CD/PV.61 19 February 1980 ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTY-FIRST MEETING held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 19 February 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. D.S. McPhail (Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA

Australia: Mr. A. BEHM

Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. J.T. SIMARD

China: Mr. YU Pei-Wen

Mr. LIANG Yu-Fan

Mr. YANG Hu-Shan

Mr. JU Xian-Jie

Mr. CHOU Hsein-Chueh

Mr. XU Liu-Gen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RÜZEK

Mr. P. LUKES

Mr. E. ZÁPOTOCKÝ

Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY Mr. F. YOHANNES Ethiopia: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE France: Mr. M. COUTHURES German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER Mr. II. GRACZYNSKI Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGLER Mr. H. MULLER Mr. I. KOMIVES Hungary: Mr. C. GYORFFY India: Mr. S. SARAN Indonesia: Mr. M. SIDIK Mr. I.M. DAMANIK Mr. HARYOMATARAM Mr. H.M.U. SILLBAN Mr. M. DABIRI Iran: Mr. D. AMERI Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO Mr. M. MORENO Mr. C. FRATESCHI Mr, F. DE LUCA Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. R. ISHII Mr. K. MIYATA Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI

Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Ifr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

If. M... CACERES

Mongolia: Ifr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Ifr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R. FEIN

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Ifr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Ihr. M. AKR.II

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO BELAUNDE

Ifr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA

Romania: Mr. C. END

Sri Lanka:

Sweden: 1. THORSSON

Mr. C. LIDGARD
IIr. S. STROMBACK
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Republics:

Im. V.I. USTINOV

Mr. B.I. KORNEYENKO

Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. N.H. M.RSHALL

United States of /merica: Ifr. C. FLOWEREE

Mr. M. DALLY

Mr. P. S.LGADO

Mr. J. CALVERT

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mrs. R. MUGICA DE ADAMES

Mr. M. VRHUNEC Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire: Mr. BUKETI BUKAYI

Secretary to the Committee on Disarmament and

Personal Representative

of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. J.IPML

Mr. DABIRI (Iran): Mr. Chairman, allow me at the outset to associate myself with distinguished representatives who have extended to you a warm welcome both as the new Permanent Representative of Canada and as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for this month. With your dedication to the goal of disarmament and under your experienced guidance, we can hope to achieve positive results. You have our heartfelt wishes for success in the difficult task that this chairmanship entails.

We would also like to express our gratitude and appreciation to your predecessor Ambassador U Saw Hlaing of Burma, for his skill, patience and endeavours which enabled the Committee to conclude its first annual session.

The delegation of Iran to the Committee on Disarmament wishes to welcome warmly the long hoped-for participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the Committee. We attach particular importance to the participation of China in our deliberations. China's participation completes the number of the nuclear—weapon States present here and at the same time strengthens the representative character of this single multilateral negotiating body. Now for the first time all nuclear—weapon States, which are at the same time permanent members of the Security Council, are present in the Committee and we can expect more successful negotiations and an accelerated process of disarmament. We have listened with great interest to the statement made by the distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Zhang Wen-Jin, and we look forward to an active and constructive Chinese contribution.

We would also like to extend our heartiest welcome to the new representatives, particularly, who are heading their delegations for the first time in the Committee, namely, Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria, Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium, Ambassador Kómives of Hungary, Ambassador Okawa of Japan and Ambassador Kakwaka of Zaire. We are certain that we will greatly benefit from their contributions to our discussions.

It is a great pleasure to extend our greeting to all members of the secretariat, in particular, to Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of the Committee and Special Representative of the Secretary-General, whose counsel will be of great value.

The United Nations was founded 35 years ago, in response to the inevitable necessity to provide for alternatives to confrontations and wars. It was the expression of the will of its members to establish an international order based on greater security. It also demonstrated the desire of nations to create an international climate which would permit the gradual elimination of instruments of war that cast a grim shadow on the future prosperity of mankind and at the same time threaten its very existence. This unique threat of self-destruction is being increased from day to day due to the competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced.

The international community, fully aware of this threat, made great efforts during the First Disarmament Decade to slow down and eventually put an end to the ever-increasing arms race. The results of those immense efforts, although combined with a favourable international climate, were not encouraging.

Reviewing the lost opportunities of the last decade on the basis of the behaviour of the Superpowers, which are predominantly responsible for the lack of real success, one suspects that none of them was really interested in reducing the arms race, but rather that each of them was seeking only to disarm the other, while assuring the maintenance of its own weaponry. Even worse, it seems as though disarmament discussions were being used as part of the strategic competition, that proposals were made which would result in unilateral advantages for the proposing side. At the very least, one would have to assume cynically that the disarmament negotiations were only a veneer, the thinnest possible response to the world appeal for disarmament.

In spite of the slow progress during the First Disarmament Decade, we felt encouraged by the continuity of the process of disarmament due to the favourable international climate and the minimum of mutual confidence which appeared to exist between the two Superpowers.

Unfortunately, towards the end of the First Decade the open military intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan put an end to those favourable conditions, and the situation that we face today is one of alarm and intense concern.

Non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the inadmissibility of the use of force and the right of peoples to self-determination are cardinal principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, whose respect and strict observance is a sacred obligation to which all Member States have committed themselves. In this respect, the Superpowers have a particular obligation, and they are expected to act in a highly responsible manner in their relations with each other and with the rest of the world.

The military intervention in Afghanistan is one of the consequences of the intensification of rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in our region. Those unfortunate events have now caused a further escalation of the Superpower competition and their military presence in the area, especially in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly condemns any interference by the Superpowers in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. It cannot accept any military interference by a Superpower in an Islamic, non-aligned, small, defenceless and neighbouring country. In the same vein, the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, the First Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at Islamabad and, quite recently, the Commission on Human Rights have condemned the direct military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and have demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawl of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

It is a cause of deep concern to see that an unacceptable doctrine — incompatible with the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations — is being extended and applied to an Islamic and non-aligned country. At the same time it is surprising to observe that the Soviet Union has not learnt any lessons from the severe defeat of the United States of America in Viet Nam and has resorted to the same actions which are necessarily doomed to failure.

The interlocking relationship between international climate and disarmament negotiations cannot be overemphasized. The task of the Committee on Disarmament is to try to reduce tensions and to enhance mutual security among States by negotiating disarmament agreements, which incorporate the articulated interests of the Governments concerned. The events in Afghanistan have heightened tensions and reduced mutual confidence. They have, therefore, complicated the task of the Committee. Those events reaffirm the need for an increased effort in our search for an international order based on greater security, justice and prosperity.

We have returned with renewed determination to the Committee for another year of meetings which hopefully will enable us to bring to fruition some of the preparatory work done during 1979. As far as the delegation of Iran is concerned, we will certainly contribute to the best of our ability, and we firmly intend to help achieve some tangible progress on the priority items before the Committee.

Among the documents before us there is the record of the General Assembly's disarmament discussion ranging widely over an elongated agenda. Looking closely at the debate which engaged the First Committee and the guidelines which it has passed on to our Committee, we do not see a very encouraging picture. The debate itself clearly reflected general dissatisfaction with the state of disarmament negotiations, but there was little agreement on constructive suggestions which might help us advance towards our objectives. The huge number of resolutions adopted indicates an ever-increasing concern on the part of most countries over this vital question. Yet, one might wonder whether the greater volume of resolutions will necessarily spell greater success for our disarmament negotiations, whether it will be possible in this particular case to equate the quality of issues with quantitative progress.

The work of the Committee is predominantly guided by the resolutions of the General Assembly. Since it is difficult — if not impossible — to negotiate all the items referred to the Committee simultaneously, the priorities indicated by the General Assembly have to be followed. Unfortunately, the priorities established in recent years have remained embarrassingly beyond our grasp.

To be sure, general and complete disarmament — the most challenging and critical problem facing humanity today — remains the ultimate goal of the international community. Of course, we do not expect to achieve this goal immediately. But there must be a continuing step-by-step process aiming at the completion of the majority of items entrusted to the Committee in time for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982.

There is general agreement that the threat of nuclear war is the greatest single peril to mankind. Therefore, nuclear disarmament remains the overriding priority, and responsibility for progress here falls predominantly on the nuclear-weapon Powers, particularly on the two Superpowers.

(Mr. Dabiri, Iran)

In this context we hope that the necessary conditions for the ratification of the SALT II agreements will be established soon. We consider SALT to be an encouraging arms control process which should not end even with the ratification of SALT II, but which should continue to clear the way for SALT III, towards the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Postponement of the ratification of the SALT II Treaty makes it even more necessary and urgent to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Committee as soon as possible.

There is no doubt that the comprehensive test ban is the linchpin of this Committee's work. It must now be transformed from the perennial priority item of our agenda into an agreed text. We have been requested in General Assembly resolution 34/73 to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive test ban as a matter of the highest priority. As far as the Committee is concerned, its role should not be reduced to hoping that the trilateral negotiations on this subject will at some time bear fruit. We believe that the Committee should initiate concrete negotiations as soon as possible, because there is no justification to delay the negotiations any further.

Another major issue is the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In General Assembly resolution 34/84 the Committee was requested to continue negotiations on a priority basis during its 1980 session with a view to their early conclusion with the elaboration of a convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The absence of any real nuclear disarmament underscores the necessity for taking these measures. It is imperative to take action to safeguard the security of States which renounce nuclear weapons. It is quite natural that Iran, as a non-nuclear-weapon State and also as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is deeply interested in the subject. Another route in this regard is the regional approach towards the containment of nuclear proliferation as a means of lessening the danger of an outbreak of nuclear conflict and limiting the sphere of the possible use of nuclear weapons through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The comprehensive test ban and negative security guarantees are two important elements of the non-proliferation régime. With the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be held in August 1980 and the difficulties this Conference will face if no progress is achieved on these two items, an added responsibility is placed on all of us.

A convention to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has also been high on our agenda. We have been requested in General Assembly resolution 34/72 to undertake, at the beginning of the present session, negotiations on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as a matter of high priority. This question, secondary only to nuclear disarmament, requires immediate action. These inhuman and indiscriminate weapons, while existing in the stockpiles of some States, have not yet become part of the active defence panoply. This is the moment to act, before these weapons also become indispensable and before additional countries seek their acquisition.

A new item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" is expected to appear on our agenda. In resolution 34/83 H the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee the report and recommendations of the Disarmament Commission on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. General and complete disarmament under effective international control is the ultimate disarmament objective, and the importance of the elaboration and adoption of an integrated global approach for the realization of this objective cannot be overemphasized.

The last item to be mentioned is radiological weapons. In General Assembly resolution 34/87 A the Committee has been requested to proceed as soon as possible to achieve agreement, through negotiation, on the text of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Like many other delegations, we welcomed the presentation of the joint United States-USSR proposal last year. The fact that these weapons do not yet exist will make it easier to agree on their prohibition.

We emphasized the interlocking relationship between the international climate and disarmament because disarmament is not an isolated issue. Disarmament is closely related to the international climate. In this context, we would like to urge the Superpowers to restore the more favourable international climate which existed before, by eliminating the causes of present tension and conflict. The unfortunate events in our region have complicated disarmament negotiations, but at the same time they have once again underscored the urgency and necessity of these negotiations.

Mr. SAIAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): As I take the floor for the first time, Mr. Chairman, may I begin by discharging the pleasant duty of congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of February. I must say already that the competence you display augurs well for the soundness and effectiveness of our work.

May I also welcome the presence among us of the People's Republic of China, without which the Committee could not claim to meet the concern for representativity and democratization which prompted its formation and composition. The Committee has thus already managed to overcome one of the main handicaps of provious negotiating bodies, since all the nuclear-weapon Powers are today represented on it. We therefore have reason to hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers, aware of the special responsibility which falls to them, will endeavour, in collaboration with the other members, to make of this Committee a genuine negotiating body whose activities will lead to effective measures of disarmament in general and of nuclear disarmament in particular.

Lastly, I should like to thank the delegations which have addressed kind words of welcome to me, and would in turn assure them, on behalf of the Algerian delegation, of our complete readiness to collaborate with them.

The renewed tension that has recently marked international relations between the major Powers is an added complication in the global fabric of the international situation in which the Committee has embarked on its work.

The stepping-up of the arms race, which already showed all the signs of an inexorable phenomenon, the fact that the SALT II agreements, just when many non-aligned countries had welcomed their signature as a possible first step towards effective disarmament, can no longer be expected to come into force in the immediate, or perhaps even the foreseeable, future, and the phenomenon of the spread of tension, which is affecting various regions of the world, are all factors symptomatic of the precarious nature of what is termed the balance of terror and indicative of the magnitude of the task that awaits this Committee.

These different factors are symptomatic of the precarious nature of the balance of terror because it has recently been stated, for instance, that often total war is avoided only because of the sang-froid of a few men, which means, to

our mind that a nuclear war, with all its consequences, must be envisaged as a very real possibility and not as an abstract hypothesis. This shows just how urgent is the need to ensure non-use of the nuclear weapon and prevention of nuclear war.

They are indicative of the magnitude of the Committee's task because the pessimism to which the facts inevitably give rise must be counterbalanced by the political will to arrive at measures specifically designed to relieve tension. The Committee must get down to the task of working towards effective disarrament measures in the unity and serenity of effort which its responsibilities require.

At the outset of the Second Disarmament Decade, and half-way towards the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, it should be noted that we have perhaps never been so far from the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Not even during the First Disarmament Decade, which none the less underlined more than ever the international community's awareness of the constant threat of a world conflict, was any agreement reached with a view to instituting in a meaningful way any systematic process of genuine disarmament. Although, in the name of realism, we have endorsed the idea of progressive and gradual disarmament, it must none the less be noted that the agreements reached so far have been the product of a piecemeal and fragmented approach, and the process which should put an end to the presence of the nuclear weapons that have brought mankind to the threshold of suicide has yet to be initiated. Having learnt from the setbacks of the past, however, we do not give way to constant pessinism. In other words, there is room for that constructive doubt which on each occasion makes us call for specific initiatives and effective measures.

It is clear from the calendar of conferences for the first years of the Decade starting in 1980 that perhaps never before have so many meetings been devoted to disarmament. In 1980 alone, for example, it can be seen that various meetings on different disarmament matters will be held one after the other without interruption. It is to be hoped that they will yield results that will maintain the fresh impetus which the tenth special session of the General Assembly wished to give the work on disarmament.

One of these meetings, and undoubtedly the most important in view of the nature of the matters with which it deals, is that of the Committee on Disarmament, which is required to meet for about six months to consider an agenda drawn up on the basis of General Assembly resolutions that request it to give the highest priority to a number of items.

One item, which was recognized as having priority in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, concerns the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. As pointed out in this document, these weapons threaten the very existence of mankind on our planet. Since it is not possible to envisage their immediate destruction, urgent consideration should be given to specific and appropriate measures aimed at progressive disarmament which would be achieved through the cessation of the qualitative improvement of these weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of existing weapons and of their means of delivery.

The non-nuclear-weapon States are not responsible for the existence of nuclear weapons; they do not possess them and consequently no nuclear threat can emanate from them. Quite apart from the self-evident truth of such a statement, they need to receive guarantees from the nuclear-weapon Powers of their security against the use or the threat of use of such weapons. The international arrangements which provide for such guarantees must also include an undertaking to discontinue the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to destroy existing stockpiles which, in the final analysis, is the only real guarantee against such weapons. This question gave rise to three resolutions at the last session of the General Assembly. We abstained from the vote on one of them because it seemed to prejudge certain restrictions so far as the States which would be granted such guarantees were concerned. Indeed, we consider that all the non-nuclear-weapon States should enjoy such guarantees, without conditions or restrictions, and that this must apply in particular to the non-nuclear-weapon States which have voluntarily remained outside the alliances formed around the main nuclear-weapon Powers.

We trust that the inclusion of this item in the Committee's agenda for the second consecutive year and the renewal, for this session, of the terms of reference of the Working Group set up to consider the item will enable rapid progress to be made in negotiations on this matter.

The question of the prohibition of all nuclear tests has long been the subject of negotiation. In 1963 and in 1968, an undertaking was assumed regarding the rapid achievement of the prohibition of nuclear tests in all environments, and the signature of an agreement to that effect was awaited in vain prior to the convening of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly. At its last session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/73 which requests the Committee on Disarmament "to initiate negotiations on ... a treaty, as a matter of the highest priority". Under this resolution, negotiations within the Committee are not made subordinate to those undertaken within a trilateral framework. Furthermore, it "calls upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration" at the present session. The Committee should therefore be kept informed of developments at these negotiations, which were resumed a few days ago, with a view to taking up the matter irrespective of the outcome.

No progress was achieved during the Committee's consideration last year of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Yet the Committee on Disarmament has inherited various draft conventions submitted to the CCD, added to which there are the various initiatives taken by the non-aligned and neutral countries, members of the former negotiating body as well as of the group of 21 within this Committee. A considerable amount of work on the matter has therefore been done, and the Committee now has an opportunity -- all the necessary conditions having been satisfied -- to initiate negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

In connexion with the item relating to new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the Committee has before it an "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". We regard this proposal as an important contribution to further negotiations on the matter.

At its last session, the General Assembly requested the Committee to consider the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme. When supplemented and finalized, the document prepared by the Disarmament Commission could provide an appropriate framework for a continuing process of disarmament with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

This Committee must respond fully to the concern which was the prime factor in its formation, so that it can become a genuine negotiating body which functions democratically, on the basis of equal participation by all States. The special responsibility vested in it calls for a constant endeavour to achieve tangible results and effective disarmament measures. It is imperative that its efforts should not be dissipated in sterile discussions and academic exchanges, since its deliberations would then become impervious to the danger which threatens the existence of our planet. It is equally important not to regard the appeals made in this vein as part of the customary statements which traditionally accompany the Committee's work. Such an attitude would be indicative of surrender in the face of what would be the fate of a world bent on its own ruin.

We cannot disregard the importance which the negotiations under way between the major Powers may have, but it seems to us difficult to dissociate the temptation, or the attempt, to set the Committee apart from substantive negotiations on questions that are vital for mankind from the temptation, or the attempt, to reduce the Committee to inactivity, when its role would be simply one of recording agreements concluded outside this forum.

Negotiations which drag on, even if they are supposed to save mankind from the danger of suicidal destruction, bear, in the face of the threat which they are meant to avert, all the subtleties of the slow end to which they would in time condern the Committee. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement and for the words addressed to the Chair. This completes my list of those who have indicated that they wish to make general statements this morning. Before we proceed further with the list of speakers, I suggest that we turn to Working Paper No. 1, containing the recommendations of the Chair concerning the provisional agenda and a framework for the programme of work.

I should like now to submit for your consideration and adoption Working Paper No. 1, and in so doing, I wish to state the following:

"In accordance with rule 27 of its rules of procedure the Committee, in adopting its agenda for 1980 (contained in Working Paper No. 1) shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by members of the Committee and the decisions of the Committee.

"The recommendations made to the Committee by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, some of which contain specific requests to report to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, are referred to in the letter of the Secretary-General in document CD/55. They are the following:

- 34/72 "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 34/73 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/60"
- 34/79 "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"
- 34/83 B "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"
- 34/83 G "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"
- 34/83 J "Nuclear weapons in all aspects"
- 34/84 "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States"
- 34/85 "Conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 34/86 "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 34/87 A "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 34/87 D "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes".

"In addition to the items inscribed in the provisional agenda, proposals were presented by members of the Committee concerning the inclusion of (a) as a sub-item of item 2, the question of 'Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war', (b) additional items on 'Conventional weapons', on which an

official document has been circulated during the current session of the Committee, as well as on 'Disarmament and development', and (c) a separate item on 'Radiological weapons'.

"Previous decisions of the Committee relating to the items on the provisional agenda are contained in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session (document CD/53).

"It is understood that members of the Committee will take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session under the relevant items of its agenda, and that, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, it is the right of any Member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

"It is further understood that the annual report of the Committee (item 7) will, inter alia, deal with the following two questions: (a) State of the consideration of the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which were transmitted to the Committee with General Assembly resolution 33/71 L., and (b) Consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee, referred to in General Assembly resolution 33/91 G."

Before we proceed with the adoption of the document, I believe that one or more delegations wish to speak.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should like to preface this statement by repairing the involuntary omission of which I was guilty in my statement at the inaugural meeting of our proceedings this year when I failed to express, as I am now doing with special pleasure, my delegation's gratitude to the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Saw Hlaing, for his wise and laudable work as Chairman of the Committee during the closing month of the previous session.

Mr. Chairman, in stating our complete agreement with the draft agenda for 1980 which you have just submitted to the Committee for its consideration, may I express my delegation's deep appreciation of the highly constructive and effective way in which you have directed and guided the informal talks which, we are fully confident, will make it possible to adopt the draft agenda by consensus.

Furthermore, my delegation considers that the results of the long and arduous hours which you and various members of the Committee have had to spend on this procedural matter, with the valuable co-operation of the Secretariat, should not be confined to the detailed explanatory account which you have read to us, but should also help to make it unnecessary to repeat those same endeavours in the future. In our view, it is a pity that, despite the firm foundations laid last year with the preparation of the rules of procedure and the so-called "decalogue", it should be necessary to spend so much of the first two weeks of the session each year on the adoption of the agenda.

My delegation will later engage in informal consultations on this question with the other members of the Committee in order to explore the possibility of submitting, in due course, a working paper which may prove of some use in the matter. This does not, of course, Mr. Chairman, detract in any way from the very great merits of the work you have brought to a successful conclusion on this occasion, and it is my pleasure to say once again how deeply it has been appreciated by my delegation.

Mr. SARAN (India): I would like to express, on behalf of my delegation, appreciation of the efforts made by the Chair to achieve a consensus on the agenda. I would also like to place on record the position of my delegation that, with respect to the question of the "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war", on which the General Assembly has asked for reports from the Committee at its thirty-fifth session, the Group of 21 would have liked it included as a sub-item of agenda item 2.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium): I simply wish to say that the Belgian delegation supports Working Paper No. 1 which you, Mr. Chairman, have just introduced to us, and I would add that we have taken note of your interpretive statement and have no observations to make on it.

While I have the floor I should like to take the opportunity to express to you our thanks and gratitude for the way in which you conducted the consultations which led to this splendid result today, and to pay tribute to Ambassador Jaipal as well as to the Secretariat, which assisted you in this task. I should also like to express our appreciation of the spirit of compromise displayed by all delegations which participated in this work; I think it augurs well for our Committee, for I believe that only a spirit of compromise in negotiations and a spirit of moderation in the statements made here in the Committee can guarantee the success of our work.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation also wishes to express its support for the agenda proposed by you, Mr. Chairman, and is pleased with the consultations which you have conducted and which have enabled us to achieve a consonsus. We prefer to conduct negotiations on items which are before us for inclusion in the agenda. We have several times stated our views on these questions under item 2 of the agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In that connexion, I wish to refer members to resolution 2936 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 on the non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the initiative of the Soviet Union. We continue to believe that implementation of this resolution, adopted by the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, would be conducive to the prevention of nuclear war and would contribute to the exclusión of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States. I also wish to refer in this connexion to the draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war submitted by the Soviet delegation at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

This is not intended to be a detailed account of our position, which I shall present in due course.

Mr. YU Pei-Wen (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese delegation wishes to thank you Mr. Chairman because, as a result of your outstanding efforts and full consultations, we have finally arrived at a consensus on an agreed agenda. I also wish to thank Ambassador Jaipal, and the Secretariat for their efforts in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no objections, I take it that the Committee decides to adopt Working Paper No. 1.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I suggest now that we continue with the list of speakers for today's plenary meeting.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to associate myself with what you said in opening this morning's meeting by extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Charles Floweree in his new capacity as head of the United States delegation. During the period 11 to 15 February 1980 the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held its ninth session, under the mandate given to it by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979. According to its rules of procedure, the Ad Hoc Group has submitted its progress report on that ninth session. The report is before you as CD/61 and, on behalf of my delegation, I introduce it formally to the Committee to be considered and taken note of. The Committee on Disarmament is also asked to confirm that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group will be held from 7 to 18 July 1980. I would also like to say that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden, is present here and is prepared to answer any questions the Committee might have concerning the report. Therefore Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate it if you could give the floor to Mr. Ericsson.

Mr. ERICSSON (Sweden, speaking as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts): The Ad Hoc Group on an international seismological data exchange has, as you might recall, already produced two reports. The first describes the main features of such an international seismological data exchange and the second filled in quite a lot of necessary details. Now, under a third mandate, the Ad Hoc Group will acquire new information and experience from national investigations in the field with a view to improving the international seismological data exchange still further. We enjoyed the co-operation of approximately 23 States during this meeting, including the People's Republic of China as an observer. It would, however, still be very useful to obtain co-operation from parts of the globe which so far are not included in this widespread group. The national studies in question are expected to unfold for the Group over the next year, beginning with the next meeting of the Group which is planned for July of this year. However, the report on the review and analysis of these national investigations is expected to be presented in July next year. As is

(Mr. Ericsson, Sweden)

the usual practice following a session of this Group, a formal progress report has been prepared and put before you as CD/61, and I would be very glad to answer any questions you might have.

The CHAIRMAN: I think this is the moment at which members of the Committee could put questions to Mr. Ericsson if they wish to do so. I would suggest that, following such questions, the Committee may wish to take note of document: CD/61, which could then be discussed at an informal meeting, perhaps in connexion with the work programme, during the next few days. If there are no questions, may I therefore thank both Mr. Ericsson and the Swedish representative.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): I just wanted to say that my name is on the list of speakers for this morning and that I intended to put a question to Mr. Ericsson in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN: I trust that the Committee agrees with me that, at this point, we should take note of the report and agree that we will return to it at an informal meeting in the near future.

It was so decided.

Mr. BEHM (Australia): In welcoming the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on its ninth session, the Australian delegation would like to express its satisfaction with the way in which the GSE has set about implementing the terms of its new mandate. As members of the Committee on Disarmament will recall, Australia supported strongly the proposal that the Group of Scientific Experts should continue its work with a view to elaborating detailed instructions for an experimental test of the global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic—events:

In the realization of its mandate, the GSE has, during its ninth session, given detailed consideration to the various national investigations which are a necessary first step to developing the general parameters for an experimental test of an international seismic data exchange. Experts from 17 of the States which participate in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts provided information on planned national investigations. The Australian expert, Mr. Peter McGregor, outlined the principal features of our national investigations, and announced that Australia would participate in the first four of the study groups described in paragraph 6

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

of this report. They are: (a) Seismological station and station network, (b) Data to be regularly exchanged (Level I data), (c) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through WMO/GTS, and (d) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level II data.

Australia remains of the view that the work of the GSE is a most important element in this Committee's work on a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty. As we have noted on many occasions, both here and in other international forums which deal with arms control and disarmament issues, Australia attaches great significance to the role which an effective verification system will play in a CTBT. The effectiveness of a CTBT as a barrier to both vertical and horizontal proliferation has a direct relationship to the confidence which the parties to the treaty have in its verification procedures.

When he spoke to the Committee on 5 February 1980, the leader of the Australian delegation, Sir James Plimsoll, drew attention to the need to avoid a situation where, once there is trilateral agreement on the CTB, a delay would occur in the elaboration of a multilateral treaty owing to the fact that no work had been done on an institutional framework. The work of the GSE, especially the development of detailed instructions for a global network, is a necessary ingredient in the negotiations which the Committee on Disarmament must eventually conduct on an international structure for the CTB.

The Australian delegation looks forward to hearing reports on the various national investigations during the GSE's summer session. In this regard, we should like to note with particular satisfaction the continued participation in the work of the GSE by Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway. The high level of expertise and broad representative character of the GSE gives us grounds for hope that the Cemmittee on Disarmament will, without any unnecessary delay, finalize the technical characteristics of an international seismic detection system.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBIES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation would like to associate itself with the words of welcome that you, Mr. Chairman, addressed to Ambassador Floweree, the new representative of the United States. I should also like to express and to convey to the members of the Group of Experts through Mr. Ericsson, its distinguished Chairman, our gratitude for the report contained in document CD/61 which we received today and which will be studied with all the attention it deserves by my delegation.

My delegation considers that there are more than sufficient grounds to justify the decision of the Committee to give the first place on its agenda for 1980 as well as in the programme of work for the first part of the session we are now embarking upon to the item entitled "Nuclear test ban". It was not in vain that the General Assembly, in its resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979, reaffirmed once again that "a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States... is a matter of the highest priority".

A comparison of this resolution with the resolution that the Assembly adopted the previous year on the same subject—resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978—underlines the increasing impatience of the international community with the stagnation of the tripartite negotiations which have been going on for two and a half years. Consequently the resolution contained a number of provisions which did not exist in the previous one, and through which the most representative United Nations body:

- (1) Emphasized the "urgent need for all nuclear-weapon States to cease the testing" of such weapons;
- (2) Noted "with dissatisfaction" that the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its first session showed that "no progress" had been made in considering "the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty" and that "a full report on the status of the negotiations between the ... nuclear-weapon States" had not been submitted;
- (3) Unequivocally expressed its "conviction that positive progress in the negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on such a treaty is a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons";
- (4) Emphatically recognized the "indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty"; and
- (5) Directly requested the Committee on Disarmament to "initiate negotiations on such a treaty, as a matter of the highest priority".

This resolution, which was adopted by 137 votes in favour and none against, was completed by another of an equally explicit but more general nature, namely, resolution 34/83 B, which was adopted on the same date with 130 votes in favour and again with none against.

In that resolution, which is entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament", the Assembly stressed that "negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should not in any way constitute an impediment to the negotiations on such questions in the Committee"; it urged the Committee "to proceed, without any further delay, to substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda", and, as a direct contribution to such negotiations, invited the members of the Committee involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions "to make every effort to achieve a positive conclusion of these negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee" and, failing this, to submit to the Committee "a full report on the status of their separate negotiations and results achieved so far".

From the brief recapitulation I have just made, it is clear why I said at the beginning that there is every reason for the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban to be given pride of place in our deliberations in this first year of the Second Disarmament Decade. Never before has the General Assembly been so categorical and imperative in urging that the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should at last embark upon substantive negotiations on a subject to which the most representative body of the United Nations has assigned "the highest priority" for many years. This is something which should have been done a long time ago and must now be viewed as a duty that can no longer be postponed. May I remind you in this connexion of what I said at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament nearly two years ago:

"We are confident that the nuclear-weapon States which have been taking part in the trilateral conversations for months, and which include the two States which are usually called Superpowers, will make a special effort to transmit to the CCD the preliminary draft of a treaty in time to allow the Committee to consider it thoroughly in order to be in a position to submit it to the Assembly at its thirty-third regular session.

"In this regard we would venture to go a little further and to express here the hope that, should these three nuclear-weapon States to which I have just alluded consider it impossible to complete their preliminary draft in what remains of the month of July, they will arrive at the conclusion that there is

no absolute need for the preliminary draft to be entirely complete before it is submitted to the CCD. On the contrary, it would seem that a number of by no means negligible advantages would be gained if this multilateral negotiating body were to take cognizance of all those articles in the preliminary draft which had already been completed, providing that the remaining articles are also submitted to it as and when they are completed. The nuclear-weapon Powers would thus have the benefit of the views of the members of the Group of 15 who, because of their impartiality, could perhaps help to provide the element of conciliation or negotiation which may very well elude the nuclear-weapon States which concentrate too much on the interests of their respective military alliances".

The words I have just cited from the statement I made on 11 July 1978 are even more relevant today than they were then because, apart from the last two resolutions of the Assembly I have quoted from today, we must not forget the forceful statement by the Group of 21 at the conclusion of the first annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, which said, among other things, that:

"The Group expresses its dissatisfaction with the report on the trilateral negotiations, conveyed at the very end of the Committee on Disarmament's session. The Group believes that it should have been possible for the States concerned to provide a comprehensive and detailed report on the status of these negotiations and of the areas of agreement and disagreement. However, it is apparent from the reported progress made in the trilateral negotiations, as indicated in the official statements of the States concerned, that there is no justification to delay any further the initiation of concrete negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a CTBT".

It should also be borne in mind that, pursuant to a recommendation of its First Committee, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in decision No. 34/422, to prepare "the study on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban", as recommended by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. In accordance with the request made by the Assembly, the study should be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament "in the spring of 1980", which probably means at the end of March or beginning of April.

This has been the factor which has prompted us to urge the desirability of giving the question I have spoken about the same treatment this year as it was accorded in the programme of work for the summer session of 1979. This would mean that we should deal with it very briefly now, but consider it at much greater length in the final stages of this first part of our 1980 session. It is at that moment —

or at least so my delegation hopes — that we could come to an agreement on the establishment of a working group to engage in negotiations on the question, without prejudice to the continuation, on parallel lines, of the tripartite negotiations which have been in progress since 1977, if this is considered expedient. We believe that this would be all the more desirable in that, as we should keep very much in mind, the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to be held in August of this year, an event which gives renewed force to the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his address to the CCD on 29 February 1972:

"..., if nuclear-weapon tests by the nuclear Powers continue, the future credibility and perhaps even the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty achieved after such painstaking effort may be jeopardized. I need not describe the greatly increased dangers that would confront the world in such an event".

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): My delegation has taken note of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on its ninth session, as presented to this Committee this morning by Mr. Ericsson to whom my delegation wishes to express its gratitude for the important role he has been playing as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group. We were pleased to learn that an expert from the People's Republic of China was present at this session. I also wish to endorse wholeheartedly the various points made by Mr. Dehm of Australia a little while ago on the work of the Ad Hoc Group, which enjoys the full support of the Japanese Government.

I also wish to say that my delegation fully shares the views just expressed by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico regarding the urgency of arriving at a comprehensive test ban treaty and, pending its conclusion, the presentation by the trilateral negotiating States of a detailed progress report on the state of their negotiations.

My delegation was also pleased to learn from the Japanese expert who attended the ninth session that a number of very constructive elements were discerned in the various national reports presented to the Ad Hoc Group last week. I am referring in particular to the initiatives of certain countries to hold workshops or seminars this year to develop further the scientific and technical aspects of international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. We consider these projects to be of positive significance in that they could very well pave the way for the eventual global experimental exercise that we have been advocating for the international seismic data exchange system.

(Ilr. Okawa, Japan)

I would now wish to go back about two years, to the Ad Hoc Group's first report which was presented to the CCD in March 1978. On that occasion, we were told that a time period of at least six months would be required for the planning and co-ordination of the experimental evercise that was proposed by the Ad Hoc Group. Sixteen months later, when the Ad Hoc Group's second report was presented to this Committee, in July last year, we were told that a further six months to one year, from that point in time, would be required for the additional studies that were considered necessary to prepare the experimental exercise. We were also told that the preparations could be completed by the end of 1980 if the Group could have about four more meetings during 1980. This information was provided to us by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group in response to questions put to him at the time by my predecessor, Ambassador Ogiso.

As a result of the Ad Hoc Group's ninth session, held last week, we are now led to understand that the Group will require three or four further sessions in 1980 and 1981 for it to be able to present its third report during the summer part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. This means that we will have to wait at least another year and a half for the third report — at least another six months longer than we were led to believe in July last year.

My delegation would, therefore, be grateful if the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group could try to explain to us in easy terms why his Group needs a further 18 months to meet its responsibilities, and whether the Ad Hoc Group's third report to the Committee could not be presented to us at perhaps a somewhat earlier date than the summer of 1981.

I hardly need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, but my Government has been strongly in favour of the early implementation of the experimental exercise, as one step in the direction of the setting up of the envisaged international seismic data exchange system — which would provide an important means of verification for the eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

We continue to believe that the exercise should be carried out prior to the entry into force of the eventual treaty, and indeed that the exercise in itself would greatly contribute to the realization of the treaty.

And I cannot help feeling that this long-awaited experimental exercise -- quite technical in nature, in the first place -- seems to be eluding us, receding, by periods of six months or more, into the future, each time that we think we are getting within reach of it.

Mr. ERICSSON (Sweden, speaking as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group):

I will try to respond to the questions just posed by the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, and to begin with, his question concerning the experimental exercise, originally proposed by Japan. In our second report CD/43 one can find a reference to it, and I must say again that it has not been possible to achieve a consensus in the Ad Hoc Group on the conditions under which such an experimental exercise could be started. As just stated, you would like to see it take place before the entry into force of an underground test ban treaty. However, as there is no consensus on this matter in the Group, we have not been able to progress with the experimental exercise as such. What we can do is to improve the general plans and the details for the international seismological data exchange and, in doing so, the conditions for an experimental exercise once it would be possible to conduct it.

As regards the report, under the present mandate, of the Ad Hoc Group -- one can say, as we are waiting for the emergence of a text for a test ban treaty, that we are taking the opportunity to improve our schemes by exploring national investigations which are or will be available to us. That is the best we can do; but we are obviously dependent upon the speed with which the national investigations are delivered. We have already taken some liberties by announcing our report for July 1981, as at least one national investigation described to us will not be concluded until 1982. On the other hand, this is the situation where we must simply explore the possibilities available right now. Once a treaty text emerges things will certainly speed up. I hope that this is an adequate answer to your question Sir.

Mr. YU Pei-Wen (China) (translated from Chinese): The progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the ninth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events is the result of efforts made by various experts under the leadership of Mr. Ericsson of Sweden. The Chinese delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the efforts they have made.

The Chinese delegation sent an expert as an Observer to participate in the meetings of the Group, but of course this does not imply that the Chinese Government has made any change in its position of principle as regards nuclear testing. I wish to take this opportunity, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to thank Mr. Ericsson and the members of the Group for the welcome and support they have given to our Observer.

The CHAIRMAN: At our informal meeting yesterday we decided to hold another informal meeting today, immediately after the plenary meeting, to continue our consideration of questions relating to the programme of work of the Committee. The intention was, on this occasion, to refer to Working Papers Nos. 4 and 5, which I believe have been circulated today in all languages. You will recall that we also agreed that, if necessary, there would be an informal meeting this afternoon at 3 p.m. on the agenda item dealing with a nuclear test ban. Accordingly, I propose that we proceed to hold a short informal meeting on the programme of work in five minutes' time to discuss the future course of our deliberations. If there are no objections, we will meet in five minutes' time in an informal meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.