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**Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).**

**Admission of new Members: (a) Status of applications still pending: report of the Security Council (A/2208, A/AC.61/L.30, A/AC.61/L.31, A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.36, A/AC.61/L.37, A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39, A/AC.61/L.40, A/AC.61/L.41) (*continued*)**

[Item 19]\*

1. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) submitted a revised text of the draft resolution of the five Central-American delegations (A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1). It incorporated the Scandinavian amendment (A/AC.61/L.41) and took into account the suggestion made at the preceding meeting by the Cuban delegation to increase the membership of the special committee—and included, among others, the Union of South Africa—and the suggestion of the Chilean delegation to recall the relevant provisions of the Charter and the discussions in the Security Council. He noted that in the English text a phrase had been omitted in paragraph 2 of the operative part; the corrected English text was contained in document A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1/Corr.1.

2. Mr. MENON (India) observed that a certain number of applications for admission as new Members, some of which had been submitted several years ago, were still pending. As a result, the United Nations was being prevented from achieving the universality intended at its inception. Moreover, it was a rather disconcerting situation. In the past few years, the position of certain delegations on several applications had varied according to circumstances.

3. The Indian delegation was guided by the desire to co-operate in the search for a solution which would help the United Nations to move closer to its ideal of universality. It considered that the Organization was

\*Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

an association of States in which sympathy or hostility towards applicants should not, as was the case in a club, influence the decision taken on their applications. Relations between States were based on other considerations. When a State decided to recognize another State, that did not necessarily mean that it approved the political system or was satisfied with conditions prevailing there. Its decision was guided by such standards as the authority exercised by the government of the country in question, its ability to secure respect for trade or other agreements it might conclude or, in other words, its ability to represent the country internationally, or again, the possible existence of another government and, in that case, the state of war or peace existing between the country in question and that other government. Unfortunately, owing to the international situation, Member States called upon to decide on an application for admission to membership consciously or unconsciously applied very different standards. Yet, if the Member States were to expand the membership of the United Nations and admit more and more States which fulfilled the conditions laid down in the Charter, not only would they be giving those States what was their due but they would be serving the cause of the United Nations. Precisely because difficulties or ideological differences set some States against others, it was all the more important for all States meeting the requirements to be represented. They could make a useful contribution to the work of the United Nations. Their very opposition which would then become manifest would render the debates more fruitful because the opposing arguments would be better known and solutions easier to find. If it was to last, the United Nations must rest on conciliation and continue to be composed of countries with ethnic and political differences.

4. Turning to the various methods that had been proposed for dealing with the problem, he referred in the first place to the argument that the problem should be referred to the International Court of Justice. That

idea was based on a misconception of the functions of the Court and of the nature of the problem. The matter was really a political one and could not be the object of a legal decision. Furthermore, were the General Assembly to ask the Court for an opinion on the question whether a recommendation could be made by the Security Council regarding the admission of new Members without an affirmative vote of all its permanent members, it would be overriding the accepted practice of the Council and deliberately passing over its competence. And such usurpation of powers, such disregard of an established jurisdiction, might subsequently be extended to other spheres. The Security Council was still the master of its own procedure and, after all, the rule of unanimity had been deliberately introduced by the authors of the Charter in view of world conditions. Lastly, the General Assembly had expressly included the admission of new Members among major questions that had to be settled by a two-thirds majority of its Members. It was therefore impossible to claim that the same question was one of substance for the General Assembly and procedural for the Security Council. For those reasons, the Indian delegation would vote against any proposal to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.

5. The second method advocated was the setting up of a special committee to consider the question. He was unable to see how such a committee could yield better results than the Security Council or in what way its work would serve any purpose. If it was a question of over-all agreement, there was no reason why it could not be achieved in the Security Council. If agreement was not likely, why refer to a special committee the question of finding out that fact? The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was quite able to do so itself. Furthermore, the system under which bodies were established in order to take the place of existing bodies was dangerous and unjustifiable. How could the peoples of the world be expected to have the slightest confidence in the Security Council when attempts were being made to strike such a blow at its prestige? The Indian delegation would be unable to serve on the special committee, although its name had been proposed in the draft resolution of the five Central-American States. The discussions of such a committee could only add to existing divisions, since some delegations which had not as yet taken sides might be moved to align themselves one way or another. The Indian delegation would therefore abstain on the draft resolution of the five Central-American States.

6. So far as the Indian delegation was concerned, the problem should be considered in the light of Article 4 of the Charter. Paragraph 1 of that article laid down two conditions for the admission of new Members: applicants had to be peace-loving on the one hand and accept the obligations of the Charter and be able and willing to carry out those obligations, on the other. How was it possible to determine *a priori* whether a State was peace-loving, since all States maintained armies the size and armaments of which were unknown? The only criterion available was whether a State desired to carry out the obligations of the Charter, and any State subscribing to the provisions of the Charter should be regarded as peace-loving. The nature of the political system of an applicant could not be taken into con-

sideration, as various groups of nations, according to their political affinities, would always want to exclude others. Moreover, systems changed. If applicants were judged according to their internal régime, the United Nations could admit a State one day which, by the same criterion, would appear unacceptable the following day.

7. For all of those reasons, the Indian delegation, which thought that it was time to try to break the present deadlock, would support the Polish draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1). He made clear his delegation's interpretation of "simultaneous admission": it meant a series of admissions that took place at the same time, none of which was dependent upon the admission of one or several of the others. Although it provided neither an absolute nor a complete remedy, the Polish draft resolution had the advantage of increasing the membership of the United Nations by opening its doors to States that could make a useful contribution and by dealing with long-standing applications that for the most part had received the endorsement of Member States. The USSR now agreed to the admission of States whose candidature it had opposed on previous occasions. The United States representative had, in 1946, submitted a draft resolution to the 54th meeting of the Security Council, proposing the admission of eight States, among them being Albania and the People's Republic of Mongolia. Thus, on various occasions throughout the history of the problem, applications for admission now pending had been at least accepted, if not approved, by various States. The United States had at one time been in favour of settling all pending applications by the simultaneous admission of the applicants, whereas the USSR had asked for each application to be examined separately on its individual merits. The respective positions of the two countries had subsequently been reversed, since in 1949 the USSR had submitted a similar proposal to that formulated in 1946 by the United States, and the United States had then maintained that each application should be examined separately.

8. The Indian delegation found that the applications for admission listed in the Polish draft resolution had a legal basis. The best plan would be to accept the applications in question so as to break the deadlock and open the door of the United Nations still wider to new members. Certain of those States, such as Ceylon and Nepal, which had no part in the ideological and political conflicts dividing the world, could make extremely useful contributions to the work of the Organization. There was close affinity between those two States and India. The Indian Government also had strong ties of friendship with Ireland, the wisdom and political experience of which would be of valuable assistance to the United Nations.

9. Mr. Menon stated that he had before him a publication dated 1950 in which Mr. Foster Dulles, who would shortly be called upon to fill an important office in the United States Government, had stated that the situation had greatly changed since the San Francisco Conference. Peace treaties had been concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Finland. The Governments of Germany and Japan were acquiring power and countries that had remained neutral during the Second World War were now applying for admission to the United Nations. The Soviet Union had prevented the

admission of Italy, which was contemplated by the Italian peace treaty, and of other nations such as Portugal, Ireland, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Ceylon, because it feared that their admission would give more votes to the non-communist bloc. For their part, the United States and other countries, Mr. Dulles had stated, had prevented the admission of such countries as Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary although their admission also was contemplated in the peace treaties. Mr. Foster Dulles had expressed his belief that the United Nations would best serve the cause of peace if the General Assembly represented the world as it was and not merely the parts that the United States liked. In concluding, he had stressed that all States should be Members of the United Nations, and that that principle should be generally accepted regardless of the internal political régimes of States. To the extent that the governments of those States really governed, they should be represented in any organization that purported to mirror the world as it was. Mr. Foster Dulles had said by way of example that, if the communist Government of China proved its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it too should be admitted to the United Nations and that, irrespective of the feelings of sympathy or antipathy that might be felt towards them, the governments that dominated more than 30 per cent of the population of the world should be represented, if it were desired that the United Nations should be representative of the world as it was.

10. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Committee would approach the problem with the object of breaking the deadlock which not only reacted to the detriment of the applicants but to that of the United Nations itself.

11. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) considered that the reason for the failure of the United Nations to settle the question of the admission of new Members in conformity with the principle of universality was that the United States Government, by adopting an attitude contrary to the principles of the Charter, had for six years prevented the admission of States which met all the requirements of the Charter. The United States policy of transforming the Organization into an instrument of its aggressive plans showed itself typically in the question of the admission of new Members. The United States was attempting to have only such States admitted to the Organization as would fall in with its policy and still further increase its present amenable majority. It was closing the door of the Organization to the peoples' democracies, which pursued an independent and sovereign policy aimed primarily at strengthening international peace and security. The United States was inimical to the peaceful co-existence of peoples and to the development of friendly relations among nations. Their policy of discriminating against the peoples' democracies and of favouring other States was inconsistent with the Charter and merely led the United Nations into an impasse.

12. Speedy solution of the problem was needed in the interests of the United Nations itself. There was an equitable way to settle the matter: the way advocated in the Polish draft resolution, which proposed that the General Assembly should request the Security Council to reconsider the applications of the various States for admission so as to submit a recommendation on the

simultaneous admission of those States as Members of the United Nations. The proposal was not tainted either by discrimination or favouritism. It was in conformity with the principles and spirit of the Charter and the interests of the United Nations. It would enable the principle of universality to be applied. Its adoption would further the cause of peace and strengthen peaceful relations between States.

13. The draft resolutions of the Central-American and Peruvian delegations were primarily attempts to evade the provisions of the Charter concerning the Security Council's voting procedure and to show that a recommendation of the Council in regard to the admission of new Members would be valid if adopted by an affirmative vote of any seven Council members. According to those delegations the matter would come under paragraph 2, not paragraph 3, of Article 27 of the Charter. That represented a further attack on the rule of unanimity of the great Powers. Those delegations were trying to create a problem which did not arise, since the matter had already been explicitly settled by the Charter.

14. Article 4 defined the conditions required of States for membership in the United Nations and the procedure for their admission. The admission of new Members was also governed by the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 18 of the Charter, which specifically mentioned the admission of new Members among the important questions on which decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a two-thirds majority. It could not be alleged, therefore, that the matter was procedural and governed by paragraph 2 rather than paragraph 3 of Article 27. If a matter was important for the General Assembly, it was, *a fortiori*, important for the Security Council, whose recommendation was an essential prerequisite to the General Assembly's decision. As was stated in the report of Committee II/1<sup>1</sup> of the San Francisco Conference, the principle that the General Assembly should admit new Members only upon the recommendation of the Security Council was based on the idea that the purpose of the Charter was to provide security against a repetition of the present war and that, therefore, the Security Council should assume the responsibility of suggesting new participating States. That report also indicated that the Security Council's vote on a recommendation concerning the admission of new Members could not be considered as a procedural vote but, on the contrary, as a vote on an important substantive matter to which the rule of unanimity of the permanent members of the Council set forth in paragraph 3 of Article 27 should apply.

15. Furthermore, under paragraph 2 of Article 4, the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations was to be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Charter used the same words in Article 5 on the suspension of a Member from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership, and in Article 6 on the expulsion of a Member from the Organization. It could hardly be seriously maintained that questions as important as that of the suspension of a State's inherent rights and privileges as a Member or that of the exclusion of a Member State from the Organization

<sup>1</sup> See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, II/1/26 (a).

were questions of procedure. Still less could it be seriously said that the admission of a new Member could be a simple question of procedure. Again, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice given on 3 March 1950<sup>2</sup> said that the Security Council had made no recommendation as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Charter if one of the permanent members of the Council had voted against a resolution recommending the admission of a State. It had therefore been clearly established that the affirmative vote of all the permanent members of the Security Council was an absolute condition precedent to a favourable recommendation from the Council with regard to the admission of a new Member. If that condition had not been met, there was in law no recommendation. A decision could only be taken by the General Assembly, however, upon the recommendation of the Council. Accordingly, rules 135 and 136 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure provided that the General Assembly could take no decision on the admission of a new Member in the absence of a recommendation from the Security Council. Rule 136 also established the procedure for the General Assembly to follow in such cases.

16. The joint draft resolution sponsored by the four Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.31) cited the declaration of the four sponsoring Powers<sup>3</sup> at the San Francisco Conference in support of the principle that the only cases in which the permanent members of the Security Council could make use of the veto were those which involved the Council's taking direct measures in connexion with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to the peace, removal of threats to peace, and suppression of breaches of peace. It was only necessary to read the declaration to see that it merely confirmed that the admission of new Members was not a procedural but a substantive matter on which a decision could be taken by the Security Council only under paragraph 3 of Article 27, i.e., by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Council. Furthermore, the declaration itself specified that a question of whether an item was substantive or procedural should be decided by an affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The draft resolution of the four Central-American States and the Peruvian draft resolution therefore flagrantly contradicted the provisions of the Charter and the General Assembly's rules of procedure. They were likely to undermine the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council and to weaken the Organization. They were illegal and therefore unacceptable.

17. The draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States provided for the establishment of a special committee to make a detailed study of the question. Actually the proposal was merely intended to challenge the powers of the Security Council, to exclude it from the debate, and to limit its members' right of decision on the admission of new Members. The proposed special committee could make no useful contribu-

tion to the work of the Security Council and could only delay the solution of the problem.

18. The other draft resolutions before the Committee related to the individual admission of certain States. The United States delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.37) recommending that the General Assembly should determine that Japan was a peace-loving State within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter and should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. It was not surprising to see the United States submit such a proposal, for pressure from that country had obtained the signature at San Francisco on 8 September 1951 of a separate Treaty of Peace with Japan, which, if it did not provide the necessary conditions for the maintenance of peace in the Far East, did give the United States military, air and naval bases in Japan. That treaty could not be considered as legally valid because it had not been signed by the Soviet Union, whose decisive share in the defeat of Japanese militarism was well known. Moreover, no treaty relating to Asian questions could be valid without the participation of the greatest Power in Asia, the People's Republic of China. The United States proposal was not likely to strengthen international peace and security. Its only purpose was to ensure Japan's participation in the aggressive blocs organized by the United States in the Far East.

19. The draft resolutions submitted by France (A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39 and A/AC.61/L.40) proposing that Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos should be admitted to membership in the United Nations were completely unfounded, for these countries were not States within the meaning of the Charter and the puppet governments which France had established in them did not represent their peoples.

20. Those draft resolutions were nothing but fresh attempts to violate the provisions of the Charter and to weaken and destroy the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council by reducing the Council to the rank of an advisory body. Ever since the establishment of the United Nations, the United States Government had been attacking the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers.

21. The course pursued by the United States of America proved that they did not abide either by the provisions of the Charter or by those of the international treaties, and that they had no intention of carrying out the obligations they had solemnly undertaken.

22. The United States had applied that discriminatory policy on 29 August 1946, when for the first time they made use of the right of veto in a vote in the Security Council (57th meeting) on a recommendation to the General Assembly. Thus the United States had prevented the admission of the People's Republic of Albania and the People's Republic of Mongolia to the United Nations. They had done so despite the fact that during the Second World War the peoples of those countries had taken up arms to fight against the Axis Powers, had poured out their blood and sacrificed a great part of their national heritage to the victory of the forces of democracy and the defeat of fascist barbarity. The very fact that the United States had used their right of veto in connexion with the examination of a recommendation to the General Assembly on the subject of the admission of a new Member proved that they con-

<sup>2</sup> See *Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, III/1/37 (1).



sidered that question to be one of substance and not of procedure. What had been a question of substance in 1946 could not be something else in 1952 simply to suit the convenience of the United States and to contribute to their plans to weaken the unanimity principle.

23. The United States had also violated the undertakings they entered into under the Potsdam Agreement and the peace treaties concluded at Paris with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. By those treaties the United States had pledged themselves to support the admission of those States to the United Nations. Hence the United States were clearly violating the international treaties and engagements they had solemnly accepted by refusing Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria admission to the United Nations. The attitude of the United States was plainly discriminatory and was inspired entirely by a profound hatred of States which had refused to become satellites of the United States and which were pursuing an independent policy as sovereign States.

24. That policy of discrimination against peace-loving democratic States and of favouritism towards other States had been particularly clearly demonstrated in the case of Italy. The United States had undertaken to support Italy's admission to the United Nations, as they had undertaken to support that of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, the situation of which during the Second World War had been similar to that of Italy. Shortly after the end of the war, however, the United States had disregarded its commitments by opposing the admission of States which had identical rights to those of Italy, while supporting Italy's admission. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, faithful to its undertakings, had several times proposed that Italy should be admitted to the United Nations at the same time as the other States parties to the Paris peace treaties. It had gone even further and had proposed the simultaneous admission of all the applicant States, despite the fact that the admission of some of them would have the result of strengthening the United States' mechanical majority in the Organization.

25. As was well known, it was the United States Government that had opposed and still opposed that proposal. It was the United States which had prevented and still prevented Italy's admission to the United Nations. All the allegations that it was the Soviet Union which prevented the admission of Italy were lies intended to mislead public opinion in Italy and the rest of the world and to shift the responsibility from the United States to the Soviet Union. They were designed to exonerate the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, which for years had refused to comply with the undertakings they had assumed under the Potsdam Agreement and the peace treaties, thus depriving Italy of its right to membership of the United Nations by persistently opposing the admission to the Organization of the peoples' democracies, although those States pursued a policy of international peace and co-operation, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States, and were peacefully building themselves up and developing their industrial and agricultural production in order to raise their peoples' economic, social and cultural standards. In their new mutual relationships, based on the principle of fraternal co-operation and reciprocal assistance, they

had been able to banish ancient sources of discord which in the past had formed a threat to international peace and security. The foreign and domestic policy of those States was directed towards encouraging peaceful and friendly relations between peoples and was thus a buttress of international peace and security. Their absence from the United Nations was thus a loss to the Organization, whose principal task was the maintenance of international peace and security.

26. The United States' policy in connexion with the admission of new Members challenged the principle of the universality of the United Nations. It formed an obstacle to the development of peaceful co-operation among the peoples of the world. He was glad to note that an ever-increasing number of Member States were becoming aware of those facts. The vote at the sixth session of the General Assembly (370th plenary meeting) on the Soviet Union proposal that all the applicant States should be admitted simultaneously showed that the majority of the Members of the United Nations were deeply disturbed by that state of affairs and deplored the attitude of the United States.

27. The Polish draft resolution opened the way for an equitable solution of the question. He whole-heartedly endorsed that draft and hoped that it would receive the support of other delegations.

28. Mr. TJONDRONEGORO (Indonesia) said that his country had been the sixtieth and latest State to be admitted to membership in the United Nations and was therefore particularly well able to understand the disappointment and disillusionment of all States deprived of the privilege of participating in the work of the Organization. Indonesia deplored the deadlock in the Security Council, since it would like to see the United Nations established as a universal organization in which the voices of all nations might find expression.

29. But that universality, which was so desirable, was apparently being sacrificed to the demands of the "cold war". Despite all the arguments advanced, his delegation could not accept the view that the admission of new Members was a question of procedure, but regarded it as a problem of the highest political importance. In deciding whether or not a country was peace-loving, a requirement for the admission of an applicant State laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, the Organization was taking a political decision to which the unanimity rule mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 27 applied. The advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice in 1950 that the General Assembly was not competent to rule on an application for admission except on the recommendation of the Security Council bore out the view that the question was a political one on which the unanimity of the permanent members was advisable if not essential under the present Charter.

30. Although the members of the Security Council had been unable to reach agreement on that vital question, the Indonesian delegation still hoped that a sincere desire for universality would permit present difficulties to be overcome and the preamble of the Charter to be translated into reality. The authors of the Charter had wished to make the Organization a meeting place of all peoples and nations. It had even been proposed at the San Francisco Conference to include a provision in the Charter under which all States would have been *ipso*

*facto* members of the Organization without an act of accession or an application for admission. That proposal had not been adopted, but it indicated that universality had been the ideal aimed at. The Indonesian delegation ardently wished for a revival of the universal spirit of the Charter, for the development of the Organization into a centre where nations would meet to harmonize their policies and reconcile their disputes. It noted with deep regret that, although Article 4 opened the door to all peace-loving States, admission had been denied to many States representing hundreds of millions of human beings.

31. An examination of Article 4 indicated that, of the conditions laid down in that article, acceptance of the obligations of the Charter was the only condition which could be judged objectively. But the peace-loving nature of a State and its ability and willingness to fulfil the obligations of the Charter were conditions which were unfortunately bound up with numerous political considerations. Member States were therefore morally bound to participate in the "judgment of the Organization" with an open, liberal and unprejudiced mind, since peace was indivisible and a matter of direct concern to all peoples, not only to existing Members of the Organization.

32. His delegation urged all Members to restore that serious political problem to its true perspective and, in deciding upon applications, to refrain from applying criteria based on power politics and on the rivalry between the two blocs engaged in the "cold war", which were charging one another with discrimination and abuse of the veto. The Secretary-General, in his annual report (A/2141) to the seventh session of the General Assembly, had placed the problem in its true perspective by pointing out that it concerned States and not governments. Heterogeneity was the *raison d'être* of the Organization, in which diverse ideas should be able to meet and blend into a common effort to assure and preserve international peace. There was no question of judging the governments of applicant States. The prime objective should be to foster understanding among all nations and the participation of all peoples in efforts for peace and the general welfare.

33. In considering applicants, it would be presumptuous for Member States to assume that other States cherished those noble objectives less than they did themselves. The United Nations had been born of the Second World War, and the term "peace-loving States" used in Article 4 therefore had a special and restricted meaning: when the Charter had been drafted it had denoted the Allied as opposed to the Axis Powers. But time had passed and peace was no longer the concern of the former Allies only, but also of all States desiring to contribute to its maintenance. Conceptions of how best to achieve world peace might differ, but that difference only added to the value of a universal meeting place where free exchange and discussion would be possible. In order to strengthen the Organization and increase its prestige, it was essential that no application should be rejected *a priori* and that the Great Powers should arrive at a compromise and should remove the obstacles at present impeding a solution of the problem. The greater responsibilities delegated to the permanent Members of the Security Council imposed upon them the obligation to discharge those responsibilities with moderation and impartiality and to avoid refusing ad-

mission to any State capable of making a valuable contribution to understanding, co-operation and peace among nations.

34. The Indonesian delegation was therefore prepared to interpret Article 4 liberally and to assume generally the peaceful intentions of all States, since their governments represented peoples who had the right and duty to contribute towards the maintenance of peace. Whether admission was simultaneous or not was a secondary question. What mattered was to make the Organization as universal as possible. It was with that principle in mind that the Indonesian delegation would vote on the various draft resolutions which were or would be before the Committee.

35. Mr. FRAGOSO (Brazil) said that the admission of new Members was one of the apparently insoluble problems created by the persistent disagreement among the permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly could not act except on the recommendation of the Council and could therefore do little more than maintain the item on its agenda.

36. The question was undoubtedly essentially political. All other considerations had receded into the background, and the question was no longer whether applicant States fulfilled the required conditions, but merely whether their applications should be examined singly or *en bloc*. Brazil, advocating as it did the principle of the universality of the United Nations, had always been in favour of considering each application separately. It thought that the Security Council and the General Assembly could not make their decision contingent upon whether applications were submitted separately or collectively. The method of collective approval involved the risk of admitting to membership in the United Nations States which did not fulfil all the conditions laid down in the Charter. It would be dangerous and detrimental to the Organization's prestige.

37. Two countries, Italy and Portugal, fulfilled all the conditions laid down and could make a valuable contribution to the work of the United Nations. They had, however, been refused admission to the Organization as a result of a deplorable system of political transactions which one member of the Security Council had been striving to impose upon all the others. The USSR representative had stated in the Security Council on 19 December 1951 (569th meeting) that his country did not oppose the admission of Italy, and that Italy could be admitted forthwith if other countries were admitted at the same time. That situation pointed to the drawbacks of a system which prevented the admission of a completely qualified State.

38. For those reasons the Brazilian delegation could not vote for the Polish draft resolution. It considered that in the existing circumstances the draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States proposing the establishment of a special committee was a useful proposal and it would vote in favour of it. The problem of the admission of new Members raised many delicate political questions, and the special committee would no doubt be in a position to give the Assembly valuable advice at its next session. He would ask that the Peruvian draft resolution and Mr. Belaúnde's statement should be transmitted to the committee as working documents.

39. His delegation would also vote for the draft resolutions of the United States and France, but reserved its position on the Argentinian amendment (A/AC.61/L.36) to the draft resolution of the four Central-American States.

40. Mr. SALAZAR (Dominican Republic) said that his delegation realized the crucial importance of the question. Either the principle established at the San Francisco Conference would be finally confirmed and the Organization would include all peace-loving States which accepted the obligations contained in the Charter and were able and willing to carry them out, and the General Assembly itself would decide on the admission of new Members; or else it must be conceded that the admission of States which obviously fulfilled all the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter should be subject to new criteria.

41. The delegation of the Dominican Republic could not consent to the use of the provisions of the Charter relating to the admission of new Members to prevent the admission of States which fulfilled the requirements and which ought to be able to take part in the work of the Organization. Nor could it agree that the difficulties which paralysed the Security Council should be allowed to prevent the General Assembly from exercising its right under the Charter to take the final decision. The General Assembly must therefore, in view of the number of applicant States, nearly one-third of that of the present Members, take up the whole question without further delay and show itself able to exercise its functions. The formal requirement of a recommendation from the Security Council should not place the General Assembly in a false position of dependence on the Council. Moreover, at the San Francisco Conference the possibility of the Security Council not making a recommendation to the General Assembly had been envisaged. Since each organ had the right to interpret the Charter in so far as its own functions were concerned, the General Assembly was undoubtedly empowered to decide, in giving effect to Article 4, the nature of the question of the admission of new Members.

42. The delegation of the Dominican Republic would support the draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.32/Rev.1) setting up a special committee to study the question, and hoped that it would lead to a satisfactory solution and a way out of the present impasse, which did nothing to strengthen the Organization or enhance its prestige. It would also vote for the draft resolutions submitted by the United States and France.

43. Mr. KINDYNIS (Greece), referring to the Polish draft resolution, pointed out that according to Article 4 of the Charter each application obviously should be examined individually and that simultaneous collective admissions, as proposed by Poland, were impossible. The Polish proposal, that the admission of States which in the opinion of the vast majority of the Members of the Organization fulfilled all the required conditions should depend on the admission of others which in the view of the majority did not fulfil them, could not be accepted. The USSR representative at the 44th meeting had contrasted Bulgaria and Romania with Greece and said that Greece was governed not by the Greeks themselves but by American missions. The two former

countries, however, had surrendered abjectly first to the nazi and then to the communist dictatorship, whereas Greece had fought for ten years in defence of its freedom and independence against fascist, nazi and communist aggression. No country could be more devoted to freedom than Greece, whose democratic traditions were as old as civilization.

44. The United States draft resolution concerning the admission of Japan represented one further argument against the Polish draft resolution and the method of simultaneous collective admission. The principle of universality had been adduced in favour of that practice, but the Polish proposal did not include Japan, which had shown that it fulfilled the required conditions and which ought to be admitted as a logical consequence of the Peace Treaty. The Greek delegation would vote for the United States draft resolution, since the admission of Japan, a nation of 85 million inhabitants, was bound to strengthen the Organization and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It would also vote for the French draft resolution relating to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

45. The draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States provided for the establishment of a special committee to study the question. That was apparently the only step that could be taken for the time being. The USSR was unlikely to renounce its negative attitude, but the Greek delegation would vote for that draft in the hope that the committee's work might perhaps lead to a way out of the dilemma.

46. Mr. GOROSTIZA (Mexico) observed that the Mexican delegation had voted in favour of the universality of the United Nations at San Francisco and had never changed its attitude. The principle of universality applied to all sovereign States complying with the conditions laid down in Article 4. He regretted the circumstances which prevented the admission of a number of States which incontestably fulfilled all the conditions. The Mexican delegation felt that it might even be advantageous to admit States that did not fulfil them, as they would thus be bound by their obligations as Member States.

47. At the San Francisco Conference the Mexican delegation, together with the majority of Latin-American delegations, had opposed the rule of unanimity of the permanent Members. It had also deplored that the Assembly had not been granted wider powers. The only way out of the present dilemma would be to find a compromise. On that account the Mexican delegation welcomed the efforts of the Peruvian delegation and the Central-American delegations to solve the problem by starting again at the beginning. It would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the five Central-American States because it thought the proposed special committee would be able to make a useful contribution to the solution of the problem.

48. The Mexican delegation had no objection to the admission of any of the countries enumerated in the Polish draft resolution, but it did not think a recommendation to admit all those States simultaneously could be considered, as it raised a question of procedure which did not arise from the Charter.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.