



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 18th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 to 65 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. ADAM (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): In response to your appeal I will confine myself to expressing my congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important Committee. I should also like to congratulate the other members of the Bureau.

Once again this year we meet to discuss anew the questions of disarmament and international security against the background of the extremely complex international situation. The situation might give rise to more concern owing to the lack of any hope or détente in international relations, détente would lead the world out of the grave dilemma in which it finds itself. It was with great interest that the world during the past few weeks looked to Reyjkavik, hoping that the two leaders of the mightiest countries in this era would be able to lay the first touches for the solution of the most important question facing humanity; that is the cessation of the nuclear arms race and achievement of the world's dream of its termination once and for all.

If we recognize that the atmosphere between the East and the West is not characterized by the necessary mutual confidence to reach a substantive agreement on a matter of that gravity and sensitivity, we can still reaffirm that we have not lost all hope yet. The nuclear arms race, which poses a real grave threat to the survival of mankind, imposes a special responsibility on the two super-Powers in that direction. We encourage such important meetings. We hope that they will be characterized by the necessary concern for the future of humanity and affirm the desire to preserve man's civilization and his achievements.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

My delegation will not in this statement be able to touch upon all the items on the Committee's agenda, regardless of their importance. We shall comment on a number of questions to which Sudan, as a non-aligned developing country, attaches certain importance. Sudan, like the overwhelming majority of the States of the world, wishes to see an end to the nuclear arms race and the prevention of the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In situations of regional conflict and deteriorating international relations the threat posed by that sinister race is too grave to ignore. It is regrettable indeed that the whole world has become a hostage to the madness of nuclear stockpiling and nuclear intimidation.

The nuclear-weapon States have the direct responsibility of ridding the world of this threat once for all. In this respect, we believe that the tenth special session of the General Assembly has laid the foundations for the creation of a multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues, and has thus consolidated the principle of collective responsibility to achieve that goal.

However, this important negotiating forum has been unable to discharge fully the duties entrusted to it because of the obstructive postures of certain powerful States which try by all means at their disposal to prevent other States from making any meaningful contribution towards the issues of disarmament, such as banning nuclear weapons, ending the arms race in outer space, and banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

From this point of view, we stress the utmost importance of the disarmament conference which we consider the foremost collective instrument for negotiation on disarmament. We call for the unshackling of that forum and the removal of the hurdles which have diminished its importance and virtually paralysed it.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

We have perused the report of the Conference on Disarmament in document A/41/27 and it is with regret that we say that it is an extremely frustrating report in so far as it shows that all the substantive issues dealt with by the 1986 session, at the Conference have not made any tangible progress auguring well for a solution to the problem in the near future. The ending of all the aspects of the nuclear arms race and the initiation of the process of disarmament must begin with the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear tests on the surface, underground, under water and in outer space.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

Here we must praise the Soviet Union's initiative, namely, its unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests. We support the view of the Group of 21 and a number of other States in the Disarmament Conference, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to start multilateral negotiations with a view to concluding a comprehensive treaty on a complete test ban in all environments and by all States. We stress the need for all the participating groups to show their readiness to reach a consensus on the highest priority in disarmament. A situation of such magnitude cannot be left to the discretion of the nuclear-weapon States alone.

We also support the view that the present means of verification can sufficiently guarantee compliance with a test ban and that the allegation that such means are non-existent should not be used as a pretext to increase the development and improvement of nuclear weapons. The ever-renewed appeal by the leaders of the peace initiative in the five continents to both the United States and the USSR to put an end to all their nuclear tests, and the offer by those leaders to use their good offices to create machineries capable of monitoring the voluntary test ban must receive due attention.

We also believe that the multilateral negotiations in the Disarmament Conference could effectively contribute to a universally acceptable agreement and a reliable monitoring and verification system which would be supported by universal co-operation and based on complete trust.

The doctrines of nuclear deterrence have definitely contributed to the increased sophistication and production of nuclear weapons, from one day to the other. Thus, they have contributed to the acceleration of stockpiling and have consumed in the process huge financial and human resources which could have been

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

channeled towards the achievement of progress and prosperity for all the peoples of the world. If the philosophy of nuclear deterrence has succeeded so far in preventing nuclear war, no one can really guarantee that it will do so for ever. In addition to the ever-present danger of human error, there are the dangers of machine error. The end result is that the world has reaped nothing from all this stockpiling of nuclear weapons but an ever-increasing terror and lack of confidence between its major Powers.

As a developing country, we view with great concern the situation created by the acceleration of the conventional arms race. The number of countries producing such weapons has increased, and the weapons have been so developed that they have become instruments of mass destruction. The production of conventional weapons on such a scale has greatly contributed to the proliferation of hotbeds of extreme tension in most countries of the world. In addition to the heavy toll in human lives the production and deployment for political and/or commercial gain of such weapons have driven the countries of the third world into a spiral of fear, mistrust and political and social instability. The constant need to procure weapons to defend their peoples and sovereignty has led to a situation wherein those countries find themselves sucked into alliances and polarizations. This has reflected very adversely on their economic and social development programmes and has plunged those countries into the quicksands of foreign debts which they cannot repay. Hence, we support the adoption of urgent measures to stop the conventional arms race, reverse its trend and prevent the outbreak of conventional wars which could easily deteriorate into nuclear conflict. Agreement on limiting conventional weapons will contribute to the lessening of mistrust and fear between States and create a more relaxed atmosphere in international relations.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

The intense tension we now witness in the Middle East, Asia and Africa stems from the cynical policies of producing and deploying more and more conventional weapons.

While the production and deployment of conventional weapons have proved to be among the main causes of tension in today's world we must add that the suspect co-operation between the two racist régimes of South Africa and Israel in the field of nuclear technology has also proved to be a grave threat to international peace and security and a tool of intimidation and blackmail in two of the most sensitive and tense regions of the world. The acquisition by South Africa of a nuclear capability has become an ominous reality which cannot be camouflaged by denials. It is also well known that Israel has been active in the area of nuclear armament with the help of certain nuclear States. It's partner in this endeavour is the racist régime of South Africa. The 1981 report of the Secretary-General on the nuclear capability of Israel provides the strongest evidence yet in this respect. In addition, The London Sunday Times of 5 October has published further information on Israel's nuclear armaments and the nuclear devices in its possession. This information was included in the testimony of an Israeli atomic engineer who worked in the Dimona Center in the Negev desert. On top of all that, Israel continues to refuse to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and rejects the idea of placing its nuclear facilities under the international safeguards system.

All this should alert us to the necessity of the establishing of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the declaration of Africa as a non-nuclear zone. The establishment of such zones in different regions, such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean, in our view, is one of the most effective means of curbing nuclear proliferation and promoting the eventual cessation of the arms race.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

Thinking of complete or partial disarmament gives rise to the great dream of security, stability and prosperity for the whole world. The interrelationship between disarmament and development is self-evident. It is an organic relationship which cannot be severed. General Assembly resolution 40/155 of 16 December 1985 gave the green light to the convening of an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development. The proposed conference has now been postponed until next year. We are confident that the General Assembly will set a date and venue for the conference in 1987, in its present session. The report of the Preparatory Committee, contained in document A/41/51, sets the framework for the conference to which Sudan, as a developing country, attaches special importance. We do not wish to be pessimistic at this point in time, but we feel that we must draw attention to the doubts which some profess to have regarding the existence of any relationship between development and disarmament. The aim of the doubtful is clear enough: it is to pre-empt the conference and make it appear as an exercise in futility.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

We must speak of the arms race in outer space. International co-operation for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes must be the alternative to an arms race in space. Space is the common heritage of humanity and must be used exclusively for the promotion of the economic and social development of all nations. The logical thing to do would be to review existing multilateral and bilateral treaties so as to render all activities in outer space exclusively peaceful. What we should have in mind is not how to regulate the arms race in outer space, but how to stop it altogether. Any attempt to justify the introduction of weapons into that environment runs counter to that objective. The United Nations and the international community as a whole must strive, as a matter of extreme urgency, to put an end to the rivalries in the field of space weapons. The deployment of nuclear defence networks in outer space runs counter to our common human goal, namely nuclear disarmament on Earth. Space devices even if merely defensive, are based on the assumption that the nuclear arms on Earth will never end. Such an assumption would certainly contribute to the weakening of bilateral and multilateral efforts aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

Let us strengthen our faith in the central role of the United Nations and its forums in the promotion of international peace and security, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, eventually, nuclear disarmament. Let us enhance the real potential of the United Nations and use it to the full in this particular field of vital importance.

Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of my delegation, I wish to extend our sincere condolences on the sudden demise of President Machel of Mozambique to the militant people of Africa who have lost a

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

leader of their fight for independence and a pioneer in the struggle against apartheid and for the progress and prosperity of Africa.

May I extend to you, Sir, our congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are convinced that you will steer the work of this Committee towards success. We should also like to congratulate the other Officers of the Committee and assure them of our desire to co-operate with them in the performance of their tasks.

Every year when we begin this debate in the First Committee, we do so in the hope that our deliberations will result in practical and positive measures capable of bringing about the fundamental objective of the Charter, namely, to save future generations from the scourge of war, intensify the international community's efforts to spare humanity the horror of nuclear war, put an end to the arms race, particularly in the nuclear sphere and in outer space and ban nuclear tests. These are the aspirations of our peoples. They all look forward to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In the light of the grave dangers into which a humanity bent on self-destruction is rapidly sliding, there is an emerging determination on the part of the international community, to put an end to the arms race. This was reflected in the Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which laid down the international disarmament strategy.

However, the numerous disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth and previous sessions, have not resulted in any substantial progress towards changing the deteriorating international climate and bringing about the desired disarmament. Quite to the contrary, certain States are stepping up their naked militaristic stance which aims at confrontation and military and

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

strategic superiority without any regard for the fate of mankind. Thus the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, continues unabated and its ominous spiral continues to spew even more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.

If our principal task here is to redouble our efforts to safeguard the peace, security and progress of all mankind and make possible the realization of our peoples' aspirations, it is only natural that we should look forward to any step in that direction, no matter how small. We were gratified to witness the progress achieved at the Stockholm Conference in the area of confidence-building measures.

We would have hoped for positive results from the summit meeting of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the President of the United States at Reykjavik especially in the area of nuclear disarmament, in fulfilment of the hopes their Geneva meeting in November 1985 had held out to the world. We do not need to review the course that the Reykjavik meeting has taken but would like to state that it was the lack of political will to respond to the aspirations of the peoples of the world, and the persistence in the policies of nuclear deterrence and military and strategic superiority which have made it impossible to reach agreement at Reykjavik. The deplorable fact remains that no result has come out of that meeting with regard to halting the arms race. This is in direct contradiction to the commitments the nuclear States have taken upon themselves in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to continue to negotiate in good faith and search for the effective measures capable of bringing about a rapid end to nuclear armaments and a treaty on total and complete disarmament under effective international control.

With regard to the disarmament conference, the situation remains frozen. No progress has been achieved in the substantial multilateral negotiations on urgent questions, in spite of the priorities which were unanimously adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

We believe that the real significant contribution to the achievement of disarmament would involve taking concrete measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, bring about a general ban on nuclear tests, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of the militarization of outer space, the setting up of an overall disarmament programme, the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of nuclear arms against non-nuclear weapon States, and removing the obstacles obstructing a treaty banning chemical weapons.

In this respect we wish to praise highly the positive and constructive initiatives of the Soviet Union, particularly its commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, its efforts to bring about a ban of nuclear tests, and its readiness to reduce its nuclear arsenals. We hope that these significant initiatives will result in the adoption of similar measures by the other nuclear-weapon States, particularly the United States, in order to put an end to the dangerous rivalry in the build up of nuclear arsenals.

If our call for complete and general disarmament is becoming ever more pressing, it is because we are aware of the threats to the fate of mankind and its progress. Indeed, the question of disarmament has become a matter of life and death for mankind. It is also connected with our efforts to face up to the economic and social problems of development. To show political will to bring about disarmament will make it possible to utilize the additional resources for economic and social development of all countries, particularly the developing nations. Halting the arms race, reversing its course, and channelling the huge human and material resources, now being squandered, on military expenditure would help relieve the misery and hunger of the majority of humanity.

It is on the basis of this thinking that we were gratified at the resolution adopted by the General Assembly to organize an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development. It is regrettable that in spite

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

of the results achieved by the Preparatory Committee for this conference, it has not been able to convene it at the scheduled date this year because of the obstacles put in its way by a few States.

We are still hopeful, however, that a definite decision will be adopted at this session to convene a conference for next year. We have high hopes that the conference will have a positive outcome which will make it possible to channel the resources freed from disarmament for the economic and social development of all, particularly the developing countries.

My country has supported the efforts of the United Nations to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, as a first step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and not as a substitute of the ultimate objective of total disarmament which we hope the present efforts will achieve.

We still think that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has three indispensable prerequisites which have been clearly defined in the relevant United Nations resolutions. First, Israel must be called upon to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Secondly, Israel should place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thirdly, Israel must cease to develop or test or manufacture nuclear weapons and/or acquire such weapons by any other means. Israel should not be permitted to deploy nuclear weapons or devices either in Israel or in the territories occupied by Israel.

It has become extremely urgent to meet these three conditions in view of the recent media revelations about the acquisition by Israel of a nuclear capability. This has been confirmed by the report of the United Nations Institute in Disarmament Research, presented at the fortieth session and by the Secretary-General's report which was submitted to the thirty-seventh session.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

It is essential to alert the international community to the serious consequences of the acquisition by Israel of nuclear weapons, particularly since Israel has never shown any respect for the international community and has always spurned its will. We call upon all States to condemn Israel and end any and all co-operation with it in the nuclear field.

With regard to the African continent, the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the racist régime in South Africa compounds the threat to international peace and security as it is the aim of that régime to perpetuate its policy of apartheid which the international community has been trying to eliminate. We believe that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964 would be an important measure which would meet the aspirations of the peoples of the African continent in general, and of southern Africa in particular.

It is in this context that we condemn the South African régime for its acquisition of nuclear weapons. We call for the immediate halting of co-operation with that racist régime. The acquisition by the two racist régimes of South Africa and Israel of the capability to develop nuclear weapons and their collaboration in this field pose a grave threat to the Arab and African peoples in the Middle East and in Africa, and indeed to international peace and security as a whole.

The international community must take urgent and immediate action to face up to this serious development; and certain Western countries which provide South Africa with the necessary equipment which enables its régime to develop nuclear weapons, must bring that co-operation to an end. It is strange indeed that those countries which continue to co-operate with Israel and South Africa have always refused to co-operate with other States which have placed their peaceful nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(Mr. Al-Alfi, Democratic Yemen)

The adoption of concrete measures to achieve the objective of the Declaration making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, will constitute an important contribution to the elimination of threats to the Indian Ocean and the promotion of peace and security in that area. In this context, we feel that the Conference on the Indian Ocean is a necessary and practical step rapidly to achieve the objectives of that Declaration. We call for all constructive efforts to be renewed. We want to see the necessary political will brought to bear to achieve the objectives of this Declaration.

As a coastal State on the Indian Ocean, we are concerned to see the obstructions of the work of the Committee on the Indian Ocean, against the wishes and will of the majority of members of that Committee. We call for effective efforts to be redoubled in order to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean on the scheduled date in 1988.

Our common responsibility requires the concerted efforts of us all to adopt concrete measures to face up to the dangers which beset us and threaten the very existence of civilization and the survival of humanity. The qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals, the schemes of militarizing outer space, the increase in military spending, the astronomical sums swallowed up by the arms race and the effects of all that on the development of our countries, make it imperative for us to adopt effective measures to realize the aspirations of our peoples for complete and general disarmament under effective international control, in the interests of prosperity and progress for all.

Mr. TORNUDD (Finland): It is a pleasure and an honour for me to congratulate you, Ambassador Zachman, on your election to the high post of Chairman of this Committee. Your experience of many international conferences and disarmament meetings will be highly valuable in our common efforts. You can count on the support of my delegation as you carry out your duties. My congratulations go as well to the other officers of the Committee, whose eminent qualities will help to ensure that the Committee will be able to work efficiently during this session.

Last year when I had the privilege of addressing the Committee, I mentioned that some indications of a positive change had emerged in the field of disarmament and arms control. Today there are further positive signs; but there are also complications, as the meeting in Reykjavik has shown. We are nevertheless encouraged by the serious and wide-ranging efforts undertaken. We hope that the dialogue and negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will continue patiently and produce the results hoped for by the whole international community. Meanwhile, we can note some progress on the multilateral side: concrete results were achieved at the Stockholm Conference; the multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons treaty have progressed; the biological weapons Treaty was successfully reviewed last month in Geneva; and, finally, we have noted the world-wide increased interest in regional disarmament measures, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones. But, although those are positive signs, we must conclude that as a whole the international situation remains tense. The continuing military build-up is discouraging in itself, but it is also an indication of the presence of fear, distrust and threats - or at least perceived threats.

On this occasion I should like to concentrate especially on one important element in all disarmament, arms-control and confidence-building endeavours. I want to deal with verification of compliance with concluded agreements or treaties -

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

a subject which has been prominent in other statements that we have heard in the Committee this year. Verification is an important part of disarmament and arms-control agreements. It is commonly accepted that verification of arms control and disarmament should be fair, balanced, non-discriminatory, clear in its intent and procedures and commensurate with the specific arms-control obligations agreed upon. While these principles are widely accepted, they are more difficult to realize in all equity, particularly in issues that are openly disputed and under severe political strain.

We know that the major nuclear Powers have differing views on the weight, scope and place of verification in disarmament accords. Verification has been called by some "the critical element of arms control", while another protagonist has emphasized that "disarmament without verification is impossible, but verification without disarmament is likewise meaningless". There seems to be, however, a broad basic consensus - even between the major nuclear Powers - that adequate national or international verification is essential in arms-control agreements whenever they are considered verifiable. To this general observation it must be added that at present there seems to be an increasing trend towards convergence between the two leading nuclear Powers in their more specific approach to verification.

Of course, verification is not, by definition, an end in itself. At least the technical side of verification is always closely connected with the type of arms regulation or disarmament agreed upon. Nor is verification a substitute for confidence. There must be some degree of mutual trust between the parties to a negotiation even to get it started. Verification can, however, increase confidence both between the parties and in the agreement itself. That, again, makes the practice of verification easier and more acceptable. On the other hand, the need

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

for the application of verification measures may become smaller with increasing confidence. Verification is a co-operative process, either in the form of passive tolerance or as an active exchange of information.

The technology of verification is making rapid improvements, but weapon technology develops at least as fast, if not faster. There seems to be continuous competition between those two, and one of the main tasks for weapon designers unfortunately seems to be to improve the non-verifiability of the presence or use of their weapons.

Nuclear disarmament has repeatedly been characterized as the primary and most urgent goal in our efforts. A nuclear war must never be fought. As far as Finland is concerned, we are committed to never acquiring nuclear weapons and we shall never allow such weapons on our territory.

In nuclear disarmament as well as in its verification a special responsibility falls upon those States which possess nuclear weapons. Some forms of verification, by so-called national technical means, are already, because of their technical nature or because of the enormous economic and human resources needed, the prerogative of the leading nuclear Powers. Other States have both a legitimate interest in nuclear disarmament and arms control and a moral obligation to contribute to the attainment of these objectives.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty remains one of the most important unresolved questions on our agenda. My Government has on several occasions stressed the significance of this arms-control measure, especially in view of the limitations it would set on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. It is a first-priority issue, and we have therefore welcomed even unilateral steps in that direction.

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

Finland has in accordance with its policy of neutrality, offered its services for the promotion of disarmament. As a technologically highly developed country, Finland participates in the international scientific co-operation carried out under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. That co-operation has for our part included essential research and development work, the results of which have been shared with other States. Recently this international scientific co-operation has made significant progress. It will be possible in the near future to test further the reliability of an international seismic verification system. For many years the most significant disagreements concerning a complete test-ban treaty were related to verification requirements. In the opinion of Finland they at least should no longer prevent the actual negotiations from proceeding.

So far in the history of arms control the most important single treaty to which Finland has become a party is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In regard to the NPT Finland has actively participated in the efforts to create and strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The ultimate goal should be the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by all States parties to the Treaty, and of course accession to the Treaty by those States that have not yet become parties to it.

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

Last year one of the main questions deliberated in the Committee was the problem connected with the use of outer space for military purposes. Taking now verification as a point of departure, I should like to stress two things.

Some military activities in outer space, for example, satellite monitoring, are generally recognized as having a stabilizing effect. However, the increased use of space technology for military purposes and especially an open weaponization of space and an arms race in space can be expected to endanger both this stabilizing function and our arms control endeavours in general. Therefore, such an arms race must be prevented. We must keep in mind the inherent difficulties in verification of any arms control agreement concerning space weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones, as arrangements for geographical limitations on deployment and the threat or use of nuclear weapons, are regarded as strengthening the non-proliferation régime. The verification problems connected with these zones were, among other things, analysed in the comprehensive study carried out in 1975 by a group of experts established by the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament. As the members of the Committee will recall, the new study on the same subject, undertaken in the period 1983 to 1985, under the auspices of the General Assembly, did not materialize because of disagreements between the members of the study group. However, there are many specific questions, including those relating to verification of zonal agreements, which could benefit from further study.

Verification issues have been essential in the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Finland has also developed verification capacities for a treaty banning chemical weapons. This national project, which started as long ago as 1972, seeks to develop verification methods that would cover non-production, destruction of existing stocks and detection of alleged use. The results of the work done in the project are regularly published in so-called Blue Books and

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discussed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and in scientific seminars arranged in connection with the project.

One of the most acute problems in the negotiations on chemical weapons has been the question of so-called challenge inspections. It is clear that effective verification of a treaty on such weapons requires on-site inspections as well as the use of monitoring techniques, both national and international. In this connection, it is encouraging to note the recent success reached in Stockholm, where the 35 States participating in the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe agreed on the principle of compulsory on-site inspections to verify allegations of non-compliance.

Confidence-building measures were also one of the main themes in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission last May. Unfortunately, the extensive and valuable findings of the Commission could not be fully agreed upon and the Commission's report includes only draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures on a global or regional level. We believe, however, as does the Commission, that its work could be completed at this session of the General Assembly. The recommendations and findings of the Commission could then be published in their proper form.

Confidence and security-building measures are still a relatively new form of regulation in the military field, but in general they can also be regarded as steps towards disarmament. There exists an interesting two-way relationship between confidence and security building measures and verification. Adequate verification possibilities seem to strengthen these measures, and the confidence and security building measures for their part could be used to facilitate verification of more far-reaching measures in the field of disarmament.

The main task of the Stockholm Conference did not, at this stage, concern disarmament as such, but confidence and security building measures. It was agreed in the mandate for the Conference that the agreed confidence and security building

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

measures should be "provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content". The verification arrangements agreed in Stockholm comprise both the use of national technical means and on-site inspection on the ground as well as from the air.

Finland, as well as the other European neutral and non-aligned States, played an active part in the work of the Stockholm Conference. Another area of confidence-building where Finland has participated on a broad scale are the United Nations peace-keeping operations. They can also have a verification aspect, especially in regard to agreements reached between conflicting parties. Good examples of verification as an element in peace-keeping are the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which started in 1974. These Forces were charged with verification of the disengagement agreements reached between Egypt, Israel and Syria. The successful manner in which they have carried out verification strengthened confidence between the parties and the durability of the agreements.

As the 1984 United Nations study on the conventional arms race showed, disarmament in this area should be pursued parallel with nuclear disarmament. The possibilities that nuclear-weapon States could be drawn into local conflict would thus be reduced. Also in conventional disarmament a special responsibility lies with the leading nuclear Powers, which are devoting the highest share of resources to research, development and production of conventional arms. Further work on this issue could be undertaken in the United Nations context based on previous studies and the Disarmament Commission's report on confidence-building measures. Special attention would need to be devoted from the outset to the verification procedures of conventional arms limitation.

A principal ambition of Finland in all forms of disarmament, be it conventional or nuclear, multilateral or bilateral, has been that wherever and

(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)

whenever we can play a constructive role and improve the possibilities for a meaningful agreement, we should offer our services.

The consistent policy of Finland has also been to support the role of the United Nations in strengthening international security. We can therefore fully support the idea included this year in the Secretary-General's annual report, that:

"... the ability of the Organization to assist in the verification and compliance arrangements should be explored". (A/41/1, p. 10)

Since the distribution of technical verification capabilities is uneven, as I have already emphasized, one possibility to increase the role of the United Nations could be the creation of a verification data base compiled and managed by the organization. The Member States would be invited to contribute to this data base a wide range of information pertaining to arms control and disarmament.

The establishment of such a data base centre could be strengthened by the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency, which was proposed by France in 1978 and supported in 1981 by the expert group set up by the Secretary-General. The opinion of the expert group was that an agency administering shared international technical verification means would be a useful tool in the prevention of international crises.

The credibility of such a verification-supporting data base centre could be further enhanced by United Nations observers and inspection teams empowered with sufficient rights to obtain and gather relevant information wherever they might be operating. Another worthwhile supporting step to consider could be the conducting of United Nations-sponsored seminars and conferences on the development of verification methods and techniques.

Those are some of the specific questions to which I have drawn attention this year and to which my delegation will certainly seek to revert as we continue our work in the Committee.

Mr. DAZA (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): We should not wish to begin our participation in the general debate of the Committee without first referring to the meeting held in Reykjavik between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, a political event which, according to official reports, came closer than ever before to an agreement of such magnitude and importance that it would have led to a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons, both strategic as well as medium range.

This fact, as well as the stated intentions to continue negotiating, offer encouragement and enable us to look at the future with greater optimism. We trust that those who bear the responsibility for the survival of mankind will in fact make the greatest efforts to ensure that these future negotiations will bring about at least essential agreement that permanent and open dialogue is indispensable to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament. We encourage the negotiators to continue their efforts.

The intense and substantive negotiations that have been held internationally this year, during which all items on nuclear and conventional disarmament have been discussed, make it possible for us to strike a more optimistic note in this statement, recalling that this is a positive sign capable of breathing new life in our activities. International trust, which stems from negotiations, is essential. Furthermore, world public opinion has realized that these meetings bore the seeds of a decision to reach an agreement through dialogue, thus lessening the danger of confrontation. Let us not frustrate such a hopeful sign.

We believe that it is necessary to strengthen at every opportunity the role of the United Nations and of discussion and multilateral negotiation with regard to disarmament matters. The United Nations is, as His Holiness Pope Paul VI said, "the mandatory path of modern civilization and peace".

(Mr. Daza, Chile)

We have constantly upheld in this and other forums the inalienable right that we, the smaller countries, have to participate in discussions and negotiations that consider and make proposals on aspects directly related to the survival of all mankind, and the United Nations is the best multilateral forum in which we can make our voices heard.

Hence we are concerned that the economy measures that have already been adopted and those that will surely be adopted in future - although we recognize the need for them - will be applied so broadly as to limit the exercise of this right and the attention that should be given to an item of this importance.

In considering the future of disarmament and of mankind, it is both important and essential that we do so in a realistic manner. The United Nations cannot achieve its goals in this particular field without the determined political will of its Members and without a determined collective effort. It is essential, therefore, that in the search for genuine measures, the legitimate interests of all Members should be respected and taken into consideration. Let us not forget that the United Nations is a tool, an instrument available to the international community that has been created to consider matters of concern to mankind and, as such, its best possible use depends exclusively on its Members.

My country, Chile, is a peace-loving country with clear-cut political goals and where hegemony or conquest has no place. We support all types of disarmament on a world or regional basis or between neighbours. For that reason, we immediately adhered to the statement made by the President of Peru, His Excellency Mr. Alan Garcia, with regard to regional disarmament. As a result, meetings between the high commands of the armed forces of Chile and Peru were held at the beginning of this year in order to find specific formulas to reduce arms expenditures for both countries.

(Mr. Daza, Chile)

My country wishes only to maintain those security and armed forces necessary to preserve its national sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal security, which are so often threatened in today's world shaken as it is by international terrorism and subversion, encouraged and financed from sources beyond our frontiers.

We are seriously concerned by the present status of world disarmament. The arms race has become an accepted fact of life. Progress in science and technology in the field of armaments has resulted in increasingly sophisticated and lethal weapons. The use or threat of use of force, in open violation of the principles embodied in the Charter, continues to be a weapon used with absolute impunity in order to pursue unacceptable policies of regional or world hegemony. The nuclear weapons possessed by both super-Powers are more than sufficient to destroy mankind several times over. It has been estimated that only one of the modern nuclear submarines can carry such a number of warheads that their explosive power would be greater than that of all the munitions and weapons used in the Second World War.

This is the general framework within which the debates of the Committee are taking place; the dangerous evolution of the East-West confrontation offers the prospect of new confrontations whose limits may be found only in the fertile imaginations of science fiction writers, thus irretrievably dragging us towards what has been called the concept of armed peace, with the accumulation of nuclear and conventional arsenals that threaten us with the much feared final holocaust.

(Mr. Daza, Chile)

Although deterrence may have worked so far, we do not believe that, as some claim, it is possible to build lasting peace on the threat of punishment. Peace can be based only on trust, mutual respect and international co-operation.

The challenge of nuclear arms continues, in our view, to be of the most pressing and fundamental nature; the elimination of the threat of nuclear war is therefore the most urgent task of mankind. We are convinced that it is essential to end all nuclear testing, because the qualitative and quantitative development of such weapons simply steps up the arms race. The total prohibition of testing would in fact impede the development and perfecting of such weapons.

Finally, we must once again reiterate our firm support for all initiatives aimed at the reduction of weapons and having the final objective of general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would constitute evident proof of a genuine desire to make progress towards total nuclear disarmament. It is a measure which should go hand in hand with other measures to implement a broad international seismological monitoring network and to carry out research to discover other systems of monitoring and verification to ensure compliance with the treaty.

If no agreement is reached on a comprehensive test ban, the nuclear arms race, as we said earlier, will continue to be encouraged, since the nuclear Powers will continue perfecting their weapons and making technological progress, thus opening up the possibility that such weapons will in fact spread to other non-nuclear countries, which would then have an excuse to develop such weapons of their own.

If we consider that 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons today are in the hands of the two super-Powers, we cannot, on the basis of this international reality, because the conclusion that the greatest threat of nuclear conflict comes from

(Mr. Daza, Chile)

those Powers and that therefore they bear the greatest responsibility for promoting progress towards disarmament and ending the arms race by bringing about a drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

We emphasize that the efforts of the international community must be concentrated on halting the arms race in weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical, radiological and conventional weapons. Chile advocates the earliest possible conclusion of a general and complete treaty prohibiting the production of and calling for the immediate elimination of arsenals of chemical, biological and bacteriological weapons through negotiations such as those held in the Committee on Disarmament and the Second Review Conference of Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

We wish also to point out that there is a pressing need for the adoption of measures to halt and reverse the conventional arms race and prevent conflicts such as those that have afflicted mankind since the end of the Second World War, in which time more than 150 conflicts have affected the developing countries, which have been not only the scenes of these conflicts but also in almost all cases, the victims.

I will not overwhelm the Committee with figures and statistics, since in any case they are well known to all and readily obtainable, and would simply refer to the total annual sums of money mankind spends on weapons - funds that are badly needed for the economic and social development of hundreds of millions of persons suffering from hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and sickness. Let me simply recall that more than 25 million people have been the innocent victims of these 150 conventional conflicts, and it is even more alarming to note that present trends do not offer any ground for hope that their frequency or seriousness will decrease.

(Mr. Daza, Chile)

Chile, overwhelmed by this reality, has from the very outset, in conformity with the proposal submitted by the President of the French Republic to the General Assembly in 1983, enthusiastically supported the idea of convening an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development. That conference was to have been held in August last in Paris. We regret its postponement and hope that the General Assembly at this session will take a decision on the place and date of its convening in the course of 1987.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the members of the Committee as well as on my own behalf, I should like to extend a most cordial and friendly welcome to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Komatina, to the First Committee. I am sure this Committee will greatly benefit from his diplomatic experience and knowledge, and we all look forward to his co-operation in dealing with the many important issues before us.

Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas): Once again representatives in the First Committee have engaged in a general debate on items and issues which for several decades have not changed in content but have multiplied. Representatives have before them as well several reports and letters expressing individual points of view on these issues. Strangely enough, if we were able to absorb all these ideas, we should find a common link that has been present since the first resolution was introduced, namely that, the survival of mankind is dependent upon the results of the arms race, whether in the conventional, nuclear or chemical field. Yet representatives can expect a plethora of resolutions which will be nothing more than a regurgitation of the same diet of words that we have been swallowing for years. This is a sad indictment indeed, 40 years later.

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

The statements made to date in the general debate have all converged on a common point - that the arms race is causing havoc in all areas of human endeavour and, unless a solution is found, the end result can be nothing less than catastrophic. Nevertheless, every year we present packages which contain nothing more than rhetoric and platitudes. I am aware, even now as I am speaking, of the seeming emptiness of these words, particularly since I am not saying anything new. My delegation has often registered its dissatisfaction over the lack of progress in the implementation of consensus decisions taken, the increase in the number of resolutions which add nothing encouraging to our deliberations, bilateral meetings which always "almost" succeed, and conferences and high-level ad hoc groups which do little more than add to the numerous reports at our disposal.

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

Despite my apprehensions regarding the value of the general debate, I subscribe to the view that one's previous comments should not be taken for granted. They should be repeated again and again.

The one ray of hope seems to me to be the efficacy of dialogue, vital to any problem-solving endeavour and from which arises the possibility of action. We must question our seriousness upon seeing that action is not based on a sense of compromise and of sharing, or on a determination to abandon selfishness for selflessness. In reality, there has to be evidence of a commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, to promote justice and freedom for all peoples and, more importantly, to assure that our efforts will not be in vain.

Delegations must say justifiably that my comments are mere words, platitudes, cliches, or even unrealistic. I would argue with only one aspect of such thoughts, namely, that these concepts, even though they may sound sophomoric and idealistic, contain the substance of what we are called on to do if we are to have a disarmed world. Anything short of real commitment would be tilting at windmills.

One of my delegation's major concern is that as we debate these issues in the several forums of the international community, there does not seem to be any room for the multilateral approach. We are all going our separate ways. We are all selling our own brand of propaganda without taking into account the needs of our neighbours.

We all seem to sit, breathlessly, awaiting the results of any bilateral talks between the super-Powers. We make insipid comments about the outcome in public, whereas in private we take sides according to our needs. Our actions seem to suggest that when the powerful speak the weak should cower in despair rather than band together for protection against their threats. There is strength in numbers

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

and there is strength in multilateralism. Why else would it be important to get the largest number of votes possible on resolutions that may not even be implemented? Or the largest number of cross-regional co-sponsors? Needless to say the bilateral angle in negotiations is very important, but reports on the work of the Organization also show the need to place serious emphasis on the multilateral angle. We have heard how little apparent influence the small nuclear-weapon-free States have but I am convinced that, if small States adopt a more unified position, tangible success would be more evident. The United Nations is basically a system where multilateral talks supplement bilateral talks and in this universe of great conflicts suggestions from all regions of the globe should be considered mandatory. In essence all countries have an obligation to maintain and strengthen peace and security throughout the world. This is certainly not a task for only a few.

For these reasons my delegation continues to be baffled by expressions which appear in many of the operative paragraphs of many resolutions spawned in this Organization. Coupled with condemnation of selective States is the call on others, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, as super-Powers, to stop the arms race, or to find a peaceful and effective solution to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Requests are often made to the Secretary-General, even though he may be powerless to oblige. Partisan politics abound in other cases and fact-finding groups are becoming the order of the day. One cannot quarrel with these efforts, since many impossible decisions are made out of frustration and despair. However, once it becomes clear that the results are non-existent, then it is time to initiate other alternatives.

My delegation has no doubt that we have movers and shakers in all areas of our work. There is no doubt that some countries have a greater responsibility for

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

slowing the arms race or are more influential in assisting in this venture. But their roles should not be exclusive because of size or power alone. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration such as the preservation of all mankind. Small States should not rely solely on the whims of the powerful, since the view that a nuclear war cannot be won is indicative of total annihilation. Small States have to stop playing the games the big States play. They must recognize the collective responsibility they bear for the maintenance of peace and security and not be deterred by extraneous factors such as size and technical expertise. Perhaps if my delegation's naivete has not been evident before, it is certainly very apparent in the last sentence. Be that as it may, I am convinced that this Organization's problems are not going to be solved if left only to a few. Moreover, the solution to the question of general and complete disarmament would be light years away if left solely to the super-Powers.

So what can small States do about it? They can begin by taking positive action against all these senseless resolutions that they are called upon to adopt. Such positive action could be along the lines of streamlining, combining similar texts, rejecting omnibus texts or texts that are unbalanced or submitted merely for testing purposes. These are all very small steps, but they could be very, very effective in the long run. Over the years attitudes have shifted in this Committee in that there is little desire to compromise, to put disarmament before national interests. If all nations agreed to make progress in slowing the arms race step by step towards its demise, there would be fewer promises and more action, and the work of the First Committee would become a pleasant task rather than an exercise in one up-manship.

Mr. MAKSIMOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic in its

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statement of 21 October dwelt on the problem of preventing nuclear war, as well as questions of nuclear disarmament, a solution to which we view as the most urgent in the field of disarmament and as the key to ensuring that the system of international peace and security is truly comprehensive. However, it is by no means our intention to suggest that the problem of disarmament in other areas is merely peripheral, and in our statement today we wish to discuss a number of non-nuclear matters.

The socialist States, as pointed out at the meeting on 14-15 October in Bucharest of the Foreign Ministers Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, favour a comprehensive approach to the problem of disarmament. The task of prohibiting chemical weapons enjoys high priority in the efforts of the international community. The reason for this obviously is that the very nature of these weapons, which were among the first weapons of mass destruction, has aroused widespread alarm. At the same time we should note the important role played by the General Assembly in concentrating these efforts since the time when the socialist States placed the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons on its agenda.

The situation which now exists in this field encourages hope but at the same time sounds a note of alarm. On the one hand, negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Disarmament Conference have brought about a certain amount of progress, opening up prospects for the early completion of work on the preparation of a convention. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is most gratified by this. On the other hand, however, the danger persists that the production of binary chemical weapons will begin in the United States.

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There is no doubt that such a step would do serious harm to the negotiations in which the world community, as has been shown by the discussions in the First Committee, is placing so much hope. The arguments adduced by the partisans of the binary weapon do not hold water. They are trying to persuade world public opinion and their own allies - indeed the whole world - that United States stockpiles of chemical weapons are no good. If that were the case, it would have encouraged the United States to work for an early agreement on the universal destruction of chemical weapons. But we are absolutely unable to understand, and we find totally unacceptable, the position of the United States with regard to the need for adding to their chemical-weapon arsenals even more dangerous means of waging chemical war. We are told that binary weapons have to be produced in order to make the USSR undertake serious negotiations. Apart from the fact that this all-purpose pretext is depressingly familiar, it also contradicts the realities. All delegations that in this discussion have touched on the problem of chemical weapons have highlighted the serious and encouraging nature of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The new proposals of the USSR at those talks which take into account the positions of many States, including the United States, as was pointed out at the Conference on Disarmament itself, make it possible to end situations that were formerly deadlocked, and we can clearly discern now the outlines of the possibility of concluding as early as 1987 work on a convention banning and eliminating not only chemical weapons themselves but also the industrial base for the manufacture of such weapons.

In the light of this, the Byelorussian delegation expresses the hope that the good principle which has established itself in international practice of not doing anything that might have a bad effect on negotiations under way will prevail and that the binary threat will be removed. We should like to draw attention to the fact that this principle is contained in the Final Document of the first special

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session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which, as will be recalled, was adopted, by consensus. All States must refrain, not only from manufacturing new types of chemical weapons, but also from deploying them on the territory of other countries. Chemical weapons deployed abroad must be withdrawn to within the boundaries of the national territories of those to whom the weapons belong.

The proposal of the People's Republic of China that all States with the capacity to manufacture chemical weapons should refrain from testing, manufacturing, transferring or deploying such weapons until a convention prohibiting them is concluded, is both timely and worthy of our attention. All these measures would make it possible to keep much of our planet free from containers bearing chemical death.

In this regard, the Byelorussian delegation calls upon all States to which proposals for creating chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe, and the Balkans were addressed to respond with practical steps. The readiness of the USSR to guarantee the status of those zones if the United States does likewise testifies to its seriousness about these initiatives. With regard to the creation of such a zone in Central Europe, we must point out that it is equally acceptable to East and West, since it does no harm to the security of either side. The Byelorussian SSR is convinced that creating chemical-weapon-free zones in Europe does not contravene the ultimate goal of a global prohibition of this weapon, and may actually be an important step and incentive for achieving it, as well as providing a useful example for other parts of the world.

A number of delegations have, quite rightly in our view, pointed to the growing danger of the spread of chemical weapons. Therefore we must have effective practical measures to prevent their proliferation on our planet. As one of the parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

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Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Byelorussian SSR welcomes the positive conclusion of the Review Conference held last month. The success of that Conference will go a long way towards strengthening the Convention's régime.

Abuse of the fruits and possibilities of scientific and technological progress for militaristic purposes is becoming increasingly dangerous. As was quite rightly stressed in the statement of the delegation of Sweden in the First Committee, the qualitative aspects of the arms race contain the threat of ever more destabilizing consequences. At previous sessions of the General Assembly, our delegation gave particular attention to the problem of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and it will continue this year to work to this end. We must work to achieve a prohibition of the manufacture of armaments which, based on new physical principles, come close, in their destructive capacity, to nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

On the basis of a comprehensive approach to the problem of disarmament, the socialist States want to see the adoption of practical measures to reduce conventional weapons. The implementation of the programme they proposed in Budapest in June this year - a 25 per cent cut by the beginning of the 1990s in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals - would create the necessary conditions for continuing the process of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe in the future. Thus the route has been mapped for resolving in practice the problem of the interdependence of disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields by making joint and consistent progress bringing weapons down to lower and less dangerous levels of military confrontation.

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At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held a few days ago in Bucharest, the Foreign Ministers confirmed their readiness immediately to embark on the practical discussion of these proposals and to view constructively other similar measures which might be proposed by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by neutral and non-aligned States and by other European countries. We hope that those who have expressed concern about the conventional armaments aspect will immediately respond to this declared readiness by similar steps. The measures proposed by the Warsaw Treaty allies make it possible to dispel apprehensions, be they genuine or feigned, that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would tilt the balance in favour of the socialist countries because, supposedly, they possess supremacy in conventional armaments.

(Mr. Maksimov, Byelorussian SSR)

Here again the Soviet Union proposes a new approach to the question: with regard to those categories of weapons where the West possesses more, let it make the relevant cuts, and in those categories of weapons where the other side has more the "surplus" could also simply be reduced. The main point is to have a balance at a lower level. The early achievement of agreement in the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe could make a substantial contribution to the attainment of that goal.

The substantial measures on confidence-building and security agreed upon in Stockholm demonstrate the possibilities offered by a spirit of co-operation, realism and mutual understanding. The Stockholm agreement provides a good starting point for proceeding to negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, as well as parallel talks on confidence-building measures, including the limitation of the scale of military activities. A positive factor of particular significance would be a decision to hold such negotiations during the second stage of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Such a decision could be adopted at the forthcoming meeting in Vienna of the representatives of the States parties to the all-European conference on security and co-operation.

There is also a possibility of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia. The proposals of the Soviet Union with regard to strengthening peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region could provide a basis for beginning this important process in that continent too.

In its unswerving commitment to new approaches, the Soviet Union has expressed readiness to take a major step of fundamental significance in declaring that its forces in other countries are not anchored there, but that, of course, the anchor must be raised simultaneously by all.

(Mr. Maksimov, Byelorussian SSR)

It would appear that, in general, closed military alliances have had their day. The constructive co-operation of States in creating a comprehensive system of international peace and security - and it is precisely that co-operation which is the major task of our times - has made them an anachronism. The socialist States have for many years now consistently expressed readiness to see the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In Bucharest the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty declared their determination to continue efforts to end the division of Europe and create a continent of peace and friendly co-operation. In our view that goal is eminently attainable.

Practical disarmament measures call for agreement on serious verification measures. The significance of such measures is particularly great, and will become even greater if we succeed in achieving radical disarmament steps, particularly in the nuclear field. Verification must be comprehensive and extremely strict. It must be carried out at all stages during the reduction of armaments and must provide for the use of both national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspection when necessary. The position of the Byelorussian SSR on verification is set forth in detail in document A/41/422.

Disarmament measures must lead to a genuine improvement in the lives of the peoples of the world. The problem of the interdependence of disarmament and development is becoming ever more urgent. In this regard it is particularly regrettable that, despite the consensus on the resolution of the General Assembly regarding a conference on this problem, such a conference could not be held this year. However, a majority of States are paying the closest attention to this question. That attention was reflected in the new proposal of the Soviet Union for the setting up, upon the achievement of agreement on a genuine and real reduction

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of military expenditures of States, of an international fund for assisting developing countries. We must embark upon the task of working out an agreement on the principles that would govern the transfer of a proportion of the funds released during the process of disarmament for purposes of assisting developing countries; that agreement would also cover the establishment of appropriate machinery. For example, an agreement on disarmament could be accompanied by an announcement by the parties to the agreement concerning the amount of money released in this way and the proportion that was to be earmarked for assistance to developing States.

Our delegation expresses the hope that the campaign being waged behind the scenes by individual States against the convening of the conference on disarmament and development will cease and that the conference will be held next year.

Recent events have underlined the importance not only of elaborating new agreements but also of maintaining existing agreements in the disarmament field. The voluntary renunciation by States of the exercise of their right to withdraw from arms limitation agreements, not to mention, of course, the need for their strict observance, would therefore serve the interests of peace and of all peoples.

Many interesting proposals have been put forward with regard to the need to curb the naval arms race. The Byelorussian SSR is convinced that, regardless of their geographical location, all States should realize that the distance between them and sea-based missiles is actually the distance between the hand and the firing button; every State in the world therefore has an interest in solving this problem. We welcome the substantial progress made on this question by the Disarmament Commission at its 1986 session, despite the attempts by the United States to undermine all work on the subject, and we would once again state that there is a need for all the major naval Powers, as well as other interested States, to begin appropriate negotiations. We must also see to it that a conference is

(Mr. Maksimov, Byelorussian SSR)

held in good time on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly.

In addition to the questions I have touched upon, our delegation would like to point out that the views of the Byelorussian SSR with regard to disarmament research on conventional weapons are set out in document A/41/501/Add.1, and that its position on United Nations research in the field of disarmament is outlined in document A/41/421.

I should like to say, briefly, that the Byelorussian SSR believes that the main criterion of the usefulness of research should be the extent to which it promotes the early adoption of practical disarmament measures. It is precisely that objective which, we hope, will be served by the holding of a third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The Byelorussian SSR considers that a decision should be taken to hold it in 1988.

The discussions in the First Committee and the proposals put forward by States in order to bring about genuine disarmament have shown that new ideas and new thinking are gaining ground. It is precisely on such new approaches that the initiatives of the socialist countries are based. All States must help to mould the future in a positive manner. A constructive exchange of fresh proposals and of ideas will provide the impetus to set the machine of disarmament in motion.

The CHAIRMAN: The Observer of the League of Arab States, Mr. Mansouri, has requested to speak. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 477 (V), 1 November 1950, and with the approval of the members of the Committee, I call on him.

Mr. MANSOURI (League of Arab States) (interpretation from Arabic): Allow me, Sir, at the outset to convey to you on behalf of the League of Arab States our sincere congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee which is concerned with political matters and the questions of international peace and security. Your election is a recognition by the international community of your experience in political matters in general and disarmament questions in particular. It is also as a recognition of and appreciation for your positive stand and constructive efforts of your friendly country, the German Democratic Republic, with regard to international peace and security.

The League of Arab States and its member States, indeed the whole world, look forward to the day when stability, security and peace will prevail. The peoples of the world attach hopes to the meetings of the leaders of the two super-Powers. They look forward to agreement between the super-Powers which may avert the danger of nuclear war and its dire consequences for humanity.

Rational logical analysis will make it clear that the consequences of a nuclear confrontation between the States in possession of those weapons, would not be confined to such States, but would certainly spill over to engulf the innocent peoples of other States which are neither nuclear nor party to nuclear conflicts. Such innocent bystanders would be affected simply because of their geographical and proximity to the belligerents.

(Mr. Mansouri, League of Arab States)

We believe that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is borne by the States members of the Security Council, and in particular, its permanent members. This responsibility which is enshrined in the Charter makes it a duty of those States to act in earnest and try to achieve the lofty goals and objectives of our international Organization, foremost among which is the objective of the prevention of another destructive world war. This can be achieved only through the adherence to and application of the principle of collective security which would ensure the political, economic and social stability and prosperity of all the world's peoples.

One of the first duties in the area of achieving these objectives is the abandonment of the policy of nuclear armament which has grave consequences that may well lead to the annihilation of humanity.

While calling for an end to the arms race on earth, it is only natural and logical to insist that the arms race should not be extended to outer space, and that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful, scientific purposes.

Proceeding from this, the League of Arab States reaffirms the need to intensify the efforts aimed at the conclusion of an international treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban especially as there is currently no effective multilateral agreement that would limit the proliferation of such tests.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the genuine expression of the desire to strive after nuclear disarmament. We believe that a treaty concluded in earnest to impose a comprehensive test ban can be achieved only through definitive bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as a matter of absolute priority, while giving due consideration to the verification measures.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States must agree on an immediate halt to all nuclear-weapon tests as evidence of their good faith and their commitment to reversing the course of the arms race. We believe

(Mr. Mansouri, League of Arab States)

that the halting of the arms race must be in conjunction with parallel arrangements aimed at confidence-building between the existing military alliances. It is also essential to make a commitment not to assist any of the States whose nuclear programmes have been identified by the international community as a threat to the security of other States. It is those very States which refuse to place their nuclear programmes and facilities under international inspection and safeguards.

The analytical review of the achievements in the field of disarmament since the first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 leads us to the regrettable conclusion that most of the provisions of the Final Document of that session remain practically unimplemented. It is to be noted that the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the super-Powers, continue to increase the build-up of their nuclear arsenals.

A new member has now joined the international nuclear club and has become its sixth member. This has been highlighted by the international news media in reporting the nuclear stockpiles of Israel. Dependable sources were quoted in this respect by the Sunday Times of London of 5 October. An Israeli eyewitness who previously worked as a technician in the Israeli nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert for at least 10 years told the London weekly that Israel has now between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons of various sizes. This information is not new. We have repeatedly pointed it out in international forums. The importance of the latest revelations stems from the fact that they came from an Israeli citizen.

We have repeatedly pointed out the gravity of the introduction by Israel of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. That was one of the reasons which impelled us, and continue to impel us, to call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and insist that Israel's nuclear facilities should be placed under international inspection and safeguards and that Israel should sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Mansouri, League of Arab
States)

The question of the Declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone dates back to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. This Committee has been discussing it at every session since then and continues to adopt resolutions that call for taking practical steps to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The resolutions also call upon the countries of the region which have not done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is clear that this call by the General Assembly is addressed to Israel, since all the Arab States are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Mansouri, League of Arab States)

It is also clear that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would require the elimination of the stockpiles of such weapons currently in the region in the interests of parity between all parties. This means that the establishment of the zone requires the elimination of Israel's nuclear blackmail. Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and its continued occupation of Arab territories are a continued blackmail and security threat to the Arab States, which hamper the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our area. It is extremely important that Israel's nuclear facilities be placed under the international safeguards and inspection system.

The Arab States have repeatedly expressed the desire to live in peace. To that end, they put forward their first peace initiative, adopted by an Arab summit conference in 1982. That initiative was based on international law. It set forth the broad guidelines for a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East question. It is the objective of the Arab States to establish peace in the region so that they may devote their efforts to development and progress. The major obstacle to the achievement of that objective is Israel's posture, its consistent rejection of the peace initiative and continued occupation of the Arab territories.

Israel goes even further in its attempts to block development plans in the Arab countries. A case in point is its attack on the peaceful nuclear facility in Iraq.

Israel has not been content with obstructing peace and introducing nuclear blackmail into the Middle East: it has extended these practices to the African continent, where it pursues its close nuclear co-operation with the South African régime. That poses a great threat to the African and in particular the front-line States. The Pretoria régime shares Israel's refusal to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Mansouri, League of Arab States)

In recognition of the relationship between disarmament and development, the United Nations had called for the convening of an international conference this year to investigate the dimensions of that relationship. Regrettably, the conference was not held this year. However, we must persist in moving together towards a common search for ways and means to release the resources now sunk in the manufacture of weapons and channel them towards development. In that regard, the League of Arab States looks forward to the scheduling of a new date, in 1987, for the convening of the international conference. It will certainly serve as an effective catalyst for the achievement of the desired goals after which we all aspire, so that our disposable financial and human resources may be channelled towards development and prosperity. The League of Arab States hopes that the conference will draw up a comprehensive, practicable plan for the reallocation of those resources, or part of them at least, to the development plans, construction projects and the well-being of the least developed countries, the feeding of hungry millions throughout the world, the building of schools and hospitals where they are so direly needed, and the building of a better world where people may live in dignity and security.

The World Disarmament Campaign is extremely important because of its positive effect on the mobilization of world public opinion in support of the popular world-wide movement for disarmament, and its increasing influence on the practical policies adopted by the international community. Hence, the Campaign must be supported and encouraged.

On the fortieth anniversary of the first use of the atomic bomb, an International Conference against the use of nuclear weapons was held in Hiroshima last year. I had the opportunity of participating in that conference and of

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visiting the city that was the first target for an atomic bomb. It is almost impossible for any human being to imagine the destruction that was visited upon that city - despite the fact that the bomb that was dropped on it did not have the power of modern weapons. The horrendous effects of the bomb are still there today. Many persons are still being treated in Government hospitals. Every year, the list of casualties of that first atomic strike grows. One can only tremble with fear when one compares the bomb dropped on Hiroshima with the nuclear weapons of today and contemplates the destruction that would result if the arms race did not cease and the stockpiles of weapons were not eliminated.

The increasingly serious threat of a war in which these dangerous nuclear weapons would be used makes it imperative that we waste no time in fruitless negotiations and initiatives. It is at the level of this Organization that expeditious international action must be taken to save the world from the armageddon of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to inform the Committee that the following names are inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon: the observer of the Holy See, and the delegations of Mali, Uganda, the Syrian Arab Republic, Fiji, Jordan, Liberia and Indonesia.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.