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Chairman: Mr. Motoo OGISO (Japan).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Miss Forcignanò (Italy), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DRAFT RESOLUTION II SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN DOCUMENT A/8915 CONCERNING AGENDA ITEM 40\* (A/C.5/L.1476)**

1. Mr. RHODES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that the statement on the financial implications submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/L.1476) indicated that, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution II submitted by the Special Political Committee in its report (A/8915, para. 25), additional expenditure in the amount of \$7,000 would be entailed in 1973 for the travel of the Chairman or a representative of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, accompanied by a Secretariat staff member. The Advisory Committee considered that it should be possible for the Secretary-General to meet the relatively modest costs of that travel within the appropriations already approved by the Fifth Committee in first reading for section 1 of the budget and the estimate recommended by the Advisory Committee for section 5, which the Fifth Committee had not yet considered. The Fifth Committee could therefore inform the General Assembly that, should it adopt the draft resolution, no additional appropriation would be needed under the budget for 1973.

2. The CHAIRMAN proposed that, if there were no objections, the Committee should ask the Rapporteur to inform the General Assembly that, should it adopt the draft resolution of the Special Political Committee, no additional appropriation would be needed for the budget for 1973.

*It was so decided.*

**AGENDA ITEM 82**

**Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board (continued)\*\***

\* United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Reports of the Secretary-General.

\*\* Resumed from the 1523rd meeting.

**Draft report of the Fifth Committee to the General Assembly (A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.16)**

3. Mr. PASHKEVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (Rapporteur), indicated a few changes in the text of the draft report of the Committee (A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.16).

4. In paragraph 5, towards the end of the first sentence, after the words "reducing . . . the rates of contribution", the following words should be added between parentheses: "now established at 14 per cent for the participating organizations". In paragraph 8, the end of the penultimate sentence should be amended to read: "to levels above those of the national civil services of countries in which the headquarters offices of the United Nations system were located". In paragraph 9, after the second sentence, a new sentence should be added reading as follows: "Some delegations wished a general study of the functioning of the Joint Staff Pension Fund to be carried out by an intergovernmental body." The text of paragraph 10 should be replaced by the following text:

"10. On the question of the organization of the Fund, dealt with by the Board in its report, some representatives expressed the view that the composition of the Board should be revised in such a way that half of its membership would consist of representatives of the General Assembly and corresponding legislative bodies and the other half of representatives of participants and executive heads."

In addition, minor drafting changes would be made in the Russian text of the draft report, but they did not apply to the other languages.

5. Mr. BENDER (United States of America) said that he would be unable to take a position regarding the draft report of the Committee on the report of the Joint Staff Pension Fund until he had studied the revised text. He would suggest a slight change in the wording of the first sentence of paragraph 9 because the support for the Advisory Committee's recommendation that a study of the Fund's contribution rates should be carried out through the Board's Committee of Actuaries had been general in nature and had not been limited to those representatives who had expressed the view that the organization contribution rate was too high. He therefore suggested a semicolon after the words "general support" with the sentence continuing with the words: "in this connexion, some representatives expressed the view that the organization contribution rate . . .".

6. Mr. DAMASCENO VIEIRA (Brazil) agreed with the representative of the United States and said he could accept the correction he had suggested.

7. Mr. KULAZHENKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he was not clear about the correction which the Rapporteur had suggested for paragraph 9 to indicate that some delegations wanted the report on the functioning of the Fund to be carried out by an intergovernmental body. In any case, he would revert to the question when he had the revised text of the draft report before him, because the Russian text as it stood did not reflect certain comments by the Soviet delegation since some parts had first been translated into English, then back into Russian.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would receive a revised text of the draft report which would take due account of the comments made by the Soviet delegation.

#### AGENDA ITEM 77

**Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions (continued) (A/8711 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, A/C.5/L.1092 to 1095, A/C.5/L.1097, A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14)**

9. Mr. GONTHA (Indonesia) announced that his delegation had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092.

10. Mr. OUÉDRAOGO (Upper Volta) said that, at least in French, operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, as amended by the Soviet delegation (A/C.5/L.1095), did not make much sense grammatically.

11. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, as amended by the Soviet amendment (A/C.5/L.1095), was perfectly understandable in the Russian and English texts. The French text should therefore be redrafted.

12. Mr. ARIS DE CASTILLA (Guatemala) pointed out that in the Spanish text of the revised United States draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1) the words *lo antes posible* in operative paragraph (b) were not an accurate translation of the English phrase "as soon as practicable".

13. Mr. HOFFMAN (Secretary of the Committee) said that the Spanish text of the revised draft resolution failed to take into account the corrigendum (A/C.5/L.1091/Corr.1) issued after circulation of the original text of the draft, which had called for the replacement of the words *lo antes posible* by *en cuanto sea factible*.

14. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote on the three draft resolutions before the Committee, said that there was a link between the three texts, since they all sought, in one way or another, to reduce the percentage con-

tributions of Member States to the regular budget of the United Nations.

15. His delegation felt that the implications of the United States draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1) were such that, if it were adopted, the financial situation of the United Nations system of organizations would be jeopardized. Consequently, it would have been better if the United States proposal had been made the subject of a detailed and expert study by the Committee on Contributions or the General Assembly itself before the Assembly was asked to take a decision on it. His delegation was not convinced that the difficulties which the entire United Nations system—and particularly the specialized agencies—would face had been adequately discussed. If the draft resolution were adopted, the Committee on Contributions would be instructed to implement them without having adequate guidelines as to how it should approach that most important and difficult task. His delegation was not sure that the adoption of proposals to reduce the ceiling and floor would not have adverse effects on the capacity of the various organs and agencies of the United Nations to carry out their responsibilities. There should be a comprehensive study of the whole question.

16. His delegation would therefore be unable to support draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 and A/C.5/L.1093 even though it believed that the developing countries, with their special economic and financial difficulties, were justified in requesting a reduction in their assessed contributions, and in that sense it supported draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093. It would be unable to vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 either, because it was one-sided and did not take into account the vital interests of all the developing countries.

17. The questions raised in two of the draft resolutions were of such importance that they fell within the purview of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter and should be so treated. They would both require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, since they treated in a fundamental way of budgetary questions, within the meaning of the said Article.

18. His delegation supported the proposition that the entire matter of the scale of assessments should be the subject of a comprehensive study by the Committee on Contributions or an *ad hoc* intersessional committee of the General Assembly, charged to report back to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

19. The proposal dealing with a unilateral reduction in the scale of assessments smacked of immorality and conveyed the notion of an unjustified withdrawal of political support for the Organization. It was based upon too many hypothetical elements, and an air of mystery lingered over the true motivation. Nor was it apparent what principle that unilateral action purported to affirm. Since such a principle might exist, his delegation did not want to appear to reject it, and it was tempted to take refuge in abstention. It remained unpersuaded by the arguments advanced by the United States delegation and would be more inclined to give

weight to the arguments of the Tanzanian delegation as to the deleterious effect the proposed action could have on the entire United Nations system, including most of the specialized agencies. Yet if, after a penetrating examination of the entire question, the Committee on Contributions or an intersessional committee found that the United States contribution could safely, on the basis of existing criteria, be reduced to 25 per cent, then his delegation might be inclined to support that proposition. Its vote would therefore reflect the perplexity which the proposal engendered.

20. Mr. YOGASUNDRAM (Sri Lanka) said that, as previously indicated, his delegation agreed with the recommendation in paragraph 44 of the report of the Committee on Contributions (A/8711 and Corr.1) and with draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092.

21. It could not agree to the amendments (A/C.5/L.1094 and A/C.5/L.1095) to that draft resolution, for the reasons stated by the Brazilian delegation at the preceding meeting, and it would therefore vote against them.

22. His delegation had not yet had an opportunity of studying the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.5/L.1097) to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, but it agreed with the text of the latter as it stood.

23. With regard to the United States draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1), his delegation was withdrawing its request for separate votes on the operative paragraphs, and would abstain if the draft resolution was put to the vote.

24. Mr. REFSHAL (Norway) said that his delegation could not in principle subscribe to a practice whereby Member States unilaterally decided what percentage of the regular budget they should contribute, what budget items they wanted to contribute to, at what time they should pay their contributions or in what currencies those contributions should be paid. Those decisions were made by the General Assembly.

25. However, it must be recognized that there were special circumstances in the particular case of the United States draft resolution. Weight must be given to the argument that no single Member should be required to carry a disproportionate share of the expenses of the Organization. It was not a healthy situation for the United Nations to depend so heavily on the contribution of one Member. Conversely, since no single Member dominated the Organization, a contribution which exceeded that of any other Member State by too much might tend to disenchant the Member concerned. That consideration had been of major importance in determining the position of his delegation and the delegations of the other Nordic countries, and it transcended some strong reservations which they did have with regard to the United States proposal. Norway was also prompted by the strong gratitude which it felt towards the United States people for its generosity over a long number of years towards other countries and the international community. His delega-

tion would therefore support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1.

26. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, which had been modelled on paragraph 21 of the report of the Committee on Contributions, most delegations, unlike the Committee on Contributions, had not had the benefit of "the detailed study of several variants in the allowance formula". Thus, it was not "apparent" to his delegation that changing the elements of the present allowance formula would be justified. The sponsors of the draft resolution requested a change in the elements but did not specify how they should be changed or to what extent. Adoption of that proposal would be tantamount to giving the Committee on Contributions *carte blanche* to change the elements, and the Fifth Committee would be faced with a fait accompli at the twenty-eighth session. Rather than adopting that method, it would be better if the Committee on Contributions were to present the General Assembly with alternative scales with and without changes. It might of course recommend one of them, but the Fifth Committee would then have an opportunity to scrutinize possible changes and their effects before a decision was taken. While his delegation was not lacking in sympathy for the question and agreed that it should be kept under review, it was nevertheless unable to support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 without knowing more details.

27. It would, on the other hand, support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, which would truly give relief to developing countries with the lowest *per capita* income, an action that would be in line with his delegation's general policy.

28. Before concluding, he would like to make two remarks. Firstly, from the references in its report, under the heading "Comparative income per head of population", to views expressed in the General Assembly, the Committee on Contributions seemed to have given more emphasis to views that advocated changes than to views that had a more cautious attitude to changes. However, such an attitude did not exclude the possibility of reasonable changes, proof of which was his delegation's support for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093. Secondly, according to the data available to his delegation, if the proposals before the Fifth Committee were to be adopted, and on the basis of the present scale of assessments, there would be only 15 countries left which would pay strictly according to capacity to pay. His delegation did not therefore exclude the possibility that the United Nations would have to look for an entirely different principle on which to base its scale of assessments in the future.

29. Mr. COGAN (Ireland) stated that, with regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, his delegation would support the proposal that a limit should be imposed, in principle, on the maximum contribution of any one Member State so that it should not exceed 25 per cent of the total of the ordinary expenses of the United Nations. That principle should be put into effect only "as soon as practicable", or, in other words, as soon as the additional resources outlined in operative

paragraph (b) of the draft resolution became available, and on the understanding, specified in operative paragraph (c), that the percentage contribution of Member States should not in any case be increased as a consequence of the adoption of the text. What was in fact proposed in that draft resolution was a further modification of the "ceiling" on contributions. A glance at the current percentage rates of assessment showed that the United Nations was heavily dependent on the contributions of a few of the wealthier Member States, the United States being the major one by far. The destiny of the Organization was dependent on its financial stability, and the effect of the withholding of contributions in the past bore ample witness to the danger of financial instability. Consequently, his delegation believed that in the present circumstances the proposed limit of 25 per cent should be approved.

30. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, his delegation agreed that there were sound reasons for making a reduction in the floor figure, particularly in the case of the least developed of the developing countries, and would support that draft resolution.

31. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, his delegation, conscious of the need to give special consideration to the countries with low *per capita* income, would not vote against the draft, but considered that the principles contained in the terms of reference of the Committee on Contributions were adequate guidelines and that their application should be left to the discretion of that Committee.

32. His delegation would vote against the amendments contained in document A/C.5/L.1094 and the amendment in document A/C.5/L.1095, the text of which was unclear and which was also at variance with the United States draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1).

33. His delegation had no objection to the text proposed in document A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14.

34. Mr. TCHICAYA (Gabon) recalled that his delegation had stated that it would abstain in the vote on the United States draft resolution unless certain assurances were given to it. It had obtained those assurances, first through the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. McGee, who had spoken for his country with such a sense of certainty that it would be hard to call his comments into question; secondly, certain contacts made by the Gabonese delegation had indicated that the reduction in the assessment of the largest contributor would not bring about any increase in the assessments of other Member States. In the circumstances his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1.

35. Nevertheless, his country was in a position where it had to pay the United Nations, with no reimbursement from the latter, a contribution of 51 million francs CFA for 1972—a sum which could pay for the construction of a number of schools or clinics—and it could not therefore endorse any action which might increase the contribution of the developing countries.

36. Mr. BILIMATSI (Greece) said that his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, considering the terms of operative paragraph (c) and the assurances given by the representative of the United States regarding the maintenance of his country's voluntary contributions.

37. His delegation would also vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092.

38. Mr. CHERPOOT (India) supported the draft resolution recommended by the Committee on Contributions in paragraph 44 of its report (A/8711 and Corr.1). At the 1535th meeting, his delegation had stated that the principle that the contribution of any single Member State should not be so high as to make the Organization exceptionally dependent on that country's financial support was a sound one. His delegation had accordingly urged the Fifth Committee to give the United States proposal the careful consideration it deserved; it had also suggested that the proposal that the ceiling on contributions should be reduced further should be examined within an over-all framework of decisions relating to the scale of assessments. His delegation would have liked the Committee on Contributions to present all the implications of that proposal to the Fifth Committee before it was asked to take any decision.

39. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, his delegation understood the difficulties faced by the countries concerned in contributing their shares to the United Nations budget, and it should be a matter of great satisfaction that those countries had been paying their assessments regularly. Nevertheless, there again, it would be better to request the Committee on Contributions to study the proposal and all its implications before any decision was taken to lower the floor to 0.02 per cent or to any other appropriate level.

40. For those various reasons his delegation would vote against draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 and A/C.5/L.1093. Its negative vote did not mean that it was opposed to a reduction in either the maximum or the minimum contribution. However, on matters having such far-reaching consequences, decisions should be taken only after thorough examination by a competent body like the Committee on Contributions, which would examine all relevant considerations, including contributions to be made by States likely to join the Organization shortly.

41. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, his delegation had noted that the Committee on Contributions had already made an in-depth study of the allowance formula and had suggested that changing the elements of the present formula was justified. The draft resolution, while requesting the Committee on Contributions to change the elements of the formula, did not mention any figure for the upper limit, leaving the matter to the judgement of the Committee on Contributions. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution, but wished to stress two important elements in it to which the Committee on Contributions should give due consideration, namely, the attention to be

paid to the developing countries and the fact that the new adjustment should take into account the changing world economic conditions.

42. His delegation supported the text of the proposal submitted by the Ghanaian delegation in document A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14.

43. Mr. MNGOLA (Kenya) recalled, in connexion with draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, that it would not be the first time the United States contribution had been reduced below that country's capacity to pay. Nevertheless, in an Organization that belonged to all Members it was essential that all the Members should bear equal responsibilities. The lowering of the contribution of the largest contributor should go hand in hand with a lessening of its control in the United Nations, for example its control of senior posts in the Secretariat.

44. It was clear that the proposal of the United States for a reduction in its contribution to 25 per cent was out of keeping with the capacity-to-pay principle. Moreover, that proposal came at a time when the United Nations was in great financial difficulty and would complicate the matter further. In addition, there was no guarantee that a further request to lower the United States contribution even below 25 per cent would not be made at a later stage or that there would be new Members to shoulder that new financial responsibility. It would therefore have been preferable to await the admission of new Members and to refer the question to the Committee on Contributions before the Fifth Committee took a decision.

45. In view of those various considerations his delegation would abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1. It would, however, vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093.

46. Mr. HSING Sung-yi (China) recalled that his country's attitude to the scale of assessments had already been made very clear at the 1536th meeting. Without going over it again, he would simply indicate that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1.

47. It would, however, vote in favour of the texts contained in documents A/C.5/L.1092, A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14, A/C.5/L.1094 and A/C.5/L.1093 which reflected the just demands of the developing countries, especially the countries with the smallest capacity to pay. However, he wished to point out that his delegation's support for those demands did not apply to such puppet régimes as the Lon Nol clique, since only the Royal Government of National Union led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk could represent the Cambodian people.

48. Mr. VAN DER GOOT (Netherlands) recalled that his delegation had already indicated at the 1535th meeting its support for the United States proposal (A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1).

49. The proposals in documents A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093 raised the issue of the relationship

between the Fifth Committee and the Committee on Contributions. Over the years, the Committee on Contributions had succeeded in establishing a balanced scale of assessments which, without being ideal, had nevertheless proved satisfactory for the majority of Member States. So far that Committee had left the role of decision-making to the Fifth Committee. Now, for the first time two draft resolutions went further; particularly the 17-Power proposal (A/C.5/L.1092), which requested the Committee on Contributions itself to change the elements of the low *per capita* income allowance formula. That would be tantamount, as the representative of the United Kingdom had observed at the 1538th meeting, to a reversal of roles and to prejudging the conclusions which the Committee on Contributions would reach in the matter. The substance of the problem was not at issue, since it was clear that times had changed and a modification of the formula was not ruled out, but his delegation would prefer less categorical language, along the lines of the wording used by the representative of Ghana in the paragraph (A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14) he proposed for insertion in the Fifth Committee's report. His delegation would accordingly abstain in the vote on draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093.

50. The amendment submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.5/L.1095) to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 ran counter to the United States draft resolution and his delegation would therefore vote against it.

51. Mr. A-YED (Democratic Yemen) said that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1. Firstly, the proposal was in contradiction with the principle of capacity to pay; secondly, the United States Government obtained benefits from the location of the United Nations Headquarters in New York; thirdly, the proposal appeared to be motivated to some extent by disenchantment caused by the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, such disenchantment being reflected in the situation of the unpaid contribution of the Chiang Kai-shek clique; in that regard, his delegation agreed with the position taken by the Chinese delegation. Finally, the United States proposal showed that the United States was taking a diminishing interest in the United Nations, as a result of the current trend in the Organization to move further away from the traditional policy of the United States.

52. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana) felt that the United States proposal would jeopardize the activities of the specialized agencies in behalf of the developing countries and that it was contrary to the principle that countries should contribute according to their capacity to pay. His delegation would therefore vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1.

53. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said it was clear from the discussion of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 that the majority of Member States wished the basic principle used in establishing the scale of assessments—namely, the principle of relative capacity to pay—to be kept and to continue to

be the principal criterion for apportioning the expenses of the United Nations among the Member States. That principle was objective, impartial and consequently fair. Even the delegations that had felt able to support the United States proposal—which involved a violation of the principle of relative capacity to pay—had refrained from openly condemning the principle. When the scale of assessments was established on the basis of the principle of relative capacity to pay, objective indicators such as each country's total national income, national income per head of population, capacity to pay and the ability of each State to secure foreign currency were taken into account and were used as a basis for calculation. It had already been decided, during the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, that if a ceiling was placed on the size of contributions that ceiling should not differ appreciably from the contribution calculated on the basis of those objective criteria.

54. The Soviet Union had defeated the forces of fascism and militarism in the Second World War at the cost of very heavy material and human losses. Currently, the United States was expressing satisfaction at the considerable increase in its gross national product. It did not seem fair that the richest country in the world should wish to reduce its percentage contribution. If the principle of relative capacity to pay were consistently applied to the United States, the latter's percentage contribution would be 38.4 per cent, instead of the current 31.52 per cent. Thus, there was already a significant difference between what the United States should pay and what it in fact paid. If the United States contribution were reduced to 25 per cent, it would be a further substantial violation of the principles used in calculating assessments.

55. The demand contained in the United States draft resolution seemed equally without foundation, for the following reasons. During the debate the Soviet delegation and those of other countries had shown that the expenses incurred by the United States in financing the United Nations budget were more than offset by the income and financial advantages it derived from the fact that United Nations Headquarters was in New York.

56. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the majority of States Members of the United Nations felt that the principle of relative capacity to pay should continue to be applied.

57. The United States proposal was absolutely inadmissible and unacceptable because it was designed to lay on the other Member States the additional financial burden which would result from a reduction of the United States contribution and would also automatically lead to a reduction in the assessments of a number of other developed countries, thereby involving a further violation of the principle of relative capacity to pay and increasing the assessments of all the other Member States. That situation would result from the principle that the *per capita* contribution of any country should not exceed the *per capita* contribution of the largest contributor. That had been confirmed by

several delegations; for instance, the representatives of Sweden and Ghana had stated that if the United States proposal was adopted it would lead to a reduction in the assessments of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada and Luxembourg.

58. A number of the delegations which were supporting the United States proposal had again endorsed the United States argument that adoption of the draft resolution would not lead to an increase in the assessments of other Member States. That kind of reasoning was incorrect and without foundation and was designed to mislead the General Assembly and Member States. If the United States proposal was adopted the very opposite would occur. A reduction in the United States assessment would necessarily place an additional burden on all the other Member States, with the exception of those paying the minimum contribution of 0.04 per cent.

59. According to current practice, of course, when new Members were admitted to the Organization the amounts which they paid were automatically used to reduce the assessments of all Member States—including the United States—except those which paid the minimum contribution. If the United States proposal was adopted that reduction from which all States benefited would not take place, because the contributions of new Members would be utilized solely for the benefit of the United States to reduce its assessment. In other words, adoption of the United States proposal would necessarily result in a relative increase in the assessments of all other Member States which paid more than the minimum contribution.

60. The attempt of the United States to link the question of its voluntary contributions to its contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations could only be viewed as outright blackmail, as a way of putting pressure on the countries that would suffer most if the United States carried out the threat which had been so forcefully and even cynically uttered by the representative of the United States in his statements. The Soviet delegation felt that it was unacceptable and shameful to threaten to reduce voluntary contributions at the very time when the question of the scale of assessments for the regular budget of the United Nations was being discussed.

61. For all those reasons, his delegation strongly objected to the United States proposal and would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1.

62. As to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, his delegation sympathized with the wish of the developing countries to change the elements of the formula used to grant relief to countries whose *per capita* income was low, so as to adjust that formula to changing world economic conditions. However, it was not irrelevant to consider the consequences of such a change: either the principle of relative capacity to pay would continue to be observed or else that important and universally recognized principle would be violated and the consequences would be chaotic. The first approach seemed to be fair and scientifically based and was in accordance

with the Charter and the practice followed for many years; for those reasons, his delegation could accept it. The second approach was adventurist and selfish and would benefit only one Member of the Organization; it was therefore completely unacceptable to his delegation for reasons of principle. A solution involving violation of the principle of relative capacity to pay would, if the draft resolution was adopted, necessarily result in imposing on many Member States, unjustly and without good reason, an additional financial burden when they came to pay their contributions to the United Nations budget. At the same time, one State, the wealthiest of all, the United States of America, would be the only one to benefit. The United States delegation had sought to justify its proposal by arguing that the forthcoming admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany would make it possible to offset the reduction in its own country's contribution. That was a specious argument and one that his delegation could not accept. In view of the foregoing considerations, his delegation had proposed an amendment (A/C.5/L.1095) to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, the adoption of which would lead to a fairer apportionment of the expenses among Member States. If the amendment was not adopted, his delegation would be unable to support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092.

63. His delegation adopted the same position towards draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093. The Soviet amendments (A/C.5/L.1097) to that draft were also based on the idea that the proposed reduction in contributions should be effected on the basis of more consistent observance of the principle of relative capacity to pay. His delegation would not be able to support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093 if its amendments were rejected. It requested roll-call votes on all three draft resolutions before the Committee.

64. Mr. CARRESSE (Uruguay) pointed out that, in determining the percentage contributions of Member States according to their capacity to pay, scrupulous attention was given to another principle, namely, the sovereign equality of States, which was laid down in Articles 2 and 18 of the Charter of the United Nations. However, it must be recognized that there were enormous economic differences between a handful of countries and the rest which constituted the majority. Those differences were reflected in the assessments which Member States had to pay, and the corollary was that countries paying the highest contributions wielded an influence which did not derive from anything to be found in any legal text but which could, unfortunately, be a decisive factor in an undesirable imbalance. Draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 offered a solution which could not be regarded as definitive but to which his delegation would give its support, without however abandoning the quest for more just solutions, which were outside the jurisdiction of the Fifth Committee.

65. Mr. KARHILO (Finland) said he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, which sought to reduce to 25 per cent the percentage contribution of the largest contributor. That proposal had the

merit of preventing the United Nations from being unduly dependent financially on any one Member State yet did not undermine the principle of capacity to pay.

66. His delegation would also vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, because the Government of Finland had always sought to ease the financial burden of the least developed among the developing countries, as was the aim of the draft resolution.

67. On the other hand, his delegation would not be able to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 because it did not specify clearly enough the task entrusted to the Committee on Contributions.

68. Mr. GONTHA (Indonesia) said that, before voting on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, his delegation would like to know whether the General Assembly was competent to determine increases in the percentage contributions of Member States to the specialized agencies.

69. Mr. MORRIS (Liberia) said he was somewhat mystified by the notion that a voluntary contribution could become a fixed percentage of a given total. If a voluntary contribution was indeed voluntary, it would be a contradiction to assume that any percentage of a given total could be anything but fortuitous. In the circumstances, the United States could not adhere to any fixed percentage of the total, whether 25 per cent or 31.5 per cent, in making future pledges to the subsidiary agencies. In view of such considerations, his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, although it would have preferred the original draft.

70. On the other hand, his delegation would be obliged to abstain on draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093, owing, in particular, to their imprecise language and to the fact that they were premature.

71. It would, however, vote in favour of the draft paragraph submitted by the Ghanaian delegation (A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14), which approached the question in a manner closer to his own delegation's way of thinking.

72. Mr. PRASAD (Fiji) said that he would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1, since he noted that it would be implemented "as soon as practicable" and that in no circumstances would it lead to an increase in the assessments of Member States. Also, the representative of the United States had clearly stated that his country's contribution to the various organizations in the United Nations system would not be reduced.

73. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 because it agreed with the underlying objectives. It supported the comments made by the representative of Brazil at the previous meeting concerning the amendments in documents A/C.5/L.1094 and A/C.5/L.1095. It would abstain on the first of those texts and vote against the second.

74. While approving the spirit of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, his delegation felt that a change in the scale of assessments would not remedy the financial situation of the developing countries; it would therefore abstain from voting on that text.

75. Mr. BENNET (New Zealand) said that, for the reasons it had already advanced at the 1536th meeting, his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1.

76. His delegation had already expressed the opinion, which was shared by several other delegations, that more detailed study of the implications that would flow from the adoption of draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093 was required. It felt that the General Assembly would be acting precipitately if it were to adopt those texts, which instructed the Committee on Contributions to make adjustments before it had been able to submit a full report on the implications of such action. The Committee on Contributions should have discretion to formulate recommendations on how best to afford relief to the developing countries, taking into account the effects of such relief on the over-all scale of assessments. The amendments proposed to the operative part of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 and the draft resolution itself were mandatory in nature and did not allow the Committee on Contributions to take decisions based on a full knowledge of the relevant facts and figures. His delegation was very sympathetic to the position of the developing countries and appreciated the argument that, if the United States rate of contributions was to be reduced, it would be only fair also to reduce the rates of countries with less capacity to pay. Nevertheless, it would be premature to take binding decisions of that kind before the Committee on Contributions had thoroughly investigated the matter. For the above reasons, his delegation would abstain from voting on draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093. It would also abstain on the amendments in document A/C.5/L.1094. It would vote against the amendment in document A/C.5/L.1095 for the reasons adduced by the Brazilian delegation at the previous meeting and because that amendment overlooked the fact that the principle of a maximum contribution had always been recognized, in accordance with past decisions of the General Assembly.

*Mr. Ogiso (Japan) took the Chair.*

77. Mr. MSELLE (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 for the reasons it had already stated at the 1536th meeting.

78. His delegation entirely agreed with the views expressed by the Norwegian delegation on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, which was based on the observations made in paragraph 21 of the report of the Committee on Contributions. The proposal was that changes should be made in the elements of the low *per capita* income allowance formula, but no details were given on how such changes were to be effected. The recommendation should have been formulated in much

clearer terms, without in any way questioning the competence of the Committee on Contributions in the matter. That was why the United Republic of Tanzania had co-sponsored the amendments in document A/C.5/L.1094. The motives of the sponsors were similar to those of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093 and his delegation therefore had no objection to the latter. The representative of Brazil had drawn a parallel between the two texts (A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093) and had recommended that they should be referred to the Committee on Contributions for consideration, but his delegation could not agree with that proposal. The Committee on Contributions had stated categorically that any decision on the matter should be taken by the General Assembly; consequently, he did not see how the Committee on Contributions could consider the question and report to the General Assembly unless it did so on the express recommendation of the Fifth Committee. His delegation could not support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092 as it stood and would therefore vote against it if the amendments in document A/C.5/L.1094 were rejected.

79. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093.

80. Mr. ADDOU (Somalia) said that, since all the implications of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 were not yet fully known, his delegation would have preferred the vote on it to be postponed until a later date and would therefore abstain in the vote. His delegation would also abstain on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1092, but would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, the draft text submitted by the Ghanaian delegation (A/C.5/XXVII/CRP.14) and the amendment submitted by the Soviet delegation (A/C.5/L.1095).

81. Mr. FUENTES IBÁÑEZ (Bolivia) said that the United States proposal in draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 was simply the logical outcome of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the question in 1946, 1952 and 1957. Since the decision in 1957 to reduce the maximum contribution of any one Member State to 30 per cent, 50 more States had become Members of the Organization; it was now more than ever true that the financing of the United Nations could not be too dependent on a single Member State. Despite the principle of relative capacity to pay, the initiative of the United States delegation was, therefore, perfectly acceptable. It should also be remembered that the United States delegation had stated that a reduction of the United States contribution to the regular budget would not result in a reduction of its voluntary contributions; in fact, its voluntary contributions might well increase as a result of the reduction of its contribution to the regular budget. It would, of course, have been preferable to refer the United States proposal to the Committee on Contributions for evaluation of the financial implications of its adoption. However, few delegations had considered that to be necessary, which meant that the majority of Member States found the proposal of the United States delegation reasonable. His delegation would therefore support the United States draft resolution.



82. It would also support draft resolution A/C.5/L.1093, the sponsors of which had taken a realistic attitude and which was undoubtedly of particular importance to developing countries with a very low capacity to pay.

83. Mr. MURRAY (Guyana) said that his delegation's position on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 was based on several fundamental considerations. The first was the desirability or otherwise of having an organization such as the United Nations heavily dependent on one Member State for the financing of its regular budget. The implications of the problem were no less political than financial. On the other hand, it was an accepted principle that the ordinary expenses of the United Nations should be apportioned among Member States broadly according to their relative capacity to pay. However, in the opinion of his delegation, the application of that criterion to the exclusion of other relevant considerations would create a situation which might have politically undesirable consequences for the United Nations. It was perhaps in recognition of that reality that the General Assembly had thought fit to impose a ceiling of 33.33 per cent, and subsequently 30 per cent, as the maximum assessment. His delegation therefore had no difficulty in supporting the principle of a ceiling. However, it believed that the attainment of any ceiling should be a gradual process which at each stage took into account the effects on other assessed contributions and, in particular, the necessity of granting relief to developing countries in view of their special economic and financial situation.

84. If the operative part of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1 had been limited to paragraphs (a) and (c), his delegation would have had no difficulty in supporting it, on the understanding that the Committee on Contributions would have progressively worked towards the goal set in paragraph (a), taking into account the developing countries' need for relief. However, the Committee on Contributions was requested to utilize, for the purpose of attaining the ceiling, percentage points which might become available above 100 per cent. In his delegation's view, such a procedure might not facilitate adequate relief for developing countries. It would therefore have been desirable to request the Committee on Contributions to undertake an in-depth study of all the implications of the application of the 25 per cent ceiling, on the understanding that the Committee on Contributions would not have been required to give any ruling on the proposal itself. Such a study would certainly have enabled his delegation to arrive at a decision on the basis of full knowledge of the facts. The United States delegation had not concurred with that suggestion and therefore, while his delegation sympathized with the principle of a ceiling, it could not vote in favour of the draft resolution as it stood and would abstain in the voting.

85. For the sake of brevity, his delegation had decided not to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.5/L.1092 and A/C.5/L.1093.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*