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Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).

Complaint of hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia (A/1946, A/AC.53/L.10) (continued)

[Item 68]*

1. Mr. GUACHALA (Bolivia) said that his delegation would support the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.10) in the same spirit in which it had endorsed the plan to create a sub-committee of the Peace Observation Commission to keep the United Nations informed of developments in the Balkans.
2. By bringing its complaint before the General Assembly, Yugoslavia was merely fulfilling the duty of every State signatory to the Charter to draw attention to disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace. Having heard the voluminous evidence of the existence of such a situation between Yugoslavia and the Cominform States, all Member States had the distinct responsibility of finding a solution compatible with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter which would enable normal relations to be restored in the affected area.
3. Bolivia, like other Latin-American nations, was especially concerned with the serious charge of intervention in its internal affairs brought by Yugoslavia against the USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc. The Inter-American Conference held in Montevideo in 1933 had condemned such intervention; the United Nations Charter reiterated that condemnation.
4. With the expansion of the communist doctrine beyond the frontiers of the USSR, a number of governments pledged to that ideology had actively interfered

in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia in an attempt to undermine its sovereignty. The word "Titoism" had been coined to signify the determined resistance of the patriotic Yugoslav people to that threat to its national independence. Economic pressure, which could ultimately crush a nation, was one of the principal weapons used against Yugoslavia. Yet, Mr. Litvinov himself had recognized that the abandonment of economic warfare was essential to co-operation between States. During the present debate in the Committee, the USSR had not succeeded in refuting the basic charges contained in the Yugoslav statement; the threat to international peace was all the more plain in the light of the counter-accusations made.

5. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden) observed that in view of the contradictory statements made by the representatives of Yugoslavia and the USSR on the item under consideration, the normal procedure would be to appoint a committee to investigate facts and causes and recommend measures to end the tension between the States concerned. However, Yugoslavia had not suggested that step and, for its part, Sweden was not making any such proposal. It was prepared to support the Yugoslav draft resolution, which was couched in objective terms.

6. Mr. PATIJN (Netherlands) expressed alarm at the exhaustive evidence of aggressive pressures brought by the USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc against Yugoslavia. In view of the general world tension which had been created by strained relations between two large groups of States, such pressures could easily lead to conflict. At a time when the conduct of international relations required the utmost care and moderation, a number of eastern European countries were deliberately following a policy which must be characterized as irresponsible. In contrast, Yugoslavia had shown great moderation in presenting its complaint to the General Assembly, and the Netherlands delegation would support its draft resolution.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

7. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) thought that the operative clauses of the unusually restrained Yugoslav draft resolution merited the unhesitating endorsement of all peace-loving States. The author was not asking the Assembly to pass judgment on the evidence submitted; Pakistan, for its part, while it did not doubt the sincerity of the speakers, did not feel competent either to accept or contradict the allegations and counter-allegations made. Nevertheless, the Pakistan delegation was convinced that tension did exist. Accordingly, it was prepared to urge the States concerned to abide by the spirit of the Charter, to enter into negotiation in accordance with customary international practice in the hope of reaching an amicable understanding, and to exhaust all possible means toward a peaceful settlement of their differences. It was especially gratifying to note that in the draft resolution Yugoslavia itself undertook to carry out those recommendations fully.

8. Mr. MACEDO (Uruguay) also felt that no examination of the actual substance of the charges and counter-charges was required to establish beyond doubt the existence of a situation likely to endanger peace. In the circumstances, the moderate measures suggested in the Yugoslav draft resolution were perfectly compatible with the spirit and purposes of the Charter and consistent with the traditional practice of Latin-American nations in securing an amicable settlement of disputes arising between them. Uruguay would support the Yugoslav draft resolution.

9. Mr. COOPER (United States of America), recalling the terms of the Yugoslav complaint, stated that the activities of the seven countries which formed the Cominform bloc clearly showed that the latter failed to observe the minimum standards of the Charter.

10. The United States Government held that Article 1 of the Charter was applicable to the situation which prevailed in the Balkan region and seriously affected international peace and security. The Charter protected every State, irrespective of its size and its economic, social and political system. In accordance with that principle, the United Nations had undertaken the task of repelling aggression in Korea. It was clear that any new recourse to aggression might, as the President of the United States had recently stated, strain the fabric of world peace to the breaking point. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Charter enjoined the Members of the United Nations to develop friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State was contrary to that principle and was expressly prohibited by the Charter. Members were also under an obligation to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

11. The United States Government could confirm from independent observation some of the charges brought by Yugoslavia. Moreover, in passing judgment on the validity of the complaint, the Committee should take into account the general pattern of conduct of the Cominform régimes: the subversion of free institutions, followed by a *coup d'état*, as in the case of Czecho-

slovakia; the support of an armed attempt to overthrow the government of a neighbouring State, as in the case of Greece; the support of armed aggression on a larger scale, as in Korea; the deliberate attempt to gain a political objective by dooming a city to starvation, as in the case of the blockade of the city of Berlin. One of the main objectives of the Cominform was to try and wreck the post-war recovery of Europe. Also in the pattern were hate campaigns against fabricated enemies, forced labour, secret police, the travesty of justice in propaganda trials and the suppression of the rights of the individual. Those practices, persistently followed by the USSR and the Cominform countries, were at the root of the tension in a great part of the world.

12. The Yugoslav Government accused the Cominform countries of openly calling on the people of Yugoslavia to overthrow the Government of Marshal Tito. Broadcasts, newspaper articles and speeches made by leading government officials in the USSR and the countries of eastern Europe contained ample evidence that the downfall of the Yugoslav Government was desired by the Cominform. Public statements to that effect had been made by such leading members of the Politburo as Mr. Molotov, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Malenkov. Speaking in Warsaw in July 1951, Mr. Molotov had referred to the Yugoslav Government as a gang which clung to power by means of sanguinary terror and, declaring that it could not last long, had said that the peoples of Yugoslavia would find ways and means of getting rid of the Tito fascist régime. A month later identical language had been used in Bucharest by Marshal Voroshilov.

13. The Cominform resolutions on Yugoslavia were well known. The resolution adopted on 28 June 1948 stated outright that the Yugoslav régime must "not be tolerated" and that the very existence of the Yugoslav Communist Party demanded that an end should be put to such a régime. A second Cominform resolution adopted on 29 November 1949 declared that it was the duty of communist and workers' parties to give the utmost assistance to the Yugoslav working class and peasantry who were fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism. Those resolutions were demands for revolt emanating from the highest officials of the Cominform countries which constituted aggressive pressure and threatened the political independence of Yugoslavia within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. How did such aggressive pressure against Yugoslavia fit in with the role assumed by the Soviet Union as the world champion of peace?

14. The United States Government was able, on the basis of its own experience, to comment on certain specific charges of treaty violation by the Cominform countries. Mass deportations of Yugoslav minorities who had for centuries lived in eastern areas adjacent to the Yugoslav frontier, had taken place in violation of the human rights provisions of the peace treaties concluded between the allied and associated Powers and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

15. The Romanian Government had, during the current year, begun the mass deportation of Serb and other non-Romanian groups from the Yugoslav frontier region to the eastern part of Romania where those people, among whom some Romanians were also included, were left to shift for themselves. The recent deportation of thousands of people from Budapest had shocked the world and was regarded by the United States Government as a flagrant violation of the human rights provisions of the peace treaty. Furthermore, by its resolution 385 (V), adopted at the last session, the General Assembly had condemned the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for failing to fulfil their human rights obligations under the peace treaties.

16. Tragic though they were, those deportations were only a small component part of the process applied throughout the orbit of the USSR, whereby hundreds of thousands of people had been uprooted and moved either within their own country or across national frontiers.

17. The United States Government could also support the contention that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were violating the military provisions of the peace treaties. According to its estimates, the combined armed forces of those three States were more than double the size permitted under the treaties and had been strengthened with modern military equipment, weapons and training. The existence of those large and growing forces, equipped for offensive action, contributed to the tension in the Balkan region. The question might be asked: why had those Governments gone back on their obligations, against whom were they raising such large armies, and what foreign interests encouraged them to do so?

18. Turning to the charge that the seven Governments had indulged in discriminatory practices against Yugoslav diplomatic representatives, Mr. Cooper could only emphasize that the diplomatic representatives of other governments had had similar experience in eastern Europe. The United States Government had been forced to reduce its staffs, the movements of its official diplomatic representatives had been restricted, and local employees had been intimidated and forced to leave. In the case of Albania and Bulgaria, the United States Government had found it impossible to maintain its diplomatic missions at all and had been forced to suspend relations.

19. His Government had had the same experience as the Yugoslav Government in endeavouring to protect its nationals through diplomatic missions and consular offices. United States citizens had often been denied access to their diplomatic and consular representatives and in many cases had had foreign nationalities thrust upon them by threats, chicanery, false promises and other forms of pressure. They encountered severe difficulties in obtaining exit visas from the Cominform countries. In certain cases, United States citizens had mysteriously disappeared or been subjected to spurious trials.

20. Clearly, when all those demonstrations of hostility were directed against one single country, they constituted aggressive pressure and were contrary to the principles of self-determination, national sovereignty and independence expressed in the Charter. It was the right and duty of the General Assembly to consider the Yugoslav complaint under Articles 10, 11 and 14.

21. Many countries viewed the situation with growing concern and the United States had, at the request of the Yugoslav Government, provided economic assistance and was now providing military assistance, notwithstanding the fact that Yugoslavia was under a communist régime to which the United States was opposed by tradition and in principle. The United States was assisting Yugoslavia in order to strengthen Yugoslavia's ability to defend itself as it had defended itself during the Second World War. It should be remembered that although the USSR was a communist country, the United States had offered it substantial assistance when it had fallen victim to Nazi aggression because in that case the fundamental principles of national independence and territorial integrity had been flouted. But the USSR Government refused to honour those principles and had insisted instead on absolute control of those States where power was in the hands of the communists. The communist faith and outlook did not suffice without absolute and unconditional subservience and willingness to take orders. Thus, by insisting on a measure of equality and independence, the Yugoslav Government, in the words of one Soviet note to Yugoslavia, had become the enemy of the Soviet Union.

22. The United Nations, however, was not concerned with the split within the Cominform, but only with the observance of the Charter which recognized the sovereign equality of all States. There were no degrees of equality. International relations should be based on co-operation and partnership and not on coercion and exploitation.

23. The Yugoslav draft resolution declared the Yugoslav Government's readiness to do everything necessary to carry out the proposed recommendations which, *inter alia*, called for the settlement of frontier differences by mixed frontier commissions or other peaceful means. If all the governments concerned applied that resolution in letter and in spirit, tension between Yugoslavia and the Cominform States would surely be reduced.

24. Meanwhile, since the Committee had approved the setting up of a Balkan sub-commission (A/AC.53/L.3), the United Nations would be able at the request of any State or States concerned to watch developments and call upon a body equipped to observe and report on any situation likely to endanger the peace in that area. It was very much to be hoped that the services of the sub-commission would not be needed and that the Yugoslav draft resolution would achieve its purpose. If it really desired to do so, the USSR Government could alleviate the existing tension; there need be neither victor nor vanquished in the settlement of the situation between Yugoslavia and the

seven countries listed in its complaint. In the interests of all the parties concerned, and of the United Nations as a whole, the victory should be won by the Charter.

25. Mr. SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua) strongly supported the Yugoslav draft resolution and urged its acceptance by an overwhelming majority. The carefully documented Yugoslav statement had clearly established evidence of grave tension between that country and the Cominform States and had solemnly expressed the Yugoslav Government's desire to implement in full the moderate terms of its proposal. Logic and the explicit terms of the Charter, which all Member States had pledged themselves to respect, demanded unrestrained support for the draft resolution in the interests of international peace. The Nicaraguan delegation felt that there was no other course but to adopt the Yugoslav draft resolution unanimously so that if, in the future, relations were to deteriorate further, it could not be said that the Assembly had failed to appeal to the wisdom of those governments in the respectful manner suggested in the draft resolution under consideration.

26. Mr. Sevilla Sacasa believed that the Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, had the duty to make such recommendations and indeed that it was compelled to take official action in the interests of peace, particularly in view of the fact that the government which considered itself attacked was only requesting a very simple course of action which fell within the noble duties undertaken in San Francisco.

27. Mr. MACDONNELL (Canada) said that his delegation had been struck by the contrast in the speeches made by the Brazilian and USSR representatives (10th meeting). The former had pointed to the moderation evident in the resolution submitted by the Yugoslav delegation. Other representatives including the Nicaraguan representative had made the same point. It was obvious from the care with which the Yugoslav delegation had presented its case (8th and 9th meetings) that the Government of that country had strong feelings on the subject and the draft resolution it had submitted was therefore all the more commendable for its restraint.

28. The USSR representative, on the other hand, had confined himself to piling up counter-accusations against Yugoslavia. The Canadian delegation had, however, information which bore out the Yugoslav charges against the Governments of the USSR and of the other countries concerned, and thought that the requests embodied in the draft resolution were entirely justified.

29. Mr. Macdonnell failed to understand how any government was unable to accept the recommendations contained in the draft resolution, and could only deplore the USSR's opposition to it. The Committee was not a court of law, constituted to sift evidence in detail, but a body responsible for deciding where the burden of proof lay and what course of action should be taken in accordance with the aims of the Organization. Even if the accusations brought by the Soviet Union could be accepted, two wrongs did not make a right. Yugoslavia had declared itself ready to abide by

the Charter but her neighbours had given no indication of their willingness to do so. That in itself was evidence as to the root and cause of the trouble in the area.

30. There was no denying that a dangerous situation was building up in the Balkans. Direct and indirect pressure of many kinds was being applied against Yugoslavia because of what certain governments considered a heresy. Extracts from official correspondence between the Governments of Yugoslavia and the USSR made it clear that co-operation with that country actually meant not only total acceptance of communist ideology but total acceptance of Soviet domination over every aspect of national life.

31. Mr. Macdonnell recalled the draft resolution adopted at the Committee's 6th meeting recommending the establishment of a Balkan sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission. It should be encouraging to the people of Yugoslavia to know that the United Nations was alert to the situation and vitally concerned in lessening the tension in the area. The Canadian delegation would support the Yugoslav draft resolution, and it urged all other delegations to do so, or failing that, to explain their reasons for not doing so.

32. Mr. VAN GLABBEKE (Belgium) wished to explain the reasons why his delegation would vote in favour of the Yugoslav draft resolution. The situation in the Balkans, which might threaten the peace of the entire world, was a cause of great anxiety to his country.

33. The Belgian delegation had been deeply impressed by the statement of the Yugoslav representative which had contained precise facts concerning the pressure brought to bear upon his country. He recalled the USSR proposals to the General Assembly of measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1962) and said that he could not understand, in the light of such proposals, how the USSR could refuse to accept the draft resolution before the Committee, couched as it was in such very moderate terms. He was unable to see how the USSR representative could refuse to accept the part of the draft resolution which merely called upon the States concerned to act in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter; nor why the Soviet Union delegation should refuse to accept the point requesting the Soviet Union to conform in its diplomatic intercourse with rules and practices born of long experience and wisdom; nor why the Soviet Union should refuse to settle border disputes through mixed frontier commissions or other peaceful means.

34. The facts enumerated by the Yugoslav representative showed that pressure was being applied on Yugoslavia not by one country alone but by all the countries of the Cominform. It was a case of concerted, carefully planned political and economic action by a whole group of countries, designed to increase even further the pressure which the representative of Yugoslavia had exposed to the Committee.

35. Mr. van Glabbeke deplored the attacks made by leading statesmen of the USSR against the head of the Yugoslav State. Such attacks were a return to jungle politics reminiscent of the tactics of Hitler and Goebbels.

36. The Belgian delegation would vote in favour of the simple and reasonable draft resolution submitted by the Yugoslav delegation, while regretting that certain other countries found themselves unable to do so. Peace-loving countries could not oppose the draft resolution, which was in full accord with the ideals of the United Nations.

37. Mr. GOYTISOLO (Peru) said that his delegation

would also vote for the Yugoslav draft resolution. The statement made by the Yugoslav representative, clearly revealing the prevailing conditions of tension, had deeply impressed him. The draft resolution was fully in accordance with the United Nations Charter and he did not doubt that it would obtain a large majority of votes.

38. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers for the general debate on the Yugoslav complaint was closed.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.