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Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Sanz Briz (Spain), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 25

Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/4861; A/SPC/58 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia), resumed the statement which he had begun at the previous meeting in the exercise of his right of reply. He said that he wished to begin by dealing with two irrelevant issues which had been raised by the representative of Israel (309th meeting), who had spoken at length about the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia. The Committee was accustomed to abusive statements from Israel, but Saudi Arabia's internal affairs and the living standards of its people were not on the Committee's agenda. He would not make boastful claims, in the Israel manner, regarding the economic development of his country, but Saudi Arabia was proud that its resources were the property of the Saudi Arabian people, that its commerce represented the toil of its own traders, and that its agriculture represented the labour of its peasants, farming their own property. Unlike Israel, Saudi Arabia had not robbed a whole people of their lands and possessions. Nor did it kill those who wished to enjoy their property rights. The Israel code preached the murder of those who attempted to exercise their property rights, thus reversing the Mosaic injunctions not to kill and not to covet one's neighbour's property. That was the verdict of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, E. H. Hutchison, who had said in his book *Violent Truce*, published in 1956 ^{1/} that many Arabs in Israel had been killed while trying to retrieve items from their former homes or harvests from the lands they had once possessed.

2. The Israel representative had also asserted that Arab refugee school children were taught to hate Israel. It was true that the Arab children hated Israel, but Israel itself was responsible for that hatred, since it was Israel's fault that the children concerned had been raised in camps where they were obliged to sleep on mats on the floor. Moreover, Israel was injecting hatred into the hearts of Israel children. According to

the Tel Aviv weekly *Haolam Hazeh*, in a poll conducted among hundreds of Jewish children on the question of what should be done with the Arabs in Israel, 95 per cent had replied that they should be killed. Yet Israel spoke of its desire for peace.

3. He had stated (307th meeting) that Israel was an incarnation of Nazism. Others with an impartial mind, a neutral outlook, had expressed a similar judgement. In an American national Catholic magazine *The Sign*, Father Ralph Gorman had declared that the Nazis had never used terror in a more cold-blooded way than the Israelis in the massacre of Kibya. The historian Arnold Toynbee had said that the evil deeds committed by the Zionists against the Palestinian Arabs, the massacre of men, women and children at Deir Yassin on 9 April 1948, were comparable to the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews.^{2/} The Encyclopaedia Britannica's *Book of the Year, 1959*, said that if the doctrine that the Palestinian refugees had forfeited their rights to their property were approved, it would mean that the Nazis had been justified in seizing the property of Jews who had had the foresight to escape from Germany.

4. To support its case, Israel had fallen back on the Balfour Declaration.^{3/} That so-called Declaration was in fact a letter written on 2 November 1917 by the British Government to a British subject, Lord Rothschild, a great financier with vast interests, and therefore could not be considered an international document; but in any case the Declaration contained the paramount condition that nothing must prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It might also be noted that the Balfour Declaration had been made at a time when Britain was not in possession of Palestine which was then part of the Ottoman Empire and when the Jews represented only 5 per cent of the population, with only 2 per cent of the land. Furthermore, it was a war promise, and, according to Mr. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had been inspired by propagandist considerations. It had been designed to enlist Jewish sympathy for the Allied cause at a time when the Allied armies were in difficulties. So the Declaration had been dictated by the exigencies of war.

5. The so-called Feisal-Weizmann Agreement had also been mentioned by the representative of Israel, who had selected certain passages of that agreement to fit his case. He did not read article 3, which contained the essence of the Agreement, namely that in the constitution of Palestine such measures should be adopted as would afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the Declaration of 2 November 1917—in other words, guarantees for the civil and religious rights of the Arab population of Palestine.

^{2/} Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. VIII (London, Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 290.

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, vol. II, annex 19.

^{1/} New York, The Devin-Adair Publishing Company.

That was the very pivot of the Agreement. Emir Feisal had evidently foreseen Israel's dispossession of the Arabs. In paragraph 4 it was agreed that the peasant and tenant farmers would be protected in their rights and assisted in their economic development. Those farmers were now living in exile, and were the tenants of tents. At the end of the agreement, Feisal had written that he could not be answerable for carrying it out if the guarantees provided for the Arabs were not put into effect. That agreement had been broken by the Israelis.

6. Thirty years later, in a similar way, Israel had violated the General Armistice Agreements ^{4/} at the time of the Suez episode. Indeed, Mr. Ben-Gurion had declared that the armistice with Egypt was dead, as were the armistice lines, and that neither could be resurrected. Since Israel had broken that Armistice Agreement, it might be asked what would be the purpose of another non-aggression agreement. He drew attention to the fact that, before the Israel forces had withdrawn from Sinai, Mr. Ben-Gurion had written the words "We shall return" in the visitor's book of the Sinai Monastery of St. Catherine.

7. The representative of Israel had referred to the General Assembly resolution adopting the partition scheme (resolution 181 (II)). As he had shown at the 308th meeting, that resolution had been adopted under pressure from the United States. The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs voted in favour of partition, but stated that he was not certain that partition was just or practicable. ^{5/} The United States representative, in explaining his vote, had expressed the hope that the boundary between the Jews and Arabs would be as friendly as that between Canada and the United States. ^{6/} The last decade had shown that the assumption on which the United States had based its vote was false.

8. Since 1943, five or six years before the entry of the Arab armies, Israel had been carrying on a campaign of fire, destruction and bloodshed against towns and churches and mosques and institutions of every kind. The representative of Israel had attempted to represent the Deir Yassin massacre as the work of dissidents, but there could be no doubt that that massacre, like countless others, had been planned by the organized armies of Israel; in 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine had reported ^{7/} that Israel had an unauthorized army of 60,000. According to a British Command Paper of 1946, telegrams from Jewish leaders such as Mr. Sharett, Mr. Ben-Gurion and Mrs. Meir had been intercepted giving instructions to the supposedly dissident groups. An Israel court had found that the attack on Deir Yassin had been ordered by the Jewish Minister of War as an operation against the Arabs. Israel was condemned by the court of Israel itself.

9. The expulsion of the Arabs from their homes had been planned by Israel itself. In his book *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948*, ^{8/} Edgar O'Ballance wrote that it had been Jewish policy to encourage the Arabs to quit their homes; they had used psychological warfare and subsequently ejected the Arabs who clung to their vil-

lages. The policy had had an amazing success because it had cleared out the Arab population and left the whole country to Israel. He wrote that many Israel sympathizers had been appalled at the ruthlessness with which the Arab inhabitants had been ousted and that the Israelis had made no excuse as the policy was part of their plan for the reconquest of their promised land in which there was no room for large, hostile, alien groups.

10. The Israel claim that the refugees had been invited by the Arab leaders through broadcasts and newspaper statements to quit their homes, with the object of making the theatre of war easier to reconquer, was utterly false. No such broadcasts or orders for evacuation had ever been given, as was borne out by a distinguished British author who had been invited specifically by the Israelis to investigate their charges with a view to winning support for them. His finding had been that no primary evidence of evacuation orders had ever been produced and that none of the promised evidence had been shown or sent to him. The author in question had further examined the monitoring records of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the United States for the whole of 1948 and found that not a single order, or appeal or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine had come from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine in that year. There had, however, been repeated Arab appeals, even flat orders, to the civilians of Palestine to stay. There were two examples of the latter. As the first great wave began, the Damascans broadcast an appeal on 4 April that everyone should stay in his home and on his job; on 24 April, the Palestine Arab leaders broadcast a warning that certain elements and Jewish agents were spreading defeatist news to create chaos and panic among the peaceful population.

11. If the Israel representative required further testimony, he would refer him to the ashamed rebuttal of an American Zionist Rabbi's charges of evacuation orders, made by one of the original Jewish pioneers, Nathan Chofshi, in *The Jewish Newsletter* of 9 February 1959. The Israel pioneer stated that he could tell the Rabbi how the Jews had forced the Arabs to leave cities and villages by force of arms, by deceit, lying and false promises.

12. If that did not suffice, there was the unbiased word of an American missionary, Miss Bertha Vester, who had spent her entire life in Jerusalem and who reported in her book entitled *Our Jerusalem* ^{9/} that Jewish Israel jeeps with loudspeakers had warned the inhabitants of Jerusalem and of Arab villages that they would be massacred as the people of Deir Yassin had been massacred, unless they left their homes.

13. The truth was, therefore, that Israel had made every effort, by war, by deceit, by atrocities and by massacres, to drive out from their homeland some 1,200,000 Arabs. Was it conceivable or credible to claim that they had been invited to do so for political ends? Such a claim was nonsense and mockery of the dignity and intelligence of the United Nations.

14. Certainly the Arab armies had entered Palestine on 14 May 1948, but there had been no secret about that move, for the Security Council had been informed the same day by a telegram dated 15 May of the action and of the underlying reasons and justification therefor. ^{10/}

^{4/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplements Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

^{5/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. II, 125th meeting.

^{6/} *Ibid.*, 124th meeting.

^{7/} See *The Anglo-American Report on Palestine* (S.Doc.No./182) (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1946.)

^{8/} London, Faber and Faber, 1956.

^{9/} New York, Doubleday and Co., 1950.

^{10/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for May, 1948, document S/745.

The action was entirely understandable in face of the British withdrawal from Palestine, leaving a vacuum in the country at the mercy of Israel atrocities. At that time, there had been no United Nations force, such as was now operating in the Congo, to protect the civilians and the Holy Land, with its churches, synagogues and mosques.

15. The only alternative open for the Arab armies had been to enter in order to save what could be saved of the people, following the years of havoc, bloodshed and destruction by the Israel unauthorized army. Were the neighbouring peoples to look on while the last woman and the last child was murdered and mutilated?

16. It was a human, if not a national, duty for the Arab armies to attempt to save the people. If they had been minded to wage war in violation of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 (181 (II)), it would have been quite proper to do so there and then. They had refrained at that time because it would have been tantamount to a political resistance to the United Nations resolution.

17. The Security Council had passed no verdict on that action of the Arab armies. Not one single paragraph was to be found in the eighteen resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the Palestine question, condemning that entry into Palestine, whereas they contained six separate condemnations of Israel atrocities and raids. He challenged the Israel representative to produce evidence to the contrary. If, today, the Christian world had access to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and Moslem worship continued in the Holy Land, that was due to the sacrifice and heroism of the Arab armies.

18. The representative of Israel had loudly proclaimed Israel's sovereignty as an obstacle to the modest Arab proposal that a custodian be appointed to look after the property of the refugees. In doing so, he was acting in defiance of the United Nations.

19. Unlike any other State represented in the United Nations, Israel's very statehood had been created by the United Nations in its resolution of 29 November 1947 (181 (II)) by virtue of which Israel's sovereignty was limited in respect of immigration, land or property, and legislation respecting Arab property. The provisions of that resolution showed that full authority had been vested in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine on the question of immigration "during the transitional period"; that control over immigration into the Jerusalem area was to be effected by the city's Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council; and that Israel could not carry out any expropriation before full compensation was paid before the act of dispossession. The point he was making was not that Israel had violated those provisions by inviting thousands of people to migrate during the transitional period, and by seizing the property of over a million refugees, without paying compensation to the owners prior to expropriation; but that according to United Nations legal precedents, Israel's sovereignty was limited in those respects.

20. The Israel representative had denied the competence of the United Nations in respect of Arabs residing within the Jewish State, whereas, according to the same resolution, the Arabs were under the guarantee of the United Nations and no modifications could be made in the relevant provisions without the consent of the General Assembly. That constituted a further limitation on Israel's sovereignty, and, under the resolu-

tion, any Member of the United Nations had the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction of any of those stipulations. The request for the appointment of a custodian of refugee property therefore fell within the purview of that resolution, and the Israel legislation that had been enumerated at the previous meeting, was null and void by virtue of the provision in the resolution to the effect that the rights of the Arabs in Israel were recognized as fundamental laws of the State and that no law, regulation or official action should conflict or interfere with those rights.

21. The Israel representative had again called for peace and for direct negotiations, as all the Israel delegations had done in the past. But peace was not a formula; it was a state of mind. And negotiation, direct or indirect, was a means for the pacific settlement of disputes and problems—not a slogan. It would be interesting to examine Israel's state of mind with respect to peace and negotiations. In the earlier stages of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine's work, the Israel delegation had rejected the suggestion to set up a mixed committee of representatives of Arab orange-grove owners and Israel experts to negotiate directly on the question of the property involved. It was befitting the Israelis that, once the property in question had been seized they should loudly seek peaceful negotiations and even attempt to gain the support of some Latin American and African delegations for a draft resolution to that end. He warned those delegations that the procedure was a dangerous one. The question was much too big to be tackled in that way.

22. In regard to Israel's position on peace, he cited statements made by Mr. Ben-Gurion in The Israel Government Yearbook of 1951, 1952 and 1955, that Israel considered that its present boundaries were only a portion of its historic homeland and that the creation of the new State by no means derogated from the scope of historic "Erets Yisrael" (land of Israel). The Israel Prime Minister had further spoken of the people of Israel being non-identical with the Jewish people, ten million of whom were living outside its borders. Israel now held an area 35 per cent greater than the area allotted to it under the relevant United Nations resolution. If that were but a fraction of the Jewish homeland, where would the frontiers ultimately stop?

23. It might be claimed that those statements were intended for home consumption, for publicity. But, in face of those contentions, how could the Arabs be expected to enter into negotiations with Israel? Negotiations were called for only in the absence of a recommended solution. The fact was, however, that if the United Nations had found the solution, an appeal for negotiations was tantamount to a denial of that solution. To appeal to the parties to enter into direct negotiations at the present stage would be to brush aside all the resolutions previously adopted by the United Nations on the matter.

24. The three main parts to the Palestine question were the refugee question, the territorial question and the internationalization of Jerusalem. It would be interesting to see how far the appeal for negotiations would affect those questions. On the refugee question, Israel had stated time and again that the refugees should not be offered a choice between repatriation and compensation; that there would be no repatriation for them. Accordingly, negotiation on that point would be futile, sterile and a mockery. Again, Israel had rejected the internationalization of Jerusalem and Mr.

Ben-Gurion had sent a communication to the Trusteeship Council,^{11/} stating that Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Israel. What was left to negotiate about, therefore, in face of Israel's adamant stand? On the territorial question, the Israel representative had bluntly told the Conciliation Commission on various occasions that Israel would not be prepared to cede one iota, and Mr. Ben-Gurion had made it plain to the first United States Ambassador in Tel-Aviv that he would not give up at the conference table what he had won on the battlefield. Again, therefore, there was no basis for negotiation.

25. That was the philosophy of Israel in concrete and tangible terms. The Israel representative had selected one single resolution of the Security Council^{12/} that seemed to be to his liking—that on the question of passage through the Suez Canal—and demanded that it should be carried out. But Israel must either take the United Nations resolutions as a whole, and abide by them, or else leave them as a whole. Israel cargoes were not more valuable than the freedom and fate of human beings.

26. He reiterated his warning against possible action to introduce a draft resolution calling for direct negotiations, and appealed to delegations possibly concerned to seek fresh instructions from their Governments. The case was not one that could be solved by that means. The Conciliation Commission had had bitter experience on the tragic question which was charged, he owned, with emotion. How could it be otherwise when the homeland, the fate and the dignity of a whole people were involved! The Arab delegations in a body would reject such a futile and sterile initiative. They stood for peace, but peace based on equity and justice, and not on the consecration of injustice and of a *de facto* situation.

27. The Chairman repeated his appeal to representatives to exercise their right of reply at the end of the general debate. Unless the Committee followed the President of the General Assembly's injunction, he was afraid that its work would be greatly delayed.

28. Mr. COMAY (Israel) was sensible of the reasons for the Chairman's appeal, but felt that it might be better for him to take a few minutes of the Committee's time at once rather than do so at a later stage and perhaps invite several hours of rejoinder.

29. The delegation of Israel felt no need to reply in detail to the Saudi Arabian representative's last statement. It merely wished to place on record a blanket reservation on the validity of his arguments, the accuracy of his sources and the elegance of his style. The delegation of Israel held to the points it had already made, namely, that it was the Arab leaders who had rejected the United Nations compromise formula in 1947 and the Arab States which had launched the war of 1948 in order to wipe out Israel, that it was the Arab aggression which had created the refugee problem, and the Arab States which had frustrated all efforts for a peaceful settlement and which were still pursuing belligerent policies and practices. The Arab States had also frustrated all constructive attempts to absorb the refugees into productive life, being determined to cling to their doctrine of conquest by repatriation. The Arab States were also seeking to appeal

for United Nations interference in the internal affairs of Israel, in particular with reference to Israel's internal property legislation, although there was no basis for such interference in the Charter, in international law or in fact. The argument based on resolution 181 (II) was totally fallacious. The position of Israel was that the Israel-Arab conflict in general, and the refugee dispute in particular, could be solved as soon as the Arab leaders would agree to settle those differences by peaceful negotiation. So soon as the Arab leaders accepted Israel as a living reality and agreed to negotiate with it, there would be no insurmountable obstacles to a future of harmony and co-operation in the Middle East. He trusted that the other Arab delegations would be less negative in their approach and less haggard by the past than the representative of Saudi Arabia. The Government of Israel, which spoke on behalf of Israel citizens only, Jews and Arabs alike, sought peace and peace alone and did not covet an inch of its neighbours' territory. After fourteen years of conflict, Israel and every decent Member of the United Nations yearned for a peaceful and negotiated solution of the Palestine problem.

30. Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) said that he now had the full text of the remarks made by the President of Tunisia, Mr. Bourguiba, which the representative of Israel had tried to use to bolster his own argument at the previous meeting. The Israel attempt to make use of a remark by Mr. Bourguiba was another instance of that delegation's widespread manoeuvrings in regard to the African States. It had tried to exploit President Bourguiba's prestige by presenting him as a supporter of the Israel argument regarding peaceful negotiations. In fact, President Bourguiba's position in that regard was quite the reverse. Israel wanted to negotiate with the Arabs in order to consecrate a "fait accompli" and that the Arabs would never accept.

31. President Bourguiba had been asked, during a meeting with journalists on the occasion of his recent visit to the United Nations, whether, in view of the importance which he attached to direct negotiations between France and the Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) in regard to Algeria and in other matters relating to Africa and the Mediterranean Basin, he felt that such an approach could also be applied to the Arab-Israel conflict. He read the text of Mr. Bourguiba's reply. He noted that Mr. Bourguiba had demanded as a prerequisite even for the principle of negotiations the application by Israel of the decisions of the United Nations. He had said that if negotiations were to take place, they would have to be on the basis of the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of the situation that had existed before 1948. If Israel would accept that prerequisite, no Arab State would oppose negotiations, and the Palestine question would be greatly simplified. If the negotiations were designed simply to consecrate Israel's usurpation of Palestine, no Arab leader, and President Bourguiba least of all, would approve them. As a staunch opponent of colonialism, President Bourguiba would never accept that most pernicious type of colonialism in which a people were ousted from their homeland to be replaced by groups from all over the world. Tunisia opposed racism of every kind and therefore it was an opponent of Zionism, which, apart from its colonialist features, was a doctrine based on race and religion. Tunisia's position towards Israel was determined not only by its Arab ties but by its consistent struggle against colonialism and racism.

^{11/} See Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fourth Year, Sixth Session, Annex, Vol. I document T/431, annex.

^{12/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eleventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December, 1956, document S/3675.

32. Mr. COMAY (Israel) stated on a point of order that he had not discussed or misrepresented the views of the Tunisian President. He had simply drawn attention to a violent attack on President Bourguiba by the official organ of the Government of the United Arab Republic because of his use of the word "negotiations" in his statement. If the Tunisian representative was correct in his interpretation of Mr. Bourguiba's remarks, the Cairo attack was all the more extraordinary.

33. Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) said that it was perfectly possible for there to be disagreement among States with the closest ethnic ties. The Latin American or the European States, for example, did not always present a completely united front. He felt that any superficial disagreement between the Arab States was not the concern of Israel. If such disagreements existed, they did not relate to basic Arab principles, first among which was the liberation of Palestine.

34. Mr. CHOUDHURY (India) said that, as the Director of UNRWA had noted in his recent report (A/4861), the Palestine refugee problem continued to grow ever larger and more complex. It was particularly sad that the main weight of the problem was falling upon the younger refugees. According to the Director's report some 30,000 refugees reached maturity every year. In general, those young adults were more literate than their parents, but they were less well equipped to earn a living, because most of them had had no opportunity to learn a trade or technical skill. The Indian delegation was glad to note that the three-year programme was moving forward more rapidly than at first planned. According to paragraph 16 of the report, the vocational training programme was somewhat ahead of schedule, by virtue of the fact that its second phase had been integrated with the first for reasons of economy. Basic relief and education services were being maintained as planned; modest improvements in education and limited increases in university scholarships had been achieved and plans for a small loans-grants programme were being evolved. However, it was clear that the Agency's problem was still serious. The Agency's operations were financed by annual contributions from various Governments amounting to some \$34 million. Average per caput assistance over the past eleven years had been less than \$30 per refugee. The Director had appealed to Governments to provide an additional amount of \$9.8 million over the next two years to complete the three-year programme.

35. It was highly gratifying to note that the Arab Governments had co-operated with the Agency wholeheartedly and had provided land, water supplies and security and protective measures for the refugees. They had rendered assistance in the fields of health, education and general welfare, and had provided substantial financial aid. The Arab countries had been providing such assistance since 1947-48, when a million Arabs had been forced to leave their homeland and seek refuge in neighbouring countries across the borders of Palestine.

36. The problem had remained with the United Nations ever since. He would not go into the history, but would merely say that from the outset, the United Nations had recognized its responsibility for the refugees. Resolution 194 (III) had been adopted in consequence of that recognition, and paragraph 11 of the resolution remained the basis for the United Nations continuing responsibility for the Palestine refugees.

37. The Arab refugees strongly demanded the right of choice between repatriation and compensation which

was held out to them by the United Nations in paragraph II of resolution 194 (III) and which had not so far been accorded. In resolution 302 (IV), the General Assembly had declared that, without prejudice to the provisions of that paragraph, continued assistance for the Palestine refugees was necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to terminating international assistance for relief. Had it been merely a question of resettling a million refugees in certain areas, it would not have been nearly so difficult. India had succeeded in settling and reintegrating nearly nine million refugees who had come into the country as a consequence of the partition of India. In ordinary circumstances, it might have been possible to settle the problem in time by purely economic methods, but in the case of the Palestine refugees that seemed to be impossible. The successive reports of the Directors of the Agency had noted that the refugees were not reconciled to their plight and by and large continued to display an intense longing and determination to return to their homes, a longing which unfortunately had not been fulfilled. India did not minimize the importance of the human considerations in the Palestine refugee problem.

38. Over the years, the Agency had done admirable work in many fields and the host Governments themselves had borne a great deal of responsibility, in education and other related matters. The Report (A/4861) had many encouraging features. The Agency's three-year programme, for instance, had made commendable progress, and the Indian delegation had no doubts regarding its usefulness. It would be most unfortunate if the Agency were to be closed down before a reasonable, if not a complete, solution to the situation had been found, thus thwarting the hopes of the refugees, and particularly the younger refugees, for proper rehabilitation. The Indian delegation concurred in the Director's views as expressed in paragraph 31 of the Report, and felt that the Agency should be continued until a satisfactory solution had been found for the over-all problem, which affected the entire complex of political relations in west Asia.

39. The Indian delegation had read the Report of the Special Representative of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/4921 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1) with care and attention. While it did not intend to pass judgement on the report, it wished to draw the Committee's attention to paragraph 49 which said that despite common insistence on the intertwined nature of the issue, both sides had expressed a willingness—though with much reservation and scepticism—to consider a step-by-step process that might lead to progress on the refugee issue without prejudice to the positions of the respective Governments on the other related issues. Although the Indian delegation viewed the Palestine refugee problem mainly from the humanitarian point of view, its political implications and its impact on the Middle East could not be exaggerated. Progress towards a solution was essential if any start was to be made in solving the difficult political situation in the Middle East. As far as the United Nations was concerned, the way ahead had been defined in resolution 194 (III) and the principles laid down in that resolution should be the starting point.

40. A more earnest attack should be made upon the refugee situation and the United Nations should give a lead. It should not be beyond Arab and Israel states—