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Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Sanz Briz
(Spain), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

AGENDA ITEM 25

Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/4861; A/SPC/58 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. COMAY (Israel), said in the exercise of his right of reply that the whole of the long statement of the representative of Saudi Arabia at the 308th and 309th meetings could be summed up in the words "Israel must be eliminated". Since the themes that he had introduced, however, would no doubt be repeated by other Arab delegations, the Israel delegation, instead of merely registering its polite dissent, would like to give a true account of the facts. It would present the views of the Government of Israel on the substance of the refugee problem at a later stage.

2. The statement of the Saudi Arabian representative was the expression of a destructive state of mind borne of compulsive hatred. That mentality expressed itself in various ways, but always with the same aim: to eliminate Israel by violence and by war. The Saudi Arabian representative's statement should be examined with those aims in mind.

3. With regard to the facts, the Saudi Arabian representative had alleged that Zionism had been an evil and sinister force. Yet Zionism was one of the most moving and most constructive national liberation movements in human history. Spurred on by the twin forces of nationalism and persecution, the Jewish people had dreamt of rebuilding their ancient homeland in Palestine and had organized the Zionist movement to promote that ideal by constructive pioneering work in what had become a neglected and backward corner of the Ottoman Empire. The Zionist Organization, founded in 1897, had sought to mobilize the help of the Jewish people everywhere and to gain the understanding and support of all nations. In 1917, support for the Zionist ideal had been pledged in the Balfour Declaration,^{1/} which had been endorsed by Great Britain's allies and by the United States, and had been written in due course into the League of Nations Mandate for

Palestine.^{2/} After the dispersal of the Jews, Palestine had been for twenty centuries an obscure province, colony or dependency under foreign rule. When, in 1947, the Arab spokesmen had demanded that Palestine should become an independent Arab State, they were demanding something that had never existed previously, and their demand had been decisively rejected by the United Nations.

4. The Jews in Palestine had sought to live in peace with their neighbours, sharing the benefits of their work and demonstrating that Jews and Arabs could live together in equality and friendship. At one time, that vision had been shared. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, a meeting had taken place between the Zionist leader, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, and the main spokesman of the Arab world at the time, the Emir Feisal, and on 3 January 1919 an agreement of friendship had been signed. And on 3 March 1919 the Emir had written to Mr. Felix Frankfurter and described the Arabs and Jews as cousins in race who could work together for a reformed and revived Near East. A revival of that spirit was the only thing that could open up a future of peace and neighbourly co-operation, instead of the future prefigured in the Saudi Arabian statement. In Palestine itself, a network of economic, social and personal relationships had grown up between the Arab and Jewish inhabitants. Unfortunately, the more extremist Arab nationalist leaders of the country had set out ruthlessly to destroy the Jewish National Home and had organized pogroms and riots in 1921, 1929 and 1936, in which hundreds of Jewish civilians had been murdered. Despite the political tension, however, the Arab population had grown rapidly and its standard of life had steadily improved as a result of Jewish activities in Palestine. The allegation that the Arab inhabitants had been displaced and driven out by Jewish immigrants was untrue. In fact, Arabs had streamed into Palestine from the surrounding countries. According to the figures given in the report by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1947, in twenty-five years the Arab population had more than doubled.^{3/} That phenomenal growth was organically related to the Zionist development of Palestine.

5. In February 1947, the Mandatory Power had laid the problem of Palestine before the United Nations.^{4/} There had followed a genuine and remarkably painstaking effort to reconcile the claims of Jews and Arabs and find a just compromise between the two. A United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had been appointed, consisting of eleven small Powers from all the different regions, none of them directly involved in the conflict. At the beginning of September 1947, after serious and intensive research, that Com-

^{2/} *Ibid.*, annex 20.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Vol. I, chap. II, paras. 11 and 12.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, Vol. II, annex I.

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, Vol. II, annex 19.

mittee had produced a comprehensive report^{5/} for the General Assembly. The item had been debated by the second regular session of the General Assembly for two whole months. Thus, resolution 181 (II) had been adopted after the most intensive, detailed and conscientious study ever given by the United Nations to any political issue before or since.

6. The Arab position at the time was that Palestine was a part of the Arab homeland and should become another Arab State. Since that claim was still being maintained, it was important to note that it had been unanimously rejected by UNSCOP,^{6/} which had unanimously accepted that both peoples, Arab and Jewish, should be granted independence on the basis of Arab and Jewish States. The Arab claim to Palestine had been put forward in the form of a draft resolution which was supported by only six non-Arab delegations and decisively defeated. Accordingly, the Arab contention that Palestine was an Arab country had been crushingly rejected by the United Nations even before the establishment of the State of Israel. The statistics and arguments against the partition plan given by the representative of Saudi Arabia had been repeated many times before UNSCOP and before the General Assembly in 1947. Eventually, resolution 181 (II) had been carried by a majority of more than two-thirds. It had been adopted in the solemn hope that the two peoples concerned would be able to build a future together in amity. That hope had been strengthened by the endorsement of the partition proposal by the two leading world Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Above all, the resolution had been adopted in the hope that a compromise solution was better than no solution at all.

7. The Jews had agreed to accept the compromise in order to gain independence in at least part of Palestine and be able to take in those Jews who had survived Nazi persecution but were still rotting in D.P. camps. They had held out the hand of friendship to their Arab neighbours in all sincerity, and had guaranteed complete equality and freedom to the Arabs who would remain within the Jewish State. That offer had been spurned, resolution 181 (II) had been rejected and the Arab leadership made the fateful decision to defy the United Nations, occupy the country by force, impose their own solution and face the world with a "fait accompli".

8. There had been many attempts to present the Arab resort to force as a reaction to Jewish "terrorism". The attack on Deir Yassin so often referred to had been an isolated incident, publicly condemned at the time by the Jewish leadership. The United Nations Mediator had said in his telegram to the Secretary-General of 12 September 1948 (S/999) that the Arab allegations were enormously exaggerated. The same could not be said of the organized bands of Arab irregulars, who killed and mutilated civilians in the most barbaric way. The responsibility for the war of 1948, and its miseries, was clear from the official records of the United Nations.

9. Even before the adoption of resolution 181 (II) on 29 November 1947, Arab spokesmen had stated their determination to obstruct it by all possible means and the very day after the Arab League published its programme for the occupation of Palestine by the armies of the League and the forcible prevention of the establishment of a Jewish State. The Palestine Arab Higher

Committee announced a holy war against the Jews. In a special report to the Security Council,^{7/} on 16 February 1948, the United Nations Palestine Commission stated that powerful Arab interests both inside and outside Palestine in defiance of the General Assembly's resolution were engaged in attempting to alter the settlement by force. The 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem had been cut off from the coast and various Jewish villages had been overrun or subjected to heavy attack. In a report to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,^{8/} on 10 April 1948, the Palestine Commission reported that armed Arab bands from neighbouring Arab States had infiltrated into the territory of Palestine and together with local Arab forces were defeating the purposes of the partition resolution by acts of violence. It was after that onslaught had been repulsed and the tide of the fighting had begun to turn, that panic had set in amongst the Arab population and they had started to flee. That movement had been deliberately ordered and fomented by the Arab leaders. It was politically intolerable to them that the local Arab population should settle peacefully in areas under Jewish control, and they had therefore ordered an immediate mass evacuation, promising the Arabs that within a few weeks they would be able to return in triumph. Far from expelling the Arabs, the Jewish authorities had appealed to them to stay where they were under guarantees of their security. That had been reported by the Haifa Arab Emergency Committee. The fact that the Arabs had been ordered to flee by their own leaders had been confirmed by a number of Arab spokesmen, including Jamal Bey Hussein, speaking for the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, in a statement to the Security Council^{9/} on 23 April 1948, and also by Mgr. George Hakim, by Edward Atiyah and Emile Ghory.

10. The Jewish authorities had done everything possible to persuade the Arab leaders to stop fighting and reach an understanding for the future. The proclamation of independence of the State of Israel after the end of the Mandate on 15 May 1948 had contained an appeal to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to return to the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State. On the first morning of Israel's independence, Egyptian planes had dropped bombs on the civilian population of Tel Aviv. On the same day, the armies of the surrounding Arab States had invaded Palestine and the invasion had been announced in telegrams to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the President of the Security Council. A week later, the Council had adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire.^{10/} That appeal had been rejected. It was not until the Security Council took a decision threatening sanctions^{11/} against the Arabs, at the end of May, that a month's truce had been arranged. When it expired, the United Nations Mediator had told the Security Council that the Arabs were not prepared to accept a prolongation of the truce. The Security Council then adopted a resolution^{12/} determining, for the first time in its history, that the situation constituted a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter and ordering the Governments concerned to cease fire

^{7/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Special Supplement No. 2, document S/676.

^{8/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Special Session, Supplement No. 1.

^{9/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 62, 287th meeting.

^{10/} Ibid., Supplement for May, 1948, document S/773.

^{11/} Ibid., document S/801.

^{12/} Ibid., Supplement for July, 1948, document S/902.

^{5/} Ibid., Vol. I.

^{6/} Ibid., chap. V, para. 3.

or face further action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The preamble of that resolution noted that the provisional government of Israel had indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce, and that the States members of the Arab League had rejected the successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council for a prolongation. It was clear who the aggressors in Palestine had been, who had sent their armies across their own borders into another country and had refused to stop the fighting until they had actually been defeated on the field of battle. The story put forward by the Saudi Arabian representative that the Jews were the aggressors and that the Arab armies had only come in to save their brethren was quite out of keeping with the facts. It was produced because people like the Saudi Arabian representative dared not admit how the Arabs of Palestine had been plunged into disaster by their own leaders. The Jews had also suffered from the Israel-Arab war. Nevertheless, despite the past, they were prepared to make a fresh start with their Arab neighbours. They were not prepared, however, to have the record of the past distorted.

11. In the negotiations which had followed under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, the main difficulty had been the refusal of the Arab delegations to meet with the delegation of Israel, and the refusal of their Governments to recognize the country with which they were supposed to be negotiating. The Saudi Arabian representative had attacked the United Nations Conciliation Commission fiercely. The Commission's last serious attempt to break the deadlock had been at the conference it had convened in Paris in the summer of 1951. It had then put forward as a basis for discussion a series of proposals and suggested in a preamble^{13/} that all the Governments concerned should subscribe to a declaration of intention to settle all differences solely by peaceful means. Israel had been willing to do so but the Arab Governments had refused. At about the same time, Egypt had been arguing before the Security Council that it was justified in blocking the Suez Canal to Israel traffic because it was in a state of war with Israel. The Committee could judge for itself where the responsibility lay for the breakdown in the efforts to make peace.

12. The Saudi Arabian representative had repeated (308th meeting) an old charge that Israel had adopted certain positions at the Lausanne Conference in May 1949, in order to gain admission to the United Nations by deceit, and had abandoned them once it had been admitted. That assertion was completely false. Israel had been admitted to the United Nations in May 1949 by a unique procedure. The question of its admission had been referred to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and during the debate, the representative of Israel had made a long statement and had then submitted to an interrogation^{14/} by members of the Committee. He had made a full disclosure of the Israel Government's position on each point. On the refugee problem he had stressed that paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) contained the qualifications of peace and practicability, that the refugee problem could not be taken out of the context of a general peace settlement, and that the main solution should lie in the resettlement of the

refugees in the Arab countries and not in their repatriation.

13. It had also been suggested that on 12 May 1948, during the Lausanne Conference, a protocol had been signed by which Israel and the Arab States agreed to the 1947 partition boundaries, and that Israel had afterwards broken that agreement. That was also untrue. There were, in fact, two separate protocols,^{15/} one signed by the United Nations Conciliation Commission and the representative of Israel and the other signed by the Commission and the Arab representatives. In both it had been stated that the working document attached to the protocol would be taken as a basis for discussions, and that the exchanges of views which would be carried on by the Commission with the two parties would bear upon territorial adjustments to the protocol. That working document was a map showing the territory attributed to the Arab and Jewish States respectively by the 1947 partition decision. It had not been an agreement or a binding commitment but merely a temporary procedural device designed to initiate discussions. By 1950, the Conciliation Commission had come to the conclusion that the protocols could not serve as a basis for negotiation, and had dropped them.

14. The mentality which had rejected every constructive solution in the past was still reflected in the statements being made in the Committee. That mentality, clinging to the vain hope that Israel could be eradicated, explained the Arab policy of belligerency against Israel. The Arab leaders told their peoples that Israel would be attacked again and diverted their resources to the training and equipping of armies. The Suez Canal was closed to Israel ships and cargoes, in defiance of Security Council decisions; the Arab League maintained an elaborate apparatus of blackmail against third-party States and firms carrying on normal trade relations with Israel. Israel nevertheless continued to grow and its ties of friendship with the outside world continued to expand. For that reason, the newly independent States were being bombarded with anti-Israel propaganda. The allegation of colonialism was too obviously spurious to need refutation. Nor was there the slightest truth in the charge of Israel expansionism. None of the border incidents which had occurred had been initiated by the Israel Security Forces, which had only acted to put a stop to the raids of armed bands. According to the Cairo newspaper *Akher Sa'a* of 19 July 1961 Mr. Mounir El-Rais, the Mayor of Gaza, whose name appeared as one of the group whose spokesmen would be given a hearing before the Committee, had stated that the battle for Palestine's "liberation" must be continued by means of incursions carried out by the Egyptian trained Fedayeen guerilla groups (whose activities had led to the Sinai campaign of 1956).

15. A peace treaty could be signed between Israel and its Arab neighbours to allay Arab fears, and define the political frontiers between them; a non-aggression pact could be signed; disarmament arrangements, with mutual inspection and control, could be entered into; the borders could be guaranteed by the United Nations or the great Powers. The Arab States had rejected all those proposals, plainly because it was not Israel which wanted to occupy Arab territory, but the Arab States which wanted to occupy Israel.

16. If there was any threat to the independence of Arab countries it came from other Arab countries. In 1958

^{13/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 18, para. 23.

^{14/} *Ibid.*, Third Session, Part II, *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, 45th, 46th and 47th meetings.

^{15/} *Ibid.*, Fourth Session, *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Annex, vol. II, document A/927, annexes A and B.

the Sudan had complained to the Security Council^{16/} of Egyptian military occupation of a part of its territory; in 1958, Lebanon^{17/} and Jordan^{18/} had brought complaints to the Council arising out of Egyptian aggressive activities; and in the same year those activities had led to a major Middle East crisis which had necessitated the Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Syria had only recently regained its independence from the United Arab Republic; there had been another recent crisis over Kuwait; and Mauritania, on which Morocco had designs, had been admitted to the United Nations only against the vigorous opposition of all the Arab States.

17. Another false allegation was that the Arab minority in Israel was persecuted. One-tenth of the citizens of Israel were Arabs; they enjoyed full political rights and many were members of Parliament, mayors, city councillors, judges, police officers, civil servants and teachers. They had full religious and cultural autonomy, and the official use of Arabic for all purposes was authorized. Their economic and social advance since 1948 had been remarkable. The average annual income of an Arab family in Israel was about \$1,600, as compared with \$40 per caput in Saudi Arabia. Some security restrictions were enforced in certain border areas; they applied to all the inhabitants of those areas, but were necessitated by hostile acts and infiltration from the Arab States.

18. The Saudi Arabian representative had made great play of recent demonstrations in Nazareth. While the Israel authorities knew why, and by whom, those demonstrations had been organized, they surely went to show the remarkable degree of freedom enjoyed by Israel Arabs. A quotation had been cited from The New York Times to the effect that Israel's Arab citizens were not given access to the civil courts. That was completely incorrect; the Israel civil courts were open to all, and the different religious communities had their own religious courts for matters of family and personal status. The New York Times had published a letter two days previously setting the facts straight.

19. Israel was a democratic society, with a free Press, and with hundreds of thousands of visitors from abroad, so that anyone could find out for themselves the facts about life in Israel. It was particularly inadvisable of the representative of Saudi Arabia to make allegations in that regard, for the facts about the feudal régime, the economic inequalities and the low living standards of the masses in Saudi Arabia were not unknown to the outside world, not to mention the half million slaves, most of them Africans, who were bought and sold like cattle in that country. If the Saudi Arabian representative wanted a United Nations commission of inquiry, he should invite it to the country which he represented. Israel did not need such a commission. One service that the Saudi Arabian representative could perform for the Arabs of Israel would be to persuade his Government to allow Israel's Moslem citizens to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca.

20. It was particularly contemptible for the Saudi Arabian representative to try to equate Israel and Zionism with Nazism. The Israel Foreign Minister had made a very full reply, to an identical allegation by the same representative (1038th plenary meeting),

^{16/} Official Records of the Security Council, Thirteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March, 1958, document S/3963.

^{17/} Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June, 1958, document S/4007.

^{18/} Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1958, document S/4053.

in the General Assembly at the 1039th plenary meeting on 18 October.

21. Having failed to prevent the creation or the growth of Israel, the Saudi Arabian representative was trying to turn the United Nations into an instrument of Arab hostility, and to persuade it to take measures which were inconsistent with Israel's sovereignty and its status as a United Nations Member. For example, when that representative spoke of implementing paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), he meant that the United Nations should install the refugees on Israel territory without the permission of the Israel Government. The Saudi Arabian representative also wanted the United Nations to make itself the guardian of one section of the population of Israel; and he wanted the Organization to take charge of properties in Israel and to repeal the property laws adopted by the Israel Parliament. However, Israel was not a Non-Self-Governing Territory under United Nations administration, and the United Nations could intervene in Israel's affairs only to the extent that it could also intervene in the affairs of Saudi Arabia.

22. With regard to the alleged property rights of the refugees, his delegation had pointed out at the resumed fifteenth session^{19/} of the General Assembly that such proposals were quite outside the scope of the item on the agenda and had no foundation in law, in fact or in established international practice. His delegation had pointed out then that property rights within the territory of a sovereign State were exclusively subject to the domestic law of that State, that the United Nations had no competence to concern itself with the regulation of such property rights, and that that situation would not be altered by the fact that the claimants happened to be refugees, and the recipients of United Nations assistance. If it were otherwise, the United Nations would be involved in private claims on behalf of tens of millions of people in scores of different countries. The number of human beings involved in the displacements which had taken place as the result of post-war political upheavals was up to forty million.

23. The figures quoted by Arab spokesmen regarding the extent of Arab hand holding in what was now Israel territory were totally misleading, as his delegation would show later if necessary. Most of the area in Israel had been Crown land under the Mandatory régime, and this ipso facto became vested in the Israel Government after independence.

24. Because the Saudi Arabian representative knew that the United Nations could not interfere with the internal property legislation of a sovereign State, he was obliged to invent a curious doctrine of half-sovereignty, based on General Assembly resolution 181 (II), which the Arabs had declared invalid and had attempted to frustrate by armed force. It was also argued that certain statutes of the State of Israel were illegal because they were said to be inconsistent with that resolution, though the Arab representatives had declared at the time that they regarded the resolution itself as illegal.

25. The Saudi Arabian representative had argued that the Palestine question was still a United Nations problem and that the responsibilities with which the United Nations had vested itself in 1947 remained intact in 1961. That was not so. Palestine had ceased to exist as from 1948. The relationship between Israel and the United Nations and its position as a sovereign State

^{19/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Part II, Special Political Committee, 250th meeting.

was unaffected by the fact that the Arab States chose not to recognize the State of Israel.

26. The Saudi Arabian representative had given a long list of property laws in other countries, none of which had any bearing on the question of abandoned property in Israel; they had been cited in order to hide the fact that there had never been a case of an international property custodian.

27. It was the refugees themselves who were the chief victims of the mentality reflected in the Saudi Arabian representative's speech. Every effort to help them to be absorbed into productive life had been thwarted, from the projects of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp Mission) in 1919 and the Johnston Plan, to the late Secretary-General's report of 1959.^{20/}

28. The refugee problem must not be solved, because the refugees were needed as a political and military weapon against Israel. It was said that the refugees must not be resettled but must be permitted to return to Israel, but it was quite clear that the intention was not that they should become loyal citizens of Israel. In his statement, the Saudi Arabian representative had said that he was not concerned with the allotment of areas, because Israel had no right to a single span of Palestine, which had always been Arab homeland and would so become again for all time to come. The aim was clearly conquest by repatriation. On 26 June 1961, the Government radio of the United Arab Republic had declared that the refugees would not return under the protection of "the Israel gang" but to a liberated Arab State. On 1 September 1961, according to the *Die Weltwoche* of Zurich, Switzerland, President Nasser had declared that if the Arabs returned to Israel, Israel would cease to exist. In May, 1961, President Bourguiba had spoken of the possibility of negotiating an agreement between the Arabs and Israel at some future date. The official organ of the Nasser régime *Al Goumhouriah* had said that Habib Bourguiba was a criminal to suggest that negotiations with Israel might eventually become possible, for the Arabs would never agree to negotiations. Even in the refugees' schools, according to a statement of the Director-General of UNESCO on 16 November 1957, Arab children were being taught that some day they would push the Israelis into the sea. In 1948, the Arab leaders had called upon the Arabs in Israel to evacuate their homes with the promise that they would soon return with victorious Arab armies. In the same way, they were still being told that they must reject any constructive solution to their problem, and must wait for a repatriation by force of arms.

29. In 1947 and 1948, the Arab leaders had been confronted with a choice between war and peace. As the United Nations Mediator had said in his report^{21/} to the General Assembly, in September 1948 the Arab States were faced with the dilemma that they must either resign themselves to the presence of the Jewish State or pursue the course of defying the United Nations. That dilemma still confronted them today. Israel would continue to seek to compose its differences with the Arab world through negotiations so that together they could work for the welfare of their peoples. Arab statements in the United Nations might not provide much prospect for successful negotiations, but it

should be remembered that there were many constructive elements in the Arab world, and that a new generation was growing up, anxious to forget the sterile quarrels of the past. Countries having ties with both the Arab States and Israel, as well as the United Nations itself, should use their influence to bring about a peaceful solution.

30. The CHAIRMAN noted that the representative of Saudi Arabia had asked to reply to the Israel representative's statement. Some weeks ago the President of the General Assembly had exchanged ideas with the Chairmen of the Main Committees regarding the problem of representatives wishing to reply to replies, and it had been agreed that a reply to a reply should be postponed until the end of the debate on the item under discussion. Under rule 116 of the rules of procedure, it was for the Chair to decide whether to accord the right of reply to a member, but he would nevertheless merely appeal to the Saudi Arabian representative to agree to reserve his reply until the end of the discussion.

31. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that although he would like to co-operate with the Chair he felt that the statement which the Committee had just heard was such a glaring distortion of the truth that it demanded an immediate reply, lest other delegations or public opinion in general should be deceived by it. The situation which the Committee was discussing transcended mere political considerations, for it involved the fate of over two million people. If he was permitted to speak now it would accelerate rather than delay the proceedings, for what he had to say would provide the other members of the Committee with facts on the basis of which to make their own statements. He therefore appealed to the Chairman to allow him to speak at once.

32. The CHAIRMAN said that in the interests of sparing the Committee a lengthy procedural debate he would accede to the Saudi Arabian representative's request. He trusted, however, that the speaker would be brief. He also expressed the hope that the practice of replying immediately to replies would soon be abandoned.

33. Mr. COMAY (Israel), speaking on a point of order, said that he wished to reserve the right to reply at an appropriate time if the Saudi Arabian representative introduced any fresh charges against Israel.

34. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that the lengthy statement which the Committee had just heard, only confirmed his own arguments. If he was intervening again it was for the purpose of acquainting the representatives of the new Member States with the falseness and injustice of Israel's claims.

35. The Arabs entertained no feelings of hatred or malice towards the Jews as such and had never practised discrimination against Jews living in Arab countries. Indeed, even now after the rise of Zionism there were still many Jews living in a number of Arab States. The Arabs were Semites themselves and as such could not be anti-Semitic. What the previous speaker had described as hatred, was only the natural reaction of the Arabs to the emergence of Zionism, entailing as it did the seizure of lands which had been Arab since time immemorial and the expulsion of their rightful Arab owners. As evidence of the tolerance shown by the Arabs to the Jews living in Arab countries he read out a passage from a letter addressed by a Jewish citizen and resident of Egypt to the Ameri-

^{20/} Ibid., Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 27, document A/4121.

^{21/} Ibid., Third Session, Supplement No. 11, Part One, chap. II, para. 9.

can Rabbi, Elmer Burger, who had quoted it in his book: Who Knows Better Must Say So. In that letter it had been stated that in Egypt both Egyptian and foreign Jews enjoyed complete freedom, whether of religion, speech or trade, and were in no way discriminated against. Zionism was a doctrine of aggression and expansionism based on the fallacy that Jews in any part of the world other than Palestine were exiles. The previous speaker himself, for example, had been a citizen of South Africa and an officer in its army, yet instead of remaining in his own country to fight discrimination there, he had emigrated to a country with which he had had no connexion. Similarly, the woman who called herself the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs was an American.

36. The premise that the Jews constituted a distinct racial entity was false, for the bond between Jews was simply their adherence to Judaism, a religion for which the Moslems themselves had the greatest respect. In a recent study of the Jewish people entitled A Biological History^{22/} which had been written by a Jew and published by UNESCO it was stated that the Jews were not in the strictest sense a nation, and that the fundamental requirement for any claim that the Jews formed a racial entity could not be met; that was the UNESCO verdict on the essence of Zionism, based on a scientific study of the biological factors involved. There were Negro Jews and there were Chinese Jews; surely no one could convincingly argue that they were of the same racial origin. Yet the Zionist notion of the ingathering of the Jews into Palestine from all parts of the world on the ground that they constituted a race had been incorporated into the Israel Declaration of Independence in 1948. That was an open invitation to every Jew in the world to abandon his own country and emigrate to Palestine. In accordance with that notion the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations, for instance, should cease to be an Uruguayan and become an Israeli. The previous speaker had quoted a number of statements out of context, including statements by Count Bernadotte. For the sake of accuracy he would like to quote from the latter's report to the Security Council dated 12 July 1948^{23/} in which it was stated that unrestricted immigration to the Jewish area of Palestine might give rise to a population pressure that would justify Arab fears of ultimate Jewish expansion.

37. The evils of Zionism were not confined to Asia but had begun to manifest themselves on the African continent, where, as he had already pointed out, it had been found that weapons from Israel were being used by the secessionist forces in Katanga. The previous speaker had denied that charge but had failed to give any concrete evidence in support of his denial. What was worse, however, was that Israelis were serving as mercenaries with the Katanga forces. The Security Council document^{24/} with a list of mercenaries taken up to 14 April 1961 had included the name of a Southern Rhodesian who had become a citizen of Israel.

38. Mr. COMAY (Israel), on a point of order, said that there had never been any Israel citizens serving as mercenaries in Katanga, as the Saudi Arabian representative would see if he would consult the ad-

dendum subsequently issued by the Secretariat to the document in question.

39. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that the fact that Israel sent in a correction denying the presence of Israelis among the mercenaries in Katanga did not prove that the charge was false.

40. In his book entitled Rebirth and Destiny of Israel published in 1954^{25/} Mr. David Ben-Gurion had said frankly that the State of Israel was part of the Middle East only in geography and that as far as the decisive aspects of dynamism, creation and growth were concerned Israel was a part of world Jewry. Thus if the Arab States negotiated with it they would be negotiating with the ten million Jews scattered throughout the world; in other words, the interests of the poor and defenceless refugees would be pitted against the interests of the powerful group that constituted world Jewry. The 1957 edition of the Israel Government Yearbook stated that the fate of the State of Israel was bound up with that of world Jewry and vice versa. If the establishment of Israel was only the beginning, the end must inevitably be expansion. Another edition of the Yearbook, that for 1953-1954, quoted a statement of Mr. Ben-Gurion that the establishment of Israel had awakened feelings of love and pride among all Jews, including those of Russia.

41. Even Jews in other countries who did not wish to emigrate to Israel identified themselves with the State of Israel, as attested by Mr. Ben-Gurion's further statement that such Jews referred to the Israel Government as their Government and to Israel's Ambassadors as their Ambassadors. Going still further, Mr. Ben-Gurion had told the Twenty-fifth World Zionist Congress meeting in the Israel-occupied part of Jerusalem in January 1961 that every religious Jew daily violated the precepts of Judaism and the Torah of Israel if he remained in the Diaspora and was not a Jew if he did not emigrate to Israel. A State which pursued such policies obviously was not peace-loving and other States could not be expected to negotiate with it.

42. He had a number of other statements from Israel sources from which he wished to quote, some of them quite lengthy; he would therefore like to know whether the Chairman wished him to continue or to resume at the following meeting.

43. The CHAIRMAN said that in view of the late hour he would prefer him to continue at the beginning of the next meeting.

44. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay), exercised his right of reply to observe that in participating as he had done repeatedly in discussions concerning what had been known as the question of Palestine and the question of the Palestine refugees he had never spoken in any capacity other than that of representative of Uruguay and its Government. His philosophical conceptions were derived from his Christian Spanish ancestry and his own position as a Christian. In referring to his Spanish ancestry he had in mind a great philosophical tradition in which were fused the Hispanic culture itself and the contributions of the Arab and Jewish thinkers, scholars and poets who had dwelt for centuries in the Iberian Peninsula. It was precisely his position as a Christian which inspired his respect for all forms of philosophical thought and all religious beliefs. The Saudi Arabian representative would be respected to the extent that he showed respect for others. His attempt to confuse the issue by introducing

^{22/} Harry L. Shapiro, The Jewish people (UNESCO, 1960).

^{23/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for July 1948, document S/888, para. 26.

^{24/} Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June, 1961, document S/4790 and Add.1.

^{25/} New York, Philosophical Library, 1954.

personal considerations would redound to his own discredit, for if he made one affirmation which could so easily be refuted, it might well be assumed that his other statements were equally untrustworthy.

45. Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) noted that the representative of Israel had sought to sow dissension among the Arab countries by pitting Sudan against the United Arab Republic and President Bourguiba against President Nasser. He would like to reserve the right to quote in full at a later meeting the statement by President Bourguiba to which the representative of Israel had referred. For the moment, therefore, he wished only to state that the Tunisian President had never advocated direct negotiations with Israel. His use of the term "negotiation" had been in a context in which Israel had been compared by France to Algeria. Thus the negotiations envisaged could be only negotiations aimed at the restoration of the Arab homeland of

Palestine. Such differences as existed among the Arab countries were not sufficiently serious to jeopardize the great principles shared by all Arabs or to weaken their common ideals, one of the most important of which was the liberation of Palestine.

46. Mr. COMAY (Israel), on a point of order, said that the Saudi Arabian representative's remarks about discrimination were refuted by the fact that no person of the Jewish faith was permitted to enter Saudi Arabia, whatever the country of which he was a citizen.

47. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that he would reply to that comment when he resumed his reply to the previous speaker's statement as a whole at the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.