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Chairman : Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

Organization of the work of the Committee (A/AC.53/L.23)

1. The CHAIRMAN read a letter (A/AC.53/L.23) from the President of the General Assembly which recalled that the target date for the completion of the Assembly's agenda was 26 January 1952, and requested that the Committee should consider measures—such as night meetings, starting in the week beginning 14 January—to enable it to finish its work by that date. The Chairman suggested that the Committee might expedite its work by holding night meetings or Saturday afternoon meetings, and that it might also begin its meetings exactly on time. He also suggested that representatives should refrain from postponing their statements, so that meetings would not need to be adjourned owing to lack of speakers, and that draft resolutions and amendments should be submitted as promptly as possible.

2. In reply to a question from Mr. KYROU (Greece), the CHAIRMAN pointed out that shortage of committee rooms prevented the holding of two meetings of the Committee a day.

Palestine : (a) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1985, A/AC.53/L.22, A/AC.53/L.24) ; (b) Assistance to Palestine refugees : report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East (A/1905 and A/1905/Add.1) (continued)

[Item 24]*

3. Mr. SALFAN (Saudi Arabia) attributed the grave problems besetting the Palestine Arabs and the Arab world in general to the unjust manner in which the

United Nations had dealt with the whole of the Palestine question from the outset. The most recent report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1985) was further proof of the chronic helplessness of the Organization to achieve an equitable solution of a situation which it had brought about by its own decisions. The Assembly had failed to heed the repeated warnings of the Arab States as to the serious consequences which must result from the abuse of Arab rights in Palestine ; instead, it had yielded to the pressure of certain interested Powers and had placed political expediency above the cause of international peace.

4. Despite the fact that Arab grievances concerning Palestine had had no redress since 1948, the thousands of destitute Arab refugees still hoped that the conscience of the international community would not permit the continued violation of their inherent rights and would ultimately secure the restoration to them of their rights and properties. Unfortunately, the Conciliation Commission's report did not give adequate emphasis to the plight of the refugees, who were, after all, the people most directly affected by the Palestine imbroglio. Nor did it accord enough serious attention to the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions which repeatedly emphasized the right of the Palestine Arabs to repatriation to their homeland and the need for the restitution of their property. Instead, the Commission had attempted to appease the Jewish authorities by stating that responsibility for the tragic situation of the refugees must be shared by both the Arabs and the Jews.

5. When it drew up the Lausanne Protocol, the Conciliation Commission had acted within its basic terms of reference and had proposed measures in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions. The Jewish authorities, however, had failed to honour the very document which they had signed. In the same

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

way, the avowed failure of the Conciliation Commission was the result of the uncompromising attitude of the Jewish authorities alone. The intransigence of the latter had been supported by the powerful States members of the Conciliation Commission. Unless those States, together with others which shared their views, withdrew their moral and material support to the Jewish authorities they could not expect to lay a sound basis for a durable political settlement. The draft resolution which they had sponsored (A/AC.53/L.22), while of unquestioned good faith, must take into account that important preliminary condition.

6. To effect a settlement between Arabs and Jews, the policy of Jewish expansion in the Palestine area must be ended, and the Palestine Arabs must be repatriated, not merely sustained on charity. The attempt to rehabilitate the Arab refugees in countries outside Palestine was unrealistic so long as the refugees were convinced, and rightly so, that they need not renounce their inalienable right to their homes and property. There was strong feeling among all Arabs that they could ultimately regain Palestine for its legitimate owners and any step to frustrate that aspiration could only aggravate the situation. The joint draft resolution lacked realism in that it failed to emphasize the Palestine Arabs' right to return to that part of the country which had been earmarked for them by the United Nations partition plan.

7. Mr. Salfan took exception to the premise stated in the joint draft resolution that the Governments concerned in the Palestine situation had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement. While the Arab Governments were in a position to assume that burden, the Jewish authorities were not, in so far as the latter's over-all economic and political policy was directed by Jewish organizations outside Palestine and their budget maintained by the contributions of foreign organizations.

8. Finally, it was unreasonable for the joint draft resolution to call for "concessions" from the Arabs, who were justifiably convinced that they had already been compelled to give away too much while receiving little or nothing in return. On the contrary, it was for the Jews, who had gained most, to make concessions.

9. Mr. FAWZI MULKY (Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) pointed out that three years had passed since the Conciliation Commission had been appointed by the General Assembly to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. The Commission had been acting in the name of the United Nations and one of its principal tasks had been to carry out the specific directives contained in resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 and 394 (V) of 14 December 1950. Yet it had failed in its task precisely because it had gone about that task in the wrong way.

10. The Jordan delegation, together with those of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, had always shown readiness to collaborate with the Conciliation Commission. A joint statement of their attitude had been submitted

to the Commission on 3 October 1951, and the Commission had included it in its report (A/1985, Annex B, Appendix II). In a letter dated 6 October 1951, the Conciliation Commission had clearly stated that it considered the joint Arab statement adequate.

11. The Arab delegations were most anxious to see an early settlement of the Palestine problem because it would put an end to the sufferings of the refugees. The reason for the Conciliation Commission's failure to reach a settlement was the refusal of Israel to implement the General Assembly resolutions. A case in point was the fact that Israel was not prepared to implement paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), as stated in paragraph 84 of the Conciliation Commission's report before the Committee. It was detrimental to the interests of the international community that the decisions of the United Nations should be ignored because they inconvenienced one party to a dispute.

12. The Conciliation Commission appeared, however, to entertain the point of view of Israel when it stated, in point 2 of the proposals it submitted to the parties and which appeared in Section D of its report, that Israel should agree to the repatriation of a specified number of refugees which could be integrated into the economy of the State of Israel and who wished to return and live in peace with their neighbours. Such an attitude on the part of the Commission tended to encourage Israel to pursue its policy of mass Jewish immigration, which was the real obstacle to the repatriation of the Arab refugees. In flagrant violation of the General Assembly resolution, the property of the refugees was being handed over to Jewish immigrants, and the policy of Israel, which would inevitably lead to aggression and expansion, was clearly dictated by its desire to achieve its own ambitions. It was hard to understand why the Conciliation Commission should take into consideration the economic situation of Israel while completely ignoring the rights of the Arab refugees.

13. The Jordan representative was aware of no arrangement between Israel and the Arab refugees which could lead to the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions nor did he know of any resolution superseding those still in force. But the Conciliation Commission, which might have been expected to do so, had not brought the unwarranted actions of Israel to the knowledge of the General Assembly, nor had it been able to take any positive action to induce Israel to accept its responsibilities under the General Assembly resolutions.

14. The Arab delegations had responded to every invitation sent to them by the Conciliation Commission and had attended meetings at Beirut, Lausanne, Geneva, New York and Paris. Mr. Fawzi Mulky wished in particular to draw the Committee's attention to the Lausanne Protocol signed in May 1949 by all the parties to the dispute. The Protocol had been intended to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives laid down in General Assembly resolution 194 (III). Since the signature of that document, the Commission had reported no attempts which it might have made

towards achieving those objectives or any reason that might have prevented their achievement. The refusal of Israel to honour its signature and implement the Protocol clearly revealed the chief reason for the Conciliation Commission's failure.

15. The Conciliation Commission's report showed how on every occasion on which the Arab States had readily offered their co-operation, Israel had refused to do so. The Commission had taken no positive steps to carry out its task and had apportioned no blame for its failure.

16. With regard to the comprehensive proposals submitted to the parties by the Conciliation Commission, the Jordan delegation could not agree with the Commission's explanations regarding point 1. The misleading arguments of the Israel representative could not obscure the acts of terrorism and massacres which were still fresh in the minds of the Arab delegations. With regard to point 2, the only equitable solution would be the implementation of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), as confirmed by resolutions 302 (IV) adopted in December 1949 and 394 (V) adopted in December 1950. The proposal of any other course would violate the Conciliation Commission's own terms of reference. If Arab refugees were prevented from returning to their homes in order to make room for Jewish immigrants, the Commission would have failed completely in its task and would have introduced a solution unprecedented in history.

17. With regard to point 3 of the Conciliation Commission's proposals, Mr. Fawzi Mulky felt that Israel should assume responsibility for compensation to refugees, and he did not see how the payment of such compensation could be made dependent on the financial capacity of the country which had either acquired or destroyed the property of the refugees. The latter should receive everything to which they were entitled.

18. The principle contained in point 4 regarding the refugees' blocked assets had already been accepted by the Jordan delegation at Lausanne, but the contents of point 5 appeared to be outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations or any of its organs, since it referred to inter-State relations normally regulated in accordance with established principles of international law.

19. Mr. Fawzi Mulky thought that the Conciliation Commission had exceeded its terms of reference; it had not only failed to implement the General Assembly resolutions, as it was required to do, but it had exceeded its powers by submitting proposals on points which had already been decided. The Commission's failure to operate within its terms of reference and its failure to take a positive stand or to apportion blame to either party had encouraged Israel to persist in its attempts to avoid undertaking any commitments in the direction of achieving a just solution.

20. The Conciliation Commission was mistaken when it stated, in paragraph 83 of its report, that neither side was now ready to seek the achievement of stability in Palestine through full implementation of the General

Assembly resolutions under which the Commission was operating. Such full implementation had throughout been the aim of the Arab delegations.

21. The Conciliation Commission's report referred to changes in Palestine during the past three years, but it failed to note that those changes had been brought about by Israel in order to deny the natural rights of the Arab refugees. Mr. Fawzi Mulky could not agree with the United Kingdom representative (34th meeting) that the Arab refugees might be happier if they were resettled in the Arab States. Such a solution would be morally unacceptable and, from a psychological point of view, would have a bad effect on the refugees themselves.

22. Mr. EBAN (Israel) stressed that the primary reason for the failure of the Conciliation Commission to carry out its mandate and for the absence of any progress toward a settlement of the Palestine problem was the obdurate refusal of the Arab representatives to engage in the normal processes of direct negotiation with Israel. Israel's offers in the course of the past three years to negotiate a non-aggression pact or a revision of the armistice agreements, its expressed willingness to discuss the Arab refugee problem either separately or within the general context of international relations had met with firm refusal on the part of the Arab Governments. That rejection of the opportunity to work out a settlement of the outstanding differences between the parties clearly implied the Arab States' determination not to reach such a settlement and thus to frustrate the prospects for peace in the Middle East. It should be recalled, to illustrate further the decisive effect of the Arab refusal to negotiate, that it was by negotiation under United Nations auspices that the Arab States and Israel passed from active hostilities to a truce and from the truce to the armistice agreements. By frank discussion within the framework of the armistice system, they had settled a number of disputes which might have threatened international peace. Moreover, the record showed that Israel and the Arab States had never sat together on any question without reaching agreement; nor had they ever agreed except after direct exchange of views.

23. The Arab Governments justified their obstinacy on the ground that Israel did not politically or juridically exist as a State, and that to agree to take part in negotiations would be tantamount to recognition of its statehood. It was that extraordinary denial of the existence of a Member of the United Nations, endowed with all the attributes of sovereignty, which blocked efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problems.

24. The perplexity expressed by the representative of Lebanon (33rd meeting) regarding the precise definition of Israel nationality resulted from the fact that he, like other Arab representatives, had failed to understand the essential fact that a cohesive, distinctive and compact national society had emerged in Israel through the processes of mass immigration. That new population, welded together after 2,000 years of dispersion and suffering, was a sovereign and inde-

pendent entity which could undertake no international commitments without the express consent of its Government. That consent, obtained through free negotiation, was the only course towards a solution of the existing problems. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, within a single lifetime, the inhabitants of the Arab world had, largely through outside efforts and sacrifices, been enabled to throw off the yoke of colonial repression and territorial domination and to forge seven sovereign Arab States. Israel occupied only 8,100 square miles in the middle of that vast Arab domain; both Israel and the world community had repeatedly denied Arab claims to sovereignty within that tiny area. Yet Arab nationalism was directed not to exploiting the vast benefits which had been lavished on the Arab States, but to harassing the small parcel of land which had justly been withheld from them. While Israel did not envy the expanse of Arab empire, it would not apologize for the small haven with which history had finally rewarded the agony of the Jewish people, and it intended to defend it despite the most cruel pressures.

25. The Conciliation Commission's report further demonstrated the Arab refusal to accept the fact of a sovereign Israel. The Arab representatives had gone so far as to reject the preamble of the Commission's proposals, which would bind them to refrain from committing acts of hostility, and had entered a specific reservation on that point. Their action clearly indicated that they did not desire a final settlement, but were, on the contrary, asking for international approval of their policy of hostility and non-recognition of Israel.

26. Several Arab representatives had also argued that population pressures within Israel would inevitably lead to aggressive expansion of the new State. That argument lost all validity when the fact was considered that, despite mass immigration, there were still large stretches of barren lands in Israel. Moreover, population density in Israel was only 200 per square mile in comparison with 280 in Lebanon and 1,400 for the inhabited areas of Egypt. Israel might more logically claim that the population pressures in the neighbouring countries constituted a threat to its existence. Nevertheless, it was the combined forces of those countries which had attempted to exterminate the emerging Jewish State, while Israel had never tried to infringe their territorial integrity or political independence. Moreover, if the Arab premise regarding the effects of population pressures was to be accepted, it should be applied to other countries like the United Kingdom, Belgium or Italy where population density far exceeded that of Israel. On the other hand, the Lebanese representative had quite accurately described the abnormal economic situation in Israel. It did in fact have the highest immigration rate known and it did need to export goods to the value of 64 million Israel pounds in order to achieve economic stability. It was confident that, through the industrial revolution already in progress, the increased productivity resulting from it, the elaboration of methods for securing a balance of payments and the selection of immigrants, it would achieve that stability. All those matters, however,

were solely within its own jurisdiction and, under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, could not be challenged on any international plane. The charge of potential expansion on the part of Israel was groundless not only in terms of economic facts; it could not be reconciled with the Arab refusal to accept proposals for non-aggression pacts which would provide guarantees backed by the great Powers and the United Nations against any future encroachment.

27. Recalling the charge of violation of Israel's pledges under the Lausanne Protocol, Mr. Eban explained that both parties had agreed, as a basis of discussion, to state their respective territorial claims in reference to the map attached to the abortive partition plan. Israel, referring to the provisional boundaries fixed by the armistice agreements, which could only be altered by mutual consent, had declared that it claimed no territory forming part of any Arab State or within the jurisdiction of such State under the armistice agreements. That declaration was proof of a desire to establish a definitive settlement on the basis of a provisional agreement. The Arab States, for their part, however, had laid formal claim to all the territories which they occupied under the armistice agreements and to a series of additional territories which actually constituted 85 per cent of the lands under Israel's jurisdiction. It was that categorical and spectacular claim which had rendered the Lausanne Protocol null and void.

28. Mr. Eban announced that, at a later stage of the Committee's debate, he would submit constructive proposals. Nevertheless, in the absence of realistic prospects of an over-all settlement of the various interdependent problems outstanding between the parties, and in view of the urgency and humanitarian nature of the refugee question, the United Nations should deal with it separately. Like leaders of public opinion everywhere, and like the States which, on the spot, were actively concerned with the question, Israel considered that the solution of the refugee problem lay in regional resettlement and not in integration of the Arab refugees in the State of Israel.

29. The refugee problem had been created not by the creation of the State of Israel, but by the Arab attempt to prevent the emergence of the new State by force of arms in defiance of international authority. Responsibility could not then be placed, as the Arab representatives maintained, on Israel and the United Nations. On the contrary, the Arab States, which had, by their assault upon Israel, spread panic among thousands of Palestine Arabs, and which reserved the right to commit further acts of hostility and to strangle the economic life of the new State, bore initial moral responsibility for the plight of the refugees.

30. Repatriation was not only an unrealistic solution; it was unjust and injurious to Israel, to the welfare of the refugees themselves and to ultimate peace and stability in the area. Moreover, the Arab refugee question was only one of many population problems besetting the Palestine region. Israel had borne the heavy burden of the European refugees, remnants of

the Nazi holocaust, and had taken in 500,000 of them. Later, it had given refuge to some 300,000 persons from Arab countries who had sought freedom in the rising Jewish State. As a result of the Israel-Arab war, there had been a two-way population shift similar to that caused by the India-Pakistan partition. While 500,000 Arabs had left Israel territory, 300,000 Jews had come into Israel from Arab countries, one-third of them from Iraq. It was significant that Iraq had as yet taken very few of the Arab refugees. The migration processes could not be reversed. It remained to be seen whether the plight of the refugees was being prolonged for political reasons or whether the logic of history would be accepted to facilitate the integration of Jewish refugees in Israel and the resettlement of Arab refugees in Arab lands. How could it be maintained in all fairness that the smallest country, having borne the brunt of two vast refugee problems, should now assume the third problem created by the Arab aggression?

31. There was a basic distinction between the problems of the absorption of Jewish refugees by Israel and the reintegration of the Palestine Arabs. Each immigrant selected for Israel must be dedicated to the survival and prosperity of his adopted homeland and to its defence against future threats to its existence. The Arab refugee, permeated by the bitterness and vindictiveness which characterized the attitude of the Arab States toward Israel, could not meet those standards. Moreover, the repatriated Arab would not willingly accept the economic sacrifices required of the people of Israel to maintain a high rate of immigration in fulfilment of the main purpose of the new State, or, as the United Kingdom representative had stated, subject himself to a régime of austerity directed toward goals which he might well resent. Similarly, the Arab refugee was bound to the Arab States by culture, language, history and religion. Accordingly, his happiness could best be assured by resettlement in those lands rather than by forcing his integration into an alien scene. Such resettlement in more congenial areas would be tantamount to an act of repatriation.

32. It was difficult to reconcile the Arab argument that the Arab citizens of Israel were being oppressed with their demands that the Arab refugees should be integrated into that country. The first contention was patently false as Arab citizens of Israel enjoyed equal rights with all other citizens. Furthermore, Israel was the only country in the Middle East where women had the right to vote and children enjoyed the benefits of compulsory education. The second contention revealed an absence of genuine humanitarian concern for the happiness of the Arab refugee. Obviously there would be no Arab refugee problem if the Arab States adopted the same attitude toward the refugees as Israel had taken toward its Jewish immigrants.

33. The joint draft resolution had taken as a point of departure the Conciliation Commission's assertion that the Arab Governments had evinced no readiness to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel and had therefore rightly concluded that primary responsibility for such a settlement rested upon the Governments concerned. On the other hand, the interest of the United

Nations in the continued preservation of peace had been effectively expressed by the Chairman of the Armistice Commission, by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and by the Security Council. Discontinuance of the Conciliation Commission would leave no vacuum in the security field. The armistice agreements made full provision for modifications, revision, or even their replacement by a permanent peace treaty by mutual consent of the parties. Discontinuance of the Conciliation Commission would emphasize the peace-making potentialities in the armistice system, and widen the possibilities for progress through machinery which had already been used. Similarly, the United Nations interest in the Arab refugees was adequately ensured by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Finally, the Conciliation Commission had itself concluded that it could no longer be effective in facilitating a solution of the political differences between the parties in view of the Arab refusal to negotiate. The deadlock did not, however, constitute a threat to the peace so long as the armistice system remained secure. Moreover, there were other areas of the world where continuing problems of inter-State relations were being dealt with without recourse to United Nations machinery. Until the time came when the Arab States were prepared to negotiate a peace settlement, the Conciliation Commission had no useful function and its existence might even do more harm than good by obscuring an intransigence that should be revealed. Finally, the Israel Government remained ready to enter into direct negotiations with the Arab States at all times. It would be desirable, therefore, to make a clean break with the past, discontinue the present Conciliation Commission and perhaps, at some future favourable moment, reconstitute a new good offices committee, with the same membership as the Commission, to be made available to the parties. In the meantime, the situation could be dealt with within the framework of the armistice agreements.

34. There seemed to be no justification for the presence in Jerusalem of an agent of the Conciliation Commission, as provided in paragraph 6 of the joint draft resolution. Jerusalem was the seat of the United Nations Chief of Staff under the armistice system, and it would be advisable to avoid any duplication of United Nations representation there.

35. In conclusion, Mr. Eban reiterated that the objective of Israel's policy was to reach formal understanding with its Arab neighbours. Should their hostility continue, Israel would go on working out its destiny in co-operation with the many friendly communities, peoples and governments that lay beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Israel. Israel aspired toward regional peace and appealed to the Arab States to consider the establishment of normal relations with Israel, which would enable their kindred peoples to build up the prosperity of the entire area, fortify it through mutual aid and remedy its social and economic ills. In view of the great political emancipation of the Arab world in so short a period, the Arab States would be false to their past and to their future if they were to decline Israel's offer of co-operation.

36. Mr. CHOUKAYRI (Syria) said that he hoped in a very short time to demonstrate that Mr. Eban's statement was entirely without foundation.

37. The Israel representative had referred to the failure of the Conciliation Commission and had said that that failure was due to the refusal of the Arabs to meet and talk with the representatives of Israel. Yet there had been both an Arab and an Israel representative on the Special Mixed Committee entrusted with the task of discussing blocked accounts, and the failure to achieve the release of any of the six million pounds belonging to the Arab refugees and frozen in the banks of Israel had been due to the intransigence of the Israel Government.

38. The Arab Governments had declared their willingness to meet representatives of Israel provided that the latter would declare Israel's acceptance of the General Assembly resolutions, upon which Israel had said that it would not be bound by those resolutions. International negotiations could hardly be conducted without any agreed basis and guiding principles, and, since the Conciliation Commission was a United Nations body, it was natural that the differences with which it had to deal should be worked out within the framework of General Assembly resolutions. Since Israel rejected the latter, it was difficult to understand why it was so insistent on holding meetings with the Arabs. Which was the party that really rebelled against the resolutions? With all the documents available on the subject, it would hardly seem that Israel wanted either to hear the views of the Arabs or to put its own views to them on the basis of the General Assembly's resolutions.

39. Israel's real motive in calling for a meeting must be a desire to dictate its will to the Arabs, presenting a *fait accompli* and ignoring the resolutions of the General Assembly. No one with sense or dignity could agree to such a meeting.

40. The Conciliation Commission had changed its procedures, its places of meeting and even its representatives, but the attitude of Israel had remained unchanged—it still refused to accept the General Assembly resolutions and it maintained its armed forces in the country which had been the homeland of the Arabs from time immemorial.

41. After three years, not a single refugee had been repatriated, not a single blocked pound had been unfrozen and not a single Arab house restored to its owner. Churches, mosques and synagogues were not secure in Israel, and the Holy Land, holy no longer, had become a *terra incognita* for Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

42. Why had the Conciliation Commission failed? Mr. Eban had referred to the Commission's three main tasks: repatriation and compensation of refugees, internationalization of Jerusalem and territorial adjustments. Without wishing to enter into any details concerning internationalization, the Syrian representative wished to point out that Israel had resisted it, and that Mr. Ben-Gurion had spoken of Jerusalem as the only possible capital of Israel until the end of time. Mr. Choukayri did not know what that meant, but he would assure the

representative of Israel that the end of time might well be beginning for a State which had been established by the will of the international community and which violated the wishes of that community.

43. Mr. Eban had referred to the territorial question. In that connexion there were resolution 181 (II) on partition, the Bernadotte plan and the armistice agreements. Yet Mr. Eban had eloquently summed up his Government's position when he stated in a letter that there could be no cession of the territory now constituting the State of Israel. It would hardly seem necessary for the Arabs to meet the representatives of Israel merely to hear that.

44. The refugee problem, according to Mr. Eban, was the responsibility of the Arabs. Yet, even before the commencement of hostilities in Palestine, which could not be described as war, 200,000 refugees had already left the country. It was the Zionist movement, an aggressive movement directed against the Arab people and intended to displace one nation by another, which was the cause of the refugee problem. In 1919 and 1921, Zionist leaders were already putting forward plans for displacing the Arabs of Palestine in order to make way for Jewish immigration. In 1945, under Zionist pressure, the Congress of the British Labour Party adopted a resolution encouraging the Arabs of Palestine to leave their country and live in the neighbouring Arab States. Israel's representative at the Lausanne talks of the Conciliation Commission had admitted that the minority problem in Palestine had been solved by driving out the Arab minority altogether, an interesting method of solving minority problems which might have uncomfortable results for Israel if it were applied to Israel by its neighbours in the Middle East.

45. Mr. Eban had, in the Security Council, described Arab refugees returning to their homes as infiltrators. Israel itself was an international infiltrator into the midst of the Arab world, and for that very reason its statehood, territory, area, population and immigration policy were open to question.

46. The terms "realism", "mutual concessions" and "justice" were hard to define. The meaning of the last, in particular, seemed to vary in every context, and it had a unique meaning for Israel. As for realism, that appeared to mean forcing the Arabs of Palestine to take up a new life outside their homeland, despite the fact that they represented 80 per cent of the population of Palestine. In fact, the United Nations was being asked to construct a new homeland for a whole nation. Mr. Eban talked of the national existence and economic security of Israel, and seemed to forget that the Arab refugees were citizens of the territory of Israel before that State had existed. A State which could only achieve security by driving out the original inhabitants of its territory could not claim to be worthy of recognition. The State of Israel itself was a danger to the security of the Middle East, and if anyone was to be driven out for security reasons, Israel should be prepared to go.

47. Mr. Eban had called for peace, but peace, which meant for the Arab countries a sincere and honest state of mind, seemed to Mr. Eban to mean merely words.

The Zionist movement was aggressive, and aimed at the establishment of an empire from the Nile to the Euphrates, and still Israel wanted peace with the Arabs. It rejected the General Assembly resolutions of 1947 and 1948, resisted the internationalization of Jerusalem, and refused to accept the repatriation of the refugees. Yet still it called for peace. It was prepared to pay compensation to the refugees, and he wondered whether that was intended to include compensation for the mosques and churches, which, emptied of their worshippers by the eviction of the refugees, would merely become empty showplaces for tourists.

48. Mr. Eban wanted the Arab States to forget the past and look to the future, to resettle the refugees in their own lands, buy Israel's manufactured goods and co-operate with that country. He wondered if any of the representatives on the Committee would feel like accepting such a fate for their own people.

49. The four-Power draft resolution was unacceptable to the Arab States, because they could not brook such a use of the words "justice" and "mutual concessions". If the Conciliation Commission was to continue its work it should do so within the framework of previous General Assembly resolutions. The Syrian represen-

tative had no objection to the transfer of the Commission's headquarters to the United States, but he questioned the value of retaining a representative in Jerusalem. The problem was the responsibility of the United Nations, and the Conciliation Commission, while it could try to conciliate between the two parties, should certainly not conciliate between the General Assembly, on the one hand, and Israel on the other. Mutual concessions could not be made by the parties regarding General Assembly resolutions. Those resolutions either had a meaning or they had not. If they had not, then the refugees should be so informed. Perhaps, if a representative were appointed, he could act as custodian of the property of the refugees; the latter could not have their property because they were absentees under Israel's laws. Yet they were absentees only on account of Israel's action.

50. Israel, which had only come into being as a consequence of the action of the United Nations, was claiming that it need not respect United Nations resolutions because it was a State. Surely its very existence in that capacity was a reason why it should respect those resolutions.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.