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Chairman : Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey),

Later : Mr. Sven GRAFSTRÖM (Sweden).

**Palestine : (a) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1985, A/AC.53/L.22/Rev.1, A/AC.53/L.24, A/AC.53/L.25, A/AC.53/L.28, A/AC.53/L.29, A/AC.53/L.30) ; (b) Assistance to Palestine refugees : report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/1905 and A/1905/Add.1) (continued)**

[Item 24]\*

1. The CHAIRMAN said that three members had signified their intention to avail themselves of their right of reply. As the situation had changed in some respects and further amendments would probably be introduced, he would withdraw his proposal to limit the time of speakers.

2. Mr. CHOUKAYRI (Syria) reminded the Israel representative that eloquence, logic and reason were not decisive in a matter which should be governed solely by considerations of justice and humanity. He would nevertheless follow the advice of the Pakistani representative (37th meeting) who had warned his colleagues against the danger of giving way to emotion. Although emotion was the source of all freedoms, of independence, of faith in the principles of right, justice and democracy, principles which had been proclaimed by the Charter, he would make no reference to the hardships and sufferings of the refugees, but would confine himself to refuting the Israel representative's statement on the basis of indisputable facts.

3. The main argument of the representative of Israel was based on the idea of responsibility. He would not

challenge that argument but would examine it in the light of the case submitted by the Israel representative. It was self-evident that the Arab States could not be held responsible for the present plight of the Palestine Arab refugees. That was borne out by the facts. It was not the Arab States which had convened the Biltmore Congress in New York in May 1942 in order to plan the establishment of a Jewish community in Palestine and the expulsion of the Arabs to the neighbouring States. It was not the Arab States which, three years before the end of the Palestine Mandate, had undertaken a campaign of terror in Palestine, blowing up bridges, mining roads and massacring innocent people. Jewish organizations had committed those crimes.

4. Yet the Arab States, it must be admitted, were partly responsible for the refugees' present plight. They were responsible because they had trusted the Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed the rights and the status of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine ; they were responsible because they had believed that the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant would be applied ; they were responsible because they had placed their trust in the Palestine Mandate, which provided for the protection of Arab rights. In addition, they were partly responsible for the current state of affairs in Palestine because they had believed the statement, made in the White Paper of 1922, that the establishment of a Jewish national home would not necessarily mean the creation of a Jewish State to the detriment of the rights of Arabs to culture and civilization. Lastly, they were responsible because they had believed in the right of self-determination of peoples. They had fallen victim to the politics of the *fait accompli* simply because they had acted in good faith.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

5. With regard to the observations of the Israel representative (39th meeting) on the Pakistani delegation's statement, Mr. Choukayri had no intention of rallying to the defence of his colleague the Pakistani representative. But his delegation would accept as its own the argument that the State of Israel was an artificial international entity.

6. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Syrian representative that he must not question the existence of a Member State, and asked him to use a little moderation.

7. Mr. CHOUKAYRI (Syria) said that he would abide by the Chairman's instructions, although they did not appear to reflect his delegation's views on the interpretation of the General Assembly resolutions.

8. With regard to the Israel representative's observations on the Holy Places, he himself had stated on a previous occasion that Israel threatened the very existence of the Holy Land, since the existence of the State of Israel in Palestine had the effect of driving the Christian and Moslem inhabitants from the vicinity of the churches and mosques in whose shadow they had lived. The Israel representative had said that his Government had no designs on the land occupied by the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Mosque of Omar in the Arab zone. It might be noted, however, that before the Lausanne negotiations the head of the Israel delegation had issued a note asking for the political frontier of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to be fixed along the river Jordan; and that made it quite clear that, despite its representative's statements in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Government of Israel had designs on the land occupied by the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Mosque of Omar.

9. As far as the property of the Palestine Arabs was concerned, Mr. Choukayri did not agree with the Israel representative, who had invoked the argument of national competence to claim that the property of the Palestine Arabs had become part of the economy of the State of Israel. The truth was that the Israel Government had usurped the rights of the Arab population of Palestine by taking possession of entire villages and even cities. It would be noted, moreover, that General Assembly resolution 181 (II), which had conferred sovereignty on the State of Israel, had at the same time established the right of the Arabs to live in the territory of the State of Israel and had guaranteed their property rights. In particular, the resolution stated that legislation enacted by the State of Israel could in no circumstances override Arab rights. Clearly, the State of Israel was required to adhere to all the provisions of resolution 181 (II).

10. The representative of Israel estimated the value of the property of the State of Israel at 100 million pounds. Although Mr. Choukayri did not know how this figure had been arrived at, he did not challenge it, but would merely point out that the Conciliation Commission, which had been instructed by the General Assembly to decide how much should be paid to refugees who did not wish to return to Israel, had omitted to do so and had thus failed in its task. Moreover, the Jews of Palestine owned only about 6 per cent of the country's

property. As the Israel representative estimated the value of the State property at 100 million pounds, the value of the property of the Jewish community must amount to 6 million pounds. He asked the Israel representative whether his Government would be prepared to accept the sum of 60 million pounds, or ten times the value of Jewish property, on condition that it left the country. That, at all events, was a proposal which followed the Israel Government's reasoning.

11. The Israel representative had boasted of his country's economic and social progress and industrial achievements, and had compared the economic situation of Israel with that of the Arab countries. It was an unchallengeable geographic fact that the Arab countries extended over desert regions. That had not prevented their Governments from establishing schools, hospitals, communication systems and irrigation canals. Those advances were, of course, of recent date, and the Arab countries were still under-developed. But the interests, freedom and independence of the Arabs should not be sacrificed merely because the Arab countries had not the science, technical skill or capital at the disposal of the State of Israel. The Israel Government's case resembled in that respect the fascist ideology of Hitler and Mussolini, who had justified their claim to dominate the peoples of the world under the pretext of scientific superiority.

12. The Israel representative was employing a curious argument when he said that the Palestine Arabs could very well resettle in other Arab countries. The same argument could be used to claim that those inhabitants of Normandy, who came from a different French province, should leave Normandy and rejoin their fellow citizens, and that, if the State of New York were occupied by the Jews, the States' Christians and Moslems would have to be transferred to Washington.

13. The Arab States were quite prepared to accept the Israel representative's invitation to begin direct negotiations. Such negotiations, however, could be held only on the basis of the General Assembly resolutions. He wondered whether the Israel representative was aware that, if he meant to disregard those resolutions, he could no longer claim to speak on behalf of the Government of a State which owed its existence to a United Nations decision, but merely on behalf of the Palestine Jews.

14. The Arab States had already announced their willingness to implement and observe all the General Assembly resolutions and, in particular, the resolutions concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem, and they had proposed in that connexion that the United Nations should ask the Pope to appoint the first Governor of Jerusalem, to whom the Arabs would be happy to hand over the keys of the Holy Sepulchre. On the other hand, it was only necessary to refer to a statement by Mr. Ben-Gurion, which was quoted in Mr. James McDonald's book *My mission in Israel*, to see that the Israel Government was not prepared to implement the resolutions. In the passage quoted, Mr. Ben-Gurion had asserted that Israel would not

give up at the conference table what it had won on the battlefield.

15. Mr. Choukayri apologized for having taken up so much of the Committee's time. The refugees, however, were not represented in the Committee; they had no powerful means of propaganda; they did not control the world radio and press; and they had nothing to offer in exchange for the justice for which they asked. All they had in their favour was the sympathy of men throughout the world and the interest taken by the United Nations in their cause. Where else could they obtain justice if not in the United Nations? While the United Nations was, of course, not a tribunal, and could not give judgment in the cases submitted to it, neither was it a club for the delivery of platonic speeches.

16. The confidence and hopes placed by the peoples in the United Nations were at stake and the question under discussion by the Committee represented a test of strength for the Organization.

17. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the question of the refugees would be dealt with when the Committee took up agenda item 24 (b). It was therefore not the time to deal with it at length.

18. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation could not accept the draft resolution submitted jointly by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/AC.53/L.22), even as amended by the Canadian delegation, as it proposed the maintenance of the Conciliation Commission, in spite of the fact that the latter had acknowledged its failure to carry out the task assigned to it. His delegation was opposed to the retention of the Commission, which had merely been the instrument of American policy in the Near and Middle East, and it had submitted a draft resolution calling for the Commission's dissolution (A/AC.53/L.24). It could not therefore support any proposal designed to retain a useless and even harmful organ.

19. The USSR delegation would take the same attitude towards the amendments submitted by Colombia (A/AC.53/L.25) and Afghanistan (A/AC.53/L.30) to the joint draft resolution, as well as towards the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan (A/AC.53/L.28).

20. His delegation was also unable to support the Israel draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.29). There was nothing in part B of the draft which would facilitate a settlement of the question.

21. As the USSR and other delegations, particularly those of the Arab States and Israel, had shown, the real cause of the Conciliation Commission's failure was to be found in its very composition, which made it the political instrument of the countries represented on it. The Israel proposal to establish a United Nations good offices committee, with the same membership as the Conciliation Commission, doomed the new organ to failure.

22. The parties should settle their dispute directly, without any pressure being brought to bear upon them by other States.

23. The representative of Yemen, at the 37th meeting, had attempted to place the responsibility for the current situation in Palestine on the USSR by recalling how the USSR had voted on the resolutions which had been submitted to the General Assembly on the Palestine question. The representative of Yemen was on the wrong track. It was a matter of common knowledge that large armed forces were stationed in the countries of the Middle East, and that many naval and air bases had been established in the Middle East against the will of the peoples of that area. Those armed forces, however, were not Soviet forces and the military bases were not Soviet bases. In fact, the current situation in Palestine was the direct result of Anglo-American intrigues and manoeuvres in the Middle East. It was therefore the United Kingdom and the United States which should be held responsible for the situation.

24. Mr. EBAN (Israel) pointed out that the Syrian representative had in fact reopened the general debate, under cover of rule 114 of the rules of procedure. As regards the Syrian representative's long diatribe, he had only two observations to make: the first was that a statement to the effect that Israel's property in Palestine was worth 60 million pounds was wholly ridiculous; the second, that he himself had never said a word about deserts constituting the greater part of the Arab States or about the inadequate development of those countries.

25. Reverting to the question under discussion, Mr. Eban explained his delegation's purpose in submitting its draft resolution. His Government considered that the primary responsibility for achieving a peace settlement lay with the States directly concerned. Until the Arab policy had as its objective to reach a settlement with Israel, no attempt at mediation would be of any avail.

26. In the absence of such a settlement, the Israel Government held that the armistice agreements should be meticulously observed. It also considered that, while the General Assembly resolutions on the Palestine question might be invoked by any government in the course of negotiation, the parties concerned should retain their undisputed right as sovereign States to conclude any agreement in which they might mutually concur. His Government hoped that the United Nations would make its good offices available to the parties, should they be in need of such assistance. The Israel delegation would therefore vote against any resolution or amendment limiting the parties to the previous resolutions of the General Assembly, which had failed in the past to provide the basis for an agreement between the Arab States and Israel.

27. The Israel delegation could not allow the general debate to close without challenging the extraordinary doctrine advanced by the representatives of the Arab States with regard to General Assembly resolutions.

28. It should be noted, in the first place, that the original 1947 resolution had become obsolete through the action of the Arab States themselves, when they used their armed forces beyond the frontiers assigned to them under the resolution.

29. Secondly, it should be recalled that, in 1948, the General Assembly had refused to confirm the 1947 resolution and had invited the parties to reach agreement by negotiation.

30. Thirdly, it must not be overlooked that that Assembly recommendation to the parties concerned was the main clause of the resolution. Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), which related to the return of the refugees to their homes, made the return dependent upon two conditions: first, the restoration of peace between the neighbouring peoples; and, second, the practicability of repatriation. The idea underlying the Pakistani proposal did not take into account those conditions laid down by the General Assembly for the return of the refugees and therefore was not in conformity with the General Assembly's instructions.

31. Finally, the territorial status of Palestine was entirely compatible with United Nations policy. In 1948, the General Assembly had asked the parties to delimit their respective frontiers by negotiation in two stages: first, by concluding provisional armistice agreements, and, secondly, by signing a final peace treaty. The first of those stages had long been passed and the United Nations was maintaining an organ on the spot to see that the provisions of the armistice agreements were not altered or that any alteration should be made only by mutual consent of the parties.

32. Those facts were sufficient to invalidate the claim of the Arab States that they were the disinterested defenders of General Assembly resolutions.

33. The Conciliation Commission had drawn the Assembly's attention to the events which had occurred since 1948 and had expressed the view that they made a solution of the refugee problem through reintegration even more urgent. Israel had absorbed 700,000 refugees to date while the Arab States, with more extensive resources, had not yet been able to absorb or reintegrate the Arab refugees whom they had turned out of their homes.

34. The Syrian representative had attempted to place the burden of initial responsibility for the flight of the refugees upon Israel. The facts showed that that responsibility rested with the States which had disturbed public order, both before and after the establishment of the State of Israel.

35. Even assuming that the Syrian representative's views were an accurate reflection of those of the Arab refugees, it might be asked how Israel could survive the absorption of people who felt about it as Mr. Choukayri did. The security of Israel was only one of the aspects of the problem, but it was not the least and it had been taken too lightly.

36. Finally, with regard to the Iraqi representative's statement (39th meeting) on a proposal which the Syrian representative had made in his own name at a private meeting, the Israel delegation remained ready to discuss any question raised by the Arab States with their representatives and would not lay down any preliminary conditions for such meetings. On the other hand, the Syrian representative should not take it

upon himself to draw up an agenda and to evaluate the results beforehand. Moreover, the idea of mixed meetings with the participation of the United Nations was not new; it had been submitted to the parties in March 1950 by the Conciliation Commission, accepted by Israel and rejected by the Arab States. If the Arab States had modified their position, the Israel Government would be glad to take the idea up again.

37. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) had hoped that the debate would give some hope for a solution of the problem, but the Israel representative's statement had eliminated any possibility of agreement. The latter had claimed that the parties could reach agreement only if they sat down together to discuss a settlement of their differences. Such conversations must have some basis, however, and for the Arab States there was only one possible basis, namely, the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly. The Israel representative had said that there could be no question of the repatriation of the refugees until peace had been restored. But peace was impossible unless the refugees' rights were recognized. The Israel representative refused to recognize those rights, yet insisted that there must be a peaceful settlement. That was tantamount to asking the Arab States to surrender and abandon the partial guarantees the United Nations had given them. There could be no peace in the Middle East if the Assembly resolutions were disregarded—and the Arab States could not be held responsible for that situation. If, on the contrary, the resolutions were observed, the repatriation of the refugees could be effected peaceably and tension would diminish.

38. As to the question of responsibility for the plight of the refugees, long before the intervention of the Arab States—which had intervened to protect the life and property of the Arabs of Palestine—terror, massacres, violations of the Arabs' most fundamental rights and the unfair policy directed against them had brought about the exodus of the Arab population of Palestine.

39. For all those reasons, the Iraqi delegation hoped that the Committee would not heed the Israel representative's statements, for they closed the door to agreement. If the Israel Government sincerely desired a relaxation of tension, it should first recognize the refugees' rights, which had been guaranteed by the General Assembly resolutions. Then, and only then, would direct conversations be possible.

40. MOSTAFA Bey (Egypt), referring to remarks attributed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, recalled that at the beginning of 1950 the Egyptian Minister had told the Conciliation Commission, which was then meeting in Cairo, that Egypt and the Arab States were prepared to meet with Israel to consider an over-all settlement of the Palestine question, provided Israel accepted and carried out the General Assembly resolutions. That statement clearly indicated that the Arab States wanted peace and he had therefore been surprised to hear the remarks attributed to his country's minister for Foreign Affairs. He wished, therefore, to reaffirm his Government's position and to make it clear that observance of the Assembly's

resolutions was the only condition which the Arab States placed on direct conversations with Israel.

41. In the matter of responsibility for the refugee problem, the Egyptian representative recalled the statements he had made to the Conciliation Commission, which appeared in that Commission's report (A/1985, annex C, appendix II). The flight of refugees had begun with the adoption of the partition plan. It had been the result of terrorist acts against the Arab population of Palestine and the violence of those acts had alarmed the Security Council.

42. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) thought that the General Assembly was perfectly justified in offering criticism, but he felt bound to reply to some of the criticisms of the Conciliation Commission which he considered unfair.

43. Some delegations had expressed doubts on the Commission's impartiality and had alleged that its members had acted as agents of their Governments. That was a serious censure which was in fact addressed to the Governments themselves. The resolution of 11 December 1948 had provided that three States, and not such and such individuals, would constitute the Commission. The States designated had appointed representatives to the Commission to act on their behalf, with the same directives as had been agreed upon collectively by the General Assembly. The action of those Governments in an organ that had been assigned the task of restoring peace in Palestine had been directed only towards ensuring the most faithful and scrupulous fulfilment of the work the United Nations had entrusted to it. The trouble was that the terms of reference presented such difficulties that it seemed hardly possible that they could be successfully carried out in the near future. In that connexion, Mr. Ordonneau wished to mention a single fact which he considered very significant. There was a provision in the original text of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.22), to the effect that solution of the problem depended primarily on the goodwill of the parties and the mutual concessions they were prepared to make. That statement had raised so many objections on all sides that, in their respective amendments, the representative of Canada, and later the representative of Colombia, had deleted it. Yet, what prospects of success were there for negotiations from which all mutual concessions were *a priori* excluded? If the negotiations did not then succeed, their failure could not seriously be attributed to the Conciliation Commission.

44. Mr. GUACHALLA (Bolivia) noted that the debates in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had revealed, as had the Conciliation Commission's report, that all the efforts at international co-operation to solve the problem had been fruitless. The Conciliation Commission had vainly endeavoured to bring the parties to a settlement. The problem, which had arisen out of the General Assembly's decision to establish the State of Israel, remained and the United Nations could not therefore shelve the question. If it did not appear that any constructive results could be obtained at present, the United

Nations could and should define the problem clearly, throw full light on all its aspects and act in accordance with the decisions it had already taken on the subject.

45. Such were the considerations upon which the Bolivian delegation based its decision to vote for the joint draft resolution as amended by Canada, while proposing that the first paragraph of the preamble should be replaced by the first paragraph of the Pakistani draft resolution; that a new paragraph should be included, namely, the third paragraph of the Colombian amendment and that the paragraphs of the Pakistani amendment calling for an enlarged Conciliation Commission should be added to the operative part and the preamble of the text. The Bolivian delegation was also in favour of the Uruguayan representative's proposal (38th meeting). The draft resolution thus amended would ensure continuity in the juridical position of the United Nations, and would be in keeping with the historic facts of the problem.

46. Mr. DARMASETIWAN (Indonesia) pointed out that the failure to obtain results hitherto, despite the efforts of the Conciliation Commission and the decisions of the General Assembly, the many charges brought by both parties before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and the political, economic, military, psychological and historical facts which appeared to divide the two parties irrevocably, might give the impression that a settlement was even more remote than it had been and that it was in fact in grave danger of failing altogether. The Indonesian delegation was convinced that the gulf dividing the two parties must be bridged and that the Conciliation Commission's failure should not be interpreted as proof of the impossibility of a final settlement. In the interest of maintaining international peace and security, the Committee should not take a pessimistic and negative attitude, and, in view of the vital importance of the matters at stake, it should rise above academic discussions, which threatened to become interminable and could lead to no positive solution.

47. The situation in Palestine was such that the Committee must show the greatest political wisdom and endeavour to produce constructive proposals which could later result in a peaceful settlement of such a complex and many-sided problem. It might offer the Conciliation Commission constructive suggestions, which would enable it to renew its efforts in a patient spirit of impartiality. No useful purpose would be served by recriminations and attempts by the parties to lay on each other the responsibility for the unfortunate deadlock which had been reached. The failure of attempts at conciliation must be taken into account when studying methods of strengthening the Conciliation Commission's authority.

48. On the basis of those considerations, the Indonesian delegation felt that it was essential to enlarge the Commission and that it should work under the direct control of the United Nations and not under the instructions received by individual members from their governments. Such a method would guarantee the Commission's impartiality. It would also be better if the Commission remained on the spot, so as to be able to

provide all necessary assistance to the parties as promptly as possible. Having thus acquired a greater moral authority, and working in the spirit of the General Assembly resolutions, the Conciliation Commission would be able to contribute greatly to a peaceful solution of the problem. In order to achieve results, all the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should give the Conciliation Commission their moral support, and thus enable it to exercise its authority and to overcome all the obstacles in the way of fulfilling its terms of reference.

49. In studying the Palestine question it was impossible to ignore the fate of the refugees, one of its most tragic aspects. The Indonesian delegation would state its point of view in detail when the Committee came to examine that particular point; for the time being it would confine itself to stressing the fact that, for purely humanitarian reasons, the United Nations must as a matter of urgency consider the fate of nearly one million human beings deprived of their most fundamental rights and their dignity as human beings. It was the duty of all Member States to ensure the implementation of measures which might be taken to solve that grave problem. By so doing, the United Nations would strengthen peace and stability in that area. Furthermore, the implementation of General Assembly decisions on the refugee problem would facilitate a final settlement; it must be admitted that failure to implement the decisions had quite certainly contributed to the deterioration of the position.

50. Taking all those facts into account, his delegation would support the Pakistani draft resolution, which offered the most effective way of settling the question. As Mr. Darmasetiawan had already indicated, he would vote in favour of maintaining the Conciliation Commission. To safeguard the general interest, the Commission should complete the work already begun, which had made it possible to put an end to hostilities in Palestine and to conclude armistice agreements under the auspices of the United Nations. His delegation hoped that the Conciliation Commission would be able to make further progress towards achieving peace and stability in Palestine and therefore could not support the USSR draft resolution calling for the abolition of the Commission. Nor could it accept the joint draft resolution which did not take the realities of the position into account. In conclusion, he reserved the right to express his views on any amendments which might be submitted, and added that the amendment submitted by Afghanistan might possibly cause him to reconsider his position on the joint draft resolution.

*Mr. Grafström (Vice-Chairman) took the Chair.*

51. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) supported the joint draft resolution as revised because it provided for the only possible solution of the Palestine problem. It was to be regretted that the Conciliation Commission should have been subjected to criticisms which were entirely unjustified. The Commission's report showed that all the proposals it had made for a settlement of questions in dispute had been rejected by both parties. The Commission had not even been able to get the two parties to meet together to confer. In the circumstances, and in view of the fact that it could only formulate proposals and was not entitled to enforce a settlement' or empowered to ensure implementation of a General Assembly resolution, the Conciliation Commission could only inform the Assembly that it had been unable to carry out its terms of reference.

52. Mr. Cooper thought that the Conciliation Commission should be congratulated on its honesty and impartiality. Owing to the intransigent attitude of both parties, it could only hope that the parties themselves would realize the need to settle their dispute both in their own interest and in the interest of world peace.

53. The joint draft resolution made it clear that the primary responsibility for settlement of the dispute rested with Israel and the Arab States and that the Conciliation Commission would lend them its assistance to that end if they so desired. He did not see how any other solution could obtain the agreement of the two parties. Much had been said of the need for realism. In that spirit, it must be admitted that if the Pakistani draft resolution was adopted, it was hardly likely to be implemented unless the Arab States and Israel had previously reached agreement. It would therefore be unfair to continue to require the Conciliation Commission to ensure the implementation of a resolution which was doomed to failure in advance.

54. There was no need to enlarge the Conciliation Commission; the number of its members would cause no change in the attitude of Israel or the Arab States. Furthermore, he could not support the USSR draft resolution, because the abolition of the Commission would be tantamount to a declaration that the United Nations had no further concern with the Palestine problem. So long as the Commission was retained, it might be hoped that, when the parties decided to reach agreement, the United Nations would be ready to give them all necessary assistance. For the same reason, the Liberian delegation was unable to support the Israel draft resolution, which also provided for the abolition of the Conciliation Commission. It would abstain from voting on that resolution.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.