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Chairman: Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. CAMFORA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): In the past year, bilateral and multilateral disarmament talks have been exceptionally intensive. Yet there have been no practical results lightening the burden on mankind caused by the arms race.

Indeed, 1986 has been a year of constant negotiations, first and foremost between the two great Powers. In Geneva, for example, there was the fifth round of negotiations on nuclear weapons and outer space issues, and the sixth round is now under way. Similarly, there have been meetings in Washington, Moscow and Bern on nuclear-weapon testing and on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In Stockholm, the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe reached agreement on confidence-building measures with regard to manoeuvres involving conventional forces.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

In the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva significant steps have been taken towards the drawing up of a convention banning chemical weapons. Further, agreements have been reached within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, on security, information and co-operation in the event of a nuclear accident. Lastly, the Second Review Conference of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons was held and led to unexpectedly positive results.

That remarkable list of forums devoted to disarmament has created the impression that the two major Powers are genuinely working towards a dialogue that will move them farther from confrontation. We must believe that the presence of the two major Powers in all those various forums has opened the way for an exchange of views to be held on their respective positions and that that will help to identify areas of agreement and disagreement.

World public opinion has taken it as understood that such negotiations are entered into because there is a resolve to achieve agreements. That in itself is an extremely encouraging sign. During 1986 we believe that exhaustive dialogues have been held on a very broad range of items. This may, indeed, have been the broadest range of disarmament items considered on an international level since the days of the cold war and throughout the alternating periods of tension and détente as the military alliances have alternately moved closer together and further apart, while mankind has continued to suffer, now on the brink of the abyss, now in the very antechamber of hope.

We believe that there has never been a time like the one we experienced in 1986, in which the questions of both nuclear weapons and conventional weapons have been the subject of talks and active negotiations. In 1986 we note that all disarmament items have been placed on the agenda of various discussions. In other

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

words, a very detailed awareness of respective positions must have been achieved. We would like to turn our attention in particular to a number of developments that have been encouraging because they have shown that the great wall of mistrust is beginning to show cracks.

During the negotiations held in the Conference on Disarmament on the banning of chemical weapons, the principle of on-site inspection has been accepted. We view that as a factor that must strengthen international confidence. We also consider, that the agreement between the scientists of the two major Powers to permit on-site observation of nuclear-weapons tests strengthens international confidence. Lastly, we must also refer to the agreement reached in Stockholm on the observation of conventional-force manoeuvres in the respective territories of the two military alliances.

These are very significant examples showing that a certain road has now been taken from which we must not depart. It is essential that international confidence be strengthened; it is essential that formulas be worked out that will generate confidence that disarmament agreements will be respected and complied with.

Such is the intent of the undertaking of the six Heads of State, among whom is the President of my country, Mr. Raul Alfonsin, together with the leaders of Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, which is aimed at creating confidence between the major Powers and at bringing their positions closer together. They have accordingly made a specific proposal to them on a system that would give each of them the assurance that any agreement banning underground nuclear testing would be strictly complied with.

We note with satisfaction the favourable reception given to this proposal by the six Heads of State by the international community. I am sure that the repeated references to it and the many expressions of support for it our leaders have received will encourage them to pursue their endeavour.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

The remarkable international effort undertaken in 1986 in so many different surroundings would appear to be aimed at achieving a sound understanding between the two major Powers at the highest possible level. According to official reports that have been issued, the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October brought them very near to a historic agreement that would have led to a substantial reduction in the level of both strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons.

The mere fact that it has been possible to reach the preparatory stage of a possible compromise on nuclear weapons is of the highest importance for the cause of nuclear disarmament. It shows that determined negotiations can lead to results if their willingness to make reciprocal concessions. We hope that the stage reached in Reykjavik will serve as a solid basis for a continuation of the bilateral negotiations to be held at Geneva.

The possibility of reaching an agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons, together with the adoption of a nuclear-test ban, are two goals that are of paramount importance. It may be that in the course of 1987 important steps can be taken towards the achievement of both those goals.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

It was not possible to reach agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms in Reykjavik owing to the failure to come to an understanding about the prevention of the arms race in outer space - an item which has become one of the major political problems of our time.

The development of a military race in space has been a reality from the very beginning of the space era. This is an unchallenged assertion and, in fact, is well known because scientific literature on the subject is abundant. In the same way, there have been consistent calls from the international community against such a development. The international community has no time left to establish a régime to ensure the peaceful use of outer space; this must be done now, for later will be too late.

At the recent meeting held at Harare, the Heads of State of non-aligned countries urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence urgent negotiations with a view to reaching one or more agreements, as might emerge, so as to prevent the extension of the arms race in all its aspects to outer space.

The concept of the peaceful use of space is very clear. For example, the use of satellites for communication, meteorological observation, the study of the globe's surface and education, among others, is quite obviously all aimed at peaceful uses. Space objects also include those used as laboratories to study various forms of life in space and other exploratory experiments. This form of activity for peaceful purposes holds great promise for mankind's progress and, therefore, must be protected; its development must be guaranteed for the benefit of all peoples.

But, of course, space objects can also be used for military observation and communication and can be integrated into land-based military systems. In addition,

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there is the possibility of using space for arms deployment; in other words, space could be used to carry out actions with defensive or offensive weapons against other space objects or land-based objects. The 1967 Treaty prohibits the deployment in space of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, but it does not say anything about any other type of weapon. The exploration and peaceful use of space must be protected and international co-operation in this respect must be developed, as stipulated in the 1967 Treaty.

At the same time, the use of space for military purposes of observation and communication must be controlled. In this respect, the international régime for the registration of space objects must be strengthened, as indeed should the means of verification, as may be necessary.

But a totally separate chapter is the use of space for the deployment of weapons. This aspect requires special consideration because of its scientific and technical complexity. None the less, it must be very clearly understood by the international community that its very highest interests lie in an absolute ban on the deployment of all types of weapons in outer space.

Furthermore, we must bear in mind that the scientific and technological development linked to research now being carried out with a view to the militarization of space could also be applied on land. That possibility has not been fully analysed and it contains a very great danger, since investigation, research and experimentation of new military elements in space could also be applied, through the creation of land-based weapons which use the new technologies that today are being researched for use in space.

We are sure that the General Assembly at this session will decide, firmly and determinedly, on the best way of organizing this task which can no longer be put off, that is, to ensure the peaceful use of space.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

The question of disarmament includes many different items of varying importance. Far too often we note with concern a trend aimed at establishing an unacceptable division of labour on the disarmament items. We see that the most important and serious items - for example, those dealing with nuclear arms, nuclear testing, outer space matters, or different kinds of technology aimed at creating new types of weapons - are in fact being removed from the framework of the debate, consideration and negotiation in United Nations multilateral forums. But those items are the reason for the great nightmares from which contemporary man suffers; those are also the items that incur tremendous expenditures which, if saved, could indeed be better used to remedy the injustices that prevail today in the economic relations between the developed world and the developing countries.

On the other hand, a series of items which do not have the same importance as the aforementioned are constantly promoted in order to create commitments for countries which are far from representing a threat of any sort to mankind's survival. A rational criterion should give logical priority to the most serious and urgent items in such a way that the Conference on Disarmament could carry out negotiations on those items before any others.

We have repeatedly heard references to the need to complement the multilateral process with the bilateral process in the consideration of disarmament issues. This complementarity is possible only in so far as both processes are linked, because if they are in fact developed separately then there can be no complementarity. That is why complementarity between the multilateral and bilateral processes requires communication between the two spheres. In this respect, we express our agreement with the important statement of the Vice-Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Petrovsky, about his country's position at the Reykjavik meeting. Similarly, we hope that a statement by the other major Power on this very important development in international life will be forthcoming soon.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

It is difficult to speak of disarmament without specifically referring to the negotiations involving the Conference on Disarmament in relation to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the devoted guidance of Mr. Garcia Robles. This is not just one item among many but rather, as is recalled in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, one of the principal tasks to be carried out since it would make it possible to draw up an instrument on the basis of a systematic order and an agreed calendar, a process of global negotiations towards general and complete disarmament, which is the goal of all our efforts.

For that reason, as has been specifically requested by the Eighth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, it would be important for the General Assembly to call on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude its negotiations in the first part of its session so that at the forty-first session the General Assembly would be in a position to adopt a decision on that document.

Finally I should like to refer to the need to strengthen the United Nations role in matters of disarmament. Nothing could be more detrimental in this respect than slowing down, or postponing multilateral activity. Hence, we must not delay the holding of the Conference on Disarmament and Development, preparation for which was the subject of intense and very careful work. It is appropriate that that Conference be convened in 1987.

We also believe that a start should be made on the preparatory work for the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the session to be held not later than 1988, in agreement with repeated decisions of the General Assembly.

Mr. JACOBOWITZ DE SZEGED (Netherlands): Since this is the first time this delegation has spoken under your guidance, Sir, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you officially on your assumption of the chairmanship and to say that we have full confidence in your ability to guide this Committee through its rather heavy work-load. We assure you that we will co-operate with you to the utmost extent.

Speaking as representative of the Netherlands, a nation strongly committed to European unity, I wish to associate my delegation fully with the statement made in this Committee by the Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Timothy Renton, who spoke on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community.

Today I will outline a number of major objectives of the Netherlands Government in the field of disarmament and of international security. More specifically, I will emphasize the conceptual framework in which issues of disarmament and of international security have to be placed and debated. But before starting to do so, allow me to dwell on one important recent event.

On 11 and 12 October the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met in Reykjavik with a view to preparing a summit meeting to be held later in the United States. Though other significant issues were on the agenda as well, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to concentrate on matters of arms control and disarmament. Considering in particular the declared preparatory nature of that meeting, my Government is of the view that Reykjavik yielded more elements of agreement than could be expected.

Quite naturally, in the Netherlands too there is some disappointment that the large measure of rapprochement could not instantaneously be crowned with agreement on all the subjects discussed. Drawing, however, on what could be achieved in Iceland, the respective negotiations should be pursued and brought to a successful

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Netherlands)

end. We are confident that the United States and the Soviet Union will spare no effort to consolidate and build on what has been achieved.

On the relationship between disarmament and security, the representative of the United Kingdom made some very pertinent remarks. Allow me to add a few words to those observations.

Security consists of political, economic, humanitarian as well as military components, and national and international security are no longer divisible. Hence the need for a comprehensive and co-operative approach to international security. Armaments are a symptom of perceptions of security. Therefore, to achieve disarmament, we should aim at creating circumstances, globally as well as on the regional level, that are perceived by peoples and States as more secure, thus gradually reducing incentives for an arms build up. Such an environment of trust can be induced while making use of existing tools. The Charter of the United Nations remains the single comprehensive and authoritative guideline for improvement of relations between our peoples and, by implication, for increased international security. We have good principles; there is no need for new ones. Such novelties would only risk undermining the spirit and letter of the Charter. A true contribution to enhanced international security would be unambiguous compliance with the letter and spirit of the Charter, and indeed of all international agreements. A number of instruments of international law is already available. Security is being undermined by the failure to make proper use of those instruments.

Much has been said in present and past debates about the paradox of the concept of nuclear deterrence, which has played a key role in preserving peace in Europe over the past 40 years. It is precisely because nuclear weapons are so destructive that they make war unthinkable and serve to prevent it. The merits of the concept of nuclear deterrence were appropriately highlighted in the

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comprehensive study on concepts of security (A/40/553) finalized last year and in the study on deterrence that came out in July of this year.

Clearly, if nuclear weapons were ever to be used, that would have world-wide effects. Inevitably, however, those who would suffer most would be the countries directly concerned. Thus they themselves have the greatest interest in avoiding such an eventuality. The Netherlands, together with its partners in the Atlantic Alliance, seeks the prevention of any war, whether conventional or nuclear, through agreements on all aspects of security, military as well as the other ones. This policy involves dialogue and arms-control negotiations in the East-West context as well as multilaterally, in conjunction with the maintenance of an adequate deterrent and defence capability, at lower levels of armaments wherever that can be agreed. The Netherlands seeks verifiable arms-control agreements that establish a stable balance of force at the lowest possible level. To prevent doubts about compliance from giving rise to mistrust between States, those States should consent to measures for the international verification of compliance. This would contribute to improved security and increased confidence between States. Arms control and disarmament are essential elements in a comprehensive security approach.

While a maximum effort must be made to bring about substantial reductions in nuclear armaments, those weapons cannot be disinvited. Nuclear weapons are part of a wider system that has afforded us a relative measure of stability. This situation cannot be changed overnight. As was recognized in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United General Assembly, on disarmament, the reduction of nuclear weapons can only be achieved in phases in such a way that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments.

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Netherlands)

At the beginning of the 1970s the two Powers which possessed the largest nuclear arsenals, and as a result bore the greatest responsibility for nuclear arms control and disarmament, made a start in the search for agreements aimed at halting the upward spiral of nuclear armament. We have to acknowledge, in retrospect, that these agreements have had the unintended consequence of a diversification of weapon systems and qualitative refinements of those systems, largely because of the agreed quantitative ceilings. This development has given rise to some dissatisfaction about the agreed arrangements. Meanwhile, more ambitious roads have been set out upon. Both sides are prepared in principle to reduce their nuclear arsenals substantially. Intensive negotiations are under way to translate that readiness into concrete agreements. Our hopes are placed on concrete results in those negotiations.

Europe is the location of a singular concentration of a diversity of types of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, having enjoyed superiority for a long time in conventional offensive means, has stepped up its capabilities in the nuclear offensive area. This is an alarming development. The Netherlands Government therefore attaches the utmost importance to progress in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear systems. An agreement seems possible. Such an agreement, however, should not be undermined by other nuclear systems of a shorter range that constitute a threat to the Atlantic Alliance, including my country.

The concept of stability has an important part to play in the process of arms control, arms reduction and disarmament. Measures in this process should increase instead of endanger stability. The nuclear problem, therefore, cannot be seen in isolation. The conventional imbalance in Europe is a case in point. The

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Netherlands warmly welcomes in this context the agreement reached in Stockholm on 22 September on a set of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, which constitutes an important step towards more political and military stability. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van den Broek, said on 24 September, hope for the future can be derived from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The measures agreed upon, incorporating provisions for international on-site inspection, can serve as a good example to other regions and provide an impetus for reaching agreement in negotiations on other security issues. We therefore hope that the proposals introduced by the Western side in the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced reductions of forces in Central Europe will meet with a satisfactory reaction from the East.

The partners in the CSCE process are now preparing for a new round of negotiations. We stress the need for progress in all aspects of security: military, economic and humanitarian.

The common conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously diminish stability and thereby increase the danger of nuclear war, induced the overwhelming majority of States to unite under the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the successful Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in September 1985, that conviction has been reinforced. Further witness to that is borne by the adherence to the Treaty of no fewer than 136 States. The Netherlands, furthermore, supports regional agreements and arrangements meeting this purpose, among them the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those parts of the world where consensus exists among the countries concerned.

The Final Document of the Review Conference underscores the importance of a comprehensive test ban as a stimulus in the pursuit of non-proliferation. The

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conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains as necessary as ever, and we remain fully committed to it. The Netherlands subscribes to the view that the question of nuclear tests, in particular a comprehensive test ban, in view of its importance for the world community, deserves priority treatment in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We call on all members of the Conference on Disarmament to make possible the resumption of the work on this issue without further delay, as from the beginning of the 1987 session of the Conference.

Interim steps and agreements, particularly by and between the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals and therefore bear a special responsibility, are capable of inducing an atmosphere of confidence in which the purpose of a comprehensive test-ban can prosper.

We wish to recall two such interim approaches. First, improved techniques and procedures for verification would enable more accurate monitoring of compliance with the threshold test-ban treaty and the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions. The Netherlands supports the call for acceptance of these new verification methods, which would remove the last obstacle to ratification of those treaties.

Secondly, the Netherlands wishes to establish a link between proposals on reducing and ending nuclear tests and early results in the bilateral arms control talks which are to continue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Effective agreements on substantive and verifiable arms control, which will substantially reduce the nuclear arsenals, appear to remain possible. We believe that a programme can be devised, in parallel with such reductions, for step-by-step reduction and limitation of nuclear testing, and the ultimate ending of all tests. We welcome the support for such a parallel approach in the intervention of the President of the United States in the General Assembly.

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Netherlands)

I now turn to some important observations of the Secretary-General with regard to the role and capacity of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament remains the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body operating in the framework of the United Nations. We fully subscribe to the Secretary-General's call for high-level attention to, and expert participation in, the Conference on Disarmament by Member States. As in the past, there is a useful role for this body in the negotiation of future arms control and disarmament agreements. All members must, in particular, endeavour to make concrete contributions; they should not be satisfied with the mere expression of broad political declarations.

An agreement for which the Conference on Disarmament continues to play an extremely useful negotiating role is that on chemical disarmament. The use of chemistry for weapons purposes has been an abhorrent reality since the spring of 1915. Public repugnance and the subsequent unambiguous prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war has not resulted in precluding their use in regional conflicts, most recently in the war between Iraq and Iran, as confirmed by findings of United Nations missions that went on-site. Arsenal have been maintained, increased and modernized. The earliest possible conclusion of a total ban on chemical weapons has acquired even greater urgency in the face of the looming prospect of chemical weapons proliferation.

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Netherlands)

Some encouraging progress was made in this field in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session. In a number of important areas, such as the verification of non-production and the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities, there is ground for some well-founded optimism about further headway. The Netherlands tried to make a contribution to the solution of one of the outstanding issues by organizing a workshop on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry, in June of this year.

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Netherlands)

The constructive atmosphere amongst all participants at that Conference holds promise for early progress in the negotiations. It is hoped that the ideas and concepts that sprang from the Conference will be a useful basis for further discussion, showing that a satisfactory system of verification is possible. However, further substantive work needs to be done. The remaining - yet quite essential - question of verification through challenge inspections has not yet been brought to a solution in spite of the imaginative and constructive proposal made by the delegation of the United Kingdom.

We are glad to note that the Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention was held in the same constructive atmosphere. The Conference was confronted with serious problems but succeeded in agreeing upon some useful and important measures to strengthen confidence in the Convention. That positive result should encourage us in our endeavours to reach a successful outcome in the negotiations on chemical weapons, which is certainly not beyond our reach.

Outer space should not become an area of competition between super-Powers. The Netherlands shares the expectations raised by the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and at terminating the arms race on Earth. Meanwhile, the anti-ballistic missile Treaty should be strictly respected. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament has a duty to examine space-related complementary issues that have a multilateral aspect.

Like the Secretary-General the Netherlands remains in favour of agreements concerning existing and new regions where nuclear weapons - or, where applicable, all weapons - are proscribed. The outer space Treaty and the Treaty on Antarctica are good examples of such agreements. However, a word of caution is appropriate. Such arrangements are of autonomous importance only if they can count on the full

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consent of all parties concerned. If States - in some instances not the least important ones - continue to fail to bring into force such regional arrangements for themselves, the purpose of those arrangements is threatened in its essence.

The Secretary-General appropriately recalls that

"Respect for the status of international civil servants is essential to a Secretariat that will enjoy the confidence of Member States",
and that

"staff members, in turn, must refrain from any action that might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization". (A/41/1, p. 14)

The Charter is unambiguous where it enacts provisions guaranteeing the international status of the United Nations staff and the corresponding duties of Member States. We condemn all actions by States in violation of their duties in this respect, most recently those interfering with the exercise of the functions of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

I have touched upon only a few subjects among the multitude that will be dealt with by this Committee in the weeks to come. The Secretary-General has appropriately warned us that the impact of the Assembly's efforts can be reduced through lack of focus and inadequate economy in their execution, and that the influence of the United Nations will be enhanced if discussions in its various disarmament forums can be so organized as to minimize duplication and reduce the number of resolutions. In our view too, the emphasis should be on defining common attitudes and on de-emphasizing mutual differences. The delegation of the Netherlands stands ready to contribute to the work of the First Committee in that respect.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Discussion in the First Committee is confidently gaining momentum and becoming increasingly broad in scope. We believe that one of its distinguishing features is the determination to take practical action and to increase the constructive efforts to achieve a breakthrough and start real movement towards a nuclear-free world and global security through disarmament. The weariness of rhetoric, which had been growing in recent years, is clearly giving way to the energy of action.

Our country not only welcomes this spirit, but is doing its utmost to follow it through in terms of specific action. New and cogent proof of this is the Soviet proposal for a meeting in Reykjavik. That meeting was a momentous event in international affairs and in the struggle to end the arms race, to prohibit and abolish nuclear weapons, and to eliminate the threat of war from the entire planet.

As a result of the Reykjavik meeting a qualitatively new situation exists. The struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a new stage at which we must make further efforts to effect radical reductions in nuclear weapons, and to work for their eventual total elimination. The Reykjavik meeting paved the way for a possible step forward towards a change for the better, provided that the United States finally adopts a realistic approach.

As stressed at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Bucharest on 14 and 15 October, the Soviet Union and its allies are determined to carry on the dialogue and the active struggle to end the nuclear-arms race and establish a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

At that meeting the Warsaw Treaty States stressed their support for the position of the USSR at the Reykjavik meeting and for the large-scale and

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far-reaching Soviet proposals put forward at that meeting. They called upon the United States and the other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to understand the responsibilities involved in the current world situation and to adopt, on a basis of realism, and responsibility, a constructive approach to the Soviet Union's proposals, which remain the main subject of the Soviet-United States dialogue.

We are firmly convinced that in the present qualitatively new situation no one can continue to act as before. What is required today is new approaches, new political thinking and a new political philosophy rejecting the age-old notions about the admissibility and acceptability of wars and armed conflicts. That new political thinking expresses in a concentrated form the collective wisdom of mankind; it is being moulded and introduced into international practice by the joint efforts of socialist, non-aligned and most capitalist countries, as well as those of broad-based public opinion.

Today, it is no longer sufficient to recognize that one cannot ride a white horse into a nuclear desert. The realities of the nuclear and space age are harsh indeed. In a nuclear war the destruction of civilization would be universal. The first nuclear strike - should anyone ever decide to launch it - would be a suicidal act: the last act. Radioactive death and nuclear winter know no boundaries, no political, geographical or ideological boundaries. This threat has made all States and social systems equal and has linked them inseparably in a common destiny. In this day and age it has made peace the supreme value for all. The key question concerning relations among States boils down to this: coexistence, or no existence at all.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Hence it follows that today no State can any longer harbour the illusion that it is incapable of making itself invulnerable by military and technological means alone, not even by creating a most powerful defence, be it on Earth or in space.

Guaranteeing security - and the meeting at Reykjavik confirmed this - is increasingly becoming a political task, and it can be carried out only through political means. I should like to quote in this connection from the Mexico Declaration, which states:

"If a repetition of Hiroshima on a global scale is to be prevented, it is not merely more knowledge or new technologies which are needed, but more wisdom."

(A/41/518, p. 3)

Security cannot indefinitely be based on the fear of retaliation. The price of continuing to pursue the doctrine of "deterrence through terror," which is employed to justify the continuance of nuclear testing, the renunciation of the first and second agreements on strategic arms limitation (SALT I and SALT II) and the erosion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), is far too high. An extension of the arms race to outer space would represent a serious, and quite possibly insurmountable, obstacle to a nuclear-free world: it would set up an even narrower dividing line between war and peace and pose a constant threat to the security of each and every one of us. That is why the strategic defence initiative has become a symbol of obstructing the cause of peace, of the concentrated expression of militaristic designs and of the reluctance to remove the nuclear threat hanging over mankind, as well as the embodiment of a short-sighted, narrow and selfish approach to the problem of international security.

It is entirely possible that neo-globalists would be happy with hegemony placed in the hands of one or two military and space super-Powers that would keep

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the entire world within the sights of their space weapons. However, we find such a prospect loathsome. We are in favour of a just, democratic and secure peace, both on Earth and in outer space.

The emergence of new means of waging war threatens to hand the responsibility for political decision-making over to computers. As a result, we may all end up as hostages to technology, which can malfunction, as has been tragically demonstrated by the recent accidents involving the "Challenger" and the Chernobyl nuclear plant. Furthermore, such sophisticated weapons systems are being planned that the agreement on their control will be virtually impossible.

The time factor has now become crucial. Extraordinary impetus is needed to get us moving down the road towards security - a reduction in the level of military confrontation, the adoption by all States of a defensive military doctrine and the limitation of military capabilities to what is required for defensive needs.

Only disarmament can provide a solid foundation for the building of a secure peace. Constructing such an edifice on mountains of weapons is like building it on sand. "Security through disarmament" - that was the way in which the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament defined what should be the main thrust of efforts by States in the nuclear and space age. That is also how it is defined in the documents of the Harare Conference of Heads of State and Government of countries members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and in the Mexico Declaration. Those are major contributions to the new political philosophy. The introduction of new ideas into the practice of international relations is served by the proposal of the socialist countries for establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

Of course, structural elements of the edifice of global security should be incorporated into the military as well as the political, economic and humanitarian fields. It is not a question of which should come first - Disarmament

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or confidence, the reduction of military arsenals or the settlement of regional conflicts. We can and should move simultaneously towards security on all fronts, not linking progress on one front with movement on another but redoubling our efforts in all areas. However, in so doing, political realism requires that we recognize the unique significance of disarmament as a system-forming process that provides material guarantees of security and confidence and that erects a physical barrier against wars.

The Comprehensive Programme of Global Security through Disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986 represents a fusion of new political thinking and a platform of concrete actions. The programme envisages: the elimination of all means of mass annihilation; a guarantee of peace in outer space; significant reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons and limiting the military capabilities of States to a level of reasonable sufficiency. The core of the programme is the plan for eliminating nuclear weapons from the planet within this century and an effective ban on space strike weapons. Its fundamentally new aspect is the fact that it envisages not merely the final objective but practical disarmament measures with a precise time-table and designed to be implemented within a historically short space of time. The programme is large scale, bold and pragmatic. It is very specific both in procedures and in the timing of its implementation. Another of its characteristics is that it is drawn up taking full account of present-day realities. It takes into consideration the views and concerns of other States, including nuclear States, and the interests of equal security for all, without prejudice to anyone.

One aspect of our programme of security through disarmament that deserves special mention is its profoundly democratic nature. Its goal is the self-dissolution of the so-called Nuclear Club. We believe that the prestige and dignity of a great Power should not be associated with nuclear or other kinds of

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weapons but, rather with its contribution to disarmament and to the establishment of security for all, without exception.

The huge constructive potential of the programme and of the new political thinking that gave rise to it were also given vivid expression in the package of important Soviet proposals made at the meeting in Reykjavik. Had they been accepted, a new era in the life of mankind would have been ushered in - a nuclear-free era.

Of course, the issue of nuclear disarmament cannot be fully solved between the USSR and the United States alone. Disarmament is the concern of each and every one of us. What is needed is vigorous action by all States, truly joint, many-sided and concentrated efforts devoted to crucial areas, efforts that make use of all the creative and ingenious potential of the world community of nations.

A nuclear-free world is the concern of the entire international community and of each and every State. The Soviet delegation fully agrees with Foreign Minister Andersson of Sweden, who stated:

"Nuclear disarmament is not the concern of the nuclear Powers alone."

(A/41/PV.10, p. 86)

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The priority area of multilateral efforts is the ending of nuclear testing. It is the simplest, clearest, and most effective step which could be taken forthwith to wind down the arms race. We believe it imperative to embark finally on full-scale talks on the cessation of nuclear explosions once and for all. This reflects the will of the overwhelming majority of States which are calling for a stop to be put to the endless chain of nuclear tests designed to perfect nuclear arsenals and create space weapons. We whole-heartedly endorse the appeal of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Robles, for an immediate solution of this question. We entirely agree also with the view of the representative of India, Mr. Razi, that a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing is an imperative.

Now when horizons of a nuclear-weapon-free world are emerging certain other questions remorselessly arise: how can we work to reach agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons if at the same time they are being continuously refined? How can one call for trust from partners if one reserves the freedom to disrupt equality in the course of disarmament?

It has become axiomatic that politics is the art of the possible. In the nuclear space age a new understanding is emerging of the art of politics as the ability and courage to rise above national and State interests and to make choices - no matter how difficult they may be - in favour of the common interests of mankind. One such difficult decision for us was the further extension to 1 January 1987 of our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. That was a practical deed demonstrating the sincerity of our intentions, our determination to act and, at the same time, to encourage others to act. This action has been appreciated on its merits by everyone who places practical deeds at the top of the scale.

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We hear energetic demands in the United Nations that the United States should join the Soviet moratorium. A Soviet-American and, subsequently, a multilateral moratorium would undoubtedly help to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons also on a treaty basis.

The Soviet Union is open to any ways and means of verifying the cessation of tests, including the establishment of a world-wide supranational verification network. Valuable recommendations were put forward by the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare. The United Nations, we think, will support the proposals of the five continents for ensuring compliance with the obligation not to carry out nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union, we declare today, will accept all recommendations produced under United Nations auspices.

Our delegation is authorized today to affirm that the Soviet Union is ready to sign a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, at any time and in any place. We are even prepared to do it here, in the United Nations itself. For the Soviet Union, any versions are acceptable - bilateral Soviet-American negotiations; trilateral, with the participation of Great Britain; or multilateral, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

Another extremely important area for increasing multilateral efforts is nuclear disarmament, aimed at achieving secure, verifiable and verified agreements designed to bring about a radical reduction in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Today we are presenting a proposal to proceed immediately to an exchange of views on these questions among all the nuclear Powers in parallel with the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons.

In the course of such a multilateral exchange of views a range of substantive, concrete questions could be discussed, particularly the cessation of the

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manufacture of fissionable and fusionable nuclear materials for the purpose of developing and manufacturing weapons; a system for eliminating nuclear weapons; fundamental principles for approaching verification of multilateral measures for nuclear disarmament, and the time for involving the nuclear Powers in the process of nuclear disarmament. That is our new proposal and it proceeds from the premise that the practical implementation of nuclear disarmament measures affecting other nuclear Powers would take place after a radical reduction of USSR and United States nuclear arsenals .

We should like to see the Conference on Disarmament finally get down to businesslike negotiations on nuclear disarmament and measures for preventing nuclear war.

It is not just a matter of our supporting those ideas. We find acceptable the proposals for the elaboration of multilateral agreements to reduce the risk of nuclear war, similar to the bilateral agreements concluded with the participation of the USSR in the 1970s. We are in favour of businesslike discussion of the proposals by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear alert centre. Clearly, the very idea of such a centre is contradicted by the creation of "star wars" weapons and the nuclear arms race.

The Soviet Union supports the democratic demands of peoples in various parts of the world for the creation in those areas of nuclear-free zones. The USSR has taken a principled stand in favour of the establishment of such zones, including a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe; zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Korean peninsula, and South-East Asia. We call upon all nuclear States to

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guarantee such a zone in the South Pacific. The USSR is sympathetic in principle to the question of creating a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic, as proposed by Brazil, and the idea of declaring the South Atlantic a nuclear-free zone.

We do not want to see nuclear weapons taking over new territories. We want to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. Comprehensive strengthening of that régime is increasingly becoming a paramount task for multilateral action in the international arena. We, nuclear and non-nuclear States alike, must resolve this question together. A reliable basis for such joint action is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which in practice has proved its effectiveness and viability. However, it is impossible to overlook the growing nuclear ambitions of Israel and South Africa or to disregard reports about attempts to develop nuclear weapons in the South Africa-Israel-Taiwan triangle, as well as in Pakistan.

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It is necessary to ensure, on a broad multilateral basis, the speedy implementation of the recommendations of the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held last year. On the same basis, efforts should be continued to further enhance the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) both in strengthening the non-proliferation régime and in creating safe conditions for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Preventing an arms race in space is the universal and planetary concern, and consequently a high-priority task for the United Nations. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, 151 countries voted in favour of an immediate solution for this issue.

The Soviet Union is deeply convinced of the need for a radical ban on the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons.

At the same time, in this field too, we are not saying "all or nothing". We are in favour of important partial steps in that direction. Most urgent among them is the strengthening of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. In Reykjavik the USSR proposed that that specific measure be implemented. The United States, however, rejected that approach, which posed no threat to it whatsoever and did not affect its genuine security interests, and flatly refused to confine research, development and testing under the strategic-defence-initiative programme to the laboratory. The President contended that he needed the programme to ensure that America and its allies remained invulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. For that matter, however, the Soviet side has proposed that all the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States of America and the USSR be eliminated ... and under strict control. So the question arises, and I put it to the United States delegation: why would there be a need to secure "the freedom of America and its friends" against Soviet nuclear

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missiles if no such missiles existed? If there were no nuclear weapons, what reason would there be for defence against them?

In the light of what happened in Reykjavik, it has become absolutely clear that the entire "star wars" venture is purely militaristic in character and designed to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. The chimera of military supremacy - I cannot use any other word - turned out to be more powerful than the need to take a necessary step, and prevented the sides from adopting decisions that might have become historic for the entire nuclear and space age. A turnabout in world history did not occur, although it was possible.

The urgent need to resolve without delay the question of preventing an arms race in outer space is now, after Reykjavik, felt more intensely than ever before. The United Nations must speak out in defence of outer space. At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, negotiations should at last be started on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all aspects, including the working out of accords on such partial steps as a ban on offensive space weapons of the "space-to-Earth" and "space-to-space" class, renunciation of the development of new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of those that already exist, and ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites.

The mobilization of the efforts of each and every one of us is also needed to accomplish another urgent task - ridding the planet of the arsenals of chemical death. Promising progress has been made at the Conference on Disarmament. Last April the USSR put forward new proposals clearing the way for an agreement which could be reached as early as in 1987. The bottom line of those proposals is the elimination in the shortest possible time, in conditions of reliable verification, of both chemical weapons themselves and the industrial base for their manufacture.

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The plans for the production of binary chemical weapons that are - whatever qualifications are used - designated for Europe are in direct conflict with that objective and lead to a new spiral in the arms race.

We ask the United Nations for support in accelerating the achievement of the prohibition of chemical weapons and in encouraging all States to refrain from the production of new types of chemical weapons and from the deployment of those weapons on the territory of other countries as well as to withdraw chemical weapons deployed abroad to the confines of the national territories of the countries to which they belong. Here again our position is flexible and open to all ideas, provided only that they lead to arms limitation and not to an arms build-up.

A very timely proposal has been made by the People's Republic of China: that all countries capable of producing chemical weapons refrain from testing, manufacturing, transferring or deploying them pending the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In our view it would be useful to establish chemical-weapon-free zones in Europe and in other regions of the world. The Soviet Union supports the proposals for the establishment of such zones in Central Europe and in the Balkans and is prepared to guarantee their status, provided the United States does likewise.

An important sphere for broad multilateral efforts should be the banning of the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles whose destructive capabilities come close to those of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass annihilation.

Movement towards genuine security through disarmament requires that, along with the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, conventional armaments and armed forces should be subject to agreed reductions.

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This problem too is an urgent one. Because of a number of their characteristics, so-called conventional weapons come very close to being weapons of mass destruction. Reports about United States plans to accelerate the introduction of the technology for the rapid conversion of conventional delivery vehicles into nuclear delivery vehicles in NATO's system of armaments are causing considerable alarm. The implementation of such plans would seriously undermine the very possibility of verification of nuclear disarmament measures, lower the nuclear threshold and threaten to destabilize the military-strategic balance.

In the reduction of conventional armaments, too, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies are ready to go as far as other States are prepared to go. That is an answer to those who today raise the question of conventional weapons. I should like to remind them that the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty came forward with concrete proposals on very substantial cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, under very far-reaching control measures.

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The objective is significantly to reduce the level of military threat on the continent. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, under our proposals, the reductions would reach 25 per cent on each side, amounting to more than 1 million men. Also of great importance would be success at the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The Soviet Union also proposes reducing to the limits of reasonable adequacy the armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia.

We are in favour of establishing reliable barriers to the proliferation of conventional arms. In our view, it is becoming increasingly urgent to adopt measures to prevent the spread of so-called inhumane types of conventional weapons covered by the 1981 international Convention. We cannot fail to note in this regard that the delay by the United States and some of its allies in ratifying the Convention is in fact preventing us becoming an effective instrument of arms limitation.

The Soviet Union has no desire to have its troops stationed anywhere outside its national boundaries. That question is also open for discussion, and we believe that it can be settled in circumstances of increasing trust and with the implementation of measures of military détente.

In order to put on a practical level another disarmament question - that of curbing the arms race in the vast expanses of the oceans and seas, we must begin talks, with the participation of all the major Powers and other States concerned. We are in favour of taking measures in this field both at the global level and in the regions of the Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union supports turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, in which there will be no room for the presence of the naval units of foreign States whose coasts are not washed by that ocean's waters. In order to promote the

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convening with delay - not later than 1988 - and the successful holding of an international conference on the Indian Ocean, we are ready to agree with the United States and other major naval Powers on freezing and significantly reducing all military activities in the Indian Ocean area.

We have put forward a complex of proposals aimed at ensuring peace and security in the Mediterranean. It has become necessary to establish within the framework of the United Nations or outside it appropriate machinery for drawing up practical measures to transform the Mediterranean into a region of stable peace, security and co-operation.

The Soviet Union proposes that negotiations be initiated on the reduction of naval activities in the Pacific, particularly those of nuclear-armed vessels. The strengthening of stability could also be promoted by limiting the competition in anti-submarine warfare - in particular, by reaching agreement to refrain from anti-submarine warfare in certain areas of the Pacific. That would constitute a substantial confidence-building measure.

Naturally, with regard to questions of limiting and reducing naval activities and armaments attention is focused above all on the world's two largest navies, those of the Soviet Union and the United States. We proceed from the premise that the measures and talks proposed by the Soviet Union in this regard could be between the Soviet Union and the United States at the first stage, and that other major naval Powers could join them subsequently.

A number of delegations have raised the question of limiting nuclear naval armaments. That question figured prominently in last year's United Nations study. The Soviet Union is ready to consider possible ways to reduce this component of the naval capabilities of States as well, both in the overall context of measures to limit those capabilities and at the relevant negotiations on nuclear arms.

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The question would be resolved in a radical way in the process of implementing the programme we have proposed for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

We also believe that with regard to increasing the safety of the sea-lanes and building confidence the time has come to work out a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the air space above them. We regard favourably the way in which the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Theorin, has dealt with the subject. We could indeed build here upon the existing Soviet-American and Soviet-British agreements on the subject.

An inalienable associated matter contained in all bilateral and multilateral agreements is comprehensive and very strict verification at all stages of arms reductions, involving both national technical means and international procedures, up to and including on-site inspections. The Soviet Union is ready to negotiate any additional verification measures. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union and the United States set out upon the path of nuclear disarmament we shall make our position on verification even tighter. In a post-nuclear environment, which calls for a particular sense of responsibility, verification must be real, all-embracing and convincing. It should give complete confidence in the reliability of compliance with agreements and provide for the right to on-site inspections.

Yet another inalienable associated measure in our disarmament proposals is the freeing of material resources and intellectual and technical potential and their reallocation to the needs of development and to the solution of the other global problems of today, including the elimination of economic backwardness, famine, poverty and disease.

The Soviet Union wants each arms limitation and reduction measure, each step towards a safer world, to bring people not only increased security but also a real improvement in their living conditions. The Soviet delegation today puts forward

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the following initiative. We propose the establishment, when agreement is reached on a real reduction in the military spending of States, of an international fund for assistance to developing countries. A portion of the resources saved by States members of military alliances and by other industrialized countries participating in such agreements would be transferred to the fund. We would also agree to the implementation of the fund's programmes and projects using, in particular, United Nations channels under proper control by the fund.

We also propose that the parties to disarmament agreements - both bilateral and multilateral - accompany such agreements with statements of the size of funds thus released and the proportion of them to be allocated for assistance to developing countries. The Soviet Union is ready to start negotiations on the principle of transferring part of the funds freed in the process of disarmament to assist the developing countries, including the establishment of appropriate international machinery.

We are disappointed that, owing to the actions of the United States and some other Western countries, the United Nations decision on the convening of an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development has not been carried out. The tasks that would face such a conference are becoming particularly urgent, and we should like to see it convened in 1987.

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We offer peaceful alternatives to military assembly lines. Instead of competition in building up nuclear arsenals, we offer co-operation in the peaceful use of the atom, with the establishment of an international régime for the safe development of nuclear power. Instead of "star wars", we offer "star peace": co-operation in a peaceful outer space, the establishment of a world space organization, the implementation of large-scale projects through joint efforts. Instead of the production of chemical weapons, we offer the pooling of efforts to develop a peaceful chemical industry. We welcome the decision taken at the second Review Conference on the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, recently held at Geneva, concerning the development of peaceful co-operation in promising areas of bacteriology.

All of this constitutes a promising atmosphere for the development of the latest technologies, for deriving profits and creating jobs in both market and planned economies, and for sharing scientific and technological achievements with developing countries.

Our proposed programme of disarmament provides for the comprehensive strengthening of the legal foundation of this process, based on the premise that the road to genuine security lies through the attainment of binding and reliable agreements on arms limitation and reduction. At this crucial time, when we face the very urgent task of working out and concluding new accords that would materially lessen the threat of war, it is vitally important to treat existing agreements carefully and to ensure the most scrupulous compliance with them by all participants and in all respects. It is also extremely important to refrain from any action that could lead to the erosion or circumvention of such agreements.

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To be sure, under the terms of some agreements, the parties have the right to abrogate a relevant commitment in accordance with their own supreme national interests. Today, however, the supreme interest of all mankind lies in reducing the sphere of the material preparations for war. Therefore, the Soviet Union is today proposing that States should voluntarily relinquish their right to withdraw from arms limitation agreements and, of course, that they should abide scrupulously by the obligations they have assumed.

The role and responsibility of the United Nations are particularly important in the collective efforts of States. A new era of concrete action confronts the United Nations with new challenges and requires from it a serious reorganization, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness and productivity and to turning it into a genuine centre for harmonizing the actions of States in order to remove the danger of war in material terms.

The United Nations must play an indispensable and unique role in ensuring movement towards a world without nuclear weapons, a world in which everyone's security will rest upon the security of all and upon the strength of right and morality rather than upon the strength of armaments. It must become one of the most important guarantors of the stability of such a world. As was wisely noted by President Miguel de la Madrid of Mexico, the Organization must "guarantee peaceful and rational coexistence". (A/41/PV.8, p. 22)

The essence of that process, as we see it, is to ensure that all States seek solutions to their security concerns, not as enemies but as partners, and by political means, in particular here at the United Nations, rather than within the framework of restricted military alliances or through new means of waging war.

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The Soviet Union is in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations machinery in the field of disarmament. We are in favour also of holding, in 1988, a productive third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and of the early establishment of a preparatory body for that purpose. We support the proposal of Cyprus to hold special meetings of the Security Council to consider questions concerning disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. That proposal is consonant with our idea of opening dialogue between nuclear Powers that are permanent members of the Security Council and of conducting a round-table meeting of their leaders.

It is important to ensure that United Nations decisions on the key issues of curbing armaments do not remain so many pieces of paper, and that all States respect United Nations recommendations, particularly those adopted by consensus, and in their practical actions abide by the political obligations they have assumed. We believe that the question of resolutions on disarmament problems raised by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Renton, was most timely. We welcome the question he raised, but we consider that reducing the number of resolutions is but one aspect of the approach to the problem. It is no less important to ensure that all Members of the United Nations heed decisions adopted by general agreement and that consensus - which, as we all know, is usually achieved at the cost of enormous effort - actually reflects the willingness of those concerned to take appropriate action. For those reasons, we fully support the United Kingdom's idea of a comprehensive examination of the question of resolutions on disarmament. This has a great deal to do also with carrying out such important tasks as implementing the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

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Today, the value of time - of each month, each week and each day - is increasing enormously. We cannot go back in time to repair or alter something. There is only one past that lends itself to change: our common future, which will very swiftly become history before we have the time to look round. What that future will be and what our balance sheet in the eyes of our descendants will be depends on our will and our wisdom.

The Soviet delegation has come to the First Committee at this extremely important session of the General Assembly prepared to co-operate, in the hope that the work of this authoritative body will contribute to advancement along all the routes on the road-map leading to disarmament and hence to a safe world for all.

Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): I have great pleasure, Sir, in extending to you, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, our warm felicitations on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation is confident that with your wide-ranging experience and well known ability you will guide the work of the Committee with skill and understanding. I should like to assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation in the fulfilment of the important responsibilities that have been entrusted to you.

I take this opportunity also to place on record our deep appreciation of the able manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Alatas of Indonesia, chaired the meetings of the First Committee during the fortieth session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

As we survey the world disarmament scene, we find little at which to rejoice. The arms race has become a fact of life despite the uninterrupted flow of rhetoric, year after year, in support of the cause of disarmament. Weapons are rapidly becoming more sophisticated and lethal. Areas once regarded as reserved for peaceful activities face the menace of militarization. The threat of obliteration by nuclear war is no longer a figment of our imagination. The annual expenditure on armaments has touched - if not exceeded - the astronomical figure of a thousand billion dollars. Non-aligned countries continue to be haunted by the fear that their independence and sovereignty remain hostages to ambitions of global and regional hegemony. The use or threat of use of force, in violation of the United Nations Charter, continues to be resorted to with impunity by powerful nations.

We had hoped that last week's super-Power summit meeting would result in decisions to decelerate the arms race and in the acceptance of new restraints. Its failure to produce any such decisions was most disappointing, especially when the two sides are reported to be on the verge of a breakthrough. However, we continue to find encouragement in their expressed determination not to give up their search for solutions.

The nuclear weapons possessed by the two super-Powers are enough to destroy us all many times over. If a nuclear war were to break out, there would be no winners. As long as nations possess nuclear weapons, the fate of mankind will continue to rest on a razor's edge. A cessation of the nuclear-arms race and complete nuclear disarmament must, therefore, remain the foremost priority in our pursuit of the goal of general and complete disarmament. We cannot afford to let efforts towards that end languish.

My delegation recognizes that nuclear disarmament can come about only gradually, through a series of measures. We know that there is no magic wand with which all nuclear weapons can be made to disappear. That is why we attach supreme

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importance to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. A nuclear test ban would contribute more than any other single step to the objective of nuclear disarmament. By stopping the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons, it would put a halt to the qualitative aspect of the arms race. It would lower the reliability of existing warheads and thus eliminate the incentives for resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban, above all, is a legal obligation assumed by States parties to at least two international treaties.

The question of a nuclear test ban has been on the international disarmament agenda for almost three decades and has been the subject of innumerable resolutions in the General Assembly. All scientific and technical aspects of the question, including the question of verification, have been exhaustively debated and discussed. There is a growing corpus of scientific evidence that the existing means of verification are adequate for the conclusion of a test ban, and yet an agreement is, today, nowhere in sight.

While in the past the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban was linked to the question of verification, today it has been made conditional on the adoption of a whole range of a whole range of other far-reaching disarmament measures. As long as nuclear weapons exist, it has been said, it will be necessary to test them. In other words, a test ban would not be the first, but one of the last, measures to be adopted for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. My delegation deeply regrets that because of that attitude the Conference on Disarmament was unable this year, for the third successive session, to agree on a meaningful mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee under the relevant item of the agenda.

My delegation appeals to the two Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals to demonstrate the political will needed for the early conclusion of a comprehensive

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test-ban treaty and, pending that, to observe a moratorium on all nuclear testing. It is in that context that Pakistan welcomed the moratorium unilaterally announced by the Soviet Union last year. We also welcomed the United States invitation to Soviet scientists to observe and measure nuclear tests on United States soil in order to contribute to the development of a more effective verification system.

Pakistan has consistently adopted a comprehensive yet flexible approach to issues of nuclear disarmament. We have supported all measures which can contribute to this objective, whether they be global or regional or of an interim, partial or collateral nature. One such collateral measure, which the international community has long accepted, is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, which would contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation and thus reduce the risk of nuclear war. Pakistan has consistently supported the establishment of such zones in various parts of the globe. The conclusion of a treaty last year on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific was, therefore, warmly welcomed by my delegation, along with a large number of others. We are happy to note that the Secretary-General's report to the United Nations General Assembly this year on the work of the Organization also urges the conclusion of agreements on the expansion of denuclearized areas. In its own region - that is, South Asia - Pakistan has been pressing for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for more than a decade. We are convinced that such a step would be in the interest of all the regional States, which have already made solemn declarations not to acquire nuclear weapons. It is our hope that the other countries of South Asia will also recognize the merit of our proposal and join us in our endeavours to keep our region free from nuclear weapons.

Pakistan remains strongly committed to the goal of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful in nature, and it does

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not aspire to become a nuclear-weapon State. Its credentials in this context are proved by policy assurances at the highest level and the nature of its initiatives in the regional context. I can only regret the reference made in this regard a little while ago by the representative of the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other State need have any concern regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme, which is emphatically peaceful and very limited in scope.

Another measure of an interim nature pending complete nuclear disarmament is the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The extension of such assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding form - which, in our view, the nuclear-weapon States are under an obligation to do - would advance the ultimate goal of a denuclearized world by removing an important incentive for the non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire a nuclear capability. We are therefore disappointed that this year, once again, the Conference on Disarmament made no progress on this important question because of the rigid positions adopted by some countries.

The threat of an expansion of the arms race into outer space is another matter which continues to cause grave concern to my delegation. Outer space, which has been declared by the international community to be the common heritage of mankind, is already being used for military purposes through existing surveillance and communications satellites. This situation is being further aggravated by plans to deploy weapons in outer space for ballistic missile defence or for anti-satellite purposes. Far from providing effective protection against nuclear missiles, an attempt to set up a space-based defensive screen against the missiles of the adversary would only impart a fresh momentum to the arms race in both defensive and offensive weapons. In those circumstances, existing arms-limitation agreements would become irrelevant, the nuclear balance would be upset and the strategic

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environment would become less stable. Everything must therefore be done to reverse and halt this trend before technological developments make it an irreversible process.

We would urge all space nations to abide strictly by the existing restraints on the military uses of outer space contained in international and bilateral legal instruments and to adopt new measures that would banish the risk of outer space being converted into yet another arena for international conflict and confrontation.

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Pending the conclusion of comprehensive agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space, interim measures should be adopted, particularly with a view to dealing with the inadequacies of existing space law.

My delegation has been following closely the progress of the talks between the two super-Powers on nuclear and space weapons which have been taking place at Geneva. We hope that those talks will lead, at an early date, to significant reductions in nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, although bilateral negotiations should be welcomed and supported they are not sufficient. Nuclear weapons threaten us all and are thus not the exclusive concern of the nuclear-weapon Powers. We cannot accept that mankind remain hostage to the security interests of the nuclear-weapon States, as perceived by them. Bilateral talks between the super-Powers must therefore be complemented and reinforced by multilateral efforts. The Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, provides us with the requisite forum. My delegation therefore views with misgiving the tendency to deny to the Conference on Disarmament the role assigned to it by the international community; that can only retard the international disarmament process.

The only item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament on which some tangible progress was registered at its last session is that concerning a chemical weapons convention. Further progress has, unfortunately, been slowed by the tendency to view many of the outstanding issues in an East-West dimension. Given the necessary political will, my delegation sees no reason why that convention should not be concluded before the end of the next session of the Conference on Disarmament. Pakistan, for its part, has participated actively and constructively in the negotiations in that body. We have made concrete proposals; we shall continue to do so to bring about an early and successful completion of the endeavours of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

An allied issue - the ban on biological weapons - was the subject of a Review Conference held last month at Geneva. The Review Conference on the biological weapons Convention marks a significant step in strengthening the régime banning biological weapons and toxins. My delegation is happy with the agreement on important new measures to strengthen the Convention and reinforce confidence among the parties. There was also a wide measure of agreement on the need to improve the verification and complaints procedures of the biological weapons Convention through new legal undertakings. We hope that that question will be taken up in a serious and constructive spirit at the next review conference on the Convention, to be held within five years from now, and will lead to the adoption of an additional protocol incorporating an improved verification and complaints machinery which is at once flexible, objective and equitable.

One aspect of particular importance to the developing countries is the need for intensifying international co-operation in the peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins. My delegation feels that the vast potential that exists in this field can best be exploited by establishing effective institutional means within the United Nations system. My delegation is pleased that the Final Declaration of the Conference acknowledged that need in its call on the United Nations Secretary-General to arrange an examination of this question in the appropriate United Nations body.

While our preoccupation with nuclear disarmament is natural and understandable, it should not obscure the importance of arresting the buildup of conventional forces and armaments which consume the bulk of global expenditure on arms. It is also important to remind ourselves that the arms race is not always or exclusively fuelled by the East-West conflict; it is often the result of regional

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

tensions and conflicts, of the ambitions of large and powerful countries to dominate their smaller neighbours, and of the refusal to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law and justice. It is therefore in the regional context that many of the causes of and solutions for the conventional arms buildup are to be found. Steps need to be taken to build mutual trust and confidence and promote good-neighbourly relations. The regional disarmament processes need to be tailored to the specific situation of each area. Pakistan fully recognizes the importance of conventional disarmament and has made several proposals in this regard in the regional context.

The close relationship between disarmament and security can hardly be overemphasized. The disarmament process can best make progress in an improved international security situation. On the other hand, an environment of distrust and tension is conducive to the escalation of the arms race. Resolution of the underlying political problems and conflicts and removal of mistrust are therefore essential for the creation of the necessary security climate in which disarmament efforts can proceed successfully. It is in this context that confidence-building measures can contribute substantially to the disarmament process. My delegation is pleased with the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures in Europe, held in Stockholm. We feel that those measures are also of relevance to other regions of the world which are characterized by political and military tensions.

The competitive relationship between disarmament and development has been recognized in several studies carried out under United Nations auspices. It is shocking that precious material and human resources should be wasted in the development and production of more and more destructive weapons when millions of people in the developing world have to struggle merely to give themselves a

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

marginal ability to survive. My delegation was therefore keenly looking forward to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development which was to be held this year in Paris. We deeply regret that that was not possible. It is our hope that the current session of the General Assembly will take a decision to convene the Conference at an early date and that the Conference will lead to the adoption of concrete measures for the diversion of resources from the buildup of arms to the economic and social progress of the developing countries.

This year we shall also take a decision on the date for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to be held not later than 1988, and on the establishment of a preparatory committee for that purpose. My delegation attaches great importance to that special session as a means for revitalizing the disarmament process, which has been characterized in recent years by stagnation and stalemate. We look forward to working in close co-operation with others who share our hope in making the third special session on disarmament an important milestone on the road to a more secure and peaceful world.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We are in a rapidly deteriorating world of insecurity, anarchy and terrorism. An interdependent world of numerous sovereign nations cannot progress towards international peace and security without an effectively functioning organization. Indeed, we have the United Nations. But when it was established, although all the other Charter provisions were complied with, one provision was bypassed - the most important provision of the Charter - namely, that in Article 43 of the Charter for a United Nations Force. On that depends, first, the enforceability of the decisions of the Security Council, the main organ of the United Nations whose decisions must be enforceable, and secondly, the validity and effect of the Council itself and, consequently, the very heart and purpose of the United Nations as an instrument of peace and security.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

The absence of a United Nations force deprives the Security Council of its effectiveness in maintaining international peace and security and order, and is the cause of the present situation in our world - insecurity, anarchy and terrorism. Undeclared but pernicious wars are in progress, on the one hand, and the Security Council and its effectiveness are paralysed, on the other.

Over all these years we have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, both nuclear and other armaments, resulting in new levels of destructiveness. Disarmament efforts, however, have been conducted over the years without effect. The reason is that there has been no parallel effort whatsoever directed towards international security. Without international security, there can be no disarmament. In consequence, efforts to reduce the arms race prove futile, year after year.

In the absence of international security, there can be no national security except through increasing armaments. Hence the arms race results. Without a system of order and security in conformity with the Charter, nations will continue to seek their security through the competitive accumulation of armaments and there will be no end to the arms race.

The drawback of nuclear weapons is that they are atmospheric in their function. Scientific research has brought out the reality that the nuclear weapon is practically unusable as a means of warfare. Why? Because it is atmospheric in its effects, and it has been established that the fall-out from a nuclear attack will through the effect of the winds, most probably return in a short time, causing parallel damage to the attacking country.

The nuclear weapon is thus rendered practically unusable; yet there is a continual accumulation of nuclear weapons. This shows that either the reality that the nuclear weapon will also strike the country that uses it is not being duly taken into account, or that it is being overlooked because of the acquired momentum of antagonism, in terms of the continued increase in nuclear armaments.

(Mr. ROSSIDES, Cyprus)

Now, this situation is one that calls for an appropriate reaction. In the resolution that was adopted last year, which was initiated by Cyprus, we brought out the need for the Security Council to become involved in disarmament. It is resolution 40/151 A of 20 January 1986. It was adopted by an overwhelming majority, yet nothing has been done. The Security Council has done nothing to involve itself in the question of disarmament, contrary to the provisions of Article 26 of the Charter.

The purpose of this statement is mainly to draw attention to that resolution, which was adopted last year by an overwhelming majority and still remains unimplemented by the Security Council, which has failed to proceed to take measures to become involved in disarmament and thus to comply with the provisions of Article 26 of the Charter. My purpose is to draw attention to this failure of the Security Council. I do not know why the Security Council avoids dealing with disarmament, though the Charter provides that it shall do so.

Mr. MOREL (France) (Interpretation from French): The Minister of State of the United Kingdom, the current president of the Twelve, last Tuesday made a statement on behalf of the member countries of the European Community which reflected the views of my delegation. He did so with even greater authority than his predecessors in past years not only because of the Community's enlargement to contain Spain and Portugal but also because of the signing last December of the unique European document, which for the first time embodies the will of the Twelve to co-operate closely on the various aspects of security. Today I should like to give a more detailed presentation of France's own views on the recent development in the state of international security and on the prospects for multilateral negotiations that are under way.

(Mr. Morel, France)

The recent evolution of the state of international security has for a year now been marked by great activity that, all in all, has led to positive results. Appreciation may of course differ on the morrow of the meeting in Reykjavik, but we must give full weight to all aspects. The stalemate in Iceland that was so spectacularly evident must not be over-exaggerated; to dramatize it would not be in anyone's interest. The disagreements are not new. Each of the parties has made substantial efforts. Yet it must not be underestimated, because a feeling persists of a lost opportunity, even failure, that is felt by all. Governments, like world opinion, have the same feeling, and that could unnecessarily increase mistrust.

It would be better therefore to keep a certain perspective and to consider the result of that meeting for what it is: revelatory of the true difficulties. Those difficulties were already known, and they have been confirmed at the highest level.

Reykjavik strengthens the analysis my country has presented for some time. A lasting improvement in international security does not depend first and foremost on a possible cessation of nuclear tests, or on the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, but rather on the drastic reduction of strategic weapons by the USSR and the United States, which presupposes an understanding on the maintenance and interpretation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and the relationship that could exist between offensive and defensive weapons.

Furthermore, the very ambitious nature of the proposals put forward, the intensity of the negotiation, and clear-cut nature of the final disagreement have confirmed that the two parties have gauged the real priorities and have had recourse to all their political means in order to solve them. After so many years of uncertainty, of reciprocal accusations and pressures of all kinds, the relaunching of dialogue is encouraging, and the final disagreement does not undermine that fact.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Indeed, perhaps one cannot make any direct comparisons with the negotiations on earlier documents. The SALT-I and SALT-II agreements remain major points of reference and have made it possible little by little to build up a major part of what I would call the basic grammar of the talks on strategic weapons that have been under way for some 17 years. But those agreements deal with a much narrower field and are in fact aimed at limiting overkill capacity, not ending it, whereas today we are speaking of the radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons, both Soviet and American. One cannot but express the hope of seeing verifiable progress in that area.

(Mr. Morel, France)

We believe, and continue to point out on every possible occasion, that the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, a legal instrument which is in full force, without any time limit, and which has played decisive role in the maintenance of strategic stability, must be strictly complied with. We certainly appreciate the magnitude of the challenge represented by new technology applied to space defence. An agreement must be reached, and it will not be simple to conclude it. But calling that Treaty into question will not increase stability.

Having emphasized that the priority given to the drastic reduction of American and Soviet strategic weapons was fully justified, I must recall another imperative need - the reduction of conventional weapons. Let us suppose for a moment that it had been possible to reach a comprehensive agreement at Reykjavik. It would immediately have raised the question of the imbalance in conventional weapons in Europe, which more than 30 years ago was the site of the original deployment of nuclear weapons, an imbalance which is still a fact of life today.

That is why we welcome with great satisfaction the first step represented by the agreement reached at the Stockholm Conference. The document adopted by the 35 participants was the result of seven years' work, if we include the drawing up of the negotiating mandate in Madrid and then the negotiations themselves in the Swedish capital. I remind the Committee that the agreement results from a proposal made by my country, submitted on 25 May 1978 by the President of the French Republic during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This new type of agreement on confidence-building measures between the 35 countries of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CSCE) perhaps did not at that time receive all the attention it deserved. The Conference to open in Vienna in three weeks' time will allow it to be put in a better perspective.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Even if limited, that first result is of a historic character. It represents progress for all the European countries, which are to experiment with new contractual practices of information and verification, which will make it possible to ensure for the first time on the continent the almost complete transparency and predictability of military activities. It also comes within the greater political design of the CSCE, which is not concerned only with disarmament aspects. Therefore, a process has been launched involving on a basis of strict equality each of the 35 European countries, whatever their size, their choice of security methods or their social system. We believe that framework is particularly appropriate for starting on new stages towards conventional disarmament, whose importance no one will deny. That is the sense of the appeal made by the Atlantic Alliance in Halifax last May, which called for bold new steps.

However, the Stockholm agreement also concerns the whole international community, particularly those who deal with disarmament issues in this body, who will be able to draw very useful lessons from the Final Document. I would sum them up as follows: the establishment of trust in the military field depends on the procedures adopted and precise actions taken, rather than general statements; the contractual practices make it possible to respect the freedom of each State; trust can be established only if a detailed and rigorous system for verifying compliance with the agreements is provided for, a tangible sign of acceptance in good faith of common rules. It is thus that it was possible, according to the formula defined in Madrid in 1980, to give effect and expression to the principle of the non-use of force, in a regional framework that seems to be particularly appropriate for the control of conventional weapons.

(Mr. Morel, France)

As well as considering the nuclear and conventional threats, we must bear in mind the threat posed by chemical weapons. Here the past year has been productive, though not decisive. It is true that in Geneva negotiations on drawing up a convention banning such weapons have become more active than ever before. A decisive role in the speeding up of the negotiations is undoubtedly played by the fact that chemical weapons have been used several times in several regions of the world in flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol, with the risk that each year the number of countries possessing such weapons will increase. If priority is to be given within the Conference on Disarmament to any agenda item, it should surely be given to negotiations on banning chemical weapons, in order to remove the serious and growing threat they present to the whole of the international community.

However, my delegation is very much aware of the efforts to be made and the difficulties to be overcome in order to achieve the result that we desire. We do not agree with the optimism of those who think the negotiations can be concluded next year or that the objective is within our reach. On none of the key sectors of the convention have we yet been able to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

It is true that important progress, the most significant progress, has been made with regard to the destruction of stockpiles. Methods of destruction and control systems, including international on-site control, have been the subject of agreements in principle which can serve as an example for other parts of the convention. Such agreement has yet to be reached on the pace and order of destruction, in order to ensure a balance in the security of each country involved. In that regard the French delegation in 1985 made proposals that we hope will contribute to allowing progress to be made in the debate.

(Mr. Morel, France)

With regard to authorized activities and adequate controls, we have also made noticeable progress. But much remains to be done. Despite our hopes at the end of the last session, no agreement has yet been reached on the classification of key precursors and their control or on the régime governing super-toxic chemicals and their verification.

It must also be said that we still have a great deal of territory to cover - the destruction of production units, or putting them to new uses, under with the necessary controls. At present on this question we still have only a very general framework with little content.

Finally, the question of inspection on challenge has not yet been resolved. My delegation appreciated and supported the effort of the United Kingdom in presenting a draft which is both effective and realistic and which should enable progress to be made. The outline that I have given clearly sets out, alongside the reasons for hope, the areas where efforts need to be made to achieve the targets we have set ourselves.

More generally, the fundamental conditions for security have not changed. Deterrence continues to be, as it will for a long time yet, a decisive element at the world level. At the same time, it continues to be a subject of international debate. We regard it not as a categorical imperative, or as an inviolable principle, but as an unavoidable part of life, the product of a history that no one can rewrite. It is indeed essential to seek, with the support of all concerned, better security for every State. But the complexity of the interplay of power in the world of today precludes radical solutions or abrupt changes. We recognize the view of those who would wish that the world were governed by different principles and that the security of everyone could be established on a new basis. However, it is our duty to take the world as it is and as it will continue to develop.

(Mr. Morel, France)

As the French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, has said, there is no alternative to deterrence within human grasp. With or without the strategic defence initiative, the nuclear weapon will continue to be an essential factor in international security for Europe and the world. After the last world war and the cold war, which were marked by the emergence of nuclear weapons, my country chose to use deterrence against the more powerful in order to determine - from a position of weakness - the conditions of its independence and survival. We see a reason - political, diplomatic or even moral - to change that policy.

(Mr. Morel, France)

It is France's wish to take into account the aspirations of those who, by choice or by necessity, are in a different situation; we are therefore not satisfied at the present situation and are continuing to seek ways of assuring less precarious world security. We consider that the very great daily threat posed to billions of people does not come from the existence of nuclear weapons, but from conventional armed conflicts, from ideological, political and terrorist violence, and from continuing international economic imbalance. Those are the areas of true urgency and of greatest need; we must constantly see to it that they are taken into full account in debates and negotiations in international disarmament forums. That is my country's view of multilateral disarmament negotiations.

The first question that comes to mind involves the very role those negotiations should play towards bilateral negotiations - principally those between the Soviet Union and the United States - and regional negotiations. How are the tasks to be allocated? The answer would appear to be obvious: ensuring the complementarity of the various exercises. But this must be well organized, and that is no small matter in the comparatively intense current stage of negotiations. Each country must offer its opinion on the division of work and responsibilities in the irreplaceable framework of the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

I think it particularly opportune to recall that that division cannot be based on extreme models, either where the two great Powers would be responsible for dealing with the major matters, leaving only secondary items and pointless debate to multilateral discussion, or on the other hand where the international community would dictate to the parties concerned the content and modalities of their negotiations. No progress can be made through hierarchical subordination of the bilateral to the multilateral or vice versa. Only through case-by-case good

(Mr. Morel, France)

management of the complementarity of bilateral, regional and world forums can the international community make progress in all ongoing negotiations.

I turn now to the current prospects in the various major areas. I have already spoken of chemical weapons and shall not do so again. I would only underscore our great interest, in the general framework of the chemical-weapons Convention, in the need for specific efforts to discourage the spread of the use of chemical weapons. I would recall also the importance we attach to the procedure for considering possible violations of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Thanks to the means available to the Secretary-General, that procedure is a reflection of the international community's vigilance.

France is pleased that the Review Conference on the biological weapons Convention, held last September in Geneva, adopted a final declaration calling for the implementation of measures to increase confidence in compliance with the Convention by parties to it. Those measures are only a first step, but they are a step in the right direction. They should be fully implemented, and the experts who will meet in Geneva in April 1987 have an extremely important task in this regard. We hope that in the future States parties will, individually and collectively, do all in their power to strengthen the authority of the Convention and confidence in compliance with it.

Ongoing bilateral negotiations on outer space have, in our view, lent greater interest to the various proposals put forward by France over the past eight years, advocating the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the strengthening of the international legal régime on the subject of outer space, with a view to preventing the deployment of destabilizing systems and to supplementing notification machinery.

(Mr. Morel, France)

With regard to the question of outer space, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has confirmed the important role of the Conference on Disarmament in this area, in parallel with the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations. In particular, the Ad Hoc Committee methodically continued its consideration of the existing legal régime on the military uses of outer space; this must be continued in greater depth with a view to reaching an agreement regarding gaps in existing provisions, which is essential if we are to make progress towards specific measures. We consider that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has already shown that the immunity of space objects could be sought in a realistic manner, inter alia through confidence-building and notification measures. We hope that next year the Conference on Disarmament will again establish the Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate similar to this year's, which remains totally valid at this stage of our work.

In connection with nuclear questions, the question of testing has been much debated and I shall only recall France's position. In our view, a possible nuclear-test ban is an integral part of more general negotiations and cannot be a kind of prerequisite. We cannot agree with various attempts to make the renunciation of testing into a sort of litmus test of international morality. There can be no general rule, when all the facts show that each country has its own special situation. Can one equate, on the one hand, the two super-Powers, which for more than 30 years and through hundreds of explosions have been accumulating a wealth of experience, and, on the other hand, my own country, which must guarantee the credibility of its minimal deterrent? Clearly, these are qualitatively different situations. Compelled to rely on our own means, we cannot agree to the imposition of the planned obsolescence of our security measures.

(Mr. Morel, France)

More specifically, criticism of various kinds continues to be levelled at us with regard to our underground testing in the Pacific. On each occasion we have been able to show that the criticism was based on no objective factor and was in fact a reflection of discrimination against us. We continue to work on the basis of the results of the in-depth scientific study carried out by the 1983 Atkinson mission, composed of experts designated by the countries of the region.

There has been no equivalent of the Atkinson mission, for one cannot compare that lengthy mission by acknowledged specialists with the short visit recently mounted by another nuclear country to show certain excavations to a few hand-picked journalists. The Atkinson mission reflected our readiness, openness and willingness to engage in dialogue; these were shown also by the welcome given last February in Paris to the delegation composed of the sponsors of the Rarotonga Treaty on the denuclearization of the South Pacific. Having had the honour of leading those talks on behalf of my country, I wish to emphasize our great interest in them. We were able to set out most frankly our position on that Treaty. On the pretext of establishing a denuclearization régime - without any reason, given the absence of any threat of proliferation in the region - the Treaty would attempt to impose a régime discriminatory with regard to France. Far from rejecting discussion, we have stressed our wish to continue consultations through regular exchanges on security matters with the countries of the region. That shows our total willingness, once having stated our disagreements in principle. We cannot endorse our own disappearance, but we exercise our legitimate rights in the Pacific with the greatest openmindedness and the fullest respect for the legitimate interests of our neighbours in the region. We hope that they will show the same respect and the same openmindedness.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I have already spoken of our interest in the Stockholm Conference, and shall say no more on conventional disarmament, apart from stating that we would be eager to see the subject dealt with more directly in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Could we not invite each group of countries or each regional body concerned to put before the Conference its own experiences in this area? That kind of methodical comparison would be of great interest. I wish therefore to state our support for Peru's proposals in this regard.

(Mr. Morel, France)

On the subject of disarmament studies and research, I must mention my country's keen concern with regard to the situation of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Mr. Liviu Bota, who is being arbitrarily held in his country, a situation that has for many months defied the Secretary-General's authority and deliberately flouted the most basic rules of international civil service. My country hopes that a solution will be found in the very near future. The last session of the Advisory Board for Disarmament Studies evidenced the broad disapproval that had been aroused - notwithstanding the usual political or regional differences - by the attitude of the authorities concerned.

I now come to a subject that could represent a major contribution to our work on disarmament but that may go beyond its actual framework. I am speaking of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The meetings of the Preparatory Committee have revealed the difficulties involved in laying the groundwork for a consensus that could lead to concrete measures. Indeed, that is the broad sense of the initial proposal made by France three years ago in an attempt to establish an effective link between security, disarmament and development, even if it were necessary to take realistic and thus progressive steps in order to do so. Owing to the lack of agreement on substantive items, we had to call last spring for the postponement of that Conference. We took that position after very careful analysis of its implications and with a full awareness of the real difficulties that might ensue with regard to organization of the Conference. As we pointed out at that time, however, we continue to be interested in this project. We are concerned that the best possible conditions are provided for its success. The French authorities have recently suggested that it be held within the framework of the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, to be held in 1988, in order to allow time for all States to make careful preparations

(Mr. Morel, France)

and to ensure the broadest possible high-level participation by all States. However, it was made clear that if a consensus emerges in favour of 1987, France, for its part, would have no objection. In that case, of course, the Conference might be somewhat different from the one initially suggested, and it would represent the launching of a process in which we would, in any case, participate very actively by putting forward precise proposals. We believe that the first meeting, in 1987, should be convened preferably in New York.

Eight years ago, during the General Assembly's special session on disarmament, France put forward three major guidelines for multilateral disarmament, namely, the legitimate right of every State to security, the participation of all countries in disarmament and consideration of the regional dimension.

The recent changes in the international situation and in disarmament negotiations confirm both the well-founded nature of such broad categories and the tremendous amount of work that remains to be done in order to give them full effect.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning, I would like to inform members of the Committee that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting: Sri Lanka, Belgium, Viet Nam, Albania, Greece and Ghana.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.