

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 603rd

MEETING

Thursday, 16 April 1953, at 10.30 a.m.

Headquarters, New York

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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/2229, A/C.1/L.39, A/C.1/L.40/Rev.2) (*continued*)

[Item 72]*

1. Mr. MENON (India) said that the topic under discussion was a general and far-reaching problem; it had on various occasions come up for discussion, and the more detailed aspects which appeared in the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.39) had also been considered. It was legitimate and normal that when there were changes in a situation, the problem should be reconsidered, no matter how many times it had been discussed. In his view there had been changes in the world situation which indicated a tendency towards decreasing tensions and prospects of resolving at least some of the conflicts that appeared in the world. At any rate, the hopes of nations and peoples had been awakened, as could be seen from the various statements made in the First Committee.

2. India had already expressed itself, both in its statements and by its votes, on the issues in the Polish draft resolution relating to disarmament and other matters. It still hoped that the change for the better in the state of general tension would be reflected in the Disarmament Commission and that the great Powers, which had the main responsibility in regard to the relieving of tension and the scaling down of armaments, would be able to narrow their differences and come to an agreement.

The Indian delegation was, however, more concerned for the moment with the problem of Korea, to which part I of the Polish draft resolution addressed itself. The reason for that was not that the problem of Korea could be treated in isolation from the other world problems, but rather that the conflict in Korea had caused such disaster and had continued for a very long time. Progress had been made towards putting an end to the war and establishing peace. The General Assem-

bly, during the first part of the seventh session, had agreed by a considerable majority to seek solutions and to use as a basis of solving the issue of the repatriation of prisoners of war the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the general requirements of international law (resolution 610 (VII)). Although that had represented a great advance, the assent of the two parties at that particular stage, in that particular form, had unfortunately not been forthcoming. When the issue of repatriation had been taken up again in connexion with the question of the rehabilitation and unification of Korea, at the resumed session, the Indian delegation had stated (568th meeting) that it regarded the proposals made not as a barrier but as a doorway to settlement; they provided the basis on which the parties could come together in order to reach an agreement. He recalled that the General Assembly at that time had wisely decided not to pass any further resolutions on that particular question, but generally to pursue the line of persistent negotiation in order to establish peace. Further progress had since taken place.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in his communication (A/2378) dated 31 March 1953 addressed to the President of the General Assembly, had made it clear that, while he adhered to the principle of international law, in view of certain differences he was prepared to consider methods by which certain difficulties in the issue could be resolved. Meanwhile, the representative of the United States had assured the General Assembly at its 423rd plenary meeting that the United Nations Command was taking that communication into account. The Indian delegation had at that time felt that the Assembly had become seized of the new situation and would continually keep it in review. Legitimate doubts had been raised at that time that the issue might pass out of the purview of the General Assembly; but that could not have taken place, since the war in Korea was being conducted by the United Nations Command. In view of the recent progress, the problem of Korea must be regarded not on the basis of previous statements or resolutions, but on the basis of the situation as it existed today.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

5. The latest phase of the situation was the communication (A/2385) from General Nam Il to the United Nations Command on 9 April 1953. In that connexion, Mr. Menon said the negotiations with regard to the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners should be welcomed; the agreement reached was a great achievement, since it constituted the beginning of the process of repatriation. The Geneva Convention regarded the return of the sick and wounded as a first stage of repatriation itself after the cessation of hostilities.

6. General Nam Il's communication referred again to article 118 of the Geneva Convention. There was nothing in the communication which was inconsistent with the position taken by the Assembly or with the requirements of international law, and point (1) of the communication was identical in position with General Assembly resolution 610 (VII). General Nam Il and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai recognized, however, that a particular difficulty had arisen in regard to the repatriation of prisoners of war; the two parties had reached agreement on all the clauses of the draft armistice agreement except that one issue. Now both General Nam Il and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai had stated that they were prepared, for the sake of peace and the settlement of the question, to approach it from a point of view in which a solution would be possible. The above-mentioned communication further stated that the Korean and Chinese side held that repatriation of prisoners of war should be carried out in two steps: both parties should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners who insisted upon repatriation, and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral State so as to assure a just solution to the question of their repatriation. That proposal was not inconsistent with the position taken by the United Nations, although certain clarifications still had to be made. The General Assembly resolution affirmed that force should not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands and that they should at all times be treated humanely. On the other hand, General Nam Il, referring to the same aspect of the question, stated that the Sino-Korean side firmly maintained that the detaining side should ensure that no coercive means whatsoever should be employed against any prisoner of war in its custody to obstruct his returning home or to effect forcible detention. That was very much the position taken in the General Assembly resolution. Since in so far as things had been stated, there was no inconsistency in the two positions, the next step should be to proceed to the further elucidation of those problems so that repatriation might be started. As a matter of fact, that had already been begun by the return of the sick and the wounded; thus, the present problem was to try to obtain agreement on the remaining clause of the draft armistice agreement.

7. All parties had already contributed to the progress made—the United States Command, the Sino-Korean Command, the General Assembly, as well as the Red Cross. The next step, obviously, was to proceed on an equal footing with the armistice negotiations, as suggested in point (5) of General Nam Il's communication to the United Nations Command. That meant that the clarification, elucidation and arrangements, of which there were probably a considerable number, should be discussed between the two Commands, in response to

the request made by General Nam Il. It should be noted that all reports indicated that such negotiations had already started at Panmunjom. All indications were that the new atmosphere, as witnessed by the communications and recent developments, was propitious and that the right step, if taken, would yield results. The immediate obligation to the Member States of the United Nations, to the peoples of the world and to the soldiers of the two armies engaged in battle, was to welcome the steps and to assure both sides of the desire of the United Nations for the speedy conclusion of an armistice agreement.

8. In view of that situation, the Indian delegation welcomed the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.40/Rev.2) presented by the delegation of Brazil, which expressed that view without trying to apportion blame or to lay down the duties of the negotiators. It was quite obvious that detailed negotiations of that kind could not take place in two different places simultaneously. The Indian delegation supported the Brazilian proposal, and it was heartened by the USSR representative's favourable reception of it, as indicated in his statement at the 602nd meeting.

9. In those circumstances, the Indian delegation would venture to ask whether the Polish delegation would consider it possible to delete from its draft resolution the clauses pertaining to Korea. There were indications that many representatives would vote against the Polish draft resolution as a whole. If the Polish delegation accepted his request and unanimity could thereby be attained on the Brazilian resolution, the General Assembly could avoid the false impression that the cessation of hostilities, the conclusion of an armistice agreement and the bringing about of peace were of less concern to one side than to the other.

10. In conclusion, Mr. Menon said that, in view of the generous attitude of the Soviet Union delegation at the 602nd meeting, he hoped that that delegation would vote for the Brazilian draft resolution. He reiterated his request to the Polish delegation and said that magnanimity was seldom the least of all virtues.

11. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) pointed out that it would appear superfluous to resume the discussion and reply to the individual observations of various representatives who had set forth views with which he could not always agree. Moreover, reverting to the details of the discussion would be the more inappropriate at the present stage when tension was focused on one fundamental point, namely, the resolution that would emerge as a result of the Committee's work.

12. The Committee had two draft resolutions before it. In view of the fact that the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea had again initiated moves for attaining an armistice and putting an end to the war in Korea, and the fact that negotiations were now taking place at Panmunjom, the Polish delegation, at the present juncture, would not press for a vote on its proposals on the Korean question and would support the second revision of the Brazilian draft resolution. Furthermore, on the basis of instructions received from his Government, his delegation wished to declare that it would not press for a vote, either, on parts II and III of the Polish draft resolution. The debate in

the Committee had indicated that the problems raised therein required further discussion and consideration and, bearing in mind the limited time remaining in the present session, the Polish delegation reserved its right to raise such problems at the next session of the General Assembly.

13. The CHAIRMAN declared the debate closed and gave the floor to the representative of Israel, in accordance with rule 114, granting him the right of reply.

14. Mr. EBAN (Israel) recalled that the issue of anti-Jewish incitement, to which the Israel delegation had drawn attention at the 597th meeting, had been discussed by many delegations in a mood of deep gravity and concern; apparently the governments and peoples of many countries regarded it as an index of the world's moral climate. It would not have been fitting for the General Assembly to disregard an issue of such high international importance, after the sudden resurgence of anti-Jewish incitement and the consequent revulsion of enlightened opinion everywhere.

15. The Israel delegation had noted the important statement of the representative of the USSR in confirmation and clarification of the welcome statement issued in Moscow on 4 April 1953. Hence, the only new element in the debate meriting reply was the series of bitter speeches delivered at the 600th, 601st and 602nd meetings by the representatives of Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Those were the only delegations which had not repudiated the policy of anti-Jewish incitement and, indeed, sponsored the main element of the evil doctrine of the world Jewish conspiracy.

16. Mr. Eban would not agree with some delegations that the discussion of the issue was gratuitous in the context of a debate of international peace. Anyone with recent memories of the European holocaust must know how intimately and organically the doctrine of the world Jewish conspiracy had been connected with the threat of war. Europe was drenched with the blood of millions, victims both of anti-Jewish heresy and of military aggression. Undoubtedly, questions of world peace and of abstention from that form of incitement were inseparably linked.

17. The Polish representative had asserted that there was no actual issue to be discussed and nothing to worry about. If that consoling observation contained an assurance and a pledge for the future in the name of all the countries associated in alliance with Poland, then the Israel delegation would welcome it with deep and ardent sincerity. But the Lebanese representative had gone beyond the mere assertion that nothing had gone wrong; rather he had ventured to state that Israel and Jewish organizations had invented or exaggerated the whole affair for the sake of financial profit. That was a disgraceful utterance, even at the height of any political controversy. It was idle to assert opposition to anti-Jewish incitement and then to advocate ignoring such incitement when it clearly existed. Anti-Jewish incitement of the very worst kind had, in the first months of 1953, been officially disseminated for a time over the whole Eastern Europe, to the indignation of the civilized world and with grave prejudice to international relations. The forthright statement issued by the Soviet Union Government on 4 April 1953 referred in the strongest possible terms to the very events and movements which had aroused

his Government's concern. Indeed, that statement conclusively refuted the assertion that no grave outburst of anti-Jewish incitement had taken place at all.

18. The Lebanese representative might not be disturbed by the gross libels of the Slansky trial and the original Moscow accusation, but the issue did exist. The satisfaction of the Israel delegation at the Moscow statement did not erase its indignation at the shocking anti-Semitic prejudices launched at the Prague trial. The important thing to watch now was whether the Moscow statement was a single isolated episode or whether, as was to be hoped, it denoted an intention to eliminate all over Eastern Europe the entire atmosphere which had accompanied and followed the propagation of the original libels. The answer would help to clarify whether recent auguries of an improved international atmosphere were illusory or real. The issue was indeed real, as well as relevant to the cause of peace and friendship among nations.

19. The Lebanese representative had not succeeded in portraying Israel's interest in the question as interference in the affairs of other countries or as a symbol of a divided allegiance among Jewish communities. To focus international attention on official policies appearing to threaten the rights and freedoms of national or religious groups was not merely a right but a positive obligation. Israel, within the modest limits of its capacity and influence, would not be found wanting in the defence of human rights, whether in a Jewish issue or any other. But Israel would speak with a special sense of responsibility on behalf of Jewish security and honour whenever they were threatened. Fidelity to its past, remembrance of its recent anguish and its basic solidarities and ideals forbade Israel to be silent on such an issue. The Arab delegations, which had revealed a hysterical Jew-baiting vehemence, would not cause Israel to abdicate the discharge of its moral responsibility to the Jews throughout the world, in full conformity with the Charter and its provisions on human rights. It should be remembered that Arab Governments engaged in discussions about Arab communities and did not hesitate to claim a special right to be heard in defence of all Arab interests.

20. The representative of Israel then reviewed various charges made by the representatives of Iraq, Lebanon and Syria concerning alleged Jewish fifth-column activity and control of information media, and intimidation at Jewish behest among legislators. The speeches of the Arab representatives had indicated that the leaders in their countries continued to uphold, to believe and applaud the very libels which the USSR Government itself had strongly and frankly repudiated. In so doing, they stood alone, isolated from the universal conscience, tenaciously embracing a prejudice after it had been discredited and ardently hoping that the bitterness produced by events would endure. Everyone else had recoiled from that prejudice. They alone repeated and elaborated it within the United Nations, in all its sordid and mendacious detail. There was no difference between the thesis expounded by the representatives of Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria and the doctrine of the world Jewish conspiracy expounded in all the anti-Semitic campaigns of history.

21. Mr. Eban then quoted from various radio broadcasts of the Arab countries, including Radio Baghdad, attacks on Mr. Bernard Baruch, Mr. Winston Chur-

chill and Mr. René Mayer, and inquired whether anyone would say that Arab nationalism was not infected with the most primitive anti-Jewish prejudice. Anti-Jewish incitement could be aroused or quelled at will, but yet it had a dire effect on the political and moral atmosphere in the Middle East. Mr. Eban wondered who would venture to deny that all that represented a basic prejudice of the most sinister kind rather than a political conflict with a movement called Zionism; taken in the context of recent history, of Arab policies and attitudes, it was obviously a symptom of a grave moral contagion with disquietingly deep roots in Arab nationalist thinking.

22. Even if it could be assumed that the recent Moscow statement and the cessation of open and official anti-Jewish incitement in communist countries denoted an intention by those Governments permanently to abandon their former course, the question still remained: What about results of the original libels, their effect in the Middle East, and the contagion which has spread into the very heart of that region? Could Israel be fully consoled if the doctrine of the world Jewish conspiracy was banished from the Soviet Press only to find a more vigorous sounding-board in the statements of the Arab delegations? Was there no responsibility in the United Nations to remove the consequences which such policies had produced in the already-tense Middle East?

23. The Arab representatives had, moreover, bitterly attacked Israel's policy and the Zionist movement. Every stage in Israel's emergence had taken place under the direct scrutiny of the United Nations and of world opinion. The applause surrounding that event had drowned the rancorous echoes of opposition and hatred. The Jewish people, after its untold sufferings, merited its small corner of freedom, at least as surely as the Arab people deserved theirs. The Zionist movement was nothing but a voluntary association of people in all the free lands dedicated to the advocacy of the simple truth that one could not acknowledge Arab freedom in a continent and deny the Jewish people their small but cherished land. Since its foundation, Israel had lived in constant struggle, with means grossly inadequate for its task, and was not the potent colossus described by the Arab representatives. Nor had the Zionist movement ever represented a strange conspiracy. Israel and the Zionist movement had never plotted to unleash a new world war. Israel did not embrace any doctrines of jihad or any other rationalizations of military conquest. In one decade, it had seen a world war, with its unbearable load of anguish, and a war of independence against invading Arab armies.

24. The Arab version of the conflict had constantly failed to commend itself to the United Nations, but Arab speakers were correct in saying that international peace was not only a function of the relations between the great Powers, but also a principle to be applied in all regions of the world. Israel could only hope that the Arab Governments would join it in drawing the conclusions which flowed from that correct premise. Arab representatives had also urged the Soviet Union and the Western Powers to get together at every available opportunity and to negotiate their differences without delay or prior condition. Would not their voices carry greater weight if they would apply to their own

regional relations the excellent advice which they bestowed upon the Great Powers? Were Arab States immune from the imperative duty of negotiating their differences with their neighbours? There was a specific Middle Eastern aspect to the general international situation now being discussed under agenda item 72. If there were progress toward an improved international atmosphere on the wider scene, then the Arab Governments which refused to negotiate their regional conflicts would find themselves increasingly out of touch with the prevailing international atmosphere. The anti-Jewish incitement had been condemned by all free men, as the statements of various representatives in the Committee had verified.

25. There was every evidence that the recent intensive expression of international opinion on anti-Jewish incitement had had a positive and a salutary effect. Israel drew encouragement and consolation from the vigour and sincerity of the world's reaction; from the earnest responsibility and statesmanlike attitude manifested in the United Nations; and from the significant omens of recent improvement and repudiation. The Polish representative's withdrawal of his draft resolution was a good example of that atmosphere. If the United Nations would face those problems frankly, it might help to liberate the world from all pernicious prejudices and touch the spirit of the present generation with a warm and healing fire of human brotherhood.

26. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) said he had been forced to seek the right of reply under rule 114 by the statement of the representative of Israel, which was an attempt to besmirch the Czechoslovak Government and to intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia on the pretext of the Slansky trials.

27. The facts were that constitutionally competent courts had sentenced conspirators for confessed crimes of which they had been convicted. International law forbade intervention in the domestic affairs of States, as was clear from Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The delegation of Israel had no right to challenge the Czechoslovak right to prosecute criminals, and any attempts to do so were condemned by Czechoslovakia as violations of international law. Some of the defendants in the trial had been of Jewish descent, but they could not for that reason be exempt from conviction and condemnation. Czechoslovak justice would continue to prosecute all violators of the laws of Czechoslovakia. The Israel delegation and others should take note of that intention and should not assume that Jews could violate the laws with impunity.

28. The true reason for the irritation of the Israel delegation was the exposure in the Prague trials of the rôle of Zionism as the agency for American espionage and subversive activity in the people's democracies. The fact that Zionism was such an agency was clear from Western sources, said Mr. David, and he quoted a passage from *The New Statesman and Nation* to the effect that Zionist groups were regarded by the United States as "soft spots" behind the Iron Curtain. There was a clear difference between the struggle against Zionism and anti-Semitism, which Czechoslovakia execrated as racial prejudice.

29. Israel, the Zionists and the enemies of peace had instituted a false and slanderous campaign against Czechoslovakia, where Jews had never been persecuted.

Those convicted in the trial were felons guilty of military, political and economic espionage and it was shameless to confuse their conviction with anti-Semitism. The Jewish workers had always been opposed to Zionism and there were in Israel non-Zionists and even anti-Zionists, who could not be regarded as anti-Semitic. There had been Zionist crimes outside Czechoslovakia, as well. For example there were those perpetrated upon the Arabs, which had been referred to in the Committee by the Arab delegations. There were also the recent bombings of Czechoslovak and Soviet Union diplomatic establishments in Tel Aviv. The record of the Prague trials and the experience of the people's democracies and the Arab States had exposed Zionism as the agent of imperialism and a menace to peace which should be condemned by world public opinion. Such enemies of peace could not succeed in besmirching the people's democracies with the slander of religious or racial prejudice.

30. While such prejudices were rife among the capitalistic nations, the workers had come to power in Czechoslovakia, racial and religious prejudice was prohibited and freedom of conscience was assured. The exposure of the imperialistic activities of Zionism by Czechoslovakia was the reason for the attacks, which had brought the level of the debate down to that of Goebbels' propaganda. Some members of the Committee had proved unwilling to discuss the important issues raised by the Polish proposal and sought to incite hatred and strife with a view to intensifying international tensions and wrecking the conditions of co-operation. Czechoslovakia condemned such methods.

31. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the statements of the representative of Israel with reference to the Soviet Union and the policy of its Government were merely a mixture of insinuation and slander, designed to poison the atmosphere. Decent people did not indulge in debate with slanderers and those remarks, not being worthy of an answer, would be passed over by the Soviet Union in silence.

32. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) expressed to the representative of the Israel authorities his appreciation for the latter's using his talents and eloquence for a further exposure of Zionism. The Israel statement had, however, made no contribution to the substance of the question and had only been intended to be beguiling. While it was a fact that Syria hated and opposed Zionism, it also hated and opposed anti-Semitism. The statement, accordingly, did not deserve a direct reply, but certain points should be elucidated.

33. The Arabs had a sense of solidarity among their peoples and did not claim that the nationals under other governments were in any way to be considered part of their people. That was a basic difference from Zionism, which concerned itself with the nationals of other States. With respect to the discussion of the alleged doctors' conspiracy in Moscow, Mr. Zeineddine asked whether or not there had been a real plot when the United Nations Mediator for Palestine had been slain and whether or not the criminals had been punished. When reference had been made to certain legislators and publishers, there had been no particular persons or nationalities in mind and the reference should not have been used maliciously by the Israel representative.

As far as the question of jihads were concerned, they were only considered lawful in the service of right. With regard to the voluntary nature of the activities of Zionist organizations, Mr. Zeineddine pointed out that the one thousand million dollars collected amounted to a sum greater than all aid given to Asia and Africa, which raised the question whether it had been raised voluntarily or through pressure. He did not wish to imply that any government had been involved. Finally, whether their attitude led to their isolation or not, the Arabs could not change their position in respect of Zionism.

34. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) observed that although the Lebanese statement had been well documented, it appeared that new proofs had been required and the representative of Israel had provided them.

35. Lebanon had argued that all who attacked Zionism or Israel were accused of being anti-Jewish and the representative of Israel had said that the critics of Zionism were inciters of anti-Semitism.

36. The representative of Israel had said that Lebanon had denied the existence of persecution. That was not the case, for the Lebanese position had been that exaggeration of the persecutions was no less a threat to the peace than the actual racial and religious persecutions, since it could have the same effect. Lebanon could not be accused of finding satisfaction in any form of persecution.

37. Lebanon had argued that Israel posed as the representative of all Jews, whatever their nationality. The representative of Israel had admitted that position and had claimed that the Arabs held it also. However, in fact, the Arab refugees, who had approached the Arab States for assistance, were Arabs by nationality. There was, moreover, a feeling that the existing Arab political systems were provisional, and that there might be one nation, including the Arabs of Palestine. The Arabs, accordingly, could answer that their concern was for Arab nationals who had lived as a majority in their own country. On the other hand, Israel claimed to represent Jews who were minorities in other States. Moreover, when attempts were made to aid the Arabs to return to their country, it was generally recognized that Palestine was their country, while the Zionists tried to bring Jews to the land of another nation. Hence, there could be no comparison between the Arab position and that of Israel. The attacks by the representative of Israel had not been based upon any official statements, but only upon radio commentaries.

38. As long as the State of Israel and its representatives insisted upon representing all Jews, they would be exposed to identification with Zionism. If attacks on Zionism sometimes appeared to be directed against all Jews, the fault lay with those who would prove that Judaism and Zionism were the same. If Israel would abandon that position, it could be assured that the Arabs would not attack the Jews as such.

39. On the question of negotiations between the Arab States and Israel, it was well known that Israel did not wish to negotiate because it did not wish to take the resolutions of the General Assembly as a basis of negotiations. In the circumstances, negotiations could not be expected and the Arab States should not be reproached.

40. Mr. BAKR (Iraq) said that the statement of the representative of Israel designed to rouse public opinion and to identify Judaism with Zionism had been foreseen. He had spoken of pogroms and anti-Jewish incitement and it could only be agreed that Europe had been drenched with Jewish blood. It had, however, been the Arab theme that the pogroms had been in Europe, while in the Middle East the Jews had lived for centuries at peace with the Arabs. In the Middle East there were no ghettos, except for unimportant exceptions. The anti-Jewish feeling there had been caused by Zionism, and the Arabs could hardly be blamed for that attitude. They regarded Zionism as the most destructive and dangerous movement to the Arabs in the Middle East. It had driven Arabs out of one of their countries, encroached upon others, and conducted subversive and espionage activities against others, including Iraq. There was a clear danger to the Arab countries from the Zionist elements.

41. Since 1948, Iraq had continually suffered from the espionage and terroristic activities of Zionism. Although the Iraqi Government had for a long time taken a lenient view, it could not always close its eyes to subversive activities, and the courts had taken action which had resulted in a few death sentences. The representative of Israel had mentioned the Baghdad radio and the references made to three distinguished persons. Mr. Bakr did not have before him the text of the broadcast concerned but he would be greatly surprised if any attacks had been made on Mr. Baruch without good reason. It was hard to believe that an attack had been made on Mr. Churchill, in view of the valued treaty of alliance which Iraq had with the United Kingdom. With regard to Mr. Mayer, it was again the case that no attack would have been made without good reason; but it should be borne in mind that Mr. Mayer had been a vehement Zionist, and in the 1930's had been the Rothschild agent for purchasing land in Palestine.

42. The representative of Israel should be the last one to complain about propaganda on the radio and in the Press. Both in Western Europe and in the United States, there had been much publicity for the Zionist cause. Mr. Bakr suspected that the statement of the representative of Israel would be featured in the newspapers, while the Arab replies would be given only a few obscure lines. The Baghdad radio certainly had a right to its own position.

43. It was the one-sided and pro-Zionist attitude of the Press and radio which had been called the fifth column in the democracies. There was no need to recall the assistance given from all sides to the Jewish Agency for Palestine during the debate in the United Nations on the Palestine question. There had also been manoeuvres behind the scenes at that time, which were still continuing. That was the explanation of the reference made to a fifth column: its purpose was to identify Judaism with Zionism in the eyes of public opinion. While the Arabs had accepted the Jewish element for centuries, they rejected the artificial marriage to it of Zionism. All States should take note of the danger of the Zionist fifth column.

44. If there was any ill feeling against the Jews, the Zionists themselves were responsible for starting a dangerous movement which could not be accepted by the Arabs. The Zionists had established a "para-

dise" in Israel and asked the Jews to go there. The immigration policies of Israel were its own concern, but the fact remained that many of the immigrants brought from Europe and especially from the Middle East had become disillusioned. That was a matter to which the representative of Israel had not referred.

45. When the representative of Israel, with his clever oratory, smeared the Arab States and spoke of the peaceful intentions of Israel, he should have recalled that Israel was the pillar of the destructive Zionist movement, which had usurped an Arab country, which was responsible for the destitution of a million refugees, and which had even denied the property rights of those refugees. Delegations which had attacked communism should not forget that since 1948 Israel had denied the Arab refugees rights to their property, possessions and livelihood.

46. The diatribes of the Israel representative had not been answered, because the Iraqi delegation did not believe in such tactics. The Arab cause was righteous, and in such a clear case the facts spoke for themselves.

47. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) said he was sure the French delegation interpreted the views of the great majority in expressing appreciation of the action of the Polish delegation in withdrawing its draft resolution and supporting the Brazilian proposal. That action was a response to public opinion and increased the hopes which recent events had aroused. There were times when magnanimity was the best policy, as the Polish representative had understood; he had acted in the interest of unanimity and had promoted a climate of conciliation.

48. Mr. CHAUVET (Haiti) said there was no need, at the present stage, to revert to the arguments over the Polish draft resolution. Nevertheless, such matters as Indo-China, Austria, the question of Greek children, attacks on ecclesiastical authorities and anti-Semitism continued to be haunting. The opinion of small States was of moral importance, since they voted objectively. To them, verbal changes reflecting a change in the war of nerves were of importance. The hopes for a lasting understanding which had existed after the Second World War had given place to the propaganda war, and it was to be hoped that the former situation could be restored. Not only conciliation, but reconciliation was necessary.

49. Perhaps the Charter would be changed and improved and problems would then arise to prove the sincerity of all parties. Hope in any event still existed, as was reflected in the preamble of the Brazilian draft resolution. The Haitian delegation would vote in favour of the Brazilian proposal. As the Polish proposal seemed inopportune, it was well that some points had been withdrawn.

50. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt), recalling the statement of the Soviet Union representative and the announced intention of the Western Powers, said it could be concluded that all desired peace and the avoidance of bloodshed. In the East, there had been an offer for co-operation which perhaps might assist in guiding the world to pleasanter circumstances. The international situation was therefore not static, and sensible policies were necessary to preserve lasting international peace and freedom of oppressed peoples.

In order to prepare and ensure mutual confidence, the United Nations should boldly struggle against the policies of imperialism and the propaganda inspired by those policies, which the spirit of co-operation condemned.

51. On the subject of racial and religious discrimination, the representative of Israel had addressed himself to all the Arab States, although up to the present the delegations of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt had not yet taken part in the discussion. Mr. Abdelrazek did not ask why the persecution of Moslems was legitimate in the Soviet Union and in the satellites and elsewhere, or why compassion for them had only been aroused in April 1953. Nor did he propose to recall Moslem history throughout the area from Indonesia to Morocco during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

52. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated that the Korean war had increased the danger of a new world war and that the cessation of hostilities would facilitate the settlement of other important questions, notably the reduction of armed forces, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control. It was therefore surprising that the USSR representative should have stressed parts II and III of the Polish proposal, when settlement of the Korean question was likely to facilitate the settlement of the questions concerned. It was to be hoped that that would be the case.

53. Part III of the Polish proposal stated that the North Atlantic Treaty was incompatible with the United Nations Charter. That would mean that the Treaty was not compatible with Article 52. That Article permitted the existence of regional arrangements for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security appropriate for regional action, provided they were consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The Charter thus recognized that national interests were subject to the influence of such factors as geography, natural barriers and economic and political developments. Moreover, it recognized that States were more able to influence events in certain parts of the world. In the evolution of the United Nations emphasis had been laid upon co-operation between States whose interests were the basis of the arrangements they made. Treaties of alliance before 1914 embraced only States which felt a common threat. Under the League of Nations, there were a number of regional arrangements, including the Locarno Agreement. The Briand proposal for a European union was a more ambitious attempt along the same lines. At the present time, the meaning of regional arrangements had changed.

54. At San Francisco, the Egyptian delegation had proposed¹ the inclusion of a definition of regional arrangements, which would establish certain criteria. That proposal had been rejected by the great Powers, including the Soviet Union, on the grounds that it could not cover all possible situations. It seemed to follow that the expression "regional arrangements" as used in the Charter was wider in scope than the definition which had been proposed by Egypt. It had

been claimed that the expression could be applied to treaties of mutual assistance between States which were not geographically close or which did not have common interests. Every State was free to enter into mutual assistance treaties or regional agreements without such treaties' being branded as incompatible with the Charter. It would be useful to include in the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly an item on that matter, so that a study by the competent organ might be recommended with a view to preparing a definition of regional arrangements.

55. The Polish draft resolution proposed the conclusion of a peace pact among the great Powers. The idea might be a good one, although the great Powers were not in a state of war, which would lead to a peace pact; it might perhaps be a pact of friendship, provided it was based on the principle of equality of rights and on the rights of peoples to self-determination. The conclusion of peace in Korea should be awaited, for it might produce an atmosphere which would encourage the conclusion of such a pact. It was no argument to assert that a pact was unnecessary because of the existence of the Charter. That argument could be used to abolish all treaties of alliance and mutual assistance.

56. The Egyptian delegation appreciated the action of Poland in withdrawing its draft resolution and would vote in favour of the Brazilian proposal.

57. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) said that the Committee should deal with the broad problem before it in a sober manner, particularly because there were signs of the possibility of some advance towards a solution. That situation laid greater responsibility on the Committee and also established criteria by which to judge the sincerity of the proposals. It was doubtful whether the old irrelevant propositions in the Polish draft resolution could meet such criteria. They offered no measures for the settlement of any issues and their withdrawal would facilitate proceedings. It was to be hoped that those proposals would not again be heard from. It was unfortunate that they had not been withdrawn earlier in order to avoid acrimonious speeches.

58. It was now possible to concentrate on Korea, where progress had become possible as a result of the persistently constructive and conciliatory attitude of the General Assembly. It was to be hoped that the last remaining obstacle to an armistice would be overcome in the negotiations at Panmunjom. The Brazilian draft resolution reflected the needs of the situation and would help lessen international tension. It did not engage in polemics or recriminations but concentrated on the main question, on which progress was possible. It expressed gratification at the advances made and the hope that there would be no further delays to an armistice. Finally, it emphasized the concern of the General Assembly with the problem, but did nothing which might impede progress from the preliminary stages towards a general settlement. The Yugoslav delegation would vote in favour of the Brazilian draft resolution.

59. Mr. KYROU (Greece), recalling his statement at the 599th meeting that he would vote in favour of any constructive proposal, said that as such a draft resolution had been submitted by Brazil, he would vote for it. The Brazilian representative had explained

¹ See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, San Francisco 1945, Vol. XII, pp. 857-858.

that he had singled out the armistice problem as being the most urgent before the United Nations. Unanimous adoption of that proposal would be an essential preliminary step towards the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the settlement of other problems.

60. The Greek delegation had appealed to Poland to withdraw its draft resolution as a contribution to the abandonment of the undesirable past. Mr. Kyrou had therefore been happy to hear the Polish representative withdraw one part of it and state the intention not to press for a vote on the other two parts. That declaration increased the hopes roused by recent events and justified the restraint of those who had avoided any expressions that might impede collaboration.

61. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) said his delegation had not participated in the debate not because of lack of interest, but because it had thought it unnecessary to speak again on subjects which had already been disposed of. When particular questions had been discussed, the South African views had been given. As the Polish proposal had been withdrawn, there was nothing to be added. The South African delegation would support the Brazilian draft resolution.

62. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) said that his delegation had not participated in the general debate which, it had feared, would be repetitious. The Polish draft resolution dealt with subjects upon which the views of the Canadian delegation were known from earlier statements. The only paragraph in that draft resolution which was new dealt with the question of prisoners of war in terms which took account of the statement of 30 March of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. That statement should obviously be followed up, and the sooner the negotiators could reach a formula, the better. If the solution was consistent with the United Nations principles and

resolutions, it should be possible to conclude an armistice which might pave the way for other agreements. As the remainder of the Polish draft resolution dealt with matters in terms which Canada had previously rejected, Mr. Johnson had been happy to hear that a vote would not be pressed. More appropriate was the Brazilian draft resolution, which had a positive rather than a negative tone. It was to be hoped that it would receive unanimous support.

63. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said his delegation appreciated the Polish decision not to press for a vote on its draft resolution and to support the Brazilian proposal. That was another welcome sign of conciliation, which had now made itself felt within the United Nations. The Indonesian delegation would vote for the revised Brazilian draft resolution and trusted that its unanimous approval would exert a favourable influence on the speedy conclusion of hostilities and the signing of an armistice.

64. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMES (Brazil) thanked the representative of Poland for withdrawing the part of his draft resolution relating to Korea. That withdrawal showed an understanding of the spirit of conciliation which had moved Brazil to present its draft resolution and would enable the Committee to achieve unanimity. It was to be hoped that the general spirit prevailing would lead to affirmative and favourable results and that an armistice followed by an honourable peace in Korea would soon be achieved.

65. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the revised Brazilian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.40/Rev.2)

That draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.