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Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

Admission of new Members: (a) Status of applications still pending: report of the Security Council (A/2208, A/AC.61/L.30, A/AC.61/L.31, A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.36, A/AC.61/L.37, A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39, A/AC.61/L.40, A/AC.61/L.41, A/AC.61/L.42/Rev.1, A/AC.61/L.43, A/AC.61/L.44) (*continued*)

[Item 19]*

1. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia), availing himself of his right of reply under rule 114 of the rules of procedure, deplored the fact that at the preceding meeting the United States representative should have thought it necessary to make allegations against the Czechoslovak Government in connexion with the Marshall Plan. It was not true that Czechoslovakia had considered participating in the Plan. From the very outset, the Czechoslovak Government had realized that for the United States imperialists the Plan merely constituted a means of interfering in the domestic affairs of States and of subjugating them politically as well as economically. The peoples' democracies had foreseen that danger and had declined to sacrifice their political and economic independence in return for dollars.

2. Ever since Czechoslovakia had been liberated, with the help of the Soviet Union, the United States Government had adopted a hostile attitude towards the Czechoslovak people. The system of military occupation which the United States had established in Western Bohemia at the time of Czechoslovakia's liberation had been an act of hostility towards that country. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 had enabled the United States to send agents to Czechoslovakia who engaged

*Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

in subversive activities aimed at the overthrow of the democratic régime. The presence of United States armed forces on the frontiers of Czechoslovakia facilitated the subversive activities of United States agents and permitted repeated violations of Czechoslovak air space.

3. The aggressive policy adopted by the United States towards Czechoslovakia was only one aspect of United States world policy, the purpose of which was to prepare aggression against the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the peoples' democracies. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 had raised espionage and subversive activities to the level of a national institution, and the United States Congress had again approved the appropriations requested by the Government under that Act for 1952.

4. Czechoslovakia was pursuing its peaceful policy despite all obstacles, but it was resolved to unmask all those who sought to jeopardize its work of peace. United States policy was hostile to the peaceful coexistence of States and was a threat to international peace and security.

5. The Czechoslovak delegation vehemently denied all the allegations made by the United States representative and protested against a method of discussion consisting in the bringing of unjustified charges against countries whose policies were disliked.

6. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) availing himself of his right of reply, said it was clear from the discussion that most delegations wished to consider the question on the basis of principles. The problem would be solved not by bringing offensive charges against certain governments, as the United States representative had done, but by discussing it in an objective and courteous manner. The United States representative's methods were incompatible with the fundamental rules of international discussion and had been deprecated by the majority of delegations.

7. The United States representative had said that his Government was opposed to the admission of the peoples' democracies to the United Nations because it held that they did not fulfil the conditions laid down for membership in the Organization. However, he had brought no evidence in support of his assertion. The peoples' democracies were peace-loving States, and supported the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. They did not engage in war propaganda. The United States was opposed to their admission to the United Nations solely because their policy ran counter to its own.

8. The United States representative had questioned the sovereignty of certain States, such as the Mongolian People's Republic. But ignorance of the facts could in no way justify such an attitude.

9. The United States representative had also asserted that in 1949 the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had infringed the human rights guaranteed by the peace treaties concluded with them, and had therefore violated the treaties. The Soviet Union delegation had already proved the baselessness of that charge (44th meeting). It was precisely because those States were observing the peace treaties to the letter that United States ruling circles wished to deny them admission to the United Nations.

10. The United States delegation had repeatedly alluded to the steps taken by the peoples' democracies against certain United States agents operating in their territories. But was it not quite natural for the governments of the peoples' democracies to defend themselves against the operation of spies and diversionists engaged in subversive activities? The United States representative had also mentioned the events in Czechoslovakia in 1948. What he had said had merely confirmed the necessity of the steps the Czechoslovak Government had then taken to rid itself of United States agents and to take the country's destinies into its own hands.

11. Once more the United States representative had tried to explain why the Soviet Union had used its veto in the Security Council in connexion with the applications for admission of States such as Italy, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Portugal. But it was the United States which had compelled the Soviet Union to use its right of veto.

12. In that connexion, the United States representative and some other Committee members had tried to prove that the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council was contrary to the interest of small countries. Some members had even gone so far as to maintain that the principle was contrary to the interests of all States. The USSR delegation contested that assertion. The principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council protected small nations against arbitrary action by the great Powers. The dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt concerning the presence of British armed forces in the Suez Canal Zone and the Anglo-Iranian dispute on the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, both of which had been referred to the Security Council, were cases in point. It was thanks to the unanimity rule that the interests of Egypt and Iran had been safeguarded.

13. In his statement the United States representative had tried to prove that the Soviet Union's policy was

contrary to the provisions of the Charter. But which country had embarked upon the armaments race? The United States. Which country had proposed the creation of the Interim Committee in violation of the provisions of the Charter? The United States. Which country was waging a war of aggression in Korea? The United States. Which country was carrying on incessant propaganda against States which disagreed with its policy? The United States. But which country, on the other hand, was leading the peace offensive in the world and followed a policy aimed at improving international relations? The Soviet Union. Thus it was not the Soviet Union, but the United States which was violating the Charter. At Dumbarton Oaks, at the San Francisco Conference and at all the other international conferences, United States representatives had made grandiloquent statements on the respect due to international obligations, but they had soon forgotten them.

14. The United States would like to make the United Nations an annex of the State Department, and some States might perhaps be prepared to accept that situation. But it might well be asked what would have become of the United Nations if the Soviet Union had not been able to raise its voice to denounce that policy, which was contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. It was the clear, powerful voice of the Soviet Union which had enabled other States to protest in their turn against the economic domination of the United States.

15. Mr. Gromyko emphasized that his remarks were not personal and applied only to those circles which exercised a preponderant influence on the policy of the United States Government. It should, however, be noted that the United States representative had been one of the most ardent champions in the Senate of the Mutual Security Act, under which an appropriation of \$100 million had been made to finance subversive activities and propaganda against the Soviet Union. It was Senator Wiley who had said at the time the Mutual Security Act was under discussion that propaganda must be organized against the Soviet Union and that such propaganda must be sensational and must consist of accusations against the Government of USSR. Senator Wiley was now seeking to make the United Nations take over the responsibility for that propaganda. It was for the purpose of deceiving public opinion more completely that some United States representatives were carrying their propaganda into the United Nations and were bringing false accusations against the Soviet Union, accusations which were prejudicial to the cause of peace.

16. All the draft resolutions before the Committee, except that submitted by Poland, reflected the position of the United States Government. The policy of the United States was to deny admission to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic under any pretext. The Soviet Union delegation could not therefore accept those draft resolutions. The proposal to set up a special committee was intended to delay a solution of the problem and was moreover contrary to the provisions of the Charter. If such a committee were set up, the Soviet Union could of course not take part in its work.

17. Replying to a question by Mr. WILEY (United States of America), the CHAIRMAN said that while

under rule 114 of the rules of procedure he could give the United States representative the floor in order to reply to the Soviet Union representative, he would urge the United States representative not to avail himself of his right of reply, since the debate might otherwise be prolonged indefinitely.

18. Mr. WILEY (United States of America) said that he would comply with the Chairman's appeal, but thought that there were grounds for introducing rules to deal with such a situation in future.

19. Mr. TARAIZI (Syria) submitted a revised text (A/AC.61/L.42/Rev.1) to the draft resolution of the six Arab States regarding the admission of Libya (A/AC.61/L.42).

20. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate closed and invited members to proceed to explain their votes.

21. Mr. MAHMOUD (Egypt) said that he had no need to restate his country's views on the admission of new Members, which were based on the principle of the universality of the United Nations. His delegation would therefore vote for the draft resolutions concerning the admission of Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

22. At the General Assembly's sixth session (370th plenary meeting) the Egyptian delegation had voted for a USSR draft resolution recommending the Security Council to reconsider the applications of fourteen States. There had then been no question of simultaneous admission. The Polish draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1 and Corr.1) was now recommending the "simultaneous" admission of the fourteen States. The Egyptian delegation had no objection to any of those States, but their simultaneous admission would be contrary to the view it had taken since 1948. It would therefore ask the Chairman to put the word "simultaneous" to a separate vote. However, his delegation would still vote for the Polish draft resolution, even if the word was retained.

23. The Egyptian delegation would also vote for the draft resolution of the five Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1/Corr.1) recommending the establishment of a special committee to study the question. It hoped that the Committee would succeed in finding a solution offering the Organization a way out of the present dead-lock.

24. Mr. ESENBEL (Turkey) reviewed the various draft resolutions. With regard to the draft resolution of the five Central-American States providing for the establishment of a special committee to study all the aspects of the problem, he recalled the suggestions which had been made to break the dead-lock. It had been suggested that the right of veto should be exercised within the limitations contemplated at the San Francisco Conference, and it had been said that only decisions connected directly with the maintenance of peace and security could be subject to the veto. Another suggestion made had been to approach the International Court of Justice for an opinion on the question whether the negative vote of a permanent member could outweigh the vote of at least seven members of the Security Council in favour of an application for membership. The delegations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua had proposed (A/AC.61/L.31) that the

General Assembly should adopt a decision to the effect that the veto should not apply to applications for admission. Finally, the representative of Peru maintaining that an affirmative vote in favour of the simultaneous admission of a group of States could be considered as an affirmative vote for each State in the group, had proposed (A/AC.61/L.30) that the General Assembly should decide that the Security Council had made a favourable recommendation in the case of the admission of those States, even though the admission of some of them had been vetoed during the consideration of their individual applications. The Turkish delegation felt that all those suggestions deserved consideration and would therefore vote for the draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States.

25. There had been no change in Turkey's position regarding the applications for membership of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, which it had already supported in the Security Council. Mr. Esenbel said that he would accordingly vote for the draft resolutions submitted by France (A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39 and A/AC.61/L.40).

26. He would also vote for the United States draft resolution on the admission of Japan (A/AC.61/L.37), a country that had an important role to play in the stabilization of the Far East. Its admission would be an act of political wisdom and would strengthen the Organization.

27. The Turkish delegation maintained its position with respect to the Polish draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1 and Corr.1). Each application for admission must be considered separately, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and no admission of a State should be made dependent upon conditions other than those specified in Article 4. It would therefore vote against that draft resolution. His delegation could not but regret that peace-loving countries like Italy, Portugal, Libya and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which could make a valuable contribution to the United Nations, should be prevented from doing so.

28. Mr. BAKR (Iraq) observed that his delegation had not participated in the general debate, but at the beginning of the session (379th plenary meeting) the head of the Iraqi delegation had recommended the admission of all States which had submitted applications for membership. The Iraqi delegation was convinced that the bigger the membership of the Organization, the stronger it would be.

29. While the American continent was fully represented in the United Nations, and justly so, the situation was quite different in the case of Europe, Asia and Africa. In Mr. Bakr's view, that was one of the main reasons for the threats to peace and security that came from those regions.

30. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Libya, Ceylon and Nepal had made an important contribution to the cause of democracy during the Second World War, both morally and materially, and were willing and able to carry out the obligations of the Charter. For that reason the Iraqi delegation had joined other countries in submitting draft resolutions concerning the admission of the former two States (A/AC.61/L.42/Rev.1 and A/AC.61/L.43) concerning the latter two.

31. His delegation would vote for the draft resolutions of Poland, the United States and France, all of which would result in broadening the membership of the United Nations. It would also vote for the draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States, which was a first step towards a solution of the problem.

32. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) paid tribute to those Latin-American delegations which had taken a prominent and helpful part in the discussion of an extremely difficult question. They appeared to have come to the conclusion that the Security Council could deal with the question as a procedural matter or that, at any rate, the General Assembly had the right to declare that the veto was not applicable to the question of the admission of new Members. It was, to be sure, hard to understand how a permanent member of the Security Council could use the veto to prevent the admission of a State which it had acknowledged satisfied the requirements laid down in the Charter and which it had accepted for admission provided that such admission was simultaneous with that of other States.

33. However, as there appeared to be no general agreement on the course to be followed, he thought that the Peruvian delegation, on the one hand, and the four Central-American delegations, on the other, had been wise not to insist that their draft resolutions (A/AC.61/L.30 and A/AC.61/L.31) should be put to a vote. However important the juridical arguments adduced in the two drafts, the Canadian representative preferred the draft resolution of the five Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1 and Corr.1), which proposed the establishment of a special committee to study the matter. He hoped that the committee would address itself not only to the legal but to the political problems involved and would succeed in finding an area of understanding where the permanent members of the Security Council might be brought together. As it had been intended at the San Francisco Conference that the Organization should become universal in due course, Mr. Johnson deeply regretted the absence of a number of States which could make a valuable contribution to the work of the United Nations and with which his country had the closest ties of friendship. In the Canadian delegation's view neither the veto nor Article 4 of the Charter were ever intended to keep out of the Organization any independent State worthy of the name. Hence it would vote for the draft resolution of the five Central-American States as well as for the draft resolution concerning the admission of Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and would vote against the Polish draft resolution providing for the simultaneous admission of fourteen States, as that list was obviously incomplete.

34. Mr. RAJAN (India) said that his delegation had already indicated its views (47th meeting) on the Polish draft resolution and the draft of the five Central-American States. He would therefore confine his remarks to the other draft resolutions. The Indian delegation considered that Japan satisfied the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter and its admission to the Organization was necessary if Far Eastern representation in the Organization was to be adequate and realistic. It would therefore vote in favour of the United States draft resolution. With regard to the draft resolution of France concerning Vietnam, Cambodia

and Laos, the Indian delegation was not convinced that those countries satisfied the requirements of Article 4. Hostilities continued to rage in Indo-China and rival governments claimed to represent the people of that area. Even if those governments were willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter, it appeared that they were not able to do so. The Indian delegation would therefore abstain on the draft resolutions submitted by France. It would vote for the draft resolutions of the Arab States concerning the admission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Libya. The admission of those two countries would add to the representation of the Middle East in the United Nations.

35. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) explained his vote on the draft resolutions concerning the admission of Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. His delegation believed that all those countries satisfied the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter, and it would take great pleasure in voting for the draft resolution proposing that the Security Council should recommend their admission.

36. With respect to the Polish draft resolution, Mr. Urquía reminded the Committee that his delegation was opposed to the system of simultaneous admission based upon purely political considerations. The draft resolution in question was incompatible both with the provisions of the Charter and with the most elementary rules of logic, and the very terms of Article 4 enjoined the separate consideration of each application. It was against common sense to make the admission of a State dependent upon the admission of other States which did not necessarily satisfy the same requirements. Moreover, as the other representatives had observed, the Polish draft resolution listed a number of States but omitted many others which had submitted applications for membership. That refuted the repeated declarations of the Soviet bloc, which posed as the champion of the principle of universality. The Polish draft resolution did not include South Korea, Japan and a number of other States. It was an act of discrimination against all those countries and his delegation therefore would vote against that draft.

37. Mr. SOTO (Chile) explained that he had not spoken in the general debate because he felt that the problem was one which necessitated detailed study for which the Committee did not have sufficient time. Moreover, his delegation was convinced that the problem was primarily a political one and that the agreement of the Security Council was a prerequisite of any solution.

38. The Chilean delegation had always been in favour of the principle of the universality of the United Nations. Without expressing its views on the substance of the proposals submitted by the Central-American delegations and the delegation of Peru, it would support the establishment of a special committee to study the problem in detail in an atmosphere of calm.

39. It would abstain on the Polish draft resolution, maintaining the position it had always held on the question. As for the draft resolution dealing with various individual countries, it would keep to the position it had already explained in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

40. Mr. HUDICOURT (Haiti) said that his delegation was in favour of the admission to the United Na-

tions of the greatest possible number of States which desired membership and satisfied the requirements of the Charter. Mr. Hudicourt deliberately abstained from using the word "universality" to describe the position he had taken, because many apparently wished to interpret the word in a sense that ran counter to the letter and the spirit of the Charter, namely, as permitting the global and automatic admission of all States applying for admission without prior consideration of each application as provided for in Article 4 of the Charter. His delegation did not think that in order to admit States to the United Nations methods manifestly contrary to provisions of the Charter could be employed. Applications for membership were being held up in the Security Council on account of political considerations, the clash of interests among the great Powers and the negative votes of one of the permanent members. To break that dead-lock various methods had been proposed, but none had been accepted by all the permanent members. There were a number of draft resolutions before the Committee which appeared to point to ways in which the dead-lock might be surmounted. Unfortunately, most of those proposals, generous as their underlying intentions might be, were contrary to the provisions of the Charter.

41. A compromise proposal must be worked out. However, it must be consistent with the Charter; that is, it must first be accepted by the five permanent members of the Security Council so as to enable the Council to recommend the admission of individual new Members to the General Assembly. Until amended, the provisions of the Charter were binding on the Organization. The Charter itself laid down the procedure for its amendment, and until that procedure had been followed Member States continued to be bound by the existing provisions.

42. The delegation of Haiti would decide its position on the various draft resolutions in the light of that principle. It would vote against the Polish draft resolution which, in its view, was contrary to the provisions of the Charter, since there was no article providing for the simultaneous admission of several new Members. Applications for admission should be considered separately, since the United Nations must judge each case on its merits and on the qualifications of the applicant State. Moreover, the draft resolution was discriminatory, since it recommended the admission of certain States while ignoring others, not on the merits of the applicant States but for political reasons.

43. His delegation would abstain from the vote on the Peruvian resolution which, although generous in its intention, was incompatible with the Charter. The Charter laid down that the General Assembly could take a decision on the admission of a new Member only upon the recommendation of the Security Council. To disregard a categorical provision of the Charter in order to circumvent a difficulty would establish a most regrettable precedent.

44. For the same reasons, the Haitian delegation would abstain from the vote on the draft resolution of the four Central-American States proposing that the General Assembly should decide to consider pending applications for admission. The General Assembly could not take that step, since the Charter stated explicitly that it must act upon the Security Council's

recommendation. The Haitian delegation would also abstain from the vote on the United States draft resolution requesting the Security Council to take note of the General Assembly's decision with respect to the application of Japan. Such a decision would be inconsistent with the Charter, as the preamble of the draft implicitly acknowledged, since it noted that the Security Council had made no recommendation to the General Assembly on Japan's application. For the same reasons his delegation would abstain from voting on the three draft resolutions of France concerning the admission of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and on the draft resolution of the Arab States recommending the admission of Libya and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

45. The Haitian delegation would abstain from the vote on those draft resolutions solely because of the principle involved. Far from opposing the admission of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, of the countries mentioned in the Polish draft resolution and of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Libya, his delegation would welcome their admission to the United Nations. However, it noted a growing but regrettable tendency in the Organization to attempt to circumvent the categorical provisions of the Charter in order to surmount difficulties. Certain delegations had gone so far as to say that the General Assembly had discretionary powers in the matter. If the States that had participated in the San Francisco Conference had wished to give the General Assembly such powers they would have said so explicitly in the Charter. Abusive interpretations would quickly lead to arbitrary action, far removed from the letter and especially the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

46. Mr. Hudicourt said that he would vote for the draft resolution of the five Central-American States recommending the establishment of a special committee to study the question. It was the only proposal before the Committee that did not overstep the provisions of the Charter. He hoped that the proposed committee would find a solution that would enable the United Nations to break the dead-lock, reconcile the divergent views of the great Powers and open the doors of the United Nations to all the States whose applications were pending.

47. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) recalled that when he had first spoken in the general debate (45th meeting) he had purposely refrained from discussing the substance of the question and had explained why he thought it preferable to refer the question to the proposed special committee. He had made certain suggestions to the sponsors of the draft resolution of the five Central-American States that had not been adopted in full. For that reason he was submitting an amendment (A/AC.61/L.44) embodying those suggestions, and which read as follows:

"Delete paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part and insert the following:

"1. *To establish* a special committee composed of representatives of twenty-five Member States, there being one representative from each State, to be designated by the President of the General Assembly;

"2. *To recommend* the special committee to make a detailed study of the question of the admission of

States to membership in the United Nations, examining the proposals and suggestions which have been made in the General Assembly and its Committees or which may be submitted to the special committee by any Members of the United Nations, such study to be conducted in the light of all the antecedents of the question;’”

The first part of the amendment proposed that the twenty-five members of the special committee should be designated by the President of the General Assembly. The second part was intended to complete paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution of the five Central-American States in a sense he thought consistent with the intention of the sponsors of that text. The latter had intended the special committee to make a detailed study, and had therefore recommended that it should take into account various considerations which they mentioned in paragraph 2 of the operative part. It was possible, however, that considerations not expressly mentioned in paragraph 2 might escape the attention of the special committee. For that reason the Uruguayan delegation proposed a broader and simpler formula: that the special committee should take into account all the antecedents of the question, namely, both the elements mentioned in the original draft and other important historical factors that were not expressly stated. If the sponsors of the draft resolution interpreted paragraph 2 in the way he had just indicated, it would be possible to devise a formula that would reconcile the two texts. It would be advisable, also, to invite those members of the Committee who had submitted proposals on the substance of the question to participate in the work of the special committee.

48. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) noted that the sponsors of the draft resolution of the five Central-American States had heard various suggestions, some of which, like that of the Cuban delegation (44th meeting), were also designed to broaden the composition of the special committee. The sponsors of the draft resolution had met and after studying the various suggestions had decided to include them in the draft. As the Uruguayan representative had not been present at the meeting he had not had the opportunity to repeat or explain the suggestions that he had made. Consequently the sponsors of the draft resolution of the five Central-American States still did not know whether the Uruguayan representative was proposing that the members of the special committee should be designated by the President (*Presidente*) of the General Assembly or by the Chairman (*Presidente*) of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. There were good grounds for either alternative, since the thorough knowledge of the problem that the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had acquired would appear to make him the natural choice for that

task. In any event, the composition finally proposed for the special committee seemed well balanced from the point of view of both geographical distribution and of political positions and conflicting interests. Moreover, the President of the General Assembly was overburdened by numerous responsibilities, and it seemed inadvisable to add to his duties. For those reasons the Salvadoran delegation urged the Uruguayan representative to withdraw the first part of his amendment. With regard to the second part, it should be noted that paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution enumerated a number of considerations of the greatest importance, which had been included at the request of certain delegations. A detailed text therefore appeared preferable to one of a more general nature. In order to satisfy the Uruguayan representative without impairing a text that had been developed by joint effort, Mr. Urquía would agree to add the words “the other antecedents of the question” after the words “the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice”.

49. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) expressed satisfaction with the Salvadoran representative's suggestion. With respect to the first part of the Uruguayan amendment, however, he adhered to the principle he had stated; he still thought that the President of the General Assembly or the General Assembly itself in plenary meeting should be made responsible for designating the members of a special committee established to deal with so important a question. Naturally the President of the Assembly could consult the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, for whose ability Mr. Rodríguez Fabregat had the highest regard. He would not, however, insist on a vote on the amendment.

50. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) understood that the Uruguayan delegation had not withdrawn the first part of its amendment, which he himself considered a very good proposal.

51. The CHAIRMAN said that when the Committee was ready for the vote he would ask the Uruguayan representative whether he wished to maintain or to withdraw the first part of his amendment. If it was withdrawn any other delegation wishing that it should be put to the vote could reintroduce it under rule 121 of the rules of procedure. In accordance with rule 119 he would allow discussion on the Uruguayan amendment even though it had not been distributed until the meeting was in progress, since the Uruguayan representative had in fact merely submitted in written form proposals that he had put forward orally at the beginning of the general discussion.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.