

he wished to refer members of the Committee to the statement his delegation had made on the question during the twenty-ninth session, at the 906th meeting of the Committee.

40. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.

41. M. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) noted that three Member States had, in opposition to the democratic decision of the General Assembly and an overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council, abusively exercised their veto against the expulsion of the South African *apartheid* régime from the Organization. Their action had come after a statement by the representative of OAU expressing that organization's concern at the role being played by certain Western imperialist countries in providing the Fascist South African régime with the means to maintain its domination over the broad masses of the people of Azania. However, the tide of history in Africa was running against the remnants of the primitive, antiquated Fascist régime. The objections and reservations expressed by the three Powers when they cast their vetoes had been heard before, and he wondered whether they thought that their actions augured well for

future harmonious relations with a free and democratic Azania.

42. The CHAIRMAN recalled that two meetings had been set aside on 10 October for observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. Requests to participate had been received from the Secretary-General of the World Peace Council, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to grant those requests.

*It was so decided.*

43. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) recalled that at the previous session (914th meeting), the Chinese representative in the Committee had explained his Government's position of principle regarding the World Peace Council—namely, that it had been reduced to the status of an instrument of the super-Powers—and had stated its objections to inviting that organization to speak before the Committee. His Government's objections to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization were also well known.

*The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.*

## 952nd meeting

Thursday, 9 October 1975, at 3.35 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.952

### AGENDA ITEM 53

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa**  
(*continued*) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641,  
A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

### GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) said that the Committee was discussing international action against the system of *apartheid* in the light of profound changes in the political structure of southern Africa. His delegation welcomed the entry of Mozambique into the United Nations and hoped that Angola would soon follow. With the withdrawal of the colonial Powers from southern Africa, Swaziland was no longer surrounded by territories under white domination and the geographical isolation of the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia had become as real as its political isolation in the world community. Moreover, the Smith régime had become a political burden to South Africa, which had previously been its chief sponsor.

2. Unfortunately, the uneasiness of the white settlers over such changes was being expressed in the form of intensified political repression. There were signs, however, that, to safeguard its own interests, Pretoria might be prepared to

abandon its support of Salisbury. In order to ensure the survival of its abhorrent system of government, South Africa had also abolished a number of minor rules of the *apartheid* system and was advertising its action as a major change in the system. That contention was belied, however, by the intensification of police repression.

3. According to information published by the Unit on *Apartheid*, a considerable number of persons of all races and from all walks of life were at present under so-called "banning orders", which were issued without due process of law and entailed severe restrictions. Earlier in the year, moreover, the régime had detained a number of young Coloured people for advocating a boycott of certain *apartheid* institutions. It had also arrested leaders of black high school students and detained a number of white student leaders and lecturers opposed to *apartheid*. Those who had been formally charged had been accused of supporting United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* and now faced the possibility of savage sentences for that offence. The Christian Institute of Southern Africa, in analysing the situation, had observed that detentions under the Terrorism Act were increasing and were firmly entrenched in the South African way of life and that young black people striving to create a more just society assumed that at some time or other they would also be detained.

4. Within South Africa and Namibia, the régime was attempting to disguise the *apartheid* system by claiming

that the "bantustans" enjoyed independence. However, deprived of sufficient land or resources to support their populations, the "bantustans" were no more than reservoirs of underpaid labour for the convenience of the white minority in South Africa.

5. There were signs that, in spite of persecution, the resistance of the vast majority of the black population was growing stronger. News and statements coming from South Africa indicated that the *apartheid* system was becoming increasingly vulnerable as a result of international pressure. His delegation shared the view of the African States that international pressure on the white régimes must be pursued and intensified within the framework of a generally agreed and truly international policy. Such a policy must take account of the fact that the States bordering South Africa needed special support to enable them to resist economic, political and, quite possibly, even military pressures from South Africa. The economic weakness of the African countries bordering South Africa represented a great danger and could have serious repercussions on future developments. Joint efforts were urgently needed to help certain particularly vulnerable countries free themselves from any remaining economic dependence on South Africa.

6. Sweden had long acknowledged the special needs of the countries bordering South Africa and had devoted a significant and increasing part of its development assistance to them. In that connexion, it had concluded a development agreement with Mozambique earlier in the year. His delegation hoped that all the rich countries would soon come to accept responsibility for joint action to strengthen the economies of the African States which were subject to South Africa's economic expansionism. While measures taken on behalf of the countries bordering South Africa might not seem to have decisive importance, in the long run they could prove effective by depriving the régime of its access to transportation, raw materials, markets and cheap labour. Moreover, strengthening the border countries would bring psychological pressure to bear on the population of South Africa and would strengthen the liberation movements inside the country. The sacrifices of the liberation movements in their struggle against racial discrimination and injustice should constantly be brought to the attention of world public opinion.

7. Transnational corporations operating in South Africa were every bit as responsible for the systematic exploitation of migratory labour as were South African companies themselves, since they profited equally from the *apartheid* system. The Swedish Government was keenly aware of that problem and, whenever possible, discouraged further investment in South Africa, because non-white workers were not only exploited but also deprived of their right to bring about changes in their own situation. The struggle for basic economic and trade union rights had thus become a struggle against the *apartheid* system as a whole. Trade unions in developed countries had become increasingly aware of the racial discrimination practised by the South African affiliates of transnational enterprises and could directly in-

fluence the central management in such corporations. Such trade union pressure represented a new and valuable weapon in the struggle against racial discrimination.

8. The startling increase in South Africa's military budget served to highlight that country's reliance on military dominance. Over 10 years ago, on the initiative of the Scandinavian States, the Security Council, in its resolution 181 (1963), had recommended an arms embargo against South Africa. Regrettably some arms-exporting industrial nations had selfishly ignored that recommendation. Sweden, however, itself a weapons producer, had faithfully complied with the embargo. His delegation also regretted the failure of the Security Council to take a decision in 1975 on an obligatory arms embargo because of vetoes cast by certain permanent members. That matter should be raised again in the Security Council, and those States which still pursued any form of military co-operation with South Africa should be reminded of their international responsibilities. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly should increase pressure on Pretoria, since the situation constituted a threat to peace within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and thus warranted the imposition of sanctions.

9. In fulfilling its duty to disseminate information about the situation in South Africa, the United Nations was assisted by various other organizations, such as the World Council of Churches. Over the years, that body had actively helped to unmask the Pretoria régime, whose leaders claimed to be Christians while flouting the basic principles of their religion. Through various channels, such information was bound eventually to reach even the white population in South Africa, who, it was to be hoped, would ultimately realize that the inhuman and absurd policy of *apartheid* had to be abandoned in the interest of their own survival.

10. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) drew attention to the fact that a draft resolution would be introduced the following day in connexion with the Committee's observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners. He hoped that delegations from every region would join in sponsoring the draft resolution and that it would be adopted by acclamation. It would thus be an expression of universal denunciation of South Africa's persecution of leaders of the oppressed population and a message of solidarity to the people in prison or under restriction.

11. The Day of Solidarity would coincide with the adoption, 12 years earlier, of General Assembly resolution 1881 (XVIII) requesting the unconditional release of all political prisoners. On that occasion only one dissenting vote had been cast—that of the South African régime itself. He hoped that the Committee would provide an even more impressive demonstration at its next meeting.

*The meeting rose at 4 p.m.*