

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 August 1986, at 10. a.m.

President: Mr. J. Alan Beesley (Canada)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 379th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, may I warmly welcome His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati who will be the first speaker at the plenary meeting today. Delegates will recall that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has made statements in this Conference before, the last time being on 27 February of this year. I wish to thank him for the interest he shows in our work.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As you know, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held its twenty-second session from 21 July to 1 August this year. As a result of its work, the Ad Hoc Group is submitting to the Conference three documents, as follows:

(a) Document CD/681/Rev.1, entitled, "Summary of the Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/720)",

(b) Document CD/720, entitled, "Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events",

(c) Document CD/721, entitled, "Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events".

May I draw your attention to the recommendations contained in paragraphs 12 (first sentence), 14 and 15 of the Progress Report appearing in document CD/721. I am inviting today the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group to introduce the documentation put before the Conference and to report to you on further steps that the Conference may need to take in connection with the work of the Group. We shall take up those recommendations at our plenary meeting on Thursday, 21 August. At the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, the secretariat is also circulating an informal paper containing a draft communication to be addressed by me, as President of the Conference, to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization. That draft communication reflects the recommendations contained in the Progress Report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group in document CD/721. Accordingly, once the Conference adopts those recommendations I intend to address a communication to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization as circulated this morning. Of course, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group will be available for any clarification that members might wish to obtain in connection with the suggestions that he has advanced in the informal paper.

(The President)

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the representative of the United Kingdom.

I now give the floor to His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, at the outset I would like to congratulate you on your Presidency of the Conference. I am sure that under your stewardship, the Conference will greatly contribute to the deliberations and to the successful discharge of its responsibilities. Today the entire world community is looking anxiously towards the work of this Conference, and here lies a historic opportunity to serve humanity and make history if we are able here to reach our objectives.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a newly born system, has been faced with numerous problems and obstacles which have been imposed upon it, and consequently we have not been able to play a complete and decisive role in the realization of the objectives of the Conference. This does not, however, negate the importance and seriousness we attach to these deliberations and as a member of the Conference on Disarmament we keenly follow its discussions and the deliberations in various committees.

The insane arms race poses a threat to the whole human community and it therefore deserves a lot of attention by any country. Apart from its universal dimensions, the subject is crucial to us for several reasons. Our country is located in a very sensitive and strategic region, under threat from direct military rivalries of the super-Powers. We have been witness to the increase of their spheres of influence and military presence in the countries of the region. The sophisticated arms delivery to the countries of the region in the past two decades is comparable with the total amount delivered to the Third World and developing countries. From the inception of the Iraqi aggression on 22 September 1980, we have been subjected to and victimized by the most sophisticated conventional and chemical weapons. We have directly experienced human loss and material damage and I am now addressing you with the deep feelings and complete comprehension of the effects of these weapons. Although we have countered and neutralized the weapons delivered by East and West, thanks to the self-sacrifice of our young, we are gradually increasing our awareness of the sensitivity attached to the international efforts for the reduction of the arms race. This awareness, particularly concerning the inhuman chemical weapons, is growing deeper and stronger. I am sorry that I have to start my statement from this very same subject, and more unfortunate still is the fact that the use of mass-killing chemical weapons has been repeated.

You are all aware of the latest report, issued in March 1986, document S/17911, filed by a United Nations team dispatched by the United Nations Secretary-General to probe into the use of chemical weapons. As you know, this is the third consecutive report. In 1984, the United Nations confirmed that chemical weapons were used in Iraqi aggression against Iran, and in 1985 the repeated use was reaffirmed after afflicted Iranians were sent for

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treatment. In the last report, Iraq was introduced as the frequent deployer of chemical weapons on a large scale. All of these reports were followed by statements by the Security Council and a number of countries condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, but none of these measures prevented the Iraqis from repeating such grave crimes.

Since the foundation of the United Nations Organization, this is the first time that a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol has officially been denounced as the flagrant violator of this Protocol, repeatedly committing these crimes. This crime is not confined to one particular country, but rather others will be affected by its consequences. Deployment of chemical weapons from World War I became an international issue crucial to the peace and security of the countries. In this very Conference, the subject of the prevention of production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been as equally important as the issue of nuclear weapons. But at the same time, a small country like Iraq is allowed to be equipped with sophisticated chemicals and to use them at various junctures.

Our studies, as reflected in the United Nations reports, show that Iraq has deployed cyanide and nerve gas in addition to mustard gas. The Iraqi régime does not possess the technical expertise to produce such weapons, particularly the nerve gas to which only a few countries have access because of its sophistication. We have information about the exportation of chemical weapons and the related technology to Iraq and these studies will be continued. However, this responsibility does not fall solely on us, as a victim of chemical weapons, but rather it is a common and international duty for all countries, particularly the members of the Conference on Disarmament as well as the relevant decision-making organ of the United Nations and other international organs which should carry out a thorough investigation into the matter.

With the continued deployment of chemical weapons by the régime of Iraq, the international duty to adopt practical and serious measures, vis-à-vis this régime, and to investigate the countries which have provided it with chemical weapons, becomes extremely serious. The Benelux countries have banned the exportation of 12 chemical substances to Iraq following the Security Council's statement of 21 March 1986 condemning the Iraqi régime. Other members of the European Community have also adopted special measures to impose controls on certain substances which can be turned into chemical weapons. It is, however, clear that such actions by a few countries concerning a limited number of substances and without thorough executive verification are in no way sufficient. Since the adoption of the Security Council's statement of 21 March, Iraq has deployed chemical weapons on five separate occasions in different places, the last of which was on 28 May 1986 in Gorgan and Amirabad in the south-west of the country -- resulting in the injury of over 50 persons. Mustard gas was used in all these instances and this has been reported to the Secretary-General with a request that teams be dispatched to investigate. Owing to Iraq's past record, no investigation was felt necessary in this regard and the cases were confirmed. In one case only, and following a long procrastination, we received a positive response for the dispatch of a probing team where the traces had, with the lapse of time, eroded away. Medical reports are sent to the Secretary-General on a regular basis.

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The criminal action by Iraq has endangered the whole validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If a country such as Iraq can violate this Protocol flagrantly and extensively and also keeps its insistence of its stance, then what kind of guarantee will exist for the implementation of the Protocol and even other international commitments by other countries? We are of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament must heed and ask the co-operation of the United Nations on the implementation of the following points: first, re-condemnation of the use of chemical weapons as a "war crime"; second, investigation into the suppliers of chemical weapons and substances to Iraq; third, a total ban on the exportation to Iraq of chemical substances and related technology which can be used to manufacture chemical weapons; fourth, the dispatch of an investigation team by the Secretary-General whenever demanded by the Islamic Republic of Iran at the earliest possible date; fifth, a demand to all countries to once again announce their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which has been weakened by Iraq; and sixth, a direct call on Iraq to commit itself not to repeat the use of chemical weapons. Until the Iraqi régime announces this officially and publicly, we reserve the right to defend ourselves.

In the meantime, it seems that the continuation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has drawn the attention of all nations towards the dangers emanating from such weapons and, contrary to other working groups of the Conference on Disarmament, we have been witness to a certain progress. Particularly in the current session on discussions related to the Convention on banning the production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons -- although achieving a final result seems remote. Regardless of agreement on those kinds of chemical substances which can be turned into weapons and their inclusion in the Convention, the modalities and nature of the implementation of the provisions of the Convention about other countries and the way of compliance and verification have still not gained any definite agreement. It is true that if any country is given the right of verification whenever its local information provides it, this matter provides certain ground for abuse, but allowing this process to depend on the consent of the other party can also create practical impediments to the implementation of the Treaty. Recent proposals in this area can lead us to a breakthrough although we believe that an international committee should make the final decision and judgement on the verification of each case. Such a committee should give top priority to the verification and destruction of stockpiles and means of producing chemical weapons in those countries identified as users of chemical weapons.

It is unfortunate to say that except in the chemical field, the Conference did not make noticeable progress and that the arms race showed an upward trend. This process, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, poses a great threat for the future of humanity, capable of destroying the whole globe several times over. There is no winner for a nuclear holocaust while its loser will be the whole of humanity. The development of nuclear arsenals must be stopped immediately as the first step, but it seems that so long as the idea of "deterrence" prevails for achieving supremacy over the world, there will be no hope for the arrest of the arms race. Deterrence is in fact a justification to gain might and use it for expansion of the sphere of influence among the smaller countries. In this context, disarmament is a matter in tune with decolonization moves and the arms race a colonial policy.

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The non-aligned and Third World countries have unfortunately entered this game of tension, intentionally or unintentionally, by using them in their relations. Competition for maintaining military supremacy on one hand leads to the deepening of dependence on the industrial countries and on the other intensifies the threat of armed conflicts among the Third World countries. What can guarantee the establishment of peace and security in the long run is reliance on the principle of common and equal security for all nations. If the Big Powers are not ready to abide by such a policy, the Third World countries as well as smaller nations should take the lead in this area.

A crucial point which has generated numerous debates and arguments is the recent initiatives to intensify the arms race in outer space. While backing and supporting the international measures and the attention paid by the members of this Conference to prevent such an adventurist move, we believe that there is a need for a more comprehensive and encompassing action. Outer space is the "common heritage of mankind" and should be used in a peaceful manner for all nations and not merely the developed ones. It has unfortunately turned into a militarized zone by a few countries, and both super-Powers, along with the countries having the technology, have saturated space with military and spy satellites. More than 90 per cent of satellites today have military purposes. The notion that the world military Powers have to acquire constant information in order to maintain mutual confidence in East-West military relations might be a justification for the presence of spy satellites, but the sphere of action of these satellites is not confined to the two blocks -- rather it brings all countries under their intelligence reconnaissance. This puts the countries independent from the two blocs in a difficult situation and removes their intelligence security, particularly as such information will be totally at the disposal of the owners of satellites and may in turn be used for political blackmail against other countries. At the moment, the Iraqi régime is benefitting from data provided by American satellites during the war of aggression launched against Iran by Iraq. This matter, which is well known, is in fact a complicity in the war while no international measure has been adopted to counter such an intervention.

This matter is noteworthy in other aspects too. The satellite can now take and process pictures as small as a few square centimetres, thanks to the progress and advancement of technology. This possibility which is at the unique disposal of a few countries, without any limitation or control, is a flagrant violation of the rights of nations to privacy. No military or civilian object is immune from the satellites' view and this is an important subject for human rights. Although the United Nations reports found the formation of an "International Satellite Monitoring Agency" difficult at the present juncture, attaining this goal is a must, and talks on this issue and studying practical and possible ways are necessary. The exact registration of satellites and their purposes is a step to this end. We believe that the arrest of the arms race in outer space is indispensable, regardless of developments on Earth. The nations can not wait for the super-Powers to reach an agreement on Earth and then talk about space -- which will be completely and irreversibly contaminated by that time. The countries having space technology should, while abiding by the existing "Outer Space Treaty" refrain from tests and the deployment of destructive weapons in space, and whatever is contrary to the peaceful use of space in the framework of a convention. The right to the peaceful use of outer space should be provided to all nations.

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In addition, an initiative to annihilate the military satellites would have a destructive effect on telecommunication and non-military ones. Safeguarding the world system of telecommunications, including the satellites and ground stations, is an international obligation and any threat to it should be prevented. Apart from the disrespect shown by the Iraqi régime for all international values in repeatedly attacking our ground stations, other countries are fully aware of the significance attached to this point.

Our attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should not in any way cause negligence on comprehensive disarmament. It is unfortunate to see that the relevant committee has recorded no progress and the proposals for nuclear and chemical phased programmes of disarmament as well as reduction of conventional weapons and forces made by one bloc are sceptically received by the other. We believe that the East should react with more sensitivity, at least at the level of the West, towards the violations of existing international treaties. Not having seen any concrete reaction vis-à-vis an important issue such as the deployment of chemical weapons will undoubtedly harm the credibility of the East and consequently its proposals.

Unfortunately, the non-co-operation attitude of a few countries has made the attainment of a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons very difficult, if not impossible. The voluntary moratorium was a positive gesture which did not receive a positive response by the other side. If it is not possible to achieve a comprehensive agreement at the present time, due to discord on modalities of verification, a moratorium can provide suitable ground for commencement of a constructive dialogue while continuation of the tests will exacerbate tension. The positive evaluation of seismic methods for verification of nuclear test can probably make a breakthrough.

The announcement of a "Non-First-Use" commitment of the countries having nuclear arsenals is a positive step although not very substantial in the trend of disarmament dialogue. This commitment should not at the same time imply further nuclear proliferation. Generalization of the commitment to other weapons such as conventional or chemical can strengthen this guarantee provided that it is unambiguous and straight.

Another point which should receive equal attention in parallel with nuclear and chemical disarmament is the reduction of conventional forces and weapons. Although the weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to the security and even the survival of the human community, we should still bear in mind that a large amount of the military budgets of the countries, particularly the Third World nations, are spent on conventional weapons. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost by the use of conventional weapons following World War II. In the meantime certain conventional weapons keep abreast with other weapons of mass destruction. During the course of the Iraqi aggression, thousands of Iranian civilians lost their lives in the bombardments by advanced jet fighters and their sophisticated armament provided to Iraq during the course of the war. Such indiscriminate murders must be condemned by the United Nations Organization and at the same time the Conference should pay more attention to conventional disarmament.

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Meanwhile, the Third World countries which have not even the slightest intention of being dragged into East-West confrontation, should enjoy adequate security vis-à-vis the use of weapons for mass destruction. The announcement of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons must be recognized and guaranteed by those countries having such weapons. Similarly, the territorial waters of non-aligned countries should be free from any military bases and manoeuvres in the context of East-West confrontation.

Development and its linkage with disarmament deserves more careful attention. The international conference on disarmament and development should meet at the earliest possible time. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament must devote a part of its activities to the study of how the military build-up adversely affects development, as well as the establishment and formulation of criteria to channel the resources from reduction of arms to world development and particularly the Third World.

The central role of the United Nations and its organs should be preserved by following the disarmament discussions. Any dialogue outside the framework of the United Nations should be reported to it comprehensively. Disarmament is an international issue in which the security of all nations is at stake and the countries owning nuclear and chemical weapons are duty bound to recognize the focal role of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. In the meantime, efforts to attract public opinion and make people aware of issues pertaining to disarmament by creating an atmosphere suitable for achieving results, are equally important. The efforts of the leaders of the Group of Six non-aligned and other countries as representatives of five continents, to bring about such a favourable ground manifesting the aspirations of the majority of the world nations, have had positive and constructive effects.

Disarmament will remain one of the most important international issues for the foreseeable future. It seems that the work will continue in the coming years. Therefore, the goals pursued by this Conference should be constantly formulated on the basis of the preservation of security and the interests of the majority of the countries of the world, particularly the Third World nations. Meanwhile, regulation of new treaties should be accompanied by appropriate attitudes towards guaranteeing and maintaining the treaties concluded in the past.

Once again I express my sincere hope for your success as well as the Conference in the efforts to make the world more safe, more peaceful and more humane, devoid of tension, aggression and military confrontation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, let me begin with very sincere words of welcome to the Presidency of Canada for the very important closing month of this year's sessions of the Conference. Canada and Japan have many things in common in our dealing with the matters of disarmament. Your leadership and well-known experiences in the multilateral diplomacy provide assurances for

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the successful conclusion of this session. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the outgoing President, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma. As I have had occasion to mention, we have a particular appreciation of the quiet but steady disarmament diplomacy pursued by this fellow Asian country and its representatives.

I have asked for the floor wishing to make a few comments on the Progress Report on the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which is being introduced today.

I first want to express the gratitude of my delegation to Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for his successful efforts to finalize the Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test concerning the exchange of Level I data through the WMO/GTS system, conducted during late 1984. It was indeed a source of great pleasure that at last the Report was adopted with the consent of all the experts representing 24 countries, identifying both the achievements as well as points of future improvements in the data exchange. It is heartening to realize that such a global scale experiment, involving so much technical preparations and advance thinking by so many scientists, has come to satisfactory results. I would also like to take this opportunity to express appreciation to the World Meteorological Organization for making available the use of the Global Telecommunication System for the experiment, and for suggesting its even further use for high-speed data transmission.

At this session, the Ad Hoc Group has made an encouraging step forward. With regard to its future work, an agreement has been reached to begin preparations for "a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres".

As I stated in my speech of 8 April, Japan has taken the initiative for an exchange of Level II data with the co-operation of a number of other countries. During the recent session, informal but very fruitful consultations took place with like-minded delegations from non-aligned, socialist, Western and other countries regarding the actual manner of conducting Level II data exchange. We also presented national papers GSE/JAP/23 and 24.

The Progress Report says that a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data must be carefully prepared on the basis of an analysis of national investigations and also of partial bilateral and multilateral experiments. This is a good reflection of the position which Japan has been advocating as a necessary forerunner of the future global test, and I appreciate that our initiative has been well received in such a manner.

In this connection, we welcome the Canadian call for holding a workshop of data communications experts in October this year. It is, in fact, in support of our initiative and we value that all interested countries are called upon to participate. On the basis of the arrangements for communication to be made by the experts at this meeting, we would proceed to the implementation of an exchange of waveform data on a co-operative national

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basis by the end of this year. We shall be very happy to report the results of this exchange to the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, thus consolidating the basis for a global test to be conducted in 1988.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to draw the attention of the Conference to a strange and sad contrast between the progress this Ad Hoc Group is making and the continuing inability of our Conference to set up an Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban, the very subsidiary organ that should benefit from and build upon this progress of the Ad Hoc Group. I would like to renew my appeal I made in my speech of 17 June, that while we should by no means relax our efforts in the pursuit of a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee acceptable to all, we should at the same time make the best use of the plenary meetings, whether formal or informal, by addressing and trying to resolve the substantive issues lying ahead of us in a practical manner. Only through such step-by-step efforts can we get ever closer to our common goal of the comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament during August is particularly difficult, since this month always marks the end of the annual session of the Conference which the General Assembly defined in 1978 as "the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum". Consequently, my delegation expresses great satisfaction that our deliberations are to be chaired by a person whose experience and capabilities are a guarantee of success, and I am sure that is what we all wish you in the exercise of your important functions. I would like once again to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tin Tun.

On Wednesday the sixth and Thursday the seventh of August, six statesmen from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe, who have repeatedly and tangibly demonstrated their profound interest in contributing to disarmament and peace, met in Ixtapa, Mexico. They were Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina; Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, President of Mexico; Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India; Andreas Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece; Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden; and Julius Nyerere, who was the First President of Tanzania.

The Conference they attended was a continuation of a process started with the Declaration of 22 May 1984 (contained in document CD/502) and continued with the New Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985 (document CD/549) and with three joint messages of 24 October 1985 (to be found in document A/40/825), 28 February 1986 (document CD/676) and 8 April 1986.

At that meeting, which I had the privilege to attend, two fundamental documents were adopted, both signed on 7 August 1986. One is a Declaration bearing the title "Mexico Declaration", and the other is the "Document on verification measures issued at the Summit Meeting at Mexico". I shall try to

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summarize the basic aspects of these two documents which will shortly be reproduced and circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, as has been done in previous cases.

The Mexico Declaration starts by highlighting the fact that the purpose of the meeting was to proclaim humanity's right to peace and to reiterate the authors' commitment to protecting that right so that the human race might endure. After recalling that it is 41 years since death and horror descended upon Hiroshima, it goes on to say that "The most dreadful war in history came to an end and, the world's nuclear nightmare began. Since then we have lived on borrowed time. All that is precious and beautiful, all that human civilization has reached for and achieved, could, in a short time, be reduced to radioactive dust".

The authors of the Declaration then point out that in the face of the danger of common annihilation, the distinction between the powerful and the weak has become meaningless, and they express their determination that their countries, which do not possess nuclear arsenals, will be actively involved in all aspects of disarmament, since, as they say, "the protection of this planet is a matter for all the people who live on it", and therefore it is unacceptable that a few countries should decide "the fate of the whole world".

The Declaration reiterates the priority aims set out in the New Delhi Declaration in January 1985, that is, an immediate halt to nuclear testing preparatory to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, the prohibition of the testing, production and deployment of space weapons; it welcomes the Joint Declaration made in November 1985 by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to the effect that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"; and it adds "Now is the time to ensure that such a war does not occur". It expresses the conviction that security is not improved by increasing the capacity for destruction through the accumulation of weapons, and so "nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, is an absolute priority", and it seems obvious that "no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests".

The authors of the Declaration also recall that in October 1985 and February and April 1986, they urged the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union "to undertake a fully verifiable suspension of nuclear testing, at least until their next summit meeting", repeating that "the unilateral moratorium by one of the two major nuclear States" should become "at least a bilateral moratorium". It then proposes that a suspension of this kind, for whose verification the Six offer their unconditional co-operation, should be "immediately followed by negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty". The Declaration also refers to the main measures that the assistance offered would comprise, a subject that I will not refer to at present to avoid repeating myself, since I will be looking at this later when I get on to the second document I mentioned.

The other aim emphasized by the six signatories of the Declaration is the same as the one that appeared in January 1985 in the Declaration of New Delhi, on which we can read inter alia in the Mexico Declaration:

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"We reiterate our demand that an arms race in space should be prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our Earth being misused for destructive purposes. It is particularly urgent to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, which would threaten the peaceful space activities of many nations. We urge the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a halt to further tests of anti-satellite weapons, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an international treaty on their prohibition. Our New Delhi warning that the development of space weaponry would endanger a number of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament is already proving to be justified. We stress that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, be fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of more recent technological advances."

In addition to these two objectives, which are basic disarmament measures, the Declaration stresses the fact that to achieve progress in this sphere "it is imperative ... that the United Nations must be strengthened, and its Charter as well as treaties relating to disarmament be observed in both letter and spirit", as well as the consequences of squandering the world's limited resources on armaments, a matter on which the Declaration states the following:

"Poverty and economic hopelessness also constitute a threat to international peace and security. This threat is aggravated in many developing countries in which the external debt problem reduces still further their ability to allocate sufficient resources for dealing with the urgent and fundamental needs among their people. The transfer of resources from military expenditure to economic and social development is therefore a fundamental necessity of our times."

The second document I mentioned at the outset, that is, on verification measures, starts as follows:

"It is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers to halt nuclear testing as a significant step to curb the nuclear arms race. The United States and the USSR, being the two major nuclear Powers, have a special obligation to initiate the process of nuclear disarmament by immediately halting their nuclear testing. To facilitate such an immediate step the six nations of the Five Continent Initiative are prepared to assist in the monitoring of a mutual moratorium or a test ban."

The way in which the assistance offered by the Six will be given is explained in the document. It looks basically at the verification of a moratorium in co-operation with the United States and the Soviet Union, which would be an important step in establishing an appropriate verification system for a treaty on the complete banning of nuclear tests. The two following possibilities are envisaged.

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First, monitoring of existing test sites, which would be intended to ensure that they are not used for clandestine tests. Three sites are involved: Nevada in the United States, and Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Union. These are quite small geographically, and could be monitored by a small number of seismic stations placed in the two countries, at or near the test sites. If it were possible to agree on the cessation of nuclear tests by both sides, the procedure envisaged in the document is set out as follows:

"Our six nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the United States and the USSR, temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All data should be available to the six nations and to the United States and the USSR. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by instruments installed on-site would provide an extremely high sensitivity down to small fractions of a kiloton and even tons of explosives".

The second hypothesis considered in the document is that of the monitoring of the territories of the United States and the USSR outside the test sites, which, as stated in the document, would be necessary to ensure that nuclear explosions are not conducted and that natural earthquakes are not misinterpreted as clandestine nuclear test explosions. Here the authors of the Mexico document indicate that: "It might be desirable to establish specific verification arrangements in some of these areas, and our six nations are prepared to co-operate with the United States and the USSR on this issue".

This statement is followed up by the suggestion that there should be an "internationalization" of a number of seismic stations selected from among those existing in the United States and the Soviet Union, "tentatively 20 to 30, in each of the two countries, by placing observers" from the six nations at the stations. Their task "would be to verify that the instruments are properly operated and that all information obtained is reported without omission. We are prepared to work out the necessary arrangements which could be made with little delay and to contribute observers for an initial period of one year".

In order to replace these temporary measures with permanent arrangements, the experts of the six nations, according to the authors of the document, "are ready to co-operate with experts of the United States and the USSR in the development of permanent verification facilities at test sites, and also in the development of an optimal network of internal stations in the United States and the USSR".

I do not wish to continue this statement further because, as I have already indicated, very soon the Conference will have available to it the complete text of the two documents on which I have been commenting. I would simply like to read out the last two paragraphs of the Mexico Declaration which, I think, give a very good indication of the spirit that moved the six statesmen who have just met in my country and the noble, lofty goals they were pursuing. These paragraphs read as follows:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Our message from Mexico is to urge the leaders of the United States of America and the Soviet Union to continue and to reinvigorate the dialogue which they started last year, to set a firm date for a new meeting between them, and by an approach of mutual compromise and conciliation to ensure that such dialogue leads to practical results in the field of disarmament. Each side has the capacity to destroy the world many times over. There can be no suggestion that either would be showing weakness by a willingness to be conciliatory. The spirit of Geneva must be revived and strengthened. And we stress again our determination to try to facilitate agreement between the nuclear-weapon States, and to work with them, as well as with all other nations, for the common security of humankind and for peace.

Once again, we urge people, parliaments and Governments the world over to give active support to our appeal. Every individual has a right to peace and a responsibility to strive for it. Neither together nor separately can the peoples of the world remove the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from human memory, but together we can and we must remove this looming horror from our future".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement introducing the recent and important Six-Nation declaration and for his kind words to the President. The introduction of these statements by a distinguished Nobel Peace Prize winner gives them added status. I now call on the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Thank you for giving me the floor in my capacity as spokesman for the Group of 21 on item 1 of our agenda. Before making my statement allow me to congratulate ourselves on having you, Sir, with your experience, skill, leadership and fair play, presiding over our deliberations during this month of August when important decisions must be adopted for the follow-up of our work.

The Group of 21 has consistently upheld the high priority that should be attached to item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since its inception in 1979. Its consensus views have been expressed in several documents, mainly CD/181 of 24 April 1981, and are presently stated in the draft mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee contained in CD/520/Rev.2 of 21 March 1986.

Recent developments between the USSR and the United States concerning nuclear tests, according to press reports, have prompted delegations from different quarters to urge this multilateral negotiating forum to resume its efforts in order to find ways and means to discharge its mandate in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (paragraph 51).

Bilateral and multilateral efforts are recognized as important conditions that should be mutually complementary in the field of disarmament if effective agreements with universal adherence are to be achieved.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Being aware that the USSR and the United States are actually engaged in bilateral conversations on the question of nuclear tests, and bearing in mind that in spite of their special responsibilities for disarmament measures (Final Document, paragraph 48), and notwithstanding the year-long unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests by the USSR, they are both responsible for the largest number of tests, the Group of 21 considers that it is incumbent upon them to report to and inform the Conference on Disarmament on their joint endeavours so that multilateral and bilateral efforts may usefully complement each other. Otherwise, parallel and unconnected discussions or negotiations on the same issues would be of little avail for the purposes of the Conference.

The request stated above is in line not only with the obligations of both countries to co-operate for the compliance of the mandate assigned to the Conference but also with previous practice the last of which was the submission to this forum of the Tripartite Report on the status of the negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments. The Group of 21 wishes to underline that in that report it is stated: "The desire to achieve an early agreement, which is so widely shared by the international community, has been repeatedly expressed at the highest level of all three Governments" (document CD/130 of 30 July 1980). That is the end of the statement.

Mr. President, the Group of 21 wishes that the statement I have just read out be duly reflected in our report to the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, for his statement and for his kind words to the President. His statement will, of course, be duly reflected in our records.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The Conference is now moving towards the point of final decisions on the work of its 1986 session.

In this context, later this morning the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, will table at the Conference the progress report of the Group on its twenty-second session.

I understand it will be proposed to the Conference that it should take note of that report at a plenary meeting next week.

Action by the Conference to that effect would provide further authority to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for the continuation of its work, specifically in terms of the proposals for future work which are made in the report, to be tabled later this morning.

Australia has participated strongly in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and we are convinced that the Ad Hoc Group's work has made an invaluable contribution to global co-operation in seismology and we have very high expectations of future work to be carried out by the Ad Hoc Group.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

We have studied its progress report and will readily agree to the recommendations provided in it.

It has been recognized for many many years that a global seismological monitoring network would lie at the heart of the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The mandate under which the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts operates calls upon the Group to "work on such measures which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests". It will be understood why I will not at present comment on the scope aspects of that mandate. What is relevant now is for us to recognize two things. First, the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts clearly envisages the establishment of a global seismological network. Second, in the work that has been undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group under this mandate and in work undertaken by way of individual national efforts, we have arrived at the point where it would be entirely appropriate and certainly positive for the Conference to take the decision Australia has called for, that is to call into existence a global seismological network.

The programme of future work proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would be compatible with such a decision and would in fact constitute further practical steps towards realizing a fully operational and permanent global network.

There have been some other relevant developments, including some in recent time, on some of which we have heard reports this morning. I have in mind, for example, the resumption of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification issues.

Last week an immensely significant set of decisions were taken by the six Heads of Government meeting at Ixtapa in Mexico which included the offer by those six States of an important contribution to verification of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, including by seismological means. Three weeks ago, in this Conference, the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union announced a new policy approach towards Level II data on the part of his Government, and at our last plenary session on Tuesday an extremely constructive and highly relevant statement was made by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany. In that statement he recalled other contributions which have been made to this work by other delegations, including my own. A lot has happened in this field.

Three weeks ago, I tabled at this Conference document CD/717 which constituted a proposal to the Conference that it should express its will that a global seismological network should exist. It is the hope of my delegation that the point of decision on this proposal will be, next week, at the time of the Conference's action on the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on its twenty-second session.

The fact is that all of the elements of a global seismological network exist. The technical test conducted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in 1984 gave us an illustration of how important parts of such a network would operate.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Only one further step is required to make the network a reality and that is for us to decide to establish a global network thus ensuring that all further work, for example under the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, will be conducted within the framework of the establishment of a global network.

Once we have labelled the existing capabilities as constituting a global network, Conference members could dedicate themselves to filling in the gaps and improving that network by stepping up exchanges of data and technology and by establishing the administrative structure necessary to manage a global network.

In this regard, the proposed future work of the GSE is highly relevant: filling in gaps and defining, as well as refining, existing and future capabilities -- first on the basis of an analysis of national investigations, second through partial bilateral and multilateral experiments in the use of Level II data, culminating in the large-scale global experiment now foreshadowed for 1988.

It is true that we have heard some concern and questions raised about the financial constraints on what countries might be able to do immediately in the field of international co-operation in seismic monitoring.

Australia is not free from such financial constraints but we do believe that a hard look at the possibilities will find that there are useful things that can be done within existing budgets and we are doing this.

Indeed, it is obvious that none of use will know whether we would be willing or able to fund additional undertakings until we have considered precisely what such undertakings might be and how they would fit in with global activities, and therefore what they would cost and what their benefits would be.

I might mention that Australia stands prepared to fully co-operate with other countries on seismic monitoring, and to expand that co-operation just as we are at present expanding our own seismological capability, and we will, in fact do this irrespective of what action on this matter is pursued in the event in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

But in discussing this proposal, or thinking about this proposal, I would like to recall a piece of history which is that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' work, which is now so widely supported, started rather more modestly as a Swedish initiative a number of years ago. The truth is, it was only adopted by the Conference on Disarmament when its work became so interesting that very few wanted to be left out. I think that it is a model and an example that we should bear in mind when we look towards a decision on a global seismological network. We propose that the Conference take that action because it is required, it is realistic, it would represent progress, it is within the competence of the Conference and it would be a clear step in the right direction. This can be done by the Conference agreeing to the principle of the proposal made in document CD/717, to establish a global seismological network and we hope that it will do this next week when it adopts the report of the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts celebrated its tenth anniversary during its recent meeting conducted from 21 July to 1 August. It did so by concluding its fourth report covering the results of the 1984 technical test and by outlining important and challenging tasks for the future.

The establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts 10 years ago provided a frame for systematic work towards a global data exchange system and for a constructive dialogue on related technical issues between experts of member and non-member countries of the Conference.

The Group has outlined the principal design of an international data exchange system containing three basic components: a global network of seismological stations operated by individual countries; a system for the exchange of data between individual countries and specially established international data centres; and international data centres where data are routinely processed and from which results are distributed to participating countries.

During its work the Group has established detailed technical specifications guiding the establishment and operation of such an international system. These include instructions on how to operate seismological stations and to analyse data in a standardized way. Together with the WMO the Group has established detailed specifications for the exchange of parameter or Level I data. Procedures and computer programs to be used at international data centres have been developed for the routine analyses of such data.

The Group has not only developed methods and procedures, it has also conducted technical tests of various components of the system. Some of these experiments have been small-scale bilateral undertakings, others have been more extensive with broad participation. In 1984 the Group conducted a large-scale technical test with the participation of 75 seismological stations in 37 countries and three international data centres. The test was conducted in close co-operation with the WMO, an organization with which the Group has enjoyed an excellent co-operation throughout the years.

The present work of the Expert Group has been supported by research programmes in a number of countries. Numerous national working papers, summarizing results of these programmes have been presented as a necessary technical and scientific basis for the Group's work. The data exchange system that has been developed is thus the result not only of efforts by experts in the Group but also of research work conducted by a large number of people at seismological stations and laboratories around the world.

I have on earlier occasions reported to the Conference on the successful outcome of the 1984 Technical Test, skilfully co-ordinated by Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia, and on the excellent co-operation that was established between participating institutes worldwide. I will today not reiterate the results of the Test but only report that the Group at its recent meeting finalized its fourth report, which covers the Test. I have the pleasure to introduce this report, which is contained in document CD/720. The report has extensive appendices containing the more detailed technical

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

material, which will not be distributed but will be available at the secretariat in the Group's working languages. I also introduce the summary report, contained in CD/681/Rev.1, which is only a slight and formal revision of the provisional summary (CD/681) submitted to the Conference on 24 March 1986.

In introducing these reports I express my gratitude to the Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, who has done an excellent drafting work. I also express my appreciation to the secretariat for its efforts and co-operation in finalizing these documents.

In its work until now the Group has primarily focused on the exchange and processing of parameter or Level I data. During its recent meeting the Group devoted considerable time to in-depth considerations of its continued work. In the progress report from its meeting, as contained in document CD/721, which I have the pleasure to introduce, the Group recommends:

"That it continue its work under the existing mandate, given by the Committee on Disarmament on 7 August 1979 (CD/PV.48).

The future work of the Group should be directed towards the design of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres (IDCs). This work should draw upon previous results and experiences, taking into account the Group's recommendations in its earlier reports, and making use of all achievements in seismology. This work would, inter alia, include:

- working out technical specifications of modern prototype stations able to collect and exchange high quality waveform data from seismic events at all distances, including arrays able to provide preliminary location data for detected events,
- further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms for automatic signal detection as well as for computer-interactive data analysis,
- developing and testing methods and procedures and investigating and testing communication links to be used for the expeditious exchange of seismic waveform and parameter data between national facilities and international data centres,
- further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms to be used at IDCs, for the processing of waveform and parameter data, for co-operation and communication among such centres and for the distribution of event bulletins to national facilities.

This system specification would require substantial research and testing.

The Group's further work should include planning and carrying out a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data. The experiment, which will include Level I data as well, will be conducted using

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

the WMO/GTS and other accessible channels of communication, including satellite transmission where possible. It must be carefully prepared on the basis of an analysis of national investigations and also of partial bilateral and multilateral experiments in the use of Level II data. The Group envisages carrying out this experiment in approximately 1988.

The principal purpose of this experiment should be testing of methods and procedures developed by the Ad Hoc Group to extract and transmit the data from stations to the Experimental International Data Centres (EIDCs) and to process them at EIDCs."

The Group took note of the recent decision of the WMO Executive Council that the WMO/GTS circuits may accommodate a certain amount of additional types of seismic data. To contribute to the preparation and efficient carrying out of the experiment the Ad Hoc Group recommends that the Conference on Disarmament request the WMO to allocate its transmission channels on a regular basis starting as soon as possible for the transmission of Level II seismic data. I have informally submitted some suggestions to the President of the Conference as to the content of such a recommendation to the WMO and this has been circulated to you.

The Ad Hoc Group further recommends that the Conference assist in involving as many States as possible in carrying out the experiment.

The design and testing of a modern international seismological data exchange system, based on the expeditious exchange and processing of waveform data, is a considerable undertaking and is likely to provide a number of scientific and technological challenges. In addition to considerable efforts within the Group this task would require extensive national and co-operative international research and development efforts. This is necessary to provide the scientific and technological basis for the design of a system which in many aspects goes far beyond what is available today on a global scale.

The Group very much looks forward to coping with these new and challenging tasks.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to the approval of the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 2 to 13 March 1987.

This concludes my introduction of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts' fourth report, CD/720, its summary report, CD/681/Rev.1, and its progress report, CD/721. I am prepared to try to answer any questions that distinguished representatives may have.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts for his important and interesting report. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to thank Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for his clear and concise introduction of the Group's report. I should like to convey the sincere

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

thanks of the United Kingdom delegation to him and to the Secretary, Dr. Ringdal, and to all the members of the Group for the dedicated work that they have been undertaking for the last 10 years.

The tenth anniversary this year of the establishment of the Group in 1976, under the Chairmanship of the late Dr. Ulf Ericsson, is a landmark in an important international scientific endeavour.

It is most encouraging that the Group have been able to celebrate this anniversary by finishing their report on the Level I experiment carried out in 1984, and that a programme of work with a view to conducting a further experiment involving the exchange of Level II data has been agreed. In this respect, we welcome the statement made on the subject by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 22 July.

I should like to take this opportunity to express the warm appreciation of my delegation to the initiative of your Government, Mr. President, in organizing a workshop in Ottawa at the beginning of October on communications for the exchange of data.

Similarly, we very much welcome the useful work for a Level II experiment being organized by Japan, to which the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, referred in his statement this morning. The United Kingdom welcomes the opportunity to participate in both these valuable contributions to progress on the subject.

Concrete contributions of this sort, which follow the good example set by the Government of Norway last year, demonstrate a real commitment to the goal of a CTB. We should very much like to see more countries, especially non-aligned countries, more involved in the work of the GSE than at present.

Finally, I should like to mention another encouraging development. I refer to the recent bilateral contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification issues in Geneva. We understand that it is the intention that these contacts should continue, and we very much welcome this.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees and it is, of course, merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. As we are coming to the end of the session and there are still a number of pending questions, I suggest that we start our plenary meetings at 10 a.m. sharp until the end of this annual session. Once again I would make a plea to delegations to get here at 10 a.m. since even the loss of 20 or 30 minutes can make a difference when it is taken cumulatively. This suggestion is reflected in the timetable distributed this morning. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, may I recall that, in accordance with the agreement reached at our last plenary meeting, the Conference will hold immediately after this plenary meeting an informal meeting to consider the substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under agenda items 1, "Nuclear Test Ban" and 7, "New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons".

The secretariat is circulating this morning, in the Conference Room, substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters" which is contained in document CD/247, as well as those relating to agenda item 6, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", which appears in document CD/WP.246. Copies of those working papers were placed in the delegations' boxes yesterday morning and early afternoon. As indicated in the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week, I intend to take them up at the informal meeting next Tuesday, immediately after the plenary meeting, time permitting.

I wish also to inform you that, after the agreement reached on the reflection in the draft report of the discussions held at both plenary and informal meetings on item 2, the secretariat is concluding the drafting of the relevant substantive paragraphs. It is expected that the English text will be available by mid-day on Monday and other languages on Tuesday morning. In accordance with the timetable, we shall take up those substantive paragraphs under agenda item 2 at an informal meeting to be held immediately after the plenary meeting on Thursday, 21 August.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 August at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.