

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.210
7 April 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 7 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. van Dongen (Netherlands)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. B. GRINDBERG Mr. P. POPTCHEV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G.R. SKINNER Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN Miss C. de VARENNES
<u>China:</u>	Mr. LI LYUE Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. GE YUYUN
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA Mr. J. JIRUSEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Mr. A.M. ABBAS
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO

Mr. I.H. WIRAAATMADJA

Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mr. D.C.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. A.N.C. NWAQZOMUDOH

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. ZAWALONKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mrs. I. SUNDBERG

Mrs. A.M. LAU-ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. B.P. NOBLE

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. M. BUSBY

Mr. P. CORDEN

Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Mr. R.L. HORNE

Mr. R. MIKULAK

Mr. J. HOGAN

Mr. J. MARTIN

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 210th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Romania.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, please allow me to associate myself warmly with those members of the Committee who have addressed you in the past few days in your capacity as our new Chairman, expressing gratification about your assumption of this high Office. I would also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Skalli for his exceptional performance during the month of March.

I would like to inform the Committee very briefly that the Federal Republic of Germany is depositing today with two of the depositary Governments its instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, thus becoming a contracting party to this universal disarmament agreement. The German Bundestag voted unanimously in this sense on 10 December 1982. At the same time, the Bundestag ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The instrument of ratification of the ENMOD Convention will shortly be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It would be an exaggeration to say that the Federal Republic of Germany has been among the early birds in ratifying these two important world-wide treaties. However, some internal legal hurdles had to be removed before the ratification procedure could be set in motion. The Federal Government has pursued the internal legal process with diligence, and now to good effect. I am pleased that my country is now on a par with the many members of the international community who are already parties to the two agreements. As regards the bacteriological weapons Convention, and the rationale of my Government in ratifying this measure, I would like to draw the attention of delegations to the statement in document CD/372. This document is now before you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

I would like to use this opportunity to add a few remarks on the comprehensive discussion which the Committee held last Tuesday on the future activities and terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. My delegation did not participate in that debate, but listened with particular attention. In the two days that have elapsed since that thorough review, we have all had an occasion to reflect upon the wealth of arguments then proffered. In the view of my delegation, that precious exchange of views, in spite of the existing divergencies, justifies a number of forward-looking conclusions. While I admit that my summary may be somewhat subjective, let me recall the following points:

All delegations showed their firm determination to continue the substantive work of the nuclear test ban Working Group in a constructive spirit. They look forward to a well-structured debate, to be launched in the remaining weeks of our present session and to continue throughout the summer.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

There was widespread agreement that every effort should be deployed to prepare, through substantive work, the essential prerequisites for a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It has become clearer than heretofore that the existing mandate of the Group, couched as it is in broad terms, permits a far-ranging debate on all essential issues relating to a future treaty. While the existing mandate places particular emphasis on verification issues, delegations have agreed that all technical and political issues arising in that connection need to be, and can be, considered in their context. My delegation would like to welcome particularly the relevant passages of the statements by the United Kingdom and United States delegations. They made it clear that their preference for the existing mandate in no way implies an attempt to curtail our debate artificially, to the detriment of other important related aspects of our work.

Our debate also testified to the broad range of problems that are in reality still before us, problems which the brief span of our working period last year did not allow us to cover.

I have also inferred from the debate that the existing mandate would offer ample authority to deal substantively with all existing and future proposals in whatever form they have come or may come before this Committee.

In sum, our debate of Tuesday last seems to indicate very strongly that the political will to advance in our work with the existing procedural tools is now present. We should use it fully. In commending specifically the delegations of Brazil and Sweden for their wise and pragmatic statements, my delegation would like to appeal to all other delegations which have so far had difficulties in associating themselves with the further work of the Group under the present terms of reference to set aside their ultimate preferences for a reformulated mandate. There is sufficient work on hand. We should now embark upon it. Such a pragmatic approach, in view of the tasks before us, should be of particular value to the new Chairman of the Group, Ambassador Herder, who will need every support he can obtain to bring his assignment as a Chairman to speedy success. We wish him well on this path.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Ambassador Wegener for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. The Chair now calls on the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me, on behalf of the Romanian delegation, to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. I am personally all the more pleased to see you in the Chair in that you are the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, a country with which Romania maintains relations of friendly co-operation, and at the same time a long-standing colleague whose professional and personal

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

qualities are well known. I am convinced that under your chairmanship the Committee will be able to make the progress we all hope for. I should also like to mention the efforts made by your predecessor, Ambassador Ali Skalli, the distinguished representative of Morocco, thanks to whose qualities, which we all greatly appreciate, the month of March was marked by achievements which were an encouragement to our Committee. I should like to assure Ambassador Skalli of the very great gratitude of the Romanian delegation.

In my statement today I should like to make some comments on the subject which appears in the Committee's programme of work for today, namely, Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons — the subject you yourself mentioned when you opened today's meeting.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, there are few items on the Committee's agenda which can rival this one in urgency. The present extremely difficult situation, which is constantly worsening, in the world in general and more particularly in Europe, where the great majority of weapons and almost all nuclear weapons are concentrated, is of the utmost concern to the Romanian people and Government, as to other countries on this continent. For, notwithstanding all the weapons that are in Europe, there is a danger of the deployment there of new nuclear missiles and the replacement of those already there by improved missiles. This once more underlines the urgency and immediacy that our discussions on the subject of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon countries should have. In the first place, there is the existence of huge arsenals whose destructive capacity can only be described as one of "overkill"; these arsenals constitute, in the words of the nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize-winner Niels Bohr, "a perpetual menace to human society". The "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" (document A/35/392) points out in its paragraph 492 that the explosive power now existing is the equivalent of more than three tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth. I will not go on quoting facts which have so often been reiterated in this Committee.

Secondly, in spite of the magnitude of the nuclear arsenals already existing, we are now witnessing developments and attitudes foreshadowing the grave danger of the occurrence in Europe of a qualitatively and quantitatively new stage in the nuclear arms race, in particular as regards intermediate-range missiles. My country and other countries of Europe attach such importance to these developments, which are also the subject of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations taking place in Geneva and of recent public statements, because they directly affect the national security of every country on the continent, whether it is a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization or of NATO, or whether it is a neutral or a non-aligned country.

Lastly, it is urgently necessary to adopt measures to increase the security of non-nuclear-weapon States because these countries are confronted by an immense danger which they are powerless to influence in any way, as they are powerless to protect themselves against the devastating effects which a nuclear conflict would have on the belligerents and their civilian populations and also the peoples of neutral countries, for example, in Europe. In that connection, the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on nuclear weapons emphasizes that:

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

"Even if the balance of deterrence was an entirely stable phenomenon, there are strong moral and political arguments against a continued reliance on this balance. It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security." (Document A/35/392, paragraph 497)

The international community has solemnly recognized the urgency of the need to increase the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the validity and importance of which were reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its second special session, states in its paragraph 20 that "it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been achieved ...".

Since its inception, the Committee on Disarmament has attached priority importance to this subject; furthermore, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances was the first working group to be established. In the Group's special report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, covering the substantive negotiations since 1979, the conclusion reached here by consensus was that "non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The report also stressed the "urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament".

In spite of these conclusions and recommendations that were unanimously adopted, the work of the Committee has shown no noticeable advance in this connection. In fact what has happened has been rather the contrary. Yet there has been no lack of concrete proposals on this subject. Allow me to recall some of them: document CD/10, containing a draft convention submitted by Pakistan; document CD/23, containing a draft international convention submitted by the USSR; document CD/27, submitted by the United States of America, concerning a recommendation by the Committee to the United Nations General Assembly; document CD/75, submitted by Finland; document CD/120 containing a possible draft resolution for adoption by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure in the sphere of security assurances, submitted by the delegation of Pakistan; document CD/153 submitted by Bulgaria on this subject; document CD/177, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom; documents CD/207 and CD/278 submitted by China on the question of security assurances; document CD/321, containing an extension by France of its assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, and the draft resolutions for the Security Council put forward in the Ad Hoc Working Group by the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan. In addition to all these, there have been many proposals put forward at plenary meetings of the Committee and in the Ad Hoc Working Group by many other delegations, including the Romanian delegation. This is an impressive list of proposals, but unfortunately it has not proved possible up to now to adopt any one of this wealth of ideas and initiatives. On the contrary, the work on this high-priority item has reached an impasse. As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, said in the statement he made on 21 April 1982 (document CD/290):

"There is consensus that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that agreement on this item should be reached urgently. However, the evident divergence in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States continues to persist. And, although many of the issues involved have been clarified, the Working Group has been unable to fulfil its mandate."

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

This state of affairs places the Committee before its responsibilities in this matter. Furthermore, it seems to us obvious that merely going on discussing the subject as we have done in the past will lead us nowhere but where we have been before. The Romanian delegation therefore believes that the first task of the Working Group should be a frank and open exchange of views, with all the necessary sense of responsibility and political will, on concrete possibilities of action, on practical measures that could be undertaken in order to increase, in present conditions, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The ever-increasing danger looming over these States makes this course of action extremely urgent.

We believe that the first objective of such a debate should be the conclusion of an international convention containing an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States never and in no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or force in general against States not possessing nuclear weapons.

The conclusion that such a convention is not acceptable to certain countries at the present time in no way exonerates the Working Group or our Committee from responsibility for exploring other possibilities.

On the contrary, within the framework of our flexible mandate, which refers to "effective international arrangements", we ought to consider any other measure capable of increasing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Such arrangements, in the Romanian delegation's view, could include a set of measures ranging from the outlawing and destruction of nuclear weapons, and the prohibition of their use in general or of their first use, to the establishment of denuclearized zones with respect to which the nuclear-weapon powers undertake not to use their atomic arsenals. Other ideas, too, could be taken into consideration, such as those put forward by the Palme Commission in its report "Common Security", among them the establishment of zones free of tactical nuclear weapons, measures designed to increase nuclear withdrawal and to reduce the pressures towards the precipitate use of nuclear weapons, and substantial reductions in all categories of intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons.

The growing nuclear dangers, particularly in Europe, where there is increasing talk of the deadly game of nuclear weapons, and as well as the impasse in the negotiations on the subject of negative security assurances, have resulted, of late, in more and more attention being paid to the proposals for the denuclearization of certain regions and subregions, particularly on the continent of Europe. What is the explanation for this renewed interest in the idea of denuclearized zones? In the first place, we believe that it arises from the very understanding of the fact that, because of its complexity, disarmament must be seen as a gradual and long-term process in which limited and partial measures, both simple and complex, are more than necessary. Regional denuclearization commends itself as such a measure, in so far as it does not directly and immediately affect one of the most complicated components of disarmament, namely, the strategic arsenals of the major nuclear-weapon powers. Regional denuclearization presents fewer technical problems from this point of view and depends to a large extent on the political will of the countries directly concerned, as well, of course, as of the major powers.

There is also a current factor contributing to the increased interest in and urgency of the establishment of denuclearized zones. That is the acceleration of the arms race in the sphere of tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, together with changes in strategic thinking tending to make the inconceivable conceivable, namely, the limited use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

In these circumstances, it is more and more clearly in the interests of small and medium-sized countries to try to, let us say, disconnect their security from the nuclear danger.

Our colleagues will no doubt remember that Romania has always actively supported all proposals for the establishment of demuclearized zones in different parts of the world. We were among the first warmly to greet the success secured in Latin America through the Treaty of Tlatelolco. My country has consistently advocated the institution of an international military demuclearization regime in the zone in which we are situated geographically, the Balkans, ever since 10 September 1957, the date on which the head of the Romanian Government sent messages to the heads of Governments of the countries in the zone proposing an international conference on the subject. Recently — only a few days ago — Mr. Nicolae Ceaușescu, the President of Romania, in his message to the seventh summit meeting of the non-aligned countries, held in New Delhi, stated: "We are in favour of the establishment of demuclearized zones as an important part of the achievement of security in Europe, and we are making constant efforts to ensure co-operation and confidence in the Balkans and the conversion of this region into a zone of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-operation, without nuclear weapons and without foreign military bases".

In Romania's view, agreements for the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons should meet certain basic requirements, including the following: (a) they should provide equal security assurances for all the countries of the zone on the basis of a solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those countries and to respect the demuclearized zone status; (b) they should not restrict the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in any way but should, on the contrary, guarantee all States, on a footing of equality and without any discrimination, unlimited rights and possibilities as regards research in this sphere and the use of the achievements of nuclear science for their development; (c) they should provide for a clear and fair system of verification, based on the principle of the equality of States; (d) such zones should be seen as an integral part of a coherent system of measures designed to lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We have today dwelt on certain aspects of the establishment of demuclearized zones because of the importance attaching to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States within the broad framework of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on that subject (document A/10027/Add.1) states that one of the principal objectives of the establishment of demuclearized zones is to increase the security of the States comprising it. Some of the experts who took part in the drafting of that report pointed out in its paragraph 115 that the provision of formal assurances by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the States forming part of the zone was an essential factor for the effectiveness of the zone.

It is for these reasons that the Romanian delegation believes that in the consideration of approaches that might help us make progress in our negotiations on the subject of security assurances, the important experience represented by the demuclearized zones ought not to be forgotten. That experience could guide and encourage our joint efforts. I am thinking, of course, both of the experience of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the other demuclearized territories and also of the many suggestions and proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been put forward. We believe that a comparative study of these from the point of view of negative security assurances could give us new ideas and perhaps offer new solutions and new possibilities as regards the subject of our concerns: the devising of effective international arrangements to increase the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Datcu for his contribution and for the words of appreciation addressed to the Chairman for the month of March and the good wishes addressed to the Chairman for the month of April.

This concludes the list of speakers for today. Is there any other member who wishes to take the floor?

If such is not the case I should like to announce that I have requested the Secretariat to circulate a time-table for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The time-table has, I believe, been distributed. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and may be adjusted as we proceed. Members may have noticed that there is some time available in the time-table for either informal meetings or informal consultations, particularly on Tuesday afternoon and Thursday afternoon. I intend to approach members to ascertain their views on how best to use the time available to us. If there is no objection, can the Chair consider that the Committee adopts the time-table?

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I do not have any objection to the time-table, I merely wanted to say that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons will hold its first meeting, mainly for organizational purposes, tomorrow, and as a consequence of the decisions which may be taken at that meeting the time-table may have to be slightly amended as regards the work of the radiological weapons Group.

If I may, I would like to use this occasion to say, as well, that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons tomorrow, will also give the opportunity to delegates to make statements of a more general character.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, our 209th plenary meeting, on Tuesday last, was devoted especially to a discussion of the question of the revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

During that meeting, the representatives of 19 States members of the Committee spoke, offering their views and proposals on the activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and its mandate.

The representative of India proposed a formulation for the Working Group's mandate which was based on document CD/181 of the Group of 21.

The delegation of Mongolia, acting as co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries and on its own behalf, submitted a new draft text for the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban (Working Paper No. 95).

At the end of my statement on 5 April I asked you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, to conduct consultations in the Committee on the draft mandate as soon as possible so that the Committee could take a decision on it very soon.

So far as I know, no consultations on this question have so far been held in the Committee.

In view of the urgency of the need for the Committee to work out a mandate for the nuclear test-ban Working Group, and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament and our established practice, we should like again

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

to draw your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the need for the immediate holding of appropriate consultations on the draft mandate so that a decision can be taken on it as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his contribution. I may perhaps, before proposing the formal adoption of the time-table for next week, reassure the distinguished representative of Mongolia that it was the intention of the Chair, immediately after this meeting, to consult with the co-ordinators of the various groups on a number of outstanding issues which particularly lend themselves to informal consultations, and I can assure Ambassador Erdembileg that the topic he mentioned is one of the items which I had in mind to discuss in that framework, when, hopefully, we shall be able to reach agreement on the way of dealing with that matter.

If there are no further comments on the proposed time-table, may the Chair take it that it can be adopted?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In the same framework, at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I should like to announce that the chemical weapons Working Group will meet in Conference Room V for both meetings scheduled next week.

Members will recall that at its 197th plenary meeting, held on 24 February, the Committee took note of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/348. Owing to an inadvertent omission, the Committee has not yet approved the suggestion of the Ad Hoc Group to the effect that it should hold its next meeting from 11 to 22 July 1983.

If there is no objection to this suggestion, may the Chair take it that this suggestion is now formally approved?

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (USSR) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask you to defer the adoption of a decision on that question until the Committee's next plenary meeting, to be held on Tuesday, 12 April.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall, then, defer this decision until the next plenary meeting at the request of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

It then only remains for me to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.