

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

## SEVENTH SESSION

## Official Records



Wednesday, 17 December 1952, at 3 p.m.

Headquarters, New York

## CONTENTS

	Page
Admission of new Members: (a) Status of applications still pending: Report of the Security Council (A/2208, A/AC.61/L.30, A/AC.61/L.31, A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1, and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.36, A/AC.61/L.37, A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39, A/AC.61/L.40, A/AC.61/L.41, A/AC.61/L.42, A/AC.61/L.43) ( <i>continued</i> )	301

Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

**Admission of new Members: (a) Status of applications still pending: Report of the Security Council (A/2208, A/AC.61/L.30, A/AC.61/L.31, A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1, and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.36, A/AC.61/L.37, A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39, A/AC.61/L.40, A/AC.61/L.41, A/AC.61/L.42, A/AC.61/L.43) (*continued*)**

[Item 19]\*

1. Mr. WILEY (United States of America) stated that he had not wished to speak again but was impelled to do so because of the misrepresentations contained in the statements made by the representatives of the USSR (44th meeting), Poland (43rd meeting) and Czechoslovakia (47th meeting). He also wished to speak in support of the resolution presented by the United States recommending the admission of Japan (A/AC.61/L.38), and the draft resolutions presented by France recommending the admission of Vietnam (A/AC.61/L.38), Cambodia (A/AC.61/L.39) and Laos (A/AC.61/L.40). He emphasized once again that his Government believed in the goal of universality of membership, but at the same time it was necessary to point out that it was the duty of each Member State to make certain that it considered that an applicant fulfilled the necessary qualifications for membership in the Organization.

2. There was no substance to the USSR charge of discrimination by the United States and other States since the fourteen applicants which qualified for membership had received more than the requisite seven votes in the Security Council. These States were Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam, and while his Government had agreed never to use the veto in connexion with

the question of membership, it was the USSR's negative vote alone which had prevented the admission of these applicants. None of the five States sponsored by the USSR had been able to secure the necessary number of favourable votes.

3. Undaunted by the repeated findings of the General Assembly, however, the USSR representative continued to speak of blocs of votes allegedly controlled by the United States. The USSR representative's remarks were an insult to the vast majority of the delegations in the Committee. It must have occurred to the USSR representative that fifty-four nations had voted for peace in Korea because they were sincerely anxious to put an end to the bloodshed in that unhappy country; it must have occurred to him that when the vast majority of the United Nations was in substantial agreement on an issue, and only the Soviet bloc was in opposition, it was because the majority was right and the Soviet bloc was wrong. It must have occurred to him that men of different nations, races and creeds could agree out of sincere conviction and not because they had been forced to do so. Unfortunately the USSR representative judged others on the basis of his own experience and his Government's practices, imputing to them the motives which inspired his country's actions. If there was any mechanical voting in the United Nations it was that of the minority of five nations led by the USSR.

4. The qualifications for membership in the United Nations were set forth in paragraph 1 Article 4 of the Charter, which provided that membership in the United Nations was open to all peace-loving States which accepted the obligations contained in the Charter and were able and willing to carry them out. And Article 1 described the purposes of the United Nations. None of the USSR-sponsored nations met the requirements mentioned in those paragraphs since they had waged the most open and virulent kind of hate propaganda against the free world. Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary

\*Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

had given at least moral support to Communist aggression in Korea and defied the efforts of the General Assembly to end the guerrilla war in Greece and to effect the repatriation of Greek children. In addition, those countries were still waging a war of nerves against Yugoslavia. As for the other applicant, Outer Mongolia, it was common knowledge that it was a phantom State. In Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, a ruthless minority—directed from Moscow—had seized power through force, terror and intimidation, maintaining itself in power by cruelly suppressing every fundamental right and essential freedom.

5. The Polish, Czechoslovak and USSR representatives had given a lyrical account of the peaceful reconstruction which was taking place in the so-called people's democracies whose admission they sponsored. If their accounts were true, the peoples of those countries would surely support those régimes and there would be no need to suppress ruthlessly all human rights, as they would have nothing to fear from their exercise. Perhaps they feared that if they permitted the exercise of human rights they would be thrown out of power forthwith.

6. The Polish representative had given a glowing description of events in Romania. He had failed to mention, however, that its Minister of Foreign Affairs, one of the veteran leaders of world communism, had been "purged" together with a host of other important officials on the grounds that they had been guilty of every kind of sabotage and had brought Romania to the verge of economic crisis. Bulgaria and Hungary and other countries of the Soviet bloc had also been torn by similar "purges". While not wishing to pass judgment on the victims of Soviet-style justice or injustice, he submitted that if the accused were guilty there must be something wrong with a system which claimed to be so progressive and yet was torn periodically by convulsions in which trusted and life-long Communist leaders admitted to the blackest crimes. Alternatively, if they were not guilty the system produced ghastly miscarriages of justice. In either case, the periodic upheavals in the so-called people's democracies—and the justifications offered for them—did not substantiate the glowing accounts of the Polish, Czechoslovak and USSR representatives.

7. He also wished to refer to the fact that, disturbed by the violations of the human rights guaranteed in the Peace Treaties by the Governments of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in 1949, his Government, together with a number of other signatories, had invoked the clauses in those Treaties providing for the settlement of disputes. They had accordingly called on the Communist régimes concerned to join in establishing a commission to settle the disputes. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, however, had not only refused to appoint representatives to such a commission but had even refused to admit the existence of any dispute. In the circumstances those countries could hardly be expected to uphold the Charter.

8. With regard to the voting record of the USSR, he wanted to state that the USSR Government had pledged itself at the San Francisco Conference, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, to use the veto in exceptional cases only. Now, however, the USSR representative had said that each State was fully entitled to use the veto as it deemed fit which meant, in practice, that it was in no way bound by the purposes and principles of the Charter. So far, the USSR had

used the veto on fifty-five separate occasions, twenty-eight in connexion with the admission of new members, thus obstructing the will of the majority in the Security Council. Nor was that all. The obstructive tactics employed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council were unfortunately extended to the General Assembly and the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

9. Far from living up to the bright hopes which had been entertained by the free world at San Francisco, the USSR had cut its people off from the rest of the world and had taken the path of aggression. As a result, instead of being able to devote all its energies to peaceful reconstruction, the United States had had to unite with other free nations in such regional security organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which were provided for in the Charter, and had had to devote to the defence of peace the wealth and energy which could have been so much more fruitfully applied to creating a better world.

10. Looking at the record of the use of the veto by the USSR in the Security Council and at its policy in international affairs, it was hard to understand what the Soviet Union was trying to do; what its purposes were in regard to the United Nations; and, indeed, whether it was not trying to destroy the Organization. He wished that it were possible to believe that the policies of the USSR Government and the applicants it had sponsored were based on simple errors of judgment and that they were not part of a calculated design. Unfortunately that was impossible. The Cominform leaders were fanatically convinced that everything they did was right and were imbued with the belief that the peaceful co-existence of the Communist and non-Communist worlds was impossible. They were dedicated to a doctrine which demanded the overthrow of the non-Communist world by subversion or violence.

11. He then addressed himself to the draft resolution submitted by his delegation, which he commended to the Committee. Since the war, when Japan had had a taste of the destruction and misery which was entailed, the Japanese Government and people had set out to build a new peace-loving and democratic nation and had created a climate favourable to the growth of democratic principles and institutions. In filing its application for membership in the United Nations, in June 1952, the Japanese Government had pledged itself to fulfil its obligations under the Charter. The United States had been proud to submit that application, which had received ten affirmative votes in the Security Council. The USSR, however, had again chosen to block the will of the majority in the Security Council by using the veto, as it had done with regard to all ten qualified States.

12. The General Assembly should endorse, at the present session, not only the application of Japan but also those of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam all of which would have received favourable recommendations in the Security Council, except, of course, for the USSR veto. General Assembly endorsement of the qualifications of the four new applicants would merely be consistent with the Assembly's findings in the case of the ten other nations whose qualifications it had already found satisfactory. His delegation would therefore also support the three draft resolutions presented by France.

13. His Government also renewed its support of the draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American

delegations (A/AC.61/L.32), which provided for inter-session study of the problems connected with the admission of new Members.

14. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), noting that he reserved the right to reply fully at a later stage, to the remarks of previous speakers, addressed himself briefly to the intervention of the United States representative. The latter, instead of attempting a serious analysis and refutation of the USSR arguments on the question of admission of new Members, had delivered a speech containing slanderous allegations against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, whose political régimes were not to the liking of aggressive circles in the United States. By using slander, innuendo and crude allegations, he had revealed the weakness of the United States position on the question of admission to United Nations membership; such methods had never helped to settle international problems or to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations. It was plain that the United States favoured the admission of some States, but discriminated against others because it disliked their internal régimes. That type of statement would not aid the United States in expanding its aggressive policy and in continuing its violation of the Charter provisions on admission of new Members. That policy was doomed to failure.

15. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines) pointed out that the debate had once again brought the Assembly back to its starting point on the question of admission of new Members: the stalemate resulting from the applicability of the rule of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council. Repeated proclamation of the principle of universality of the United Nations and expressions of regret or condemnation regarding the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto on questions of admission would not break that stalemate or secure the admission of a single State. It was apparent that a new approach had to be made to the membership problem.

16. Such a fresh approach should take into consideration the fact that the question of membership was essentially a political matter rather than a legal or juridical problem. As a political question, it should be examined in the context of the present international situation and its solution should be sought on the level of political accommodation or settlement rather than on the level of legal argumentation. Experience had shown that it was no longer profitable to attempt to overcome the obstacles to a solution by juridical methods like those suggested in the draft resolutions of Peru (A/AC.61/L.30) and the four Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.31). Juridical possibilities for a settlement had been exhausted at the last session of the General Assembly. Efforts should now be directed to reviewing proposals, previously rejected or by-passed, in a spirit of political realism based on a frank acknowledgment that the rule of unanimity continued to be the overriding consideration. Instead of scholarly research into the historical development of the problem, or attempts to invalidate the veto power by legal interpretations, the energies of the General Assembly should be concentrated on bringing about a situation in which the veto either would not be used on membership questions or would be used sparingly. That should be the first objective of the study entrusted to the special committee envisaged in the draft resolution of the five Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1).

17. The establishment of a special committee constituted the only reasonable alternative before the General Assembly. It should not be interpreted as a derogation of the authority or prestige of the Security Council. There was still a meagre hope that, by discussing the question at leisure outside the atmosphere of the General Assembly, the committee might find a new approach to it and might be able to initiate an effort to free the United Nations from the prevailing dead-lock. From the outset, the committee should realistically recognize the existence of the veto and seek methods for admitting as many qualified States as possible within the limitations of the voting procedure laid down in the Charter and sanctioned by past practice. There was no need for undue pessimism: there had been a growing tendency since 1946 for more and more delegations to reconsider their positions on the question of admissions; the substantial support given the Scandinavian proposal at the sixth session was clear evidence of that trend. The committee had no alternative but to work within the bounds of the rule of unanimity in its efforts to advance the cause of the universality of the United Nations. It was a harsh, but inalterable law of international diplomacy that the best of intentions must be conditioned by stubborn facts. Moreover, the special committee should have in hand all the other proposals before the *Ad Hoc* Committee in order not to prejudice any of the issues to be studied.

18. The delegation of the Philippines, like many others, deplored the abuse of the veto by the USSR which was barring several qualified States from membership. Their absence from the United Nations was less their loss than a loss to the whole Organization. Accordingly, the Philippines supported the draft resolution of the five Central American States in the hope that a solution might be found by the proposed special committee which, while not wholly satisfying all legal and moral scruples, would bring the United Nations as close as possible to the ideal of universality.

19. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) declared that universality of the United Nations was absolutely essential if the Organization was effectively to discharge its task of maintaining international peace and security. Universality had been the primary objective at the San Francisco Conference where some States had even demanded automatic admission to membership of all nations. It was to further that objective that Article 4 had been inserted in the Charter. The fact that there had been agreement at the San Francisco Conference among States with different political systems showed that the nature of internal régimes should play no part in determining eligibility for membership. Any solution which was not based on Article 4 would be inadequate.

20. He agreed that the question of admission to membership was political rather than legal. Political considerations had been at the root of all legal arguments in the Security Council, in the General Assembly and before the International Court of Justice. The United Nations Charter was based on two fundamental principles—the principle of self-determination and the equality of States regardless of size—but by preventing certain States from entering the United Nations, they were infringing upon those fundamental principles of the Charter and impairing the sovereignty of the States qualified for admission. Syria had therefore co-sponsored two draft resolutions favouring the admission

of Libya and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (A/AC.61/L.42 and A/AC.61/L.43).

21. It would also vote in favour of the Polish draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1) which included those two States in the group of applicants whose requests were pending. For the reasons given earlier by the Indian representative (47th meeting), however, the word "simultaneous" should be deleted from the Polish draft.

22. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the most important fact which had emerged from the debate was that the United Nations could not function effectively except on a basis of harmony and understanding among all Member States and, principally, among the great Powers. It was clear, moreover, that the United Nations was being prevented from functioning effectively or even normally by the refusal of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe to co-operate with it and by the more significant fact that they were actually at war with the United Nations in one form or another. In the circumstances, the problem before the Committee could not be discussed as if the Organization were operating in the normal way.

23. The United Nations had in fact become a great debating society with a major share of publicity being given to the USSR, sometimes with the help of the United States Press. It was obviously absurd to expect unanimity on all decisions, but it was reasonable to expect constructive criticism, criticism motivated by a desire for agreement. Such criticism would lead to reciprocal concessions and ultimately to solutions. Debate in good faith, with differing views expressed, should be directed to seeking the truth. The tragedy of the United Nations was that the profound disagreement among the great Powers made it impossible to work toward that objective. That schism had existed since the San Francisco Conference. No organization had had to overcome a greater obstacle, an obstacle which could not be overcome through objective reasoning or appeals to respect the Charter.

24. It was exactly because of the present atmosphere that the five Central-American States had suggested that the matter should be referred to the special committee, but that committee should be given very precise terms of reference in order that the mere accumulation of facts would not make it difficult for the committee to see the real problem.

25. The question of the admission of new members was at the same time a legal, juridical, moral and political question. No aspect could be disregarded or isolated from the others. The Peruvian delegation approached it integrally. To see it merely as a legal question would lead to endless debate. For example, it could be argued interminably that the required Security Council recommendation regarding membership applications was a procedural matter because it was part of the process leading to the final General Assembly decision on admissions or that it was a substantive matter because the Security Council was actually pronouncing judgment on the applicant's eligibility. Similarly, while the question of the recommendations concerning the admission of new members had not been explicitly listed in the category of procedural questions, it could be argued that the list contained in the declaration of 7 June of

the sponsoring Powers at San Francisco<sup>1</sup> merely gave examples of such matters and was not exhaustive. Finally, it might be argued, as the representative of the USSR had (44th meeting), that for six years the Security Council had interpreted its law—the Charter—to mean that the rule of unanimity must apply to recommendations regarding the admission of new Members, and that surely the law should be interpreted by the organ applying it. All those were logical arguments, but at best, legal argumentation could only create a great doubt and might result in a unilateral solution.

26. That was why, when all legal arguments had been exhausted, the problem must be considered on a much wider basis: that of the structure of the United Nations, its objectives, the rights and powers of all its organs, and ultimately that of the moral responsibility of the United Nations. The special committee which was proposed to study the question must realize that it could not consider the voting procedure in the Security Council as an isolated problem. On the contrary, that procedure affected the structure of the entire Organization and must be seen in the light of the responsibilities of the General Assembly and the purposes and principles of the Charter. That contention had not been challenged by any member of the Committee. Law could be unjust, but there was never any opposition between just law, morality and honourable politics. The veto was a right which was subject to abuse, but its abuse could be remedied by bringing to bear the pressure of international ethics, of world public opinion. No State could afford indefinitely to flout the conscience of the world and to violate international morality. Every abuse of the veto right compromised the rights and responsibilities of the General Assembly, and it was that moral problem which created the legal problem.

27. Peru, like many other small States, would never have agreed to the veto if it had believed that it would be applied to paralyse the United Nations and bar from membership one-quarter of the nations of the world. Were it not for the dead-lock in the Security Council arising from the deep schism among the great Powers, there would be twenty more Member States. Thus the great Powers, when they had signed the Charter, had apparently had different intentions than the smaller States and it might well be asked what was the value of the initial agreement between them. The question transcended legalistic considerations and came within the province of morality.

28. He felt that the representative of the USSR had skilfully avoided answering the substance of the arguments put forward by the Peruvian delegation. He regretted that the representative of the United Kingdom (44th meeting) appeared to consider the veto as an absolute right. It was not so. It had clearly been proved by experience to be an undesirable procedure, and it had not conduced to harmony in the United Nations. Rather, it had given to one country, the USSR, a sort of dictatorship over the United Nations.

29. Addressing himself to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China, he said that the veto had been intended originally to prevent war. But it could no longer be argued that it

<sup>1</sup> See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*.



should be used in connexion with enforcement measures. There seemed to be no question that, when one of the Great Powers refrained from voting for measures of enforcement, the United Nations would nevertheless apply them. The reason for that procedure could be found in the resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for Peace", under which the General Assembly had declared itself entitled to take action when the United Nations would otherwise be paralysed by the use of the veto. If the General Assembly could, and rightly, take such action in respect of enforcement measures, he wondered why it could not take the same action in respect of peaceful measures such as the admission of new Members. He could not understand why the veto, which could be and was being used to defeat the very purposes of the Charter, should be regarded as sacrosanct, particularly when the resolution "Uniting for Peace" had, for all practical purposes and for the benefit of humanity, destroyed the veto.

30. He wished to draw attention to a very important legal point which the four Central-American States had not raised in their draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.31), namely, that the question of the admission of new members was one which closely affected the structure and the purposes of the United Nations. He felt that that point should have been recalled, and also the fact that, under Article 4 of the Charter, the decision as to the admission of new members rested with the General Assembly. The situation which had arisen in the Security Council could not be considered as legally, morally or politically separate from the responsibilities and rights of the Assembly. He did not intend to pursue the point further at that stage, but if a committee were formed as the draft resolution of the five Central-American States had proposed, his Government would submit a memorandum for its consideration containing all the points which he had mentioned.

31. His delegation's point of view was based not only on ethical and legal considerations, but also on political considerations. He wondered how anyone could continue to believe in the possible effectiveness of a sincere and friendly approach to the USSR. Nothing could have been more sincere and friendly than the Indian draft resolution concerning the Korean question (A/C.1/734/Rev. 2), but it had been flatly rejected by the USSR. The only realistic method would be to let that country see that the General Assembly was prepared once again to take, in respect of the admission of new members, the same step as it had taken in the resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for Peace". Perhaps, if the USSR wished to remain in the United Nations, such action would induce it to consider a more equitable settlement. There could be no question of bargaining.

32. He referred to the position taken by the representative of India at the preceding meeting as disappointing and the political solution which he advocated as utopian. The Polish draft resolution recommending the admission of fourteen new Members might appear to propose the admission of a group of States, the majority of which belonged to the same school of thought as the western democracies. But the advantage was only illusory. The admission of the fourteen new members would inevitably entail the permanent exclusion from the United Nations of Japan, Korea, Western Germany and Spain. Further, the admission of the fourteen Members would mean, as the United States had pointed out, that together with the nine States to whose admission none of the western

Powers was opposed, there would enter the United Nations five States which had on many occasions violated the principles of the Charter, and would, by their very presence in the Organization, continue to do so. Once that bargain had been agreed to, the USSR would perhaps insist on the admission of Communist China, a step which would be difficult in the face of that country's recent refusal to accept the United Nations proposal for peace. In view of the arguments which he had put forward, he thought that it must be clear that any suggestion of a political bargain on the admission of new Members was purely utopian. The USSR would never agree to the admission of Japan, Korea, Western Germany, Spain, Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos.

33. The political situation might change with the change in events, but the legal problem would remain. For the study of that problem, it had been proposed that a committee should be set up. He welcomed and warmly supported that proposal, but pointed out that the committee must concern itself exclusively with the legal aspect of the question, and should make the most profound study of the Charter and the jurisprudence based on it. In addition to the suggestion that the committee should consider the proposals put before it, there might well have been an invitation to Governments to lay points before the committee. That body should bear in mind the fact that it was dealing with the structure and purposes of the United Nations, and that, when two laws came into conflict, preference should be given to the law which had the highest moral purpose and the best legal foundations. The jurisprudence of the Security Council could not extend beyond matters within its own competence. He stressed most emphatically the need that the committee's terms of reference should be absolutely clear, so that its work might neither be obscured by the collection of too many data or hindered by the lack of them. It must not be faced by any problems of political bargaining or "horse-trading", but must deal strictly with its own side of the question.

34. If the United Nations could not find a solution to the problem of the admission of new Members, without infringing the rights of the General Assembly, it would be faced with a serious loss of prestige. The Organization had enhanced its prestige when it had refused to be used as a mere sounding-board for USSR propaganda, and had found an unimpeachable solution for previous deadlocks arising from the use of the veto by passing resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for Peace". He reminded the Committee that that resolution had been opposed by the USSR on legalistic grounds.

35. It had been decided at San Francisco that the General Assembly should be given the right to make final decisions, not simply to countersign the decisions of the Security Council. By the use of the veto, it would appear that the decision fell on the Security Council and not on the General Assembly. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Of the eleven members of the Security Council, there were six smaller Powers and four great Powers in whom the Assembly was able to repose full confidence. But the use made of the veto meant that in actual fact, matters lay entirely in the hands of the fifth great Power, so that the Charter was being used to support the domination of that one Power over the Security Council and the General Assembly itself. That was manifestly absurd. Such being the case, there could be no possibility of contending that the interpretation hitherto given to the Char-

ter was the right one. Nor, in view of the behaviour of the USSR, could there be any possibility of hoping for a satisfactory settlement on the basis of bargaining. The only possibility lay in the courageous and honourable alteration of the policy hitherto followed, which had led so far only to injustice and absurdity. That course had been followed in the case of the punishment of aggression. It should be followed now in the case of the admission of new Members.

36. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) said that he did not propose, like the representative of El Salvador (45th meeting), to divide the Committee into positive and negative groups, the former, rather strangely, comprising those representatives who wished to admit only nine new Members and the latter comprising those wishing to admit fourteen. One might also say that some of the speeches in the debate had referred to the problem of the admission of new Members, while others had merely dealt on general lines with the principles of the Charter.

37. The speech just made by the United States representative did not fit into either of those categories. It had been quite out of keeping with the tone of the debate and quite off the point. It had been an outburst of abuse, falsehood and distortion. He felt that all representatives, regardless of their political opinions, must have been disturbed by it. On behalf of his own country and the other countries concerned, he repudiated the charges made. No arguments or political facts had been put forward, and the United States representative had accused the USSR of an over-frequent use of the veto. By that very action, the USSR had been serving the United Nations because it had rendered impossible the admission to the Organization of only those countries favoured by the United States. With regard to the States whose admission was now advocated, it was absurd to refer to the sovereignty of Japan when that country was occupied by United States troops. The same applied in the case of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which were occupied by French troops.

38. Many speakers in the debate had referred to the San Francisco Conference, and the representatives of the Latin-American States who were opposed to the prin-

ciple of the unanimity of the great Powers had contended that certain principles of the Charter did not exist. Those arguments had been repeated many times and had been refuted not only by representatives of the Eastern European States, but also by those of the United Kingdom (44th meeting) and India (47th meeting). Articles 4 and 27 of the Charter remained unchanged. He felt that the omission by the five Central-American States of any reference to the Charter in their draft resolution as originally submitted (A/AC.61/L.32) was noteworthy. The sponsors of that draft resolution must be anxious to forget provisions which were not in line with their opinions. They wished to establish a committee to do work which had often been done before and to follow illegal methods. He would accordingly vote against the draft resolution of the five Central-American States.

39. Referring particularly to the comments made by the representative of El Salvador (43rd meeting), he said that he thought that his own statements on the advisory opinion of 3 March 1950 of the International Court of Justice were quite clear and correct, and that the representative of El Salvador had misconstrued them.

40. Other representatives had referred to the desirability of making the United Nations a universal organization and acting in a spirit of compromise. He felt that representatives holding such opinions should vote for the Polish draft resolution which, by advocating the admission of a large group of States, would be a step towards achieving universality. His delegation was genuinely anxious to secure sincere international co-operation, and felt that only just procedures could lead to fair solutions.

41. In view of the fact that further new draft resolutions had been laid before the Committee, he thought that it might be desirable to postpone the voting until the following day.

42. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines) proposed the adjournment of the meeting.

*The proposal was adopted by 30 votes to 7, with 3 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.