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Chairman : Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece : (a) report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/1857, A/AC.53/L.2, A/AC.53/L.3, A/AC.53/L.5, A/AC.53/L.6, A/AC.53/L.7) (concluded)

[Item 19]*

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to resume the discussion of item 19 of the agenda.

2. Mr. MACEDO (Uruguay) stated that he had already indicated his Government's attitude on the question under consideration. The work of the Special Committee on the Balkans constituted a valuable experiment for the United Nations in that it had contributed to the maintenance of peace in a disturbed area. At a time when the termination of the Committee's work was being contemplated, it would not be unhelpful to provide for its replacement by a sub-commission which could send observers anywhere they were needed, with the consent of the countries in question, namely, without prejudice to the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the domestic affairs of States.

3. It was for that reason that the delegation of Uruguay would vote for the joint draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.3).

4. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) requested the floor in order to explain his vote at the preceding meeting of the Committee.

5. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Polish representative, whose name was on the list of speakers in the general debate, should state his delegation's point of view forthwith, at the same time as he explained his vote.

6. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that, in view of the fact that he would be permitted to explain his vote in the course of his main statement, he would prefer not to advance his turn to speak.

7. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) pointed out that he had asked for the floor after the Polish representative. However, he had no objection to making his statement immediately.

8. On behalf of the French delegation he wished to pay tribute to the Greek nation and to recall the role which it had played during to second World War in the defence of the Mediterranean world. He was gratified to note that, after such a long troubled period, the Greek people were now enjoying daily improved political and economic conditions and that there was no more guerrilla activity on Greek territory. The credit for that recovery was due to both the Greek people and the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. It was for that reason that he desired to associate himself with the praise which the Greek delegation was addressing to the members and staff of the Committee in its draft resolution. The French delegation would vote for that draft (A/AC.53/L.2).

9. Mr. ORDONNEAU recognized the appositeness of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.3). It was wise to envisage the establishment of a sub-commission of observation in a region where the situation had improved but was far from being stabilized. While the French delegation hoped that the sub-commission would never have to intervene, it would vote for the joint draft resolution recommending its establishment.

10. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted that during the discussion of item 19 of the agenda many speakers had praised the Special

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

Committee on the Balkans. Such praise ought not to take the place of a methodical examination of the Committee's report. If the facts were examined, it would be found that the Committee, established in violation of the United Nations Charter, had directed its activity towards objectives foreign to the strengthening of international peace and security.

11. In its successive reports, the special Committee had in fact made a point of insinuating that Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia had been threatening the independence of Greece and the peace of the Balkans. None of those insinuations had been supported by proof; none of the evidence invoked would bear critical examination. In support of that view, Mr. Palamarchuk pointed out contradictions in the evidence reproduced in the Committee's reports (witnesses' statements T.204, T.217, T.249 and T.250, referred to in paragraph 73 of document A/1857).

12. The fact was that the Special Committee had served to cover constant subversive action against Albania and Bulgaria. The ruling circles of Greece had, indeed, never hidden their aggressive intentions, and Mr. Palamarchuk adduced as evidence the statements made by Mr. Venizelos on 18 February 1951 and by Mr. Papaandreou on 3 February 1951. It was also known that Greece still coveted Northern Epirus, which was the southern part of Albania.

13. The Special Committee on the Balkans had also served to mask foreign interference in the internal affairs of Greece. As early as 1947, the Ukrainian SSR delegation had drawn the Security Council's attention (153rd meeting) to the alarming situation which the presence of British troops had created in Greece. The situation had since changed, inasmuch as the United Kingdom had been obliged to give way to the United States, which had every day tightened its military and economic hold on Greece. Greek economy had been utterly changed in order to serve United States ambitions, and was already in a state of crisis. On the home market, the trend was for American goods to replace Greek products. Foreign trade was undergoing a severe crisis, occasioned by Greek economic dependence on the United States.

14. In the political field, terror still reigned in Greece, and, in spite of the promises of amnesty made by a large number of candidates at the recent elections, Greek courts were still sentencing Greek patriots to death. In that connexion, Mr. Palamarchuk regretted that the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had not seen his way to authorize the consideration of the USSR draft resolution on the commutation of the death sentences recently imposed on twelve Greek patriots (A/AC.53/L.1).

15. Greece had therefore sacrificed its independence, not as the result of action by Bulgaria and Albania, but through the action of the United States. The United States was responsible for the threats to the political independence of Greece as it had transformed Greece into a territory dependent upon it both econ-

omically and politically. That was why the Special Committee on the Balkans had played a part which was pernicious and contrary to the interests of the Greek people. That was also why the Ukrainian SSR delegation would oppose the replacement of the Committee by a Balkan sub-commission whose competence might extend to any part of the Balkan area.

16. Consequently, the Ukrainian SSR delegation would vote for the dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and against the draft resolution proposing the establishment of a Balkan sub-commission.

17. The Ukrainian SSR delegation approved the part of the Chilean amendment (A/AC.53/L.7) recommending the resumption of diplomatic relations between Greece and its neighbours. It could not, however, support the whole of the recommendations, which merely repeated the fabrications contained in the Special Committee's report.

18. The Ukrainian SSR delegation unreservedly supported the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.6) and would vote for it.

19. Mr. TAMBA (Liberia) observed that, whenever the Greek question was raised, certain delegations did not attempt to reply to the charges made by Greece against its neighbours, but merely made counter-charges against Greece. The Liberian delegation considered that that method was contrary to the rules of logic and law and implied a tacit admission of the truth of the Greek Government's charges against its neighbours.

20. The USSR draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.6) advocated the cessation of interference in the affairs of Greece by the United States. The Greek Government, however, had made no complaint, either directly or indirectly, against the United States Government. Consequently, the Liberian delegation could not support that part of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

21. The same draft resolution also recommended a general amnesty in Greece, the suppression of concentration camps and the annulment of the death sentences imposed by the Greek military courts. It had not, however, been proved that Greece had violated the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It had not been proved, either, that it would be in accordance with the spirit and the letter of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter to tell the Greek Government how it should treat citizens found guilty of acts which, in certain other countries, would have involved the application of the death penalty. The Liberian delegation could not support that part of the USSR draft resolution either.

22. The Soviet Union draft resolution then recommended the establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania and Bulgaria, on the other. That recommendation was an interference in the sovereign rights of Member States

Consequently, the Liberian delegation would refrain from supporting it.

23. Finally, the Liberian delegation would adopt towards the last recommendation in the USSR draft resolution the attitude assumed by the authors of the joint draft resolution. Consequently, it would vote against the USSR draft.

24. Mr. VAN HEEMSTRA (Netherlands) said that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had served well the purposes of the General Assembly in helping to restore peace and order in Greece. He would like to pay a tribute to the Committee's work and to the courage of the Greek people. The Netherlands delegation felt that the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Greece and the joint draft resolution met the requirements of the situation. Mr. van Heemstra would therefore vote for them.

25. He would also like to draw the Committee's attention to the existence in central and eastern Europe of a network for the training and re-introduction into Greece of guerrilla agents for the purpose of conducting subversive activities. For that reason, it would be better for the United Nations to have its observers on the spot. He therefore hoped that the Balkan sub-commission, if established, would not hesitate to send observers—with the consent of the State concerned—to areas of tension in the Balkans.

26. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the Special Committee on the Balkans had opened the way to United States interference in the internal affairs of Greece. The strategic importance of Greece had not escaped the notice of the United States Government, which had first sent military missions there and had succeeded in making Greece one of the signatory nations of the North Atlantic Treaty.

27. From the economic point of view, the Greek Government had been subjected by the United States to pressure to which it had been forced to yield. The result was that, far from rising above the ruins caused by the war, Greece was at present in a disastrous economic situation.

28. That being the case, it would be futile to claim that Greece was not the object of attempts at foreign interference and threats to its political integrity. Those threats had not ceased to exist. They were the work of the United States Government, and the danger which threatened the economic and political independence of Greece was greater than ever.

29. The last report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had not given a truthful picture of the Greek situation. The charges it made were not supported by proof. It contained numerous contradictions, and the evidence it adduced should be treated with caution, for it was a well known fact that the witnesses had been subjected to intimidation by the police, and even to torture. Rumours or suppositions were doubtful premises on which to base important conclusions. Serious charges, based on

vague, unverified evidence, were made against Bulgaria. On the other hand, the report made no mention of violations of the air space and frontier of Bulgaria by the Greek armed forces. Those violations had not been investigated by the Committee's observers. Other charges were made against countries other than Albania and Bulgaria, such as Poland. Mr. Katz-Suchy expressed surprise that the report's charges against his country should be based on documents submitted and refuted at previous sessions of the General Assembly.

30. Furthermore, the report defined the word "guerrilla" so broadly that it was really difficult to take the definition seriously. For example, the report regarded as subversive activity the attempt by guerrillas to collect signatures in support of the Warsaw resolution, which requested a five-Power pact for the defence of peace and the prohibition of atomic weapons. In that connexion, he alluded to the American interpretation of the word "peace".

31. Mr. COHEN (United States of America), on a point of order, asked the Chairman to request the speaker to confine himself to the subject under discussion.

32. The CHAIRMAN asked the Polish representative to conclude his statement.

33. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland), resuming his statement, said that a reading of paragraph 150 of the report seemed to indicate that propaganda in support of peace was an offence.

34. He was also astonished that the Special Committee's report made no mention of Greek threats to the territorial integrity of Albania and Bulgaria. Greece had not renounced its ambitions regarding a part of Albanian territory. Moreover, it was strange to note that, while the population of Cyprus was claiming union with Greece, the Greek Government did not dare to say anything about its rights to that island, which was at present a base for British troops.

35. The CHAIRMAN said that the Polish representative's remarks were irrelevant, and requested him to confine himself to the subject under discussion.

36. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he was speaking strictly within the subject of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Cyprus was part of Greece.

37. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had done a great disservice by not permitting a full discussion of the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.1). That draft was directly relevant to the situation in Greece, since tension in the Balkans was being increased by the prevailing political terror.

38. Some delegations had praised the heroism of the Greek people during the war. They forgot that it was ELAS and EAM, now being persecuted by American guns, which had led the opposition to the enemy. It was to those organizations that their tributes should have been paid.

39. In the present state of tension in the Balkans, it was impossible to consider the Greek question without anxiety. That anxiety was increased by the inclusion of Greece in the ranks of the North Atlantic Treaty, which constituted a direct threat to the independence of Bulgaria and Albania.

40. Establishment of the proposed sub-commission would not solve the problem. The solution lay in the cessation of foreign interference and the withdrawal of military and economic missions from Greece. Those measures must be accompanied by the action envisaged in the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.6).

41. The dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans would not be sufficient to lessen the existing tension in the Balkans. The establishment of the proposed sub-commission would in fact merely represent a stage in the preparation of further aggression, along the same lines as the aggression committed in Korea. It would not serve the interests of peace, but would merely create additional tension. Such a proposal must be rejected by the United Nations, which had as its function the maintenance of international peace and security. If the United Nations did not fulfil that duty, it would bear the responsibility for the sufferings of the Greek people.

42. ANDRAOS Bey (Egypt) said that it was only natural that his country should pay a tribute to Greece. It was unfortunate that the Polish representative should challenge that tribute by giving a list of left-wing people who had saved Greece. General Metaxas and General Papagos, the leaders of the Greek resistance movement, were not leftists.

43. Greek independence had been saved by Greek patriots, without distinction of political party. All who wished to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Greece must support the two draft resolutions submitted by Greece, on the one hand, and by France, Greece, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States, on the other.

44. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) expressed his appreciation of the flattering remarks that had been made about his country.

45. On the other hand, the speeches of the representatives of the USSR and of the countries of the people's democracies seemed to be a part of the war of nerves being waged against the Greek people in order to break their will and to permit the carrying out of plans about which no secret was made.

46. Mr. Politis felt that there was no need to answer those speeches point by point. He would merely mention a few facts from which representatives would be able to draw conclusions. The Greek Ministry of Security had recently discovered an espionage ring in possession of wireless transmitters and in regular secret communication with certain of the people's democracies, to which it was transmitting information of a military nature. It had been established that one of the members of the ring arrested was acting under the orders of a

subversive organization with headquarters in one of the people's democracies.

47. Moreover, all the reports of the Special Committee on the Balkans had established that the countries within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence had shared in the conspiracy against Greece. The Special Committee's report currently before the Committee also revealed the story of the activities of members of subversive organizations at present being sheltered in the people's democracies. In that connexion it was inevitable to ask who financed such subversive organizations, the activities of which were obviously co-ordinated. That co-ordination was made clear from the report of the Special Committee on the Balkans, and was proof of the connivance of the USSR and the people's democracies. The representatives of those countries had therefore no right to discuss the domestic affairs of Greece, since it was not possible to be at the same time the guilty party and the judge.

48. The second reason why the representatives of the USSR and of the people's democracies were not qualified to sit in judgment on the Greek Government's acts was that they were the representatives of a régime based on terror. Consequently, they were in no position to pass judgment on respect for human rights in other countries.

49. A third reason was that the delegations of the USSR and of the people's democracies had shown their obvious lack of good faith and had systematically distorted the facts.

50. When the First Committee started its discussions at the General Assembly's fifth session, those delegations had submitted at the 393rd meeting a draft resolution which they claimed was designed to save the lives of persons sentenced by Greek courts. They knew perfectly well that the persons concerned had benefited from the Greek Government's clemency. At the present session, the same story was being repeated. The USSR delegation knew perfectly well that the twelve convicted persons who were the subject of their solicitude and who were mentioned by name in the draft resolution it had attempted to submit to the Committee, were also receiving the benefit of the Greek Government's clemency.

51. The criticisms levelled by the USSR and the people's democracies against the Special Committee on the Balkans should go unheeded by the members, observers and officials of that Committee who had simply carried out their duty to the letter. The persistence of attacks against the Special Committee was illuminating. It showed the disappointment felt in some quarters at the excellent results obtained by the Committee.

52. It had been argued that the Committee was a tool of the Greek and United States Governments. Nevertheless, Greece and the United States were actually proposing that it should be dissolved.

53. Greece had also been accused of using political refugees from adjacent countries to carry out subversive

activities. It was common knowledge, however, that during the last two years Greece had urged the International Refugee Organization to take charge of the refugees, who were a source of anxiety and expense to the Greek Government.

54. Mention had also been made of the aggressive designs of Greece on Albania and Bulgaria. Since the peace treaty, however, those countries had closed their frontiers, refused to comply with the clauses of the treaty and broken off all contact with Greece. It was Greece that had proposed to Bulgaria and Albania the resumption of diplomatic relations, but their reply had been that they would only accept such a proposal if Greece complied with the conditions formulated by the USSR, namely, if it changed its form of government.

55. The delegations of the USSR and of the people's democracies had shown great interest in the economic situation in Greece. The USSR representative had been apprehensive lest the solicitude shown towards Greece by the United States should be designed only to strangle Greek industry. The truth was that, owing to the aid afforded Greece by the United Kingdom and the United States, reconstruction after the ruin left by the nazis in Greece and improvement of the country's economy had been made possible.

56. Greece's sole aim was to maintain itself on the land which it had occupied for three thousand years. Greece's strength resided in the courage of its sons and in the defence of the freedoms and institutions which were its pride.

57. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) invoked his right under rule 114 of the rules of procedure to reply to the statements made by some of the representatives on the work of the United States Government in Greece. He rejected indignantly the suggestion that American aid had in any way interfered with the freedom of the Greek people which was the very object of that aid. He pointed out that Congressional legislation authorizing American aid to Greece included the proviso that such aid should cease if the United Nations thought it no longer helpful in the interests of peace. The United States felt that it had been acting on behalf of the interests of the United Nations. Mr. Cohen pointed out that the American aid programme was a continuance of the type of aid given to other peoples during the war under the lend-lease programme, of which the Soviet Union had received a generous share. Such aid was not used to enslave any people which received it. Whenever the Greek case was discussed in the United Nations, there was a certain diversionary effort made by some delegations which seemed to be insisting that there could never be freedom in Greece until Greece was willing to accept the dictates of the Cominform.

58. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), invoking the same right of reply, stated that the Greek representative's statements were pure invention and not supported by any proofs. As regards the Greek representatives allusions to the Soviet régime,

he would merely recall that the citizens of his country enjoyed such freedom as Greek citizens had never yet known.

59. The CHAIRMAN stated that the debate was closed and called upon the Committee to decide on the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/AC.53/L.2) and the two amendments to that draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/AC.53/L.5) and by Chile (A/AC.53/L.7). The USSR amendment, which was furthest removed from the original proposal, would be voted on first.

The USSR amendment was rejected by 47 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions.

60. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) stated that the purpose of his amendment¹ had been to apply the recommendations of the Special Committee on the Balkans and to incorporate them in the Greek draft resolution. As that draft, however, approved the recommendations made in the Committee's report, he did not consider his amendment necessary and would withdraw it.

61. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) asked that the French text of the Greek draft resolution should be amended by substituting the words "*mettre fin à l'existence de*" for the word "*discontinuer*", which was not good French usage.

62. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Greek draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.2); the French text would be amended in accordance with the French representative's request.

The draft resolution submitted by Greece was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

63. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.3) submitted jointly by France, Greece, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States.

The joint draft resolution was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

64. The CHAIRMAN called upon the members of the Committee to vote on the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.6).

65. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) asked that the draft resolution should be voted upon in parts, paragraph by paragraph.

66. Mr. MACEDO (Uruguay) asked that paragraph (b) should be voted on in two parts, the first part to conclude with the words "by Greek courts on Greek democrats"

¹ The Chilean amendment (A/AC.53/L.7) to the Greek draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.2) proposed that paragraph 4 should be replaced by the following, the original paragraph 4 to become paragraph 5:

"4. *Recommends* the cessation of all assistance or support to the Greek guerrilla movement in its activities against Greece; the renewal of diplomatic and good neighbourly relations; the renewal, revision or establishment of frontier conventions; the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas; the provision of no arms and materials of war either directly or indirectly to Albania and Bulgaria, and the co-operation of the States concerned with the appropriate United Nations body, particularly as regards the prompt and impartial investigation of their complaints and allegations."

and the second part to extend as far as the end of the paragraph.

It was so decided.

The preamble was rejected by 32 votes to 8, with 11 abstentions.

Paragraph (a) was rejected by 46 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

67. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) stated that the negative vote registered by his delegation did not in any way mean that there was interference by the United States in the affairs of Greece. On the contrary, everybody knew that that allegation was totally unfounded.

68. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) stated that he would not participate in the vote on the USSR draft resolution. The preamble had been rejected, and even if certain paragraphs were adopted, the final text would no longer have any meaning, as it would not contain any recommendation to the General Assembly.

69. The CHAIRMAN put the first part of paragraph (b) to the vote.

The first part of paragraph (b) was rejected by 37 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.

The second part of paragraph (b) was rejected by 31 votes to 10, with 13 abstentions.

Paragraph (c) was rejected by 22 votes to 12, with 18 abstentions.

Paragraph (d) was rejected by 33 votes to 9, with 12 abstentions.

70. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested a vote on his delegation's draft as a whole.

71. Mr. VAN GLABBEKE (Belgium) pointed out that under the terms of article 128 of the rules of procedure, which read : " If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole ", the USSR proposal could not be put to the vote, as its various parts had been rejected in their entirety.

72. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Committee's practice had been to put a proposal as a whole to the vote, even if all its parts had been rejected. The draft resolution in question was of such political importance that his delegation would like to see it put the vote as a whole. He would not, however, press the point if the Chairman found it impossible to meet his request.

73. The CHAIRMAN regretted that, in view of rule 128 of the rules of procedure, he was unable to meet the request of the USSR representative.

74. He requested the Committee to proceed with the consideration of point (b) of item 19 of the agenda, which dealt with the question of the repatriation of Greek children.

(b) Repatriation of Greek children: reports of the Secretary-General and of the international Red Cross organizations (A/1848, A/1932, A/1933, A/AC.53/L.4, A/AC.53/L.4/Rev.1).

75. Mr. GRAFSTROM (Sweden) recalled that, despite the injunctions of the General Assembly, the majority of States that had given shelter to Greek children had, with the exception of Yugoslavia, taken no action to ensure their repatriation. It was true that there were some technical difficulties, among them, the meaning of the word " child ", the manner in which the child could express its desire for repatriation, and the methods of checking the genuineness of that request. A decision had also to be taken as to where the child should be sent when his parents resided in different countries. Nevertheless, such difficulties were of a practical nature, and it had been possible to find a solution for them, particularly in the case of Greek children in Yugoslavia, where the Swedish Red Cross had collaborated closely with the Greek and Yugoslav authorities.

76. The real obstacles to the repatriation of Greek children were not of a practical nature. Without going into detail on the reasons why the wishes of the General Assembly had not so far been carried out, it sufficed to note that, in the opinion of the Secretary-General, the Red Cross organizations and the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children, success could be expected only through a frank exchange of views by the parties concerned. It was true that, as stated in the Secretary-General's report, such a method had been tried. The League of Red Cross Societies had been in touch with the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Romanian Red Cross societies and had proposed that they should either send representatives of the International Committee of the League to the capitals of the four countries concerned, or that they should send representatives of the Red Cross of those countries to Geneva, or engage in more general consultations in a town to be mutually agreed upon. Those proposals had not been acknowledged. The Standing Committee had endeavoured, also without success, to establish contact with those Governments with a view to speeding up the repatriation of Greek children. Nevertheless, the Standing Committee was convinced that the problem could only be solved by negotiation. That was why the Swedish delegation associated itself with other delegations in proposing (A/AC.53/L.4) that the representatives of countries where there were Greek children, and the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek children, should be asked to consult in Paris, and that consideration of the question should be postponed until the reactions of the Governments concerned were known. Should their reactions be favourable, consultations could take place and the necessary recommendations made. The Swedish delegation was convinced that, if the representatives of the countries concerned agreed to participate in such consultations in the spirit of the General Assembly's resolutions, a satisfactory solution for the problem might be found. It therefore invited all delegations to support the joint draft resolution.

77. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the amendment (A/AC.53/L.9) submitted by the Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherlands delegations to the joint draft resolution of the Peruvian, Philippine and Swedish delegations, and enquired whether the sponsors of the latter accepted the amendment, which would modify the first paragraph of their text to read as follows :

"Considering that, in order to accelerate repatriation of Greek children as provided for in various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, it would be desirable for consultations to be held in Paris at the earliest date between representatives of the countries harbouring Greek children and the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek children..."

78. Mr. GRAFSTROM (Sweden), Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines) and Mr. GOYTISOLO (Peru) accepted the amendment.

79. Mr. VAN GLABBEKE (Belgium) said that, in view of the action contemplated in the amended joint draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.4/Rev.1) his delegation would confine itself at the point in the debate to making a preliminary statement, and reserved its right to go more fully into the question when the results envisaged were known. While he was convinced that no effort should be spared to solve the problem, which involved the moral values on which civilization reposed, he was still somewhat pessimistic on the outcome of the proposed consultations.

80. On behalf of the Belgian people and particularly of all the mothers of Belgium, he appealed to all the States concerned, whether Members of the Organization or not, to do everything possible to put an end to the tragic lot of Greek children whose non-repatriation was a challenge to the civilized world and one of the most odious crimes in history. His delegation considered itself justified in speaking in such terms, for it regarded the family as the very foundation of civilization. Belgium had given refuge to thousands of Spanish and Hungarian children, but it had never contemplated putting any obstacle in the way of their repatriation, despite the sorrow to which in some cases the consequent separations gave rise in the homes which had given the children shelter.

81. The Committee should examine only a single aspect of the problem of Greek children : their repatriation. While the Belgian delegation was prepared to examine other aspects of the problem at the proper time, it held that, since the Committee's work was limited by the terms of reference laid down by the General Assembly resolution, the same should apply during the consultations envisaged by the joint draft resolution under consideration.

82. No progress had been made in the repatriation of Greek children. Only Yugoslavia had recently given

its co-operation, and he wished to thank the Yugoslav Government on behalf of Belgium. Yugoslavia should be congratulated on the goodwill it had shown, and it would not be out of place to cite to other countries concerned, during such consultations as might take place, the example of the understanding shown by Yugoslavia in the solution of the technical difficulties involved in the repatriation of Greek children in that country. It was to be hoped that all governments would be guided by a similar spirit of co-operation, and it was regrettable that in the draft resolution entitled "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations" (A/1962) which the USSR representative had submitted to the General Assembly, he had not inserted a clause on the need to repatriate the Greek children.

83. The Belgian delegation had, in agreement with the Luxembourg and Netherlands delegations, taken the initiative in submitting an amendment to the joint draft resolution, first, because it was necessary to bring the French text into line with the English text by making it clear that the countries it referred to were those harbouring Greek children and not, more generally, to all countries where there might at present be Greek children ; and, secondly, because it was important to stress the fact that the consultations referred to in the joint draft resolution should be conducted in accordance with the General Assembly's decisions on the question.

84. In conclusion, Mr. van Glabbeke asked for clarification of the term "countries harbouring Greek children". In his opinion, there existed no doubt in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania ; but it was more difficult to decide whether invitations to attend the proposed consultations should be issued to governments such as that of Albania, which had announced that there were no Greek children in its territory, Poland, which had stated that the Greek children who had gone to Poland had made only a temporary stay for the purpose of undergoing medical treatment, the German Democratic Republic, where representatives of Greece had stated that there were thousands of Greek children, and the USSR, where it had been said that there were also Greek children. Similarly, it should be made clear whether it was intended to invite the Government of Yugoslavia. While it was true that that Government had done a great deal to find a humane solution to the tragic problem of the Greek children—a fact which might seem to exclude it from the proposed consultations—it was nevertheless true that the experience it had acquired in framing practical measures to solve a variety of serious technical difficulties might be highly valuable. Finally, it should be stated whether the Greek Government was to be invited. That Government was most directly concerned in the matter and was in possession of the valuable files of documents assembled by the Greek Red Cross.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.