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Chairman: Mr. Enrique de MARCHENA
 (Dominican Republic).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. SOWARD
 (Canada), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 13

**Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3170, A/
 C.4/350, A/C.4/L.472/Rev.1, A/C.4/L.476, A/
 C.4/L.477) (*continued*)**

**CONSIDERATIONS OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/
 L.472/Rev.1, A/C.4/L.477) (*continued*)**

1. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to continue its consideration of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.4/L.472/Rev.1).
2. Mr. TAZHIBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said his delegation still considered the establishment of a definite period for the achievement of independence by Trust Territories to be absolutely essential. In view of the course of the debate, however, he would accept the Syrian amendments (A/C.4/L.480), which appeared to enjoy a wide measure of support. In so doing he assumed that the Administering Authorities would take due account of the remarks that had been made during the debate and would set definite periods for the achievement of independence by the Trust Territories. He also assumed that the Administering Authorities would submit suggestions on the subject to the Trusteeship Council, that the Trusteeship Council would consider them and that the question could be taken up again at the twelfth session of the General Assembly.
3. Mr. GIDDEN (United Kingdom) observed that the new wording proposed by the Syrian delegation for the last paragraph of the preamble and for paragraph 1 of the operative part was not very specific, as the Soviet Union representative had himself said at the 637th meeting.
4. His remarks would deal principally with paragraph 2. That paragraph implied that the estimate to be made by the Administering Authorities would be subject to discussion and negotiation in the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, after which, presumably, a final date would be fixed. That being so, any Administering Authority which had in mind to follow the procedure of submitting an estimate of the time required for the attainment of self-government or independence, and which was aware of the usual pattern of discussion

in the United Nations, would find it necessary to inflate its estimate somewhat in order to ensure that the period laid down after negotiation in the United Nations would be a time nearer to its own real views on the matter. It was impossible to imagine that any estimate of time provided by any Administering Authority would be accepted by the Trusteeship Council or the General Assembly without dispute. An illustration was provided by the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954, which had suggested in its reports on Tanganyika (T/1142) and on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1141) periods of twenty to twenty-five years for the achievement of self-government by those Territories, whereas the Soviet Union had proposed a period of from three to five years. It would be difficult to guess what compromise would be officially agreed on by the General Assembly in any given case, but on the basis of past experience it could safely be said that it would not be the estimate suggested by the Administering Authority.

5. The whole process appeared to the United Kingdom delegation to be the very negation of all orderly government. Both the territorial Governments and the metropolitan Governments would be made to look ludicrous in the eyes of their respective public opinions if they engaged in such undertakings.

6. The substance of the matter could be quite simply stated. It was impossible for an Administering Authority, or at all events for the United Kingdom—conscientiously to declare an estimate of the period of time required for the attainment of self-government. It might be possible, and even necessary, to state such a period at the very last stage before self-government or independence was achieved, although even when the period was set not more than one year in advance serious difficulties might still be involved. That had been the experience of his Government. The United Kingdom Government had endeavoured and would endeavour faithfully to fulfill its own obligations under the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements and it could not be deflected from that course of action by the views of a majority of the members of the Fourth Committee, however well-intentioned they might be.

7. In the case in point the United Kingdom delegation had little regret in opposing the draft resolution, since the intentions of its authors were hardly likely to command the confidence of most of the Member States represented in the Committee.

Mr. de Marchena (Dominican Republic) took the Chair.

8. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) said that he had not intervened in the general debate because the same views and arguments had already been heard many times during the past ten years and there seemed to be little new to add. On so important a matter as that now under discussion, however, he could not refrain from stating his Government's position.

9. His delegation was entirely in agreement with the principle that had inspired General Assembly resolution 558 (VI), but unfortunately none of the Administering Authorities had so far seen fit to comply with that resolution. Notwithstanding that fact, within the past two or three years the General Assembly had been asked to terminate various Trusteeship Agreements on the alleged grounds that, either by integration into some colony which was soon to become independent or by union with or absorption into the metropolitan country, the Territories concerned would soon have attained the objectives of the International Trusteeship System.

10. The General Assembly had never had time to study all the legal and moral implications of those sudden requests. At the ninth session the Philippine delegation had proposed an amendment (A/C.4/L.384/Rev.1, para. 2) to the draft resolution which had become resolution 860 (IX), to the effect that the legal, moral and other aspects of the question should be studied before a final decision was reached. Those suggestions had been neither adopted nor taken into account. The time had now come when it was essential to know when the various Trust Territories might be expected to attain self-government or independence. The trend of events in the Trust Territories was obvious. Many of them were administered, under what were known as administrative unions, not by the Administering Authority but by a neighbouring colony. The interests of those Trust Territories were subordinated to the interests of the inhabitants of the neighbouring colony or to those of the Administering Authority.

11. With regard to the Soviet draft resolution, his delegation could not accept the often-repeated argument that the General Assembly was not competent to make such requests. If Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter had any meaning, the only logical conclusion must be that the administration of those dependent territories no longer belonged exclusively to the Administering Authorities but to the United Nations in general. By claiming that the administration of the Trust Territories was still their exclusive function the Administering Authorities gave the impression that they were guided by mere self-interest.

12. The experience of his own country further convinced him that the course of action proposed in the USSR draft resolution was wise and right. The draft resolution, as amended, was merely a reiteration of previous General Assembly resolutions. If the Syrian amendments were adopted he would support the draft resolution. There was no reason for the Administering Authorities to object to it; it was merely in the form of a request and if they wished to refuse to comply with it they could do so.

13. Mr. TAZHIBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thanked the Philippine representative for replying to a number of the objections raised to the Soviet draft resolution.

14. His delegation had accepted the proposed amendments in the light of the debate. Representatives had pointed out that in certain Trust Territories self-government or independence might be obtained in less than three years, whereas in others the period of three to five years mentioned in the original draft resolution (A/C.4/L.472) was far too short. It had been argued that a period should be fixed for each Territory in the light of its particular circumstances, as had been done

in the cases of Somaliland under Italian administration and Togoland under British administration.

15. He would have thought the draft resolution in its amended form would be acceptable to a great majority of delegations. The United Kingdom representative, however, still objected not only to the next but to the motives underlying the draft resolution. In the Soviet delegation's view the draft resolution contained nothing to which any Administering Authority could object, unless the reason was that the United Kingdom did not wish to grant independence to the Territories under its administration within a reasonable time.

16. He agreed with the view that had been expressed that an Administering Authority alone could not take any decision concerning the status of a Trust Authority. Important questions must be decided jointly by the United Nations and the Administering Authority concerned.

17. Mr. JAIPAL (India) said that some of the United Kingdom representative's objections to the draft resolution appeared to be based on a series of hypotheses regarding what the Soviet or Syrian representative might have had in mind in proposing the draft resolution or the amendments. Since it had been the practice of the United Nations to judge the meaning of resolutions according to the interpretation given them by the General Assembly rather than the intentions which may have been in the minds of their sponsors, those objections did not seem tenable. Nor could his delegation agree that the objection of principle raised by the United Kingdom representative was valid or that a simple matter such as the establishment of target dates was a threat to orderly government. Had it accepted that view, it would have been reluctant to agree to the establishment of a ten-year period for the attainment of independence by Somaliland under Italian administration.

18. Mr. RIVAS (Venezuela) said that the amendments suggested by Syria and India (637th meeting) had radically changed the character of the Soviet draft resolution. His delegation still had reservations, however, with regard to the idea of establishing definite time-tables for the Trust Territories. Because of the human element involved, it was extremely difficult to adopt a fixed plan for preparing a whole population for independence. It was true that time-tables had been adopted for Somaliland under Italian administration and for Libya, but those cases had been rather different in that both Territories had been Italian colonies whose status had changed as the result of the Second World War.

19. His delegation also doubted whether it should be the Administering Authorities who should decide on the period of time required for the attainment of self-government or independence by the Trust Territories. Indeed, paragraph 2 of the draft resolution unintentionally attributed greater powers to the Administering Authorities than they held under the Charter, since the United Nations had the right to review each Territory on an individual basis.

20. His delegation therefore asked for a separate vote to be taken on the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble and paragraph 2, on all of which it would abstain. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, although it still seemed a little too categorical in tone.

21. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said that reference had been made to an article he had written in which he had expressed the view that the establishment of target dates for the Trust Territories was useful. There was, however, a great difference between fixing such target dates for use as guides to planning and making definite commitments regarding the date of independence. In the present circumstances, his delegation was convinced that it was impossible to establish definite dates for the termination of trusteeship.

22. Mr. GRILLO (Italy) said that the revised Soviet draft resolution no longer had anything in common with the draft resolution originally submitted, which he had characterized as unrealistic and impracticable. As it now stood, it contained some elements of logic and reason. The Soviet representative could not, however, without contradicting himself, vote in favour of the revised draft resolution unless he withdrew the statements he had made at the 630th meeting in introducing the original draft resolution. For example, the Soviet representative had stated that the backwardness of the indigenous populations was only a myth perpetrated by the Administering Authorities; if he still believed that, he should continue to insist that New Guinea should be given its independence within three to five years. On the other hand, the Soviet representative had stated also that Australia had done little to improve conditions in New Guinea; if that was so, it was obvious that the independence of the Territory within three to five years should not have been proposed.

23. The original draft resolution had called for the granting of independence—without mentioning the alternative of self-government—to six Territories within three to five years. In its revised form, New Guinea had been dropped from the list of Territories, the alternative of self-government was included and no rigid date for the attainment of independence or self-government was imposed. Those changes so altered the draft resolution that his delegation might find it possible to vote in favour of it if a further modification was introduced, for the revised draft resolution was still objectionable from a legal standpoint. His delegation had joined with many others in declaring that no Trusteeship Agreement could be unilaterally terminated by an Administering Authority; by the same token, however, no Trusteeship Agreement could be unilaterally modified by the United Nations. The General Assembly could only express an opinion on the desirability of establishing target dates and could not make formal requests, which was tantamount to imposing its views on the Administering Authorities. His delegation would not, therefore, vote in favour of the draft resolution unless it was further amended to indicate that the consent of the Administering Authorities was necessary in establishing time-tables for the Trust Territories.

24. Mr. JAIPAL (India) proposed that the word "*Requests*" in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution should be replaced by the word "*Invites*".

25. Mr. MENCER (Czechoslovakia) said that in spite of the Italian representative's incorrect interpretation of the revised draft resolution his delegation considered that it preserved unaltered the spirit of the original draft resolution. At its previous meeting the Committee had heard a petitioner from the Cameroons under French administration state that the Territory was entirely ready to assume the responsibilities of independence. That statement only strengthened his delegation's support for the Soviet draft resolution.

26. Mr. KIANG (China) said that his delegation agreed with most of the comments the Haitian representative had made at the 637th meeting on the original Soviet draft resolution. The amendments suggested by the Syrian representative had improved the draft resolution to the extent that they had divested it of its propagandistic and arbitrary character. Even as it stood, however, the revised draft resolution was not one which could serve any useful purpose in giving effect to the recommendations in the Trusteeship Council's report (A/3170), since it disregarded some of the elements which were basic to those recommendations, namely, those relating to the preparation of the people of the Trust Territories for self-government by gradual development in the political, economic, social and educational fields. For that reason alone, his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

27. Mr. ROLZ BENNETT (Guatemala) said that his delegation attached great importance to the fixing of dates for the granting of self-government or independence to the Trust Territories and, if possible, even more importance to the setting of dates for the adoption of intermediate measures designed to further the attainment of the objectives of the Trusteeship System. Such a procedure was important both for the formation of governmental policy and as a means of dissipating resentment and anxiety for the future among the peoples of the Territories. History had shown that the advance of dependent peoples towards full capacity to govern themselves was apt to be far more rapid than the Administering Authorities recognized. The United Nations should therefore do its part to encourage that advancement by setting dates.

28. To illustrate the validity of his contention he cited Western Samoa, which was advancing towards the objectives of the Trusteeship System in exemplary fashion. The Administering Authority and the population were co-operating fully with each other; dates had been set for the attainment of various objectives; and the last shadow of doubt of the Administering Authority's good faith and intention to accelerate the attainment of self-government or independence had been dispelled. From that illustration it was clear that if rationally applied, the method of setting dates would give satisfactory results.

29. Guatemala's support for the principle of setting dates did not, however, mean that the same dates should be set for all Trust Territories. The adoption of the Syrian amendments (A/C.4/L.480) had greatly improved the draft resolution, which now conformed to the precedent set, for example, by General Assembly resolution 558 (VI). Guatemala would therefore vote in favour of the Soviet draft resolution as amended but would abstain on the last paragraph of the preamble if it was put to the vote separately.

30. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that her delegation would vote in favour of the Soviet draft resolution, as amended, in the conviction that it was in conformity with the spirit of the Charter and of previous General Assembly resolutions. The fact that Togoland under British administration would shortly attain independence in union with an independent Gold Coast did not remove the obligation of the United Nations to accelerate the attainment of the objectives of the Trusteeship System by other Trust Territories.

31. Mr. TAZHIBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the amendment suggested by the Italian representative was unnecessary. It was clear

from paragraph 2 of that draft resolution the USSR did not mean that the United Nations should decide questions relating to the status of Trust Territories unilaterally, without the consent of the Administering Authorities, or that rigid dates should be set. He urged the Italian representative to stand by the undertaking he had given the Indian representative that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution if the mention of specific dates was omitted.

32. Mr. GRILLO (Italy) denied that he had given the Indian representative any undertaking that he would support the draft resolution if the prescription of rigid dates was omitted. He had merely said that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution provided it contained no formal request to the Administering Authorities to establish dates.

33. His suggestion for amending the USSR draft resolution was not a formal proposal. He would abstain when the draft resolution was put to the vote.

34. Mr. MEDANI (Sudan) said that, unlike some previous speakers, he regarded the USSR draft resolution as a sincere effort to promote the legal rights of the Trust Territories. His delegation, with its great interest in African affairs, was bound to welcome any such step. Moreover, while it objected to the fixing of specific dates, his delegation supported the general principle that time-tables should be established. Italy would recall that when the Sudan had asked for its independence the administering Power had rejected the request as premature; all would acknowledge, however, that after the administering Power had left the country it had proved able to manage its own affairs. The current theory that certain peoples were unable to govern themselves was fallacious.

35. The Sudanese delegation had favoured the Syrian amendments, but even had the Soviet Union not accepted them it would have voted in favour of the USSR draft resolution.

36. Mr. VELANDO (Peru) asked for a separate vote on the last paragraph of the preamble.

37. Mr. TAZHIBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) accepted the Indian amendment to replace the word "Requests" in paragraph 2 by "Invites".

The first four paragraphs of the preamble to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.4/L.472)/Rev.1 were adopted by 43 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions.

The fifth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 34 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions.

The sixth paragraph of the preamble, as amended by Syria, was adopted by 30 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions.

Paragraph 1, as amended by Syria (A/C.4/L.840, para. 2) was adopted by 38 votes to 12, with 10 abstentions.

Paragraph 2, as amended by India, was adopted by 34 votes to 12, with 13 abstentions.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 were adopted by 38 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions.

At the request of the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Social Republic, a vote on the draft resolution as a whole was taken by roll-call.

Iran, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iran, Iraq, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,

Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia.

Against: Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France.

Abstaining: Israel, Italy, Nicaragua, Spain, Turkey, Brazil, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Finland, Honduras.

The draft resolution as a whole (A/C.4/L.472/Rev.1), as amended, was adopted by 38 votes to 13, with 11 abstentions.

38. Mr. QUIROS (El Salvador) said that delegation had always considered it desirable that the Administering Authorities should set reasonable periods within which the self-government or independence of the Trust Territories should be attained. As amended by Syria and India, the USSR draft resolution had been akin in spirit to General Assembly resolution 558 (VI), which his delegation had supported. He had accordingly voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

39. While he was of the opinion that most Trust Territories would be ready for self-government in the near future, he shared the Venezuelan and Guatemalan objection to the phrase "firmly convinced" in the last paragraph of the preamble and had accordingly abstained in the vote on that paragraph.

40. Mr. VELANDO (Peru) explained that, as the Chairman had not read out the last paragraph of the preamble as amended, before putting it to the vote, he had been obliged to vote against it. Consistently with that decision he had voted against the draft resolution as a whole.

41. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to take up the Haitian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.477).

42. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) announced that, since his exchange of views with the United Kingdom representative concerning his draft resolution at the 635th meeting, he had been assured by those members of the Committee whom he had consulted that his proposal was constructive and merited consideration by the Fourth Committee. As the United Kingdom representative would doubtless recognize now that he had had an opportunity to study the proposal in detail, it was not a substantive measure and did not require the Committee to pass judgment on the proposals Mr. Nyerere had made during his hearing at the 579th meeting. It was true that the draft resolution departed from the stereotyped pattern of resolutions usually adopted after the Committee had heard petitioners; resolutions on that pattern, however, were often unduly vague, and he hoped that his proposal would be considered an improvement in that respect.

43. Mr. JAIPAL (India) said that in his delegation's opinion the Haitian draft resolution was concerned not with the detailed administration of Tanganyika, which was primarily the Trusteeship Council's province, but with a major question of policy entirely suitable for discussion in the General Assembly. There was nothing new about that particular question of policy, which had been before the Trusteeship Council since 1954, when

the Visiting Mission had made observations on the character of the future State of Tanganyika in its report on the Territory (T/1142). The Council, unfortunately, had largely evaded the issue. Mr. Nyerere had therefore found it necessary to lay his case before the General Assembly. The petitioner was the leader of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika, which had a substantial and increasing following; he could not, therefore, be regarded as either a nonentity or a subversive.

44. It was significant that Mr. Nyerere sought the development of Tanganyika, not into an exclusively African State, but into a primarily African State. India believed that in the long run, if not in the short run, the majority would rule in Tanganyika as elsewhere; the overwhelming majority in that Trust Territory consisted of the African population of 8 million, in addition to which there were 70,000 Asians and 20,000 Europeans. The fact that, despite that striking disparity, Mr. Nyerere did not demand that Tanganyika should become an African State testified to his political sagacity and moderation. Has he made such a demand his party would have been accused of racist tendencies; the non-African community in Tanganyika would have been terrified; and investment, and with it the Territory's development, would have been adversely affected. For the same reasons it was essential that the acts of the United Nations should not be open to an interpretation which would contribute to political uncertainty in the Trust Territory. He therefore asked the Haitian representative to delete from paragraph 2 of his draft resolution the words "essentially African", which went beyond Mr. Nyerere's requests and might cause consternation in Tanganyika. That amendment was in the spirit of the Charter and would not affect the substance of the proposal. If the Haitian representative accepted it, India would vote whole-heartedly in favour of the draft resolution.

45. When the Haitian draft resolution was considered from the standpoint of substance two questions arose: why it should be necessary to recommend to the Administering Authority that it should consider making a statement on the policy it proposed to follow in Tanganyika, and why Mr. Nyerere should have found it necessary to demand that the country should be developed as a democratic State. The Trusteeship System established pursuant to the Charter left no room for the development of a Trust Territory otherwise than as a democratic State: that much was clear from Article 76, read in conjunction with Article 1. In the light, however, of the petitioner's grievances it was clear that the demand for Tanganyika's development as a democratic State was by no means out of place. The Trust Territory had to be considered in its East African setting, where the real problem was the interracial struggle for political power and where, with the exception of Uganda, neighbouring territories inspired little confidence for the future. In view of the reasonableness of Mr. Nyerere's demands the Indian delegation did not see what possible objection there could be to the Administering Authority's being asked to make a statement on policy. Any ambiguity on that subject would lead to frustration and suspicion, and for that reason alone the Haitian draft resolution merited wide support.

46. In reply to a question from Mr. DIPP GOMEZ (Dominican Republic) concerning the meaning of the expression "an essentially African democratic State" in paragraph 2 of the Haitian draft resolution, Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) said that the Trust Territory

was 98 per cent African and when it attained statehood the indigenous element should take control. The word "essentially" did not mean "exclusively"; Haiti pursued a policy of racial toleration at home and could not adopt a racist attitude in international matters. Furthermore, such an attitude would represent more than the petitioner had requested. The petitioner, who wanted all races to have equal rights in Tanganyika, feared that if the development of political institutions were continued on its present lines some elements would acquire a position of permanent domination; he wanted a statement by the Administering Authority that would dispel the fears entertained in some quarters, whether or not those fears were warranted. In order, however, to remove the possibility of any misunderstanding he would comply with the Indian request and delete the words "essentially African" from both paragraph 2 and sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of the preamble.

47. Mr. GIDDEN (United Kingdom) said that while it might seem to the majority of the Committee that the draft resolution was primarily of a procedural character, his delegation, as the only one which would be affected by it, was decidedly of the view that it touched upon matters of substance. Had it been purely procedural its drafting would have been simpler, as in the case of General Assembly resolution 859 (IX). The present draft resolution was extremely complex in both content and drafting. As it was admittedly based on a petitioner's statement, which had given rise to little comment at the time of its presentation, it would appear at first sight that here was no need for anything but an administrative action on the part of the General Assembly transmitting that statement to the Trusteeship Council for examination. Hence on administrative grounds there was no need for a lengthy and complex resolution.

48. He wished to make it clear that his delegation was in no way opposed to the fact that a leading political figure from the Trust Territory had appeared before the General Assembly, nor was he concerned to criticize that individual's views as such. His main objection to the draft resolution from the standpoint of substance, however, was the danger that the views presented by a single petitioner might be taken to represent the views of a substantial part of the population. The task of assessing public opinion in a territory with as large a population as that of Tanganyika was a difficult one, as the Administering Authority knew only too well. The present draft resolution tended to endorse some if not all of the views put forward by a petitioner, yet the Committee was not in a position to know whether those views represented the opinion of the majority. The debate on Togoland under British administration in successive sessions of the Fourth Committee had shown how easy it was to obtain an erroneous impression of conditions in Trust Territories from statements presented by individual petitioners. The tendency to endorse the views of the first petitioners heard should be avoided.

49. The Haitian representative had described the draft resolution as constructive, but a constructive resolution most of necessity be substantive in character. To begin with, the title and the first paragraph of the preamble referred to the future of Tanganyika, implying that a change was contemplated, yet the future status of that Territory was not in question at present. In his statement the petitioner himself had not appeared to be re-

ferring to the future or to a change of status. The second paragraph of the preamble, in singling out four of the points raised by the petitioner while neglecting to mention others, constituted a subjective interpretation of the petitioner's statement. The word "merely" appearing in sub-paragraph (d) had not been used by the petitioner, and the sub-paragraph as a whole did not convey the intent of the original text. Paragraph 1 was superfluous, because the Administering Authority was already fully familiar with the views of the Tanganyika African National Union. Paragraph 3, which implied that the General Assembly feared the Trusteeship Council would not instruct its visiting mission to carry out a certain task, was unnecessary on purely administrative grounds. An exact analysis of the paragraph, however, gave rise to other objections. The Trusteeship Council ordinarily drew up the terms of reference of visiting missions and there had never been any complaint of their being inappropriate. In the present case the visiting mission was to make a further study of Tanganyika's political advancement. The function of visiting missions, however, was to study all aspects of the situation in a Trust Territory, and it was hard to see on what grounds the General Assembly should suddenly find that political advancement was the subject which most required study. The 1954 Visiting Mission had in fact concentrated on that particular aspect of the Territory's development and it was apparent that the Administering Authority could not conceal the true political situation even if it wished to. Paragraph 3 was therefore unnecessary from both a procedural and a substantive point of view. Furthermore, the words "in the light of the principles enunciated above" was extremely vague, and the meaning of the words "special study" and "problems mentioned above" in paragraph 4 was not clear. If they referred to a political study, he would only observe that it could be taken for granted that the 1957 visiting mission would be primarily interested in political advancement.

50. Paragraph 2 in particular was, in the view of his delegation, of a substantive nature. Moreover, the recommendation was unnecessary, for a statement of policy such as that which the paragraph called for had been issued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in June 1952 and there had subsequently been no change of policy. He proceeded to read out an extract from the statement, in which the United Kingdom Government expressed its firm intention of carrying out the obligations it had assumed under the Trusteeship Agreement.

51. It was the Committee's responsibility to ensure that the problems raised by petitioners were properly dealt with by the organ set up for that purpose and its practice hitherto had been to refer petitioners' statements to the Trusteeship Council for examination, since a substantive debate on a Trust Territory would be impracticable in the Committee itself. It would be both unnecessary and unwise for the General Assembly to enter into questions of substance as the result of a hearing granted to a single petitioner. For that reason, if the present character of the draft resolution were maintained his delegation would be constrained on grounds of principle to vote against it.

52. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Haiti) said that the draft resolution was not intended to embody a textual quotation from the petitioner's statement but merely to summarize his various points.

53. Mr. JAIPAL (India) read out two additional sentences from the policy statement of the Secretary of

State for the Colonies quoted by the United Kingdom representative, which expressed the hope that Tanganyika would remain in the British Commonwealth after the objectives of the Trusteeship System had been achieved and noted the importance the United Kingdom Government attached to the maintenance and promotion of British traditions and the British connexion with the Territory.

54. Mr. GIDDEN (United Kingdom) said that if he had failed to read out the two sentences in question it was not because his Government was ashamed of holding such views but because they were not relevant in the present instance, since they dealt with a situation which would arise only after Tanganyika had attained the goals envisaged in the Trusteeship System.

55. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) pointed out that the Haitian draft resolution was based not on the statement of a single petitioner but on the Committee's observations of developments in the Territory over the past ten years and on the Council's report (A/3170). Even if the petitioner had not appeared before the Committee the Yugoslav delegation would have advocated that the General Assembly should pay more attention to developments in Tanganyika. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that from the administrative point of view the draft resolution was unnecessary. If in the present case, however, the Committee were to depart from its usual practice of adopting only procedural resolutions with regard to petitioners' statements, it would be as the result of the new factors which the Committee had itself observed; indeed the various points the petitioner had stressed had been already known to the Committee.

56. He hoped that the United Kingdom representative's objection to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was not intended to imply that the Fourth Committee had failed to make recommendations to the Trusteeship Council that it should instruct its visiting missions to pay particular attention to certain matters.

57. His delegation thought that a statement of principle on the policy which the United Kingdom intended to follow in the Territory would be extremely useful and might prevent conflicts in the future. He would therefore vote in favour of the Haitian draft resolution.

58. Mr. RIVAS (Venezuela) did not agree that the draft resolution was inconsistent with the functions of the Fourth Committee. The United Nations was concerned with the future of Trust Territories as well as the present.

59. There was another point which was of the utmost importance to the Fourth Committee. Political parties in sovereign States were essentially concerned with internal matters; in Trust Territories they were concerned primarily with their Territory's political status. That was the very question that interested the United Nations, and the General Assembly should therefore be informed of the position of the political parties. The United Kingdom representative had himself admitted that the Tanganyika African National Union was the most important political party in Tanganyika, and for that reason the statements of Mr. Nyerere deserved to be taken into account.

60. Since the Haitian representative had agreed to the deletion of the words "essentially African" in sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of the preamble, he wondered whether there was any point in retaining the words "as 98 per cent of the population of Tangan-

yika is African" at the beginning of the same subparagraph.

61. With regard to subparagraph (d) of the second paragraph of the preamble, he suggested that the words "and not merely as a source of cheap labour" should be deleted and the words "a more active" should be inserted between "take" and "part". He felt that that wording would be a more accurate reflection of the views expressed by the petitioner.

62. He thought it would be better in paragraph 2 to say "in accordance with the goals of the International Trusteeship System" rather than "in accordance with the principles . . .". The word "goals" should also replace "principles" in paragraph 3 and he suggested that that paragraph might end with the words "enunciated above". In his delegation's opinion paragraphs 3 and 4 were the essential parts of the draft resolution,

although if the Haitian representative pressed for the retention of paragraphs 1 and 2 he would not object.

63. Mr. VELANDO (Peru) said that in his delegation's view the draft resolution embodied the proper approach to the study of Trust Territories, which was to deal with them on an individual basis. It did not reflect adversely on any Administering Authority and there was therefore no reason for any delegation to feel itself singled out in it.

64. His delegation agreed with the suggestions made by the Venezuelan representative and considered that they would improve the draft resolution.

65. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Haitian and Venezuelan representatives might confer together with a view to producing a revised text of the draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 2.10 p.m.