the racist régime of Pretoria. The Vorster clique seemed unwilling to modify its odious policy of *apartheid* in any way, despite general disapproval.

19. His delegation fully endorsed all the views expressed in the Committee with regard to the South African régime's so-called policy of "détente". It was obvious that South Africa was persisting in its open defiance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that it had not kept its promise to introduce constitutional reforms of substance.

On the contrary, the South African Government had chosen to stabilize and strengthen the policy of *apartheid* through the "bantustan" system and was, as before, deliberately excluding the entire non-white population from the activities of South African society, while subjecting to increasingly cruel punishment the leaders of the black organizations whose only crime was their opposition to the heinous system of *apartheid*.

20. In such a situation, which constituted a serious threat to international peace and security, especially in southern Africa, it was useless to apply sanctions by halves. The United Nations could strengthen some aspects of its activities, by demanding, for instance, that in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Security Council, all countries should forthwith cease deliveries of arms to the Vorster régime.

21. The people and Government of Haiti were firmly opposed to the policies of *apartheid*. Haiti had been a member of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* from the outset and consequently supported the conclusions and recommendations contained in chapter II of its report to intensify the isolation of Vorster's racist régime. It also believed that the General Assembly should adopt even more effective measures to provide more practical aid to the masses in South Africa and reaffirm the legitimacy of the Azanian people's struggle for liberation. His delegation felt concern at the Vorster clique's "bantustan" policy and was confident that the appeal made by the General Assembly in its resolution 3324 E (XXIX), paragraph 10, when it called upon all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institution or authority established in the context of that policy, would be heeded.

22. South Africa should know that it would meet a united front of opposition to its racial policy. It should also know that it had embarked upon a path which could lead it nowhere but to disaster and that the independence of Portugal's former African colonies and their admission to the United Nations had created favourable conditions for the struggle against *apartheid*. Accordingly, it was to be hoped that the white minority would finally agree to a form of government and a society in which everyone enjoyed freedom and equality, without distinctions of race or colour.

23. Mr. JATOI (Pakistan) said that the international community, which had been dealing with the problem of *apartheid* since 1946, had demonstrated beyond any doubt its total opposition to that policy, which violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concern and indignation with regard to racism in South Africa had been voiced not only in the United Nations but also in other international forums, such as the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, at its sixth session, held at Jidda from 12 to 16 July 1975. Perhaps the most unequivocal expression of the world community's repudiation was South Africa's vacant seat in the United Nations, the result of the measures adopted by the General Assembly against that country in 1974.

24. Growing isolation, the struggle of the national liberation movements, the pressure of world public opinion and

the pressure of socio-economic factors had recently forced South Africa to introduce some modifications in its system of *apartheid*. Nevertheless, despite South African propaganda, it was obvious that those changes had been restricted to the “petty” aspects of *apartheid* and that the other manifestations of *apartheid* remained unchanged. It was pointed out in a paper entitled “The Changing Situation in Southern Africa” by Tami Hultman, Reed Kramer and Don Morton<sup>1</sup> that blacks in South Africa were still being torn from their land and forced to take employment in the white areas as migrant workers. They were being separated from their families, subjected to discriminatory laws and deprived of their trade union rights, and their freedom of movement was severely restricted. Fifty per cent of the black children born in the “homelands” died of malnutrition before the age of five. There were numerous political prisoners, and hundreds of persons were banned, detained, held incommunicado and tortured. Furthermore, to consolidate its repression and control, the régime had increased its military budget.

25. The peripheral nature of the reforms and the statements made by the leaders of the South African régime made it clear that South Africa had no intention of ending the system of *apartheid*. Vorster himself had said that blacks would never have equal political rights in the white parliament. However, the Pakistan delegation believed that the pressure of inexorable forces gave reason to hope that the collapse of *apartheid* might be imminent. The racist régime was finding it increasingly difficult to repress the yearning for freedom on the part of the majority of the population of South Africa and their determination to achieve their human rights. Even economic forces were proving too strong for South Africa to avoid fundamental changes in its system. The international community had an important part to play in that process and was duty-bound to take any action it could to save the South African people. He hoped that a mandatory arms embargo would soon be put into effect. He also endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee, contained in paragraph 210 of its report, that the Security Council should consider the desirability of an embargo on the supply of petroleum to South Africa, an embargo which the Arab countries were already applying.

26. Moreover, the world community should increase its assistance to the people of South Africa and the liberation movements. The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa was a useful instrument for providing that assistance and Governments would doubtless continue to make generous contributions to the Fund. But that was not enough; there was also an urgent need for an intensified United Nations information programme to counteract South African propaganda designed to confuse world public opinion. A campaign should be launched to expose those countries which continued to collaborate with the South African régime.

27. Pakistan's position in the matter was well known. It had never maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa and had suspended all cultural and sporting contacts with that country. Moreover, it had imposed a complete trade boycott on South Africa and had forbidden the sale

of arms and any kind of military and strategic materials. Pakistan's ports and airports were closed to South African vessels and aircraft. In keeping with that position, Pakistan would continue its efforts to ensure that power was transferred to the people of South Africa.

28. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey), after welcoming the representatives of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Papua New Guinea, said that the views of his delegation on *apartheid* were well known. However, he wished to emphasize that mere words could not overcome that system or alleviate the sufferings of the peoples of Azania and Namibia. Turkey opposed any kind of racism and racial discrimination; starting from those premises, it had not established any diplomatic, economic, cultural or other relations with the régime in Pretoria and would not do so until *apartheid* was eradicated. Turkey was a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia and had supported all international measures against colonialism and *apartheid*. It also contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Fund for Namibia, of which Turkey was a trustee.

29. Such modest steps by a country might, at first glance, seem insignificant, but he believed that if every country did the same, more progress would have been made.

30. The report of the Special Committee portrayed the tragic situation in South Africa in detail. One thing was clear: the racist régime had no intention of submitting to the call of reason. The intensification of oppression in South Africa was a clear indication of the growth of the anti-*apartheid* forces. His delegation reiterated its solidarity with those forces and with the oppressed masses of Azania and Namibia.

31. Mr. K. B. SINGH (Nepal) said that the collapse of autocratic government in Portugal and the fact that Mozambique had attained independence and Angola was about to do so had totally destroyed the unholy alliance between the Pretoria régime, the Ian Smith clique and the Portuguese colonialists. South Africa's immediate response to the new political situation had been the so-called “détente” with African States. South Africa was obviously trying to camouflage the reality of an obnoxious system by resorting to ignominious propaganda on the removal of “petty” *apartheid*, with the aim of convincing the world of its good intentions. However, OAU had not been hoodwinked and had demanded the dismantling of the institutions of oppression and repression against the non-white population. Otherwise, “détente” with South Africa would mean tolerating the oppression and degradation of the African people.

32. As the *apartheid* régime felt increasingly insecure, it was intensifying the persecution of its opponents and was becoming an even graver threat to international peace and security. Despite all Vorster's promises, it was obvious that he was hoping to build up around South Africa a group of States similar to the “homelands”, which would be so economically dependent on South Africa that they would be unable to assist in any way in the liberation of their fellow Africans. Obviously, Vorster was hoping to include among such States Namibia and perhaps even Southern Rhodesia.

<sup>1</sup> Unit on *Apartheid*, Notes and Documents, No. 14/75.

33. If South Africa wished to avoid confrontation, with all its frightful consequences, then it must act and act quickly by granting an unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned for their opposition to *apartheid*, repealing all repressive laws restricting the right of the people to strive for an end to racial discrimination and enabling the people of South Africa to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In short, it must comply immediately with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3324 C (XXIX), as a preliminary step towards a peaceful solution of the problem of *apartheid*. But the peace that the Pretoria régime appeared to be offering was not one which would avoid confrontation.

34. He firmly believed that the United Nations and the international community had a special responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements and towards those who were suffering because of their struggle against *apartheid*, which had been declared a crime against humanity. The time had therefore come to intensify the fight to eradicate *apartheid* once and for all. There could be no compromise solution. It was imperative that the international community should take decisive and concerted action against *apartheid*, above all during the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and should provide all types of assistance to the liberation movements.

35. It was highly regrettable that the Security Council had failed to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 3324 B (XXIX). His delegation urged the immediate application of those measures to bring about the speedy end of *apartheid*.

36. Mr. PIETINEN (Finland) regretted that the presence of the new Member States of Cape Verde, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe—a convincing proof of the decolonization process—had not convinced the Government of South Africa that peace could only be secured in southern Africa through the abolishment of the inhuman system of *apartheid*, based on institutionalized racial discrimination. Both the documents before the Committee and the statements in the discussion revealed, on the contrary, that South Africa had intensified the repression of its opponents.

37. The people and Government of Finland firmly opposed the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and rejected any form of racial discrimination. His Government had repeatedly stated that the policy of *apartheid* was a continuous danger to the development not only of that region but also of the world as a whole, and that its elimination must therefore be one of the central objectives of the United Nations.

38. The report of the Special Committee showed clearly that despite some minor adjustments, the Government of South Africa had not expressed any intention to make fundamental changes in its cruel system of *apartheid*. On the contrary, the efforts to speed up relocation of the African population in "bantustans" had been intensified. The so-called independence to be enjoyed by those "bantustans" could not deceive world public opinion. The sad results of the policy of "bantustans", which was designed to divide the African people and consolidate white domination in South Africa, were already known.

39. His delegation considered that the substantial increase in the South African military budget indicated the fear and uncertainty the South African Government must be experiencing due to its persistent policy of racial discrimination. The Finnish Government had been complying with the arms embargo recommended by the Security Council in its resolution 181 (1963), which was a step towards increasing international pressure against South Africa.

40. One of the most tragic examples of South Africa's defiance of the decisions of the United Nations was the application of the system of *apartheid* in Namibia and the "bantustanization" of that Territory. The first step the Government of South Africa should take towards justice and peace in southern Africa would be the withdrawal of its illegal administration from Namibia.

41. It was vital to keep world public opinion constantly informed of the measures adopted against *apartheid* and of the practically unanimous condemnation of the racist régime in the United Nations. For that reason, his Government had been the first contributor to the Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund established by the Secretary-General in January 1975 in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3151 C (XXVIII), and intended to continue contributing to that Fund. In that connexion, the importance of the international campaign against *apartheid* in sports should not be overlooked. Even though sports organizations in Finland were private bodies, they had been requested by the Government to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI). A committee consisting of representatives of the Government and sports organizations had been established in Finland to discuss questions concerning international sports relations; contacts between Finnish and racially selected South African teams had subsequently become practically non-existent.

42. Finland had supported all the international humanitarian action taken for the defence of the victims of *apartheid*. In the current year, it had contributed \$86,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, and would continue to contribute in the future. It had also contributed \$48,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia. Moreover, realizing the importance of the national liberation movements in the strife against racial discrimination, Finland had in the current year channelled more than \$41,000 for humanitarian assistance through the OAU Assistance Fund for the Struggle against Colonialism and *Apartheid*.

#### *Organization of the Committee's work*

43. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in the absence of any objection, the meeting should be adjourned in order that the group of non-aligned countries could meet to complete their preparation of some draft resolutions on the item under discussion. The Committee should be able to conclude its consideration of item 53 during the current week and begin consideration of item 50 the following week.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.*