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Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

AGENDA ITEM 25

Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(A/4861; A/SPC/L.79 and Corr.1 and 2, L.80, L.81 and
Corr.1) (continued)

1. Mr. CROWE (United Kingdom) said that he did not intend to go into the history of the question once again, but he wished to refute certain hostile statements which had been made about the policy of the United Kingdom Government and which gave a thoroughly distorted account of the actions of British officials and troops. It was the Committee's task to seek means of improving the living conditions and future opportunities of the Palestine Arab refugees and to find a way likely to lead to a solution of the problem. The United Kingdom delegation paid a tribute to Mr. Davis and to the staff of UNRWA for the work they were performing with such devotion. It supported the Director's report (A/4861) as a whole and was glad that UNRWA continued to maintain good relations with the Governments of the host countries. The United Kingdom delegation had been particularly impressed by the progress made in putting into effect the three-year programme and it hoped that nothing would hinder the efforts that were being made to provide vocational training for the refugees. The revision of the ration rolls seemed a wise step, in which he hoped all concerned could co-operate. He emphasized the necessity for an increase in the financial assistance given to UNRWA, with particular reference to the countries which had not yet contributed to the cause of the refugees. The pessimistic conclusions of the Director of UNRWA were slightly mitigated by the ray of hope which appeared in the addendum to the nineteenth progress report of the Conciliation Commission (A/4921/Add.1 and Corr.1). The Commission had been criticized, but it should be borne in mind that the task it had been bravely trying to carry out was extremely difficult. The appointment of Mr. Joseph E. Johnson was a praiseworthy initiative, which could not be attributed to any nefarious motives. Mr. Johnson had shown himself to be realistic and objective and he rightly considered that, although the chances of progress were not as great as might be wished, it was nevertheless necessary to persevere. It was a pity that some delegations seemed to be trying to discredit the methods suggested by Mr.

Johnson before it had even been possible to put them to the test. He himself supported the proposal relating to the appointment of a special representative.

2. Mr. COLLET (Guinea) congratulated Mr. Davis, the staff of UNRWA and all those who were trying to improve the living conditions of the refugees. Reviewing the programmes of aid to refugees undertaken by UNRWA, he noted that the activities of UNRWA in 1962 would result in a deficit of \$5,600,000, which might endanger the implementation of the three-year programme. While the Guinean delegation shared the anxiety of the Director of UNRWA, it wished to point out that the annual income from the Arab refugees' property amounted to four times the budget of UNRWA for 1962. If that property was returned to its rightful owners, the question of financing the activities of UNRWA would no longer arise. The United Nations, which was mainly responsible for the situation in Palestine since the adoption of resolution 181 (II) on partition, should take immediate steps to bring that tragedy to an end. The activities of UNRWA were only palliatives to which it had been necessary to have recourse, but their continuation might cause the only valid solution, as described in operative paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), to be lost sight of. The Conciliation Commission, which was responsible for the implementation of that resolution and for questions of compensation, had not yet made any progress towards solving the problem. In its most recent progress report (A/4921 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1)—the nineteenth—it had simply announced that it might soon be able to make suggestions with respect to methods of procedure that might lead to progress.

3. He recalled that the Commission had three members: the United States, France and Turkey. Although the representatives of the United States had always said that they were strongly in favour of the implementation of operative paragraph 11, their words were belied by the acts of their delegation, which had tried, at the fifteenth session, to prevent the adoption of any resolution which would entail recognition of the refugees' property rights and the appointment of an administrator of their property.^{1/} Moreover, the speeches of United States representatives had been designed to delay any decision until the sixteenth session of the Assembly. Such tactics recalled the pressure exerted by the United States Government in 1947 to ensure the adoption of the resolution on partition and he wondered how impartial the United States could be in the Conciliation Commission. France had excellent relations with Israel and its feelings towards the other party were well known—as witness the Algerian tragedy, the events at Bizerta and the discrimination against Arabs in France. Lastly, it

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (Part II), Special Political Committee, 247th meeting.

should not be forgotten that Turkey was bound by military pacts to the other two Powers. In the circumstances, it seemed clear that the Conciliation Commission, in its present form, could be neither neutral nor impartial. The Guinean delegation thought that its membership should be increased, on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to enable it to carry out its tasks more effectively. That change should be embodied in the decision which the Assembly would have to take with regard to the new mandate for UNRWA, in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1456 (XIV). He thought it would be useful to make a few suggestions on that matter forthwith. In his opinion, the efforts of the United Nations should be concentrated on giving the Conciliation Commission new life, in accordance with principles which might be based on the views he had expressed. The reorganized Commission could then begin, in the immediate future, to repatriate all the Arabs who had been driven out of the areas which lay outside the boundaries of Israel as laid down in the partition plan. That operation alone would affect half the refugees. Moreover, if the Jerusalem zone were placed under an international régime, over 100,000 refugees would be able to return.

4. The repatriation of refugees who wanted to return to Israel itself would be easier if the mass immigration of Jews into Palestine was brought to an end. The mandate of UNRWA and of the Conciliation Commission with regard to assistance to the refugees should end as soon as the repatriation had been completed, the time-limit being 30 June. UNRWA would continue its activities in the field of education and vocational training for a certain time, in co-operation with the Governments of the host countries. Lastly, the appointment of an administrator of the refugees' property would make it possible to protect that property. The delegation of the Republic of Guinea hoped that the suggestions it had made would help in the quest for a solution which would rectify the mistakes and the injustice of which the United Nations had been guilty in the past and would at last give the Palestine refugees a chance to lead a normal, decent life in their own land. The Guinean delegation would base its attitude upon the above considerations in voting on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

5. Mr. HOOD (Australia) reviewed the humanitarian aspect of the question of the Palestine refugees, for which UNRWA was responsible, and the political aspect, which was the concern of the Conciliation Commission. He regretted that, for lack of funds, UNRWA was obliged to adopt an order of priorities and to spend most of the available funds on emergency relief. He was glad, however, that the present three-year programme laid more stress on the vocational training of the refugees and that the implementation of that part of the programme was a little ahead of schedule. The Australian delegation was glad to note the close co-operation between UNRWA and UNESCO, thanks to which it had been possible for twenty-one UNESCO experts to give their services under the vocational training programme. Nevertheless, the lack of funds was still a serious obstacle. Although some States had decided to start contributing as from the financial year 1962-63 and other States had increased their contributions substantially, the total income was still inadequate and he hoped that Governments which had so far paid nothing towards the expenditure of UNRWA would reconsider their attitude. Australia had only been able to main-

tain its contribution at the level of the previous year, namely \$201,600, because it had to meet growing expenditure for the development of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea. He paid a tribute to UNRWA and its Director for the zeal and competence with which they were carrying out their task. He also wished to congratulate the host countries on their efforts to improve the living conditions of their Arab brothers.

6. Nevertheless, UNRWA's operations were only a palliative and it was essential that a just and realistic solution should be found—a matter which, under resolution 194 (III), was within the competence of the Conciliation Commission. In that resolution, the Assembly had entrusted to the Commission two tasks which were essentially connected with the question under discussion and were defined in paragraphs 6 and 11 of the resolution. In 1950 the Assembly, in resolution 394 (V), had recognized that it was unlikely that the Commission would achieve the objectives laid down in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 194 (III) and it had concentrated its attention on paragraph 11. However, the provisions of paragraph 6 were still valid and it was to be hoped that, in spite of the unfavourable signs, the Commission would be able to contribute to a final settlement of the whole question.

7. Having examined the Commission's nineteenth progress report (A/4921), he congratulated the Technical Office on the progress it had made in the identification and valuation of refugee property. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1604 (XV), the Commission had decided to appoint a special representative, Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, to explore the precise views of the parties as to what action might usefully be undertaken in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). Mr. Johnson's report (A/4921/Add.1 and Corr.1) justified neither boundless optimism nor absolute pessimism. The results of Mr. Johnson's first conversations at Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Gaza, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, justified the conclusion that the Conciliation Commission should continue along that path and appoint a special representative to examine with the authorities concerned, in more detail than time had allowed Mr. Johnson to go into, the practical means for making progress towards a solution of the Arab refugee question in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). The Commission would report to the Assembly at its seventeenth session. In view of the failures of the past thirteen years, no possible chance of success that presented itself should be abandoned. Lastly, despite the opinion expressed by the Syrian representative (312th meeting) and other representatives of Arab States, his delegation did not think that Mr. Johnson's terms of reference went beyond the powers conferred on the Conciliation Commission by the General Assembly resolutions. It was apparent from the Special Representative's report that he had conceived his mandate as being limited by the provisions of paragraph 11, but it was easy to understand that, as was stated in paragraph 39 of the report, "such is the interrelationship of the various aspects of the Palestine question ... that one or more of the other aspects were referred to, and often heavily emphasized, in virtually all the conversations [he had] engaged in".

8. Mr. LOKMAN (Mauritania) said that he wished to explain the position adopted by his Government on the question under consideration. Following his previous statement (311th meeting), he had been reproached

for judging Israel severely and taking the side of the refugees, of whose fate he had spoken feelingly. It was always honourable to adopt a just cause and no one could remain indifferent to the sufferings of a people numbering 1,200,000, torn from their homes. It had also been alleged that the Mauritanian representative had made himself the spokesman of the Arab delegations within the Brazzaville group. He categorically rejected that assertion. The members of the Brazzaville group were closely united in their common ideal of struggle against African colonialism and any efforts to divide them were doomed to certain defeat. Like the members of a family, each of them was free to express its point of view. The States which belonged to the powerful Western North Atlantic bloc likewise did not always share the same views. Turning to the proposals before the Committee, he said that he could not support draft resolution A/SPC/L.80, which did not deal with the substance of the question and took account neither of the Assembly's resolutions nor of the interests of the refugees, who were, after all, the main concern. The real parties to the dispute were Israel and the refugees, not Israel and the Arab States, which had been involved in it accessorially. It was the duty of the United Nations, which was responsible for the tragedy of the refugees, to put an end to that tragedy by ensuring the full application of partition resolution 181 (II). Nor should the opposition of the Arab States, which had been unable to prevent the establishment of Israel, prevent the United Nations, resorting to force if necessary, from setting up the Arab State contemplated in the partition plan, of which the refugees would constitute the population.

9. The contributions made to the Agency indirectly benefited Israel, since it collected the income from the property of the refugees. The modest sum of \$0.08 a day allocated to each refugee barely enabled them to subsist in conditions of extreme poverty—a fact to which he could testify personally, having lived for a long time in contact with them. The United Nations, which was expending enormous sums in its efforts to put an end to the Katanga secession, could not forever deprive the refugees of their homeland in order to satisfy Israel's wishes. Whatever the Israel representative might say, countries which were not their own remained alien lands for the Arabs. He considered that some aspects of the United States draft resolution (A/SPC/L.79 and Corr.1 and 2) might partially solve the problem if the text was modified to take the views of the refugees into account.

10. Mr. ATALLAH (Jordan), commenting on the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel at the 318th meeting, said that the Pakistani representative had already stated, at the 319th meeting, that the spiritual and historical ties of the Jews with the land of Palestine were not enough to justify the Zionist claims. He would therefore not dwell on that point.

11. While exalting the faith of the Jews dispersed throughout the world in their final return to the land of Palestine, the representative of Israel made light of the desire of the Arab refugees to return to their homes. It was not correct to say that the establishment of the Jewish National Home and later of the State of Israel had not damaged any Arab interests, for if there had been no Jewish State the Palestine Arabs would have acceded to independence and Palestine would have become a Member of the United

Nations like the other Arab Mandated Territories. Although there had been no independent Arab State in existence in the region during the period of the Mandate, the Turks and the Arabs had at least enjoyed equal rights within the Ottoman Empire and the Arabs had desired the dissolution of that association in order to establish their own government in the Arab territories of the Near East.

12. The Israel representative regarded the United Nations decision to establish a Jewish State in Palestine as a compromise solution and threw the responsibility for the struggles which had resulted onto the Arab leaders. But what leader could accept the partition and destruction of his country and the establishment of a foreign Power there? Anyone who did so would be guilty of treason and it was not surprising that the Arab leaders had had no choice but to reject the partition decision of 1947. The Israel delegation had accused the Arabs of having given the signal for combat, but he would like to know of a single case in which the Arabs had attacked a Jewish town or village and occupied it, after driving out the inhabitants, before the end of the Mandate; on the other hand, the representatives of the Arab States had justly accused Israel of many aggressions of that kind.

13. The Israel representative had quoted, out of context, several passages from the report of the Director of UNRWA in order to give the impression that the number of Arab refugees was below the figure of 1,200,000 which the Director had given. She had neglected to mention the Director's general conclusion, appearing in paragraph 42, that although some persons were registered on UNRWA's lists who should not be there, there were, on the other hand, various categories of refugees who were not registered although they should be, so that the number of refugees actually registered was not higher than the number of refugees who should be registered.

14. Referring to UNRWA's vocational training programme, the Israel representative had stated that it had been possible to integrate some Arab refugees with vocational skills into the economy of the Middle East and she had implied that the refugee problem could be solved in that way. When it was in full development, however, the vocational training programme would cover no more than 2,000 to 2,500 young people, or 5 per cent of the annual population increase, and would not make it possible to settle the fate of 1,200,000 people.

15. According to the Israel delegation, paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) conferred no rights on refugees but merely stated the conditions in which some of them could be authorized to return to their homes. Such an interpretation was bold, to say the least, and an insult to the intelligence of the Committee. During the current discussion (315th meeting), he had analysed in detail the meaning of that paragraph, which conferred on Arab refugees the absolute right of choosing between repatriation and compensation. Of course, if they chose repatriation, refugees had to show that they were ready to live in peace with their neighbours. So far, however, the refugees had not been able to express their feelings, for the opportunity of choosing repatriation had never been given to them.

16. The Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed the release of accounts and bank balances in an effort to display her Government's nobility and generosity. In fact, the Israel Government had been

prompted not by a desire for the Arab refugees' welfare but by an instruction issued by the Jordan Supreme Court to banks that held such accounts and balances and still had branches in Jordan to release the funds and balances in question or else their assets in Jordan would be sequestered. The Israel Government's decision had therefore been taken under pressure from the banks which had been forced to comply and from the United Kingdom Government under whose jurisdiction they came.

17. The Israel representative had expressed deep sympathy for the Arab refugees but had ascribed selfish if not perverse motives to the Arab States. Israel's acts, however, were not in accord with its words. It continued to oppose the return of refugees, contrary to United Nations resolutions, and the Israel representative had asserted before the Committee that those refugees were living not on foreign soil but on Arab soil. The Israel Government's policy, which conformed to the proverb "Who wills the end must will the means", was in strange contrast with the words of sympathy expressed by the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs.

18. The Israel representative had ended her statement by an appeal to the Arab States for peace. For Israel, however, peace was based on the denial of the right of refugees to return to their homes—at a time when Israel was opening its doors wide to Jewish immigration—and on a policy of territorial aggrandizement. The Arab States were eager for peace in order to advance their economic and social development but they did not want peace at any price; they desired a peace based on law and justice.

19. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) observed that the statement made by the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 318th meeting was based essentially on the argument that the Arab States wanted to annihilate Israel at all costs. Thus, all Israel's acts, even the most odious, were justified by self-defence, whereas the Arab States, even when they were trying to relieve the sufferings of the refugees, were prompted solely by destructive motives. Such a viewpoint was hardly objective.

20. According to the Israel representative, Zionist claims were based on the historic and cultural links between the Jews and Palestine. The sufferings of the Jews had been lasting and world-wide but such sufferings should not be exploited at the expense of the Arab peoples, who were not responsible for them. The history of the Jewish people taught that Abraham had come from Ur of the Chaldees, an area which was now in Iraqi territory. There was therefore no reason why the Zionists should not extend their claims to Iraq. Abraham's ancestors themselves came from the land of Canaan and Arabia where they had lived for twenty centuries. According to the Bible, God had promised Abraham that the land of Palestine would be reserved for him and his descendants; but of the two sons of Abraham, one, Isaac, was the ancestor of the Jews and the other, Ishmael, was the ancestor of the Arabs. According to that argument, the Arabs would therefore have as much right as the Jews to Palestine. Such historical arguments, however, had little to do with the political realities of the twentieth century. The fact remained that the Jews had lived in Palestine as a political entity for only about 600 years whereas the Arabs had occupied Palestine for more than 2,000 years.

21. As for the Balfour Declaration,^{2/} upon which the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs had based her argument, it was nothing more than a letter from the British Minister for Foreign Affairs announcing his plans to Baron Rothschild. It was not an international document. The Palestine Mandate had been granted in violation of Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Moreover, the League of Nations had resembled an exclusive club, where European influence was predominant; it had never been a truly universal organization like the United Nations. The League's decision could not therefore be considered at the present time as a legal instrument establishing a Jewish national home.

22. According to the Israel representative, the Arab States possessed vast territories and it would be selfish to deny a small part of them to Israel. Yet, on that small part, an Arab population, whose interests must not be neglected either, had lived for many centuries. There were other countries, for example, Australia, the United States and the Soviet Union, that also had vast unpopulated territories where the Jews could have settled just as well as in Palestine.

23. The Israel representative affirmed that, at the end of the First World War, the Arab leaders had accepted the plan for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and if they had remained faithful to the principles of good neighbourliness, the Arabs of Palestine would have lived without any difficulty in the State of Israel. But the text of the Charter of the Jewish Agency for Palestine laid down that land obtained from the Arabs by any means whatsoever should never be sold back to Arabs and it prohibited Jewish enterprises from employing Arabs. All that the Arabs had handed over to the Jews must therefore be lost forever. In those circumstances, it was difficult to see how good neighbourly relationships could have been established.

24. The Israel representative had spoken of the 1947 decision as a compromise. A person who had seized half of a property which did not belong to him was not justified in describing his act as a compromise on the pretext that he had wanted to take it all.

25. According to the Israel representative, the Iraqi representative had, at the 317th meeting, wrongly accused the Jews of having been the first to attack the Arab community after the partition decision. In fact, even before the arrival of a single soldier from the Arab States, the Zionists had occupied sectors which, according to the partition plan, were reserved for Arabs. In support of that assertion, he quoted an extract from the book *The Edge of the Sword* by Netanel Lorch,^{3/} now a high official in the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It proved not only that the Haganah was in close liaison with the Irgun (the so-called dissident group, guilty of the Deir Yassin massacre) but that, acting in concert the two groups had encircled and captured Jaffa in April 1948, i.e., before the expiry of the British Mandate.

26. It was gratifying to note that the Israel representative had admitted that, on the arrival of the Arab armies in Palestine, hundreds of thousands of Arabs had already left their homes as a consequence of the fighting that had broken out in the country. Thus she herself had refuted the Israel argument that the refu-

^{2/} See *ibid.*, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, vol. II, annex 19.

^{3/} New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961.

gee problem had been created by the invasion of the Arab armies.

27. The arguments advanced by the Israel representative concerning the Arab population in Israel bore a striking resemblance to those advanced by the representative of South Africa at the 284th meeting in adducing the low living standards of the indigenous population of South Africa as justification for their enslavement. One could reverse the argument and say that, as the Arabs were so happy in Israel, their brother refugees should be invited to share that happiness. In any event, would Israel be willing to organize, under the control and safeguards of the United Nations, a plebiscite among the Arabs in Israel and the 1,200,000 refugees in order to determine their real position?

28. Unfortunately, the Israel representative had taken it upon herself to address a veiled threat to Mr. Davis, taxing him with indiscretion for having said that the refugees had never been able to exercise their right of choosing between repatriation and compensation. In fact, he had stated the absolute truth. It was moreover for that reason that the right in question had had to be re-affirmed by successive United Nations resolutions.

29. With regard to the actual number of refugees, he preferred to accept the UNRWA figures (1,151,024) rather than those quoted by the Israel representative.

30. The Israel representative had sought to prove, by citing paragraphs 5 and 6 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), that the refugee question was inseparable from the whole of the Palestine issue and should consequently be solved by negotiation.

31. Paragraphs 5 and 6, however, had no connexion with paragraph 11. The negotiations to which they referred, as the Security Council resolution^{4/} cited in paragraph 5 showed, were solely armistice negotiations. Those were the only negotiations in which the Arab States should or could take part, for they were in no way entitled to negotiate the rights of the refugees. Paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), far from subordinating the refugees' right of free choice to a possible agreement between Israel and the Arab States, established that right absolutely, in the form of a resolution which had to be carried out. Thus it could not be claimed that the refugee question depended for its solution on the outcome of negotiations between Israel and the Arab States, or that it could not be solved until peace had been restored between them. Israel had in any case tacitly admitted that fact by announcing that it was willing to pay compensation even before the final peace settlement. Such compensation would in fact cost Israel nothing, since the funds to pay it would come from abroad. But the Government of Israel had naturally never offered to apply the passage in the resolution concerning the right of free choice, for it had never intended to repatriate anyone.

32. The Israel representative had brought a serious and unjust accusation against the Arab States when she stated that they had purposely kept the refugees in perpetual exile to serve their own political designs.

33. The UNRWA report showed that the Arab States had done much, despite their slender resources, to

help the refugees. The refugee situation was not the fault of the Arab States, and its solution did not depend on them. There was a right at stake, and a right was not subject to negotiation; it ought to be respected.

34. The Israel representative had rejected the appointment by the United Nations of a custodian of Arab property in Israel on the ground of Israel's sovereign rights, and had denied that Israel's sovereignty depended in any way on the clause of the partition plan that provided for a declaration to be made previously by the two provisional governments concerning, among other things, reciprocal property rights for the minorities, on the pretext that that declaration had never been made. Yet it was an integral part of the partition plan, and the fact that Israel had not applied it did not invalidate the clause or diminish the obligations it imposed. By rejecting that portion of the partition plan, Israel was denying itself the possibility of accepting the rest, including its right to the title of sovereign State.

35. Mr. COMAY (Israel), in the exercising of his right of reply, said that he would not embark on historical considerations. That aspect of the question had been settled once and for all by the General Assembly when it had adopted the partition resolution of 1947 in accordance with the documentary evidence.

36. In reply to a question from the representative of Jordan, he said that, between November 1947 and May 1948, the Arabs had attacked a large number of towns in Israel, the list of which he held at the disposal of anyone interested. He would mention only the Jewish quarter of the old town of Jerusalem, subsequently destroyed by the Arab Legion of Jordan, where Jews from all over the world were still refused access to the Wailing Wall. It was strange that the representatives of the Arab countries, who at the time had voted against the internationalization of Jerusalem, should now be rediscovering its merits.

37. It was also strange to claim, as the representative of Iraq had done, that the United Nations had never asked the Arab States to take part in any negotiations other than armistice negotiations. Many successive resolutions had advocated negotiation for the settlement of all the questions pending. He referred specifically to paragraph 3 of resolution 512 (VI).

38. In reply to the representative of Pakistan, who was, he thought, in error as to Israel's attitude and the facts, he recalled that one of the members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, which had unanimously rejected the Arab claims to an exclusive right to Palestine, was a Muslim, Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

39. There were many points of resemblance in the circumstances that had surrounded the birth of Israel and that of Pakistan. In both cases, the two population groups involved had been separated by too wide a gap to allow of their accession to independence as a unified State, and it had been necessary to resort to partition. The fact that, in the case of Palestine, one of the conflicting parties had refused to accept that solution did not prove the injustice of it.

40. In both cases, there had been disturbances and bloodshed, and a large number of refugees; 6 million refugees had gone to Pakistan, which had integrated them all in its economic life. Doubtless those were refugees willing to be integrated, but, as the Director of UNRWA had observed, the state of mind of the

^{4/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, document S/1080.

refugees did not necessarily hinder their capacity to be self-supporting. One might wonder whether Pakistan would have accepted those refugees if, instead of being willing to become loyal citizens, they had shown open hostility.

41. In Palestine as in the Indian sub-continent, there had been a two-way migration movement which constituted a *de facto* exchange of population (9 million refugees had gone to India) and which it was wiser to treat as a basic situation rather than to attempt to reverse it.

42. In the context of that emigration, India and Pakistan had made arrangements for taking charge of abandoned property.

43. Finally, in both cases there were outstanding problems between the opposing parties, but Pakistan had stated that the only possible solution was that of negotiation, and that was precisely the method recommended in draft resolution A/SPC/L.80.

44. It was regrettable that the representative of Pakistan should have accused the Israel delegation of resorting to insulting remarks for lack of valid arguments. The Israel delegation meant to insult no one, and was pleading its cause as best it might, whereas some representatives of the Arab countries had been making attacks as vulgar as they were interminable without arousing any criticism on the part of Pakistan.

45. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) said that his observations on the Israel delegation's methods of discussion were corroborated by the records of the meetings.

46. The analogy that had been suggested between the partition of Palestine and that of the Indian sub-continent was far from accurate. In the explanations

he was about to give, there was no intention on his part of criticizing the Indian Government.

47. Firstly, the partition had been made with the consent of both the parties involved, and had not been imposed by the minority on the majority. Each of the two parties had been allocated the sectors in which it had a majority according to the results of the 1946 general elections, which had thus taken the place of a plebiscite. If the same principle had been applied in Palestine, the Jewish State would have been limited to a sub-district of the town of Jaffa.

48. As for the problem of refugees, Pakistan had stated at the time that it was willing to take back all those who had left Pakistan, and had hoped that India would do likewise.

49. Regarding the refugees' property, Pakistan had at the time hoped that there should be no expropriation in either of the two countries, and that the refugees should be entitled to retain ownership of property abandoned in their flight and dispose of it themselves.

50. Lastly, Pakistan would have been perfectly willing to accept the refugees whatever their political attitude. There were in fact at the present time in Pakistan some 10 million Hindus who had the indefeasible right to live there irrespective of their personal attitude towards partition. It might, however, be asked whether Israel would be willing to accept the return of the refugees in any circumstances at all.

51. Mr. SINGH (India) said that he wished to express some reservations as to the interpretation given by the representative of Pakistan to certain aspects of the Indo-Pakistan question.

The meeting rose at 2.10 p.m.