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*Chairman* : Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

**Complaint of hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia (A/1946, A/AC.53/L.10/Rev. 2) (*continued*).**

[Item 68]\*

1. Mr. VERGIN (Turkey) felt that since 1948 Yugoslavia had been subjected to outside pressure designed to bring about the economic and political disintegration of the country. He recalled that Yugoslavia was asking the United Nations to recommend that the Governments concerned should take appropriate measures to put an end to the prevailing tension and that, for its part, Yugoslavia pledged itself to observe in every detail the recommendations which might be adopted toward that end.

2. The statements of the Soviet Union delegation and of the other countries of eastern Europe concerned showed that none of them denied the existence of that tension, but that each of the parties was endeavouring to throw the responsibility on to the other party.

3. In the circumstances, the Turkish representative felt that the Committee should take note of the tension between Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and the countries mentioned in the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.2) on the other, and should then proceed to determine the causes of that tension.

4. Despite the attempts of the USSR and the other States concerned to refute the Yugoslav argument, the Turkish representative realized the difficulties confronting Yugoslavia. In that connexion, it might

be interesting to note certain tendentious allegations made in the Committee. At the 10th meeting, the Soviet Union representative had found it necessary to refer to United States military aid to Turkey in wholly inaccurate terms. As the diplomatic services of the USSR were always very well informed, Mr. Vergin felt that such inaccuracy could only have resulted from evident bad faith. By misrepresenting the nature of Turkey's legitimate efforts to ensure its independence and security, the Soviet Union could only strengthen Turkey's doubts and suspicions regarding the USSR's intentions. He added that Turkey wished to live in peace with all its neighbours and was prepared to respect fully the rights of others.

5. The Turkish delegation would support the revised Yugoslav draft resolution, the terms of which were entirely compatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

6. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) found it significant that most of the speakers of the Anglo-American bloc had refrained from commenting on the substance of the charges brought by Yugoslavia. The representative of France, for example, had stated that there was no need to examine the merits of the complaint after the detailed statement of the Yugoslav representative. That reticence clearly showed that the Yugoslav complaint was intended to divert public opinion, both in Yugoslavia and throughout the world, from the traitorous policy of the Yugoslav rulers who were delivering their people into the hands of the American imperialists and transforming Yugoslavia into an instrument of United States aggressive policy.

7. The United States representative had said (11th meeting) that his country was giving Yugoslavia economic and military assistance notwithstanding its communist régime. He had not explained why the

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

United States was making such an exception from its general policy. The explanation was simple enough: the American monopolists had no doubt whatever as to the fascist character of the Yugoslav régime and knew that the policy of Yugoslavia's rulers was directed to converting the country into an American colony, an American military base.

8. Mr. Sobolev noted that the United States had not come to the aid of Yugoslavia in healing the wounds of the Second World War and had not granted it credits for the reconstruction of its demolished factories and houses. Its financial aid had been given only for the building of aerodromes, strategic roads and military bases. If there were any doubt left that the Yugoslav complaint had been inspired by the United States, it must have been dispelled by the statement of the United States representative, who had unreservedly supported Yugoslavia's groundless charges and had added others of his own invention.

9. The Soviet Union delegation considered that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should reject the Yugoslav draft resolution as based on slanderous statements and insinuations directed against the USSR and the people's democracies.

10. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) observed that the representatives of the countries of eastern Europe, instead of attempting to refute the Yugoslav charges, had made complaints against Yugoslavia which, by their very nature, could not be verified by the Committee. He pointed out that even if Yugoslavia were guilty, it was still not clear why the governments of eastern Europe had interfered in the affairs of another State and had refused to restore normal relations with Yugoslavia.

11. It was significant that the USSR representative had not even dared to mention the matter of political relations, although that question was much simpler and did not require a lengthy process of verification.

12. The Yugoslav representative noted that his adversaries had made no reference to the statements of the Cominform or of government leaders, which were in fact direct incitements to revolt in Yugoslavia. They had not spoken of the violations of the peace treaties concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, nor of the campaign of hate directed against Yugoslavia.

13. The representatives of the countries of eastern Europe had not refuted the evidence presented by Yugoslavia regarding the extermination of Yugoslav minorities in the Cominform countries, which betrayed the Soviet Union Government's plans to enslave the Yugoslav peoples. The persecution of those minorities showed that the USSR and the countries of eastern Europe had not only failed to convince the peoples of Yugoslavia, but that they had failed to convince the Yugoslav minorities living under their police supervision. They had simply resorted to fabricating alleged persecutions of national minorities in Yugoslavia.

14. Mr. Djilas then gave details on the case of the Soviet citizen, Demidenko, recalling that, as early as 1949, the Yugoslav Government had proposed to the USSR Government, through diplomatic channels, the repatriation of all Soviet citizens who so desired. No reply had been made to that proposal.

15. The Yugoslav representative said that he would not deign to refute the lies regarding the various trials to which the Soviet bloc representatives had referred. The true objective of those trials was to spread terror and prepare the ground for aggression against Yugoslavia. The fact that the trials were used as the main and perhaps the only argument against Yugoslavia, showed that they did not represent the application of justice, but rather were an instrument for carrying out a definite policy. The trials were artificially created for the sole purpose of justifying the denunciation of treaties and agreements and the economic blockade directed by a whole group of countries against Yugoslavia.

16. Mr. Djilas recalled the USSR representative's statement that Yugoslavia had failed to fulfil its commitments and had not delivered certain goods within the agreed time limits. He was not disputing the fact that there had been delays arising from inevitable post-war difficulties, but he pointed out that arbitration procedures had been provided to meet that type of difficulty. However, instead of resorting to them, eight countries had unilaterally and simultaneously broken off economic relations with Yugoslavia, giving purely political reasons for their action.

17. He also wished to correct certain statements made by the USSR representative regarding his country's assistance to Yugoslavia. He noted for example that the USSR credit of 795 million roubles granted to Yugoslavia had been largely made up of investment credits amounting to 135 million dinars under an agreement signed in 1947. Of that total, Yugoslavia had received goods in 1949 not exceeding \$US 800,000 in value. Mr. Djilas added that, generally speaking, the statistics supplied by the representatives of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland had been manipulated and should not be taken seriously.

18. The delegations of those countries had also distorted the true facts regarding the frontier incidents, and some of the versions they had given did not withstand analysis. Erroneous dates and contradictory statements showed that an attempt was being made to place responsibility on Yugoslavia. Moreover, the incidents revealed the existence of a state of tension which Yugoslavia's neighbours were trying to maintain. For its part, Yugoslavia asked nothing more than to put an end to it and to settle frontier disputes through mixed frontier commissions.

19. Mr. Djilas objected to the attitude of the representatives of the USSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR, who had based their statements to the Committee on Soviet propaganda. It was untrue that Yugoslavia had repealed its nationalization law.

It was equally false that Yugoslavia had sent six divisions to Korea, as had been alleged on the Hungarian wireless. It was also untrue that the countries of the Western bloc had laid their hands on Yugoslav economy. There were no undertakings in Yugoslavia financed by foreign capital.

20. The Yugoslav representative further denied that Yugoslavia had been liberated by the Red Army. It was true that that army had helped in the liberation of one-eighth of Yugoslav territory; but it must not be forgotten that the Yugoslav armies had held in check and annihilated many German and Italian divisions and by that means had assisted the Red Army and the other allied armies. Yugoslavia had liberated itself by its own efforts and it meant to remain free. It had no ambition for conquest, whatever the representatives of the USSR bloc might say. There was no foundation at all for their allegation that Yugoslavia was seeking to conquer Albania. Yugoslavia had helped Albania to the best of its ability at the time it maintained diplomatic relations with that State. That could be proved by reference to *Izvestia* of 11 January 1948, which mentioned the aid given to Albania by Yugoslavia. He read the passage in question and added that the Albanian Government had only broken off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia under pressure from the USSR Government.

21. Mr. Djilas also protested against the statements of the representatives of the Soviet bloc who had tried to prove that Yugoslavia was becoming an American military base, since the United States had furnished it with aid and weapons. That argument could be answered by pointing out that the Soviet Union itself had received American aid, without thereby becoming subject to the United States. It was, moreover, natural that Yugoslavia should have tried to re-equip its army when the USSR was arming Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in contravention of the peace treaties. Yugoslavia's rearmament was designed entirely to improve its defences against threats of aggression. It did not mean, as the USSR representative had tried to prove, that the United States General Staff had assumed command of the Yugoslav army. In that connexion he wished to point out to the Soviet Union representative that a small country could maintain relations other than that of subordination with a larger country.

22. The assertions made by the representatives of the Soviet bloc concerning terrorism in Yugoslavia were also entirely baseless. Yugoslavia was a country where tourists, diplomats and journalists moved about freely. They had been able to see for themselves that there was no terrorism in Yugoslavia, nor were there concentration camps or forced labour camps.

23. In conclusion, Mr. Djilas recalled that his Government had on several occasions proposed a peaceful settlement of all outstanding disputes. In that respect he recalled the statements made in 1948, 1949 and 1950 by the representative of Yugoslavia before the

United Nations General Assembly. He also quoted a statement by Marshal Tito, the text of which had been reproduced in the Yugoslav White Book (document 287). All those proposals and appeals for better relations had met with no reply. Yugoslavia's struggle for national independence reflected its people's desire to live in peace. The draft resolution he had submitted was a further effort on the part of the Yugoslav Government to establish normal relations with neighbouring countries.

24. Mr. Djilas did not think that he could accept the Israel representative's proposal (13th meeting) to amend the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution. Yugoslavia had made a complaint, and that complaint must be mentioned if the draft resolution was to have any meaning.

25. He expressed the hope that the draft resolution submitted by his delegation would be adopted by a large majority, and he requested the Chairman to take a vote on it paragraph by paragraph.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that under rule 127 of the rules of procedure he would allow members to explain their votes after the voting, but speakers must limit themselves to five minutes.

27. He then put the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.10/Rev.2) to the vote paragraph by paragraph.

*Preamble :*

*The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 48 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

*The second paragraph was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.*

*The third paragraph was adopted by 52 votes to 5.*

*The fourth paragraph was adopted by 53 votes to 5.*

*Operative part :*

*Paragraph 1*

*Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

*Paragraph 2*

*Paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

*Sub-paragraph (b) was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

*Sub-paragraph (c) was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

*The draft resolution, as a whole, was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.*

28. Mr. MALOLES (Philippines) thought that although the Committee was not in a position to verify the facts underlying the charges which it had heard, it would nevertheless appear that the statements of the Yugoslav representative were well founded. His delegation thought that the Balkan sub-commission might play a useful part in the settlement of the dispute by determining the truth of the allegations made by both sides. He would therefore be prepared to support any recommendation which might lead to an invitation to the parties to have recourse to the good offices of that sub-commission. Although the Philippines was

very far from Yugoslavia geographically, it was none the less deeply concerned for the independence and integrity of that country, which seemed to it to symbolize the independence and integrity of all small States. The Philippine delegation had therefore supported the Yugoslav draft resolution in order to secure respect for the provisions of the Charter, particularly Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4.

29. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) said that the Burmese delegation was unable to determine what justification there was for the charges brought before the Committee; but the draft resolution just adopted did not require the Committee to pass judgment. Clearly a dangerous state of tension did exist between Yugoslavia and the other States named in the draft resolution, which merely suggested means, fully in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and generally accepted international practice, whereby the tension could be removed. His delegation had voted for the draft resolution, since the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes was a cornerstone both of the Charter and of the Burmese Government's policy. Neither party would be the victor if the draft resolution which had just been adopted was implemented. Only peace would emerge victorious.

30. Mr. MORENO (Panama) had voted for the draft resolution in order that the problem might be studied impartially and the principle of peaceful co-operation between nations respected. The draft resolution reflected Yugoslavia's desire to live in peace with its neighbours and to avoid any friction liable to endanger world peace. The delegation of Panama was doubtful, however, whether the draft resolution would be effectively implemented.

31. Mr. NEHRU (India) recalled that the various speeches made in the Committee had confirmed the seriousness of the tension which Yugoslavia had brought to the notice of the United Nations. His delegation had supported the Yugoslav draft resolution not only because it was based on the principles of the Charter, but also because it was practical and reasonable. Certain people had tried to trace the causes of the dispute and to fix responsibility. Mr. Nehru pointed out that such considerations were not included in the draft resolution, and thought that no verdict could be given without a thorough investigation by an appropriate body. In the absence of such an investigation, the United Nations could not pass judgment on the complaint; it could only note the existence of the tension and remind the Governments concerned of their duties as Member States and as peaceful members of the world community.

32. Mr. DE BEAUMONT (France) wished to speak only because the attitude of the French delegation had been called in question and also to give certain explanations which he felt were necessary. He had never contended that there was no need to furnish evidence in a discussion which might result in the condemnation of one of the parties concerned. In point of fact, the Committee's role was not to pass judgment

but to remind the parties that certain principles must be respected. Moreover, he did not believe that the French delegation's statement had led to any confusion, and his view was borne out by the reports published in the Press.

33. Mr. NOTOWIDIGDO (Indonesia) said that his delegation, without going into the details of the various accusations, wished to stress its concern over the tension which prevailed in the Balkans, as well as on the threat to peace in that region and the consequent threat to peace to the whole world. In supporting the Yugoslav draft resolution, the Indonesian delegation hoped that the recommendations of the General Assembly would be observed by all peace-loving States.

34. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) stated that his delegation had abstained from voting on the preamble and on the draft resolution as a whole because of the absence of definite information on the situation, and because of the divergence of opinion in the Committee. It had, however, voted for the recommendations, which were wholly in accordance with the Charter, and he hoped that the draft resolution would be implemented in a spirit of co-operation.

35. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) said that he had refrained from speaking in the general discussion not because he had not been fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation, but because he wished to hasten the work of the Committee by making his comments at the end of the debate. The seriousness of the situation in the Balkans had been clear to all even before the Yugoslav complaint had been submitted to the United Nations. Even if the Yugoslav Government had not raised the matter, the accusations of the USSR would have sufficed to reveal the gravity of the tension and would have justified the recommendation of the measures designed to reduce it. In the circumstances, the delegation of El Salvador considered it impossible to abstain from voting. Although it had often been opposed to Yugoslavia in keen discussions, it was convinced that its attitude would be justified by the importance of the principles involved, since the independence and existence of a State were literally at stake. The existing tension might give grounds for apprehension that Yugoslavia was only the first focus of hostile activities which would spread later and endanger world peace. Consequently, the delegation of El Salvador had voted for the Yugoslav draft resolution which contained no condemnation but invited the parties concerned to observe the principles of the Charter. It hoped that the Balkan sub-commission would deal with the problem.

36. Mr. PLAZA (Venezuela) stated that he had voted for the draft resolution because it embodied the principles which his country applied in its international relations. The exemplary moderation shown by Yugoslavia was wholly to its credit, and the Venezuelan representative felt that all peace-loving peoples would endorse the draft resolution which the Committee had just adopted. He hoped that it would not remain a dead letter but would be applied effectively.

37. Mr. GASHAOU (Ethiopia) considered that it was the duty of Member States to help each other in ensuring the adoption of measures for the maintenance or the re-establishment of friendly relations between governments. Such was the aim of all the recommendations contained in the draft resolution which were addressed impartially to all the parties concerned, without passing judgment on any one. The Ethiopian delegation had therefore cast its affirmative vote.

38. Mr. VAN GLABBEKE (Belgium) said that he had voted for the draft resolution not only for the reasons which he had stated earlier, but also because the last statement made by the Yugoslav representative had confirmed him in his opinion. The third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble reiterated the principles of the Charter, and it was inconceivable that a Member State could vote against principles upon which the United Nations as a whole was founded. In the first paragraph of the operative part, the Committee took note of the declaration that the Yugoslav Government undertook to carry out the recommendations in the draft resolution and therefore to settle the dispute by peaceful means. There, again, it was inconceivable that any delegation would vote against a text which emphasized that the rule of law must be respected. The Belgian delegation had consequently voted for those paragraphs, since it feared that a country which did not observe the rule of law would inevitably end by using force.

#### Organization of the work of the Committee

39. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Committee would, at its next meeting, take up item 3 of its agenda, entitled: "Appointment of an impartial international commission under United Nations supervision to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas."

40. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) asked whether it would not be possible for that item to be postponed until the meeting on Tuesday, 4 December, in order to allow the head of the United Kingdom delegation, who would be unable to be present at the meeting scheduled for Monday, 3 December, to introduce the subject.

41. Mr. PATIJN (Netherlands) proposed that the meeting scheduled for Monday, 3 December, should be cancelled and that two meetings should be held on Tuesday, 4 December. In that way the wishes of the United Kingdom delegation might be met without the loss of valuable time.

*It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.