

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.383
28 August 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 August 1986, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 383rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I am going to propose a relatively unusual procedure. I am going to invite the Chairmen of the several Committees to present their reports if they are all here and able to do so, and then I am going to suggest a very brief break to hold an informal plenary meeting for the purpose of processing some documentation which the Secretariat needs as a matter of urgency. To begin with, as announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall now invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Chemical Weapons, and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to introduce the reports of their Committees.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, to introduce the report of the Committee, which is contained in document CD/726.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): At this final stage in our work, I should like to take the floor briefly to present to the Conference the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It was my honour to preside over this body during the present session. The report is to be found in document CD/726.

The Ad Hoc Committee, having been re-established by a decision of the Conference taken on the day that the first part of its session ended, namely 24 April 1986, started its work the following day and, during the second part of the session, following an initial exchange of views, adopted on 24 June 1986 a work programme comprising the following points:

- "(1) Examination and identification of issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- (2) Existing agreements relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- (3) Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In carrying out its task, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Committee in 1985."

To allow these subjects to be dealt with in a balanced fashion the Committee decided to allocate an equal number of meetings for each one. The Committee therefore held nine meetings to consider these three subjects and a final summing-up meeting.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Part III of the report reviews the various positions taken on these subjects. Although it does not give similar views concerning the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee, part IV of the report, entitled "Conclusion", indicates that a consensus was reached within the Committee recognizing the significant role of the legal régime applicable to outer space, the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament, recognition of the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in space and the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee is ready to work to attain this objective. Lastly, the Committee decided that no effort should be spared in continuing to do substantive work on item 5 of the agenda, and to this effect recommended that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1987 session.

I hope that the Committee's endeavours have laid the foundations for the work of its future sessions, enabling it to fulfil faithfully the objective that has been set and the well-known recommendations by the General Assembly of the United Nations, contained more particularly in resolution 40/87, adopted at its fortieth session.

Very kind and encouraging words have been spoken here with respect to the Committee and its work and I am very appreciative of them. Certainly, the Committee did work actively to fulfil its mandate and make progress in its efforts.

In concluding this chapter I should like to express my deep thanks to all delegations for their very valuable and serious contributions to the work of the Committee and the flexibility and spirit of co-operation they showed, without which we would not have been able to obtain these results. I wish to thank all delegations which enriched the Committee's discussions by presenting various working papers and relevant proposals. They all represent in my opinion valuable contributions and demonstrate the desire to find effective solutions to solve the urgent task of preventing an arms race in outer space. We would also like to express our gratitude and thanks to the Secretary of the Committee, Miss Aida Levin, and to the other members of the Secretariat, whose dedication and effectiveness facilitated the work of the Committee.

Since I have the floor, allow me Mr. President to take this opportunity to say, in my capacity as representative of the Mongolian People's Republic how deeply the people of my country appreciated the recent decision by the Soviet Union to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until the end of this year. My country's attitude as regards this act of good will, which is an example of new political thinking, has been fully expressed in the Statement of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, issued on 25 August at Ulan Bator. The Statement says, inter alia, that in extending the unilateral moratorium the Soviet State is offering the American Administration a new possibility to make a serious assessment of the situation being created and to seize a historic opportunity to reach agreements on cessation of the arms race and on nuclear disarmament. The Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic consider the position and the practical actions

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

taken by the Soviet Union to be extremely timely and realistic and aimed at concluding an agreement between the USSR and the United States to halt nuclear tests during this year. Cessation of nuclear tests by all nuclear Powers, and the conclusion of an international treaty on the complete and general prohibition of such tests would advance the cause of nuclear disarmament and lay the foundations for a comprehensive system of international security. Since the subject dealt with in the Statement is entirely relevant to the work of the Conference, my delegation has requested the Secretariat to publish it as an official document of the Conference.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on the way in which you have presided over the Conference during this difficult month of August. I would also like to express my regret that Ambassador Imai of Japan will shortly be leaving us and wish him all the best in taking up the new post to which he has been called.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for introducing its report.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie, who as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, will introduce the report of that Committee, which has been circulated today as document CD/727.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is before the Conference in document CD/727. The Committee has continued its work on the basis of the mandate indicated in paragraph 1 of it, which was given to the Committee in the present form in 1984. This mandate embodies the common will of all delegations to elaborate at the earliest possible date a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stock-piling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. All delegations are firmly united on the great importance of this goal which has been pursued with increasing urgency by the Ad Hoc Committee since its inception in 1982.

The main substantive result of the Committee's work in the 1986 session is contained in the rolling text of the draft Convention contained in its appendix. This continues the practice initiated in 1984 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and developed last year under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of establishing a single text which, without binding any delegation, represents the present stage of negotiations, with the recommendation that it be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention. Procedurally it represents an up-date of Appendix I of last year's report contained in document CD/636.

As you will see, remarkable progress has been made in many important areas of the draft Convention. The area of common ground represented by text unqualified by brackets and footnotes has been much enlarged. We have new and largely unbracketed texts for Articles IV, V, VI and VIII of the Convention. Considerable progress has been made on Article IX and on the detailed annexes to some of the Articles, notably Articles IV and VI. The credit for these important steps forward is due to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups set

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

up by the Ad Hoc Committee, in which the detailed substantive work was done. Working Group A, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rowe of Australia, was responsible for Article II on definitions and Article VI, now entitled "Activities not Prohibited by the Convention". Working Group B, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria, was responsible for Article III on declarations and Articles IV and V, now retitled "Chemical Weapons" and "Chemical Weapons Production Facilities". Working Group C, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia, was responsible for Article I on general provisions on scope, Article VII on national implementation measures, Article VIII on the Consultative Committee, and Article IX on consultations, co-operation and fact-finding. I should like to congratulate and thank all of them very warmly for the tireless work that they have done to contribute to the combined result which you see before you. Mr. Wisnoemoerti is leaving Geneva at the end of the session and I should like to thank him both personally and on behalf of the Committee for the work he has done and to offer him our very best wishes for success in his next assignment. I am glad to say that both Mr. Rowe and Mr. Poptchev are staying and will be continuing during the inter-sessional period the successful work which they have been carrying out. I should also like to express my gratitude and that of the Committee to its secretary, Mr. Bensmail, and to all other members of the Secretariat, and to the interpreters and translators who have contributed to our work and to the production on time in the present difficult financial circumstances of the report that you have before you today.

The progress recorded in this report has been made possible by the spirit of good will and co-operation demonstrated by all delegations represented in the Committee. This has been particularly noticeable in the summer part of the session after the common experience of visiting The Hague and Rotterdam for the workshop in June organized by the Netherlands Government. I should like to express again here the warm thanks of the Committee to the Government of the Netherlands and to the Netherlands delegation for organizing such a fruitful meeting and for their very generous hospitality. I think that there would be general agreement that this year the pace of progress in the negotiations has been further accelerated, and that it is essential to go on increasing this momentum with a view to the early conclusion of a Convention. Accordingly, the Committee agreed to recommend in paragraph 10 (c) of its report that it should resume its work on issues under specified Articles during the three-week period from 12 to 30 January 1987, in accordance with the practice of the last four years, and that this formal session of the Committee should be preceded by consultations under my authority as Chairman in the intervening period. These consultations would continue during the months of September, October and November and would culminate in a period of open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee to be held here in Geneva between 24 November and 17 December. The Secretariat would provide during this period a limited number of meetings with full services and all delegations are warmly invited to be present with such expert advisers as they think desirable. I would, however, emphasize that it will not be a formal session of the Committee: any common ground identified on a provisional basis during the inter-sessional period will be put formally for the consideration of the Committee when it meets again in January 1987.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The Committee has agreed to recommend that the formal session of the Committee in January consider issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX and under those parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI. Experience this year suggests that these Articles are interdependent, and that progress on one may depend on progress on others. This is particularly true of Articles III, IV and V, on which work has been continuing very actively since Working Group B submitted its report. The first fruit of this work was seen in the draft Article IV added only last week to the rolling text by agreement of the Committee at its last meeting on 20 August. We should be prepared to consider any or all of these topics at our open-ended consultations in late November and December and the promising areas will be identified by the consultations that Mr. Rowe, Mr. Poptchev and I will be holding in the meantime. We will prepare the ground with a view to making the open-ended consultations in November and December as fruitful as possible and to making a further decisive step forward in the report of our formal session in January to the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, the Committee recommends in paragraph 10 (d) that it be re-established at the outset of the 1987 session with its 1986 mandate and that Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden be appointed as its Chairman. I would like to say how pleased I am that I shall be passing on the Chair of the Committee in February into his able and experienced hands for what may prove to be the decisive year of its work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in his capacity as its Chairman. The report is contained in document CD/728.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I have the honour to present to the Conference on Disarmament the report of the Committee on its work in 1986.

The document in question, document CD/728 of 26 August, has two pages summarizing the organization of the work of the Committee, and an annex of 34 pages reproducing the provisions that the Programme could contain. The content of the provisions is self-explanatory, for which reason a careful reading is highly advisable.

As indicated in the report, between 20 February and 25 August the Ad Hoc Committee held 21 meetings, thus bringing the total number of meetings held since work was begun on this subject up to 119.

Six working groups were established to try and solve the problems still existing in connection with various parts of the draft. As may be read in the report, both in the contact groups and in the consultations held by the Chairman "intensive efforts were made ... with a view to reconciling differences and reaching agreement on paragraphs of the Programme that remained outstanding. While the relevant texts continue to reflect points of

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

difference, the areas of disagreement were narrowed and, in some cases, considerable progress was made towards harmonizing positions". This happened, for example, in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the section concerning "Nuclear weapons"; in paragraph 2 of the section on "Conventional weapons and armed forces"; in paragraph 3 of the section on "Related measures" and in paragraph 5 of the chapter entitled "Machinery and procedures". Nevertheless, and despite its intensive efforts, the Ad Hoc Committee, as is indicated in the Conclusion contained in the report, was not able in the time available to it during the session this year to resolve all outstanding issues. Accordingly, and bearing very much in mind that the General Assembly in resolution 40/152 D asked the Conference on Disarmament to submit to it at its forty-first session "a complete draft of the Programme", I kept that in view and considered it my duty to suggest that the Ad Hoc Committee should examine the desirability of pursuing its work during the first part of the 1987 session with the aim of completing the elaboration of the draft programme and submitting it to the General Assembly before the closure of the forty-first session. As a result of that examination, the Committee, as is indicated in the Conclusion contained in the report, "agreed to recommend to the Conference that work on the elaboration of the Programme be resumed at the beginning of the 1987 session for the purpose of completing the Committee's task during the first part of the 1987 session and submitting the programme to the General Assembly at that time".

That recommendation -- which I trust will be adopted by the Conference -- implies, in my view, a commitment by all members of the Ad Hoc Committee to make maximum efforts to ensure that at the Spring session of the Conference next year, through mutual concessions in everything that does not imply a step backward compared to the Final Document, to complete, I repeat, the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme, which, in the Final Document itself, the Assembly solemnly declared, as will be recalled, that it should encompass "all measures thought to appear advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

I would not wish to conclude without expressing yet again, as I have done in the past on similar occasions, my appreciation to all members of the Secretariat, both those we see and those we do not see, who have made their valuable contribution to our work, and I am sure that no one will reproach me if, amongst them, I mention by name Miss Aida Levin, who has acted as secretary of this subsidiary body of the Conference since it began its work in 1980 with the title of working group and who, as I said two years ago, has discharged her duties with exemplary and laudable competence, knowledge and objectivity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for his statement, introducing the report of the Committee.

Delegations will recall that I had proposed to have a brief adjournment of the plenary at this stage in order to hold an informal meeting. My reason for not proceeding that way is the good news that we have already had distributed this morning the text on item 1 and we are able to proceed with

(The President)

our normal list of speakers a little longer and then we hope, relatively soon, to have distributed the text of the report on item 3. Thus we would not need two separate informal meetings but might manage to get through a good deal of work in only one. Under the circumstances I suggest that we go ahead with our list of speakers and break for informal plenary a little later than I had indicated. I cannot tell you more than that for the moment, but it should not be too much longer.

Therefore, I call upon the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): At the last plenary meeting, my delegation gave its views, by an authoritative voice, on the main problems that presently confront our Conference and on the status of our work. If I take the floor today, it is not to continue the consideration of substantive matters, but simply to say good-bye. As you, Mr. President, and colleagues know, I have been transferred to another, although related, post. My delegation will henceforth be led by Ambassador von Stülpnagel, whom many of you know, and have come to appreciate.

A number of colleagues have made mention of my impending departure in their statements in recent plenaries and I would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude especially to those who have found kind, warm-hearted and encouraging words, reflective of the good and fruitful co-operation that has marked our joint passage in the Conference. I am grateful for these signs of good comradeship, and for the wishes expressed for my future assignment.

Four colleagues will relinquish their duties at the Conference simultaneously with myself; the four of us may derive some comfort from the fact that we can now share, as far as the group of colleagues goes, the same pangs of departure pains; as far as the Conference goes, perhaps the same withdrawal symptoms. I will remember with gratitude the warm and friendly personality of Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, as much as his perspicacity and, again and again, his original and piercing thoughts. Ambassador Jessel and I have together presented an exemplary case of how French-German co-operation and friendship function on the personal level. I had much to learn from his comprehensive grasp of security policy affairs. Ambassador Imai of Japan has, to my mind, made a unique contribution in our Conference in that he has brought a rare mixture of scientific knowledge and political insight to bear on the problems of disarmament as his recent valedictory statement has once more demonstrated. Over the past five years I have often had the opportunity to praise the outstanding performance of Ambassador Souza e Silva. May I, in parting, also express my good wishes for these colleagues whom I shall miss, as the Conference will miss them.

My last month with the Conference has been marked, Mr. President, by your exceptional stewardship. Like your predecessors, you were reliably and competently assisted by Ambassador Komatina and his Deputy, Ambassador Berasategui. I would like to acknowledge, at this juncture, the fine co-operation from which my delegation and myself have benefited on their part over the years. The entire Secretariat has been helpful and able throughout. May I particularly refer to the indispensable assistance, always reliably and charmingly rendered, of Miss Thompson, the Documentation and

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Conference Officer. I would also like to acknowledge the excellent work of our Press Officer, Mrs. Endler, who manages to elucidate our complex proceedings to the outside world with rigorous impartiality and great competence. I would equally like to mention the helpful work of the Librarian of the Disarmament Research Library, Mrs. Ertan. Over my entire period of tenure, our interpreters have dealt admirably with the formidable double challenge they face: the complexity of our analyses and the complicated vocabulary we use, and the rapid staccato which some speakers, and, I fear, myself included, favour in delivering their speeches.

Many colleagues who have departed before me have claimed, in their final statement, the privilege of placing on record some personal observations, strongly shaped no doubt by their personal experience and the particular phase of disarmament politics in which they participated. With your indulgence, I would like to avail myself of the same privilege and leave with colleagues some personal impressions on the function and functioning of the Conference on Disarmament and, perhaps, possibilities for future improvement.

Five years ago, I arrived in the midst of one of the bleakest moments of East-West and big Power relations. The dialogue between the two major military Powers was well-nigh broken, and with the brief interlude of the START and INF negotiations which the Soviet Union then discontinued in 1983, remained so for a long time. That state of affairs made it difficult for the Conference to fulfil its own functions, as our worldwide endeavour requires the bona fide participation of the two great military Powers. I am now leaving at a juncture when the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in an arms control dialogue of unprecedented breadth. Hope is now justified that both big countries -- and not only, as heretofore, one -- earnestly look for the establishment of a durable and stable military and political relationship, at the lowest level of weaponry. These hopes, as they increasingly emanate from the bilateral process, have also permeated our work and given us encouragement. But there is no doubt that the Conference on Disarmament has so far failed to draw the full benefit of this unique new period of hope and promise. The potential of the multilateral negotiation process is far from being realized. Global security needs require global security solutions. During the years I have been involved, my profound belief in the need for and potential of the multilateral disarmament process has been growing. We have to make sure that it produces more and better results. This makes it necessary to work out a more organic relationship between the bilateral and the multilateral angle of disarmament. I am saddened and preoccupied by the fact that the momentum and excitement of the bilateral disarmament negotiations have apparently not allowed the participants in that process to focus on this relationship and that the danger that the Conference is either considered as a mere public place or looked at with indifference or negation has not been sufficiently exorcized.

The resurgence of bilateral negotiations on the overridingly important nuclear problems, and the new comprehensive proposals that have been exchanged in that process should also cause us to reflect once more about the respective potential of bilateral and multilateral negotiations in coping with the nuclear dilemma. In my five years in Geneva and New York I have been impressed by the fact that the fond, and noble, dream of the participants in

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- that nuclear disarmament could be achieved over the heads of the nuclear weapons holders by the international community at large -- has been increasingly receding and that a new and more sober approach has taken its place. Not all delegations may agree, but to me the tendency is clear: the role of the Conference on disarmament and nuclear disarmament proper, in decision-making with a view to reducing nuclear hardware, is very limited and the unique and emotional preoccupation of some with nuclear matters, neglecting broader and more comprehensive needs of disarmament, including its conventional component, has increasingly shown its weaknesses. This description of more realistic trends does in no way take away from the validity of the 1978 Final Document with its broad and multifaceted approach to all disarmament issues.

Our somewhat ritual descriptions of the function of our Conference mainly refer to its assignment as the only worldwide disarmament negotiating forum. But here again the reality is somewhat different. The Conference bears a Janus face, it is a negotiating and dialogue organ at the same time, the two being inextricably linked, since negotiations on complicated security issues cannot be launched at whim, at arbitrary dates and with arbitrary contents, but must be carefully prepared by a long process of dialogue, of conceptualizing and of establishing technical and political prerequisites. It would be wise for us to acknowledge this double-faced nature of the Conference more clearly and to exploit its dialogue potential more fully. The distinctive feature of the Conference and of the United Nations disarmament bodies in New York is their triangular structure. Other multilateral disarmament conferences -- such as the MBFR negotiations in Vienna -- are, in essence, between the two major military alliances. The vital interest of our body lies in the fact that the countries of the third world which cannot look to military alliances and their immediate protective effect find here the forum in which they can discuss their own security concerns along with those of a more global nature. If such is the importance, especially for the non-aligned countries, if participation and dialogue are their true interest, then the Conference should attempt to enhance its dialogue potential further. The worst sin would then be to deny dialogue and to leave the non-aligned countries without the possibilities for a full airing of their views. One thing is clear: the denial of rational dialogue is a recipe of irrationality. I draw the conclusion that the Conference on Disarmament, more than heretofore, should be the place where, in a comprehensive process, the participants learn about one another's security perceptions and problems. In this context it is particularly important that we all gain a deeper understanding of the fragility of the security situation in the third world countries with their numerous conflicts and instabilities. Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan of Pakistan has recently and wisely directed our attention to regional security problems and the need to develop models for regional security arrangements and problem solving. Indeed, both the regional and the global approach must be the subject-matter of our deliberations, by way of a comprehensive dialogue. If we are serious in providing, especially to the non-aligned participants, a forum for a comprehensive security debate, then we should also exploit our rules of procedure better and be less hesitant in creating appropriate working bodies where dialogue can be optimized. In my view there is no logical reason why each subject-matter on the agenda of our Conference -- any subject-matter -- should not be treated in optimum form, and

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

special committees may often provide that most appropriate format. How can the consideration of a particular subject matter in an ad hoc committee be detrimental to the security interests of a country that has already agreed to placing that same subject matter on the agenda of our Conference? How can a more thorough consideration of a problem be more dangerous than its superficial treatment? Countries that are convinced of their good case in adopting and practising a certain security policy can only benefit from the opportunity to present their case with more detail and persuasiveness. As Ambassador Imai has pointed out, the security stance of a country can often only be understood if the underlying rationale is made thoroughly transparent in an open debate. To my mind, the Conference could very well afford the courage to indulge in certain experiments to that effect. A subsidiary body to which a particular subject-matter is entrusted will certainly wither away when it appears that the subject-matter is exhausted or not suitable or ripe for consideration and that a negotiation in the true sense is not a feasible proposition.

In the same vein, and in a search for more dialogue, I also regret that too often detailed and well-researched proposals are made by delegations in their statements in plenary, but that too few others relate their own presentations to them. There is often a series of monologues, where a lively interchange and the argumentative probing of each other's proposals would be in order and would help our case. I find it inadmissible, both in terms of good style and constructive work, that questions which one delegation has put to another with the serious intent of increasing our mutual insight into the subject-matter remain unanswered for a long time, or even forever. A delegation that makes the effort of putting firm and solid views before the Conference and before colleagues has a right to expect that its proposals are being taken seriously and being argumentatively processed.

Our dialogue, our inquiry into the security views of the members of the Conference, should go deeper than slogans and superficial assumptions. In this context, one important topic of investigation should be the military doctrines and strategies propagated by the various participants. Foreign Minister Genscher has often stressed that this inquiry could be the key to safer military relationships. The important test for any military doctrine would be whether it is peaceful and defense-oriented, and whether the actual military posture of the country corresponds to its doctrinal prerequisites. The ideal situation is one where a defensive doctrine, aiming at the prevention of war and the preservation of peace, is fully reflected in a predominantly defensive posture, physically incapable of offence and conquest, where professed non-aggressivity and the inability to practise aggression manifestly coincide.

Changes in doctrine and strategy are difficult to register and are reversible; they cannot therefore themselves be made the subject of arms control agreements.

The important feature for a political strategical dialogue is, however, the coincidence or non-coincidence of strategic teachings, including training manuals and manoeuvre patterns, with actual military capabilities.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

A deeper inquiry into these relationships would, among others, reveal the strictly defensive nature of Western security doctrine and its full and evident translation into a defensively structured armed forces posture, incapable of conducting a strategic offensive. I have often deplored the cavalier treatment and wholesale condemnation of Western strategy, including its nuclear component, by a number of delegations, and at this juncture, I do not hesitate to attribute them to ignorance and failure to inquire into its precepts, mechanisms and force structures. I would hope that the recently completed United Nations Study on the Implications of Deterrence, to which I had the privilege of providing an input and which will shortly be available to delegations, might contribute to a more informed and rational debate on these matters.

General Secretary Gorbachev has recently highlighted the need for the prevention of all wars, the adoption of defensive military postures and the exclusion of surprise attacks. His appeals have been echoed by the WTO States in the communiqué issued at the close of their political consultations at the Budapest meeting. These are welcome signals. The fact remains, however, that none of the official writings on Soviet military doctrine and strategy, even of the most recent date, reflect these views; that the emphasis on offensive operations, on the advantage of surprise attacks, even those involving nuclear weapons, and on the rapid offensive mobile thrust of WTO forces still remain the same. That would indicate that, in spite of the recent political statements affirming the defensive character of the armed forces, Soviet military doctrine has not yet changed. In the Soviet view, a military decision is still to be sought on the opponent's territory. This is ominously reflected in superior and rapidly growing military capabilities, clearly able to launch surprise attacks and conduct rapid and far-reaching forward moves.

An in-depth consideration of the relationship of political announcements, military doctrines, and military capabilities could help to eliminate misunderstanding, defuse perceptions of threat and demonstrate, if the situation evolves in this direction, and that would be my hope, how recent Soviet declarations are translated into credible action.

In this context, it is also of interest that, to my knowledge, the 1982 commitment by the Soviet Union never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, has not yet been reflected in Soviet military teaching and force manuals, nor in structural or organizational changes in the Soviet nuclear forces. Military writings in the Soviet Union as of this day still stress the integrated nature -- nuclear, chemical and conventional -- of Soviet forces, and the command structures and deployment patterns still appear to be the same. In my personal view, a thorough debate on these relationships could enhance the quality of our security dialogue and clarify whether there are only -- understandable -- time lags involved or whether the problems are of a graver nature.

I have used these personal remarks to make a plea for a more rational and comprehensive debate on some essential security issues -- for more dialogue. There is nothing in this plea incompatible with the good traditions of our Conference.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The hallmark of this unique body is its spirit of mutual comprehension and tolerance even in the face of sharply diverging views. I have always attempted in my work in the Conference to give all colleagues, and all delegations, the benefit of the doubt. There is no doubt in my mind that all around this table are, in equal measure, committed to the avoidance of war and the preservation of peace. I wish the Conference well in the further accomplishment of its noble task.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. Before calling on our next speaker, I would like to express, on behalf of the Conference, the feeling that is so widely shared, that the news of your departure has been received with regret. On official grounds because of your long-standing and constructive contribution to the work of the Conference, and to the work of the UNDC, which you have recently chaired with outstanding competence and authority. Your contributions have been remarkable, perhaps even unique, both for those who have agreed with you and for those who might have disagreed, for the depth and innovative character of your approaches and argumentation as well as for your well-known courage and integrity. On personal grounds Ambassador Wegener has been one of those representatives who has brought to the Conference and to his colleagues, not only his intellectual involvement and commitment, but also his passion for direct and frank dialogue, coupled, however, and tempered with an unusual capacity for warmth in personal relations. I am sure that the fact that your Government has given you a new important assignment is proof enough that it has appreciated your contribution.

I now call upon the representative of France, Ambassador Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): It is not without some feeling of sadness that I take the floor today, since it is the last time I do so in the context of our Conference. It so happens that my statement comes immediately after the substantial yet concise statement by my friend and colleague, Henning Wegener, whom I thank for the kind words he said about me and to whom I wish to convey once again my very best wishes. I will not therefore try in my statement to do better or even as well as him, and I realize I am basing myself in my words on experience in the Conference that is a great deal shorter than his.

When I joined you 15 months ago, it is true I did not think that it would be for so short a time, but in this nomadic life of ours we well know that the length of our stay in various places is haphazard and depends on all sorts of imponderables. I note moreover that many of our colleagues who have just left us have had an even shorter stay here than I have. Even before my arrival I had heard about the high level of the debates in the Conference, but when for the summer session of last year I had the privilege of being among you, I found even more than I had expected.

First of all, a very friendly and warm welcome,

Then a quality of human relations that has never failed and which turned over the months into ties of friendship which I am sure will continue after my departure,

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Moreover, and generally speaking, there has been a very moderate tone that has been used in expressing very varied, even opposed positions, and usually a calm and quiet atmosphere which I think is the best way of preserving the future,

Having dedicated a large part of my career to security matters -- of which disarmament is an inextricable element, as Ambassador Ruth stated here the day before yesterday -- I have constantly had the opportunity of finding here views, sometimes very close to mine, sometimes very remote from mine, sometimes entirely opposed to mine, expressed not in a cold and bookish way but in a lively and occasionally vehement way by colleagues I have learned to know, to respect and to esteem and whom I have met regularly in this room and outside. I have found plentiful reasons for further thinking, endeavouring not only to analyse abstract points of view but also to understand the men who express them, something which has also led me to ponder, from this twofold angle, on my own concepts, which have often been enhanced and enriched. I have, I must admit, acquired a taste for this exercise.

It is obvious that the goal we are all seeking to attain is the maintenance of our security at the lowest possible levels of armaments. But it is equally true, although perhaps less obvious, that this goal cannot be achieved by the victory of one viewpoint over others, by the diplomatic defeat of one or more protagonists to the benefit of the others, as if disarmament diplomacy was simply war "pursued by other means" to use Clausewitz's phrase in reverse. On the contrary, it is only by patient effort and mutual compromise, and synthesis that we will all reach this result together, which will be a joint victory from which we will all benefit.

I have also been intrigued by the power, the kind of magic, spellbinding power, of certain words. I am thinking more particularly about some reactions to the notion of "nuclear deterrence". It is there, I feel, that the magic of words becomes manifest. In the dominant language in these halls, it is the concept of "nuclear deterrence" -- and "deterrence" is obviously related to "terror". It is not at all surprising that terror should form part of the psychological impact of this concept. I would note that, in my language, it is different. We speak of "nuclear dissuasion"; "dissuasion" is related to persuasion and it is a matter of persuading people not to do something, of persuading a potential aggressor not to attack. And this dissuasion, both in conventional and nuclear terms, lies at the heart of any credible defensive policy, moreover it is the opposite of a policy of aggression, above all on the part of the weak, in what we call dissuasion by the weak of the strong. Perhaps here there are some elements which might demystify somewhat the notion which has been much discussed recently?

Of course I will not, on this penultimate day of our session, recall in detail the positions of the French Government on all of the major dossiers that figure on the Conference's agenda. These positions have been thought over and worked out at length. They are not subject to sudden whims nor seasonal changes. I have stated them on many occasions, as did my predecessor before me. I will confine myself now to some reminders and some thoughts on the two major topics of nuclear disarmament and space disarmament. On the first point I have several times recalled the conditions under which France could associate itself with the process of nuclear disarmament. These conditions are three in number:

(Mr. Jessel, France)

(1) The nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers will have to have been reduced to such levels that the gap between their capabilities and those of the other nuclear Powers has changed in nature;

(2) Significant progress will have to have been made in correcting the conventional imbalances, particularly in Europe, and the chemical threat will have to have been eliminated;

(3) Lastly, strategic defence systems, notably space systems, will have to have been subjected to qualitative and quantitative limitations.

And as you know, these three points pertain to various negotiations that are in progress, bilateral and multilateral, one of which -- on chemical weapons -- is taking place here.

In this context, I must mention a point which is constantly the subject of many statements and on which our position is somewhat different from that of many other delegations. I am speaking about the halting of nuclear tests. For us this issue cannot nor should not be dissociated from the whole of the process of nuclear disarmament, but it should not precede it or constitute a prerequisite. It is argued that this would be a radical means of stopping the modernization of nuclear weapons. But allow me just to express a very general thought. The process of disarmament must progressively make States, and especially the major Powers, move away from the stage of distrust to that of mutual confidence, and this is why progressive reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, will have to be carried out without jeopardizing the security of the protagonists, such security still being ensured, until such time as complete disarmament has been reached by military means, which will themselves dwindle but will none the less still have to remain credible. The question that arises is, therefore, the following: how can the Powers in question allow their security to be based not only on reduced means but, in addition, means that are doomed to obsolescence from the very start? And I note that in the two agreements on limitation of their nuclear means -- SALT I and SALT II -- the signatory countries expressly reserved the right to modernize the weapons that they were authorized to keep.

With regard to outer space, I will confine myself to one brief point. The subject has been tackled repeatedly in our plenary meetings, but also last year and this year in the Ad hoc Committee, in which we have this session conveyed our thoughts on the legal aspects of the problem and tried to determine the headway made in the existing legal régime, as well as its shortcomings, and it seems to us that it would be opportune to go deeper into the legal aspects of the limitation of the military use of space. More generally, and as you know, France has on a number of occasions over the past 10 years made various proposals on this matter and we hope that, in due course, the seed thus sown will germinate and bear fruit.

I should also like in connection with this work on outer space to make a remark in passing, a more pragmatic remark. The Ad hoc Committee, as stated at the beginning of this meeting, held some 10 meetings this year. Nine were held last year, but this year had much more time, something that brings us face to face with the budgetary restrictions we have had to bow to. I think this should give us some thought for the future.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

I would not wish, on this last occasion, to take up too much of your time and so will no longer on the French positions, not because I have nothing to say, but you are well aware of our views on the other items of our agenda. Therefore, I am going to leave you without having had the time to participate in any concrete achievement of the Conference or even in any breakthrough in one area or another within our competence. At least I will not have had to fall victim to routine or discouragement. But I have become more aware that in this area things just do not happen on their own. Often, historians who scrutinize past history, petrified history, dead history, give a picture of a logical and necessary sequence, as if the turn of human events were as inescapable as that of chemical or physical phenomena. For those of us who participate in history as it is being made and sometimes even contribute to it, for those of us whose profession also compels us to analyse the uncertain future, we know full well that things occur differently, that opportunities arise, not permanently or constantly, but at certain privileged moments, to shape developments in such and such a direction, to consolidate peace, harmony, prosperity, or else to let them collapse. And it is for statesmen worthy of the name to grasp some opportunities and reject others.

It seems to me that the period ahead has good chances of opening up a number of "windows of opportunity" in general and also for the Conference on Disarmament:

In bilateral terms, namely the two major Powers, the prospects of progress in the negotiations seem to be taking shape, through the forthcoming summit and the current multiplication of contacts,

If such is the case, there will certainly be a positive spin-off in the multilateral domain,

But the multilateral domain also has its own dynamics and, there too, some signs of progress can be seen:

(1) It is true, as pointed out this morning in connection with our negotiations on chemical weapons, and we could say that the chances of a successful outcome are now increasing, although I would refrain from setting any date,

(2) In other forums we might reasonably hope to see the Stockholm Conference come up soon with its first results, and the establishment of confidence-building measures in Europe,

(3) Another reason for optimism seems to lie, here in this place, in the interest displayed by an increasing number of speakers in conventional disarmament, and this too seems a promising sign when we think of the number of conventional conflicts that are ravaging the world and the number of victims they cause.

These are a number of reasons which seem to me to hold out hope for the prospects of disarmament in general, and for the future of the Conference on Disarmament in particular. On condition however:

(Mr. Jessel, France)

That we do not miss the opportunities that will arise and we prepare for them carefully,

On the condition also that we avoid the polemics that could precisely prevent us from seizing such opportunities;

On the condition, too, that we know how to curb our propensity for the delights and quarrels of procedure.

I will not fail, you can be sure, to follow from afar, but with interest, the continuation of your work. Allow me to conclude by thanking the Conference as a whole and each of its members for everything they have taught me in terms of the skills of our craft, of further thinking, and of friendship. I would naturally like on this occasion to thank also the members of the Secretariat, Ambassador Komatina, Ambassador Berasategui and their collaborators. Finally, allow me to express my best wishes to each of my colleagues, first of all to you, Mr. President, and to the entire Conference, for the irreplaceable role which the Conference has and must continue to have. Allow me, Mr. President, also to add my congratulations to you for the remarkable way in which you have steered our work to a haven through all these difficulties -- and you are best placed to know those difficulties -- in the month of August.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement.

As was the case with the preceding speaker, we have heard the valedictory statement of Ambassador Jessel. Obviously, during the period in which he has been with us, we have had an opportunity to become aware of the quality of his contribution, which is the best measure of any contribution by a diplomat, rather than quantity in the sense of length of time. It is interesting that in the statement we have just heard, reference was made to the spirit of moderation and the quiet, calm atmosphere which usually prevails and, of course, quite obviously, we are, in using those terms, describing the kind of contribution which Ambassador Jessel has himself invariably made. We have always heard him speak in terms that are moderate and calm and conducive to a quiet atmosphere. It is also noteworthy that he has referred to the need for diplomats to make an analytical approach and to respond to changing developments. Of course, we have just heard yet another indication of his own analytical ability. These qualities, coupled of course with his well-known tact, grace and courtesy exemplify the best of French diplomacy, which is, I think, high praise indeed. Coupled with these qualities, of course, are the personal characteristics of Ambassador Jessel which have endeared him to all of us.

I must say that on behalf of all of us we regret his early departure. We wish Ambassador and Madame Jessel every best wish in their future diplomatic life.

I have noted now the presence in our company of Mrs. Wegener, Geraldine, and may I add to the comments expressed earlier by wishing her, as well as Ambassador Wegener, the best of good wishes.

(The President)

I am going to now continue with our list of speakers, because we have not quite yet reached the stage at which we can distribute the second document that I am hoping to have shortly.

I now call upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan, and in doing so express pleasure that his health is now improved and that he is able to be with us in person.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, the regular session of the Conference on Disarmament has come to an end. The results of the past seven months of its work will be carefully analysed by delegations, in capitals, and will be the subject of consultations. But we can already say now that this session of the Conference was of a particular nature, not only because of what occurred within the Conference itself, but also very much because of the events, trends and factors which have been determining international developments this year.

In its statement the Soviet delegation does not intend to analyse in detail the work of the current session agenda item by agenda item. Our appraisal of its work is reflected in the Joint Statement of the Group of Socialist Countries on the result of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament which will be presented by the Co-ordinator of the Group, the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meizster. We would like to share some considerations of a general nature concerning the state of affairs at the Conference in 1986.

The world of today is complex, diverse and contradictory, and at the same time objectively it is becoming increasingly interdependent and indivisible. This particularity of the human community on the eve of the third millenium cannot be disregarded in foreign policy, if that policy is to be realistic. Otherwise there will not be normal international relations: they will be doomed to turmoil and, in the final analysis, to catastrophic confrontation. Many new world processes are tightly bound together. Today's world is characterized by an aggravation of global problems which cannot be solved unless all States and peoples join their efforts. Exploration of outer space and of the ocean depths, ecology, epidemic diseases, poverty, backwardness, all these realities of this century require international attention, international responsibility and international co-operation.

The natural logic of human self-preservation urgently calls for the breaking of the vicious circle of confrontation, fear and the arms race, it calls for new responsible approaches to the problems both of the security of each State and of international security as a whole, to the entire system of factors which determine international relations and the conduct of States in the international arena today. Thus the problem is one of remodelling the very perception of foreign policy thinking, of revolutionizing the foundations of relations among States.

At this extremely important stage in the history of civilization the joint efforts of all mankind are required. The responsibility and role of negotiations on preventing war and limiting the arms race and disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, including, of course, in the Conference on

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Disarmament, has increased significantly. Mutually acceptable and effective agreements can be reached as a result, and only as a result, of the efforts of all participants in the negotiations, this being an axiom of international relations. For this reason, when analysing the results of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament the very legitimate question arises as to what was in fact the real contribution made by each member State in creating possibilities for agreements on the wide range of questions discussed at the Conference.

The Soviet Union, acting on the basis of an objective and impartial analysis of the realities of today's world, has displayed a spirit of innovation, political boldness and dynamism and put forward in 1986 a whole series of proposals on a wide range of issues concerning arms limitation, disarmament and the strengthening of international security. Among the statements made by Mikhail Gorbachev, that of 15 January is of particular importance. It contains a comprehensive plan for the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century.

The Soviet Union has tabled a package of constructive proposals at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

The Soviet Union has put forward numerous proposals within the framework of bilateral and multilateral forums and has supported these with bold, concrete steps, thus displaying its preparedness to immediately resolve one of the crucial problems of our time, the stopping of nuclear tests.

A unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has been in force for more than a year already, and has been repeatedly extended despite the absence of reciprocity. The Soviet Union has made a number of important steps in the sphere of verification of the discontinuance of tests using international forms of verification, including on-site inspections. Quite recently our proposal on seismic verification in this sphere was circulated as a working paper of the Conference. It is based on the expeditious exchange of Level 2 seismic data.

The Soviet Union, consistently working for a radical solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in space, which is essential if we wish to remove the danger of nuclear war, has expressed its readiness to elaborate and conclude a multilateral agreement to ensure the immunity of artificial Earth satellites and to ban anti-satellite systems as a partial measure. In this instance again our proposals have been supported by unilateral steps. A unilateral Soviet moratorium on anti-satellite weapons has been in force for more than three years.

Soviet proposals are not confined to nuclear and space weapons.. Together with its Warsaw Treaty allies, the Soviet Union has proposed a number of measures to reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In this sphere as well we wish to see joint and consistent progress towards lower and less dangerous levels of military confrontation.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

New proposals on chemical weapons have also been introduced. As was recently stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev they should permit, in our view, before the end of this year or next year, the signing of a convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating stockpiles of such weapons as well as of the industrial base for their production.

At the Stockholm Conference, the socialist countries in constructive co-operation with other participants have done much to find solutions to major problems such as the non-use of force, notifications of military manoeuvres and troop movements, exchange of annual calendars of military activities and invitation of observers for inspection purposes.

Recently the Soviet Union proposed a wide range of measures to ensure security and co-operation in Asia and the Pacific, and invited all States to take part in this process. It offered to co-operate with all interested States in establishing an international régime of security in developing nuclear power. In the summer of this year we presented in the United Nations, as an alternative to the "star wars" programme, a "star peace", programme with the creation of a world space organization.

Finally, our new approaches to foreign policy issues were summed up most comprehensively in the basic provisions of the comprehensive system of international security formulated at the twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU. Recently the Group of Socialist Countries formally tabled the issue of the establishment of such a system for consideration at the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly. Soviet proposals this year have been addressed to the entire world, and not least to the Conference on Disarmament. They reflect our desire to enhance to the maximum the role and effectiveness of the Conference as a multilateral negotiating body. This is confirmed first and foremost by the address of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, to the Conference in February this year and by the statements at the Conference by Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, George Kornienko and Vladimir Petrovsky, and by the Chairman of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy, Andronik Petrosiants.

In submitting its proposals the Soviet Union fully realizes that no matter how important and significant they may be we will not be able to do everything single handed. International security is a common problem. It is thus our common concern and common responsibility. We have drafted our proposals taking into account and studying the points of view and initiatives of other Governments and public and political movements, and we are very particular about ensuring equal security for all at every stage of implementation of these proposals.

We display flexibility, a readiness to search for compromise and mutually acceptable formulas. Suffice it to refer in this connection to our position on the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban, on the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for the production of these weapons, and to a whole range of other questions. We have not made a fetish of organizational or procedural issues. For us, the crux of the matter is substance, movement towards the solution of the problem of disarmament. Another special feature of our proposals, and this is something that we have proven more than once, is that we do not consider them to be final. We do not

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

consider that discussion of them is impossible. Dialogue and contacts, discussions and negotiations are the way to overcome dead-ends and confrontation. We believe that only in this way can one melt the ice of mutual mistrust and achieve practical results.

But in the final analysis, Mr. President, what do we consider the main political results of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament? It is obviously impossible to give a simple answer. We note with satisfaction that the positions of the vast majority of States which form public opinion at our forum, so to speak, are more and more distinctly reflecting a new philosophy, new approaches, which are in keeping with the realities of the nuclear and space age. I am referring not only to statements at plenary meetings but also to specific proposals and suggestions made by many States this year, and although this is still far from the concrete results, specifically treaties or agreements, which the international community expects from the Conference, this situation does none the less, give certain grounds for hope and guarded optimism.

We are also satisfied with the fact that the question of a nuclear-test ban has become the paramount issue at this session. There does not seem to be a single delegation which has not expressed its opinion on this subject, and the overwhelming majority have made clear statements in favour of the immediate cessation of nuclear tests and starting negotiations to conclude an appropriate treaty. And it is especially significant that many participants of the Conference support this position in favour of banning nuclear tests with specific and often quite detailed proposals on different aspects of a future treaty. We would like to take this opportunity to express our disappointment that many of these proposals were not the subject of negotiations. At the same time, our delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank all delegations, again the majority, which highly appreciated the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions.

Of course, the fact that the Conference this year again failed to commence negotiations cannot but cause dissatisfaction. The reasons and culprits for this are well known to the Conference. Opponents of the test ban blocked the commencement of the negotiations but did not manage, however, to mute the issue, shift it to the category of secondary considerations, impose on others their own view that a nuclear-test ban is a so-called "long-term" objective. This point of view of the United States, and its refusal to join in the Soviet moratorium, were condemned everywhere, including in the United States itself.

We are also satisfied with the fact that the Soviet programme for a stage-by-stage approach to nuclear disarmament by the end of this century has attracted universal attention at the Conference. Virtually every delegation commented on it, and while the comments were not all the same, although in general they were positive, the essential point is that the Soviet programme has made possible a serious, substantive dialogue. It is regrettable that in this instance as well practical negotiations were rendered impossible due to the position of some States, although a number of informal meetings of the Conference cannot be regarded as anything other than a prelude to negotiations. The discussions at these meetings brought out many interesting suggestions aimed at nuclear disarmament. Delegations of non-aligned States

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

and China, as is known, have also submitted their proposals to this end. Is this not proof of the extreme urgency of the problem of nuclear disarmament and of the readiness of, at any rate, the vast majority of States members of the Conference to draw up specific nuclear disarmament measures? The opponents of negotiations on nuclear disarmament found themselves in the minority in this instance as well. This is an indisputable fact.

Although the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was not provided with a negotiating mandate, who could deny that within the framework of that Committee negotiations have in fact started, whether the opponents of these negotiations like it or not? About a dozen States submitted definitions of the term "space strike weapons" and expressed their opinion of the legal aspects of a future agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Specific proposals submitted by delegations will undoubtedly be used in future work on this important area of disarmament talks.

Finally, the results of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons may also justify a certain degree of satisfaction. We take a positive view of the general agreements regarding the early and complete elimination of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons. Progress was made in elaborating the provisions on the elimination of stockpiles of these weapons. The whole range of issues of permitted activities was considered in substance. Procedures for challenge on-site inspections were thoroughly discussed. If reciprocal readiness for compromise had been displayed by the Western countries as well, the results would have been more substantial.

In our view, all these features favourably distinguish the results of the current session of the Conference from those of previous years. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this that the work of the Conference as a whole was positive. The absence of negotiations on the whole range of nuclear disarmament issues is still seriously damaging the authority of the Conference. No reference to on-going bilateral talks, to the so-called "immaturity" of the Conference, etc. can justify the obstructionist position of Western States on this issue. We are deeply convinced that the Conference will completely discredit itself and lose its role as a multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament in general if it does not in the very near future initiate genuine negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, on nuclear disarmament and on other acute disarmament problems. Putting it frankly, the real question for the Conference is "to be or not to be". The authority of the Conference is also damaged by the intentional slowing down of negotiations on chemical weapons.

In this connection we deplore the fact that due to the position of one Western country, despite the widely publicized interest of the Group of Western Countries in speeding up negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons, these negotiations are to be interrupted for several months. The proposed consultations, in which as a rule only a limited number of members of the Conference participate, can hardly compensate for real negotiations.

A new approach to ensuring international security undoubtedly requires that the entire arms limitation negotiating machinery should work in high gear. The pace of negotiations must exceed that of the arms race. The outdated negotiating stereotypes which act as brakes should be discarded. We

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

urge the United States and other NATO countries to join in joint efforts aimed at solving the urgent problems facing mankind today. The Soviet Union for its part will continue to do everything in its power to ensure that mutually acceptable agreements are reached. Our proposals stem from the realities of today's world. They are the product not of weakness but of an understanding of the lofty responsibility we bear for the destiny of mankind.

Soviet foreign policy is inspired by the fact that throughout the world people and political and public forces with very different outlooks and beliefs are all increasingly aware and convinced of the fact that the very existence of the human race is at stake, that the time has come for resolute and responsible actions.

Mr. President, I should like to address a few words to you. I should like to congratulate you on the brilliant way in which you conducted the work of the Conference during the month of August, and also the great skill and ability which made it possible for the Conference to adopt its report.

I thank you for that and I wish you all the best.

I should also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and his deputy Ambassador Berasategui, for the tremendous amount of work that they have been doing. I should like to thank the secretariat and the interpreters servicing the Conference.

I would also like to warmly welcome the new representative of India, my friend Ambassador Teja.

Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for his extremely kind words to the President.

I welcome with pleasure the presence of Dr. Teja, and particularly so because he, too, has had a spell of difficult health. Now, maybe it augurs well for our Conference that each of you is in good health. I am now going to take the liberty of asking those on our speakers' list who would normally be continuing with our work to agree that we suspend this plenary meeting very briefly, in order to hold an informal meeting to consider and attend to the processing of documentation which is urgently needed by our technical services. I might just say, for the record, even though I may be saying more later, that they have done an exceptional job in processing so quickly documents that they have received so recently. I am going to adjourn literally for five minutes to give delegates the time to look at the reports on items 1 and 3. Please do not go very far away because we will be resuming exactly at 12.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.35 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting, which we had briefly suspended, is resumed.

I call on the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): As this is the first time that I take the floor during your Presidency of the Conference, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference. As I am also speaking late in the month of August I am in the position to express high appreciation of the way in which you have presided over the work during the month of August, normally a difficult period for the Conference and its President. We can now, with insight, congratulate ourselves on the circumstance that the Conference was able to benefit from your supreme diplomatic skill and sharp legal mind, both qualities having come to very good use during this final month of the 1986 session, extraordinary in its complexity, measured even by the standards of the Conference on Disarmament.

I would also like to thank, through you, Ambassador Tin Tun, of Burma for his very able guidance of the Conference in the month of July. My delegation and myself especially appreciated the close co-operation we enjoyed with Ambassador Tin Tun during his Presidency.

I would also like to bid farewell to our departing colleagues, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel of France, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Gonsalves of India and Ambassador Imai of Japan. Their departures will be a loss for the Conference in the light of the very often important contributions they have brought to the work of the Conference. You, Mr. President, have eloquently expressed our thoughts and sentiments in relation to our departing colleagues. I will only add that I personally have had many engaging and stimulating conversations with all of them and that I regret that it will not be possible to continue this dialogue in the future. I will also use this opportunity to welcome most heartily the new head of the delegation of India to the Conference, Ambassador Teja.

May I start with a short statement on behalf of the Group of 21 when we congratulate the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, on the impressive report of the work of the Committee during the 1986 session and also express our gratitude to him personally for the efforts, so characteristically skilful, patient and tactful, that decisively influenced the successful outcome of the negotiations on chemical weapons during the 1986 session. With this proven ability of the Chairman of the Committee, it is indeed with high expectations that we look forward to the intersessional work under the direction of Ambassador Cromartie, ably assisted by Mr. Rowe of Australia and Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria. And with that I end the statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

This is not the time to make an in-depth analysis of the state of affairs with regard to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. We can, however, note with satisfaction that significant progress has been registered with regard to the issues of elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Intensive work has been carried out on the difficult problems of lists and régimes for key precursors and chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes. The Chairman of the Committee has already highlighted the basic progress of the Committee, so I will limit myself on this point.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

During the intersessional work this autumn and in January 1987 we will be able to address a broad range of issues vital for a Chemical Weapons Convention. My delegation would look with special interest on the questions of régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals and of order of destruction.

Although we hope that we shall be able to register real progress during the intersessional work, many difficult problems remain. I can only mention declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and the related issue of order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities as well as régimes for different categories and items of chemical weapons production facilities and for activities not prohibited by the Convention.

One of the outstanding key issues is the question of challenge inspection. Useful work on this issue has been carried out within Working Group C of the Committee under the able guidance of Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.

We note the statement, repeated in the Conference as late as earlier this week, by the United States, that the challenge inspection arrangements contained in the United States proposal, document CD/500, is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. We have in this context studied with great attention the recent proposal by the United Kingdom, document CD/715, which contains some important elements. Likewise, we consider the proposals by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, document CD/CW/WP.136, and by Pakistan, document CD/685, as being helpful to the work.

My delegation shares the view that if, in exceptional circumstances, there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the Convention, a State Party should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it is of the greatest importance that provisions for such inspections take into consideration legitimate security interests of States Parties and that they should not, in this context, be used for purposes not directly connected to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

During recent years we have developed a well-balanced and rather robust organizational framework for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. This system has served us well. Also, the method applied by the Chairman of the Committee to concentrate the negotiations on the continuing development of a rolling text has worked well and ascertained that results achieved during earlier negotiations have not been lost. When the negotiations now are approaching more decisive stages, the subjects for negotiations appear to be more specific and more diverse than before. On the one hand, there are a number of problems of great political and technical significance and complexity; on the other hand, there is a mass of loose ends remaining after general agreements have been reached on some of the main issues. Further, there are several provisions necessary for the future convention which so far have not been touched upon and have been subject only to a limited consideration.

The organization of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee next session should, in the opinion of my delegation, be designed with these new characteristics of the subject matter in mind. It should thus be possible to develop the

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

organizational framework to make it flexible and effective enough to cope with the shifting problems to be solved, without sacrificing the valuable features of the present organization, especially the politically balanced approach.

I listened with special attention to the recent interesting remarks on this problem made by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, drawing upon his experience as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1985, and by Ambassador Imai of Japan.

This year the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons continued its work on both of the major subject areas, a prohibition of radiological weapons and a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. As agreed, the Ad Hoc Committee worked in a unitary way on both of those major subjects. However, my delegation could not fail to note that very little attention was devoted to the question of a ban on radiological weapons. On the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, however, intensive work was carried out and a great number of clarifications were made. Although this question is a relatively uncomplicated and straightforward one in comparison with most other disarmament related issues, some problems remain to be solved. From the outset and later during the process of elaboration of these problems, it has become obvious that for many delegations, from all groups and representing countries which have developed or plan a nuclear power programme, a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities would correspond to essential interests. Sweden, for one, considers an international prohibition, if widely accepted, of vital importance to its security.

One of the problems in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has been the insistence of some delegations that nuclear facilities to be covered by the prohibition of attack should be installations devoted to peaceful purposes. As the application of IAEA safeguards is the only means of verifying that a facility is devoted to peaceful purposes, some delegations have expressed the view that only safeguarded facilities could be considered in this respect. Sweden, having submitted its nuclear programme to full-scope IAEA safeguards, has however pointed out that such an approach would mean that some installations in non-nuclear-weapon States would not be covered by the prohibition and that many nuclear energy installations in nuclear-weapon States would likewise not be covered. As the aim of the proposed prohibition is to prevent mass destruction as a consequence of attacks on nuclear facilities, it is of course not desirable that a number of important installations would not be within the scope of prohibition. Sweden has therefore proposed that a party could assure itself of protection against attacks by requesting that facilities it wished to have covered by a prohibition should be put on a list, kept by the Depositary. Parties to the treaty would undertake not to attack installations included in such a list. A simple control arrangement to confirm the necessary data to be included on the list, which are exact location and capacity as expressed in thermal output or contents of radioactive material, would be required. Such data could be obtained in most cases by documentation from the IAEA or, in case such data were not available, by an inspection. It appears that delegations from non-nuclear-weapon States, with some nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards, have in one way or the other made objections to this approach. It is my impression that all other delegations, however, appear to have no objections to this cost-effective and practical method.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

This problem has, one way or the other, to be settled at the next session of the Conference. It appears that the consultations within the Ad Hoc Committee managed to find a broadly acceptable way not to confuse the issue of RW-related matters with the nuclear weapons complex. Furthermore, it is the view of my delegation that prevention of mass destruction should remain the basis for a prohibition of attacks and that such an approach is politically and practically feasible and the best method of reaching an international agreement on the prohibition of attacks. A couple of delegations have none the less expressed concern that, as a consequence, very small nuclear installations could not be included on the list of facilities protected by the prohibition, as attacks would not result in any mass destruction. This problem must also be looked into when the Ad Hoc Committee resumes its work next year. In this context, I would also like to express my deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Lechuga of Cuba, who organized and led the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in an effective way.

The proclaimed aim of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva is to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. The two negotiating parties have also set as their task to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth. In this latter context, it is the opinion of the Swedish delegation that a nuclear test ban treaty remains a most urgent measure in the field of disarmament.

It is our hope that the two negotiating sides will make rapid progress in their negotiations. As was stated in the Mexico Declaration of 7 August by the five Heads of States or Governments of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the first President of Tanzania "Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons tests". The six leaders therefore remained convinced, as they stated, "that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests".

My delegation would like to lay particular stress on this statement drawn from the Mexico Declaration. A nuclear test ban would in our understanding effectively support the attainment of the task set out in the joint United States-Soviet Statement of 21 November 1985 to terminate the arms race.

It is generally accepted that a nuclear test ban would not in the short run block all modernization and development of nuclear weapons. Delivery vehicles as well as guidance and other support systems could obviously be further developed under a nuclear test ban régime. However, it would be practically difficult to develop new types of warheads under such a régime.

The effect of a nuclear test ban on the quantitative development of nuclear weapons may thus not be as direct and obvious as the corresponding effect on the qualitative development. However, a severe restraint on the creation of new nuclear weapon systems would certainly have an overall moderating effect on the nuclear arms race, as one, if not the most important, driving force of that race is the continuing modernization and sophistication of nuclear weapon systems. In addition, it is the considered opinion of my Government that negotiations on reductions of nuclear arsenals would benefit from a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The work of the GSE as well as the very interesting statements in the plenary of the Conference during this session have demonstrated an emerging consensus that reliable verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be feasible. There are still differences as to what are the necessary arrangements to verify a treaty. An encouraging development was the statement by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union of 22 July, when he stated the interest of the Soviet Union in using the exchange of so-called Level II data as part of a global system of verification of a nuclear test ban. The GSE will now, on the basis of an emerging consensus on using waveform data, further develop the capacity of a future global seismic verification system. It intends to carry out, in 1988, a global test with regard to the exchange of Level II data. If this test is as successful as the test of 1984 a considerable step will have been taken to solve the technical problems of verification of a nuclear test ban.

However, a verification system cannot be established through technical solutions only. Negotiations on the design of the verification system must also be carried out on a diplomatic level. Such negotiations would cover, inter alia, the questions of seismic stations, international data centres, data exchange and installation with regard to data on radiation, routine inspection, challenge on-site inspections, other compliance elements and institutional arrangements. Obviously, a verification system must be developed in interrelationship with the scope of a prospective nuclear test ban treaty. In this respect, the debate during this session of the Conference has been especially rewarding, inasmuch as more interest than hitherto has been devoted to the problem of small and very small explosions. My delegation is hopeful that the elements discussed in document CD/712 could constitute a basis for the solution of this problem, which we consider an important one among the scope problems to be settled. With regard to peaceful explosions, the Swedish draft treaty of 1983, document CD/381, in principle based upon the Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament, document CD/130, offers the outline for what we consider a mutually and generally acceptable solution.

A great number of problems related to the questions of scope and verification of a future treaty must thus be solved before a treaty can be finally concluded.

It is with such considerations in mind that Sweden is of the firm opinion that the Conference should, without any further delay, start the work on a comprehensive test ban treaty. The Conference has been entrusted by the international community with the task of carrying out the multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban. At the present time, when the nuclear arms race, both with regard to offensive and defensive strategic weapons as well as other nuclear weapons, is on the brink of entering a phase even more intense than hitherto, it is the duty of the members of the Conference to shoulder their responsibility to make their contribution to halt the nuclear arms race.

It is with a sense of frustration that we note that this summer an agreement on starting the work has been very close but still unattainable. We appeal to all sides and to all delegations to look again on their reservations, based no doubt on serious concerns and important principles, and

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

to put them into the perspective of the overall global security interests and disarmament concerns. In the perspective of an immediate acceleration of the nuclear arms race, we have very little time and cannot afford to wait.

Nothing would strengthen the authority and prestige of the Conference on Disarmament more than the realization within the Conference of negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. The work on a test ban would effectively support progress in the bilateral talks on reductions, and progress in the bilateral talks would support prospects for rapid development in the work of the Conference on a nuclear test ban.

The two approaches of nuclear disarmament, the multilateral and the bilateral, would mutually support and strengthen each other. The Conference would then at last be allowed to emerge from its present discrete existence to play the central role in the field of international security and striving for peace that was the hope and expectations of all of its Members when the Conference on Disarmament was established in its present form in 1978. I propose that the recess of the Conference should be used for consultations between delegations on the issue of a mandate for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is the hope and ambition of my delegation that this mandate would be a negotiating mandate, but if this does not prove possible, the Conference should be able to settle for a mandate that could make possible substantive work subsequently developing into negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. If we use the recess well, the Conference could, immediately after the opening of its 1987 session, start the work on a nuclear test ban within the framework of an ad hoc committee of the Conference. The 25th year since the establishment of the multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), could not be commemorated in any better way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for his kind words to the President.

I had earlier asked for the indulgence of those delegations on the speakers' list to enable us to interrupt our work to have an informal meeting and as usual, during this month of August, we received the total co-operation of all the delegations in question. At least one of the delegates cannot stay on until 1.20 p.m. and, in any event, the number of speakers and the time involved would take us beyond that point. So, I will reluctantly suspend this meeting, which will resume at 3 p.m. Once again, I thank those speakers who have agreed to defer their statements. It might help you if I give you an indication of the names remaining on the speakers' list. It will be an important meeting this afternoon, for we will be hearing the delegates of Peru, Brazil, Canada and the United Kingdom. In addition, we will be proceeding to the adoption of the reports of the Ad Hoc Committees. You will have before you this afternoon documents CD/722, CD/726, CD/727 and CD/728. I would, however, also like to express my appreciation and that of the Conference to the interpreters, who had kindly consented to stay on till 1.25 p.m., if necessary. I now suspend this plenary meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: We now resume the 383rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Although delegates are still arriving, I feel that as a courtesy to those representatives who agreed to speak this afternoon, we ought to give them ample time to be heard. I begin with the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando, and I will then announce the remaining list of speakers.

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you upon your conduct of our work during this month of August, traditionally a difficult month for the Conference on Disarmament. Your excellent management has the benefit of a sound, legal background and valuable professional experience. Allow me also to express appreciation and cordial farewells to colleagues of the prestige of Ambassador Wegener, of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Kerroum, of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel, of France, Ambassador Gonsalves, of India, and Ambassador Imai, of Japan. I would also like to express great appreciation to the Secretariat and in particular to Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui.

The close of this session of the Conference on Disarmament prompts the delegation of Peru to make some remarks that are not confined to bemoaning the periodic frustrations and contradictions in this forum. My delegation is trying, rather, to foresee as of now what can be expected in this forum as from next February.

This mention of the month of February next year is not just a routine allusion to a new session. This forum, like others which are similarly competent in matters pertaining to international peace and security will have options for fruitful action, provided the major Powers re-establish before 1987 the bases for mutual trust and greater readiness to co-operate that the international community calls for.

In this was, the Conference on Disarmament would recover the negotiating exercise that was assigned to it. But even in that event, its work may develop slowly, in gradual stages, but not necessarily predictable in terms of their exact content. Therefore, we can expect serious difficulties that this forum must overcome with new targets and more effective procedures.

On this assumption of a change, positive in essence and capable of making gradual headway, it is appropriate to refer to some of the items on our agenda.

One of the first goals that the Conference can attain in 1987 should be the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on all chemical weapons, and there is no need to recall in detail the advances already made by the Conference on technical aspects and in political negotiation.

In parallel fashion, although more complex in character, is another unpostponable task for the Conference, namely to give a multilateral dimension to the negotiations that the major Powers will be resuming supposedly to achieve, inter alia, a halt to nuclear weapon tests. It is fair to recognize in this connection the importance of the renewed extension of the unilateral moratorium declared by one of the major Powers, and it is to be hoped that, at an early stage, this moratorium will be shared by the other Powers capable of carrying out such tests.

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

It is appropriate to recall in this respect the position of the Group of 21, which Peru fully shares, as well as the most recent of the declarations by six highly distinguished Heads of State and Government. The concrete initiatives of the "Declaration of Mexico" are of paramount importance, especially as they are designed to promote participation by non-nuclear-weapon States that are in a position to contribute to a broader system of verification of the testing of such weapons. The work that an ad hoc group of experts has been carrying out in the context of the Conference on Disarmament is an encouraging step in this direction.

As to the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the delegation of Peru shares the favourable view of other delegations about the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee, despite the limitations of its mandate and the little time made available to it to work out valuable although preliminary conceptual approaches.

On the assumption that a consensus does exist to avoid extending of the arms race to outer space, there is no doubt about the priority in time of maintaining the agreement on anti-ballistic weapons and of concluding other complementary agreements which can be linked, among other matters, to anti-satellite weapons and the specific protection of non-military satellites.

Another indispensable step is to clarify accurately the nature and scope of existing agreements on the use of space and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, with a view, inter alia, to determining exactly to what extent military activities in space may be compatible with such peaceful use.

As rightly stated by the distinguished delegation of Canada, those agreements, and especially the one of 1967, are open to two dissimilar interpretations, one broad, and the other restrictive, of what is to be understood by uses for peaceful purposes, or even more, by exclusively peaceful purposes.

The delegation of Peru is not only in favour of the first of the aforementioned interpretations. It is convinced of the need for a future legal régime in space to be conditioned by the norms contained in the instruments mentioned, and thus thinks that the régime should be viewed with the same comprehensive breadth as in the case of the negotiations on the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In other words, it is desirable to have a broad vision that will enable all of the international community to participate in the benefits of the use of space for peaceful purposes, on the understanding that such use for peaceful purposes will not continue to be for the major Powers an entelechy that is difficult to define and which in practice is used only in keeping with their interests, which moreover are dangerously self-contradictory in themselves.

Hence it is necessary to give proper substance to these peaceful activities in space, for from that substance it will be possible to infer the requisite strict limitation of military activities in this domain. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how the concept of space as the common heritage of mankind can be applied. Naturally, all this would entail international

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

consultation and agreement that would be beyond the competence of this forum and would be of the scope favoured, at this session by, among other delegations, the delegation of Peru.

On the subject of radiological weapons, the delegation of Peru wishes to record its interest in the thoughts and expressions heard from other delegations with regard to the dangers of radiation involved in accidents such as the one at Chernobyl. Reference has been made to the work in Vienna of two groups of experts that each have prepared a draft convention on early warning and mutual assistance régimes in the event of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies.

The delegation of Peru has been concerned in the forum in Vienna, and is still concerned in this forum, by the fact that the drafts by these groups of experts are in principle limited to possible accidents at non-military facilities, even though, to some extent, still not entirely satisfactory, those texts have opened up the possibility for optional action in the case of accidents at military facilities.

We do not see how there can be differences in substance between the harmful consequences, which are predictably transnational, of accidents that occur both in nuclear facilities for military use and those for civilian use. In consequence, there should be one single régime for both types of nuclear facilities, in the same way as, by analogy, it does not seem justifiable to limit the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities solely because they are civilian, for in the case of military facilities the radiological risk can be expected to be at least the same, while the other risks would be of a magnitude beyond control.

This Conference has been dealing with the question of improved efficiency in its functioning. The delegation of Peru believes in this regard that such improvements and efficiency can easily be achieved, but only when this forum has a political consensus among its members in order to give a multilateral dimension to the basic understanding that is expected of some major Powers.

My delegation also believes that the work on improvement and enhancement of efficiency should not be confined to matters pertaining to the internal functioning of the Conference. Such tasks should be combined with proper communication between our forum and others with similar objectives, both within the context of the United Nations as well as outside that context, including, in the latter case, the regional forums, especially those with their headquarters in Stockholm and Vienna. It goes without saying that this Conference should also be kept informed of the course of recognizably important bilateral negotiations, such as the ones that are taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union. For this reason, the initiative that in this case emerged from the Group of 21 is of particular importance, an initiative which can certainly be included in the report that we are to submit this year to the General Assembly.

Similarly, it can well be asked, in the light of document CD/653, adopted on 5 February 1986, whether our agenda does not reveal, apart from other signs, some form of persistent autism in this forum. Indeed, if we look in that document at the very broad spectrum of subjects assigned to us by the

(Mr. Morelli Pando, Peru)

General Assembly, especially through the Final Document of 1978, we will see that only some topics, and always the same ones, are before us for consideration. This has been happening for years, to the exclusion -- one would say, the premeditated exclusion -- of certain items, such as Conventional Weapons, the Reduction of Military Budgets, Disarmament and Development and also Disarmament and International Security.

There are a number of delegations, our own among them, that regret the absence of these topics in our deliberations, but one cannot ignore the fact that, alongside this reality there is another reality, and it stems from the lack of consensus to overcome this situation in the short term.

The delegation of Peru does not believe that this lack of consensus is insuperable. For instance, it would be possible to examine, with pragmatism and a spirit of compromise, the possibility of engaging, within our forum, initially in purely informal meetings to deal with the issues that still await consideration. The Secretariat of the Conference could contribute to this aim by means of a compilation of reports that are available on the activities of competent forums dealing with disarmament and international security.

I would like to conclude by expressing the hope that the outcome of this 1986 session will not only be remembered favourably, because not only the letter but the spirit of our report to the General Assembly should be compatible with what is expected of this forum in 1987.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for his kind words to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): A nuclear test ban has been the most contentious issue in this forum since its inception in 1979. It could not be otherwise. Testing or not testing nuclear weapons is the watershed between the arms race and disarmament. Some countries have already made their choice, others have not. It is an issue in which fundamental perceptions of security, even of survival are involved. Heated exchanges on this subject, as we have witnessed in recent meetings, are not surprising. I am taking the floor today not to fuel these exchanges but to try to understand them.

For the majority of delegations around this table a test ban should be negotiated and adopted as soon as possible. For other delegations, clarifications of, and agreements on, certain questions that might lead to our final goal are still required. On this divergent approach, it seems to me, lies the main, if not the only, reason for our contention.

For the Group of 21 we should proceed forthwith to starting negotiations for the conclusion of a test ban. According to the Western countries, before coming to that stage, we should previously discuss and agree on some preliminary and essential problems, namely, verification, compliance and scope. They are quite right. There will be no test ban without a solution to all these elements. For this reason they have pressed insistently for the adoption of an ad hoc committee with a mandate that would address such issues.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Let us suppose for a moment that the Conference accepts the Western proposals. We set up a committee and we achieve everything the Western countries have in mind. We might even adopt a document, let us say a draft Treaty in which all delegations present here unanimously agree that there are no more problems concerning verification, compliance and scope. Apparently, we shall have then made a very substantial progress. But would we have made a step forward to our common goal? I would say no, for the simple reason that we do not have a common goal.

The overwhelming majority wants a test ban, while one delegation does not. And in this case it is not just one delegation: it is the key delegation which disagrees, for reasons it has stated in recent years over and over again. Its position is not the same as we used to know some time ago. In July 1980, we received a report on a test ban signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in which we read: "The desire to achieve an early agreement, which is so widely shared by the international community, has been repeatedly expressed at the highest level of all three Governments" (document CD/130 of 30 July 1980). In 1981 we heard in the First Committee of the General Assembly that a test ban was a "long-range objective" for the United States.

There we notice that "early agreement" and "long-range objective" do not express, to say the least, the same kind of urgency. More recently, we have been informed that the United States position was subject to new qualifications. It has been stated here, in Geneva, in the First Committee in New York, and in the White House in Washington that a test ban would jeopardize the security of the United States, its allies and friends, would undermine its military credibility and would be destabilizing for the present deterrence on which its policy is actually based. Accordingly, to that delegation, or rather, to the United States policy, nuclear testing is essential to security, stability and peace.

At the same time, however, the United States delegation insists on the establishment in this Conference of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Only two days ago we heard a statement delivered by Ambassador Lowitz in which he said it was regrettable, even deplorable, that some delegations had prevented the Conference from adopting a mandate, his mandate, that would set up such a committee. So some delegations, including my own, are being criticized for blocking progress on a test ban by the same delegation that firmly believes that a test ban would be an unacceptable outcome to our endeavours. In all good faith one might ask: what are we talking about?

My understanding is that the Conference must have a committee on a test ban, but it must not have a test ban. We should be looking forward to dealing with all matters related to tests, but not to a ban on tests.

We might tread all important avenues, but the final destination would always be beyond our reach, unless that delegation, or its Government, decides to return to its previous position referred to in 1980. If there is a different conclusion to that muddle I should like to hear it, and first of all, from the United States delegation. Otherwise, I see no meaning in our wrangling over concepts, formulations, words, when we know that the proposed objective is considered to be counterproductive by the very delegation whose

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

co-operation in this field is absolutely indispensable. Arguments that, in spite of this reality, we must keep on trying, at least for the sake of credibility, should be dismissed. We have a mandate from the international community to which we must report on our achievements and failures with equal faithfulness.

This situation reminds me of the story of a father who said to his children: if you behave properly during the week I will take you out on Sunday to a pastry shop and there you may look, as long as you wish, at the pies and cakes displayed in the window, provided you do not touch them.

I had expected that we might deserve a different kind of treatment.

As my assignment to this post is coming to a close, I wish to bid farewell to my colleagues and friends in the Conference and the Secretariat. I am grateful to them for the valuable assistance and friendship extended to me during my seven years of service in this office.

In taking my leave during your Presidency, Sir, I shall keep in my memory an example of the competence and statesmanship with which the high standards of our proceedings should be conducted.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement, and for his kind words to the President.

I think Ambassador de Souza e Silva is a man who is difficult to describe. It goes without saying that we all regret his departure, as we have needed him and others like him. It is hardly necessary for me to go into details about the outstanding contribution he has made to our work, since he has on so many occasions served the objectives of the Conference, and at the same time represented his country, with the same ability, diplomatic experience and professional competence we have come to expect of him. He is, of course, one of the Deans of the Heads of Delegations accredited to this Conference, for he has been with us for the last seven years. In his case, however, whether we were to measure his contribution in terms of quantity or quality, we would still find it equally great. He is the only member of the Conference, as is well known, who has served twice, since its constitution in 1979, as its presiding officer. He presided, as well, over the First Committee, thus having guided the work of all permanent multilateral disarmament bodies which report to the General Assembly.

I think we would all agree that his contribution to our work and to those of our sister bodies cannot and should not be measured in terms of seniority of the offices he has held, but rather in the manner in which he has fulfilled these offices. He is, of course, and it is presumptuous of me even to say so, well known to us all as a brilliant diplomat, who has guided the Conference not only efficiently but with complete impartiality in his functions as President. Indeed, his constructive influence has been felt at every step of its activities and, I venture to say, will go on being felt after he leaves us. His remarkable intellectual abilities, his broad conceptual approach, are coupled to an unusual degree with an ability to be frank and even blunt, and yet to express himself always in moderate terms. Thus he is at one and the same time, a no-nonsense man, a model of the truly

(The President)

civilized man. He is, therefore, both a distinguished diplomat and a very fine human being who leaves behind our deep respect, appreciation and admiration, as well as an enduring mark of his involvement in our Conference. Moreover, he leaves behind many, many friends.

Mr. DEPRES (Canada): I would like to take this opportunity to comment on the Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which was presented to the Conference on 21 August.

It has been 10 years since the Conference on Disarmament first gave a mandate to the GSE. From the beginning of its discussions Canada has strongly supported and actively participated in the Group's work. The Group has sponsored several practical experiments with the aim of facilitating the specification of the technical features of an international seismic data exchange, which, it is generally recognized, would constitute a key component, though not the only component, of any verification system for a nuclear test ban agreement covering underground tests. By far the most ambitious and important of these experiments is the GSE's 1984 Technical Test, which is the subject of the report submitted on 21 August. Canadian experts are fully familiar with this Technical Test, having participated in its design, implementation and evaluation. Data from three Canadian seismograph stations -- two in Canada's North and one in Quebec province -- constituted a significant proportion of the total data collected and processed.

Even a brief glance at the detailed report cannot fail to impress us with the diligence and dedication of the GSE in carrying out its mandate. On behalf of the Canadian Government, I would like to emphasize our gratitude for the work of the GSE.

The GSE, through its activities, has gone a long way to facilitating the verification of any future agreement on a CTB or any other agreement on a nuclear test ban. The report is an excellent example of the Group's activities. The activities of the GSE have also, in the Canadian view, highlighted the useful work that can still be done on verification questions. The adoption by consensus of resolution 40/152 (a) by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1985 certainly reflects the recognition by the international community of the great importance of verification in the process of developing arms control and disarmament agreements.

If the work of the GSE and of the Conference regarding verification of a CTB are not yet finished, much has been accomplished on which we can build and for which we salute the GSE. This was pointed out in the brochure on existing technological capabilities for seismic monitoring of a test ban, distributed earlier to all delegations. The Canadian delegation therefore unhesitatingly endorses the recommendations in the GSE's report for continuing its work.

The work of the GSE clearly merits the support of all the Conference's members and other interested countries. This work, in our view, is not only allowing clarification of technical issues but is also contributing to an

(Mr. Depres, Canada)

emerging consensus on the need for the eventual establishment of a global seismic network if a comprehensive test ban is to be adequately verified. Canada, like many others, is doing what it can to make human and technical resources available in support of the GSE's work and will continue to do so. Ambassador Beesley referred to some of Canada's actions in his statement to this body on 11 March and they do not need to be repeated again.

In connection with the GSE's work, I would like to draw the Conference's attention to the statement to this body on 14 August by Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the GSE, where he refers to the recommendations of the Group. Among the future recommended activities of the GSE will be "the developing and testing of methods and procedures and investigating and testing of communications links to be used for the expeditious exchange of seismic waveform and parameter data between national facilities and international data centres." The Group also plans to carry out a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data, probably in 1988. In this context, we think that the Ottawa workshop of seismic data communications experts scheduled for October will prove a useful step towards these goals and we encourage wide participation by appropriate experts from interested countries. In a more immediate context, this workshop integrates well with the recent Japanese initiative for an exchange of Level II data.

I would conclude this brief statement by noting that the practical work of the GSE occurs against a background of favourable developments in the political realm, some of which are likely to be critically important in determining whether and in what manner the results of our labours will be applied. Nevertheless, when taken together with other indications of a more forthcoming approach on issues of verification, these developments are further evidence that common ground is being developed on these questions. That common ground is the essential prerequisite to a negotiated NTB.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to speak briefly on behalf of the Western Group, in connection with the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD), which has been adopted today.

The Ad Hoc Committee is re-established at the beginning of our annual sessions with the same mandate and with a minimum of delay. All of us share in the objective of completing a draft text which can act as an important guide or road map for our future objectives in the arms control and disarmament fields, and to inspire our future endeavours.

This year has seen quiet but distinct progress towards the completion of the draft. Dedicated and intensive work by representatives from many delegations and from all groups has been responsible for this achievement. Mr. Niaz of Pakistan chaired the contact group on bilateral negotiations, which succeeded in developing the text found in paragraph 5 of the "Measures" section of the annex to the report. Mr. Sharma of India produced the text in paragraph 7 of that same section devoted to the prevention of nuclear war issue. This paragraph, although still bracketted, provides a basis for future work on this topic. Both Mr. Niaz and Mr. Sharma will be leaving the Conference shortly, and I should like to express our appreciation to them for their work.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Another difficult area which was successfully resolved is that on conventional weapons in Europe. Appropriately, the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Krutzsch, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Peters, were responsible for this. Also, much commendable work was done on formulating a new text on outer space with very few brackets. This is due to the untiring efforts of the representatives of Mongolia, Mr. Bold, who has now left our Conference, and of Italy, Mr. Adorni Braccesi.

In addition to providing overall guidance and direction to our work, the distinguished permanent Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, chaired consultations on the Machinery and Procedures section of the CPD, and provided delegations with a Chairman's text which could serve to help resolve some of the issues in this key area. This built on the valuable work done by Mr. Moritan of Argentina in the contact group on this subject.

As we all know, despite all these intensive and productive efforts, it did not prove possible to meet the deadline of sending a completed draft text to the General Assembly at its forty-first regular session, this autumn. The fact that this was not achieved reflects on no one. It is simply an indication of the importance and complexity of the issues which remain to be resolved. It was therefore sad to hear in one or two recent plenary statements attempts to apportion blame. In our view, this is unjustified, as those who have worked so long and hard in the Ad Hoc Committee and its contact groups since early in the year can testify.

Happily, the Chairman of the Committee has arrived at a formulation with respect to future work. This recommendation is included in paragraph 8 of the Committee's report and has the full support of the Western Group of countries. We pledge to Ambassador Garcia Robles our full co-operation in the effort to complete work on the draft at the Conference on Disarmament next year.

Finally, I should like to refer to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. Regrettably the Conference has again been unable to finalize its decision this year. For its part, however, the group of Western countries has nominated its candidate -- Norway, which for a number of years has participated actively in all subsidiary bodies of the Conference and submitted numerous valuable working papers. The delegations for which I am speaking hope that a final and positive decision about the selection of new members will be taken during the next year's session of the Conference.

While I have the floor, I should like to take the opportunity to say goodbye to four close and valued colleagues who are leaving the Conference at the end of this session: Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Jessel of France, whose farewell statements we heard this morning, Ambassador Imai of Japan, who told us last week that he would not be with us again next session, and we have just heard with great regret from Ambassador Souza e Silva of Brazil that he too is leaving our community in this Conference after seven years as a member of it. I will not try to add to what you, Mr. President have said about each of them, but I should like to say to each of them how much they will be missed in our disarmament community here in Geneva and to offer each of them my warmest wishes for the future.

Mr. MEIZSTER (Hungary) (translated from Russian): As the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries I should like to make the following statement. The delegations of the group of socialist countries members of the Conference on Disarmament, guided by the foreign-policy line set out in the communiqué issued by the meeting of the political Consultative Committee of States members of the Warsaw Treaty held in Budapest on 10 and 11 June 1986 and in the decisions of their Party congresses, consider it their duty resolutely and consistently to strive towards resolving the cardinal issues of our time -- the elimination of the nuclear threat, the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction by the end of the twentieth century and the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.

In the present circumstances, no State or group of States can construct its own security and well being by attempting to dictate its own policies to other countries and peoples through military force, without solving the fundamental problem of the modern world, disarmament. Reliable security for all countries and peoples and peaceful conditions for their development can be ensured only through political means and activization of the entire machinery that has evolved for disarmament negotiations, including this unique multilateral body, the Conference on Disarmament. The broadly representative nature of the Conference and the participation in it of States from all continents belonging to various socio-economic systems, members of military alliances, and non-aligned and neutral countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, predetermine the important role which the Conference must play in ensuring the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

Our delegations take a very responsible view of their participation in this important forum, based on their realization that it is disarmament which is the main avenue towards new and just international structures and the construction of a safe world. This was stressed, in particular, in the messages to the Conference on Disarmament from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, dated 18 February and from the Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, dated 30 May 1986, and in the statements made at the Conference of high-level representatives of socialist countries.

One of the most urgent problems facing mankind today is limitation of the arms race and ensuring nuclear disarmament. The wide-ranging initiative taken by the Soviet Union on 15 January of this year, which included in particular a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the twentieth century, established extremely favourable opportunities for making progress in this task, including progress in the Conference.

However, because of the position of the delegation of the United States and certain other delegations in the group of Western countries, the Conference was again left out of negotiations on this problem in 1986. Assertions that nuclear disarmament concerns only two States are not only in essence undemocratic but also, in the final analysis, deny the real situation prevailing in the disarmament process, in which all sovereign States act on an equal footing.

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

Throughout the session, the delegations of the group of socialist States have called for multilateral negotiations on halting the arms race and ensuring nuclear disarmament to start immediately in the Conference and for the establishment for this purpose of an ad hoc auxiliary body with an appropriate negotiating mandate. In this connection they take a positive view of the holding of unofficial meetings to examine these issues as a small step but nevertheless a step in the right direction. This examination, in particular, showed not only the great interest taken by the overwhelming majority of States in the Conference in starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament and their readiness to do so, but also the fact that a number of specific proposals have already been put forward on this subject. The socialist delegations are convinced that this creates the necessary favourable conditions for starting such negotiations in the very first days of the next session.

An early halt to nuclear tests would be a major step towards nuclear disarmament which would be relatively easy to implement, and at the same time a barrier to the process of perfecting nuclear weapons and creating new types of such weapons. The first step could be a mutual moratorium by the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear explosions. In this connection our delegation welcomes the further extension of the unilateral moratorium by the Soviet Union, and calls on the United States to join the Soviet Union in this measure.

The socialist delegations are convinced that the Disarmament Conference could become a very important forum for multilateral negotiations on a nuclear-test ban if the artificial barriers erected by the United States delegation, which impede the effective activities of the Conference in preparing a draft treaty, are removed.

Our delegations attach particularly great importance to reliable measures for monitoring the implementation of a nuclear-test-ban agreement, and call for the strictest possible verification measures, including on-site inspections. There are now sufficiently reliable seismic monitoring devices to detect and identify any nuclear test, and therefore references by the opponents of a ban on nuclear tests to the verification problem as a reason for avoiding negotiations are unfounded.

In this connection we consider the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to be useful, and are in favour of its continuation, so that the Group may begin work on the development of a system for the operational transmission of Level II seismic data which could serve as a basis for international seismic monitoring of a nuclear-test ban.

The delegations of the group of socialist countries welcome the Soviet Union's agreement to send representatives to the meeting of experts from six countries with Soviet and United States experts, a meeting which could make a very significant contribution to achieving the aim of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The above-mentioned delegations consider it necessary once again to reaffirm their readiness to set up an ad hoc committee with an appropriate

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

mandate to deal with item 1 of the agenda of the Conference, "Nuclear-test ban". They intend to continue to show flexibility and a spirit of co-operation with other delegations with a view to setting up such an ad hoc committee and ensuring a rapid start to negotiations on a nuclear-test ban.

At the present time item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, "prevention of an arms race in outer space", is becoming increasingly urgent. The United States is pressing on with the creation and production of space strike weapons, hoping, with the help of the so-called "Star Wars" programme, to achieve strategic superiority. The socialist countries' response to this policy is their programme of "Star Peace".

We resolutely call for the Disarmament Conference, which has an Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, to start specific negotiations on this subject. The proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on banning space strike weapons and, as a first step, drafting and concluding an international agreement on ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites and on banning the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems, as well as eliminating those systems that already exist, create a solid basis for a satisfactory solution of this problem too.

The socialist States cannot conceive of a safe world without the elimination of one of the most barbaric types of weapon of mass destruction, namely chemical weapons. In general, the 1986 session of the Disarmament Conference was marked by businesslike negotiations on chemical-weapon-related disarmament issues. The content and form of these negotiations has been oriented increasingly towards the final result -- preparation of the complete text of a convention on banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. These developments were facilitated by the Soviet initiatives contained in the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January of this year and spelled out in greater detail in the statement of the 22 April.

Our delegations are of the view that work must be continued on agreeing very important provisions of the Convention, first and foremost those related to ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons at commercial chemical facilities, procedures for eliminating the production base for the manufacture of chemical weapons, and the activities of various bodies to be set up under the Convention. The issue of challenge inspection is an important one. The socialist countries consider that the proposals made by the German Democratic Republic and Poland on this subject constitute a weighty contribution to achieving agreement on this problem.

The delegations on whose behalf I am speaking are of the view that the decisions taken by the United States and NATO regarding rearmament with binary chemical weapons, which in essence map out for the coming years not only the continuation but the intensification of the chemical threat hanging over all mankind, cannot but seriously impair the ongoing negotiations on banning such weapons. Those decisions run counter to efforts to eliminate chemical weapons, and are in conflict with the United States/Soviet agreements reached at the Geneva summit.

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

We are convinced that an international legal measure banning radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities could be agreed to fairly rapidly provided, of course, that all those involved adopt a positive approach.

The inability of the Conference, over a number of years, to complete the drafting of a convention on banning radiological weapons -- a task set out in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament -- cannot but weaken its authority.

During the present session of the Conference we have called several times for the stepping up of efforts to complete the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which would provide for specific measures in the field of disarmament and their implementation in agreed stages. The new proposals by the socialist countries, in particular on the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, were a useful contribution to the elaboration of such a comprehensive programme. We are compelled once again to voice our dissatisfaction at the fact that, despite the efforts of the socialist, non-aligned and neutral States, the task before the Conference of presenting a comprehensive disarmament programme to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-first session remains uncompleted.

Overall, it is impossible not to be disappointed at the results of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The delegations of the group of socialist countries are determined to bring about a fundamental improvement in the activities of the Conference, and intend to work single-mindedly in the future to ensure that maximum use is made of the potentialities of the Conference on Disarmament in order to justify the hopes placed in it by world public opinion. It is important that our Western partners in the negotiations should also make their contribution.

(continued in English): Before concluding my statement, permit me, Mr. President, to say a few sentences also as head of the Hungarian delegation. First, I wish to bid farewell to those of our colleagues who have already left Geneva or will be leaving us soon: Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel of France, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Imai of Japan and, as we have heard today, Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil. Expressing appreciation for their contributions to our common cause, we also thank them for their friendship and co-operation. We shall cherish pleasant memories of their stay here, and wish them all the best in their future responsible duties.

Finally, speaking at the last meeting of the session but for the first time under your chairmanship, I feel I can spare you, Mr. President, the habitual compliments, instead we should compliment or rather congratulate ourselves. We held you in high esteem even before you occupied the chair. We knew your many qualities -- great professional skill, long experience, high prestige and pleasant manner -- and expected you to guide the Conference to a satisfactory conclusion. But now, at the end of this month, we can really appreciate our good fortune in having had you presiding over this closing phase of the session. Not once but on numerous occasions during recent weeks, not only the fate of the report, but even, some say, the fate of the Conference itself was, in fact, at stake. However, I feel, Mr. President,

(Mr. Meizster, Hungary)

that it would be wrong of me to continue to praise your role in saving the Conference or list any more of your merits. Nothing could be further from my intentions than any wish to upset one who is characterized by unusual modesty. Let me simply express my delegation's deep sense of gratitude for your exemplary political judgement, integrity and dedication, your personal commitment -- which also reflects that of your Government -- to the cause of disarmament and, most of all, your sense of fair play. We do thank you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for his very kind comments to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before we proceed to the adoption of the reports of the Ad Hoc Committees? If no one does, then we shall proceed to that part of our work. As I mentioned this morning the Conference has before it the following documents: Document CD/722, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons", Document CD/726, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space", Document CD/727, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons", and Document CD/728, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

We should now turn to document CD/722. Does any member wish to speak? I call upon the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I would like to suggest a change of drafting in paragraph 11 of the report, since the idea is not brought out fully in the first sentence. We propose that the first sentence be replaced by the one I am going to read out: "The co-ordinator of the contact group on the issues of verification and compliance prepared a paper with a view to facilitating consultations on these issues." That is the sentence I propose in order to replace the one appearing in paragraph 11, because as will be seen from the document, it does not say what co-ordinator, or what group. This will bring the wording into line with paragraphs 9 and 10, concerning the other co-ordinators.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba. We have noted the drafting change, which is of a technical nature and I see no problems. I take it that there is no objection to that change? It will be noted and incorporated in the document. I suggest that we now take up for decision the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/722. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Does any delegation wish to take the floor after the adoption of that report? I see none. Let us now proceed to document CD/726. I will give the floor to any member wishing to speak before the adoption of the report. I see none, so I propose that we take up for decision the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/726. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Are there any delegations who wish to take the floor after the adoption of that report? I see none. We should now consider document CD/727 and I will give the floor to any delegation wishing to speak before the adoption of that report. I see none requesting the floor. I suggest that we take up for decision now the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/727. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I will now give the floor to any member wishing to speak after the adoption of that report. I see no such delegation.

We should now proceed to document CD/728 and I will give the floor to any member wishing to speak before the adoption of that report. I see no request to speak. I propose that we take up for decision the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, contained in document CD/728. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I will now give the floor to any delegation wishing to speak after the adoption of that report. I see no request to speak.

That concludes our consideration of the reports of the Ad Hoc Committees of the Conference. In accordance with existing practice, these reports will be an integral part of the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Secretariat has circulated today a working paper dated 21 August 1986 containing an index of the verbatim records of the Conference in 1986. This document is distributed to delegations so that, before it is issued in final form attached to the annual report, members may transmit their comments and suggestions, if any, to the Secretariat.

As the annual report will be processed soon after its adoption to ensure timely circulation in the General Assembly, those members having any observations should communicate them to the Secretariat not later than Wednesday, 3 September, at noon. At that time, the Secretariat will proceed with the text circulated today, as amended by delegations. This means that any corrections submitted later will be issued as corrigenda to the text, but they will not be incorporated in it.

In accordance with the timetable for this week, the last plenary meeting of the Conference will be held tomorrow, Friday, 29 August, at 5.30 p.m., in order to adopt the report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Clearly, we should not go back at that stage to questions already settled, as we have already done two readings of the draft report. Copies in English of the draft report are expected to be available by 2 p.m. tomorrow, while the other languages will take a little longer. We expect that they will be ready by 4.30 p.m. The document containing the

(The President)

draft report will be issued under the symbol CD/WP.243/Rev.1 and may be obtained from room C.111 (Distribution of Documents Section).

I will repeat at this stage what I said earlier, in informal plenary, in expressing appreciation to all groups and all delegations in agreeing to the compression of our normal working methods in order to finish our work.

The Secretariat is opening a list of speakers for the closing plenary meeting for those members wishing to speak in connection with the report. Members should indicate to the Secretariat whether they wish to speak before or after its adoption. I express the personal hope that they will speak after it.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Friday, 29 August, at 5.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.