

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.381
21 August 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 26 August 1986, at 10.00 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 381st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced previously, I intend to put before the Conference today document CD/721, which contains the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on its twenty-second session. You will recall that I noted at previous meetings that this document contains a number of recommendations in the first sentence of paragraph 12, as well as in paragraphs 14 and 15. Once the list of speakers is exhausted I shall invite the Conference to adopt these recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group.

I wish also to recall that the Conference will hold today an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting to continue our consideration of the draft annual report to the General Assembly. We had originally expected to deal today with agenda item 2, but we have not been able to keep to the agreed timetable and we should today take up first the substantive paragraphs under agenda items 3 and 6. I hope that we shall make up for the delay and that we will be able to deal with both agenda items and then move to agenda item 2. Otherwise, I should inform you that I do not see how we can conclude the annual session in the time left to us.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan, Algeria, Poland, China, Australia, France and Canada. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, it is a pleasure to see you, the experienced and skilful representative of Canada, in the Presidency of the Conference for the concluding month of its session. Under your efficient guidance we shall undoubtedly be able to appropriately evaluate what happened in the Conference during the last year and conclude the elaboration of our report to the General Assembly. My thanks go also to your predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, for his efficient Presidency in July.

We note with satisfaction that negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons have entered an intensive stage. The Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups were working very actively throughout this session, and some important aspects of the chemical-weapon ban were also addressed at the bilateral United States-Soviet consultations. It is thus only natural that a certain optimism is emerging. Our delegation also welcomes the fact that the chemical-weapons ban seems closer now than it did a year or two ago. We recognize the positive impact which the new Soviet proposals exerted on the ongoing process of negotiations. A flexible approach, demonstrated once again by the Soviet proposals of 22 April, is the only attitude which can lead to final success. It is desirable that, as we try to finalize the convention, flexibility should mark the approach of all delegations.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

But there are unfortunately, not only positive developments concerning chemical weapons. While the Conference is doing its best to outlaw them, the NATO alliance is preoccupied with search for the rationale for the production of binary weapons and their eventual introduction in Europe. We deplore the Brussels decision of 22 May and we fail to understand how it fits in with widely proclaimed readiness to achieve a CW ban. This inconsistency makes us wonder what is wrong with the present process aimed at chemical disarmament if, in spite of its relatively advanced stage, it has not eliminated the drive towards a further chemical-arms build-up. Does this inconsistency result simply from the approach of individual military planners, or is it an indication of a wider, general policy line?

We can hardly find an exhaustive answer to that question. But some conclusions might offer themselves if one looks back at the development of CW and at the inner logic of the chemical-arms race. Within the span of about half a century several generations of CW were developed and it was mainly their toxicity which constantly increased. As a result, in terms of toxicity and area coverage, modern CW agents surpass the agents used in World War I by several orders of magnitude. A simple comparison of lethal effects of various CW agents illustrates this progression very clearly. If, in the case of phosgene, used in 1915, this represented 3,200 mg per cubic metre of air within a minute, for yperite (1917) it was only about half of that amount. For sarin, produced in 1939, the lethal effect threshold went down sharply to 100 mg/m³ of air, for nerve agent VX (1960/1) to 38 mg/m³ of air and the chemical designed as EA 5774 (1979) to just about 10 mg/m³ of air. Thus, today's CW agents are substantially, "qualitatively", different from the old ones. It might be further demonstrated by the simple fact that for percutaneous administration - which represents an important method of military use - about 200 drops of yperite are needed to constitute a lethal dose, while the same effect can be achieved by a simple drop of VX compound.

But even this extreme toxicity does not, unfortunately, represent a limit which could not be further lowered. Toxic compounds, which the United States is considering for military use and which are currently still in the development stage, are estimated to produce lethal effects even at a concentration of 0.1 to 0.001 mg per cubic metre of air. It might be safely presumed that these "prospects" are tempting to military planners and represent an important reason why they are not ready to abandon the chemical-arms race in their quest for superiority.

With the overall development of weapons and military equipment, the means for delivering chemical weapons are also becoming faster, more accurate and more penetrating. Today a whole spectrum of such means exists, from already obsolete chemical mines and hand grenades for use in combat to more sophisticated artillery and multiple-rocket-launcher shells, air force bombs and containers, chemical warheads for short-range and medium-range ground-based missiles. Here again, a new generation of delivery means appears on the horizon. For instance, it has been reported that specific systems for delivering organophosphorous compounds by means of cruise missiles are being developed and have already been tested. They will make it possible to carry out surprise attacks on pinpoint targets well behind the battle lines, using highly toxic and fast-acting chemical warfare agents.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

These, and possible future developments in the delivery means for CW, could lead to dangerous calculations about increased use of CW against the civilian population. It is obvious that, even without this "special concern", civilian populations will have to pay an extremely high price in the event of a conflict with the use of CW. It has been estimated that the ratio between killed soldiers and civilians could be as high as 1 to 20. In case of conflict in densely populated Europe, or other similar regions of the world, the civilian casualties would be immense.

These indiscriminate effects of CW, against both armed forces and the civilian population, render chemical weapons, by their nature, primarily offensive weapons. Since chemical weapons would demonstrably cause greater loss of life among civilians than among military personnel, it would make little sense to employ them as a means of defence against an invader. Instead of halting the enemy's advance, CW would, in the first place, provoke severe losses among one's own civilian population. Thus, the justification of the need for chemical weapons to serve defensive purposes simply does not hold water. Likewise, the necessity to possess CW in order to deter chemical aggression would simply disappear with the universal elimination of CW stockpiles. Weighing all the pros and cons, the most accurate conclusion seems to be that for supporters of the development and manufacture of ever new chemical weapons these play a far from insignificant role in scenarios for the offensive use of military power.

The NATO Airland Battle Doctrine is quite outspoken in this respect. The possible use of CW in offensive military operations might also be contemplated in conjunction with both nuclear and conventional weapons. Under certain scenario CW could be more readily used in place of another kind of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear weapons. This could apply to situations when long-term contamination of an attacked area is undesirable. Some chemical warfare agents may cause prolonged ground contamination, but this property is limited to only a few of these weapons. As a rule, chemical contamination would be much more shortlived than radioactive contamination due to nuclear weapons.

The increase in the toxicity of CW and the development of equipment for their use went through more or less clearly defined stages. It seems obvious that we are now somewhere between the two stages. The nerve agents of World War II are now firmly in the chemical arsenals of a number of countries and they have reached more than desirable perfection. But today, after long years of research and experiments, which in some instances took decades, a new generation of CW is already prepared for massive production.

It is thus only natural that the Conference on Disarmament has been considering the problem of a chemical-weapons ban in the course of the last six years. This fact alone confirms that the international community feels the need to prevent the introduction into arsenals of new, even more toxic and more sophisticated CW. To avert this new stage does not appear, however, to be an easy task. The problem is that it has in fact begun a long time ago. While existing CW were further improved, research on new weapons went on in parallel.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In this connection, the announcement by the United States in 1969 that it would stop manufacturing lethal CW agents is of some interest. Many nice words have been said about that decision and we are not going to question its value. But one aspect is usually omitted -- the United States could afford to halt the production of the chemical agents known at that time because it had begun to develop binary weapons under a programme for the military use of new types of CW agents.

By 1969, extensive research on binary weapons had already been accomplished. It started in 1954, when the United States Army Chemical Corps embarked on a binary weapons programme, followed by the United States Navy six years later. Widely-financed research in the following years made it possible that in 1965 binary nerve gas bombs of the Big Eye type were patented by United States Navy and Air Force, as well as binary cluster bombs in 1968. In 1969 the XM 687 binary howitzer shell prototype was field tested at Dugway proving ground. The ensuing extensive work brought us to June 1980, when the United States House of Representatives appropriated the funds needed to set up a new production facility for binary chemical weapons at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. There followed the necessary political decisions from both the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government, and the stage was set for the actual production of this new generation of CW.

If binary and multi-component weapons production is launched, the verification of the desired CW ban will be substantially complicated. The problem is that components required for binary weapons can be made in the civilian chemical industry with no need to conceal huge stockpiles. They may also be used for peaceful purposes, e.g. to manufacture insecticides, pharmaceuticals or other chemicals. Furthermore, the binary technology makes it possible to contemplate the use of substances earlier thought to be unsuitable for military application because of their shortlived chemical stability. These are by no means all the potential dangers this new technology might bring about. If we fail to prevent binary-weapons production, we would set ourselves on a path full of unknown and often unpredictable dangers.

In our opinion, no country would start binary-weapons production out of purely security considerations. Rather, various aggressive designs will be kept in mind as well as the eternal quest for profits. And the mass production of binary and multi-component chemical weapons would ensure the arms contractors involved enormous extra profits. About \$US 10 billion is to be spent on the binary-weapons programme of the United States in the years up to 1990. Moreover, the eventual introduction of binary weapons into various regions of the world would substantially increase the chemical threat to many countries, which can only contribute to further proliferation of chemical weapons. We maintain that neither staunch aggressiveness of outdated military strategists nor financial interests of the military -- industrial complex represent a valid reason for States to launch a new round of the chemical-arms race. We are ready to believe that political realism will prevail and that finally the right choice -- the chemical-weapons ban -- will be made in time.

Let me stress one more aspect which renders a CW ban an urgent measure. With the development of the chemical industry one might note that commercial and military chemical substances are somewhat closer to each other than in the

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

past. Nobody can exclude that in the relatively near future some military use might be found for today's purely commercial chemicals and vice versa. For instance, single-purpose precursors, like QL or DF, have no commercial use today. But with the rapid development of science and technology no one can give us a guarantee that in the future some commercial use will not be found even for these substances. If that happens, these substances might spread quickly throughout civilian chemical industry. If the CW ban has not been achieved by that time, it would become then substantially more difficult to negotiate it and ensure compliance with it. Thus, a rather peculiar situation emerges -- in the absence of the CW ban, the natural development of chemical science and technology, which no one can stop, might objectively hamper prospects for the cessation of the chemical-arms race. On the contrary, early achievement of the ban and full compliance with it can give us a sufficient guarantee that future development in the field of chemistry will remain peaceful, with more favourable conditions for fruitful international co-operation.

We appreciate the fact that the Conference is paying due attention to the elaboration of the CW ban. Its relevant Ad Hoc Committee is by far the most active working body of the Conference with a unique negotiating mandate. Delegations are prepared to work actively not only during the Conference session itself but also in the intersessional period. Serious interest in chemical disarmament is also demonstrated by such actions as the recent Workshop on the verification of non-production of CW organized by the Netherlands, for which we would like to thank the Dutch delegation.

We maintain that each and every delegation should contribute towards the achievement of the CW ban. This is not a problem for only the handful of countries that possess the largest chemical capabilities. The need to provide for world-wide compliance with the ban, and its possible impacts on the civilian chemical industry and international trade in the field, require that countries take an active part in the formulation of the convention's basic provisions. It would not be a wise choice to wait until the convention is ready and then only try to fit it to a State's own interests.

Judging by some political decisions, like the one I mentioned in the beginning of my statement, it seems that for the time being in some NATO countries there are two opposite tendencies -- one supporting the prohibition of CW while the other favours the massive production and deployment of new CW. But these two tendencies cannot go on side by side for a long time. We are now at a point in time when extremely important decisions will have to be made. If the second option prevails and new CW production programmes are launched, negotiations on a CW ban will be seriously hampered and the tasks to be solved will become incomparably more difficult.

I cannot conclude my statement without expressing our deep appreciation of the decision of the Soviet Union of 18 August to prolong its unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing till the beginning of next year. We consider it a bold and unprecedented step aimed at the effective cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is high time that other nuclear-weapon States, in the first place the United States, reacted appropriately to this constructive invitation which the world applauds. These are deeds, not words!

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As regularly happens in the month of August, a number of our colleagues will be leaving us. Ambassador Gonsalves of India is already back in New Delhi discharging his new important functions. I would ask the Indian delegation to convey to Ambassador Gonsalves how I appreciated close co-operation with him. Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel of France and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany are also leaving us. We enjoyed working together with them and we wish them all success in their new important assignments. Let me also welcome among us the new representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. We are certain that he will contribute constructively to the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for his kind words to the President. I would also like to thank him for the speed of his delivery, given the length of our list.

I now give the floor to the representative of the USSR, Mr. Kashirin.

Mr. KASHIRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The members of the Conference and the observers from several countries taking part in its work already know that the Soviet Union has again extended the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which it has been strictly observing for one year now. The special decision to this effect taken by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government was made public by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, in his address on Moscow television on 18 August, which, at the request of the Soviet delegation, will be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

It should be especially clear to experts on disarmament that this was not an easy decision. It was taken in accordance with the Soviet Union's fundamental policy of ensuring general security by means of disarmament, and taking into account the multitude of factors, events and problems that determine the face of today's world and the realities of the nuclear space age.

Those realities are grim. Mountains of nuclear and every other type of weapon have been built up, but the arms race is not abating but accelerating. The danger has arisen that it will be transferred to outer space. The militarization of the United States of America and the entire NATO bloc is proceeding at high speed. The pace of development of military technology is so rapid that it is leaving less and less time for peoples, States and politicians to awaken to the real threat and reducing mankind's opportunities to halt the slide towards the nuclear abyss. There must be no delay, or such sophisticated arms systems will emerge that agreement on their control will be altogether impossible. The situation is becoming increasingly intolerable. Today it is not enough to preserve the existing treaties; major practical steps are required, steps which can curb militarism and bring about a turn for the better in the course of events. The balance of fear is ceasing to be a factor of restraint. That is so not only because, in general, fear is no wise counsel and can only lead to actions with unpredictable consequences. Fear is a direct participant in the arms race. By heightening distrust and suspicion, it forms a vicious circle of enhanced tension.

(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

Pre-nuclear thinking in fact lost its significance on 6 August 1945. Today it is impossible to ensure one's own security without taking into account the security of other States and peoples. There can be no genuine security unless it is equal for all and comprehensive. To think otherwise is to live in a world of illusion, in a world of self-deception.

Two tragedies involving nuclear and space-age technology have happened recently: the loss of the Challenger crew and the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. They have heightened anxiety and been a brutal reminder that man is only just beginning to master the fantastically powerful forces he has himself brought into being and is only now learning to place them at the service of progress. These events have furnished an object lesson in what would happen should nuclear weapons be used. A major, perhaps the major lesson is that the weapons devised by man should never be used and that today it is simply suicidal to build relations between States on the illusion that superiority can be attained in terrible means of destruction. Their complete elimination is the only way towards genuine peace. Specialists have estimated that the radiation from the explosion of the smallest nuclear warhead would be equivalent to three Chernobyls. This estimate is very probably correct. And if it is, that means that exploding even a small part of the accumulated nuclear arsenal would be a catastrophe, an irremediable catastrophe. Anyone who still dares to make a first nuclear strike will doom himself to an agonizing death -- not from a retaliatory strike, but from the consequences of the explosion of his own warheads. This is not propaganda, not political extemporizing, not the heightening of fears, but reality. It is simply irresponsible to reject it, and criminal to disregard it.

The decision made by the Soviet Union a year ago on a moratorium was based on the devotion of socialism as a social system to the cause of peace and on profound awareness of its responsibility for the future of civilization. The Soviet Union, as a socialist State and as a nuclear Power, regards as its supreme duty to do everything it can to save the peaceful future of the planet. Our desire to move the course of international development towards détente is consistent with our philosophy and our socialist morality, but in the nuclear age, saving the Earth from nuclear annihilation is a universal human task, a matter for all peoples.

We can, of course, only take inspiration from the fact that people of good will have welcomed our decision to extend the moratorium on nuclear explosions. We have been hearing words of approval and support from all corners of the world. Politicians and parliamentarians, public figures and mass organizations have seen in this step an example of the correct approach to the present-day problems and a hope of deliverance from the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. The Soviet moratorium was approved by the United Nations General Assembly -- the most representative gathering of States in the world. Throughout the world now, in the minds of peoples, politicians and public figures of the most diverse orientations and world outlooks, a conviction is asserting itself ever more strongly: the very existence of the human race is at stake, and the time has come for resolute and responsible action. This is shown, incidentally, by the statements of many delegations in the Conference on Disarmament. The importance of the Soviet moratorium has been mentioned here by the distinguished representatives of Mexico, India, Sweden, Venezuela and many other countries.

(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

To be fair, it should be said that some delegations, while paying tribute to the Soviet moratorium, have nevertheless expressed doubts as to whether it can provide an answer to the arguments put forward by the opponents of a test ban. I have in mind, in particular, the interesting and in some respects very convincing statement made by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, on 29 July 1986 on the issue of a nuclear test ban.

In this respect, I would like to emphasize that, as we have stressed on numerous occasions in the past, the Soviet Union does not regard a moratorium as an end in itself or as a substitute for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but as an important first step towards such a treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to agree on a series of verification measures to check compliance with a Soviet-United States bilateral moratorium, including on-site inspections when necessary.

Thus, a mutually verifiable moratorium could become the dress rehearsal, as it were, for the comprehensive test-ban treaty the conclusion of which has been and is still our principal goal in this sphere. In this respect, I would remind you that, in the past, a moratorium on nuclear testing contributed to the conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Many delegations at the Conference have noted with concern that the United States still refuses to follow the Soviet Union's example and join in a moratorium. Indeed, the United States, the champion as regards the number of explosions for 40 years, has detonated another 18 nuclear devices during the year of the Soviet moratorium, and three of them were not declared. Moreover, as a rule it has done so ostentatiously, timing the tests to coincide either with a Soviet announcement of the extension of the moratorium or with some other Soviet initiative. They even invited us to Nevada to watch it all happening. To this it should be added that the present United States Administration is implementing the broadest of military programmes. In a word, the Soviet Union has ample justification for resuming its nuclear tests. And yet we are still convinced that the ending of nuclear testing not only by the Soviet Union but also by the United States would be a genuine breakthrough towards stopping the nuclear arms race and would speed up the elimination of nuclear weapons. The logic here is simple: if there are no tests, there will be no upgrading of nuclear weapons -- which both sides have in any case stockpiled in abundance. This is demonstrated by the appeals made to the United States and the Soviet Union by a substantial and prestigious part of the world community States. It includes the "Delhi Six", a standing forum of leaders of countries in four continents -- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden. A few days ago, at a meeting in the city of Ixtapa, they adopted the Mexico Declaration, which contains a further appeal for an end to all nuclear tests. That is also the demand of the majority of the States members of the non-aligned movement. The Soviet Union is, of course, aware that forces which have no wish to disarm at all are active in the United States. Moreover, they are doing their utmost to drag us into ever-new spirals of the arms race, to provoke us into slamming the door at the talks. But we would like to hope that realism and understanding of the need for a joint quest for ways of improving the international situation, halting the senseless arms race, to eliminate nuclear weapons, will prevail in American assessments and actions.

(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

Under these conditions, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Government of the Soviet Union having thoroughly and scrupulously weighed all the pros and cons and guided by their responsibility for the fate of the world, have decided to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987. In taking this step, the Soviet Union believes that people in all countries of the world, political circles and international public opinion will correctly assess the lengthy silence on Soviet nuclear test ranges. As Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized in this connection, and I quote, "On behalf of the Soviet people, I appeal to the reason and dignity of Americans not to miss another historic chance on the path towards an end to the arms race". The Soviet Union is confident that an agreement on ending nuclear tests can be reached speedily and signed before the end of this year at the Soviet-American summit meeting. That event would, without a doubt, be the main tangible outcome of the meeting and a considerable step towards ending the arms race. It would be a kind of prologue to further progress at the talks on nuclear weapons and their elimination and to radical improvement in the world situation as a whole. The Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear explosions, being an action and not merely a proposal, is practical proof of the earnestness and sincerity of our nuclear disarmament programme and of our calls for a new policy, a policy of realism, peace and co-operation. More than half of 1986, which was declared the Year of Peace by the United Nations, has passed. By extending its unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union is contributing to the common striving to ensure that this year goes down in history as being worthy of its name. That is the essence of the Soviet Union's new political initiative.

The Soviet delegation would like to take this opportunity to introduce its working paper, CD/724, devoted to issues of seismic verification of the non-conducting of nuclear tests. This document has already been distributed to delegations. The document puts forward the Soviet Union's ideas on this important aspect of verification of a nuclear test ban, including the relatively rapid exchange of Level II seismic data, and on the carrying out of an appropriate international experiment. The Soviet Union's proposals on this matter are prompted by a desire to expedite in every possible way the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on a general and comprehensive nuclear test ban under effective control.

As the Soviet delegation has repeatedly stressed, our country is prepared to use all possible roads leading to that goal. Here, at the Conference on Disarmament, we have persistently worked for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the topic, showing considerable flexibility during the consultations on its mandate, and we cannot, of course, but express regret and disappointment at the fact that, despite all the efforts of the socialist countries and the States members of the Group of 21, the Conference has not managed to agree on setting up such a committee. In this regard, we would like to express agreement with the view of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, that the States supporting the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban had gone the greater part of the way in the search for a compromise. It is clear that it is only the inflexible stance of the United States and its closest allies that has, for three successive years, been preventing the Conference from getting down to practical work on this issue. It is regrettable that the Western countries

(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

which were the authors of documents CD/521 and CD/621 have not displayed one iota of flexibility and have not heeded the opinion of the other countries that form the majority of the Conference.

While we attach the greatest importance to the elaboration of a multilateral test ban treaty, we deem it important, for wholly understandable reasons, that measures to stop nuclear tests be taken first by the United States and the Soviet Union. That is why the Soviet Union, which declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions last year and recently extended it afresh for almost another half-year, is so persistently trying to obtain the United States participation in that moratorium and so keenly pursuing the question of the resumption of, and the attainment of practical results in the tripartite negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom.

As regards the question put by the Group of 21 to the delegations of the USSR and the United States concerning their countries' bilateral efforts on the issue of banning nuclear tests, we should like to point out that we share the view of the non-aligned and neutral countries that bilateral and multilateral efforts can usefully supplement each other. As regards the bilateral efforts in this area, as you know, a round of Soviet-United States negotiations on the problem of halting nuclear-weapon tests took place in Geneva from 25 to 31 July of this year. The Soviet delegation at those talks firmly insisted that their aim must be to define the methodology and terms of a nuclear test ban as well as to solve the problem of verification. On issues of verification, our position was and is based on the need for the verification to be of the prohibition and not of the conducting of nuclear tests. We have followed that line in all forums dealing with the prohibition of nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the position of the other side offers no evidence of any constructive approach on the part of the United States Administration to what is one of the most acute problems of our time, a problem whose urgent resolution is now being called for by an overwhelming majority of States and by millions of people throughout the world, including a majority of the population of the United States itself. The Soviet Union will continue to work steadfastly to ensure that the Soviet-United States negotiations, the next round of which is scheduled for early September, will end specific agreements that will at last enable headway to be made towards the resolution of this urgent problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR and I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): It is not without emotion that I realize that this August marks the completion of four full cycles of my duty at the Conference on Disarmament. In addition to the United Nations First Committee and various review conferences, something like 24 months of deliberations and negotiations in this Council Chamber have been added to my diplomatic career. I should like to say that it has indeed been a pleasure and a privilege. In the normal course of my duty, it is rather unlikely that I shall be here for the fifth time next February and, as today is likely to be the last opportunity for me to address the plenary as head of the Japanese delegation, I should like to ask for the indulgence of my colleagues for a moment while I review what, in my mind, are the most important features of the international disarmament exercises.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

We can all recall the good old days when no one doubted that the whole point of disarmament negotiations was to reduce arms and thereby to bring about increased security. Of all weapons, nuclear explosives and their delivery systems are obviously the most crucial. When the post-war disarmament process started in the 1950s in Geneva, it was natural that one central topic should have been the ban on nuclear testing, which, in addition to the concern over environmental contamination, was the shortest-cut to restraining the development of new and more powerful weapons. These were the days of crude nuclear warheads and testing methods, and the logic of the test ban was very clear. Also, a complete ban of nuclear weapons and complete international control of the related technology and material were still very much on the horizon. I would like to refer a little later to this central theme of the Geneva process.

From the late 1950s, the composition of the Geneva negotiating forum has changed, first involving 10 East/West countries, then adding eight non-aligned States to make up the ENDC, and finally to today's Conference on Disarmament with its 40 member States. Arms control negotiations have been conducted in other forums including the United States/USSR bilaterals, trilaterals, or multilaterals with a European focus. Also there have been regional approaches.

In spite of the expansions in the number and scope of negotiating forums, we are today unfortunately no closer to successful reductions in arms, nuclear or otherwise. Instead we have seen a tremendous growth in the number and destructive capabilities of nuclear warheads, the rapid increase in the number, range and throw-weight of missiles, advancement in target acquisition and in their state of readiness. The only thing we have succeeded in so far was stopping the increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States, and this, thanks to the collective wisdom and courage of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We look at the on-going Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for deep, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons with a great deal of interest. They may become the first ever to achieve real nuclear arms reductions instead of just placing ceilings on their expansion, and we sincerely hope that such measures will be realized between the two negotiating parties.

The thought leads us back to the real purpose of arms control and disarmament negotiations. It has been pointed out that, in spite of the tremendous increase in nuclear arsenals, or maybe because of such an increase, the world has managed to avoid a nuclear catastrophe for the past 40 years. The destructive capabilities of the two arsenals are such that both physical and psychological deterrence are at work, while highly sophisticated command and control systems are in place to prevent accidental nuclear warfare from inadvertently breaking out. What has at one time been described as the two scorpions in a bottle has somehow survived. The situation is described as MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) plus the minimum CBM (Confidence-Building Measures) to enable co-operation in crisis management.

The situation is far from being ideal, but in this way the world continues to be livable, and here I would like to touch upon the concept of "nuclear winter". I have always felt somewhat uneasy with those who venture to make numerical predictions regarding the effects of a nuclear war based on a simple one-dimensional climatic model. The Earth's atmosphere is governed

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

by much more complicated equations. I was pleased to read in the recent issue of Foreign Affairs an important clarification regarding the possible deficiencies arising from the adoption of an over-simplified model.

There is a theory that the most important part of arms control and disarmament is not necessarily their output as signed and sealed documents, but the continuation of the process itself, in which the two major nuclear Powers are constantly in touch and maintain dialogue regarding each other's war-fighting capabilities. If one imagines a situation in which the two would not talk to each other, that would be a far more dangerous world.

Unfortunately, in the present situation, the above-mentioned view is far from being overly pessimistic. If we recall the very long period of time that was necessary for the two partners to work out the SALT Agreements, it may be reasonable to argue that the process of negotiations is at least as important as the output. We can add that the similar considerations apply in the case of multilateral negotiations.

I would like to refer to the following three points. One is the need of maintaining contact, or of not giving up. One can see a telling example of this perception in the importance given to the hotline as a part of crisis avoidance between the two most powerful countries. The second point is in fact widely accepted as the basis for stability and security, and that is the proper balance between the two forces. I shall not get into theoretical details regarding what is and what is not deterrence in modern strategic thinking. The conceptual framework has changed with time. It is sufficient to point out that the balance of military forces, including both conventional and nuclear, is an essential ingredient of modern arms control. Thirdly, there is a great deal of hard work that must go into the writing of any disarmament agreement. We all know that "definitions", "declarations" and "verification" have to be elaborated carefully and in painful detail so that the essential balance which is the very core of any agreement can be clearly described and be implementable.

I do not need to point out that the Conference is in the middle of such detailed work with regard to a convention banning chemical weapons, while on some other agenda items there is disagreement as to how we, as the Conference, should handle these essential building blocks. In any event, these considerations definitely lead us to conclude that mere declaratory positions about disarmament and arms control are no longer sufficient or convincing.

As we continue these considerations, it becomes important that we examine again the role of a multilateral forum such as ours, in the context of the continuing arms control dialogue between the two major Powers. The Conference is the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. It would then be useful to review what were the basic expectations at the time of its establishment by the Final Document. In view of the seven years' record of the Conference's existence which failed to produce a single disarmament agreement, this cannot be a trivial point.

It is easy enough to blame the situation on the lack of so-called political will on the part of someone else, and thus avoid the blame on oneself. If the usefulness of the multilateral negotiating forum is primarily

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

as an instrument in propaganda, then that is another matter. Japan, for one, has never considered the Conference as a forum for a public relations exercise, or as an apparatus to improve one's own political image. I believe that we have much more serious issues at hand and its importance transcends mere pride of participation or an alibi at the expense of someone else's "political will".

There were times in the Geneva process when joint drafts presented by the United States and the Soviet Union were sufficient. The multilateral forum first acted as a sounding board, then examined the drafts, commented on their provisions and sent them on the General Assembly for final considerations and adoption. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the NPT of 1970 and other examples are available in this category. The Antarctic Treaty of 1960 and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 went through a somewhat similar procedure.

On the other hand, there have been a number of purely bilateral agreements worked out around what were then considered to be solely bilateral problems. In the negotiating history of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, we find an interesting reference to possible offensive capabilities of a third party. However, there was no question that the matter of balance between offensive and defensive arms was primarily a bilateral affair. At the same time, although no other States except the United States and USSR held any meaningful capability or intention to place weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit, the Outer Space Treaty was conceived of and agreed upon as a multilateral instrument.

We live and work today in an atmosphere different from the days of joint chairmanship and joint drafts, and this in itself is a development reflecting an increased role for multilateral participation. At the same time, it should be clear that any idea of nuclear or space disarmament which does not command the simultaneous support of the two major Powers cannot be a viable proposal. Awareness of this fact does not in any way diminish our role or responsibilities. It enhances our function in arms control and disarmament by forcing us to make efforts either jointly or separately to reason with the major Powers to accept viable disarmament measures, which, after all, are not just matters of bilateral concern.

Perhaps I have talked too long about generalities. These, however, are not only my personal convictions but represent the philosophy with which I have been conducting my duty in this forum for the past four years. I would now like to turn to the issue of the nuclear-test ban, which has been one of the central focuses of the Geneva disarmament process.

As to the actual final steps which led the negotiators in 1963 to the partial NTB agreement, including assessment of seismic detection and the effects of underground testing on warhead design, we have available limited records of the United States side only. The Soviet Union did not disclose any meaningful information reflecting their considerations leading to acceptance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, nor indeed on any policy or technological background regarding military-related decisions. This makes it very difficult for us to form a realistic assessment of the comparable positions of the two States regarding a comprehensive test-ban régime. All we have from the

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Soviet Union is a declaratory position without explanation. I believe that there can be a range within which explanation of details would help and not impede the progress of the test ban régime.

Japan has consistently emphasized the importance of the world-wide seismic network in which both Level I and Level II data may be effectively exchanged. We have presented a number of working papers on the subject and have made proposals in the hope of making some sort of viable multilateral verification system a real going concern. The recent developments in the Conference to encourage further work by the GSE (Group of Scientific Experts) is gratifying. What is not very clear is the question of bilateral verification. The maximum sensitivities of NTM or National Technical Means are never made known (nor for that matter have NTMs ever been defined in an international agreement) and we do not know whether there exists a certain band below which detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions becomes unclear. Even with the on-site installation of devices capable of detecting and analysing weak signals, unless they are installed in the immediate neighbourhood of any and all test sites, there may be a limit below which the signal-to-noise ratio would be such that meaningful identification is difficult. At the same time, there are reports of nuclear devices of sub-kiloton yields which are useful either as weapons or as triggering devices for other weapons. Although the probability that computer simulation can effectively take the place of an actual nuclear explosion does not sound very convincing, it provides an opportunity to carefully review the meaning of a CTB régime.

There are also arguments that occasional testing is necessary in order to check the shelf-life of the existing arsenal, a point of view which is rejected by other experts. Although we are not in a position to press for judgement regarding all these arguments, it was with these things in mind that Japan, back in 1984, proposed a step-by-step approach to this problem. It has been very unfortunate that the Conference has spent most of its energy in this field on the matter of a mandate for an ad hoc committee, and has never had the opportunity to closely examine the substantive matters, including those we have been suggesting for some time.

Since it is difficult to believe that actual engineering and scientific logic of nuclear weapons design and testing would be different from one country to another, the inability on our part to appreciate Soviet thinking on this subject is effectively preventing us from having a better understanding of the fine structure of the problem. For the deliberations at the Conference to be meaningful, I believe a disclosure of some of the relevant details would have been much more useful than proposals for a freeze, which, in spite of any positive impressions it might create, is nevertheless a unilateral position with all the associated memories of historical problems.

If we can imagine ourselves in the process of writing a convention on a nuclear-weapons ban after the style of a CW convention, we may be able to see more clearly the place of a test ban within the comprehensive structure of nuclear disarmament. We would, of course, need to have definitions, and this would require clarification of the respective national positions regarding laboratory-scale examinations of the nuclear explosion phenomena. Then, one may have to deal with "permitted activities" or "protective purposes", which

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

may be no more than a contradiction in terms. Initial declarations of weapons stocks will be followed by their verification and then elimination. One should also talk about non-production, in which the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safeguards may be pertinent.

I mention these as matters we would be investigating if we were to be writing a convention to ban nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it looks to be a rather remote possibility as a disarmament objective. Nothing, however, prohibits us from engaging in such an exercise as a means of setting up an ultimate goal as a criteria against which we may make assessment of various test ban possibilities. When Japan made a test-ban proposal, I do not think that we had any illusions about what could be meaningfully achieved in the short term. At the same time we did not feel constrained in insisting on the basic logic of the subject matter.

I would now like to touch on some other items on the Conference's agenda.

Outer space is already very much in use, such as for meteorological observation, commercial and other communications, or geological and geophysical observations as represented by activities of the Earth resources satellites. At the same time there is no question that outer space represents the most sophisticated and advanced technologies of our time. Also, the distinction between peaceful uses, military uses, and offensive and defensive systems has traditionally been one of the most challenging and conceptually complicated.

In spite of a considerable degree of complications, technical, legal and financial, we nevertheless feel that outer space has to be jointly and multilaterally administered, based upon a widely accepted legal and technical régime. Mankind's contact with outer space has been so far very limited, while the number of countries with direct access to various Earth orbits has not been large. We suspect, however, that with the expansion of such contact, extensive and complicated work will be required, and if that is the case, we should begin now, and begin with the examination of the broad framework of possible agreements as to what kind of order we would like to see in outer space from the viewpoint of effective prevention of an arms race. In this sense, although disarmament may be our primary concern, we do not need to limit ourselves to the immediate subjects such as ballistic missile defence or anti-satellite weapons. To do so hastily will confuse the issue. In my understanding, many BMDs are technically capable of ASAT functions, while most ICBMs may be BMDs.

I have had a number of opportunities in the past to discuss our CW work and have no intention of repeating myself today. I would rather like to point out the following.

Because of the difficulties which the Conference is encountering in the negotiation of other agenda items, there is a distinct interest in CW as the only available subject for negotiations. This in itself may be a welcome sign, especially with the increasing interest in various capitals. At the same time, since the major part of the work is conducted at the working group level, which meets five or six times a week, it is not easy for anyone to have a good grasp of all the technical and legal details of the current work. It

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

is not inconceivable under the circumstances that both technical experts and non-experts might lose sight of the overall structural logic of the convention, obviously each into different directions. While we are all for the early realization of a CW convention, there is an additional consideration of importance. That is the fact that the convention, by necessity, will be an instrument which will place the world's chemical industry under some restrictions. Since extensive control of what is in effect a gigantic and mature industry is neither feasible nor desirable, it is important to draw a clear line at which an effective ban on chemical weapons can be carried out without undue interference in the day-to-day operation of the peaceful chemical industry. That is easier said than done, but obviously there is no alternative.

It seems to me that there are several key provisions in the convention that mark the dividing lines, and once these are identified and become parts of a shared common understanding, then ways can be found so that the respective details may be handled separately by appropriate experts in the most expeditious manner. If we were to fail to clarify these key provisions, then it is possible that the conceptual framework of the convention might be overwhelmed by the nuts and bolts aspects of the detailed provisions. Then we would indeed be wasting what seems to be a common political will to achieve this convention as soon as possible.

Finally, I would like to say a word about radiological weapons, in particular what we commonly refer to as "track B", if only because of my past association with nuclear power stations. The reactor accident at Chernobyl was a very sad occasion. We express our deep sympathy to those who have lost their lives and to those whose sufferings do not seem to have ended yet. At the same time there are a number of technical features of that accident which are specific to Chernobyl, and it is very difficult to generalize. One feature that is a lesson of that accident is a need for organized and quick international action, including immediate information of accidents and necessary joint decisions to minimize the damage. In this regard we are glad to note that last week in Vienna, a governmental expert group successfully worked out the text of a "Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident" and a "Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency" within a short period of time. At the same time, we have always been aware of the possible consequences of unmanaged and large-scale dissemination of radioactivity and such a concern did not originate with Chernobyl. It has been our national position that we should agree to prohibit military attacks on peaceful nuclear activities, but for the moment avoid the complicated task of trying to define quantitative thresholds of such facilities. We took this position when we offered the idea of an optional protocol to the Conference in 1982, and our thinking remains unchanged.

If I have over-generalized, or over-philosophized, I offer my apologies. At the same time, it is part of my conviction that in dealing with arms control and disarmament one should occasionally leave polemics and details behind and philosophize a bit as to what we really want to achieve. During my four years in this Council Chamber my seat has made a roughly 180° turn from the right-hand corner to where I am sitting today. I said at the beginning of my intervention that this is likely to be the last occasion for me to speak

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

before the plenary and I took the liberty of sharing with you some of my convictions. I hope I have made sense. Thank you, Mr. President, and through you I should like to thank all my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. We have learned that Ambassador Imai is likely to be leaving us after having served his country and this Conference for four years with outstanding diplomatic competence. I do not need to recall his significant contributions to our work as they are well-known to all of us. We shall, however, miss his advice, sense of humour, his wisdom, his personal expertise and also, if I may say so, on behalf of all of you, his humanistic optimism, which is the rational nature of man, and his capability to master and regulate the course of his destiny. On behalf of the Conference, I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Imai all the best in their personal as well as their diplomatic life.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Kerroum.

Mr. KERROUM (Algeria) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on behalf of the delegation of Algeria on your election as President of our Conference. I am convinced that your well-known competence and your outstanding experience, as well as the commitment of the Government and people of Canada to the cause of disarmament, will guarantee the success of our work as well as help to prepare for the next session. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Burma, U Tin Tun, for his devoted and dedicated discharge of his task as President during the month of July.

As the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to a close, my mandate as representative of Algeria to this Conference is also coming to an end. A year with you is certainly not long enough for me to claim to enrich the usual stock-taking at this phase of our work, but I will perhaps take advantage of the privilege that I had of being in this very spot in 1979 to share with you some thoughts that I have had, given this two-fold experience with a few years in between.

In February 1979, just after the holding of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament and of its success as shown in the form of the Final Document, as in February 1986 following the Geneva summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and its international impact, it was more than reasonable to hope that there would be a decisive breakthrough towards disarmament and that we would see the Conference on Disarmament, an expression of the common destiny and joint effort of nations, effectively play its role and fully discharge its mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating body in its field. Now it must be said that the expectations of the international community have not been met. Neither the impetus provided in 1978 by an international consensus commensurate with the challenge facing mankind, nor the solemn will expressed in 1985 by the two major Powers, has enabled the Conference to make significant headway. On the contrary, judging from the turn taken during the session, from the debates on the various agenda items, it appears that in 1986 we are even further away than we were in 1979 from the Final Document that is, and must remain, our benchmark.

(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

True, considerable commendable effort has been made and progress has been achieved in the discussions on a chemical weapons convention. However, while it notes this positive development, the delegation of Algeria today is more inclined to express its concern at the trend which is emerging. It appears that little by little we are losing sight of the objective of a total ban on chemical weapons and that we are now envisaging a concept closer to a non-proliferation régime. If this trend was confirmed, it would mark a step backwards and one all the more negative in that it would carry within itself the seeds of the inevitable failure. Over and above the requirement of security, the signature of and compliance with an agreement of this nature are of necessity dependent on the production potential and development needs of States. I must therefore reaffirm what I said on 25 February 1986: that a chemical weapons convention "can only mean the total elimination of chemical weapons if it prohibits their development, production and stockpiling. It cannot possibly have a non-proliferation function or constitute any sort of obstacle to the chemicals industry, which is the very foundation of development, particularly in agriculture".

The greatest disappointment concerns a nuclear test ban, that is because of the symbolic importance of such a ban, which is seen as an indication of the determination to halt and then reverse the arms race. General acceptance of a moratorium and full preparedness to embark on a negotiating process continue to constitute the sole appropriate response to the expectations of the international community. The inability to set up an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate, and the attendant interminable discussions, can only lead to frustration.

The debate on this item, however, was certainly not futile. Backed up by the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, the debate has helped to show that, where nuclear tests are concerned -- and this applies to chemical weapons too -- verification problems are no longer insurmountable obstacles if there is political will to succeed and the necessity of an agreement is accepted.

The disappointment and frustration are the same as regards outer space. Rather than the possibility of preventing the development of the arms race in outer space while there is still time, the preference seems to be to consider no more than controlling that race.

Despite the numerous commendable efforts that have been and still are being made, this stalemate and this tendency to move backwards cannot, logically, lead to substantive results as regards either the prevention of nuclear war or a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In politics, the art of the possible, realism is undeniably a fruitful virtue. Now, it may seem more realistic, in a world which is more and more governed by the law of relative might, to focus our energies on controlling the arms race, but that same realism should lead to the realization that sooner or later, with the constant improvement of more and more sophisticated and destructive weapons and the unceasing growth of mistrust, the arms race will inevitably become uncontrollable. That realism ultimately accepts the assertion -- unacceptable because what is at stake is the survival of

(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

mankind -- that war, even nuclear war, is a biological necessity. At all events, it contradicts what was said in the joint statement issued after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit to the effect that a "nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought".

In this state of affairs, one question remains of burning concern: how to remove the so-far insurmountable obstacles on the road to disarmament? The delegation of Algeria is of the view that there is a beginning of an answer in the solemn declaration by the two major Powers of their renunciation of military superiority. It is the search for, or fear of military superiority that is at the very source of the arms race. That is true of the greatest Powers, as well as of the smallest nations. The result is a climate of suspicion, aggravated by the feeling that security is always to be perceived in military terms -- and that at ever-higher levels -- and is always precarious.

The renunciation of military superiority gives cause for hope because it implies that security is no longer a function of military parameters alone and that weapons are neither the only, nor even the best means of ensuring security. It enables the problems of disarmament to be set in their true context -- that of international relations as a whole. It encourages awareness that the business of disarmament can only be viable if dialogue replaces confrontation, co-operation, antagonism and international law power politics and, above all, if a far more just system of economic relations is established. The heightening of inequalities in levels of development, constitutes an increasing threat to international peace and security. The failure to come to grips with this problem dramatically illustrates the impasse in which we now find ourselves. It is regrettable enough that, even though it is included in the Final Document, the link between disarmament and development has never been debated within this Conference. It is even more regrettable that the international conference that was scheduled on this matter has had to be postponed. Considerations of circumstances apart, it seems that, in the final analysis, the postponement of this conference, as well as the standstill in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, are due to the same factors and particularly to the persistence in seeing all problems, whatever they may be, in a single perspective -- that of controlling the arms race.

The true nature of the link between disarmament and development implies that institution of a healthier international environment would, initially, enable all countries, particularly the poorest, to devote the bulk of their national resources to their development. That would already be an immense step forward and one, at all events, in keeping with the principle of relying first of all on oneself. In the second phase, once mistrust had diminished or perhaps even disappeared and dialogue and co-operation prevailed, restructuring of the international economic system along the lines of justice and equity would, far from causing insoluble problems, become a demand shared by all and enable development efforts to bear full fruit. One could, finally, envisage a third phase in which a disarmament for development fund could be established, not so much as a decisive means of bringing about development, but more as a means of giving concrete form to a basic principle, that of international solidarity.

(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

Disarmament is too noble a cause, too vital to mankind's future, for us to give in to despair. My presence for a year alongside representatives who are so devoted to this cause has strengthened me in this belief. In February 1987 I shall no longer be here with you. I should like to take the opportunity today to express my thanks and gratitude for the full co-operation and willingness to assist shown to me by all representatives, by the Secretary-General of the Conference and by the secretariat. I am fully aware that, without their co-operation, sometimes even their indulgence, my task would have been an impossible one.

One always has mixed feelings when leaving. Feelings of regret, consolation and gratification. The regret comes when I think that I shall no longer be participating in your work and that I shall have no chance to build on the relations that I have had the privilege of establishing with other representatives to this Conference.

I am consoled, however, when I think that in any event I would not have had the pleasure of seeing certain representatives again as they, too, are about to leave. I have in mind the representative of France, Ambassador Jessel, whose competence and experience one cannot but admire, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, whose contribution to the work of this Conference is unanimously recognized and who has constantly been willing to engage in discussions that I have always found enriching. I am thinking, finally, of the representative of India, Ambassador Gonsalves, a man remarkable for his keen sense of political reality and one who has brilliantly expressed and defended his country's position and ardently advocated the principles of the non-aligned.

I am also consoled, and proud, when I think that I shall have the honour of representing my country, as of 1 September 1986, in Yugoslavia. Everyone is aware of the exceptional ties between Yugoslavia and Algeria and of the friendship between the peoples of those two countries. These ties and this friendship stem from the similar sacrifices made to obtain our freedom and they have been strengthened over the years by the common struggle in the cause of non-alignment. They are expressed in co-operation, in the context of our exemplary self-help relations. Furthermore, I shall, sooner or later, have the great pleasure of seeing Ambassador Vidas again and so of continuing the friendship we formed here. I shall also have the equal pleasure of seeing Ambassador Komatina again regularly, if only during the brief holidays that he will have from his demanding post and that is one privileged link with the Conference that I shall be keeping.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, and for the touching words with which he concluded his statement.

We will all miss Ambassador Kerroum, whose extensive experience and diplomatic ability, coupled with his constructive and positive and co-operative approach, have been invaluable to the work of the Conference. Albeit for too short a period, I am sure we would all feel that. His thoughtful presentation, including his statement today, belie the modest but obviously sincere opening comments he made. He has represented his country with great distinction in this Conference and I feel sure that he will be

(The President)

successful in the new and important post which has been entrusted to him. I extend to Ambassador and Mrs. Kerroum on behalf of all of us our best wishes.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, before I come to the main subject of my statement today, which will be chemical weapons, I would like to welcome wholeheartedly the recent extremely important decision taken by the Soviet Union with respect to the extension until the end of this year of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, which was so fully presented by the representative of the Soviet Union, Comrade Kashirin.

This courageous step of the Soviet Union is renewed proof of its determination to stop the nuclear-arms race, and a further contribution to the United Nations International Year of Peace, so frequently referred to in this hall.

In announcing this decision General Secretary Gorbachev said:

"Being an act, and not only a proposal, the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear blasts proves in action the seriousness and sincerity of our nuclear disarmament programme, of our calls for a new policy -- that of realism, peace and co-operation."

Such a new policy of realism, peace and co-operation is also expected by the peoples of the world from the United States. Regrettably, this is not the case so far.

As I have indicated, today I should like to make several comments and observations on some aspects of item 4 of the agenda, i.e. chemical weapons. Poland attaches great importance to negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation does its best to contribute to the Conference's work in this field, including as item co-ordinator for the group of socialist countries.

The Conference on Disarmament is getting closer to its goal of elaborating a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Over the years a lot of work has been done, but the convention as a whole has not yet been born. Let us believe the delivery will be prompt and successful. I think there is a sound basis for this belief.

This being my fourth consecutive year of involvement in CW negotiations, I feel that we are entering a new stage, hopefully the final one.

It seems to us that the overall atmosphere of the negotiations has improved, positions of the delegations, although tough, are business-like and in general co-operative and compromise-oriented.

The negotiations are being carried on multifariously -- in the Ad hoc Committee, in the Working Groups, and at various multilateral and bilateral consultations. A valuable contribution to the Committee's work was the

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

bilateral Soviet-American consultations -- which we wholeheartedly welcome. It was broadly felt that their results were simultaneously incorporated into the work of the relevant Working Groups.

During this year's negotiations, new incentives were given to the Conference and many interesting, valuable ideas and proposals were put forward.

The proposal made by the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 to get rid, before the end of this century, of weapons of mass destruction, one of them being chemical weapons, paved the way for more fruitful and faster work in the Ad hoc Committee. The ideas stemming from this proposal were later developed and specified at the Conference. I have in mind the Soviet Union's proposals of 22 April 1986. They opened new possibilities for the solution of the crucial problem of elimination of the industrial basis for production of chemical weapons, thereby enabling faster work and progress in Group B.

My delegation considers as well that the Workshop held in the Netherlands in June this year also served its purpose. It brought out a better understanding of problems concerning verification of chemical industry with regard to the area of non-production, making it also more clear that actual possibilities of such verification are not unlimited, that they are bound to have certain limitations which need further study. At the same time it seems that this practical exercise indicated the important role which verification at the national level could and should play in this respect. Allow me, Mr. President, through you to thank the authorities and the delegation of the Netherlands for this useful initiative, hospitality, and excellent organization of the Workshop.

Many other interesting, thought-provoking working and conference room papers were put forward in the Committee, in the plenary and in the Working Groups, especially with regard to various aspects of verification of the future convention.

But the intensity of work on CW prohibition, impressive as it is, has not so far brought results which are equally impressive. I have to admit, however, there is always a certain degree of intermediary results which are still not mature enough to appear in a written, agreed form. What seems to be also important is that there is more creative thinking in seeking new, mutually acceptable approaches. Sometimes it is better to start from a general definition before getting into details, but in other cases it might be more productive to start from details before coming to more general notions.

That is why an attempt to assess or to measure progress made during this year's session would not only be a very difficult task but the result of such an assessment would most probably be rather inaccurate.

I think, however, that today, at the end of the 1986 session, everybody would probably agree that the achieved results, though not up to some expectations, are certainly not disappointing. We have moved forward in the elaboration of the CW convention. The body of the preliminary structure of the convention is getting thicker and more concrete, though I believe we should be careful not to overload it with too many details.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The question of non-production is one of the basic issues of the future convention, the one which from the very beginning would have direct bearing on chemical industry of all States parties to the future convention, though, due to various structures and level of development of chemical industry, this bearing may differ.

If we have a look at the issues considered in Group A, it becomes clear that the existing material worked out by the Group consolidated and developed last year's work, especially the so-called Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals. A more clear picture of the problems we face in this area was created. It is obvious, however, that article VI, that is Activities not prohibited by the Convention, and relevant annexes, especially Annex I relative to Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems], still need a lot of work before they could reach a stage of mutual agreement and actual drafting. Some further consideration of this question is needed in the capitals. With regard to my delegation this will be done during the recess in the Committee's work. I do believe that consultations to be undertaken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in the intersessional period would be a very useful forum to further elaborate on these issues before they are formally put again for consideration by the Committee.

It is especially in this area of non-production that all delegations should bring the most active contribution to working out final solutions. Only by a common effort would we be able to agree on uniform procedures of transmitting statistical data and procedures of systematic international on-site inspections. We all know and agree that this system of control should not be detrimental to the normal activity of chemical industry, but we seem to understand it in different ways. Statements of some delegations in the Ad hoc Committee suggest their reluctance to submit the relevant chemical industry to adequate control.

If one takes a closer look at issues under consideration in Group A, it seems that at this stage of negotiations particular attention should be paid to the following questions:

Scope of data on production, distribution and use of relevant chemicals to be submitted to the Consultative Committee. In our view, it would be the simplest, the most basic and the cheapest form of verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

We are of the opinion that an important and urgent task should be to reach agreement on the list of key precursors in Annex II to Article VI. The problem is difficult as there seem to exist rather opposed approaches either to broaden or to narrow this list. Like always, a mutually satisfactory solution has to be found.

There is a need to work out an appropriate régime for key precursors. It is yet not entirely clear -- at least for my delegation -- whether such a régime should be uniform with regard to all chemicals in the list, or should be diversified. A preliminary scheme of this régime would make it easier to finally agree on the whole list. It would also be helpful to determine a militarily significant level for every key precursor.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

A still deeper analysis is needed with regard to the issue of super-toxic lethal chemicals (STLC), which at present are not used in CW production, but their future use for that purpose cannot be totally excluded today. As is known, some STLCs are being produced by the pharmaceutical industry, others in small quantities in research laboratories. I think that a clearer picture of this question is needed in order to solve comprehensively the STLC issue in the convention.

More attention should also be paid to multinational corporations, as they create some additional specific questions in the context of the verification of non-production of CW.

There has been a promising development of Group B in a very difficult and sensitive area of elimination both of chemical weapons and of the CW production facilities.

I think everybody would agree that further rapprochement of positions was achieved with regard to the content of relevant declarations as well as to the process of elimination and its control. It has to be noticed that formulations of Articles IV - Measures on Chemical Weapons and V - Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, together with relevant annexes, though still in some instances heavily bracketed and footnoted, show a clearer picture of this difficult part of the convention than was the case last year.

The results achieved in Group B, especially with regard to production facilities, would be very helpful in working out a still outstanding definition of production facility.

What seems to be more and more perceptible is a comprehensive blue-print of indispensable provisions concerning the whole process from declarations up to final elimination of CW stocks and CW production facilities. That is why we see in the present text of these articles obvious signs of progress. No doubt we have gained momentum in our work on these issues, and this momentum should not be lost.

One of the crucial outstanding issues is still the question of challenge inspection. There has been some conceptual rapprochement of positions which, however, does not suffice at present for working out a mutually acceptable solution. I think I would commit no mistake by saying that there seems to be general agreement that challenge inspection should not occur in everyday practice but rather in exceptional circumstances. There is, however, not enough clarity as to what is really meant by these exceptional circumstances. The need to resort to challenge inspection would depend very much on the efficiency of the whole system of verification including systematic on-site inspection. The better the routine verification system, the lesser, to our mind, the probability that challenge inspection would be needed. In short, we think that having a clear and precise picture of the whole system of so-called routine verification would help in final construction of the concept of challenge inspection.

Let me also, Mr. President, dwell briefly on some organizational aspects of our future work. The methods of work should always be in keeping with the stage of progress achieved. What is proper for today may not necessarily be

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

most useful tomorrow. I do not have any concrete ideas to offer at this juncture, but I merely would like to suggest that we should think over how to best organize our future work, which we would like to hope will be the final stage of the elaboration of the preliminary draft of the CW convention.

On the one hand there is an increasing need of a comprehensive review of the whole material with a view to make not only further preliminary drafting but also some rearrangement of the material if necessary.

On the other hand, there are still many detailed, sometimes minor, though important, problems which could be initially elaborated in smaller groups before being the subject of working groups or Committee's consideration.

One of the assets still not fully utilized by us is time. My delegation is of the opinion that there should be no place in our work for too long recesses. That is why we welcome the agreement achieved in the Committee to hold the traditional extended session in January as well as consultations by the Chairman in preparation for this resumed session. However, I would like to point out that the delegations of the socialist countries were prepared to use the recess in our work more fully. Unfortunately, this desire was not shared by some delegations which so often advocate the need for continuous negotiations on the convention.

In concluding I would like to congratulate and thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, for his able guidance of the Committee's work. His chairmanship will continue for some time and I am confident it will be no less productive. Let me also express high appreciation of the contribution made by Ambassador Cromartie's collaborators -- the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Popczew and Mr. Wisnomoerti, whose efforts have brought us closer to our common goal -- a treaty on prohibition of chemical weapons.

Before I finish, may I welcome back in our midst my distinguished neighbour at the Conference table, Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru. I look forward to renewing our co-operation. May I also thank for good co-operation and wish all the best in their future assignments our colleagues who will be leaving Geneva soon, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel of France, and Ambassador Imai, who indicated to us today that he is also preparing to leave. I am sure that their contributions to the work of this Conference will be long remembered.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (People's Republic of China): Mr. President, as the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament is approaching its end, the Chinese delegation wishes to make some observations on the work of the current session and on the outlook for next year.

The current session has been held against the background of certain relaxation in the tense international situation. When the session began, many delegations entertained hopes for progress at the session. Thanks to the joint efforts of all delegations, the session has made some progress over the past six months or so, yet its outcome falls far short of expectations.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, People's Republic of China)

This session, like previous ones, has again failed to set up ad hoc committees on the priority items pertaining to the nuclear issue. For years, people throughout the world have been ardently hoping that the Conference could carry out substantive negotiations on these items and produce practical and effective results. It is therefore disappointing that year after year the Conference has remained in a state of inertia. This year, however, differs from the previous ones in that, under the guidance of Ambassador Sousa de Silva of Brazil, President of the Conference for the month of April, a series of informal meetings were held on item 2, "Cessation of nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", and substantive discussions were held on such issues as the stages and measures of nuclear disarmament. The Chinese delegation took an active part in the discussions. In our view, given the serious divergence of views between various sides on this issue, such informal exchanging of views is conducive to enhancing the understanding of each other's positions, reducing differences and identifying greater common grounds. However, since informal discussions are only an interim arrangement pending the establishment of an ad hoc committee, they cannot supplant substantive negotiations. We share the view of many delegations that the Conference, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum, should play its due role in nuclear disarmament -- an issue of common concern to all countries -- rather than wait idly for the outcome of the negotiations by the two major military Powers. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations, far from being mutually exclusive, are mutually complementary and promotive. We hope that next year the Conference will reach agreement as early as possible on the establishment of ad hoc committees on such issues as a nuclear test ban, nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

Here I would also like to mention the adoption of the Report on the Group of Seismic Experts' Technical Test (GSETT), 1984 and its proposals on future data exchange. We are pleased with this positive result.

Though the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space was relatively late this year, it is a positive result of the current session. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, this Ad Hoc Committee has engaged in extensive and in-depth discussions on issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Delegations have further examined the existing international legal instruments on outer space, held preliminary discussions on the definition of space weapons and put forth various proposals and programmes on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

It is clear from these deliberations that the existing international legal instruments, notwithstanding certain positive significance, all have their limitations and are thus inadequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is therefore necessary to conclude new international legal instruments. More and more delegations agree that at the present stage the Conference should proceed to negotiations with the emphasis on prohibiting all space weapons. Many delegations proposed to start with the prohibition of ASAT weapons. Such a proposal, in our view, merits consideration. In so much as the importance and urgency of the prevention of an arms race in outer space have already been widely recognized, we are of the view that at the beginning of the next session the Conference should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space at an earlier date, so as to enable it to address substantive issues as soon as possible.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, People's Republic of China)

The elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament reflects the urgent desire of the people throughout the world for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament. This year, under the experienced guidance of Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Committee on CPD has carried out intensive and detailed work and managed to overcome numerous difficulties. The six contact groups have made progress to varying degrees, as evidenced by the closer positions of various sides. However, we cannot fail to note that this is still a far cry from the elaboration of a programme acceptable to all parties.

The Chinese delegation has always attached importance to the elaboration of the CPD. We have participated in the discussions and consultations with a constructive approach and made some necessary concessions to facilitate progress in our work. At present, views still differ on the division of stages and time-frames, relating to the introduction and the part on the machinery and procedures of the CPD. In our view, CPD should naturally contain stages and an indicative time-frame for each stage, so as to promote the implementation of disarmament measures. We hope that agreement can soon be reached on this subject.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has all along been an item of greater promise for progress in the Conference. Trends more positive than before have emerged in the negotiations on the Convention this year. The positive and business-like discussions and consultations among delegations have brought about progress on certain issues. For instance, on List C intended for chemicals with wide civilian uses which can at the same time be used for chemical weapon purposes, there is basically a consensus on most of the chemicals to be included in the list and their régime. Preliminary discussions have been held on the contents of List A containing chemicals for key precursors of chemical warfare agents which can at the same time be used for peaceful purposes, and a considerable degree of agreement has been reached on the scope and extent of the data-reporting system. A common understanding has largely been achieved on the need for taking action without warning or unpredictability in routine inspections of the relevant production facilities. There has also been some progress on the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Useful attempts have been made to narrow the differences on challenge inspection, which has long been a subject of deep controversy. In this connection, the working papers put forward by Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Japan merit our attention.

These achievements are inseparable from the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie, and the Chairmen of the three working groups, whose devotion and diligence have contributed to the progress in negotiations. Here I wish to mention the useful role of the workshop on verification sponsored in early June by the Netherlands Government in promoting the negotiations in this field.

While giving due credit to these achievements, we should not overlook the fact that a large amount of work still needs to be done in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in view of the differences on verification, particularly challenge inspection, and on certain other issues that are yet to be solved. We welcome the willingness expressed by the

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, People's Republic of China)

two States with the largest chemical arsenals to expedite the negotiations on chemical weapons and hope that they will substantiate their intention with action.

For many years, the non-nuclear-weapon States have been making ceaseless efforts against the nuclear threat and for security guarantees. China has all along held that the most effective security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to reduce the nuclear threat to non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States should, pending nuclear disarmament, undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones. China has declared on many occasions that it unconditionally assumes this obligation. We are also in favour of concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, it is regrettable that our Conference has been stagnant on the issue of security assurances. We will continue to support all efforts conducive to the breaking of the present impasse.

On the issue of expansion of the membership of the Conference, the successive Presidents of the current session have all engaged in most responsible and patient consultations with various parties. Since the number of applying States is more than double the number that can be admitted, difficulties of selection have naturally arisen. We hope that a solution acceptable to all will be found so that those peace-loving countries that have actually contributed to the cause of disarmament can be soon admitted. For this purpose, we have proposed seeking a partial solution when a comprehensive one is unfeasible all at once and settling the remainder of the problem when conditions are ripe. The Chinese delegation will continue to consult with other delegations in order to facilitate the solution of this issue.

Not long ago, the leaders of Mexico, Argentina, Greece, Sweden, India and Tanzania held an important meeting and issued the Mexico Declaration, calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to immediately stop nuclear testing and urging the leaders of the two countries to continue the negotiations on such issues as the reduction of nuclear armaments. The Declaration also voiced opposition to the development of ASAT weapons by the two super-Powers and to their arms race in outer space. This is a just demand for peace and disarmament.

Cessation of the arms race and the maintenance of world peace are the common aspiration and strong demand of the people throughout the world and of all peace-advocating countries. The super-Powers pursuit of military preponderance through various means and their intense confrontation have created turbulence in the international situation and aroused worldwide discontent and opposition. To settle differences and disputes through dialogue has become the trend of the contemporary world, it is welcomed by and enjoys the attention of the international community. We sincerely hope that, at such an important juncture, the Conference on Disarmament will score real achievements, instead of going through the motions.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, People's Republic of China)

His Excellency Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Alfred Sylvester Gonsalves of India, His Excellency Ambassador Nourdine Kerroum of Algeria, and His Excellency Ambassador Jacques Jessel of France will leave the Conference soon. Just now we heard that Ambassador Imai of Japan will also leave us soon. Though the duration of their involvement in the Conference varies, their experience, knowledge and valuable contributions have won praise from us all. Please allow me to wish them further and greater successes in the future.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I would like to wish you success in discharging your heavy duties at the last stage of this session. The talent and devotion you have displayed in performing your functions are highly appreciated by all of us. I would also like to thank the President for the previous month, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, for the enormous effort he made. I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to thank Ambassador Komatina, Ambassador Berasategui and the staff of the Secretariat for their industrious efforts and their assistance to the Chinese delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind comments addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I did not intend to make this statement. But I am bound to do so because, at our last meeting, a question was put to my delegation. For wider reasons too, I am obliged to exercise the right of replying to the statement made, last Tuesday, by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. President, in the Australian Parliament -- the Australian political system is one of parliamentary democracy -- there is an established convention under which any Member of Parliament may seek the attention of the presiding officer and request that he be permitted to make a personal explanation. The form is that the presiding officer then enquires of that member whether or not he claims to have been misrepresented. If the Member then claims to have been misrepresented, he is, automatically, granted leave to make his explanation.

This is not quite the procedure followed in this Conference and on this occasion I want to make it clear that my delegation certainly does claim to have been at least misrepresented in the statement made by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic.

But I want to make it equally clear that what I will say now is by no means an explanation. I make this latter point because, as any rational person knows, it is axiomatic that an explanation is what is not required in the face of misrepresentation. What is required is a correction.

In his statement, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic claimed that "it is difficult for some delegations, however, to explain why they do not support a negotiating mandate which would open a direct road to the conclusion of such a treaty" -- that is, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation has no such difficulty. We have stated repeatedly that our policy and purpose is to take the "direct road" to the conclusion of a nuclear-test ban treaty. This is precisely why we have supported and continue to support the mandate proposed in CD/521.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

If that direct road has been severed, if it has had a massive road block built across it, it has been so impeded by those such as the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic and the group of States for which he has sometimes spoken who have insisted that nothing can take place, that no passage down that "direct road" can occur unless we first genuflect to the mere word "negotiation". This blockage is confirmed only a few sentences later in the most recent statement by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, when he speaks of the need for us to start "meaningful" work.

What would be "meaningful" work other than work on the scope of the means of verification and compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty? This is precisely the meaningful work, specifically defined and called for in the draft mandate provided in document CD/521.

While the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has avoided addressing this question when he refers to "meaningful" work, he has not resisted the temptation of throwing up the other, now extraordinarily tired and battered roadblock which is to question the need for collective work on the means of verification of a test-ban treaty. Indeed, he has chosen to distort what my delegation and other Western delegations have said about verification when he has claimed that we want to concentrate "predominantly" on the issue of verification.

Mr. President, if this seems confused, then we should be patient, because there is more.

The Ambassador claimed that the German Democratic Republic "supports effective and reliable verification and compliance with a test ban", yet he charges us with some deception or with some transgression when we say that we want the same. But he is generous. He offers a solution and that is that "the verification issue can, in the final analysis, only be resolved in connection with the drafting of a treaty".

May I pose another question, that is, why? Why does he assert that these two related but quite different activities must be inherently, fundamentally, connected? The drafting of a treaty is something that we all know could be done, perhaps not in the twinkle of an eye, but in only a little longer time than that. The treaty itself would be an amazingly simple document. After all, it would presumably contain one and only one obligation, that is, never to conduct nuclear tests. The hard part is to settle the scope of such a treaty and to build the means of verification and compliance with the simple undertaking that would be stated in that treaty.

So, by making the difficult part completely dependent upon the totally simple part, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic would single-handedly prevent the beginning of work on solving the only serious problems which need to be solved if there is to be an end to nuclear testing. And he asks us to believe that this policy is pursued because of the sanctity of an entirely notional concept called negotiation. And worse, he says that those who question the logic and sincerity of his position should stand accused of some kind of perfidy.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

My delegation has proposed that the Conference establish, without delay, a global seismological network. Australia has done this because it knows that such a network will be required as part of the means of verifying compliance with a nuclear test-ban treaty. We have made this proposal now because we know that, if a treaty were written down on a piece of paper in the way that the German Democratic Republic seems to prefer, it would be nothing more than a piece of paper, unless and until the obligations it established were able to be verified. We have also made this proposal partly because the work of the Group of Scientific Experts has progressed to the point, and will progress further, where it is practical and feasible for such a global network to be established. Yet the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has said this proposal is not acceptable.

I pose another question: Why is it not acceptable, especially given that he says his Government and those other Governments for whom he is occasionally charged to speak, want to see the means of verification of a treaty established? Why, then, is this proposal not acceptable to his Government? What reason does he give?

The best answer he has been able to supply so far is an answer in the form of a question to my delegation to the effect: will we be prepared to consider a "slight modification" to our proposal so that it proposes the establishment forthwith of a global seismological monitoring network "in the framework of a USSR-United States moratorium on nuclear testing"?

So, all is now revealed: The delegation which claims an interest in any means of verification is not, in fact, interested in the establishment of such means. Apparently its only interest is to use the proposal for such a network as a bargaining chip, as leverage, towards the establishment of a bilateral nuclear testing moratorium.

By this action, he makes the establishment of a vital means of verification, a means that would be fundamental to any serious global non-nuclear testing régime, hostage to a different and separate political consideration. Surely this calls into serious question the sincerity of his Government's position and that of any others for whom he claims to speak, on the fundamental issue of verification as such. Specifically, nowhere does he say that a global seismological system isn't needed, can't be built, or wouldn't work. He prefers instead a bilateral moratorium. I guess this would sit well with his proposed chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe. I might be forgiven for commenting that such Eurocentricity is matched only by this gross insensitivity to our 40-nation Conference. Quite simply, what about the other nuclear-weapon States? What about those of us who don't live in Europe? What about French nuclear testing in the Pacific? Most of us in this room want a universal comprehensive test ban, not a bilateral moratorium. It was interesting that just half an hour ago in this room, the representative of the Soviet Union confirmed that a bilateral moratorium is "not an end in itself but an important first step towards a treaty". The Soviet Union would thus seem to be clearer about our real objective than it has appeared to be in the past and we will certainly study carefully the paper tabled today. Perhaps the delegation of the German Democratic Republic may now wish, in the light of that announcement, to reconsider the question it put to us last Tuesday.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Anyone who is serious about bringing about an end to nuclear testing via a treaty with that purpose and effect will begin by recognizing that it is easy to write down the treaty obligation on a piece of paper. The hard part is to produce the means of verification which will make that treaty effective. Thus we should begin by solving the practical problems of verification. To refuse to do this is to refuse to walk down what the German Democratic Republic has called the "direct road".

I recall that at about this time last year I made a statement in this Conference on the same issue. Interestingly, it was, if I recall correctly, at least partly in response to a statement made by the representative of the German Democratic Republic. In that statement I said that, while the first victim of misrepresentation was truth itself, the real cost was progress towards a test ban treaty. It appears that, at least because of the actions from one side of this house, the victim has remained the same in 1986 and we have been obliged to continue to pay the same price. I hope this will stop soon.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. I might clarify one point on which I do not think that there is any difference of views. The opening comments of the Australian delegation suggest that the practice of entitlement to a right of reply is not the usual procedure in the Conference. Whatever views may be on that, it is my understanding that a delegation is entitled to request a right of reply and I wanted to confirm that I am not aware of any such request having been made earlier and denied. I think it may be just a case of interpretation of the opening comments.

I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Jessel, who I think is not making his valedictory statement, but his penultimate statement.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): As you just said, Mr. President, this is indeed not my valedictory statement, but as I am taking the floor for the first time since you have assumed the Presidency, allow me to extend to you my heartiest congratulations. I should like to congratulate you as the representative of a country which my country has particular reasons to cherish because, as you said correctly, Canada has the privilege of having two mother countries, one of which is France, and that explains the warmth and the permanence of our ties.

I should also like to congratulate you personally. I think we can rightly be glad that you have the formidable honour of presiding over our destinies during this difficult month of August, for by the many qualities which you have, your calm, your prudence, your persuasiveness, you have already begun to show us the way towards a reasonable and satisfactory conclusion of our work during this session. But to get there will still require from you, and from all of us, a great deal of effort.

I would also like to thank Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, who preceded you as President and who, in guiding our work during the month of July, showed enormous patience and good will.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

I would also like to tell those of our colleagues who have left or will soon leave us how grateful I am for the bonds of esteem and friendship we were able to establish and I would like to express my warmest wishes to them in their future assignments, to Ambassador Gonsalves of India, and to Ambassador Imai of Japan, who will soon be leaving us. I would also like to extend the same wishes to Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, our neighbour in the Mediterranean with whom we have so many things in common. I would, further, like to tell all of them that I hope we will meet again in the pursuit of our nomadic careers. I would also like to express warm wishes to Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany and to his successor, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. With the first I have established, and with the second I am beginning to establish, relations akin to the close and exemplary contacts of co-operation and friendship that have developed between our two countries, not only to their mutual benefit but also, I think, to the advantage of the international community as a whole because the world community can only welcome the reconciliation between France and Germany which has played, and I think will continue to play, a considerable role. As you know, Mr. President, I shall also be joining the ranks of those who are leaving, but a little later, at the end of September.

I hope to have another opportunity to take stock of the results and prospects of our present session and I would like to devote my statement today to our negotiations on chemical weapons. I should like to say at the outset that I do not share the opinion of those who consider that these negotiations are only a secondary matter. On the contrary, this is a problem and these are negotiations to which we attach great importance and it is our impression that many people around this table share that attitude. In addition, our role as a depositary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 induces us to give this problem particular attention and vigilance. For this reason we continue to denounce all violations of that Protocol wherever they occur and by whomever they are perpetrated. For this reason we are anxious to help with everything that can further progress in the current negotiations.

For this reason too, we are happy to note that the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups have done a serious job, in a constructive spirit, as the report adopted yesterday by the Committee shows. The Workshop on verification organized by the Netherlands in June gave a first-hand view of the complexity of the problems which confront us and contributed to the serious atmosphere and realism of our work this summer. For that reason, I am happy to join those who have already expressed their deep gratitude to the Netherlands authorities for having organized that very useful meeting and organized it so well.

We welcome the decision taken, as last year, to continue consultations between sessions in order to make progress on the matters remaining pending. France had been making similar proposals for a long time; it even hoped that more would be done, but the agreement now reached is satisfactory.

It is true, after all, that a whole series of problems still require considerable work for the various viewpoints to be brought closer together. That is why, in particular, agreement has not yet been possible on the question which is at the heart of our negotiations, that of verification of compliance with the Convention. Within our Conference, and outside it too,

(Mr. Jessel, France)

everyone has noted the new things being said on this matter by the Soviet Union. However, the clarifications we have been given, including those given within the framework of the Conference, do not seem to us to have provided so far the truly decisive elements that we expected. We must therefore patiently continue the search for a satisfactory solution to this key problem.

Here in April I presented France's view of the general structure of a verification system based, in almost all cases, on international on-site inspections -- "routine" inspections -- and on the regular exchange of statistical data. Unfortunately, this has been a further year with no in-depth discussion of those matters.

To be complete, the system we have to set up must also provide for the exceptional cases where, doubt having arisen regarding the compliance with its obligations by a State party to the Convention, the regular "routine" inspection measures cannot be enough to dissipate it. In that case it becomes necessary to be able to resort to other measures, to other machinery. To be effective, such a "safety net" must, in our view, meet several criteria: first, the time interval between the request for an on-site inspection and the implementation of that request should be extremely brief so that there is no time to get rid of the evidence of a possible violation, for this reason, the procedure must be automatic, that is a State which wants to initiate an inspection should not have to go through an institutional obstacle course which, aside from wasting time, would also have the disadvantage of making it possible to block a request; finally, replying to a challenge should as a general rule be mandatory and not simply voluntary. Only if it meets these three criteria can an international on-site challenge-inspection régime serve as a genuine deterrent.

The United Kingdom delegation has submitted to the Conference, in working document CD/715, a draft which meets these criteria. It is based on two fundamental elements which seem to us both to guarantee the effectiveness of the system proposed and to respect the legitimate security requirements of each State.

To explain: on the one hand, the United Kingdom proposal calls for a public procedure of which the bodies of the Convention would be kept fully informed from beginning to end but the implementation of which would be the responsibility of the two States concerned, the State which requests the inspection and the State to which the request is addressed. The initiation of the procedure as well as the consequences to be drawn therefrom are up to them. Thus, whether the replies given by the "challenged" State are satisfactory or not can, all things considered, only be decided by the party whose suspicions have been aroused.

The second characteristic of this proposal is to provide that in very exceptional cases, where the security of a State is at stake, satisfaction could be given by measures other than unrestricted access to the installation with regard to which there are doubts. But those measures would have to be such as to enable the challenging State to come to the conviction that prohibited activities were not taking place at the installation in question. A State which requests an inspection being by definition the only judge of when

(Mr. Jessel, France)

it considers itself reassured regarding the activities being carried out at the installation, this procedure seems to us to meet the requirements that I have just stated. In addition, it would have a deterrent effect because no State concerned with its international reputation would be likely to take the risk of undertaking manufacture in violation of the Convention when it had, in advance, accepted as a general rule that an international inspection team could go to factories that came under suspicion.

The situation is different for the proposals that have been put forward elsewhere. Those which would only allow inspection at sites defined in advance would have the effect of defining, a contrario, the places where it would be permissible to circumvent the provisions of the Convention. Others, which would leave open the possibility of purely and simply refusing a request for access, would simply aggravate the crisis of confidence which has led to the call for challenge inspection, yet others, which would permit parties to hide behind delaying procedures within a committee that would in all likelihood be unable, because of the absence of agreement among its members, to make the necessary decisions, would ultimately lead to a result just as negative as the rest.

For all these reasons, and after very careful study of the problem, the French delegation gives its full support to the United Kingdom proposal. It earnestly hopes that that proposal will win the support of all sides and thus contribute to solving one of the key problems of these negotiations.

On this occasion I should also like to compliment the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Mr. Cromartie, on his efforts as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and to thank him for the results that have been achieved due largely to his skilful tenacity, as well as to the work done by the chairmen of the various working groups. We are happy to see that he will, as usual, be continuing his work at the head of the Committee until next February, and we earnestly hope to see that he will be able to make further progress during that period. He will find that all the easier if we all help him in the firm determination to move ahead and to achieve results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France. In asking whether any other delegation would like to take the floor, and I see the German Democratic Republic has asked me to do so, I would inform you that I am proposing to leave the decision required of us on the Ad Hoc Seismic Group report until 3 p.m. this afternoon, because we are running into the problem of going past 1 p.m. So what I would propose for this afternoon is that we have a very brief plenary meeting to take that decision and immediately go into informal plenary to resume work on our report. I would leave it to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, and now I have also Czechoslovakia, to decide whether they wish to speak now or whether they will speak at 3 p.m.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Please give me a few minutes, I will be very brief. If you would permit, I should like to make a short statement.

The PRESIDENT: I have already said that every delegation has the right of reply and I would let the delegations in question pick the timing of it. I

(The President)

intended also, however, to allow you the necessary time, which you would then have at your disposal better, at 3 p.m., but go ahead now.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I listened with indignation to the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler. My first impression is that the length of his statement is a clear indication of the difficulties he had in giving a clear answer to a very simple question which I put to him last Tuesday, concerning the proposal submitted in document CD/717. The style of statement is another proof that some delegations have difficulties in entering into a business-like and substantive discussion and exchange of opinions, as soon as their position is questioned. I have to examine whether the rest of the statement is worth responding to but, in any case, I have immediately to reject the unbelievable accusations against my delegation and my Government. I have also to reject the unbelievable distortions regarding our position in general and the position I outlined in my statement last Tuesday. Misleading is not enough, it was distorting.

Ambassador Butler should know that we are not political chameleons, and our position as far as a nuclear test ban has been and will be that we are only in favour of a reliable or reliably verifiable test ban and that is what I explained last Tuesday. As far as the proposal in CD/717 is concerned, I would recommend to Ambassador Butler to put it to a decision so that we can see who is in favour and who is against.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic. I do not wish either to prevail unduly upon the representative of Czechoslovakia but, if he is willing to wait, then we could perhaps resume our meeting at 3 p.m.

I now have also requests from the representatives of Australia and Mexico.

I would make a plea to all of you to agree to make your statements at 3 p.m. this afternoon; I would even say 3.15 p.m., against all principles, since we are running over a little bit. Do I have the agreement of all of you? The representative of Czechoslovakia has the floor.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I will be extremely brief. I just wanted to say now something it will not be possible to say in the afternoon.

We have always listened with interest to Ambassador Butler's statements and I think that his eloquence and his oratory have brought juice into our deliberations; that we have sometimes admired. But today, and I must say not only today, in his statement there is a certain aspect which surprised us: trying to put the blame for the lack of progress on the issue of a test ban on someone upon whom the blame should not lie. I think this is not the way that we shall break the vicious circle into which we are moving. My delegation fully supports the endeavours of the Government of the German Democratic Republic for disarmament -- as is well known -- and it fully supports also the endeavours and work of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic here. That is all I wanted to say.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia, who, like the preceding speaker, was brief, and call on the representative of Australia. After his statement I shall determine whether others wish to speak.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): In his right of reply, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic said among other things that he would like to examine the statement that I made. For that purpose, I had intended to provide him with a text after I had made my statement. But I wonder if I could ask him through you, does he already have a copy of my text?

The PRESIDENT: I believe that a question has been addressed to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, I will not attempt to answer on his behalf. I do now call on the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): As what I have to say is very short and as we shall probably be able to finish our work on this item this morning, I prefer to speak now. I only have the English text here, so I shall read that and make things easier for the interpreters, who will not have to work any more. At the 363rd meeting, on 19 June 1986, I made a statement in the course of which I said:

"If our goal is that the comprehensive test-ban treaty for which we are striving should include among its provisions all those that seem desirable for suitable verification of the obligations entered into, a view with which my delegation has always agreed, I think that resolution 40/80 A which I have already mentioned provides for a procedure offering every guarantee that this will be so. That resolution not only calls on all States members of this Conference, and 'in particular the three depositaries of the Moscow Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty' to promote the establishment of 'an ad hoc committee to carry out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions', but also expressly recommends to the Conference that 'it instruct such an ad hoc committee to establish two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

- (a) Working Group I - Structure, and scope of the treaty,
- (b) Working Group II - compliance and verification.'.

This resolution, which, of the four adopted by the General Assembly at its last annual meeting on the topic with which I am dealing, was the one that received the highest number (124) of votes in favour, was based on a draft sponsored by a group of nine non-aligned or neutral States -- Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico -- and certainly represents a praiseworthy example of a conciliatory effort to satisfy, without prejudice to principles, the standpoint of the very small number of members of the Conference which have hitherto made it impossible to progress in the consideration of this topic.

With regard to the Group of 21, whose position on this matter has been supported by a Group of Socialist States and by China, it may be said that the procedure advocated in resolution 40/80 A represents a step of not 50 but 90 per cent to bridge the distance between the two positions."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico. I would like to conclude the meeting. I still have some things I must say, particularly, I must put to you the decision on the Ad Hoc Seismic Group report. May I recommend to Ambassador Butler that he follow up on his question, if he deems it necessary, after lunch, when we reconvene, rather than now. I cannot insist on that, of course, if he wishes to take the floor. I give him the floor.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): This will not take more than a minute. I posed a very serious question a few moments ago, through you, to the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, which he declined to answer. I would like to make clear why I posed that question.

First of all, the text that I delivered today is different from some 15 copies which I delivered to the secretariat solely for interpretation purposes, because I made some amendments to the text before delivery. Secondly, it has been drawn to my attention that it seems extremely likely that, in fact, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has a copy of my text. I so -- and I would be delighted to learn that this is not the case -- if so, there has been an unauthorized distribution of my text to the Ambassador and I think that is a matter of very serious concern to all of us.

The PRESIDENT: Since the question Mr. Butler has posed raises some matters that are sufficiently important and serious to warrant consultations between the Secretary-General and myself, I suggest we pursue this after the luncheon break, not with any idea of sweeping anything under the rug, but rather in order to give people a chance to keep commitments they may have made and also to come back refreshed and make a new start on the problems facing us. So I will now adjourn the meeting until 3.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and reconvened at 3.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I am going to begin with the question that was left open to us all when the meeting was suspended. I had thought that the information I am now about to make known had already been passed on to Ambassador Butler and I expect we will not have to return to this matter. I have been informed that the document in question was not the one which it was perceived to be -- that it was another one, a previous statement that looked very much like it. This is the reason for the confusion and the misunderstanding. As has been indicated privately, not on the record, there was no advance text given to the delegation in question. I would ask all delegations to accept that in good faith. I would also ask the Secretary-General to state for the record the normal practice on such matters and what steps he took in this case to ensure that the normal practice was followed. After this has been done, I hope we can go back to other matters.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament): I would like, for the record, to say the following:

The secretariat considers the distribution of documentation as a very serious problem which it handles always very carefully. The secretariat is very sensitive to avoid any negligence, let alone non-observance of rules. The proof that it is so is that, during the several years of existence of the Conference. Such a situation has never occurred before. We control carefully, to the extent possible, all documentation at our disposal, including the

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament)

copies of speeches, of course, and their circulation. I want to assure the Conference that we will continue to do all that is possible to ensure the normal functioning of the whole system of servicing of the Conference and the handling of its documentation.

As this particular problem arose, we have investigated and found out that all copies were in the possession of members of the secretariat who were supposed to have them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General for that explanation. Does the representative of Australia wish to comment? I give him the floor.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Of course the security of documentation is an extremely important issue. Our task in this Conference is difficult enough without it being made more difficult by unauthorized passage of documentation between delegations or anywhere else. I raised the question that I raised this morning because, as I said, I had every reason to believe that our colleague from the German Democratic Republic had received, and in advance, an unauthorized copy of the statement that I was about to make.

One of the reasons why I believed that was that, and I would like this to be on the record, about half an hour before I spoke, ...

The PRESIDENT: I wish to interrupt the representative of Australia.

I will set aside time at the end of the day if delegates wish to stay and hear this. I want to get on with our work. I have given an explanation and asked you all to take it in good faith. I take it for granted that the Australian delegate would not have raised this kind of issue unless he had what appeared to be good reason for doing so. He does not need to demonstrate his good faith. We take it for granted and I think that can be said of other delegates, and certainly of the secretariat. I do not think that there has been any implication of improper conduct on the part of the secretariat. We have heard an explanation and I really plead with you all to leave this matter to rest and get back to our work. We do not have this kind of time and I mean that as no criticism of any delegate. I think we do have to get on. I ask the Australian delegate kindly to heed the President's plea.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, this morning you said that this matter would be looked into and that it would not be swept under the carpet, I took that in good faith. I would now propose to accept your decision that we should get on with our business. I regret to say that it remains my view that your intention that this matter not be swept under the carpet has not been fulfilled.

The PRESIDENT: We shall get on with our work now. I will ask the Deputy Secretary-General to speak to the Australian delegate along the lines that I understood he had done, but it turned out that there was an incomplete communication of information. But I am not prepared to hear this kind of thing.

(The President)

As announced at the close of the plenary meeting, I will now put before the Conference for decision the recommendations contained in document CD/721, entitled "Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events". May I remind delegations that those recommendations appear in the first sentence of paragraph 12, as well as in paragraphs 14 and 15. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts those recommendations.

It was so decided.

In accordance with the decision that we have just taken, the next session of the Ad Hoc Group will be convened from 2 to 13 March 1987.

At this stage I have some further information, some of it bad news, about our own timetable and the flexibility of it as things are going, but I will call on the distinguished representative of the USSR. I would make a plea to him that, if it is in connection with the subject discussed just before, he try and adhere to the same stipulation that other delegations adopted and be as brief as possible.

Mr. KASHIRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We have been compelled to ask for the floor because at this morning's meeting the representative of Australia initiated a discussion and, regrettably, quite rudely made what, to our mind, were insulting attacks on the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. In so doing, the representative of Australia resorted to what, in our view, were not entirely fitting methods of using statements by, in particular, the Soviet delegation to the effect that the Soviet Union views a moratorium not as an end in itself or as a substitute for a comprehensive test ban treaty, but as an important first step towards such a treaty. The distinguished representative of Australia made accusations against the German Democratic Republic, alleging that the delegation of that country was distorting Australia's position. I think that such a description is entirely applicable to the methods that have been employed today by the representative of Australia. Yes, the Soviet Union views a moratorium as something other than an end in itself; that is entirely obvious, and the entire logic of human thought tells us that a moratorium is really a temporary measure. When, at Tuesday's meeting, the representative of the German Democratic Republic suggested an amendment to the Australian proposal so that that proposal would be truly applicable to a moratorium by the USSR and the United States, that appeal to another nuclear Power seemingly similarly aroused the anger of the Australian delegation. But why, if the Australian delegation is so concerned to achieve the earliest possible agreement on the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, does it not, like the Delhi Six and many other delegations here and non-aligned States, call upon the other nuclear Powers to follow the example of the Soviet Union? That would really open the way to the achievement of a genuine and verifiable accord. The Soviet Union will not accept verification of the conducting of tests; it has said that repeatedly and will say it again. The Soviet Union will accept the most resolute and effective measures for the verification of the non-conducting of such tests. And that is just what was proposed in the suggestion by the German Democratic Republic.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union. I will now refer to the timetable that I mentioned, then I propose to adjourn the meeting. Delegates can, of course, return to the issue of substance, should they so desire, at the next plenary meeting.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week. Unlike other cases during the annual session, I should inform you that this time the timetable may not be subject to change. We have to try to keep to it if at all possible. As we approach the last week of the annual session, we should conclude our second reading of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations at the latest on Wednesday, 27 August, early in the afternoon. Any delay beyond that date would imply a postponement in the closing date, with additional financial expenditures which I am sure we want to avoid. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that timetable.

It was so decided.

I wish to recall the intention expressed earlier, this morning, that the Conference will hold an informal meeting in a few moments in order to continue its first reading of the substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under items 3 and 6, as well as item 2, if we have time to take it up.

Before I adjourn the meeting, I give the floor to the Australian delegation.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I do appreciate that we have had a very active morning. I, in fact, had asked much earlier this morning to be listed to speak following the adoption of the report of the Group of Scientific Experts and it is on that subject that I would like to speak very briefly.

Australia supports and welcomes the adoption by the Conference of the 22nd report of the Group of Scientific Experts. We support the programme of work it contains and will contribute to it to the very best of our ability. As is well known in this Conference, Australia has submitted, in document CD/717, a proposal on the establishment of a global seismological network. Such a development would be consistent both with the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts and the past results and with the future programme of its work. We had hoped that, on the adoption of the 22nd report of the Group of Scientific Experts, the Conference would also be able to take a decision in terms of document CD/717. I understand that this will not be possible today, but Australia hopes, however, that the Conference and the Group of Scientific Experts will take the Australian proposal fully into account in their future work. We will also seek to ensure that our proposal is appropriately noted in the 1986 report of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Australian delegate and apologise for the inadvertence on the part of the President for not calling on him; I did not understand earlier that he would wish to speak.

(The President)

If there are no other speakers, I am going to adjourn the plenary meeting, but may I remind you that we are going to resume in informal plenary virtually immediately.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 August, at 10.00 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.