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Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/2184, A/2216 and Add.1, A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2, A/AC.61/L.25, A/AC.61/L.26, A/AC.61/L.27, A/AC.61/L.28) (continued)

[Item 67]*

1. Mr. KONDAPI (India) regretted that in its latest report (A/2216 and Add.1) the Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to report any appreciable progress. The Indian delegation felt, however, that the Commission should continue its efforts to carry out the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly resolutions, in particular by resolution 194 (III).

2. The Indian delegation would support the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25), as it felt that the previous resolutions should be reaffirmed and not merely recalled, as was the case in the eight-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2). Moreover, United Nations objectives in Palestine should be specified and the basis for the recommended negotiations should be made clear. The Indian delegation had felt some concern on hearing the Israel representative state (29th meeting) that the previous resolutions had been rendered obsolete by the march of events and could not serve as a basis for negotiation. The resolutions in question should continue to be the basis for negotiation unless the parties themselves agreed on any other basis. Furthermore, as it did not yet seem possible for direct negotiation to take place, it would be as well to transfer the Commission's headquarters to Jerusalem, as the four-Power draft resolution suggested. The Commission would thus be in more direct contact with the parties; it would be able to judge the situation in a more realistic way and its work would be made easier.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Moreover, if the number of its members was increased, its work would become more effective. The four-Power draft resolution had been framed in a conciliatory spirit and did not deviate in any way from earlier resolutions. It was to be hoped that it would enable the Conciliation Commission to persuade the parties to enter into direct negotiation on the basis of the General Assembly resolutions.

3. Turning to the eight-Power draft resolution, Mr. Kondapi thought that the United Nations should not absolve itself of all responsibility and initiative, for without its assistance the parties would find it still more difficult to negotiate. Furthermore, the General Assembly should do more than merely recall earlier resolutions: it should create the necessary psychological atmosphere for negotiation between the two parties to take place on a prescribed or mutually agreed basis. No effort should be spared to obtain an understanding between Israel and the Arab States, for that was of vital importance to the stability of the Middle East, and hence to world peace. The eight-Power draft resolution was not adequate to achieve that purpose and the Indian delegation could not, therefore, support it.

4. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the statements ascribed to him by the Indian representative were not exactly what he had said. The Israel delegation had emphasized that the negotiations should not be limited or tied to earlier resolutions but should be free to cover the whole area of alternative solutions, with special reference to new solutions.

5. Mr. KONDAPI (India) pointed out that Israel was nevertheless suggesting that the United Nations should look for solutions other than those advocated in earlier General Assembly resolutions.

6. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) explained that the French delegation had preferred to wait until the end of the general discussion before intervening, because it had hoped to find in the statements of the parties to

the dispute new trends indicating the possibility of an early settlement. Its hopes had not been entirely realized. Some statements, in particular that of the Israel representative had been based on a breadth of vision which augured well; many intransigent positions had, however, been maintained and the Arab delegations had made very strong speeches voicing sincere and deep feelings. The French delegation had deemed it necessary to endeavour to free itself from the impassioned atmosphere which too often prevailed in the Committee and to consider the Palestinian question from the point of view of fact and reason.

7. The material factors of the case were simple. They originated from the Arab conquest, which in the seventh and eighth centuries had overwhelmed the eastern and southern Mediterranean coasts. Islam had not been successful in Palestine in conquering or in converting all the Israel people; moreover, throughout the Mediterranean area the latter had established thriving colonies of people who for centuries had dreamed only of returning to the land of their forefathers. But the return of the Israel people to Palestine was possible only if the Moslem empires in the Middle East collapsed. For centuries they had waited. The placing of Palestine under mandate in 1918 had been the first tangible sign that times had changed; the return of the Israel people had started.

8. During a period of nearly thirty years, up to the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations, Israel had built up its strength and its demands had become more pressing. Then, in 1947, had come the crisis. When the United Kingdom had renounced its mandate, the United Nations had assumed the League of Nations obligations regarding Palestine. A partition plan had been drawn up; it had been rejected by the Arab delegations but adopted by the General Assembly by resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

9. Rejected by one of the parties, that resolution could not have the effect which the General Assembly had hoped for of establishing peace in Palestine. The troubles which had broken out in Palestine at the beginning of 1947 had degenerated into pitched battles which the Security Council had succeeded in stopping by its resolutions of April and May 1948¹. A truce had been agreed upon and mediation organized. Hostilities had again broken out in the south, but had again been quelled by the Security Council. Finally, armistice agreements had been signed in implementation of a Security Council resolution (S/801) which the Arab States had first opposed but the directives of which they had subsequently accepted. At the present time peace reigned in the Middle East, although it was a somewhat precarious peace.

10. The French delegation did not conclude from those facts, as some did or appeared to do, that the United Nations was responsible for the difficulties which beset the Middle East, that it was its duty to remedy them and to make reparation to the States, the communities and the peoples who had suffered. It did not believe that the settlement of the Palestine question was the duty of the United Nations alone. The

United Nations had not created the Palestine problem: the problem had been thrust upon it, with all its age-old history. By resolution 181 (II) the United Nations had put forward a peaceful solution, which had, however, been rejected. When hostilities had broken out, it had imposed a cease-fire, as was its duty in accordance with the terms of the Charter. It had consolidated the cease-fire armistice agreements and had supervised the maintenance of peace. The United Nations had therefore fulfilled all its obligations under the Charter. The re-establishment of peace in Palestine was a magnificent achievement.

11. In order that the problem might be fully settled, a state of armistice must be transformed by signed and ratified peace treaties into a legal state of peace. That entailed an agreement between the parties on a whole series of political and economic problems and necessitated the conclusion of one or more treaties.

12. Turning to the legal side of the question, Mr. Ordonneau said that by virtue of the Charter, the fundamental task of the United Nations was to maintain peace. To that end the Security Council and the General Assembly had been invested with specific powers, the object of which was to ensure the cessation of hostilities and the material re-establishment of peace. Those powers had been fully exercised. On the other hand, the question of the final political settlement of the frontiers or of the payment of compensation came within the jurisdiction of the parties to the dispute. It was upon them that the primary responsibility fell for reaching an agreement on the terms of that settlement. Mr. Ordonneau admitted that the United Nations, heir to the League of Nations, had been saddled with special responsibilities by reason of the Mandatory Power's request, but he felt that the General Assembly had been guided by the theory he had just set forth when it had set up the Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 1948 by resolution 194 (III). Since then the General Assembly had drawn ever closer to that theory each year.

13. The function of the Conciliation Commission had been to conciliate, to obtain an agreement between the parties, but the responsibility for reaching an agreement as also the power to do so belonged to the parties themselves and the Commission's task was simply to assist them in the lengthy process leading to such an agreement. General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) reaffirmed that original concept in explicit terms; in it the General Assembly considered that the Governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine and it requested the Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts to secure the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions and to be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding questions.

14. The eight-Power draft resolution followed the lines of earlier resolutions and set forth a legally correct solution in clear terms. It had the additional valuable quality of being realistic. The primary responsibility of finding a solution to their disputes lay with the parties, not only in law but in fact. A treaty which was not freely accepted by the parties would have to be imposed by force. As the United Nations had neither

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year*, No. 62 and Supplements for April 1948 and May 1948.

the power nor the wish to use force, it was absolutely essential that the parties should accept the treaty and the most simple way to achieve that was for them to negotiate it themselves.

15. That was precisely why the Conciliation Commission had achieved only limited results. It could not supply the lack of any will towards reconciliation on the part of the parties concerned. The work would not have been any more successful if the Commission had had more members or if its headquarters had been at Jerusalem. It had been at the disposal of both parties. Unfortunately, most of the Arab delegations had ignored it to the point of not even replying to its communications. Those delegations had no right, therefore, to criticize a failure for which they themselves were responsible. The record of the Commission's efforts was not wholly negative. In that connexion the French delegation fully shared the views expressed at the 28th meeting by the United States representative.

16. His delegation also wished to follow the course recommended by the Mexican representative (25th meeting). It continued to believe that the Palestine problem could be settled only by agreement between the parties, whether that agreement was obtained directly or with the help of the Conciliation Commission. The only issue that should not be settled in that way was the question of the Holy Places which, because of its nature, could be settled only on an international basis.

17. The French delegation was convinced that agreement between the parties was possible. What had hitherto been lacking was the desire to reach agreement. Henceforward the parties would perhaps have to forget or suppress their bitterness and regret, even where it was justified. They must also refrain from attempting to bind themselves or their opponents in advance by recommendations of the General Assembly. His delegation was concerned at the insistence with which some representatives sought to confine the proposed negotiations to the framework of the General Assembly resolutions. If the delegations which took that view sought to prevent the parties from departing from the decisions of the General Assembly, even in cases where they agreed to do so, and wished to lay down that no negotiation was possible except on the basis of implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, they were advocating a course which would lead nowhere. Negotiations in which the parties could not compromise on any point ceased to be negotiations. Moreover, there were a great many resolutions, some of them contradictory, and for practical reasons it was impossible to carry them completely into effect.

18. The eight-Power draft resolution did not call upon the parties to renounce their rights or to abandon their claims in advance. It invited them to meet and to weigh their rights and reciprocal claims to determine whether they could be adjusted by a process in which each party would retain its sovereign rights since, until the agreement was finally signed, it would have the right to withdraw its assent. There was nothing there which governments conscious of their rights could fear. The French delegation sincerely hoped that it would be possible to begin the negotiations proposed in the eight-Power draft resolution in the near future and trusted that they would be crowned with success.

19. Mr. FOURNIER (Costa Rica) welcomed the action taken by various members of the Committee to solve the Palestine problem. He could not endorse the eight-Power draft resolution as it stood because some of its provisions were vague and had been construed in various ways. There seemed to be general support for the principle of direct negotiation but there was disagreement with regard to the framework within which the negotiations should take place. The eight-Power draft resolution was inadequate in that it did not define that framework and what was more serious, each of its sponsors seemed to hold a different view regarding its scope. According to some of them, the proposed plan left the parties completely free to reach whatever settlement they thought best even if that solution did not conform to the resolutions the General Assembly had adopted on the subject. Some of them, like the representative of Ecuador (32nd meeting), had said that the proposed plan did not run counter to previous decisions, and that it was intended to enable the parties to negotiate directly within the framework of previous resolutions with such adjustments as might be necessary to meet the existing situation. Lastly, the Israel representative, who said that he was prepared to accept the draft resolution (29th meeting), argued that Israel was an independent, sovereign State and that not even the United Nations could lay down prior conditions with regard to negotiations in which it was going to engage. Thus, the paragraphs of the draft resolution recalling the resolutions of the General Assembly were regarded by some representatives as an affirmation of the value of those resolutions, while others considered them to be a highly flexible provision permitting the adaptation of the resolutions to the existing situation or even a purely symbolic reference which was in no way binding on the parties and which would enable them to ignore the resolutions at will.

20. The Costa Rican delegation felt that the eight-Power draft resolution could not lead to a real settlement and that in fact it would present serious dangers. The smaller countries owed their continued existence to the fact that the more powerful States had respected moral principles and to the fact that public opinion accepted neither aggression nor violence. They did their utmost to strengthen and perfect the rules of international law and would regard as dangerous any weakening or admission of defeat by the United Nations. The adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution as it stood would be tantamount to an admission that the United Nations was unable to ensure respect for its decisions. If the Committee adopted a draft resolution under which the parties concerned could settle their differences without regard to previous resolutions it would renounce the Organization's competence in the matter and it would be impossible for the United Nations, if necessary, to call upon the parties to carry out any other decisions it might take. Lastly, to let it be understood that the United Nations had been mistaken in 1948 while affirming that it had been justified in deciding on the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel in 1947 would be tantamount to an admission that the only valid decisions were those applied by force of arms or by political or economic power.

21. The Costa Rican delegation had voted in favour of the creation of the State of Israel to provide a just

solution for the tragic problem of a people that had been dispersed 2,000 years ago and sought to return to its national home. Nevertheless the rights of the other peoples who had been living in Palestine in 1947 should not be forgotten and the concern felt with regard to the problem in religious circles could not be disregarded.

22. His delegation had accordingly joined other delegations in drafting an amendment (A/AC.61/L.27), which was intended to ensure respect for General Assembly resolutions and which recalled the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the rights of mankind had been most fully expressed. Mr. Fournier expressed the hope that the parties concerned would recognize the wisdom of the measures proposed in the amendment.

23. His delegation was prepared to consider the principle of reviewing the conditions laid down in previous resolutions of the General Assembly, if it seemed likely that such action would facilitate direct negotiations. He pointed out however that such action should not be undertaken without careful consideration to ensure that it was clearly advisable.

24. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia) said that at the General Assembly's sixth session his delegation had urged the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (40th meeting) to conduct its debates on the basis of constructive proposals. He noted with appreciation the many helpful suggestions which had been made during the discussion and welcomed the contribution made by the Conciliation Commission.

25. Although there was some merit in the Israel peace plan it was unfortunate that the Israel representative had proposed that previous resolutions should be disregarded. The adoption of that policy would create a precedent which would seriously damage the prestige of the United Nations. In seeking a solution, the first step must be to dispel the bitterness which now prevailed and to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees. The plan of the Israel delegation could not be considered until common ground was found on which the Arab States and Israel could meet and that could not be accomplished unless the General Assembly resolutions were respected. If their fears were allayed, the Arab States would be encouraged to co-operate with Israel.

26. For those reasons, his delegation was one of the sponsors of the four-Power draft resolution. The draft provided for the opening of direct negotiations in a form which was compatible with the responsibility of the Governments concerned to reach a settlement and with the obligation of the United Nations to do its utmost to promote a settlement. In proposing that the membership of the Commission should be increased and that its headquarters should be moved to Jerusalem, the draft incorporated the provisions of an amendment (A/AC.53/L.31) submitted by the delegations of Indonesia and Iran at the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (41st meeting), during the General Assembly's sixth session, the expediency of which was more apparent than ever before. Certain criticism had been levelled at the Conciliation Commission. The steps proposed in the four-Power draft resolution would dispel misgivings as to its impartiality and would enable it to function more

effectively. Mr. Hanifah hoped that the Committee would adopt the four-Power draft resolution.

27. Mr. ESENBEL (Turkey) said that his Government had followed the Palestine question with great interest. His delegation continued to believe that peace and prosperity could be restored to the Middle East and that the parties to the dispute would be able to compose their differences.

28. The criticisms levelled at the Conciliation Commission were most regrettable. The very fact that the parties were attempting to blame the Commission for the failure to find a solution and produced conflicting reasons for doing so proved that the Commission had followed the right course. It had employed every method at its disposal. Whether in its present form or with a larger membership it should remain at the disposal of the parties. The success it had achieved in the problem of blocked accounts showed that progress could be made towards a settlement.

29. Mr. Esenbel hoped that, in a spirit of conciliation and moderation, the parties to the dispute would shortly undertake direct negotiations, within the framework of previous General Assembly resolutions. It was his understanding that the sponsors of the various draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee were going to try to combine them into a single text. He, therefore, reserved the right to speak again after that text had been submitted.

30. The CHAIRMAN called upon Mr. Al-Jamali who had been authorized by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to make a statement on its behalf.

31. Mr. LOURIE (Israel) asked to be informed on the nature of Mr. Al-Jamali's credentials.

32. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at the 25th meeting he had read out a telegram to the Secretary-General from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan confirming a previous telegram dated 30 October 1952. The telegram said that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had appointed Mr. Al-Jamali, the head of the Iraqi delegation, to represent it at the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee during the discussion of Jewish aggressions and violations of the armistice agreements. No objections had been raised at that time.

33. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), speaking on behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, thanked the Chairman for giving him an opportunity to lay before the Committee the present state of affairs between Jordan and Israel. He felt that his statement would enable the Committee better to appreciate the difficulties in the way of the settlement of the dispute between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States and to determine where the responsibility lay.

34. The Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes, on 3 April 1949, between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel, envisaged a total cessation of hostilities along the whole demarcation line separating the two countries. How had Israel honoured the solemn undertakings it had contracted by signing the agreement? In no single month since April 1949 had Israel refrained from firing upon Jordanians or from making armed incursions into Jordan territory. There had

been only nine months out of thirty-seven in which no Arab had been killed in Jordan territory by Israel action. Israel authorities sought to justify their attacks on Jordan's territory by maintaining that raids into Israel by small groups of Arabs, generally thieves, constituted hostile acts by the military or para-military forces of Jordan. Such a contention would not be upheld in any neutral or unbiased court of law, regardless of the extent of such robbery, whether armed or unarmed. They were in fact the spontaneous actions of unfortunate refugees goaded to desperation by the contemplation of their farms being exploited by Israel settlers or lying derelict and falling into ruins. The Jordan Government had endeavoured to suppress those spontaneous acts of revenge. It had never planned raids on Israel territory nor had it carried out any reprisals for the many murders and acts of terror committed by Israel nationals.

35. In May 1952, three Arab peasants had been killed in the neutral zone. It had been agreed that both parties would take all measures in their power to prevent illegal harvesting in that zone, but the measures to be taken for that purpose by each side should obviously have been directed to preventing their own nationals from entering the neutral zone and not to the murder of those of the other side. The three Arabs in question had been killed some 200 yards from Jordan territory, whereas at that point the neutral zone was 3,000 yards in breadth. For the Israel patrol to have detected the three Arabs on a moonless night, it would have had to be in the neutral zone, which alone was a breach of the armistice agreement far graver than that committed by the three Arab peasants.

36. There was a glaring contrast between the Israel and Jordan complaints submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission. While a large number of Israel complaints dealt with civilian infiltrators into Israel, armed or unarmed, most of the Jordan complaints arose out of breaches of the demarcation line by Israel troops or police penetrating into Jordan or firing upon its people. Israel had never had occasion to complain of Arab Legion forces entering Israel to abduct civilians or to carry out reprisals against them.

37. In short, Israel troops, police or para-military bodies were the principal and almost the only cause of incidents on Jordan territory.

38. The CHAIRMAN said that, while he assumed that Mr. Al-Jamali was reading out a statement prepared by the Government of Jordan and that it was difficult for him to deviate from it, he would nevertheless make a friendly appeal to him to try to speak with great moderation.

39. Mr. EBAN (Israel), speaking on a point of order, asked the Chairman to rule whether or not the statement being made on behalf of Jordan came within the agenda item under discussion. The incidents referred to had no relation to the work of the Conciliation Commission. They could quite well be placed before the Security Council, where the Israel delegation would willingly answer the charges made against its country.

40. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that it was difficult for him to make a ruling, since the item under discussion referred to United Nations resolutions, some of

which dealt with the operation of the armistice concluded between Israel and the Arab States.

41. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) continued his statement on behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. He quoted figures showing that, since the signing of the armistice in April 1949, the number of incidents provoked by Israel nationals had steadily risen. In 1949, the number of Arabs killed had been fifty-five, in 1950, twenty-three, and in 1951, thirty-eight; in 1952 it had risen to more than nineteen per month. Yet, at the beginning of 1952 a special agreement had been concluded which forbade the opening of fire on civilians, although that had already been categorically prohibited by the Armistice Agreement, in article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, and article III. Israel had insisted that the new agreement should be renewable every two weeks. On 6 May, they had refused to agree to any further renewal, alleging that Jordan had taken no special measures to curb infiltration into the neutral zone or into Israel. Following the denunciation of the agreement, incidents had increased and there had been a massacre of Arab women and children. Mr. Al-Jamali cited two particularly tragic incidents which had occurred, one at Qaffin and the other in the Latrun area. Those murders were in flagrant contravention of the Armistice Agreement to which Israel was a signatory.

42. The responsibility of the Israel authorities for the murders of Arabs was clearly apparent if it was borne in mind that during the three months in which the special agreement prohibiting firing across the demarcation line had been in force, the number of Arabs killed had fallen to two, whereas incidents had multiplied and the number of deaths had risen sharply the moment Israel had denounced the agreement.

43. In conclusion, Mr. Al-Jamali declared that the acts of aggression and terrorism committed by Israel had made peace less likely today than when the armistice had been signed three years ago. Such actions on the part of Israel showed what was to be thought of the statements of its representatives professing a sincere desire for a peace settlement with the Arab States.

44. Mr. QUINTANILLA (Mexico) thanked the delegations which had been good enough to express appreciation of his appeal for moderation and conciliation. The basic role of the United Nations was to intervene between States in order to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes. That was the concept that had led the Mexican representative, Mr. Padilla Nervo, to take the initiative at the third session (147th plenary meeting) of addressing an appeal to the great Powers to redouble their efforts with a view to solving their differences and establishing a lasting peace, and to remind the General Assembly's seventh session, at its opening meeting, that one of the basic purposes of the United Nations was to serve as a centre to harmonize the efforts of the nations for the attainment of their common objectives. It was not enough, however, to affirm such principles; they must be translated into action.

45. In the matter under discussion, all the parties had proclaimed their faith in the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and expressed the belief that the methods of ensuring the settlement would be effective; but in spite of all its efforts the Conciliation

Commission had not succeeded. The time had come to resort to a fresh approach for reaching an agreement between the parties. The main thing was that they should negotiate and that each should make its proposals. That in no way implied that they should give up the principles they supported. The direct negotiations contemplated were only one step towards a settlement. The parties had nothing to lose by them, for negotiations would at least enable the parties to explain their views and the problem would be elucidated. Furthermore, such negotiations did not exclude the good offices of the Conciliation Commission, since, under paragraph 4 of the eight-Power draft resolution, the Commission would be requested to be available to the parties, if so desired.

46. The Mexican delegation was fully aware of the sufferings Israel and the Arab States had endured, but it was convinced that those States would be able to draw from their virtues the strength needed to overcome the memory of those sufferings and to compose their differences in a way compatible with their honour and dignity. They would thereby be showing the world that the principles of the Charter could be profitably applied. The settlement of the Palestine question would ensure peace in one of the vital areas of the world, permit the resumption of normal relations between countries which represented two great civilizations and enhance the prestige of the United Nations.

47. The soundest procedure for dealing with the item before the Committee would be that the delegations which had submitted draft resolutions or amendments should confer with a view to working out an agreed text based on the eight-Power draft resolution, which had been submitted first. Agreement seemed possible along those lines, for the various proposals did not present fundamental differences, and the divergence of view apparently related only to questions of interpretation. The Mexican representative accordingly urged the delegations concerned to display the greatest possible spirit of conciliation and moderation during their informal meetings.

48. Mr. DONS (Norway) said that the Mexican representative had already submitted his proposal to the authors of the eight-Power draft resolution. Those delegations would confer with the authors of the amendments to the draft during the afternoon. Informal meetings could certainly take place later, in a broader framework, but the eight delegations considered it better to have a discussion first with the authors of the amendments to the draft; if the measure of agreement reached would allow of it, they could subsequently get in touch with the sponsors of the four-Power draft resolution.

49. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not regard the proposal that had been made as binding upon the Committee. It could be no more than a suggestion which some delegations had been good enough to bear in mind. The meeting might be

adjourned so as to give the delegations that were to meet, the necessary time to prepare for their talks.

50. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Israel representative had asked to use his right of reply to the representative who had spoken on behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

51. Mr. EBAN (Israel) stated that Jordan, which was not a Member of the United Nations, had asked a representative of a Member State to read a pamphlet that had no connexion with the question before the Committee. The question of complaints about the operation of the armistice agreements came under item 68 of the General Assembly's agenda or more properly within the competence of the Security Council.

52. The atrocities described came within the sphere of the most false and vicious propaganda. On behalf of the Government of Israel and in full knowledge of the facts, he categorically denied all the charges that had been brought against his country. The documents at the disposal of the Committee, namely, the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization (S/2833 and Add.1) gave not the slightest support to the version according to which Jordan was the aggrieved party in the recent incidents. The Security Council had dismissed with indignation the complaint of the Government of Jordan concerning the Nahamain incident. The number of Israel nationals who had been killed, wounded or abducted and the number of murders and attempted murders had been very high. He had noted that in his statement the Jordan spokesman had added, without any explanation, the Israel casualties to the list of Jordan casualties he had read out.

53. Israel and Jordan had concluded a frontier adjustment agreement in an effort to regroup agricultural properties, but that agreement had not been ratified by the Government of Jordan. The representatives of the United Nations on the spot advised the parties to conclude supplementary agreements in order to strengthen the Armistice Agreement, which had never been expected to remain in force for so long. If the statement of the representative of Jordan was at all relevant to the matter under discussion, it was in demonstrating the urgent need for free and direct negotiations to enable the armistice to be translated into a lasting peace.

54. Mr. QUINTANILLA (Mexico) raised a point of order. His suggestion had been that all delegations which had submitted draft resolutions or amendments should meet and endeavour to formulate a joint text. It now appeared that two informal meetings were contemplated and that the delegations of Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan would not take part in the first. He would have preferred a single meeting between all the delegations concerned, but he would not insist, so long as it was understood that every delegation that had presented a proposal would be consulted on the preparation of the new text.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.