



Friday, 30 November 1951, at 10.30 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Complaint of hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia (A/1946, A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.1) (continued)	57

Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).

Complaint of hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia (A/1946, A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.1) (continued)

[Item 68] *

1. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) noted that the draft resolution submitted by the Yugoslav delegation (A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.1) was couched in very moderate terms. He compared the validity of the arguments advanced by the delegations of Yugoslavia and the USSR.

2. As far as the allegations adduced by the Yugoslav representative in support of his draft resolution were concerned (8th and 9th meetings), Sir Gladwyn noted that whenever it had been possible to verify them, their accuracy had been confirmed. The USSR representative, on the other hand, had merely read a list of frontier incidents, the responsibility for which he had attempted to place on Yugoslavia. Further, while asserting that Yugoslavia was nothing more nor less than an American colony, he had been unable to refute any of the charges made by the Yugoslav delegation.

3. The United Kingdom representative then proceeded to consider the deep-lying causes of the dispute. He recalled the part played by Yugoslavia in the struggle against fascist tyranny and the hopes which the Yugoslav people had placed in the USSR, by whose side it had thought to build a new society after the cessation of hostilities. Thus, for three years, Yugoslavia had striven to co-operate with the USSR, and in so doing, had been led to adopt an attitude of suspicion

towards the western Powers. When in 1948 the Cominform decided to expel the Yugoslav Communist Party, the Government of Yugoslavia had a rude awakening. However, it transpired that it was to that break with the Cominform that the Yugoslav Government owed the preservation of its independence.

4. The main cause of the tension in the Balkans was the Soviet Union's tendency to regard as enemies governments which did not accept all its views unreservedly. In that connexion Sir Gladwyn remarked that such was not the attitude of the western countries which were members of the North Atlantic Treaty. Those countries were accustomed to settle their differences in a spirit of mutual tolerance and by a process of democratic discussion. If it really wanted to reduce tension in the Balkans, the USSR Government could adopt those democratic methods. It could put an end to the broadcast campaigns against the Yugoslav Government and authorize the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the States of central Europe which were members of the Cominform. Lastly, it could say that it was prepared, in its relations with the Yugoslav Government, to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter. That would be a more constructive attitude than to claim, as did the Soviet propagandists, that Yugoslavia was an armed camp effectively controlled by the American army. The allegation was untrue; Yugoslavia had accepted the help of the western Powers because it had been impelled to do so by the need to protect itself against the dangers of an invasion which it had good reason to fear.

5. If the Government of the USSR abandoned its campaign against the Belgrade Government, the atmosphere would clear immediately, and the discussions that were taking place in the General Assembly's First Committee would be made correspondingly easier.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

6. The draft resolution submitted by the Yugoslav delegation contained nothing but very reasonable requests. It did not even condemn the activities of the Soviet Union Government. No government could refuse to act in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter; and no government could refuse to conform to the practices customary in international relations, or to settle frontier disputes by means of mixed commissions. He expressed the hope that the Soviet Union Government would put an end to its dispute with the Yugoslav Government and it was in that hope that the United Kingdom delegation would support the draft resolution before the Committee.

7. The CHAIRMAN asked all speakers on his list to refrain from using discourteous language when referring to certain governments or heads of States. He was prepared to exercise his authority to prevent any lapses of that nature, but he was sure that he would not have to do so.

8. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) said that the Yugoslav draft resolution deserved careful study, since the Members of the United Nations had undertaken to respect human rights in all countries, large and small.

9. His delegation was particularly well qualified to recall the attempts which the Soviet Union Government had made to interfere in the internal affairs of other States. In 1946, the Chilean Government, which had been elected with the support of the Communist Party, had had to defend itself against attempts at interference similar to those described by the Yugoslav representative in his statement. The diplomatic representatives of the countries within the Soviet Union orbit had attempted to interfere directly in questions which lay within the exclusive competence of the Chilean Government. It was for that reason that his Government had broken with the Communist Party and with Governments of the USSR and the satellite countries.

10. Mr. Trucco then recalled the tragic fate of Czechoslovakia and of the Czechoslovak statesmen who had believed that they could participate in a government which was under orders from Moscow. When the Czechoslovak question was referred to the Security Council at its 268th meeting in March 1948, the Chilean delegation had asked for an inquiry. The representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR had at that time claimed that the United Nations was seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of a Member State. They were actually charging other governments with actions for which their own governments could justly be blamed.

11. Yugoslavia's present situation had many features in common with that of Czechoslovakia prior to 1948. There was concrete evidence that the USSR Government had sought to incite members of the Yugoslav Communist Party against their own Government and that the USSR Government had endeavoured to exercise its authority in Yugoslavia as it had succeeded in doing in the other central European countries. It was observed that when that evidence was adduced, the USSR delegation adopted in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee the

same attitude of denial as it had adopted in the Security Council at the time of the Czechoslovak affair. It confined itself to alleging that the Yugoslav Government was dominated by the western Powers and that the charges made were baseless. Mr. Trucco accused the Soviet Union representative of not having replied to the specific charges which the Yugoslav representative had brought against the USSR Government.

12. The facts showed that the Governments of the Soviet Union and of the countries within its political orbit had, in their diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, pursued a policy which was in flagrant contradiction with established international practice. It was also a fact that those same Governments were attempting to drown Yugoslavia in a flood of wireless propaganda.

13. The facts showed, lastly, that the USSR and the central European countries, whose policies it directed, had repeatedly violated human rights to the detriment of a large number of Yugoslav nationals. Mr. Trucco read out a long list of those violations and asked whether the Soviet Union delegation would agree to support a General Assembly draft resolution requesting information concerning the fate of all the Yugoslav nationals who had been the victims of those violations of human rights. If it refused, or if it abstained from doing so, that would be proof that the USSR, while claiming to protect human rights, merely adopted that attitude for propaganda purposes.

14. The USSR delegation had not replied satisfactorily to any one of the specific questions asked by the Yugoslav representative. It had merely asserted that Yugoslavia had repeatedly provoked, not just one of its neighbours, but all those of its neighbours which were supported by the Soviet Union army.

15. Mr. Trucco also recalled that Generalissimo Stalin had himself declared that communist and capitalist systems could exist side by side. In that respect too, it could be noted that the facts did not accord with the statements made by responsible members of the USSR Government. Long before the Second World War the various communist parties had endeavoured to weaken the countries of the free world which were later to find themselves at grips with the forces of national socialism. Those manoeuvres constituted a violation of the agreement concluded in 1933 between the USSR and the United States. The truth was that Soviet Union policy was guided by opportunist and arbitrary considerations. That was proved by the various changes in that policy during the Second World War, and also by reference to the long list of political leaders, who, in various countries, and in central Europe in particular, had supported the Soviet Union régime only to be condemned subsequently on orders from Moscow. The latest victim of such arbitrary action was Rudolf Slansky, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

16. The Yugoslav complaint clearly revealed the underlying causes of the international unrest: the USSR Government was seeking to impose its doctrines directly

or indirectly on all countries in the world. For that reason the General Assembly must, by adopting the Yugoslav draft resolution, oppose the USSR's attempts at hegemony. The Chilean delegation, for its part, would whole-heartedly support the Yugoslav draft resolution.

17. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation had voted against placing the Yugoslav complaint on the General Assembly's agenda as it considered that an examination of the complaint would impair the moral authority and prestige of the United Nations.

18. It was easy to see what the Yugoslav Government sought to achieve in referring to the United Nations the question of the alleged hostile activities against Yugoslavia of the Governments of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its aim was, first, to use the complaint to intensify the propaganda campaign against the people's democracies; then, to cover up its own hostile activities against those countries, to mislead the public at home and abroad as to its activities, to help to undermine the historic friendship between the Yugoslav people and the other peoples of the Slav community and, lastly, to subject those peoples to the influence of the imperialist countries. The Yugoslav people, however, had good memories and had not forgotten that it was the peoples of the USSR who had freed them from the fascist yoke.

19. It should be noted that Yugoslavia's hostile policy towards the Soviet Union and the people's democracies was the result of its submission to the policy of the American imperialists who had secured a firm hold on the Yugoslav economy. The sole purpose of the credits and loans granted to Yugoslavia by the United States was to enable it to obtain arms and to increase the output of the raw materials and semi-finished products necessary to the preparation of war.

20. To understand how the American imperialists viewed the future of the Yugoslav economy, it should be recalled that, in 1951, when Yugoslavia asked the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for help in securing a loan of \$200 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United States Government had let it be known that it had no intention of promoting the financing of heavy industry in Yugoslavia, but was, however, prepared to offer financial aid to Yugoslavia to enable it to intensify its struggle against the USSR and the people's democracies.

21. Moreover, the total subservience of Yugoslavia to the United States was clearly shown in the agreement concluded between the two countries on 14 November 1951, providing for the supply of arms to Yugoslavia and the dispatch to that country of a military mission with very wide powers. Under that agreement, Yugoslavia bound itself to supply the United States with the raw materials and semi-finished goods required for the latter's rearmament.

22. The purpose of the complaint brought by Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies was to divert the attention of public opinion from those facts, which showed that the United Kingdom and the United States wanted to convert Yugoslavia into a spring-board to be used for aggression against the people's democracies. That was why the complaint was doomed to failure.

23. At the preceding meeting, the United States representative had said that, while all the charges brought by Yugoslavia against the people's democracies could not be substantiated, it none the less appeared certain that the Hungarian authorities had carried out mass deportations of persons of Yugoslav origin. That assertion was false. The Hungarian Government, as was its right and duty, had merely ordered the deportation of criminals and fascists who had engaged in subversive activities. Under the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, the Yugoslav ethnic minorities in Hungary enjoyed the same rights as citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin. They participated in national political life and were represented in the Hungarian parliament. They were allowed, in a number of schools, to give their children a primary and secondary education in the Serb and Croat languages.

24. In contrast, the Yugoslav Government applied a policy of discrimination to Hungarians residing in Yugoslavia and subjected them to vexatious and humiliating measures.

25. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Government used its diplomatic missions in the people's democracies as centres of espionage and subversive activities. The Yugoslav representative had mentioned the case of a certain Milanov, condemned for sabotage carried out in a factory in Bulgaria. He had omitted to state, however, that Milanov had confessed that he had acted on the orders of the Yugoslav military *attaché* in Sofia.

26. The only conclusion which could be drawn was that the complaint brought by Yugoslavia was a complete fabrication and its baselessness should be clear to everyone.

27. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would vote against the Yugoslav draft resolution, the purpose of which was to conceal the hostile activities directed by the Yugoslav Government against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

28. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said that he had listened very attentively to the detailed statement of the Yugoslav representative and to the reply made by the USSR representative. That reply, and the statement of the Ukrainian SSR representative had, both by their form and tone, apparently produced the opposite effect to what their authors had expected. They had merely served to support the Yugoslav case by arguments which, because they had been advanced by the other side, gave even more weight to the Yugoslav representative's statement. For example, the USSR representative and his Ukrainian SSR colleague had

confined themselves to placing on Yugoslavia the responsibility for the frontier incidents without denying their seriousness or their increasing frequency. It was not very clear, in the circumstances, as the United Kingdom representative had rightly pointed out, why they should object to the third recommendation of the Yugoslav draft resolution providing for the settlement of frontier disputes by mixed commissions or other peaceful means. That recommendation was clearly in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.

29. Nor was it clear what objections the Soviet Union representative might have to the other two recommendations contained in the Yugoslav draft resolution asking the Governments concerned to settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and to conform in their diplomatic intercourse with the rules and practices which were customary in international relations.

30. The Committee should especially bear in mind the assertion of the Yugoslav representative that the pressure brought to bear on Yugoslavia by the USSR Government had become manifest well before the publication of the Cominform resolution addressed to the Yugoslav Communist Party; but it was only from that moment that it had become open and threatening. Although the United Nations had really been powerless to protect Yugoslavia from the "friendly" pressure of the USSR Government before 28 June 1948, it could not remain silent in view of the alarming character which that pressure had assumed since that time. Greece had learned by painful experience that the Cominform stopped at nothing when it wanted to translate its intentions into action.

31. The duty of the General Assembly was clearly set forth in the Charter, but the will to fulfil that duty should be expressed by a very large majority.

32. The Greek delegation, which had learnt from bitter experience, was rather sceptical regarding the chances of the Yugoslav draft resolution being implemented. Nevertheless, it would not hesitate to vote for it.

33. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia), invoking the provisions of rule 114 of the rules of procedure, asked the Chairman whether he might speak at the afternoon meeting rather than at the morning meeting, as he had planned. The violent attacks made against the Czechoslovak Government by the representative of Chile required him to study carefully the Chilean representative's statement before he could reply to it.

34. The CHAIRMAN agreed to the Czech representative's request.

35. Mr. BUSTAMANTE (Ecuador) thought that the Yugoslav Government had exercised a right conferred by the Charter upon United Nations Members in drawing the General Assembly's attention to a situation which it considered to be a threat to Yugoslavia's peace and security. The Assembly was therefore obliged to examine the Yugoslav complaint and to make appropriate recommendations.

36. Ecuador was far away from the Balkans and had no special interests in that area, but being alive to the danger threatening collective peace and security in any area where international tension or threats of aggression arose, it had studied with great care the charges brought by both parties to the dispute. The Ecuadorean delegation was pleased to find that other members of the Committee had been equally conscientious and was confident that the Assembly would act in the same spirit in that as in all other cases of the same type. The Ecuadorean representative thought that it would be necessary to appoint an investigating body to ascertain the facts in relation to the accusations made by both parties. In the present circumstances, his delegation was unable to pass judgement upon the charges made. It had, however, been impressed by the following circumstances: the great number and the gravity of the Yugoslav charges, together with the abundance of data adduced to support them; the absence of a full and satisfactory reply from the USSR; the fact that other delegations, whose testimony was worthy of consideration, had borne out the Yugoslav accusations and, as a general axiom, the fact that it was unlikely that the weak would provoke the strong.

37. The Ecuadorean delegation did not think it necessary to examine the facts, especially if the Assembly could help to lessen the existing tension. The statements of both parties alike revealed the existence of a dangerous state of tension which had continued for over three years and was growing progressively worse. That fact, if proved, sufficed to place upon the United Nations the duty of taking speedy and effective remedial measures. The Assembly could not fail to carry out the duties incumbent upon it. In the first place, it should draw the attention of the parties to their obligation to conduct their mutual relations and settle their disputes in conformity with the spirit of the Charter, which obliged them to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States, to co-operate peacefully in the economic, social and cultural fields, and to refrain from threatening to use force against other nations and from intervening in their domestic or external affairs. Mr. Bustamante recalled that General Assembly resolution 380 (V) of 17 November 1950 had defined aggression, whatever the weapons used, as the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world. For those reasons, his delegation would support the preamble and the first and second paragraphs of the operative part of the Yugoslav draft resolution.

38. The Ecuadorean delegation felt bound to make some reference to the Yugoslav representative's statement that his country was prepared to comply with the Assembly's recommendations, a statement which was a demonstration of good faith and of loyalty to the United Nations. He regretted that the USSR delegation had not exhibited the same good faith and hoped that before the final vote the Committee might hear from the USSR delegation that its country was not animated by any hostile intentions against either the people or the Government of Yugoslavia, and, above all, that it was prepared to respect the latter country's independence,

and to carry out the Assembly's recommendations. If the USSR delegation were to make a sincere statement to that effect, he would be prepared to support an amendment to the first paragraph of the operative part to make it read that the Assembly took note of the declarations of both parties.

39. With regard to the final paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution, the Ecuadorean delegation feared that, in view of the existing state of tension and of the previous ineffectual efforts in that sense, as well as of the cessation of the ordinary diplomatic channels between the parties, the proposed mixed commissions might not be able to start work as promptly and effectively as was necessary. There was, however, the Peace Observation Commission, to which his delegation ascribed great importance, and which, under a previous decision of the Committee, was authorized, through a sub-commission, to exercise its functions in "any area of international tension in the Balkans" (A/AC.53/L.3) and therefore, on the frontiers of Yugoslavia as well as elsewhere. Mr. Bustamante was confident that neither party would hesitate to make use of that sub-commission, which would allow of objective, impartial and first-hand observation of the facts and incidents and would help to diminish the existing tension.

40. Provided paragraph 2 (c) did not preclude recourse to the Balkans Sub-Commission of the Peace Observation Commission, and that such recourse was covered by the general recommendation as to other peaceful means, the Ecuadorean delegation would vote in favour both of that paragraph and of the draft resolution as a whole.

41. Mr. WILSON (New Zealand) did not consider that the USSR delegation had made any serious attempt to refute the charges brought by the Yugoslav Government or the evidence adduced by that Government. Although the New Zealand delegation had no direct sources of information which might enable it to verify the truth of the various charges made, it had nevertheless observed that they had not been refuted and that other delegations which it considered to be trustworthy had confirmed those allegations.

42. If the charges with regard to hostile pressure against Yugoslavia were well founded, the situation was an abnormal one and the attitude of certain States was incompatible with the obligations they had undertaken under the Charter. Nevertheless, the Committee was not called upon to pass judgement. The Yugoslav delegation had confined itself to asking the Committee to recommend the States concerned to fulfil the most elementary duties incumbent upon them under the Charter and, by the very moderation of its draft resolution, the Yugoslav delegation had defied Member States to vote against its draft, since in doing so they would be voting against the principles of the Charter.

43. The New Zealand delegation was glad to observe that Yugoslavia had shown firmness and resolution and that its attitude had received the almost unanimous

moral support of the Committee. In supporting the Yugoslav draft resolution by its vote, the New Zealand delegation expressed the hope that the proposal would be adopted by a large majority and that its implementation would lead to a diminution of tension and the re-establishment of normal relations between Yugoslavia and its neighbours.

44. Mr. DE BEAUMONT (France) said that his delegation welcomed the form in which the Yugoslav delegation had presented its Government's complaint. The Yugoslav representative had indeed given the facts moderately and objectively and had stressed his wish for a peaceful settlement of the problems he had submitted to the Committee.

45. At the present stage of the discussion, it did not seem necessary to consider all the aspects of the case in detail. The facts were wellknown even before Yugoslavia submitted its complaint, but the time had come to eliminate the threat to international peace which was inherent in that situation.

46. The draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia offered means to solve the problem. The recommendations contained therein in no way prejudiced the dignity and honour of the interested parties and conformed fully with the principles of the Charter. In those circumstances, it was difficult to see how they could meet with any opposition.

47. The fact that serious tension existed between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was, of course, undeniable and it was the duty of the General Assembly to try to alleviate that tension. One of the principal causes of that situation lay in the abnormal nature of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, on the other. France also had had experience of the expulsion of diplomatic and consular officials, which was incompatible with good-neighbourly relations.

48. The tension thus created in the Balkans had not escaped the notice of the French Government, which had informed the Yugoslav Government at the beginning of 1951 that it was following the developments of the situation with the greatest attention and that it would not fail to consider the consequences within the framework of its international obligations.

49. Thus, the existing situation in the Balkans was not a new development and the Yugoslav proposal to set up mixed commissions to settle frontier disputes seemed an excellent one. The General Assembly could not disregard its obligation to try to settle disputes between Member States by peaceful means and by direct negotiation. In the solution of the problem which would be submitted to the Assembly there should be neither victor nor vanquished. The spirit of the Charter alone should prevail, and the French delegation would therefore vote for the Yugoslav draft resolution, which was in full accord with that spirit.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.