

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 July 1986, at 10 a.m.

President: U Tin Tun (Burma)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 371st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Ambassador Gerald Hinteregger, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. I wish him a useful visit to Geneva and I am sure that members will follow his statement with special interest.

In accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference continues its consideration of item 4 on its agenda, entitled "Chemical Weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed in the timetable of meetings to be held this week, the Conference will continue today, at an informal meeting, immediately after the plenary, its consideration of item 2 on the agenda, entitled, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Sweden and Canada. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 340th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Austria, His Excellency Ambassador Hinteregger.

Mr. HINTEREGGER (Austria): It is a distinct honour and pleasure for me to take the floor at the Conference on Disarmament and I should like first of all to express our great appreciation to see you, Ambassador U Tin Tun, as the President for the month of July of this most important Conference. Your Presidency is a very illustrative proof of the truly global character of this Conference. If we consider this Conference as one with an effective and reliable working structure, it is also due to the efficient action of the Secretary-General and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy-Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and the staff.

I welcome this opportunity to present to the Conference on Disarmament the views of Austria on disarmament and arms control and especially on specific disarmament issues which are discussed in this body. Although Austria is not a member of the Conference, it is a candidate for membership and follows its proceedings very closely and with great interest.

The huge arsenals of deadly weapons existing in the world of today are a threat to peace and stability. Although the bulk of them is in the possession of only a few countries, the concern for their reduction is shared by all, because they are a threat to everyone. As we are all affected by the actions and decisions taken by the Great Powers in the field of disarmament, it is right and necessary that the International Community has established this multilateral forum to work together for common solutions of common problems. As the only global negotiating forum on disarmament the Conference

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on Disarmament has its special place among several disarmament fora. The close association that exists between this Conference and the United Nations guarantees that the negotiations in this forum and the debates there have a mutually beneficial effect.

Global efforts are complemented by regional efforts in the disarmament field. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is about to finish its first phase. On the basis of its report the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe will have to decide on the further course to be taken by the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament. We hope that the decisions of the Vienna meeting will open the way to important contributions in the field of disarmament to be made by that conference. Both here in Geneva and in Stockholm, disarmament is not left to the Great Powers alone but is understood to be a common enterprise. In this enterprise the neutral and non-aligned States believe they have a special role to play.

Austria, being situated at the centre of Europe, the continent with the greatest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the greatest density of conventional weapons, is profoundly concerned about the arms race in its nuclear and conventional dimensions. With regard to nuclear weapons, it is not only the huge quantities of arsenals built up over the years that is a source of great concern, but equally the continuing modernization of those weapons. This modernization has a destabilizing effect on security, as new generations of smaller and more precise weapons may lower the nuclear threshold and constitute a source of new dangers. One of the most important tasks today is, therefore, to slow down and halt the qualitative arms race.

In this respect endeavours to halt nuclear testing play a crucial role. The Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty not only undertook to stop testing in specific environments but also undertook to seek to achieve a stop to any test explosion of nuclear weapons for all times. They expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that effect and reaffirmed that commitment in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The success achieved by that Treaty with regard to the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons must not, however, distract our attention from the failure to implement the intentions expressed in that Treaty regarding what is called vertical proliferation. The number of owners of nuclear weapons has not increased, but the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons has done so in a frightening way.

A decisive step towards halting vertical proliferation and curbing the qualitative arms race would be the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). An argument sometimes put forward against such a treaty is that nuclear tests are necessary in order to check the reliability of nuclear weapons. It is said that, without those checks by testing, the owners of nuclear weapons would have to compensate for the decrease in weapons reliability by increasing their arsenals correspondingly. This argument appears to be faulty, because both sides would be equally affected by those probability calculations and the existing equilibrium would, therefore, not be disturbed.

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The problem of adequate verification of a CTBT has played an important part in the deliberations on that question. We understand from our experts -- and the majority of the international community shares that view -- that verification, within reasonable margins, of compliance with a CTBT is technically within reach. Austria has actively participated in the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts for many years. This Group has achieved notable progress in establishing a mechanism for exchanging seismological data to help detect and identify underground tests.

Those technological considerations, important as they are, cannot, however, in themselves produce a solution to what is a political problem. They can only ensure that the conclusion of an agreement is not obstructed by a lack of mutual trust. What is needed is the political will to conclude an agreement. That political will must be generated by a security philosophy of which arms control is an essential part.

The efforts to reduce and finally to abolish nuclear weapons on earth would be futile, if they were not supplemented by appropriate disarmament agreements regarding the militarization of outer space. In this respect, Austria welcomed the understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union reached in January 1985 in Geneva to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance nuclear stability. The establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space by this Conference appears to us a necessary multilateral complement to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR on that subject. We should have hoped that the creation of that ad hoc committee would have led more rapidly to a substantial debate with a view to action in the spirit of the policy laid down in the January 1985 Geneva agreement.

Further delay would engender new dangers. Huge scientific endeavours and the allocation of corresponding resources to the development of new military technologies make it imperative that the search for understandings on the curtailing of the dangers inherent in those technologies be continued and intensified. If the results of research on new military space technologies are made use of outside an agreed framework, countermeasures will necessarily follow. Whether they consist in the increase of the offensive capacities to compensate for the impact of a space based system or whether they are reciprocal measures, the result would be a military equilibrium on a more expensive and less stable level.

Such a waste of resources must be avoided and those members of the international community that are rich enough to afford such weaponry must do everything to prevent humanity from being burdened with such irrational costs. Any other course of action could not be understood by the great number of people in the world who live in hardship and misery and cannot satisfy even the basic needs of a life in human dignity.

In this disarmament forum of the international community Austria, therefore, urges those concerned to pursue substantial and constructive negotiations so that the world is spared another arms race in a new dimension.

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There is another type of weapons on which I wish to speak, the terror of which is not only a potential danger but an actual horror: I am speaking of chemical weapons. The activities of the Conference on Disarmament in this field have, therefore, acquired an aspect of acute urgency. Victims of such weapons used in an ongoing war have been treated in Austrian hospitals. That humanitarian aid has created an awareness of the danger of chemical weapons in the Austrian public. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, once called chemical weapons the nuclear bomb of the smaller countries, and this warning of the extreme danger of the proliferation of those weapons should find a swift response.

Austria was among the first Parties that signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and of Bacteriological Warfare. Furthermore, Austria renounced the possession of chemical and other special weapons in the State Treaty of 1955. It is also a Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, the second Review Conference of which will take place in September this year here in Geneva.

The abolition of chemical weapons seems to be the field where major progress may be possible in the near future. We noted with appreciation that during the last sessions of the Conference on Disarmament the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons moved forward in such important areas as the definition of chemical substances, permitted activities, destruction of existing stockpiles, and key precursors.

Agreed verification procedures will, of course, constitute an essential element of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The issue is complex and it is obvious that no 100 per cent effective procedure can be found. There is, however, no reason why the Conference should not be able to establish adequate verification provisions that are generally acceptable.

Austrian experts have taken part in the technical discussions initiated by this Conference and would be available for participation in a safeguard system on request.

As in all negotiations, there will come a moment in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention when the search for further perfection may have to be halted in favour of a viable compromise between what is desirable and what is practicable. The prospect of new types of chemical weapons is on the horizon. Experience tells that new types of weapons are more difficult to prohibit once they have been introduced.

As the question of disarmament in all its aspects is a matter of your deliberations, it seems appropriate that I comment briefly on some additional aspects of that wide subject.

Since 1972 talks between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on conventional force reductions are taking place in Vienna. As they are negotiations between two alliances, Austria as a permanently neutral country is not participating in them. We act as a host country that not only tries to be a good host but is also aware that its own geographical position is in

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the very centre of the two alliances whose members' territories circle the globe. With respect to results so far achieved in those talks one must, I am afraid, be ready to admit that there are none. But the amount of expertise created over those 14 years should not be allowed to be buried.

There is now a greater awareness of the interdependence of disarmament in the nuclear field and in the conventional area, and important disarmament proposals with a view to progress in both areas have been put forward in the course of the present year. The fact that, as of coming November, Vienna will be the host of both the disarmament talks of the two alliances and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has a membership including the European neutral and non-aligned States, should allow a cross-over of ideas and promote imaginative concepts.

The coming months will offer opportunities on many levels to probe such ideas and to examine the best ways to pursue them. It is obvious that the spirit of Helsinki creates the right intellectual and moral atmosphere in which the question of how to arrest the arms race can be answered. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, in its first phase, is dealing with confidence building measures, whereas the Vienna talks on conventional-force reductions concern disarmament itself. In a second phase the fact will have to be taken into account that confidence is a prerequisite for disarmament but that disarmament itself is a source of confidence. Confidence building and disarmament are two processes that must be followed in parallel. If we accepted the logical fallacy that the lack of confidence prevents disarmament and the lack of disarmament prevents confidence, we would have created a vicious circle, a kind of "Catch 22" on a global scale.

Confidence and disarmament would be greatly promoted by an agreement between the two super-Powers on the elimination and destruction of intermediate-range nuclear arms in Europe. The proposals of the two sides are sufficiently close to each other to permit the conclusion that, had they been made at a time before the arms spiral in this field had been set in motion, Europe would not be faced today with this additional nuclear threat. If this assessment is correct, we are allowed to face the future with greater optimism than in the recent past. Disarmament needs technical expertise but it also needs creative imagination, and the spirit of creativity prevails in the present disarmament dialectics.

There is general awareness that the continued accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, does not provide additional security. Austria has always held that the key to real security is not to be found in military competition but in co-operation. Common security must be based on the recognition that nuclear weapons have not only changed the scale and horror of warfare but radically altered the concept of war as a means of policy. In the nuclear age war can no longer be a rational instrument of policy, since any outbreak of violence in the international community includes the risk of escalation to nuclear war in which there would be no winners but only losers. National security has to be defined as the national aspect of common security in the international community. That new security concept will gradually allow the reduction and abolishment of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of peace at much lower levels of conventional arms. National

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resources could be reallocated to peaceful purposes and especially to improving the quality of life of that large part of mankind that must feel disinherited when it compares the wealth of the world with the irrational use to which so large a proportion of it is put.

May I express the confidence that the Conference on Disarmament will play a growing part in promoting disarmament and arms control and thereby help building an international community based on security and justice.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, in my first statement this month it is a privilege for me to welcome you in the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for July. As a representative of a country the history and philosophy of which we admire, you will undoubtedly give us guidance which is so necessary now, before we engage in a final, closing month of this year's session. We definitely need further impetus, especially after our summer session was launched with appropriate dynamism under the Presidency of Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria. Let me use this opportunity for thanking him again for the important contribution he offered us in June. Allow me also to welcome most heartily in our midst Ambassador Hinteregger, Secretary-General of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His statement, which we are going to study in depth, proved that our friendly, neighbouring country, Austria, on many issues of disarmament shares the views of the great majority of this Conference, including our own.

Today I am going to address the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I will explain why my country considers it a question of vital interest that outer space remains free of an arms race and its peaceful uses remain open to all countries, irrespective of their economic or military capability.

Let me stress at the outset that for Czechoslovakia this is a very practical problem, having direct repercussions on our security and national economy. As a small country with relatively limited resources we could not afford our own, independent programme of exploration of outer space. We therefore welcomed the opportunity to join the international Intercosmos programme, uniting the efforts of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Hungary, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Romania at the end of the 1960s. It is a mutually advantageous co-operation. The member countries provide their own financial and material means for the preparation of scientific experiments, some special systems for satellites and probes and processing of data obtained. The USSR supplies, free of charge, carrier rockets and satellites, and it also ensures launching and monitoring of space instruments, which represents a substantial part of the total costs.

In practically all flights by Intercosmos various Czechoslovak instruments have been used, such as an X-ray photometer for studies of the sun and a photometer designed to search for dust layers in the Earth's atmosphere, instruments for measuring space radiation, a telemetric transmitter for the transmission of low-frequency signal parameters and others. We have gained

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much through the peaceful activities of Intercosmos in the areas of space physics, space biology and medicine, space meteorology, space communications and research of the Earth's surface from space. Czechoslovak scientists have obtained interesting results in research on the high-altitude atmosphere and magnetosphere, in solar and non-solar X-ray astronomy, in the studies of hard components of the interplanetary matter of the moon and planets as well as in some other fields. And I certainly cannot avoid mentioning that, thanks to close co-operation with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia became, in 1978, the third country whose citizens entered outer space.

Our participation in the peaceful exploration of outer space requires substantial investments. It is thus only natural that we are deeply interested in outer space remaining free from military confrontation. Otherwise, all investment in its exploration would become rather a risky venture. But this economic aspect is not the only, and even not the most important, reason why we look with disquiet at the recent developments on the Earth which might soon result in the permanent introduction of weapons into outer space. What is at stake is security, not that of individual countries, but of the whole international community. The creation and deployment of space strike weapons, and the involvement of further States in the notorious "Star wars" programme, would represent a direct threat to the territory of countries around the globe and, in the final analysis, also to these weapons' creators. It can result only in general destabilization, insecurity and incalculability of risks.

In his letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 3 July, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chmoupek, stressed that Czechoslovakia considers the main direction of the efforts of States against the militarization of outer space to be the achievement of a strict prohibition on the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons under appropriate verification, including access to the relevant laboratories. Minister Chmoupek emphasized that in the nuclear and space age security for all can only be provided through nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The tendency to introduce weapons into outer space, which is becoming more and more obvious, can and must be stopped. An important, partial step toward this end, would be the elaboration of an agreement on the immunity of space objects and on the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of new, and the elimination of existing, anti-satellite systems.

The programme usually described in the United States as the "Strategic Defence Initiative" is far from being truly defensive. My delegation and many other delegations have on numerous occasions pointed out the offensive, aggressive nature of the SDI. Today I will limit my remarks to analysing the effect it will have on the existing disarmament treaties. Here, the negative impact of the SDI will be imminent. Immediately upon its entering the stage of development and testing, for instance of X-ray lasers -- and it is now on the verge of doing so -- the United States programme will violate two treaties. One of them is the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting any nuclear explosions "in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space". It would also violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits placing in orbit around the Earth "any objects of weapons of mass destruction", installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing them

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in outer space "in any other manner". Let me note in passing that if we heard, in the past, statements about the strictly non-nuclear nature of the SDI components, such utterings later became only sporadic and now we simply do not hear them any more.

A widely discussed question is whether the SDI would be a violation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. We uphold that it would violate both the spirit and the letter of the ABM Treaty. As to the first aspect further elaboration is hardly needed. The ABM Treaty was clearly based on the recognition of the fact that efforts to build an anti-missile defence would automatically lead to an increase in offensive capabilities, and thus neither reliable defence nor restraint in any further arms build-up or arms limitations could be achieved. The SDI again departs from this elementary reality, which today, 14 years after the conclusion of the ABM Treaty, remains fully valid. But the SDI goes also clearly against the letter of the 1972 Treaty. While its Article IV permits some limited development and testing of fixed, land-based ABMs, Article V expressly forbids development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are "sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based". This provision, fixed, land-based way of deployment, applies also to ABM systems based on "other physical principles", covered by the frequently mentioned Agreed Interpretation D of the ABM Treaty.

With respect to this Treaty it is amazing to occasionally listen to arguments that the Soviet Union continues to keep an ABM system around Moscow while the United States "abandoned" their system in North Dakota. These arguments sometimes deliberately imply that by doing so the USSR is somehow taking the lead in ABM technology to which the United States must respond. But one does not have to be a specialist to understand that the Soviet ABM system around Moscow is in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. On the other hand, the United States system in Grand Forks, which is described as conserved, can relatively quickly and easily be brought back to full functioning capability. As far as we know, not a single installation there was dismantled. Its "PAR" radar is operating, and "MSR" may also be quickly reactivated. Nor does the re-introduction of missiles into the silos represent a complicated technical operation. Let it also be noted that the USSR assumed in 1982 the unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, while the United States has no similar commitment.

There is one more detrimental consequence that the SDI, if it enters the stage of development and testing, will have on disarmament treaties. All existing and possible future treaties on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons will be permanently hampered and directly or indirectly undercut by any SDI-related activities. We have been informed recently that one of the Parties to the SALT II Treaty is considering withdrawing from it and exceeding the limits it imposes. We regard this as a highly negative, unprecedented action. But even if both participants to the SALT Treaties were willing to abide by their provisions, we would be very much afraid for the destiny of those two Treaties, as well as for the prospects for future strategic arms limitations, once the SDI is implemented. Sooner or later the offensive strategic arms race would be fully reignited and the arms limitation measures achieved so far would become meaningless. In view of all this we maintain that if the SDI is to be practically realized it will become a turning point

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leading to the destruction of all the essential results of arms limitation achieved in the 1960s and 1970s, launching a qualitatively new chapter in the offensive nuclear arms race and, finally, fully introducing the arms race into outer space, turning it, thus, into a source of vital danger to all States. It would be a difficult question then, to ask "What will come next?".

It seems that all delegations in the Conference agree that the arms race in outer space should be prevented. We firmly believe that it is still not too late and that if we all realize the danger we are confronted with it would be possible to act promptly. With respect to outer space we have a very good precedent. After the first man-made satellite entered outer space in 1957 it was suddenly fully realized that humanity had started its exploration without any laws and rules to regulate it. And it is almost unbelievable how fast space law developed. What took centuries in other fields of international law was accomplished in space law within years. As early as December 1958 an ad hoc committee on outer space was established by the United Nations General Assembly, which later became the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Between 1961 and 1963 the ethical principles of space activities were developed into a Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. The "golden age" of United Nations work on outer space matters reached its peak in 1967 when the Outer Space Treaty was agreed, prohibiting, inter alia, the placing in orbit around the Earth of nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, or installing such weapons on celestial bodies. The following year, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space was adopted, as was the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects in 1972. And let me finally mention the 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the 1979 Moon Treaty. All these international treaties, and the especially brief period during which they were achieved, clearly confirm that we can act expeditiously when it is objectively necessary. And such an objective necessity today, as far as outer space is concerned, is to prevent it from being militarized. For the time being, there are no weapons installed in outer space. If we fail, in the very near future, to formally agree not to introduce weapons in outer space, we shall ignore the objective need of our time, and we may lose an opportunity which will not be repeated.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, discharging actively its mandate and we consider that it is doing so very well. The ongoing exchange of views clearly indicates that important things still need to be done, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to ensure that outer space remains free from an arms race. But for this to be achieved multilaterally here in Geneva the Ad Hoc Committee should be given an appropriate, clear-cut mandate. My delegation has already expressed its views on what it considers an appropriate mandate for the Outer Space Committee. I will not deal with it in detail now and I will, perhaps, defer my comments in this respect for next February. Rather, I would welcome it if the Committee were to undertake useful exchange of views on some specific problems, such as the definition of space strike weapons. Any results achieved in this regard will be useful when we, hopefully, move towards more concrete work on measures needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

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Before I conclude my statement today I would like to touch upon one aspect we consider urgent. I mean the growing need for close international co-operation in all fields of outer space activities. Next year we will celebrate the 30th anniversary of humanity's entry into outer space. During that relatively short period, 2,300 launches were undertaken, 2 per cent of them piloted. By December 1985 there were 2,766 objects in outer space. On the geostationary orbit alone there are about 500 objects. In the near future we shall be confronted with the problem of outer space around Earth being rather crowded. It is quite clear that the SDI could place in orbit a huge number of additional objects, bringing no use but danger, and substantially complicating international co-operation for peaceful uses of that environment.

The placement of objects in outer space, the assigning of an orbit to them and the regulation of their movement will of necessity become more and more the subject of international co-operation. Broad international co-operation will also ensure that all States, whether large or small, can receive the benefits of the peaceful exploration of outer space in practically all fields of science and economy. This co-operation will be simply inevitable, since, as the founder of astronautics, Tsiolkovsky, foresaw, society will be incorporating outer space into the sphere of its creative activity to an ever-increasing degree. First, this activity will be limited to our solar system, but later it can expand into other planetary systems, into other, still more distant worlds.

In view of all these realities, with military and peaceful aspects mutually interconnected, we associate ourselves with the plan for the creation of a solid material, political and organizational foundation of "star peace" in the spirit of the three-stage programme of joint steps proposed by the Soviet Union on 12 June 1986. We consider it a realistic plan, starting with the thorough study of the needs of humanity concerning the uses of space technology, with agreeing on the main directions of the qualitatively new co-operation and common projects for the peaceful uses of outer space, proceeding gradually to the establishment of the material basis for such co-operation through the development and build-up of the relevant space technology and, finally, resulting, by the end of this century, in the carrying out of specific programmes with the most effective application of space technology. We are attracted by the proposal to establish, by 1990, the World Space Organization, which could co-ordinate peaceful uses of outer space and verify compliance with agreements aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It would be possible to proceed to such verification without undue delay since, in the first stage, the WSO could use technical means offered by countries active in space exploration.

As I noted in the beginning of this statement, Czechoslovakia has broad experience in international co-operation for the peaceful uses of outer space. Such co-operation, expanded to all countries, is the most reasonable course to follow. It would be unwise to split and unnecessarily repeat efforts of States in space exploration. In any event we strongly prefer that States unite their efforts for generally advantageous peaceful activities in outer space instead of throwing huge resources into, and endangering their security with the senseless concepts of "star wars".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): I would like to begin by welcoming you to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. It is gratifying to see a representative from a fellow Asian country guiding the deliberations of this sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament. Needless to say, my delegation will offer maximum co-operation to your able guidance. I would also like to take a moment to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, as the outgoing President. I would like to say that it was indeed a pleasure to have worked with him while I was the co-ordinator for the Western group during the month of June. I would like to take this opportunity to formally express my delegation's appreciation to the Netherlands delegation for the organization of a workshop on chemical weapons, which gave very useful suggestions regarding possible solutions to some of our outstanding problems.

I extend a welcome to Ambassador Hinteregger, Secretary-General of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I am sure that there is no need for me to repeat here the importance of the Chemical Weapons negotiations for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and also in terms of the current East-West disarmament dialogue. Along with the nuclear and space bilateral talks that are going on in Geneva, there is little doubt that chemical weapons can also be a very important and possibly very useful area for bilateral considerations. In addition to the work conducted in the Conference's Ad hoc Committee under the able guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Ian Cromartie, we notice a number of signs that are rather encouraging in the context of arriving at possible compromises within the broader framework of more comprehensive arms control arrangements.

At the same time, if we look at the differences in views and discrepancies in positions regarding such important items as (a) the listing of chemicals and their respective control régimes, (b) the problem of non-production and the range of permitted activities, (c) provisions for initial declarations and their verification, and (d) the composition and functioning of the Executive Council, we realize that we still have a long way to travel before complete and satisfactory agreement may be worked out. There is no need of additional admonitions that we should not take the subject of the chemical weapons convention lightly. In order to realize the amount of remaining problems, one need only count the number of square brackets in texts such as CD/636, Appendix I, or other comparable documents. Undoubtedly, with the involvement of large-scale chemical industries and with a large number of chemicals which may be dually useful either in medicine or in industry, this is one of the areas of arms control and disarmament that represents and reflects the complexity of our twentieth century life.

However, I would like to emphasize that we are far from being confronted with an impossible task. As we can see from reading the various negotiating histories of arms control arrangements during the past 20 years or so, it has always been the case that while problems seemed unsurmountable, ways have been found to arrive at viable agreements somehow advancing the cause of

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international arms control and disarmament. In the case of chemical weapons, which do not lag behind other disarmament subjects in the extent of complexity in handling, we nevertheless should be able to see our way through, so that the seeming confusion may be dispelled and the clear and logical structure of our convention emerge from the process of our negotiations.

It is in such a spirit that the delegation of Japan is today tabling Working Paper CD/713. This paper contains proposals and analysis which are primarily scientific, which I have had opportunities to discuss in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Also, back on 3 April, I had an opportunity to recall general principles which should run through the process of considerations of our chemical weapons agreement. Then, I called it a matter of quantitative consistency, so that various arrangements under the convention should be based on an accepted mathematical principle and thus be logically consistent. What this Working Paper proposes is the open recognition of such a need, and that the mathematical accountancy aspect of chemical weapons-convention verification be clearly established. The rest is, I hope, self-explanatory.

But in case it is not, I would like to give a short preview. We all know that in taking opinion polls on a national scale, one can somehow make telephone calls to several hundred persons and derive from such an exercise the entirety of the national trend with something like 90 per cent confidence. This is because the samples are carefully chosen on a "random and stratified basis" so that mathematical theory will ensure that there can be high confidence estimates on a population 100,000 times larger than the sample. Random sampling is a technique used in the quality control of industrial products, thus avoiding the need for testing and checking all the products, day in and day out. Random and systematic components together make up what is called statistical sampling. What is being discussed in our working paper is that by making use of the principles and theories of statistical sampling, we may establish a credible verification system regarding chemical weapon depots, destruction facilities and production facilities. In some cases, continued on-site inspection may be required, but then one may also employ tamper-proof remote sensing devices.

One additional comment I would like to make on this occasion is that we need not elaborate all the details of the chemical weapons convention at the Ad Hoc Committee meetings. It is the view of my delegation that the Committee may best serve its purposes by identifying governing principles for the different portions of the chemical weapons convention. Thus, we do not think that the Conference or its subsidiary body should be too much concerned with details regarding random sample verification and its statistics or the fine details concerning rights and obligations of international inspectors. We believe that once the governing principles have been worked out, it is better and more effective that the filling out of details be left to groups of competent experts.

This is all I wanted to say today in introducing our Working Paper CD/713. I hope tht I have made our intention clear. I also hope that if the seemingly gathering momentum toward an early completion of a chemical weapons agreement turns out to be real, our contribution may be properly

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assessed so that we can continue to follow up this Working Paper with further elucidation of what we consider to be the logically consistent structure of the chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): May I first of all welcome you most warmly as President of the Conference for the month of July. You have already demonstrated the highest quality of diplomatic skill, a quality the Conference will have to draw upon for the remainder of this month. The Presidency of Burma carries a special significance for my delegation, as Burma and Sweden belonged to the original group of 8 delegations making up the group of non-aligned and neutral States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a group that is now made up of 21 delegations.

Allow me also to express, through you, Mr. President, the appreciation of my delegation to the President for the month of June, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, for the skill and energy displayed by him. We have, today, enjoyed the presence in the Conference of Ambassador Gerald Hinteregger, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria. For Sweden, as a neutral country it is certainly a pleasure to welcome a senior representative of likewise neutral Austria. In addition, my delegation would like to express its gratitude to Ambassador Hinteregger for his important statement.

Several years have now gone by since the Conference was in a position to address in substance the question of a nuclear-test ban. Although it was not possible in 1982 and 1983 to make much headway, some very useful proposals in the form of Working Papers and other documents were introduced to the Ad hoc Working Group. Due to its limited mandate the Group could not carry out a full examination of all material of relevance to a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Questions of verification, however, were dealt with at some length and some limited progress was achieved.

In the field of verification, important developments have taken place since then. In 1984 the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts carried out a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data providing a vast amount of experience, previously unavailable. The test also showed that most of the procedures developed by the Group with regard to Level I data worked satisfactorily, but that further developments were necessary in some areas.

From the political point of view there has been rather rapid development since 1984. New proposals and positions have changed the international scene. A fresh awareness of the importance and complexity of the political problems related to the test-ban issue has emerged. The recognition, and I say recognition may be by all, that a test ban would have a fundamental impact on the nuclear arms race remains unchanged. Contested are, however, what conclusions should be drawn from this insight and which practical steps should be taken.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

For Sweden the answer to this problem is clear and straightforward. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be a matter of highest urgency.

In the absence of consensus on that proposition, it is important to find ways to promote the goal of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Sweden considers that this could best be done by immediately establishing an Ad hoc Committee on the subject of a nuclear-test ban within the Conference. This should be done already during this session and the work could be carried over next year so that the Ad hoc Committee could resume its work without delay early in February. We are aware that other possibilities are contemplated. The trilateral forum has been tried before and according to reports in news media, bilateral talks between the two major nuclear-weapon States are now under way on the question of verification and compliance.

While Sweden supports all measures that could promote the goal of a test ban and therefore welcomes such bilateral talks, it is the firm opinion of the Swedish Government that multilateral talks within the Conference on Disarmament would more effectively support the efforts to develop a sound basis for an agreement acceptable to all States and to create a reliable and water-tight verification and control system based on world-wide co-operation.

As a CTBT would be of major importance to halt the qualitative arms race, it concerns all of mankind, not only the nuclear-weapon States. All five nuclear-weapon States are members of the Conference. It is already therefore logical that the question of a test ban is substantively addressed in this forum. Furthermore, a technological and industrial capacity to produce and design nuclear devices is not limited to the nuclear-weapon States. A growing number of States have this capacity. For a test ban to be effective it must be global and only a multilateral forum can produce a globally acceptable treaty.

As has been recognized by all participant States, a CTB must be verified. The main means of verifying compliance with a nuclear-test ban is through a world-wide network of seismological stations, with sufficient sensitivity and with a capacity to discriminate with a high level of confidence between events of natural origin and those that are man-made. This again calls for international co-operation far beyond what could be envisaged if only the nuclear-weapon States were concerned.

The Swedish delegation today introduces a Working Paper on Nuclear-Test-Ban Verification (CD/712). This paper contains an analysis of the technical aspects of nuclear testing and seismological verification. A number of working papers has been presented to the Conference during the last year, elaborating upon the detection capability of seismic methods with regard to underground explosions, for example the United Kingdom's Working Paper CD/610, Japan's Working Paper CD/626 and the Federal Republic of Germany's Working Paper CD/624. These working papers discuss evasion scenarios and verification problems related to small nuclear explosions. In the Swedish paper the problems raised are analysed. The overall conclusion is rather optimistic. It should be possible to create a verification and compliance system that would provide enough confidence that the parties to a nuclear-test ban observe their obligations with regard to underground testing. But it is

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

also clear that a considerable amount of work on a system for verification of a test ban remains to be done. And that system should be, as stressed before, an international one. In this light, it should be a matter of highest priority to immediately start substantive work on creating such a system, all the more so as this task even when addressed in good faith and with the best of intentions, might require a couple of years to be successfully resolved.

The new Working Paper by Sweden contains a description of some basic characteristics of nuclear weapons in order to clarify the validity of yield thresholds for halting development of nuclear weapons. It is concluded that a ban on tests above a certain threshold does not prevent the development of warheads with yields far above that threshold. However, it is also argued that tests with yields significantly lower than one kiloton would be of limited interest from the point of view of the general weapons development.

Furthermore, the Working Paper contains an assessment of the possibilities to discriminate between seismic signals generated by earthquakes and by underground explosions.

One conclusion is that it would be possible quickly to identify 90-95 per cent of all observed earthquakes by estimating their depths and their location and that, for the remaining seismic events, other discrimination techniques could be used. Such techniques are described in the paper. On this basis it is concluded that the probability is extremely low that a detected seismic event would remain unidentified after an analysis using all techniques. In fact, the seismological means of disclosing CTB violations are potentially so effective that only the remaining marginal uncertainty may be subject to further investigation by other means, such as on-site inspection.

Several evasion scenarios are considered, including all those described in some of the working papers mentioned earlier, based on efforts of either reducing seismic signals from nuclear explosions below the detection threshold or manipulating signals in such a way that explosions would be misidentified as earthquakes. Technical requirements for detection and identification of nuclear explosions hidden by means of decoupling, multiple explosions or so-called "hide-in-earthquakes" are elaborated upon.

An important part of the Working Paper is devoted to network detection capabilities with regard to both global network and regional distances. The Working Paper discusses the need to design a prototype detection station and recommends that such a "CD monitoring station" should be developed and tested. An important concluding statement is that it could be possible to monitor nuclear-test explosions to any requested level. The verification limit depends primarily on the number of seismic stations used in the verification systems, their location and the technical performance of the stations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, having already had the occasion to speak in plenary under your wise stewardship, I will not reiterate what I said before except to suggest that we are increasingly well-served by you and we express our appreciation.

I would like first to take this opportunity to welcome the recent news that United States and Soviet officials are to meet soon in Geneva to discuss questions relating to observance of the SALT II Treaty and, as well, the announcement of the agreement between the two major nuclear Powers to open expert-level bilateral talks on nuclear testing issues. When I addressed this Conference on 3 July, I stated that the subject of nuclear weapons was the most vital one on our agenda and that the ABM and SALT agreements remain fundamental building-blocks for shaping a more secure future and that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban is a fundamental Canadian arms-control objective. The fact that the United States of America and the Soviet Union have now agreed to meet to discuss important aspects of these vital issues is most encouraging and we can but hope that these increased bilateral contacts will enhance mutual understanding and confidence, thus paving the way for the conclusion of meaningful arms control and disarmament agreements both bilateral and multilateral. Although one should never be facetious when addressing such serious subjects, I am tempted to say that I am particularly encouraged that the two super-Powers have moved so swiftly after my plea, whether or not in response to it. May I therefore take the opportunity of reiterating our hope that the bilateral talks on aspects of outer space will lead to success and to early evidence of success and that this forum can make a useful contribution to that process, and vice versa.

Indeed, our main purpose in asking for the floor this morning is to make a related announcement foreshadowed in my statement of 3 July in which I informed the Conference of my delegation's intention to submit a working paper dealing with selected aspects of legal terminology relevant to arms control and outer space.

Last year, my delegation tabled a working paper, CD/618, entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space". In general, it comprised a broad discussion of the significance, scope and application of existing relevant treaties. Supplementary to that survey, and in accordance with our conclusion that certain key definitions need consideration and clarification, I am now pleased to table another Canadian working paper, which will bear the number CD/716, entitled "Terminology Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space". An advance copy in English only will be distributed this morning to all delegations.

As you know, several delegations to the Conference on Disarmament have drawn attention during our current session, both in their plenary statements and in meetings of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, to the need for greater terminological precision, and a common understanding of certain basic definitions relating to outer space. There is evident concern that imprecision or perceived imprecision in defining treaty obligations has led in some instances to controversy regarding compliance with those obligations. While it has been argued on occasion that "constructive" ambiguity may facilitate negotiations and eventual agreement, such an approach, in our view, should be used with the greatest caution. The need for

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flexibility should not be transposed into an acceptance of ambiguity. It is essential to come to a shared understanding of the nature of obligations -- a commonality of commitment -- in order to ensure that parties apply the same standards when judging the compliance behaviour of others.

The Canadian working paper, which has been submitted to the Secretariat for translation and reproduction and which will soon be distributed officially to all delegations, summarizes a range of views concerning some key terms. As I indicated on 3 July, it is our hope that the working paper will serve further to elucidate the legality or otherwise of current and contemplated activities in outer space in light of existing treaties and legal precepts. More specifically, CD/716 outlines the variety of interpretations that exists among international legal experts, which is to varying degrees reflected in views of governments, and draws the following conclusions based on the analysis contained in the working paper:

Having in mind conflicting interpretations of the concept of "peaceful purposes", it is difficult to arrive at an unqualified and clear-cut definition of "peaceful purposes". It is our view that a restrictive interpretation is the most appropriate in view of the negotiating history of the Outer Space Treaty, its actual wording and State practice since its coming into force.

Terms such as "weaponization" and "militarization", which have been widely used, are even more ambiguous. These terms are not used in space treaties and do not even appear to have any generally accepted meaning in political discussions.

States have agreed to or acquiesced to a considerable extent in the military use of outer space. Many of the satellites now in orbit must be considered to be military. The ABM Treaty provides for verification by "national technical means" including photoreconnaissance satellites, which are clearly military. However, such stabilizing military uses of space are highly desirable and should continue without interference. Indeed, they should be supported by the international community and by international law.

Apart from weapons of mass destruction, the placement of weapons in earth orbit has, in the past, not been addressed in any extensive fashion, partly because, until recently, this was not seen as a technically feasible or militarily useful possibility.

The paper postulates that, in the absence of more developed treaty law in outer space, general international law would apply. This has been explicitly done to some extent already, according to the terms of various outer space conventions.

From the point of view of general international law, outer space may be analogous to other environments beyond national jurisdiction, notably the high seas. I hope I will be forgiven for saying that the Law of the Sea Convention stipulates in article 88 that "the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes". This is a more clear-cut expression of the concept than appears in the Outer Space Treaty. Article 88 has never been interpreted as preventing, for example, the passage of warships or prohibiting maritime military

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

activities such as naval exercises or even weapons tests. Nor has it been seen to ban the stationing of any type of weapons on the high seas. "Peaceful purposes", as this phrase applies to outer space, is open to military activity. If the international community decides on restrictions on certain types of activity which do not otherwise contravene international law, it must do so by specific agreement, as indeed it did to some extent in the Outer Space Treaty. Again an analogy with the law of the sea is relevant. The 1971 Seabed Treaty, as its title states, prohibits "the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor". This treaty embodies the prohibition of a particular use of a particular weapon which would otherwise not have been contrary to international law, except with respect to the continental shelves of other States. The same considerations apply in outer space. In the absence of a specific existing prohibition (such as, for example, the one against nuclear weapons) and on the assumption that the activity in question is not contrary to an existing principle of international law (such as non-use of force) the placement of weapons in orbit in space is not per se unlawful, at this stage of development of the law of outer space.

It is not suggested, and I would like to emphasize this, it is not suggested by the Canadian delegation that placing or using weapons in space (or the increased "militarization" or "weaponization" of space) would be a desirable development. However, the elementary level to which space law has so far progressed does not of itself seem an adequate basis on which to prevent such a trend. To prevent the risks to security on Earth which may be posed by the threat of weapons placed in space or for use in space will require that States develop the law well beyond this elementary stage. And may I express my personal hope that this forum will make a major contribution to just that process.

As in the case of all Canadian working papers, CD/716, on terminology relevant to arms control and outer space, is being submitted for the sole purpose of accelerating progress in our deliberations on item 5 of our agenda. Whether delegations all agree with our conclusions or not, in our view, attempts to clarify the meaning of outer space related concepts could constitute a useful step and we therefore hope that our working paper will enable the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space to advance its work pursuant to its mandate and agreed work programme.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

The Secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. It has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members that the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which were scheduled for tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m. in Conference Room I, will be held as announced in the timetable for this week. The group of delegations which had to be consulted by its co-ordinator at the time of the adoption of the timetable agrees with those consultations. Accordingly, we shall hold the meeting in Conference Room I tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m.

As I announced at the opening of the plenary meeting, I intend to convene, immediately after we adjourn, an informal meeting of the Conference to continue its discussion of the substance of item 2 on the agenda, entitled "Cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament". The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 22 July at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.