

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 June 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. K. Tellalov

(Bulgaria)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 361st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As announced at the informal meeting last Tuesday, we shall hold today an informal meeting to deal with some organizational questions. Immediately after concluding the list of speakers, I shall suspend the plenary meeting and continue our work informally. We shall resume the plenary meeting later to formalize any agreement that might emerge at the informal meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America and Venezuela. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Lowitz.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, before beginning my statement today, I want to extend my delegation's congratulations to you on Bulgaria's assumption of the Chair for the month of June. We stand ready to advance the work of the Conference under your leadership. I also wish to commend your predecessor Ambassador de Souza e Silva and the Brazilian delegation for the excellent manner in which they carried out the duties of the presidency in April.

We return this week from a recess in which States represented here have had the opportunity to reflect upon and to assess the results of our efforts during the first three months of the 1986 session. My delegation hopes that the pause has been a profitable one, and that we can approach our tasks with renewed energy and dedication. The international community expects no less of us.

I am pleased to report to my colleagues that President Reagan has again personally expressed the importance he attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. On 5 June I met with the President and with Vice-President Bush to review the status of our work, particularly the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. The President has instructed the United States delegation to continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues in the chemical weapons negotiations.

Following the meeting a statement was issued by the White House reflecting President Reagan's view of the importance of effective multilateral arms control, and his mutual commitment with General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union to accelerate our efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention. I have asked the secretariat to distribute copies of this statement.

The President has asked me to convey to you, and I quote from the statement, "his sincere hope that a spirit of dedication and vigorous work would result in a successful agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban and his conviction that the Conference is fully capable of achieving such an agreement, which the peace-loving nations of the world greatly desire." Further, and I quote again from the statement, "he stated that, for its part, the United States again stands ready to intensify even further these negotiations when the Conference reconvenes, and called upon the other members

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of this unique body -- the sole arms control negotiating forum in which all regions of the world participate -- to do likewise."

The hope and conviction expressed by President Reagan are surely widely shared within this Conference. At our plenary meeting on 10 June, we listened to statements by the distinguished representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Minister Genscher, of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, and of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan. Not all of these statements are completely congruent with our own views. But they all stress the importance of continuing our negotiations for a chemical weapons ban, and the importance of translating our work into a concrete agreement. My delegation has, in addition, carefully noted the plenary statement made on 22 April by Ambassador Issraelyan.

In light of the broad agreement on the importance of the negotiations we are conducting under agenda item 4, I expect serious work on a chemical weapons convention to take place during the summer. I wish the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, all success in guiding this work forward, and pledge him the full support of the United States delegation.

The first part of our 1986 session also set the stage for substantive work in the Committee re-established under item 5 of our agenda, prevention of an arms race in outer space. As the Ad hoc Committee resumes its consideration of the issues it is mandated to examine, it is important to recognize that this will be no small task. The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as our initial exploration last year showed, is a complex matter. Last year's work was useful. But it was only a beginning. It is clear that much remains to be accomplished under the terms of the Committee's mandate, and my delegation will work hard to ensure the Committee's progress during the coming weeks.

With respect to resuming work in an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1, on the other hand, matters are not as advanced. But here as well it is the hope of my delegation that the Conference will reach agreement to re-establish this committee. The work of this committee was suspended nearly three years ago, and it is time that we return to the consideration of issues -- such as scope, verification and compliance -- relevant to a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear explosions. All of this work can be accomplished under the mandate proposed by Western States for an ad hoc committee.

The intrasessional period also saw important events related to the subject matter of item two of our agenda: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. First, on 8 May the bilateral nuclear and space talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed here in Geneva for their fifth round. Second, the United States has decided to adopt new criteria for determining the size of its strategic nuclear forces and for exercising restraint.

This decision on new criteria concerns in part United States policy with regard to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty known as SALT II. The SALT II

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Agreement was concluded six years ago with the expectation that by 1986 it would have been superseded by a much more far-reaching agreement reducing nuclear arsenals.

But the decision is more concerned with the future course of nuclear disarmament. It is concerned with United States objectives for achieving deep reductions in nuclear weapons. And it is concerned with a better basis for mutual, interim restraint, a better basis from which to achieve significant progress in the strategic arms reduction talks.

We should recall that arms control and disarmament agreements are designed to serve the objective of strengthening international security. The United States, despite its reservations about the SALT II Agreement, decided in 1982 not to undercut this Agreement in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to new negotiations, obviously on the understanding that the Soviet Union would do likewise. Our objective was to improve the prospects of replacing the very high numerical ceilings in the SALT II Agreement with very deep reductions -- reductions that would increase stability and pave the way for even further reductions. The United States was convinced then, as it is convinced now, that agreement to equitable and verifiable reductions would better serve the interests of international security.

Subsequently, we were disappointed in the failure to achieve such an agreement, and we were disappointed in the failure of the Soviet Union to display a degree of restraint corresponding to our own. Instead of restraint, the response was a pattern of violation of arms control agreements, including the SALT II Treaty.

Indeed, the United States concluded that in two major respects -- the deployment of a second new type of strategic intercontinental ballistic missile and the encryption of telemetry, which prevents our national technical means from effectively verifying compliance with the SALT II Treaty -- the Soviet Union was in violation of the terms of the SALT II Agreement. Nevertheless, in 1985 the United States took action to continue its policy not to undercut the SALT structure to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Again we were motivated to maintain conditions which we hoped would promote agreement on deep reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. And again we were disappointed in the results.

President Reagan's statement on 27 May 1986, recorded his decision -- given the situation I have described -- to base future actions regarding United States strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat to Western security posed by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the President sought to look to the future, not to the past. The United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint, and it will continue to seek radical reductions in deployed nuclear warheads.

The President has decided to retire and dismantle two older Poseidon submarines as the eighth Trident submarine began sea trials at the end of May. The President made clear that this step was taken for reasons of cost-effectiveness. The President also determined that, commencing with the deployment of the 131st carrier of air-launched cruise missiles later this

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year a retirement of compensating systems, as specified by the SALT II Agreement, would not be implemented. However, the United States will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty for some months. In this regard, the President said, "I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account."

The President also made clear that in the period before a new agreement providing for deep reductions is negotiated, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than are deployed by the Soviet Union. Nor will it deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than are deployed by the Soviet Union.

The United States seeks to proceed seriously with the bilateral negotiations, and it remains convinced that the levels of nuclear warheads must be reduced. It remains convinced as well that nuclear restraint is by far the best course. But it cannot ignore situations in which a military advantage would result from a Western failure to respond to the actions -- militarily significant actions -- of the other side.

In brief, what the United States seeks is a firmer and fairer basis for a system of interim mutual restraint, and not a continuation of a system in which unilateral restraint is practised only by the United States. It is our belief that such a basis is a better one from which to reach agreement to reduce strategic arms significantly.

Arms control and disarmament agreements must be taken seriously. They must be complied with. Due to the very serious consequences of non-compliance the United States has been compelled to address its future course of action. It is international security that is at stake, that determines our approach to weapons and that motivates efforts to ban them.

International security is a most serious matter. It is at stake both in the bilateral forum and in the Conference on Disarmament. I want to conclude my remarks today on this note of seriousness. We have some three months at our disposal to do our part to strengthen international security. We should make the best possible use of this time, especially to seek substantive progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT, (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, as this is the first statement of my delegation in an official plenary meeting of the Conference since we began this year's session, I would like to start by expressing our appreciation to the distinguished colleagues who presided over the first part of this session before you. To Ambassador Butler of Australia, Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, and Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil I would like to extend our gratitude for the efficiency, impartiality and skill

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with which they guided the work of the Conference during February, March and April. To you, Sir, I would also like to say how happy we are to see you preside over the Conference and to wish you every success in your duties and assure you of our entire willingness to co-operate with you in order to help achieve tangible results in our work. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank all my colleagues who, in their statements during the first part of the session, addressed kind words of welcome to me upon my return to the Conference on Disarmament.

The first part of this year's session began in an encouraging climate of optimism which was inspired by the holding a few months previously of the first summit meeting in six years between the leaders of the two main world Powers. Practically all those who spoke during the first part of the session referred to the summit as an outstanding event that should pave the way for new prospects in East-West relations. Indeed, the Geneva summit gave the impression that it was the starting point for a new dialogue which should lead to specific measures to improve the world climate, and for a process that would produce tangible results in disarmament. That optimism has gradually given way to disappointment, because the declared intent of bringing about a relaxation of international tension has not been followed up, nor have we seen the fulfilment of the pledge made by the two protagonists of the Geneva summit to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth.

Quite frankly, we did not really harbour any false hopes from that meeting, whose sole direct result was to bring about, albeit for a short time, a relaxation of the international climate which was, at that time, extremely ominous and disquieting. But even those modest results of the summit meeting were of very short duration, and the "spirit of Geneva" seems to be giving way once again to the tensions fuelled by the fundamental differences that separate the two Great Powers. Similarly, the only other achievement of the November summit, namely the prospect of a second meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, now seems to be in jeopardy as a result of the new signs of confrontation that have occurred since then. We are therefore, beginning our work now, unlike the first part of our session, in an atmosphere where uncertainty, not to say pessimism prevails.

In my statement today I would like to refer, albeit in a brief and very general manner, to some of the items on our agenda which I shall approach in the light of the prevailing international situation and certain recent events which affect the course of our work in one way or another.

In speaking of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race, it is inevitable to speak first of all of the role that a country like Venezuela, or any other country which is not a nuclear power, can play in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This is a question which is frequently addressed to us when discussing our activity in the Conference on Disarmament. What is the role that a country having very little military power, like Venezuela, can play in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament when the Powers which have the monopoly over nuclear destruction have themselves not managed to reach agreement?

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To answer this question, I think it would suffice to recall that the United Nations General Assembly, in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, declared with regard to the arms race that "to meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world". This assertion is all the more valid in the case of nuclear weapons, which, again according to the Final Document, "pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization". We, the non-nuclear-weapon States, categorically reject the notion that a handful of countries, which have in their arsenals the capacity to destroy the planet, can also have the exclusive right of disposing of that power without taking account of the opinion of more than 75 per cent of the world's population that is living under the constant threat of a nuclear hecatomb.

I do not think it is necessary to repeat the arguments that have been voiced so often to underscore the danger represented by the increasing accumulation of nuclear arsenals and the consequences of their possible use. I do, however, believe it is worth pointing out that the World Health Organization has recently issued the preliminary results of the studies that it has asked a management group to carry out on the catastrophic effects that a nuclear war would have, not only for those countries directly involved in a conflict, but for all other countries, and in particular the developing countries. In referring to the immunological consequences of a nuclear war, the report of the WHO Group says the following: the combined effect of various types of stress in war conditions could be catastrophic and give rise to devastating epidemics of various diseases on an unprecedented scale with regard to the climatic effects of nuclear war, the Group summarizes its conclusions as follows: There is no doubt that all countries would be affected by the climatic effects of a nuclear war regardless of whether they are belligerents or non-belligerents or, developed or developing countries. The report goes on to say that nevertheless, the main health effects of these climatic changes would occur as a consequence of the loss of crops or the serious shortage of food; hunger would probably cause more deaths than all the direct effects of the nuclear war combined. The report dwells on this aspect in the section on problems of food supply and hunger. There we read that: Food shortage would not affect the belligerent countries of the northern hemisphere alone; death by attrition would be even more widespread in the developing countries both in the north as in the south. It is clear that the disastrous indirect and delayed effects of a nuclear war on climate and food supply could be more serious than the acute direct effects. Hunger, cold and death from starvation would decimate the survivors not only in the belligerent countries but throughout the world; hence the main victims of hunger would be the developing countries and death from starvation would occur throughout the world.

With this picture in mind, who can deny that the non-nuclear countries have not only the right but the duty to speak out against nuclear weaponry and demand that an end be put to the nuclear arms race and that existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons be destroyed. In taking this position our countries are not unaware that, as established in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the

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task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. But that responsibility is not limited to the reciprocal relations among the nuclear countries; it implies above all a responsibility towards the international community which consists in showing genuine political will in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, and in negotiating in good faith in the various disarmament forums so as to attain tangible results.

In the recent past we have witnessed an impressive proliferation of proposals aimed at bringing about a reduction in nuclear weapons. The idea shared by both the United States and the Soviet Union, of reducing by 50 per cent the number of strategic nuclear warheads is particularly attractive, but while public opinion continues to wait for the most powerful nuclear countries to come to an agreement on how to attain this objective, in practice the programmes designed to improve and increase nuclear weapons continue to intensify. To use the words of an eminent international institute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its latest edition of the Strategic Survey, this is equivalent to pedalling humbug to a gullible and hopeful public. We do, however, still entertain the hope that one day the two Major Powers will manage to reach agreement on specific disarmament measures. We hope that the two recent proposals put forward by General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan in the last two days will indeed lead to specific agreements which will materialize the hopes of this gullible and hopeful public.

Paradoxically, a tragic accident, which we all deplore, has lent the topic of a nuclear-test ban an urgency that is more than justified. Before going on I would like to express to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union our sympathy at this grievous accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station which had distressing consequences for his country and has aroused deep concern in international public opinion. As General Secretary Gorbachev said, the accident at Chernobyl has once again shown the danger represented by the atom when it escapes human control. We also agree with General Secretary Gorbachev when he said that the Chernobyl accident is "one more stroke of the tocsin, one more grim warning that the nuclear age necessitates new political thinking and a new policy". Therefore, we are not surprised that, faced with the alarming circumstances of that tragic event, General Secretary Gorbachev announced to the world a further prolongation of the moratorium that the Soviet Union had set itself. Once this period has elapsed, a year will have gone by without the Soviet Union carrying out a nuclear test. Symbolically, the Soviet moratorium began on the anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and will last until the next anniversary of that event.

The other major nuclear Power not only has not responded to the invitation to observe the moratorium but, a few days after the announcement of the new extension and after the frightening accident in Chernobyl, it once again carried out a nuclear test, then the eleventh since the Soviet Union suspended its own tests: I understand another test has since been carried out, bringing the number of nuclear tests to 12. We cannot refrain from

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expressing our concern at the fact that another nuclear Power is continuing unremittingly its programme of nuclear testing, and has carried out four tests so far this year. The non-nuclear countries categorically reject all the arguments that have been adduced to try and justify the continuation of the nuclear tests. We reject the notion that the existing means of verification are not sufficient, especially as the Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to accept on-site verification and to co-operate in the establishment of sophisticated procedures of seismological verification. Likewise we reject the notion that the continuation of nuclear tests is necessary as long as deterrence has to be based on nuclear weapons. We also reject with the same vehemence the notion that nuclear tests are necessary to ensure the reliability, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, as well as for their modernization, or to carry out tests designed to develop new systems of weapons based on new technologies. In accordance with information that recently appeared in the press the latest nuclear tests are intended to experiment with developments in x-ray lasers; but the same reports indicate that, given current scientific know-how in this field, hundreds of underground nuclear tests will be necessary before a weapon based on the use of the x-ray laser can be perfected.

The course of events in this field leads us to stick more and more closely to our opinion that the first step towards nuclear disarmament should consist in the total prohibition of nuclear tests, since the main objective pursued by such a ban is precisely to prevent the technological development of existing weapons and help make arsenals obsolete so that it will be easier gradually to eliminate them. The same considerations apply to the development of new weapons.

The strategic doctrine of deterrence is based on the notion that against an attack with nuclear weapons there is no possible defence. Faced with the impossibility of defending themselves from an attack with such weapons, the nuclear Powers have no other alternative than to hide behind a sufficiently powerful arsenal which will permit them, if they survive, to have a sufficient number of nuclear weapons left to retaliate and be in a position to inflict intolerable damage on the aggressor. Thus we see the appearance of the mad thesis of mutually assured destruction, whose acronym in English is indeed MAD, which could not be more eloquent to describe the insanity of this notion which has ruled mankind for several decades. Today we are faced with a completely new situation. The notion that it is not possible to defend oneself against a nuclear attack is being replaced with the idea that it is possible to design defence systems capable of protecting a country against a nuclear attack. This concept, in our opinion, is even more dangerous than the one that had been keeping us living under a system based on collective terror. Up to now, whether we like it or not, the danger of a nuclear war had been kept at bay because of the fear of a world conflagration. Now that danger is once again becoming acute because of the emerging possibility that a country could create a shield capable of protecting it against nuclear missiles launched at it by another country. This means that while we are leaving behind the strategy of deterrence, which had kept the world on the brink of destruction, the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war is becoming more likely. Nations, like human beings, fear each other, respect each other

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but do not attack each other if they think that the rival has the same power, but if they find the means of protecting themselves, then they feel inclined to attack. The rival who is at a disadvantage has two choices: he either has to get his own protective shield, or acquire sufficient weapons to cancel out or overcome the defensive capacity of its rival. Space science is without any doubt one of the two fields of human knowledge that has evolved most rapidly. If we think that the conquest of space began hardly 30 years ago, and if we stop to think about the surprising progress that has been achieved in so little time, we realize what human ingenuity is still capable of with the help of space science. Thus, if two years ago the idea of a space-based defence system seemed fantastic, today this idea has ceased to be a hypothesis and is becoming a terrifying probability, in which the sums of money being invested are as unimaginable as the project itself.

I do not think it is necessary to set forth the reasons why we are against any initiative whose purpose is to make outer space a new dimension for the arms race. At this stage in the discussion which is taking place with regard to the Strategic Defence Initiative, perhaps it is more appropriate to confine ourselves to saying that we are not convinced by any of the arguments that have been put forward to justify it nor by the replies that have been given to the criticisms made against it. A system of strategic defence is not going to make nuclear weapons obsolete. On the contrary it will only help to accelerate their vertical proliferation in both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and most probably it will also start an acceleration of the conventional arms race. To this we should add that we consider it insane to devote to this programme the enormous amounts of money that are planned to this end when on Earth we still have more urgent problems of hunger, poverty, health and education to solve particularly in the Third World.

My delegation attaches enormous importance to the work that is to be undertaken shortly by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We would like in this connection to express our congratulations to Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil for having managed to achieve a consensus with regard to the mandate for re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee which will have the responsibility of carrying out the substantive work of the Conference on this subject. As you may recall, I was President of the Conference last March when we had the satisfaction of attaining this same goal, and therefore I am well aware of the difficult and delicate task that has been crowned with success for Ambassador de Souza e Silva. We therefore attach the utmost importance to the decision taken by the Conference under his Presidency, thanks to his patient and careful work of persuasion. We also wish to congratulate the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on this important topic, Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, on his appointment and offer him our full support and co-operation. Until now, the Conference has assigned the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. In our opinion the prevention of an arms race in outer space should begin to receive as much attention and be given the same priority as nuclear disarmament.

To conclude, we wish to appeal to the two Powers that today have in their hands the capacity to extend the arms race into space to display the necessary political will to achieve concrete results rapidly by agreeing on an

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international instrument that will strengthen the fundamental principle that space should only be used for peaceful purposes and at the same time prevent the arms race now taking place on this planet from spreading to the heavens.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Hungary, David Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Permit me first of all to associate myself with the previous speakers and extend to you the sincere congratulations of the Hungarian delegation on your assumption of the Presidency of this Conference for the month of June. We are confident that your diplomatic skill and long experience in international political affairs and your devotion to the great causes of peace and disarmament will be instrumental in guiding our activities here to a constructive start to the second part of the 1986 session. May I assure you of the full support of the Hungarian delegation in all your efforts in that sense. Let me be permitted also to express our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, who occupied that chair in April with much tact and skill. Under his able leadership the Conference was able to make some headway, thus improving the chances for further strides in our efforts to achieve progress.

The only purpose of my brief intervention today is to draw the attention of the Conference on Disarmament, in a preliminary manner, to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States which was held in the capital of my country on 10 and 11 June and to the important documents that have been issued thereby.

The Hungarian People's Republic, as the host country of the meeting, has the honour and obligation to submit the documents of the Political Consultative Committee to the Conference on Disarmament. In a letter that I sent today to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, I have enclosed the text of the Communiqué of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States and the Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the Member States of NATO and to all European countries for a programme of reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and requested that they be circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament. The documents have been received only today, but my delegation considered it appropriate to make them available to all delegations of the Conference in a most expeditious way so as to enable them to get acquainted with the far-reaching proposals contained in them from authentic documents. The Communiqué and the Appeal deal with the most pressing problems of the European and world situation and with a wide range of disarmament issues, including the programme of reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. At the same time, the documents contain positions and proposals of Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization directly pertaining to the priority task on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation intends to turn in a more substantive way to those questions at the earliest possible date in the plenary of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, the informal meeting which we agreed to hold today to consider some organizational questions. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and reconvened at 12 noon.

The PRESIDENT: The 361st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of our deliberations at the informal meeting, we should now take up for decision requests by non-members to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee re-established under agenda item 5 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The Conference has received requests from Norway, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, New Zealand, Denmark, Spain and Austria. In accordance with established practice, we shall take up those requests one by one in the order in which they have been received by the secretariat. I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.231 1/ relating to the request received from Norway. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.232 2/ relating to the request received from Finland. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.233 3/ relating to the request received from Portugal. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.234 4/ relating to the request received from Greece. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.235 5/ relating to the request received from Turkey. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.236 6/ relating to the request received from New Zealand. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts that the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.237 7/ relating to the request received from Denmark. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.238 8/ relating to the request received from Spain. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I put before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.239 9/ relating to the request received from Austria. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I recall that the Conference will hold an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m. to continue its substantive discussion on item 2 on the agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". As I announced on Tuesday, three members were inscribed to speak at the first meeting devoted to the subject and I shall give them the floor first tomorrow morning. They are the delegations of Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Mexico. I should also like to announce that the meeting of Working Group C of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, scheduled also for tomorrow at 10.30 a.m., has been cancelled.

As agreed at our informal meeting, I wish to announce that the plenary of the Conference will consider items 1 "Nuclear Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", between 16 and 27 June. I have been asked by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space to announce that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, scheduled for tomorrow at 3 p.m., will start punctually.

May I now turn to another subject. I have requested the secretariat to circulate a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. It has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We have concluded our business for today. I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 June at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting of the Conference stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

Notes

1/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/655) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/656) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

3/ "In response to the request of Portugal (CD/657) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

4/ "In response to the request of Greece (CD/658) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/659) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

6/ "In response to the request of New Zealand (CD/660) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

7/ "In response to the request of Denmark (CD/662) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

8/ "In response to the request of Spain (CD/665) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."

9/ "In response to the request of Austria (CD/669) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 5 of its agenda."