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**Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).****The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/2184, A/2216 and Add.1, A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2) (*continued*)**

[Item 67]\*

1. Miss KLOMPE (Netherlands) said that the problem of Palestine, which had come before the General Assembly every year from the time that resolution 181 (II) on partition had been voted in 1947, was one of the most important issues which the Assembly was called upon to discuss, since it involved the restoration of peaceful conditions in a vital part of the world. She explained briefly why her delegation had joined the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2) before the Committee, which had been inspired by an earnest desire to find ways and means to restore peaceful conditions in the Middle East. She strongly supported the Mexican representative's appeal (30th meeting) for a spirit of conciliation in the debate.

2. The expression of the Netherlands delegation's deep concern over the Palestine problem was no mere rhetorical phrase. Anyone who tried to envisage the problem through the eyes of either of the parties could not fail to be moved—on the one hand events following the partition decision had caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arabs from their homes in Palestine, while on the other there were the Jewish immigrants, the victims of anti-Semitic feeling in Europe, which had not yet completely died out, who had seen at last an opportunity to return to their old homeland of Palestine and who had been faced on doing so with the need to repel attacks from neighbouring States. In view of the circumstances, the Netherlands delegation believed that both parties had a strong human case.

3. An effort must be made, however, to escape from the existing dead-lock. The Lebanese representative

had stated (28th meeting) that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had based themselves on the facts alone, while the Arab representatives were basing their case on law and right. Miss Klompé wondered if that interpretation did justice to the situation. Much had happened between 1947 and the present date, and the march of history could not be turned back. Recognition of that fact could not be labelled political opportunism. Without intending to analyse the responsibility of either of the parties to the dispute, she felt that it might be said objectively that all concerned, the Arab States, Israel, and the United Nations, had merits and mistakes to their record. The United Nations had made every effort to find a solution to the problem, had adopted measures to alleviate the hardships of the refugees and done everything possible to conciliate the points of view of the parties concerned by setting up the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. She had listened with great attention to the review of the Conciliation Commission's work given by the United States representative (28th meeting). It had been an impressive record, and she wished to express her delegation's gratitude for the Commission's unfailing energy in its efforts to carry out its task. It must be a matter of regret that the Commission had had to report failure, not in all fields, but on the major political questions, where it had been unable to persuade the parties to enter into direct negotiations.

4. The United Nations had exhausted all possibilities in its efforts to find a solution. It was obvious that a new start had to be made and the only method seemed to be direct negotiations between the governments concerned. Miss Klompé understood from the speeches of the representatives of the Arab States that they were willing to accept the proposal for direct negotiations made in the draft resolution. They wished, however, to make such negotiations conditional upon the use by all the parties concerned of the United Nations resolutions as a basic principle for the discussions. The Netherlands delegation wondered whether close adherence to that condition was the right approach to the

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

situation. Was it right for one of the parties to lay down conditions as to the very substance of the negotiations in question? Surely the proper procedure would be to give all parties complete freedom to submit whatever proposal they desired to discuss.

5. The joint draft resolution recalled all resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Not one of them had been rejected, and the Arab delegations were perfectly free to submit them as a basis for negotiations, while every delegation would have the right to put forward new and different proposals in the light of events. It was the very essence of the proposed negotiations to seek an agreement on the starting point as well as on the final outcome of the discussions. The United Nations resolutions undoubtedly contained many useful proposals which could and should still be implemented, but they also contained directives conceived in the light of past conditions which no longer existed. The Netherlands, although not involved in the dispute itself, was desirous of helping to find a solution which would lead to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and felt that direct negotiations without any prior conditions and with full freedom of expression for all parties was the best procedure to achieve results. The parties were being requested to take action which was in full conformity with the Charter, and she felt that no sovereign State could refuse to comply with such principles. If, as might well be the case, the parties required the assistance of a United Nations organ, that need would be met by the provision in the draft resolution requesting the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to be available to them if so desired.

6. In conclusion, Miss Klompé appealed to the representatives of both the Arab States and Israel to accept the joint draft resolution, not only because the procedure seemed to be the only possible way of achieving more peaceful conditions in the Middle East, but also because the Netherlands so ardently desired to give to the younger generation of both the Arab States and Israel a new hope and a new perspective for the future. Those young people should not be made to pay for the unfortunate things that had happened. She pleaded for an effort to find a solution which would ensure them a happy future and bring peace at last to the Holy Land.

7. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia) regretted that his delegation would find it difficult to respond to the appeal made by the representative of Norway (26th meeting) that the Committee should consider the joint draft resolution without entering into the substance of the Palestine problem. The position of the Arab States was complicated by the fact that the question under discussion involved the interests of a people not their own, but with whom they had the strongest possible ties. In view of the motives underlying the Norwegian representative's appeal, however, his delegation felt that it should bring its references to the substance of the question in line with the aim which the Norwegian representative was trying to achieve.

8. The position had been rendered more difficult by Mr. Eban's statement on the previous day (29th meeting). It had been no surprise to the Saudi Arabian delegation that the Israel representative had been unable to conceal his Government's real motives and had repeated his customary unfounded accusations against

the Arabs while painting his own Government as an example of virtue and benevolence. He had endeavoured to obscure the issue by referring to a large number of subjects which fell within the sphere of the sovereign rights of Member States. The Saudi-Arabian delegation wished to stress the fact that the item under discussion was the Palestine problem and its solution. It was true that the Arab States had played an important role in the course of the problem's development since it had first been laid before the United Nations, but the parties directly concerned were the Arabs of Palestine and Israel. The main role of the Arab States was to defend the interests of the Palestine Arabs and the problems arising between those States and Israel were only secondary. The main component parts of the problem were the repatriation of Arab refugees and their compensation, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the settlement of the territorial questions. Those matters affected Israel and the Palestine Arabs and once they were settled the United Nations concern with the problem might also be ended. The Arab States could only be guided in their representation of the Palestine Arabs by the latter's best interests, and they could not agree to a settlement to which the Palestine Arabs were absolutely opposed.

9. When the General Assembly, at its third session (184th, 185th and 186th plenary meetings), had taken up the progress report of the United Nations Mediator for Palestine (A/648) it found that as a result of one of its own resolutions it was faced with a horrifying tragedy, one of whose worst aspects was the fact that almost 80 per cent of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine had been driven out of their country and become refugees. The purely humanitarian aspect of the problem was of deepest concern to the Arab States and they had been grieved by the attempts to give the matter a political character, thus leading to the continued suffering of the refugees. Mr. Dejany recalled the Mediator's comments on the extent of the calamity and its details, and his reference to the right of the refugees to return home. The right of an individual to return to his country and to enjoy his property was a most sacred human right which had been incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It had been recognized as a principle of international law in a decision of Mr. John Marshall, a former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and the principles involved had been confirmed by the General Assembly, which had incorporated them in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948. That resolution had provided that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so and that those not choosing to return should receive compensation. The Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been established by that same resolution, and the question of the refugees was one of two questions concerning which the Commission had been given specific instructions. The second of those questions had been a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area.

10. Territorial and other questions outstanding between the parties were to be settled by negotiation on the basis of the General Assembly resolutions, and the Commission had been instructed to provide its services of mediation and conciliation to that end. Both parties to the dispute, Israel and the four Arab States of Egypt,

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, had signed on 12 May 1949 the Lausanne Protocol which the Commission had very properly proposed as a basis for its work. No sooner, however, had Israel signed the protocol than it proceeded to obstruct the work of the Commission as a matter of policy. It had insisted on combining all the issues of the problem together and delaying the solution of any one problem until a final settlement had been reached for all. Representatives of three of the Arab States, who had worked with the Commission and were familiar with all its proceedings, had analysed the cause of the Commission's failure to achieve progress and its unfortunate yielding to the policy of Israel, which was based on the principle of the *fait accompli* and the *status quo*.

11. Israel had agreed to repatriate a maximum number of 100,000 Arab refugees, but had made the reservation that they might be settled not on their own land but wherever Israel pleased. It continued to defy General Assembly resolution 181 (II) on the internationalization of Jerusalem and on the territorial settlement had declared that there would be no cession. Mr. Dejany drew particular attention to Israel's attitude on the problem, not only because that country had gone back on its agreement as embodied in the Lausanne Protocol, but also because its attitude clearly illustrated the unreliability of its pledges, its conception of its obligations and its lack of respect for United Nations resolutions.

12. Mr. Eban had proposed (29th meeting) discarding those resolutions on the grounds that the parties had failed to comply with them. His comparison between the attitudes of the Arab States and of Israel to the United Nations resolutions was quite misleading. The Arab States, indeed, might have had some justification for refusing to accept resolution 181 (II), but Egypt's refusal to comply with that resolution was its privilege under the Charter and the fact that other States chose to do so did not in itself impair the validity of the resolution. Further, as Mr. Eban himself had pointed out, the resolution was addressed to the Arabs and to the Jews in Palestine as well as to the Mandatory Power. No matter how many States refused to comply with the resolution, the fact remained that it embodied the solution to that particular problem. Israel, which owed its very existence to that resolution, could not now claim the privilege of refusing to comply with it, or repudiate it on the grounds that some States were opposed to it. Mr. Eban himself had insisted at the First Committee (208th meeting), during the General Assembly's third session, that General Assembly resolution 181 (II) should be used as a basis for settling the territorial question. Israel had really achieved its own wish when the resolution had later been incorporated in the Lausanne Protocol. Mr. Eban had then gone still further, giving the resolution a greater binding force than the recommendation which resolutions usually constituted. He had referred to it as a valid instrument of international law: an important declaration on behalf of his Government. One of the reasons for the particular importance which Israel attached to that resolution might have been the fact that its authority had been incorporated in Israel's declaration of independence. In view of Israel's stand, it would appear that nothing had since occurred which could be con-

sidered as an excuse for abrogating the resolution's binding force.

13. If Israel regarded instruments of international law as something which could be discarded at will without any particular justifying cause, Mr. Dejany wondered how the Arab States could be urged to conclude any international treaties with Israel. He wondered, further, how the entire contents of Mr. Eban's statement made on the previous day could be isolated from the Israel policy of adhering to international instruments only as long as any advantage could be derived from them. Mr. Eban had gone further with another alarming concept, in reply to the Arab insistence that future policies should conform to General Assembly resolution 181 (II). He had suggested that international instruments rapidly became obsolete, a sentiment quite in keeping with his Government's view that five years was a long time for an instrument to remain in force, even though the other party to it did not agree to its abrogation. Such a dangerous concept appeared incompatible with Mr. Eban's appeal for negotiation.

14. It was very misleading for the Government of Israel to attempt to evade its obligations under General Assembly resolution 181 (II), which it had previously recognized as having binding force, by alleging the refusal of the Arabs to accept it. That refusal had been based partly on the objection of the Arab States to a resolution which divided Palestine and gave part of it to the Jews, thus making the Palestine Arabs a minority in their own country, and partly on fears of possible aggressive action by the Zionists, fears which had been justified sooner than had been expected. Since the formula contained in the resolution had been incorporated in the Lausanne Protocol, which had been signed by the Arab States, the attitude of those States had not wavered.

15. Another point in connexion with the territorial problem was Israel's occasional claim that the territory assigned to the Arabs under General Assembly resolution 181 (II) belonged to Israel by right of conquest. Mr. Dejany thought that the representative of Uruguay had, in the First Committee (210th meeting), during the General Assembly's third session, already firmly defined the principle that territorial rights could not be conferred by military conquest and in doing so had expressed the views of all delegations, including Israel. But Israel's claim and the attitude of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine in yielding on it was typical and explained the background of Arab apprehensions.

16. Israel's position on the question of Arab property and the payment of just compensation to refugees not wishing to return, was little better than its position on other questions. Orange groves had been allowed to deteriorate, valuable urban property had been confiscated and sold on the international market to secure foreign exchange, and the scanty compensation which Israel was prepared to provide was subject to many conditions. The value of the compensation in that case largely disappeared, and the basis of determining property rights and appraisal of value was entirely unsatisfactory and unjust.

17. Israel had maintained a consistent attitude of defiance to General Assembly resolutions, and it was deplorable that the Conciliation Commission should

have been influenced by that attitude to declare that the implementation of the resolutions concerning the refugees, Jerusalem and the settlement of territorial questions had become impracticable. None of the inevitable changes which had occurred during the past three or four years could have been so extensive as to justify overriding the fundamental rights of a large majority of the indigenous inhabitants of a country. Nor, when such changes were the result of a deliberate obstructionist policy, designed to prevent implementation of fundamental rights recognized by the United Nations, could they carry the same weight as those occurring in the ordinary course of a country's development. In any case, whatever the changes, if a party preaching goodwill were really sincere, no obstacle would be insurmountable and no change final.

18. The Saudi Arabian representative passed on to deal with some of the factors contributing to the changes referred to by Mr. Eban, and said that he would address himself to proving the invalidity of the grounds on which Israel was urging that implementation of the General Assembly resolutions was impracticable. He would refrain from dwelling on the internationalization of Jerusalem—a step which had been rendered impracticable solely by Israel's unrelenting defiance. The impracticability in that case applied rather to the *status quo* than to internationalization.

19. The representative of Israel had sought in vain to make a case for the impracticability of repatriating the Arab refugees by diverting attention from his country's obligation to various irrelevant considerations, such as responsibility for the refugees' plight, the capacity of the Arab States to absorb their kinsmen, and the example set by Israel in receiving thousands of Jewish immigrants. The refugee question was purely humanitarian; it involved individual rights on which the matter of responsibility had absolutely no bearing. The argument that the Arab States had the means to resettle the refugees with whom they had cultural ties was equally absurd, especially since the Israel representative had admitted that Lebanon and Egypt, for example, had a far greater population density than Israel. Finally, the analogy drawn between the Arabs of Palestine, who had been forced into exile and degradation, and the Jews who had left the Arab States to settle in Israel, was fallacious.

20. The charge that the Arab States had subjected their Jewish minorities to persecution from which they had fled was wholly unfounded. The truth was that those States had consistently shown tolerance and hospitality towards their Jewish inhabitants, many of whom were among their most prosperous citizens. Less than 3 per cent of the Jewish population of mandated Palestine had come from Arab countries and the total number of Jews emigrating to Palestine from those countries during the first three years of the Second World War amounted to no more than a few hundred. They manifestly had little cause to leave countries where they had settled of their own free will and enjoyed equal rights with other citizens. They did not leave them because they were persecuted or unhappy, but rather because their minds had been poisoned with Zionist propaganda which sought to uproot them and settle them in Israel in order to bar the return of the Arab refugees to the homes and lands from which they

had been banished. In its urgency to establish the prior claims of immigrants to the homes of the Arab refugees, the Israel Government had used unscrupulous methods designed to cast doubt on the integrity of the immigrants' countries of origin and to stir up discontent in those Jewish communities with a view to stimulating mass Jewish immigration. Press reports revealed, moreover, a growing trend of Jewish immigrants towards leaving Israel, either to return to their countries of origin or to settle elsewhere. Some 3,000 recent immigrants from Europe and the Orient, for example, were seeking visas to the United States. Their number would be even greater if the immigration policies of many countries were liberalized. On the other hand, immigration of Jews into Israel had practically come to a standstill.

21. The Arab refugees were animated by a genuine determination to return to their homes and would accept no alternative solution. As all groups and individuals which had visited their camps could confirm, they rejected all plans for their resettlement in Arab countries and had asked the Governments of those countries to speak on their behalf on condition that their right to repatriation was not compromised. They were prepared to undergo great sacrifices in order to regain their rightful homes. In the light of the facts that Jewish immigration had virtually stopped and large numbers of Jews were leaving Israel, there could be no justification for barring Arab refugees from returning. In order further to relieve existing pressure, other countries of the international community could attract Israel immigrants and thus contribute indirectly to the repatriation of the refugees. That suggestion should not be construed as an incitement to Israel Jews to emigrate; it merely reflected the real situation.

22. Moreover, careful examination and reports in the Press revealed that both homes and lands were available in Israel for resettlement of the refugees. Most of the Jewish immigrants who had settled on farms were not occupying Arab property. The Israel Minister of Agriculture had conceded that a very small percentage of Arabs lands was being cultivated and large areas of arable land had not been taken over by the *kibutzim* or the new colonies. Other Arab property, such as buildings, were proving to be a loss to both the absentee owners and the Israel Government. As Jewish immigration had almost ceased and was being counter-balanced by emigration, it was unlikely that a need would arise in future to utilize Arab land. The return of its rightful owners, far from creating competition with the Jewish farmers, would mean an influx of food producers who would help to alleviate the current food shortage and would further benefit Israel's economy by relieving that Government of the huge debt it would otherwise have to pay in compensation for property which was yielding it no benefit.

23. It followed from those facts that there had been no fundamental change in the essential factors determining repatriation and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees which would justify the argument that that was impracticable. The security of Israel had likewise been invoked in support of that argument. That reason was incompatible with Israel's appeal for peace and could only serve to perpetuate mistrust of that Government's motives. Against the argument that the Arabs of Palestine had a separate economy, a different language and



culture and would therefore create a minority problem, it must be borne in mind that they had always lived in Palestine and the late President Weizmann had affirmed that there was room in his country for both Jews and Arabs to live without fear. Thus, the contention that it would be impracticable to repatriate the refugees was totally unfounded and intended to becloud the fact that Israel was refusing to recognize the elementary principles of justice and was defying General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948; a little more than a year after its spokesman had said in the First Committee (216th meeting) during the General Assembly's third session, that the State of Israel owed its existence to General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and had therefore been established on a sound juridical basis.

24. It had been suggested by the Norwegian representative (26th meeting) that the solution of the refugee question should be part of the over-all settlement of all issues outstanding between the parties. If that had indeed been the intention of the General Assembly, it would not have given the Conciliation Commission specific instructions regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem and the refugees in its resolution 194 (III). Nothing in that resolution indicated that solution of those problems was to be made contingent on the success of the general conciliation efforts. They were quite separate questions, unrelated to the other points in the resolution, with their own legal validity. Obviously, the representative of Norway had not interpreted the General Assembly's intention otherwise, because when Israel had been admitted to the United Nations, he had stated in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (51st meeting), during the General Assembly's third session, that it was his understanding that Israel had pledged itself to comply with the repatriation provision of General Assembly resolution 194 (III).

25. From the outset, Israel had attempted to obstruct the work of the Conciliation Commission and to concentrate on direct negotiations with a view to evading all the obligations emanating from the United Nations resolutions. Its purpose had been confirmed by the assertion that in the progress of direct negotiations it would neither oppose nor accept any prerequisites for such direct negotiations. It apparently intended not to yield on any issue which did not conform to its own plans, and when negotiations broke down, to accuse the Arab States of failing to comply with their obligations under General Assembly resolutions.

26. Israel would only accept a solution on its own terms. If it were sincere, it would accept the offer made by the Lebanese representative (28th meeting) and prove its good intentions by replying to the questions he had put. It was difficult to expect good faith and co-operation in direct negotiations from the State which had defied United Nations resolutions, refused to implement the Lausanne Protocol and insisted that the demarcation lines laid down in the armistice agreements were final when those agreements had explicitly been concluded without prejudice to a final settlement. It was therefore surprising that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution before the Committee should believe that their proposal held the key to a solution.

27. The Arab States' mistrust of Israel was the result of the bitter memories left by the events in Palestine

in the past half century and particularly in the past five years, which had culminated in the tragedy of the refugees. The fact that many Jews also mistrusted Israel's desire for peace was shown by statements in the publication *Jewish Newsletter* which had called upon the Israel Government to grant fundamental human rights to the Arab minority rather than ask the great Powers to force the Arabs into peace and had challenged Israel to demonstrate its sincerity by acts rather than words. The Arab States would not be misled by words. They could not trust the peaceful intentions of a State which defied international law when it found it expedient, incited Jews to abandon their countries of origin and emigrate to Israel in order to make repatriation of the Arabs impracticable, and whose Foreign Minister had stated that his country needed four million Jews in order to maintain its existence in the midst of a hostile Arab world. The implication appeared to be that Israel wanted peace in order to build up its war machine; there was no assurance that its ambitions had been checked and the policy of the United Nations on the Palestine problem had not been such as to encourage the Arabs to take chances.

28. There must be a limit to the compromise for which the Mexican and Norwegian representatives were pleading. The Arabs had made many compromises in the last twenty years; they must weigh the appeal for compromise against that background in order to determine whether the limit had been reached. The League of Nations which, like the United Nations after it, had been dedicated to peace, human rights and the self-determination of peoples, had struck the first blow against the Arabs of Palestine by incorporating the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate. On that basis, Jewish influence and holdings in Palestine had become extensive and the Jewish population had increased tenfold, despite the opposition of the Arabs to Zionist aims. The violence to which the Zionists had resorted in their struggle for control of the country had led the Mandatory Power to bring the problem before the United Nations.

29. It was in a spirit of compromise that the Arabs had been asked to agree to the partition of Palestine decreed in 1947 by General Assembly resolution 181 (II). Thus, a second decisive blow had been struck against the Arabs of Palestine and its deplorable consequences had become manifest in the tragedy of a million refugees. Ironically, the situation had been brought about not by the act of a tyrant, but by that of a group of generous men who believed they were benefiting humanity by pressing the Arabs to compromise. General Assembly resolution 194 (III) had been adopted in order to alleviate that situation. Nevertheless, the Conciliation Commission had thus far not repatriated a single refugee owing to Israel's intransigence. The same generous men were now asking for further compromise in order for the parties to reach a final settlement. The Arab refugee had little left to contribute. He had been deprived of his country, his wealth, his dignity and hope in the future. He staked all on the dim hope of ultimate repatriation. Surely it was not the purpose of those who called for compromise to eradicate that hope. Every United Nations resolution was actually a compromise; the Arabs had gained by none of them. Consequently, it was not unreasonable

able to ask for a settlement between the parties to be based on United Nations resolutions—a settlement which would necessarily be a compromise and would not be unfair to Israel.

30. Mr. ANDERSEN (Denmark) expressed his delegation's approval of the work done by the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. It was true that it had not succeeded in fulfilling its main objective and in bringing about a normal peaceful situation in Palestine, but some valuable preparatory work had been done which might well prove most useful when the real negotiations started. That was why the sponsors of the joint draft resolution assumed that the Conciliation Commission would be continued.

31. While disappointed at the lack of progress, the Danish Government felt that neither the Conciliation Commission nor the United Nations could impose a solution; the parties must themselves seek a peaceful settlement of their outstanding differences.

32. No direct negotiations between the parties had so far taken place. It was to be hoped that they would agree to such negotiations in the near future as it was most unlikely that a solution could be reached by any other means. Jews and Arabs had, in the past, lived and worked peacefully together in Jerusalem. It would indeed be ironical if that land of three religions should become a permanent centre of unrest and strife. A grave responsibility towards the entire world therefore lay with the statesmen of the countries concerned. It was natural that there should be bitterness on both sides and that the parties to the dispute should fear that any hasty concessions might prejudice their cause. They should also remember, however, that concessions made too late could be equally dangerous.

33. The time had come to make a fresh start on the basis of direct negotiations. The previous day, the Israel representative had suggested what he called a kind of agenda for such negotiations. The Syrian representative had, at the previous meeting, submitted his draft agenda. It was to be hoped that those suggestions would prove useful in any possible future negotiations.

34. Were the representatives of Israel and the Arab States to meet in a spirit of conciliation to seek areas of agreement, they would be setting an example to the world and writing a new and important chapter in its history.

35. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) suggested that it would be well to remember that two of

the purposes for which the United Nations had been created were to foster friendly relations among nations and to act as a centre for harmonizing their actions. The Chairman had, by his wise and statesmanlike conduct of the Committee's work, contributed towards the attainment of those objectives.

36. While the South African delegation had been heartened by the Conciliation Commission's success in the matter of blocked accounts and the Government of Israel's gesture of goodwill in releasing those accounts, it regretted that the Commission had made no progress in its general function of conciliation. His delegation felt that the parties to the dispute should be urged to make greater use of the Commission in settling their outstanding differences. The joint draft resolution before the Committee therefore merited serious and sympathetic consideration.

37. The South African Government entertained the most friendly feelings for both the Israel and Arab peoples, who lived in an extremely important and sensitive area of the world. The resumption of friendly relations between those peoples would undoubtedly contribute to the restoration of world peace and security. His delegation therefore sincerely hoped that the Arab States would follow the example of Israel and accept the principle of direct negotiations. It was encouraging to note that the Arab States had not rejected the idea of direct negotiations, although they wished them to take place on the basis of past General Assembly resolutions. As the Canadian representative had pointed out at the previous meeting, it was important to determine which of those resolutions should serve as a basis for negotiations.

38. Mr. Jordaan suggested that the delegations concerned might meet during the present session in order to see what areas of agreement there were between them. His delegation, too, was more interested in solutions than in resolutions. If it had to vote for a draft resolution, however, it would prefer to vote for one commending the parties for having reached agreement on their own initiative.

39. Lord LLEWELLIN (United Kingdom) said that he would like to reserve his statement until all the draft resolutions had been submitted. He therefore suggested that any delegation wishing to submit a resolution or amendment should do so as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.