

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.343
27 February 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 February 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President,

Mr. R. Butler

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. N. KERROUM Mr. A. BELAID
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M. CAMPORA Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R.A. ROWE Ms. M. LETTS Mr. J. OKELY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. C. CLERCKX Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYS
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. V. BOJILOV Mr. H. HALATCHEV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. R. DEYANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TIN TUN U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT Daw AYE AYE MU
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.A. BEESLEY Mr. R.J. ROCHON
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN Jiadong Mr. HU Xiaodi Mr. SUO Kaiming Mr. SHA Zukang Ms. WANG Ziyun Mr. YANG Minglang Mr. YU Zhongzhou Mr. LI Daozhong Mr. TAN Han
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:France:

Mr. J. HESSEL
Mr. H. RENIE
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. H. PETERS
Mr. W.-N. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. T. TOTH
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. A.S. GONSALVES
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. A.M. FACHIR
Mr. R.I. HENIE
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. A. MASBAR

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. A.A. VELAYATI
Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. M. ABBASZADEH
Mr. F. SHAHABI

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. E. SIVIERO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

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Mr. D.D. AFANDE
Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

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Mr. S.-O. BOLD
Mr. G. GONGOR

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. M.S. BENRYANE

Netherlands:

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Mr. R. MILDERS

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Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. A.A. ELLA

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Mr. K. NIAZ

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Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

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Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

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Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER
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Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

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Mr. L.A. NAOUMOV
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Mr. O.V. KUZMIN
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
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Mr. J. ENGLEHARDT
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Mr. R.L. LUACES
Ms. S. MANNIX
Mr. R. NELSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A. TAYLHARDAT
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 343rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, I wish to extend a cordial welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who is listed to speak today at the Conference. I should also like to welcome the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Torbgoern Frøysnes, who is addressing the Conference today. They have been with us before, expressing the views of their Governments in connection with disarmament questions. I am grateful for their interest in our work and I wish them a productive visit to Geneva.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of items 1, "Nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In accordance with the agreement reached at our last plenary meeting, at the end of the list of speakers we will hold today an informal meeting to consider organizational questions relating to the intensive consultations that I have been conducting during the past weeks. In particular, as decided last Tuesday, we should consider the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, on which a consensus has become apparent during those consultations.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, the United States of America and New Zealand. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to be here today in the Conference on Disarmament under your Presidency, and to be among people who share a common dedication to the cause of disarmament, and of whom many have distinguished themselves in seeking that goal. I am confident that your wise guidance will help the Conference to deal successfully with the weighty responsibilities which the international community has entrusted to it.

The international community feels more than ever in dire need of providing the necessary grounds for the materialization of disarmament, or at least arresting the arms race. It is the duty of this august forum to draw the main lines for such a crucial matter without any ambiguity; success will enable humanity to fully utilize its God-given endowments for moral and material development, free from the fear of war and destruction. The people of the world have today pinned their hopes on the well-wishers to find a way out of the vicious circle of the arms race. Hence, this has raised their expectations that this gathering of representatives of various countries will take serious steps.

It is unfortunate that a colossal amount of money, exceeding the debts of the Third World countries, is spent annually on the lunatic arms race. But I ask the delegations represented today, what is the raison d'être of such an evil phenomenon? While all the speakers unanimously call for disarmament, in practice we are witnessing that the arms race is increasingly swallowing up the economic potential of mankind each year. Are the merchants of death not

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

the main obstacles in the way of achieving these aims? Is the hegemonism of the Big Powers and their rivalry not the main reason? Is the polarization of the contemporary world not contributing to the further escalation of the arms race? Should human aspirations and the happiness of mankind fall victim to the greed and expansionist goals of these Powers?

This arms race has also been imposed on other States in such a way that the Third World countries, in spite of their economic and social problems, are spending larger parts of their resources for armaments due to their lack of confidence and international insecurity. The merchants of death, by fanning the flames of differences and regional conflicts, intensify this trend to pocket and plunder the economic resources and national wealth of these countries. International confidence and tranquility has been endangered by the following elements:

first, intensifying the arms race between the super-Powers to gain larger spheres of influence in the world; second, stepping up the efforts by the Big Powers to impose hegemonism on other States; third, making attempts to expand the arms race in new dimensions; fourth, carrying out military manoeuvres and expanding military bases in the sensitive quarters of the world; fifth, fanning up the differences and border conflicts among the Third World countries; sixth, exercising suppressive policies against the Third World countries aimed at preventing them from further achievements at the levels of independence, security and development; and seventh, weakening the credibility of the international organizations, particularly the United Nations Security Council, by exerting persistent influence on small countries.

The amount of damage inflicted by the above-mentioned factors on the process of initiation and growth of confidence and international security is so vast that the possibility of making any tangible moves towards the realization of justice, peace, disarmament and development is very remote.

What is evident, however, is the need to rebuild the house together, possibly on a stronger foundation, and with richer experience. Confidence needs to be built, since we all have a sacred duty to prevent wars, so that we all may work together for a brighter future, free from lack of faith, injustice, ignorance, fear and hunger.

One of the ideas in the meeting of the Helsinki Conference in 1975 was to provide a setting conducive to substantive arms control and disarmament measures which would strengthen trust among the participating States.

The neutral and non-aligned nations in the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures supported the mutual non-use of military force for aggressive and threatening purposes. They considered that equal respect for the legitimate security interests of the States required determined efforts by all of them to build mutual confidence.

Extensive discussions were also held in the general meeting of the 1983 SIPRI Conference on common security, regarding the definition of "confidence" and the policies which could build or destroy it. A principal question that was raised in the Conference was what confidence can mean, even between countries with deep political conflicts or different military capabilities.

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The 1980s have seemed to many experts to be a time of worsening insecurity, and some have gone as far as to question the conceptual foundations of present policies. The need for new concepts as well as for new policies is deeply felt. The idea of common security was termed in the 1982 Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues as being founded on the overwhelming common interest in avoiding nuclear war.

The Report indicates that "acceptance of Common Security as the organizing principle for efforts to reduce the risk of war, limit arms and move towards disarmament, means, in principle, that co-operation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interest". The Commission thus rightly concluded that "A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments".

The Independent Commission opposed the strategy of deterrence in a rather general sense, as the expression of the continuing importance of military force in international life.

In the International Conference on Common Security it was also argued that World War III could be unleashed in the region of the Third World unless a stop is put to bloc rivalries. It was also strongly emphasized that common security did not mean that super-Powers should agree to preserve the status quo in a given region and that it was "to the countries in a region themselves to resolve their differences away from the super-Powers' interference".

It is clear that, in such circumstances, suitable grounds for the formation of durable peace in different regions of the world, especially in the Third World, gain strength, and thereby the threat of escalation of nuclear war is also reduced.

But it is due to the continuation of acts of aggression on the part of the major Powers and as a consequence of their unprincipled reaction in the face of violations of accepted norms of international law that the expression of the deterrence doctrine, which connects war prevention with the capacity to fight wars, still has considerable strength in the minds of many military strategists around the world. In short, the cause of the lack of confidence and the prevalence of chaos and tension in our world today is the difficulties and hardships created by some major Powers for different countries, especially the countries of the Third World

Compliance with and respect for bilateral and multilateral commitments, as well as adherence to justice in settling international disputes and differences, can, in our opinion, provide solid foundations for maintaining confidence even among States having political differences and with different military capabilities. To express abhorrence and condemnation vis-à-vis the violation of international laws and regulations will enhance these commitments and contribute greatly to the growth of confidence in the world.

Administration of justice, achievement of a permanent and durable peace and the establishment of joint security in the world require a halt to any military intervention or raising of tension by the domineering Powers.

In recent years, our nation has been a witness to shortcomings in international policies. The unjust and premeditated war imposed on our country

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

by the totalitarian régime of Iraq is an evil instance of arming a puppet régime to destabilize one of the most sensitive regions of the world.

Unfortunately, arms delivery to Iraq was not only not halted after the inception of the aggression but was intensified, and went as far as the frequent deployment of chemical weapons in the past three years. The reports of the United Nations experts confirm the use of poisonous gas by the Iraqi régime against Iran (document S/16433). The presence of tens of Iranian victims of chemical weapons now being treated in European hospitals substantiates our claim.

The Iraqi régime, in addition to the use of chemical weapons in 33 operations in the past which have killed or injured more than 4,500 civilians and military personnel, has recently deployed more lethal doses in more than 10 instances leading to the injury of about 8,500 civilians. The detailed figures of these chemical attacks were presented to the Conference on Disarmament on 18 February 1986. On the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a United Nations team despatched by the Secretary-General to probe into the recent deployment of chemical weapons arrived in Tehran last night.

The United Nations Security Council's failure to take a clear position vis-à-vis the violation by Iraq of the 1925 Geneva Protocol has further encouraged this régime to continue such acts, and it was vividly clear that adopting resolutions such as those of 25 April 1985 and 24 February 1986 of the United Nations Security Council would not solve any problem. The violation of international laws and regulations was not limited to the use of chemical weapons, and other breaches by that régime can be summarized as follows: outright and fully-fledged military aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran instead of recourse to international organizations and arbitration to settle claimed differences through peaceful means; deliberate demolition of cities and population centres with bulldozers (Security Council Document S/15834); total violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1949 concerning the treatment of POWs and civilian citizens of the occupied territories (Security Council document S/16962); application of chemical weapons in contravention of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (Security Council document S/16433); attacking mercantile vessels in the Persian Gulf (Security Council document S/16877); violation of the 12 June 1984 undertaking with the United Nations Secretary-General as to the cessation of military attacks on civilian and population centres (Security Council document S/16897); attack on the atomic reactor in Bushehr, in the south of the country; attack on historical sites which have been registered as the cultural heritage of the world community in contravention of the Hague Convention 1954, especially the recent attacks against the monuments of historical value in Ispahan; and attacks on civil aircraft and threat to the safety of civil aviation.

The recent crime committed by the Iraqi régime in attacking a civilian aircraft in which 46 civilians were murdered is a new instance of violation of international laws and regulations.

If the deliberations on disarmament reach nowhere, and if verification of banning the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons is not carried out, is the trial of war criminals and those who deploy chemical weapons beyond the capability of international organizations?

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The Islamic Republic of Iran seeks the punishment of these criminals, similar to that of the Nuremberg Court, and reserves the right that, in case the international community is incapable, the Islamic Republic of Iran will take the necessary measures to punish the aggressor, the war criminals and those who in contravention of the Conventions in Time of War have breached the Charter of the United Nations and have committed crimes against peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to His Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Torbgoern Frøysnes.

Mr. FRØYSNES (Norway): Mr. President, I am indeed pleased to be back in the Conference on Disarmament at a time when there seems to be greater hope for concrete progress than we have seen earlier in the 1980s. Admittedly, peace-making is a slow process, and maybe rightly so. Already King James I of Great Britain recommended that "As I have counselled you to be slow in taking on a war, so I advise you to be slow in peacemaking".

It seems to me that international peace-making forums are still taking this advice of King James I very seriously: some would say, too seriously.

I know that the international disarmament agenda is ambitious. But precisely because of that, it is necessary to single out areas where progress is possible.

Here at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva it seems to me that such an area could be a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This should more than ever be a priority item on the international disarmament agenda. The existing draft text which has been negotiated here in the Conference on Disarmament provides a good basis. It must be a major task for this Conference to expand further the basis of agreement with a view to concluding a binding convention as early as possible.

How do we achieve the urgent progress which we need? I see a two-fold strategy. Firstly, it is the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament to undertake and complete the negotiations on the convention. Secondly, the major chemical weapons Powers have also a special role to play. Indeed, it is highly significant that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at their meeting in November 1985 agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on chemical weapons. We welcome their agreement to intensify bilateral discussions at the expert level on all aspects of such a chemical-weapons ban, including the question of verification. This agreement has special significance in light of the fact that the verification issues have proved to be among the most difficult questions to solve.

We know that verification of a chemical-weapons convention will be a complex matter, necessitating more comprehensive monitoring systems than in any existing disarmament treaties. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament has to break new ground in order to establish an adequate verification mechanism. The system which will be developed by the Conference will have a bearing on verification provisions in other future disarmament agreements as well. Among the issues which have to be solved, the question of on-site inspection on

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challenge retains special significance. We believe that an effective and verifiable convention will necessitate a compulsory system of on-site inspections without making use of unnecessary intrusiveness. The elaboration of such a system is a momentous task, which will require an open mind and a flexible attitude from all the parties concerned.

So where do we go from here? I wish to recall that the United States, for its part, has tabled comprehensive proposals in the draft convention of April 1984. This was a welcome contribution. My Government attaches importance to the fact that the United States underlined that the draft was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This is a necessary approach for all the parties at the present time. In his statement on 15 January General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would accept strict control, including international on-site inspection, for a number of major measures to be covered by the convention, inter alia destruction of the relevant industrial base for production of chemical weapons.

Let us now, then, have all the cards laid down. Think what a relief it would be if this Conference could finally announce that the horrors of chemical weapons will be eliminated! It is high time now.

In Norway's participation in these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament we have presented the results of comprehensive field research on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. The Norwegian research programme will continue and later this year we will present additional proposals dealing with verification of alleged use of such weapons.

In this connection I also want to emphasize the grave concern of my Government in view of the new and recent reports on use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. The Norwegian Government condemns the use of such weapons. These reports, and not least the recent statement of the Foreign Minister of Iran, underscore once more the urgency of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons ban.

We know that various proposals for regional zones free from chemical weapons and a treaty on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons have also been put forward. I think what we know of the use of chemical weapons dictates that we must eliminate this class of weapons altogether from existing arsenals. All other considerations are second to this fundamental objective.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would, in Norway's opinion, represent a significant contribution to the aim of halting the nuclear-arms race and promoting non-proliferation efforts. We regret, therefore, that the Conference on Disarmament so far has not been able to agree to resume its substantive work which was initiated on this issue in 1982 and 1983. In this respect I should like to recall that Norway last year joined nine western countries members of the Conference in presenting a proposal for a programme to facilitate the further work on this issue.

A test ban must be comprehensive. It must prohibit both nuclear-weapon tests and so-called nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The necessity of such a broad scope stems from the fact that it would be impossible in practice to work out an arrangement for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that would preclude acquisition of military benefits. The ban should further be applicable to all States in all environments on a permanent basis. It is noteworthy that developments during the Third Review

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Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly has shown increased support for such a comprehensive ban.

In our view, a global seismological network would have to play a central role in verifying compliance with a test ban. Norway has invested considerable resources in this field. As a follow-up to the workshop which was organized in Norway last year, we shall later this year present a proposal to the Conference on Disarmament on the role of small-aperture arrays in a global seismological network. The proposal will be based on the experience already gained during the operation of the small-aperture array NORESS in Southern Norway. This array, which was inaugurated in May 1985, incorporates some of the most recent technological and scientific advances in seismic array design, instrumentation and data processing. I would like to stress that our research indicates that some technical problems still remain to be solved as regards seismological verification of a test ban, although significant, and in a negotiating context, important progress has recently been made. For this reason it must be of major interest to continue the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, which started its work 10 years ago. As the work towards a test ban progresses, the Conference on Disarmament should in our view be able to draw on the competence of this group. We must ensure that practical work towards the gradual establishment of a global seismological network as an integral part of a treaty régime continues.

In addition to the global seismological network, other verification possibilities need to be further examined, such as an international atmospheric radioactivity monitoring network, on-site inspection procedures and national technical means. We note several important initiatives in this field during the last year. In our view, the American offer last year to experts from the Soviet Union to visit a test site in the United States would contribute to a better basis for verifying limits on underground nuclear testing. A Soviet declaration in December last year stated that the Soviet Union favours reaching agreement with the United States on a number of in situ monitoring measures to eliminate doubts about the observance of a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear tests. We understand that such an acceptance of on-site inspections would not only be valid for a mutual moratorium, but indeed for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. In our view these are elements that need further exploring in a way which would concretely further the work of this Conference.

Further measures should be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space. The decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space in 1985 was, therefore, a welcome initiative.

Norway followed closely the Committee's deliberations in 1985, when it began an examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In our view it is of great importance that further concrete work be done on this issue also in 1986. The deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament on this issue represent an important supplement to the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on space arms. In the view of my Government, the work to prevent an arms race in outer space should continue along both a bilateral and a multilateral path. We believe further multilateral measures to prevent an arms race in outer space will be necessary.

(Mr. Frøysnes, Norway)

In view of what has actually transpired in the Conference on Disarmament as regards the expansion of membership, Norway had hoped by now to take part as a full-fledged member of this negotiating forum. From its 1985 report we note, however, that the Conference has reconfirmed its decision that its membership might be increased by not more than four States and that the Conference will intensify its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision on selection of new members at this year's session. We of course welcome this renewed and strengthened commitment by the Conference. We hope that the Conference will reach a decision in 1986. But I also think that it is time to ask whether the prestige of this Conference should not finally be given priority over national prestige.

Over recent months we have witnessed an improvement in East/West relations in general. From the Norwegian side, we have actively encouraged such a development and we strongly welcome it.

The bilateral United States-Soviet nuclear and space talks here in Geneva are of the highest importance in terms of security and maintenance of strategic stability at reduced levels of nuclear arms. The central objectives of these negotiations must be to reduce drastically the total number of nuclear arms and to prevent an arms race in space.

We are encouraged by the mutual commitment undertaken in the summit Joint Declaration last year to accelerate the bilateral Geneva negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, such as deep cuts in strategic arms and the idea of an interim agreement. Similarly, we attach importance to the agreed principle that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will seek to achieve military superiority.

In particular, Norway attaches importance to an agreement in principle on substantial reductions in long-range INF arsenals. To be effective such reductions will have to be global, and must be accompanied by parallel measures to avoid circumvention of agreed limitations. An interim agreement would be an important achievement, and would help to make the International Year of Peace, 1986, more than a mere concept.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Clerckx.

Mr. CLERCKX (Belgium) (translated from French): "International Year of Peace": at a time when we are beginning our work for 1986, it seems appropriate to refer, as several other speakers have done, to the "International Year of Peace".

It is a symbol of our work which recalls to mind the lofty principles which we all support and for the respect of which we all are working: peaceful and equitable settlement of conflicts in the world, strict compliance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, mutual respect, human rights, development, solidarity, disarmament.

An international year of peace in a world shaken by conflicts, a Conference on Disarmament in a world which is being suffocated by insane means of destruction.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

Between peace and disarmament there is a striking relationship: peace is sought through disarmament but disarmament is found only in peace. The common denominator for States is called security. There can be no peace without security, nor disarmament without security. Disarmament is not an isolated exercise. Its ultimate objective is the complete elimination, under effective international control, of all means of waging war.

Its path is gradual: to limit, reduce, and eliminate certain categories of weapons first, and other categories subsequently. Its handling is delicate: it is an instrument in the service of peace and should be handled without endangering any party's security. Disarmament is to be carried out in order to achieve a position of improved security for all and undiminished security for none.

In the first stage let us convert to an "armed peace", as the manuals would say, the "over-armed peace" which we have today, at least as it exists between the two major military alliances. Tomorrow we shall perhaps have just "peace". It is this goal that we have for years been striving to achieve.

Our Conference, as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the specific task of initiating negotiations and bringing them to a successful conclusion, i.e. to disarmament agreements which can be effectively verified.

No negotiation is possible without the participation of the main protagonists.

At the procedural level, that means the indispensable "consensus" of all; at the level of the programme of work, it means an equally essential selection of areas which can usefully be the subject of negotiations. Indeed, what would be the significance of negotiations on certain weapons, if the members of the Conference which possess such weapons were absent from such negotiations or participated in them reluctantly, without a genuine desire to reach agreement?

On the other hand, where decisions are taken to negotiate an agreement, we benefit at least from the assumption that all participants are guided by such a desire, that none will engage in obstructionist tactics or seek to defend interests which are not legitimately compatible with the objective of the negotiations to be conducted, that after having had ample opportunity to defend its legitimate interests, each party will endorse the final agreement and recommend it to the countries which have not participated in the negotiations.

The resumption of the political dialogue at the highest level between the United States and the Soviet Union has undeniably been an important element in the progress of our work. That summit meeting and the Joint Statement which was issued, particularly the passage concerning the prevention of any war, give reason to hope that genuine progress has been made in East-West relations. We welcome the announcement of a further summit meeting this year, we also hope that the climate of better and mutual understanding may have extended its range to include multilateral security relations, wherever they arise, for instance within our Conference.

We have noted in this regard some encouraging signs including the fact there has been a rapprochement over concerns about verification. The adoption, by consensus, of resolution 40/152 O, "Verification in all its

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aspects", of which Canada was both the initiator and main sponsor, is undoubtedly one of the most positive achievements of the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

We hope that our Conference will translate into concrete agreements this rapprochement at the level of principles. The bilateral disarmament negotiating process, which is clearly of concern to all countries, is taking place in a constructive manner, to judge by the exchange of proposals and counter-proposals of which we are all aware. These negotiations are difficult, but we continue to be fully confident that they will lead to successful and substantial results.

Obviously, progress stems from moving forwards: by demonstrating that they can once again conclude disarmament agreements which respect their security interests, these two countries will agree to continue to advance towards general and complete disarmament, in which of course other countries would be called upon to participate, without excluding any category of weapon and, therefore including conventional weapons and forces, for which negotiations covering a well-defined geographical area have already been undertaken at Vienna, within the framework of the MBFR talks.

We have taken note with great interest of the message which the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has sent to our Conference and of the statement by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The response which the President of the United States has just made to the proposals put forward on 15 January by Mr. Gorbachev is the latest link in this constructive chain of events.

On 25 February 1986, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Leo Tindemans, welcomed the latest disarmament proposals by the United States of America, which in his opinion are likely to have a positive effect on the bilateral disarmament negotiations. On 11 February, Mr. Tindemans had already stressed the importance which Belgium attaches to security, on the one hand, and to balanced disarmament at the lowest possible level, on the other. In this context, he drew attention to the possibility of concluding a separate agreement on intermediate range nuclear missiles, and the need to remedy the imbalance in the field of conventional weapons.

The Belgian delegation expects these favourable developments at the bilateral level to have a beneficial effect on our work.

If the first and most obvious task of our Conference is to conclude the negotiations which it has initiated within the shortest possible time, it is clear that the Conference cannot restrict its consideration solely to the negotiations which it has itself undertaken. Perfecting the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the nuclear-test ban, and halting and reversing the arms race in space are no less urgent tasks facing our Conference.

Every year, the Conference has to select the activities it is going to take up, and explore all disarmament problems in order to determine what concrete contributions it can make at present to the cause of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

It does so with a sense of dynamism, since it must not abdicate in the face of an arms race which is so wasteful of resources and fraught with such grave danger. In our opinion, this is entirely to its credit.

In the opinion of Belgium, the complete elimination of chemical weapons, the existence of which is reported in the arsenals of several countries, and the use of which it has been necessary to deplore on several occasions, even recently, as His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran has just reminded us once again, is a matter of the highest priority. We believe that it is one of the main areas in which our negotiations can succeed, and succeed rapidly. It goes without saying, however, that a disarmament agreement will be valid only if it is scrupulously respected by its contracting parties.

If the agreement is violated, its credibility is likely to be affected. Suspicion may also spread to other agreements which have been or are about to be concluded. We are, I believe, fully alive to this danger: hence the attention we are giving to the questions of control and surveillance that arise of course in their own specific ways under any disarmament agreement.

In this regard, the future convention on chemical weapons should include adequate safeguards, since we cannot permit a situation to arise in which the renunciations to which some States would accede in good faith could one day be exploited to their detriment.

We would not wish to allow room for doubt among States parties concerning respect for the convention without provision being made for dispelling such doubt as quickly as possible through a binding investigating mechanism.

For the various chemicals likely to be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons, the systematic verification arrangements would be adapted in such a way as to encourage States parties to have confidence in the intentions of the other parties, while on the other hand preserving all opportunities for peaceful research and development and progress in the industry. In our opinion, these two concerns can be met if one is guided by what is called the "general purpose criterion", which has already proved to be an essential tool.

The objective sought by Belgium is a total and effectively verified ban on chemical weapons. It is clear that the object of the convention will not be to authorize the peaceful activities of the chemical industry but to prohibit and effectively prevent chemical production from being diverted to armaments. Chemical weapons are the result of the desire to have such weapons, coupled with the possession of chemicals or a combination of chemicals of which the characteristics and quantities are such that they can satisfy that desire.

It is the combination of these two elements, the intentional and the material which will be covered by the prohibition on development, manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and utilization.

The objective of total prohibition corresponds perfectly, in our opinion, to the criterion of equal security for all or of non-discrimination. It should be pursued for itself alone, particularly since it concerns a weapon the use of which has been renounced by all of us in acceding to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This weapon can be legitimately possessed by some countries only as a safeguard against a violation of the commitments entered into under the Protocol.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

As soon as all member countries of this Conference, and therefore the main presumed possessors of this weapon, have demonstrated the will to achieve an agreement on the total prohibition of its manufacture, to accept the elimination of their weapon stockpiles and production facilities under international control, there is no possible justification for not considering that the active pursuit and rapid conclusion of our work are a matter of priority, at the very moment when all participants in the convention demonstrate an equal interest in the solution of verification problems which constitute, we are well aware, the main difficulty.

So long as this convention has not been concluded and ratified by a significant group of States, the outcome of our efforts will remain uncertain and the security risks connected with chemical weapons will continue to exist. It is the success of these negotiations, which are of course difficult but not insurmountably so, that will give expression to the desire so often proclaimed by so many to make a contribution to that end, and confirm beyond doubt the sincerity of our declarations.

We are, I think, all aware of the full significance that this crowning of our efforts would have. We shall have shown that it is possible to prohibit totally and effectively an entire category of weapons which is not merely foreseeable or hypothetical but which exists. We shall have shown in particular that it is possible to agree on procedures for effective verification and for all of us to submit to them, without any exception.

In our opinion, it would not be going too far to say that the future of disarmament hinges on such concrete demonstrations, since it is evident that the more a disarmament agreement is significant for the security of States the more it should be verified, for the insecurity created by any violations would be more serious.

The Belgium delegation has welcomed the pragmatic and more positive turn which the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has taken since last autumn. It hopes that the various working groups will continue their efforts along that promising path.

Belgium also hopes that our Conference will be able to complete successfully its deliberations on radiological weapons. We are aware of the differences of opinion which have emerged with regard to the very object of the convention. We hope that they can be surmounted. We continue to believe that radiological arms, strictly speaking, can be separated from the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear power stations, a subject in which Belgium would be of course interested because of the number of such stations installed on or in close proximity to its territory.

Nevertheless, we would do nothing whatever to delay the conclusion of a disarmament convention the subject of which would remain distinct and should in our opinion remain distinct so long as the conditions are not met for the negotiation of a ban on attacks against nuclear power plants.

We hope that the work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will progress this year in such a way that by the end of the session we will be able to adopt a document entirely by consensus. At a time when the international situation with regard to disarmament offers more reasons for hope, the universal adoption of a concrete and flexible programme of step-by-step action leading to general and complete disarmament would undoubtedly constitute a major achievement.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

The question of the prohibition of nuclear tests leads me back to the important issue of verification, which is often associated with this subject. In a situation where most countries demonstrate equal concern in this regard, it may be thought that an agreement on the complete prohibition of tests should necessarily include rather strict and sufficiently elaborated verification procedures.

If we could resume the political consideration of the verification problems of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, studied in detail and updated by proceeding to an in-depth examination of the various points of view, we would advance towards the objective of the conclusion of such a treaty.

Belgium is in favour of continuing the work of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts who are helping to increase the knowledge which will enable us to set up a network for detecting and identifying seismic events and for an exchange of data, which might be gradually brought to the level required for the purpose of verifying a complete ban on nuclear tests.

Belgium considers that documents CD/524 of Japan and CD/612 of the Federal Republic of Germany make extremely positive contributions to our work and that they might usefully serve as a basis for future action, in particular with a view to building confidence among the parties.

With regard to our agenda item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", I believe there is no need to recall that in 1983 Belgium introduced document CD/380, the purpose of which was to arouse interest in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement in a field where there are already bilateral agreements and, in sum, to enlarge the basis of those agreements to cover all those who possess nuclear weapons. That document envisaged measures capable of preventing the danger of an accidental use of nuclear weapons and ensuring that such accidents would not, in the event of a misunderstanding about the intentions of the country concerned, lead to generalized conflicts. We are convinced that that is a subject of concern to all, including, naturally, the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves.

Two years of intensive consultations with other delegations have led us to note that there are many differences of views and even some uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the subject covered by this agenda item. The subject is, it is true, vast and complex. We believe that an organized and detailed dialogue should make it possible for all States to state their views on the matter, with regard both to substance and to procedure. It would help us to identify points of agreement or disagreement on the role that our Conference could play specifically in respect of this agenda item.

With regard to outer space, Belgium is in favour of continuing the work begun last year under the excellent chairmanship of the Ambassador of Egypt, Mr. Alfarargi. We believe that a detailed examination of the subjects dealt with and a continued exchange of views would enable us to identify the areas which might be the subject of negotiation.

I hope to have an occasion subsequently to refer to some agenda items which I have not sought to deal with as thoroughly as I would wish in this first statement. Belgium became a member of the Conference on Disarmament in the hope of being able to make a concrete contribution to the negotiation and

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

conclusion of agreements on disarmament or arms control. I have already indicated the achievements in which my delegation hopes to be able to participate this year. It will do so in a spirit of dialogue and open-mindedness with a view to contributing to a spirit of mutual understanding, which is useful in itself and a necessary condition for any progress made in common.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): We have appreciated the presence in the Conference of the Foreign Minister of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, and have listened with great interest to his important statement. It is indeed a great pleasure also to see once again in our midst His Excellency the State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Torbjoern Frøysnes, and we are grateful to him for his important statement.

To Sweden, like so many other countries, the issue of a nuclear test ban is a major preoccupation, and has been so for many years. A test-ban treaty would have an importance on world affairs that can hardly be over-estimated.

We have had reason many times to recall what we consider clear commitments to negotiate a nuclear test-ban treaty as laid down in the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. More recently, during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, it was agreed by consensus that "the cessation of nuclear weapon-testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind". It is also important to recall that as late as in 1985, in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT, that the three nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty once again restated their commitment to a nuclear test ban. Two of those States declared themselves "committed to the goal of an effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". However they added that they "considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as the highest priority". The third nuclear-weapon State adhered to the call "on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament".

During the late seventies the three nuclear-weapon States carried out substantive work on a draft test-ban treaty.

In 1980 the trilateral negotiations were broken off and have not been resumed since. In 1982 one of the major nuclear-weapon Powers -- the United States -- announced that it considered a nuclear-test ban only a "long-term goal". One explanation given was that efforts to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals -- as later repeated in the 1985 Final Declaration -- were more urgent than a test ban. However, this does not explain the reluctance to engage in negotiations on a test ban. The consideration that reductions in nuclear arsenals would be more urgent than a test ban, a view we do not share, does not necessarily mean that such a ban would not be an urgent matter in itself.

Another explanation presented to the Conference was that testing plays a role in ensuring the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. Considering the impressive overkill capacity of both major nuclear-weapon Powers this is an argument that does not sound convincing to my delegation. Neither does that

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

argument explain why negotiations on a test ban could not take place -- especially now at a time when bilateral negotiations on reductions of nuclear arsenals already have started.

The two arguments advanced to support the need of some nuclear-weapon States to continue testing have been, firstly, that such testing would control the reliability of their nuclear inventory and, secondly that it would also be necessary in order to develop new nuclear weapons.

Concerning the first argument it is difficult to see that the end, i.e. the control of the shelflife of explosions, could justify the means, that is, continued testing. In addition, the predominant opinion among scientists appears to be that with present technological capacities it would be fully possible to check the accuracy of nuclear stockpiles by other means than nuclear tests.

With regard to the second argument, we recognize that nuclear testing may be essential for the construction of new nuclear warheads and new types of nuclear explosives as part of the qualitative developments of new weapons. But we are indeed sceptical about the rationale of the reasoning that security of any State -- be it a nuclear or a non-nuclear-weapon State -- would be in any way enhanced through the developments of new types of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, new types of nuclear weapons and capacities would rather have negative effects on international security, as they almost inevitably would tend to de-stabilize an already precarious situation. Our experience over the last 40 years shows us that modernization of weapons stimulates and accelerates the arms race. Furthermore there is reason to fear that talks on the reduction of nuclear arsenals would be made more difficult if numerical reductions of arsenals were likely to be offset by the introduction of new and qualitatively improved nuclear weapons.

It is the firm belief of the Swedish delegation that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would support talks on arms reductions. With a nuclear-test ban the consequences for the security of the negotiating parties of each step in the reductions could be calculated with a reasonable degree of confidence. A fully verifiable nuclear-test ban would help to ensure that the quality of the remaining arsenals was not upgraded but stayed as predicted.

Both the major nuclear Powers have now presented proposals for deep reductions of the nuclear arsenals and, with regard to the INF systems, these proposals aim at the elimination of all such weapons in large areas. There are now expectations that an agreement may be reached already this year with regard to the elimination of INF systems. In the United States statement of 11 February in the Conference, Ambassador Lowitz underlined that a nuclear-test ban should be achieved "in the context of significant reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons". An elimination of the INF weapons must indeed be considered "significant", and my delegation holds the view that the Conference must therefore act urgently to bring its work on a test-ban treaty in line with the development of the bilateral negotiations.

Then there is another explanation given for not wanting a nuclear-test ban, that it would not be possible to sufficiently verify such a treaty. Sweden, like other States represented in the Conference, considers that disarmament agreements must be verifiable if they are to function effectively.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

It goes without saying that a nuclear-test-ban treaty must be adequately verifiable. Sweden considers that the present state of the art of seismic detection and identification makes full verification of a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear testing feasible. To prepare for such a verification system to be established we need now to embark on further substantial work, both in terms of drafting provisions and in the technical field. True, some basic material is already in existence, such as the report of 1980 from the trilateral negotiations, the document submitted in 1983 by the delegation of the Soviet Union on "Basic provisions of a treaty" (CD/346) and the draft treaty likewise submitted in 1983 by Sweden (CD/381). According to the Swedish delegation the work of the Ad Hoc Committee should aim at outlining the structure of a treaty and the main undertakings of States parties. It should address the problem of scope, national and international means of verification, procedures for compliance, institutional arrangements and final provisions. In General Assembly resolution 40/80, initiated by Mexico, and with Sweden as a co-sponsor, the Assembly makes some important proposals of a practical nature by recommending the Conference to set up, within the Ad Hoc Committee, two Working Groups -- one for the structure and scope of the treaty and another for compliance and verification. This proposed arrangement could be an ideal organizational framework for the necessary substantive work to be undertaken.

Let me now return to the question of verification of a CTB treaty.

To analyse this problem we can draw upon a number of important contributions made during last year's session. One of them was the workshop on seismological verification hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. On that occasion a well-organized and highly interesting demonstration of a modern and efficient seismological installation was offered. The demonstration showed that modern technology can be utilized to create a sensitive seismological station providing high quality data and an efficient data analysis facility. An instructive document (CD/599) was issued by Norway as a result of the workshop.

The NORESS station that was demonstrated is a so-called mini-array which is primarily designed to detect events at regional distances, that is at distances of less than 2,000 to 3,000 km. At this regional distance detection capability is considerably improved compared to detection at larger, so-called teleseismic distances. However, this capability varies considerably between different regions of the world. When estimating global detection capabilities only the teleseismic capability is usually taken into account. Such estimates usually give detection capabilities of around magnitude 4. In the Norwegian Working Paper detection capabilities of magnitude 2-3 are mentioned for regional and local distances, corresponding to yields of one tenth to one hundredth of a KT.

Experiences from a fairly dense local network in Sweden show that detection capabilities of magnitude 1 can be obtained at distances of up to a few hundred kilometres and that such a network also gives a very high location and depth estimation capability. How to utilize recordings at local and regional distances for test-ban verification and how this would improve the overall capability of a global system, merits, in our view, further consideration. The examples show, however, that verification is a political rather than a technical issue. It is the task of the negotiators of a test-ban treaty to reach agreement on the establishment of a sufficiently dense network of seismic stations -- including stations at suitable points on

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

the territories of the nuclear-weapon States designed to measure signals at local and regional distances -- so that all Parties to the future treaty would have full assurances that compliance with it could be verified and that cheating was not possible.

The potential of such a network of seismic stations was, by the way, clearly spelled out by the Netherlands delegation in its interesting statement on 13 August 1985.

The importance of utilizing modern instrumentation at seismological stations is also discussed in the Norwegian Working Paper. We share the view that available modern technology should be utilized in a global verification system. Our experience of the Hagfors array station in Sweden, where a mini-array technique similar to that demonstrated in Norway is being utilized, tells us that this array design concept should be most valuable not only for detection at regional but also at larger, teleseismic distances.

The Working Paper presented by Japan (CD/626) gives, in our view, a good account of the concrete measures needed to realize an international seismic data exchange system. It stresses the need to modernize and standardize seismic stations and to establish modern stations in areas where such stations do not exist today. The Japanese Working Paper further gives concrete examples on how such a modernization could be carried out to establish a homogeneous network of high-quality stations able to operate with high reliability. Modern and well-equipped international data centres are other important components in this proposed system.

Sweden welcomes these concrete proposals and shares the view of incorporating the latest available scientific and technological achievements into a global system and to make such a system as homogeneous as possible.

The Japanese Working Paper further includes valuable preliminary cost estimates to establish and operate such a network. We have a preliminary feeling that it should be possible to reduce these estimates. In any case they show that the cost of establishing efficient verification measures to monitor disarmament agreements is reasonable, especially when considering the goals they are intended to further.

The proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany, presented by Ambassador Wegener in his statement on 18 February, to gradually set up a permanent global seismic monitoring network is based upon two Working Papers (CD/612 and CD/624) tabled last year, which we have studied with great interest. Working Paper CD/624 contains a most comprehensive and valuable assessment of a system design for the improvement of seismic monitoring capabilities for a test-ban treaty. This paper also stresses the need to establish modern stations, taking into account the latest scientific and technological achievements.

The Working Paper also offers a thorough discussion of the estimated verification capabilities of global and regional station networks. Such estimates always carry a considerable uncertainty due to regional differences in signal propagation which are difficult to take into account with existing modelling techniques. The diagrams presented, however, clearly show the importance of also using stations at close distances, forming a regional network, to improve the verification capability. The high sensitivity and the regional dependence of signal propagation at short distances is also clearly illustrated.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The Working Paper contains an interesting section on cavity decoupling of nuclear explosions. The calculations show that decoupling is substantially reduced for signals at high frequencies. As such signals can be recorded primarily at short distances, this provides an additional argument for using stations at close distances for test-ban monitoring.

The United Kingdom Working Paper (CD/610) also contains a discussion of cavity decoupling and the possibility of using high frequency signals to counteract such evasive actions. The British Paper arrives at conclusions similar to those of the Working Paper of the Federal Republic of Germany, even if the figures differ somewhat. The United Kingdom Working Paper states that while signal strength at the frequency of 1 Hz might be reduced by a factor of 100 through cavity decoupling the reduction at 5-10 Hz could be as little as 5.

The lack of experience of cavity decoupling and the present difficulty of predicting the signals from such explosions, together with the possibility of recording high frequency signals, especially in the continental areas, substantially reduces, in our view, the credibility of decoupling as a way of conducting clandestine nuclear testing.

The British document also presents an evasion scenario of multiple explosions in which a number of explosions are to be set off in a time sequence so as to generate signals similar to those from earthquakes. This means that the signals will be detected at monitoring stations but that they, supposedly, will be misidentified as coming from earthquakes. We think this method lacks credibility. It would be extremely difficult to predict in detail the actual signal waveforms at distant recording stations to make sure that the explosions are not identified by advanced computer processing.

As to the possibility of hiding an explosion in an earthquake we share the view expressed in the British document that such a procedure would cause considerable operational problems. The location and size of a suitable earthquake must be determined and the explosion set off within less than a minute after the earthquake occurred. Technology has not proven its ability in this regard. We have made quite a thorough investigation of the number of expected opportunities necessary to hide explosions in nearby earthquakes. As an example we found less than one such opportunity per year to set off a magnitude 5 explosion in the most seismic regions of the Kuril and Aleutian Islands. A military significant weapons development programme cannot be based on such uncertain testing possibilities, the political risks aside.

In addition to the evasion issues which I have commented on, the United Kingdom Working Paper contains an interesting and detailed survey of seismic verification. We do not necessarily agree with the estimates that are presented and with the quite pessimistic conclusion as to the overall capability of a verification system. In a Working Paper to be presented at a later stage we intend to offer more detailed comments to issues raised in this and other working papers.

When presenting the British document on 11 July last year, Ambassador Cromartie brought up the problem of how nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be handled in a test-ban treaty. He said "it is for those who seek an exemption for peaceful nuclear explosions to tell us in detail what practical system of verification they propose to give confidence that nuclear explosions they might carry out were exclusively peaceful and brought no military advantage of any kind."

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

My delegation agrees with this statement. The Swedish draft treaty of 1983, in its Article II, presents one way to resolve this problem.

After having gone through the documents referred to above, I have the impression that we all seem to agree that modern technology and the latest scientific achievements should be fully utilized in designing an efficient verification system. In the message by General Secretary Gorbachev recently to this Conference it was stated that the Soviet Union "is agreeable to the most strict control over a ban on nuclear weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all achievements in seismology". One task for the Group of Scientific Experts should be to utilize the latest scientific and technological achievements to work out technical specifications for a recording station which would be able to collect high quality digital data from seismic events at all distances. Such a "CD-designed" station could then be the basis for a global verification system to be tested and then established on a permanent basis, within the framework of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

When discussing modern instrumentation we also have to discuss how to make full use of the data that is collected. It has been shown that simultaneous analysis of waveform data from globally distributed stations considerably improves the possibilities of defining and locating seismic events. This also decreases the number of unassociated observations. It further substantially improves the possibilities of accurately estimating the depth of seismic events. This waveform analysis could be standardized in the same way as has been agreed upon for Level I data analysis at the International Data Centres. Procedures for such routine use of waveform data for these defined purposes and the ways and means of exchanging such data should be worked out by the Group of Scientific Experts. Use of waveform data would in no way change the basic rules for the international co-operation system. The final assessment of whether an event is an explosion or an earthquake will still be made at the national level.

A global verification system is not only a question of hardware such as station instrumentation and computers. It is also -- and to at least an equal extent -- a question of software, that is methods, procedures and human knowledge. This stresses the importance of continued international co-operation in the developing and testing of methods and procedures and in promoting and exchanging scientific and technical information around the world. Through such experiments involving a growing number of countries, some with limited experience so far in the use of seismology for test-ban verification, knowledge and experience are spread globally. These experiments offer education and practical training of personnel at a number of stations and data exchange facilities around the world. This is precisely the kind of patient scientific work that is needed to establish how available seismic technology should be most effectively utilized to create an effective, global data exchange system to help verify a test ban. It is important that full use be made of recent developments in science and technology for this purpose and that available techniques can be utilized on a global scale.

With regard to the question of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban the Swedish delegation fully supports the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 contained in document CD/520/Rev.1. However we are open to other proposals. Such proposals will be looked upon on the basis of mainly two criteria: one, that the language does not preempt issues to be negotiated; and two, that the mandate contains a commitment to the goal of a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

It is urgent that the Conference be given a chance soon to start on substantive work on a test ban. For my delegation the wording of a mandate is less important than what can actually be achieved on substance. Experience in the Conference has demonstrated that sometimes a broad and far-reaching mandate has yielded only very modest results in the subsidiary body concerned. In another context even a vague and limited wording of a mandate has proven to be fully adequate for considerable progress on substance. In the final analysis, it is the work done in the subsidiary body that decides the outcome, not the wording of the mandate.

We are all aware of the many difficulties related to the question of a nuclear-test ban. However, my delegation considers that it is the duty of the membership of the Conference not to abdicate in the face of all those obstacles. Substantive work on the issue would assist in influencing and changing the difficult circumstances under which we have to act.

The Swedish delegation appeals to all delegations to join forces in order to achieve some tangible results by addressing problems of substance. Such an approach would offer the best prospects for bringing us closer to the goal -- a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, in my statement during our plenary session on 11 February of this year, a number of issues that I addressed related to the first three items on our agenda: a nuclear-test ban, the question of the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. I want to return to these three agenda items today.

One reason for doing so is that, since I spoke, there has been a significant development with regard to the bilateral nuclear and space talks which are taking place almost within earshot of this Council Chamber. On 24 February, subsequent to the response made by the President of the United States to the 15 January statement of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, the United States negotiating team introduced new proposals in the bilateral talks.

It is not possible for my delegation to discuss the subject matter of the bilateral negotiations in detail, the actual proceedings of which, by mutual agreement, remain confidential in the interest of maximizing the possibilities for progress. Within these limitations, however, I believe that it is appropriate for me to make several remarks on this subject.

President Reagan also issued a public statement on 24 February regarding the arms-control proposals put forward by the Soviet Union on 15 January. The President had earlier welcomed this action, and said that the United States hoped that it would assist in making progress in the bilateral negotiations, as well as in other forums. He had noted elements in the statement that appeared to be constructive, as well as other elements that continued to present problems.

President Reagan's response followed close consultations with our allies, who contributed substantially to the decisions reflected in our proposals. In his response Mr. Reagan expressed his desire to see progress in key arms-control forums, and in the other key areas of the United States/Soviet agenda: regional issues, human rights and bilateral matters. The President has made clear our position that significant reductions in offensive nuclear

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

weapons now under negotiation in the bilaterals should be the first steps in the nuclear disarmament process. He was pleased "that the Soviet Union appears to agree in principle with our ultimate goal of moving to the total elimination of nuclear weapons when this becomes possible". He cautioned, however, that the complexity of this task should not be underestimated, and requires that security be preserved for the United States and its allies.

The President again endorsed the United States objective of beginning the reduction process by an agreement to make 50 per cent reductions in each side's offensive nuclear forces, appropriately applied, as well as by an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

With regard to the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, President Reagan announced that on 24 February the United States delegation in the bilateral talks had introduced "a concrete plan calling for the elimination of United States Pershing II, ground-launched Cruise missiles and Soviet SS-20 missiles not only in Europe but in Asia as well, with all such missiles to be removed from the face of the Earth by the end of this decade".

On a broader problem, President Reagan expressed pleasure that the Soviet Union has given public recognition to the critical importance of verification in negotiating agreements. The specific issues in this regard will be pursued at the negotiating table.

In his statement, Mr. Reagan also made a number of cautionary remarks, reflecting positions that the United States has long held. He pointed out that the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons is a process that will require the resolution of other serious security issues at the same time. Thus far, the proposals made by the Soviet Union have not addressed these issues, which include the imbalance in conventional and other forces, the need to ensure full compliance with existing and future agreements, and the free and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts without outside interference. Moreover, there are specific details in the later stages of the Soviet statement of 15 January that are not now appropriate for consideration.

Mr. Reagan stressed that the United States is doing its part in the bilateral negotiations and in other negotiations. This includes, of course, the negotiations on chemical weapons at this Conference. The President concluded by saying that, "with an equal commitment by our Soviet negotiating partners, real progress is now within our reach."

The new proposal by the United States and those prior proposals that we have tabled represent a sound basis for that progress. Our new proposal is one that gives added substance to United States commitments to leave no stone unturned in its efforts to resolve the fundamental security issues posed by the threat of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the remarks of President Reagan succinctly place these efforts in the larger context of other efforts needed to further peace and stability. We all need to recognize that fundamental political differences are at the root of the security concerns that lead States to possess weapons. Thus, resolution of the threat to international security posed by nuclear weapons cannot, in the last analysis, be accomplished without also resolving other security concerns posed by imbalances in conventional and in chemical weapons.

Modern technology has provided mankind with many benefits, but it has also increased dramatically the destructiveness of conventional weapons. The

(Mr. Lowitz, United States) •

appalling toll of human suffering in the conventional conflicts in too many parts of our world is a grim stimulus to us whose responsibility it is to address the threats to peace posed by weapons of all kinds.

In this regard, I recall the importance of that portion of the 21 November 1985 Joint Statement in which the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed that both nuclear and conventional conflict between them must be prevented. The dual need to address both aspects of conflict applies to our work in the Conference as well. This need is clearly echoed in the comprehensive title of agenda item 3 of this Conference: the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Those related matters are the need to prevent conventional conflict, and the interrelation between nuclear deterrence and conventional force levels. I would not agree that coming to grips with these issues detracts from the importance of nuclear disarmament, as suggested by the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Gonsalves, in his statement on 25 February. Rather, in tackling these issues, the prospects for nuclear disarmament will certainly be improved.

Mr. President, let me add a few more points concerning the bilateral negotiations currently under way in the nuclear and space talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Obviously, it is important in any negotiation to seek out common ground -- to narrow differences with the objective of reaching mutual agreement. Accordingly, I would observe that there are certain aspects of the Soviet Union's position in the nuclear and space talks which, if they remain unchanged, will continue to present serious obstacles to agreement. The Soviet objective of eliminating nuclear weapons is one we share, but initial reductions, as conceived by the Soviet side, would perpetuate Soviet advantages and create dangerous imbalances. It is also important that progress, when possible in one part of the bilateral negotiations, not be delayed pending resolution of differences in other areas. Such an action would be inconsistent with the mutual agreement to accelerate the nuclear and space talks, and to work for early progress in areas of common ground.

Second, the Soviet definition of the term "strategic" is clearly used to seek to create division among the Western allies. A number of Western intermediate-range systems would be included, while similar systems on the Eastern side are excluded, thereby preserving Soviet advantages. The definition has consistently been rejected by the United States in both the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. As for the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, the Soviet side continues to seek constraints on the nuclear forces of third countries, a position that the United States finds unacceptable. Additionally, the Soviet views still do not address the important matter of Asian security. My colleague, the distinguished Ambassador Imai of Japan, has already drawn attention to this serious matter in his statement on 13 February.

Despite the potential of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative to enhance stability and deterrence, and despite the fact that it is not possible to verify limits on research, the Soviet Union continues to insist that this research programme be banned. In the meantime, programmes of the Soviet Union directed towards strategic defence -- programmes about which we hear so little -- would presumably continue.

Finally, the United States is still awaiting a response to its proposals placed on the negotiating table on 1 November, nearly four months ago. These

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

proposals were concrete and comprehensive. A similar response in the bilateral talks would constitute a true mark of seriousness. Public statements of a more general nature offer no substitute for what is really needed: constructive, specific responses to constructive, specific proposals. And these responses should be made in the negotiating forum, the only place where agreements can be reached.

In our view, there are potentially constructive elements in the Soviet Union's proposals that could be translated into elements offering the possibility of concrete progress.

In the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, the fact that the Soviet Union apparently has accepted, in principle, the goal of reducing the number of United States and Soviet long-range INF forces to zero is constructive. There appears to be agreement, in principle, that the forces in question would be destroyed. An agreement would also not require a change in United States views on the Strategic Defence Initiative.

I have already cited the agreement of both sides ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons, a goal the United States has long advocated. Both sides must now focus on equitable and verifiable measures to achieve deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear forces, and must correct those basic conditions which give rise to the need for reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.

We have noted the interest in verification expressed in recent statements by the Soviet Union. I hardly need repeat to my colleagues here the essential nature of this aspect of arms control and disarmament. It is an aspect stressed by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Georgy Kornienko, in his 20 February address before this Conference. It remains for this general commitment to verification to be translated into specific proposals which can be embodied in agreements currently under negotiation in this body, in the nuclear and space talks, in the Stockholm Disarmament Conference, and in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations.

With regard to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna, I share the disappointment expressed by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom in his statement of 25 February. It is regrettable that the hopeful reports of prospects for progress have very recently been dampened by the news that verification may still be as much a problem there as before. Recent initiatives do not appear to have elicited a forthcoming response, but rather a return to earlier positions of the Eastern negotiators on verification. It is my hope that this apparent regression is not an omen presaging a slow-down -- rather than an acceleration, as called for in the 21 November Joint Statement -- in forward movement in all of the negotiations now under way. It would be doubly regrettable were this to be the case, because agreements reached in one forum should mutually reinforce agreements negotiated in other forums.

In sum, the United States hopes that the progress foreshadowed by recent meetings and statements will be translated into concrete results. Concrete results in resolving the security issues with which our negotiations are concerned -- nuclear, chemical, and conventional -- and in resolving the security and political problems posed by regional conflicts and differing political systems, will provide a necessary basis for further steps toward nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

One of these steps would be a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear explosions -- what our Conference describes as a nuclear-test ban. Surely it is unnecessary for me to describe the United States position on this question -- a position which remains unchanged -- at greater length than I have done in past interventions. A nuclear-test ban is an objective which can be realized in the context of the steps that I have discussed above -- steps involving deep reductions in nuclear weapons; steps addressing the security concerns posed by the conventional force imbalance between East and West and the resulting need of the West to maintain an effective and reliable nuclear deterrent posture; and steps for the development and improvement of means that would be applied to the verification of compliance with such a ban.

We have taken due note of that part of the message from Mr. Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament on 20 February, as read by Minister Kornienko, that the Soviet Union will accept on-site inspection to verify compliance with a nuclear-test ban, as well as "the use of all achievements in seismology". On-site inspection is an issue which would be highly appropriate for practical work in an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1 in the Conference on Disarmament. It was, in fact, an issue on which consideration had only begun in the summer of 1983 when the work of the subsidiary body ended for the year. The failure of this Conference to take the necessary steps to resume this work has, accordingly, precluded an in-depth consideration of the many aspects of this matter.

The United States has long advocated a dialogue with the Soviet Union to arrive at the improved verification procedures necessary for any nuclear testing limitation. To the extent that Mr. Gorbachev's statement may reflect the development of common ground on this crucial issue, it is hopeful. We would welcome any dialogue with the Soviet Union that would narrow differences on this issue.

It is clear to my Government that the existing seismological assets available for monitoring a nuclear-test ban would not constitute an adequate basis for such an agreement. It would be important for the Conference on Disarmament to continue its consideration of this matter in a committee charged with doing so. In this way delegations that have argued in this body that seismology now provides a basis for verification can lay out their views in detail so that other delegations may benefit from their analyses. Clearly, this also would permit other delegations to present alternative positions. It is not only the problem of monitoring the underground environment under normal circumstances that is at issue here. A verification system also must work against attempts to evade a test ban. Such attempts would involve taking steps to hide an explosion: by lowering its yield, by masking the seismic signal, by concealing the nuclear test in a large chemical explosion, or by still other means. Let me cite one example in this regard. In his 25 February statement, Ambassador Gonsalves argues that existing seismological means are sufficient and that cheating would be too difficult, even statistically impossible. But how would seismic means ensure that nuclear explosions were not masked by large chemical explosions? Other approaches, such as on-site inspection, would also be needed.

In our view, it is important to continue work on the technologies and means of verification. We had a very useful contribution to this work in the seismic workshop sponsored last June by Norway. Closer to home, work is continuing in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. With regard to the GSE, I welcome the support for the continued efforts of this outstanding body expressed by Mr. Kornienko in his statement last Thursday.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The nuclear-test-ban issue is one of longstanding, as we all know. We hear statements in this body that the verification problem has been "solved", and we hear that because the problem has supposedly been solved, it is only a matter of "political will" that blocks the immediate initiation of multilateral negotiations to work out an agreement. If those who make this argument are suggesting that the United States is acting in a cavalier or capricious way, then they underestimate the seriousness with which my Government approaches this issue. In fact, it is because, in the United States view, the question of nuclear testing is directly related to our security and that of the Western alliance -- through the role testing plays in the maintenance of a reliable nuclear deterrent, a deterrent made necessary by the hard facts of international life in our day -- that our position on this issue is a careful and principled one.

The inseparability of the question of a nuclear-test ban from that of international stability and security extends as well to our unwillingness to enter a moratorium on nuclear testing. Our experience with simple, unverified declarative cessations of nuclear tests has not been encouraging. I have previously referred to the 1958-1961 period, at the conclusion of which the Soviet Union abruptly resumed its own testing programme with the detonation of some 40 explosions in the space of several weeks. It is clear that at the conclusion of a moratorium, testing can resume with full or increased intensity on the basis of preparations undertaken during the moratorium period. Moreover, it would be relatively easy, at a point when immediate testing objectives had been satisfied, to introduce a hiatus in testing on the assumption that the United States could not reciprocate. It also would be easy to include offers to apply verification measures that would in fact require careful and painstaking negotiation and application within a treaty framework.

What, then, should the Conference on Disarmament do about agenda item 1 at this time? I think that the answer is straightforward. It should take up work where it left off in 1983. It should respond to the proposal for a mandate, contained in document CD/521, under which an ad hoc committee should operate, a proposal which was offered in 1984 and which remains fully valid. We should not forget that that mandate was offered in response to the views expressed by others. It was a response that, so far as I can determine, was simply set aside. Thus, on the crucial point that appears to prevent further work -- that of initiating negotiations now -- setting aside the Western response had the predictable result of a deadlock. Deadlock is unfortunate. It has the readily apparent result: no progress in an area where important progress is possible.

In conclusion, I would briefly take note of news reports on the remarks of General Secretary Gorbachev on 25 February concerning the response of President Reagan to the 15 January proposals of the Soviet Union. My delegation trusts that these reported remarks will not constitute the full or final word on the United States proposals. The United States took sufficient time to ensure that its responses were considered ones. I feel certain that the same will be the case for the Soviet Union.

As for the issues I have discussed today under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament, the United States will of course continue to listen with great care and attentiveness to the views of all the members of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. Distinguished delegates, I believe we have exhausted the time available to us at this morning's meeting of the plenary. There are additional speakers listed, and in addition we need to conduct some further business. I propose, under these circumstances, to suspend the plenary meeting and resume this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. sharp. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has kindly agreed to delay the opening of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee this afternoon until this plenary meeting has been completed and adjourned. I wish to thank him for his consideration, and it is for that reason that I must urge members of the Conference to be ready to start at 3.30 p.m. sharp. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would meet immediately after the conclusion of that plenary meeting.

There is one other matter that I believe I should clarify now, with regard to the indicative programme of informal Presidential consultations, so that there is no doubt. I want to reiterate that that programme has been concluded and that there are no such meetings scheduled for today or for tomorrow. That programme has been concluded. If there is no further comment or statement I would propose now to suspend this session of the plenary. I see none. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and reconvened at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 343rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I propose now to resume the list of speakers, as decided this morning, and, in accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 338th plenary meeting, I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Richard Nottage.

Mr. NOTTAGE (New Zealand): As others have done I congratulate you on your successful Presidency of this Conference. I am fortunate, and it is especially appropriate, that I may address this body while you, Sir, colleague, friend, dedicated protagonist of the pursuit of arms control and disarmament measures and distinguished representative from New Zealand's closest neighbour country, preside over this assembly. Let nobody doubt the breadth, the depth, the strength and the endurance of the relationship between your country and mine. It is doubly appropriate that I speak today, about a nuclear-test ban because our two countries have worked together with unremitting resolve over many years to achieve it. I believe that resolve and the determination of our peoples and Governments is stronger today than it has ever been.

We have also noted the excellent statements this morning by the representatives of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments, both of whom paid particular attention to the subject of a nuclear-test ban.

The subject of a nuclear-test ban is one with which New Zealand has been closely identified for many years. We have worked within the United Nations system and outside it in order to further this very important objective. We are therefore grateful for the opportunity to speak in the Conference on Disarmament on item 1 of your agenda on a nuclear-test ban.

(Mr. Nottage, New Zealand)

Nearly one year ago, our Prime Minister, the Right Honourable David Lange, told the Conference that the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive-test-ban treaty was a primary goal of the New Zealand Government. New Zealand's frustration and disappointment at the lack of progress towards that goal was also expressed. At that time, Mr. Lange was mindful that the Conference had not carried out any work on this subject in 1984 because of its inability to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban. We all expected that the Conference would be able to do better in 1985, but again our hopes went unfulfilled.

While valuable time has been lost in this Conference, most sections of the international community have been seeking to make more and more plain their concern at this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The arguments in favour of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the benefits it would bring, have been spelt out many times. They must, by now, be familiar to all. They have been repeated time and time again in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. They are also expressed in successful disarmament and arms-control treaties.

Last year, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty underwent its third review. The Final Document which emerged from the Review Conference contained one of the clearest statements of support for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban that has been agreed by a broad and representative number of countries in recent times. Admittedly a small number of countries expressed different views on the priority to be attached to the negotiation of a test ban. But that does not detract from the extent to which members of the NPT were united in their conviction that a nuclear-test ban should be implemented. Against that background, it was not surprising that there continued to be strong demands for progress on a ban at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The resolution sponsored jointly by New Zealand and Australia, resolution 40/81 entitled "The urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", contained a number of elements of direct relevance to this Conference. It stressed the urgency of the need for a comprehensive treaty. It reminded us all that the parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty had expressed their determination to continue negotiations to achieve the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It noted that this determination was also recalled by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

With specific reference to this Conference, the resolution expressed profound regret over the inability of the Conference to reach agreement on the re-establishment, in 1985, of an ad hoc committee under the NTB item on its agenda. It urged the Conference to establish such a committee to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in accordance with a specified programme of work.

It is New Zealand's firm view that this Conference must respond to the expectations of the international community and must ensure that no more time is lost. The efforts of so many to secure progress on a treaty should be followed by the resumption of work in the Conference this year. It would be more than disappointing if in 1986 we were to see a repetition of the last two years. The Conference has a responsibility to the international community which it must fulfil. For it to fail once again to initiate constructive work towards the negotiation of a NTB would be to fail to meet that responsibility.

(Mr. Nottage, New Zealand)

New Zealand has sponsored its comprehensive test-ban resolution in the United Nations General Assembly for many years now. This has been done because of the belief that global security would be significantly enhanced if all nuclear tests were to be stopped. The frustration of the people of New Zealand has increased as that goal has receded.

One cannot overlook the central and inescapable reality of the nuclear age: that nuclear weapons are different. They are uniquely destructive, even in the case of so-called small nuclear weapons. They generate overwhelming uncertainties.

Global security is undermined, rather than enhanced, by the already grossly excessive nuclear arsenals. To compound the problem, new or improved weapons are being added to these arsenals. We believe the climate for arms control and disarmament negotiations would improve if all the parties renounced nuclear testing. That renunciation, by minimizing the prospect that new or improved nuclear weapons might be developed, would strengthen the confidence throughout the international community that the security situation would not be changed, and the negotiations undermined, by the introduction of new weapons. How much better off might we be today, and how much easier would the negotiations have been, if the development of new and more effective nuclear weapons over the last few decades had never occurred? Furthermore, what might be the negotiating climate today if the development of new nuclear weapons was inhibited by a ban on testing? The history of efforts to secure a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is partly a history of lost opportunities to halt the nuclear arms race.

We freely acknowledge that only negotiated cutbacks in the numbers of nuclear weapons will reduce the nuclear arsenals. That is why we wait, with hope, progress in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. A comprehensive test ban is not a substitute for such arms reduction negotiations. But it would be a vital first step in bringing the arms race to a stop. The security benefits of a comprehensive test ban would also flow from a ban's impact as a non-proliferation and confidence-building measure. As one statement to this Conference last week put it, "a measure that can unfold stabilizing effects".

If we accept that non-proliferation is now a norm of international behaviour, then the cessation of nuclear testing could be regarded as an essential complement to it. In the final analysis there can only be one general standard: restraint by the non-nuclear-weapon States must be matched by denial on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

I noted earlier that we should like to see negotiations on a comprehensive-nuclear-test ban commence in the near future. Our General Assembly resolution urged the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations and such a process inevitably involves a considerable amount of preparatory work, both of an administrative and substantive nature.

We recognize that there are differences of approach within this Conference on questions of timing and scope. At the same time, there is widespread agreement that the goal must be a comprehensive test ban. The proper forum for consideration and resolution of the differences that exist would be in an ad hoc committee which focused, in the initial stages, on those aspects of scope, verification and compliance where more work is yet to be

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done. In order to get down to constructive work on a nuclear-test ban, all parties may have to re-examine their attitudes and policies if any progress is to be made.

My Government considers that there are certain minimal conditions that a test ban must meet. The ban must be comprehensive, banning all nuclear explosions and including those alleged to be for purely peaceful purposes. It must also be a ban that can be satisfactorily verified. We have never viewed unilateral test ban moratoria or other non-binding initiatives which lack adequate measures of verification as capable of ensuring stability and mutual security. They may have a contribution to make, but it would fall far short of that from a comprehensive and verifiable agreement.

That being said, we do welcome any reduction in the number of nuclear tests. A genuine moratorium, provided it was not followed with a burst of "catch-up" tests, could have an impact on the current political situation. But infinitely more significant would be the permanent discontinuance of all testing programmes. There is no need for further nuclear tests. A moratorium is not enough.

A fundamental part of New Zealand's approach to a test ban is the issue of verification. The brightest spot in the Conference's consideration of a test ban has been the gradual progress made over the years on seismic monitoring by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts. In General Assembly resolution 40/81, the Conference on Disarmament was urged to "take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network to determine the capabilities of such a network for monitoring and verifying compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". The Conference was also asked to take into account the work performed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. It also seemed appropriate to the sponsors of the resolution that the Conference should initiate a detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We do not accept that it is impossible to verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The excellent workshop run by the Norwegian Government in 1985 showed that the technical facilities are already at a high level of sophistication. With the appropriate distribution of such facilities it should be possible for even small nuclear explosions to be detected and verified. The techniques upon which verification depends are already available -- it is mainly the political will to deploy them that has been lacking until now.

We are encouraged by positive comments that have been made already in this session that the work of the Ad Hoc Seismic Group should continue. We are committed to the Group, of which we have been an active member for many years. New Zealand is an earthquake-prone country and we have built up considerable experience in seismic monitoring techniques. We will continue to contribute wherever we can in the verification work that must be completed as a prerequisite to the implementation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We were particularly interested in the comments of the distinguished representative for the Federal Republic of Germany last week concerning the kind of work that needs to be done before a global seismic monitoring network can be said to be performing satisfactorily and reliably. We acknowledge the

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detailed work done on this subject by his and other Governments. His proposal deserves close attention and we shall be considering carefully how New Zealand, which maintains a small network of monitoring stations in the South Pacific, can best make a contribution in this area.

I hope that the comments I have already made make it clear why New Zealand has worked for so long for a comprehensive test ban. But this statement would not be complete if I did not draw attention to the fact that our region has been used as a nuclear testing ground for more than three decades. People in the South Pacific have become very sensitive to the issue of nuclear testing through the testing done by countries from outside the region. You will all be aware of the depths of our concern over the fact that nuclear testing continues in the South Pacific to this day. It places great pressure on the Governments of the region to find new avenues to make that concern known. Continued testing in our region does not, in any way, contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in the South Pacific.

It was with security in mind that the members of the South Pacific Forum last year endorsed the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty. That Treaty, which has now been ratified by three countries and signed by six others, establishes the world's second nuclear-free zone in a populated region.

This initiative underlines the determination of the people of the South Pacific that their region should be free from the tensions generated by the nuclear-arms race in other parts of the world. By assuming the obligations contained in the Treaty the parties to it will pledge to each other not to possess, manufacture, or acquire nuclear explosive devices anywhere. They will pledge to prevent the testing and stationing of such devices in their territory, to prevent the diversion of fissionable material to non-peaceful purposes, and not to dump radioactive waste in the zone.

In due course, perhaps as early as August this year, it is expected that the South Pacific Forum will adopt and open for signature three Protocols to the Treaty. It is presently envisaged that one of those Protocols will contain an obligation not to test nuclear explosive devices within the Zone. The five nuclear-weapon States will be eligible to become parties to this Protocol. Agreement to do so would go a long way towards demonstrating, to the people of the South Pacific, and to the rest of the world, their commitment to the arms control process.

In conclusion, we are reminded of the Joint Statement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of 21 November 1985 in which they agreed that nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences and should never take place between the United States and the USSR. They also agreed not to seek to achieve military superiority. New Zealand believes a comprehensive test ban is of considerable importance to and would assist in the achievement of those objectives, since it would stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and would have enormous symbolic importance as a signal that the nuclear arms race is being brought to an end. We hope that proper recognition will be given to the part that a comprehensive test ban can play in the course that has now been charted by the two major nuclear-weapon States. Non-members of this Conference, with the co-operation of its members, can contribute in a number of ways to progress on the items on its agenda. But without the establishment of a specific ad hoc committee we are left with little to contribute to this important area of your Conference's work. We remain optimistic that in the case of item 1 of the agenda a mandate will be agreed and work begun on one of

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the most important subjects the Conference has to grapple with. No other single step that could be taken by this Conference would do more to allay the concerns of ordinary people everywhere about the nuclear arms race. We trust that the Conference is successful in meeting this challenge.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): We have heard today a number of major statements. I should like briefly to take up an issue raised by one of the speakers, the problem of the use of chemical weapons referred to by His Excellency Mr. Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. May I first of all recall that on many occasions in the past my Government has emphasized and deplored the serious consequences of the prolongation of the disastrous conflict between Iraq and Iran not only for those two countries but also for the integrity of the neighbouring States and the security of the region, as well as peace and international stability.

Furthermore, on various occasions France has condemned quite categorically any use anywhere of the toxic warfare agents prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In doing so, my Government has merely been adhering to what has been France's unswerving policy since the signing of the Protocol more than 60 years ago. It has further reason for doing so in view of its responsibilities as a depositary State of the Convention. I recalled this in my statement before the Conference on 18 June 1985, and I recall it once again today.

As you know, the 1925 Convention does not include any verification procedure. That is why, pending the conclusion of the Convention currently being negotiated in our Conference, France and a number of other States submitted a resolution providing for interim verification procedures to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted it. In this connection, France welcomes the decision just taken by the United Nations Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission. We welcome the Secretary-General's action, which is in our opinion in keeping with the spirit of resolution 37/98 D, which serves the same purpose and has the same objective.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If that is not the case I would now propose to move to another subject, for which purpose I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Komatina, who will make a brief statement for the information of the Conference.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): Mr. President, I know that I risk to be repetitious, but I have asked for the floor today to report again to the Conference on the grave financial situation of the United Nations with respect to the regular budget. This matter has been the subject of permanent action by the Secretary-General internally as

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well as in his contacts with Member States. As you know, copies of the communication addressed by the Secretary-General to the President of the Conference on 24 January 1986, of the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the subject of the financial situation of the Organization and of the letter addressed by the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representatives at Headquarters on 22 January 1986 were circulated to all members in accordance with the request made to the Secretariat by the President of the Conference at the 338th plenary meeting.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his internal communications and contacts with Member States, has again expressed his grave concern that the financial integrity of the United Nations and its capacity to implement mandated programmes are very seriously threatened, in particular by developments which have led to a situation when at least one-tenth of funds required for the regular budget in 1986 will not be available this year. As part of the economy measures already announced in the circulated documents, the Secretary-General has established a Steering Committee on Financial and Administrative Matters under the Chairmanship of the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management to formulate overall policy in connection with the administrative and financial problems of the Organization and continues to be in close contact with Member States to inform them of the seriousness of the current situation and of actions needed to meet the immediate financial emergency.

You will recall that I made a statement in the Conference at its 338th plenary meeting, by which I informed you of a number of actions taken by the Secretary-General in connection with a reduction in the costs relating to the hiring of consultants, temporary assistance and overtime, the application of Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the control and limitation of documentation and the optimum use of allocated Conference resources.

Accordingly, I feel duty-bound to report to you on our use of conference services during the first three weeks of the 1986 session. In that connection, I should note that, by certain meetings not being held or by not utilizing the three hours assigned to each of them, the total hours lost for meetings with full services amounted, for those three weeks, to 74 hours and 5 minutes. I think it useful to inform the Conference about the utilization of conference resources from time to time, so as to provide the members with a full picture of the situation, because after all, the Conference is both serviced and budgeted by the United Nations and the under-utilization of resources may lead to a review of what is allocated to the Conference.

In this regard, may I note that by resolution 38/32 D, the General Assembly requested, in paragraph 4, that especially those organs which have over the past few years under-utilized the meeting time allocated to them, and I quote "... consider at their organizational sessions, the question of improving the organization of their work in order to secure a more effective use of conference resources and to put forward concrete proposals on this matter, including, where feasible, the shortening of sessions".

May I now turn to the question of control and limitation of documentation, which is of particular interest in effecting savings. This is a very sensitive area, where I am sure the Secretariat can count on the

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Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations)

co-operation of the Conference to avoid unnecessary spending. To complete our information I have requested the technical services to provide me with a figure of the cost of a single page of official documentation in the six official languages of the Conference. I am informed that the cost is \$US 580 per page. This being the case, I hardly need to emphasize the importance of savings in this particular area. In this connection, may I inform you that the Secretariat is bound to follow resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning documentation. May I recall that by resolution 36/117 A II, paragraph 5, the General Assembly confirmed that, and I quote: "32 pages should be the maximum length of all action-oriented documents prepared by the Secretariat for inter-governmental meetings".

Some limitations concerning the circulation of documentation may result as a consequence of the existing situation. The Secretariat will do its utmost to ensure that this would not affect the work of the Conference and, for this purpose, I count on the co-operation of all members of the Conference and on their understanding in the event that certain occasional inconveniences may be experienced, which the Secretariat will try to reduce to a minimum.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his statement of which, I am sure, all members have taken due note.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Mr. LECHUGA HEVIA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We have listened very carefully to what we have just been told by Ambassador Komatina, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. I think that we all agree that savings must be made, but we would like the Secretariat, not immediately but after it has had time to prepare the information, to give us details about the breakdown of the costs of each document; above all, I have just heard that one page costs over \$500, and it would be a good thing not only to save pages but also to save money per page, in other words, to make the preparation of documentation cheaper. I think this would also help us to make considerable savings in the United Nations budget. I should be grateful if at some future date it could be possible to give us these details, which would be most useful.

Mr. VAN SCHAIK (Netherlands): Although what I have to say will be brief, and related to the statement of the Secretary-General of the Conference, I would not like to miss this opportunity to congratulate you, not only on the assumption of your Presidency, but more, on the excellent way you have guided us up to these last days of your term. You have proved an active, skilful, and, above all, independent President and we have appreciated that very much.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina for the very able and efficient way in which he presided over us in the month of August and I would like to extend a word of welcome to our new colleagues around the table.

Turning to the subject of my brief intervention, I have listened carefully to what Mr. Komatina has told us and I think that we all here are fully aware of the precarious financial situation that the United Nations

(Mr. Van Schaik, Netherlands)

finds itself in at the moment. While we all know, of course, that the Conference is master of its own procedures, this does not take away from us a wider responsibility to do whatever is possible to contribute to alleviating the financial deficit with which the United Nations is faced. So, I agree with our colleague from Cuba that it would be beneficial to look into this matter in more detail.

As I understand it, there are two areas in which we could, in principle, cut expenditures. One is by cutting the number of sessions and the length of sessions, and, still more, the number of missed hours as indicated by the Secretary-General. An overall area in which we could reduce expenditures concerns documentation, which is an area where restraint on the part of all delegations is required. I think that what Mr. Komatina said, that one sheet costs more than \$US 580, whatever the breakdown may be, is tremendous, and it is time to reflect on the cost of each paper that is circulated to us and whether we could not reduce the documentation.

I think it is, of course, appropriate that we should not restrict the right of delegations to submit whatever document they may deem fit for circulation to the Conference, as far as it is directly related to our work, but, I must confess that my delegation sometimes wonders whether it would not be more efficient if documents were only circulated in all official languages when they are really related to the heart of our work here, to the substantive work of the Conference. Moreover, I could imagine that sometimes the purpose of information to delegations could equally be served if the delegations concerned circulated to the Conference whatever it has to communicate, under its own responsibility, at its own costs and under its own heading. In fact, my delegation itself sometimes receives interesting messages or communiqués via two or three channels at the same time. An alternative would be that circulation in all languages would only be required at the request of one or more delegations. Perhaps other delegations have other suggestions in this area. I only wanted to suggest that this is a subject that we could further consider at this Conference and I am looking forward to further suggestions from you, Mr. President, from your successor and from the Secretary-General of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he expressed.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? As that is not the case and as we draw to the close of the first month of our work in 1986, and thus, according to our rules of procedure, to the closure of the Australian Presidency of the Conference, I felt it would be appropriate and helpful, with your permission, if I could make a brief statement.

My delegation and my Government have thought hard about the role of the Presidency of this important body and we arrive firmly at the view, guided, indeed, by our rules of procedure, that the President of this Conference, is above all, and I think I have said this once before, is above all, the servant of the Conference. There is a saying in the English language of a person who has all power and no responsibility, the President of this Conference is in fact, probably in the opposite position, that is, all responsibility and no power. That responsibility is, however, quite clear and precise, it is to serve this Conference, it is to ensure that the work of the Conference is conducted in an orderly and efficient fashion, consistent with its rules of procedure and to facilitate the work of the Conference. I hope that the

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Australian Presidency, something which comes to each of us only once every seven years and eight months has met those requirements. The report that I would now like to give to the Conference at the conclusion of this first month of our work, is not a report on which I would hope there would need to be any debate or comment. At yesterday's final session, of informal Presidential consultations, on the Conference's agenda items for the month of February, I said that I would present to the Conference today, a summary report of the outcome of those consultations.

I took this decision because I believed it would be helpful to the Conference and would be a constructive way of handing over to be distinguished colleague, Ambassador de Clerckx of Belgium, who will preside over the Conference in March.

During this opening month of our 1986 session the Conference established ad hoc committees on items 4 (chemical weapons) and 8 (comprehensive programme for disarmament) in accordance with the recommendations contained in the 1985 Report of the Conference on Disarmament. Work is now underway in both of those Committees. The Conference requested that the President carry out intensive informal consultations on all other agenda items.

Accordingly I carried out, during the month of February, intensive informal consultations individually with delegations, with Group and Subject Co-ordinators, and on an open-ended basis with all members of the Conference on items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of our agenda.

On item 1, "nuclear test ban", initial consultations made it clear that all delegations regarded this item as one of great importance and wished to see an ad hoc committee established as soon as possible. Initial consultations saw the reaffirmation by all groups of the positions they had adopted last year and which were expressed in the draft mandates contained in CD/520/Rev.7, CD/521 and the associated document CD/621 and CD/522.

Nevertheless some flexibility was expressed and in the event the President was asked to prepare a non-paper on the basis of which some further consultation and consideration might take place. Accordingly the President prepared such a paper dated 11 February. Further consultations indicated that the approach outlined in that paper caused some difficulties and as a consequence the President suggested that it might be withdrawn in order to clear the way for further consultations. Groups responded to these circumstances by asking the President not to withdraw his non-paper saying that it or perhaps a revised version of it could facilitate the consultations.

Accordingly the President drew up a revised non-paper dated 21 February in replacement of the previous non-paper. This non-paper was then considered by all groups. At the concluding round of open-ended consultations conducted on 26 February representatives of all groups reiterated the great importance they attached to the subject matter of agenda item 1. Representatives of each group reiterated that their preferred position was reflected in their own mandate proposal. However, one group said that if the President's non-paper were acceptable to other groups as a basis for the establishment of an ad hoc committee then that group could agree to action being taken in these terms. Another group said that it was not in a position to accept the President's non-paper and called for flexibility to be shown by others in order that agreement could be reached on this issue. Another group said it could see nothing that could be achieved through acceptance of the President's non-paper

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that could not be achieved by proceeding on the basis of its own mandate and programme of work proposals. Another group reaffirmed its flexibility on the issue.

In summing up these consultations I said that I believed there was a wish that consultations on item 1 of the agenda be kept alive because of the great importance placed on it by all delegations. This view was affirmed by all groups participating in the consultations.

On item 2 of the agenda, "cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", an informal proposal was made that a Committee of the Whole be established for consideration of this item. No conclusion was reached concerning this proposal. Some delegations stressed the importance of this item and the need for serious discussion and work to take place. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a very clear possibility of progress being made on this item at an early stage. One delegation asked that the President of the Conference for the month of March call a plenary meeting in order to arrive at a decision on how the Conference should deal with this item during 1986.

On item 3 of the agenda, "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", there was a substantive exchange, including a discussion of what took place last year and how the item should be dealt with in 1986. A number of delegations stressed the importance they attached to this item and said that substantive discussion and work should take place in 1986. Ideas were expressed about the possibility of considering this item in a subsidiary body although no consensus was possible on the establishment of an ad hoc committee as such. The Committee of the Whole format was examined.

No further developments have occurred on this item. One group expressed its support for an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate but indicated that it was flexible on the kind of mandate to be adopted. Another group suggested that the Conference should explore the possibility of establishing a specifically tailored organizational format to consider this item, making full use of rule 23 of the Conference's rules of procedure. This group suggested that next month's President could explore this possibility further.

On item 5 of the agenda, "prevention of an arms race in outer space", the great importance which all groups attach to this item was very clear. One group expressed the view that the 1985 mandate was by no means exhausted and could and should form the basis for continued work in 1986. Another group expressed its wish that an ad hoc committee be established on this item with a mandate which took into account General Assembly resolution 40/87. Another group said that it would prefer a negotiating mandate. During consultations on this item the President was asked to provide a non-paper for a draft mandate, drawing on the 1985 mandate and the relevant paragraph (paragraph 9) in General Assembly resolution 40/87. This paper was produced and is dated 21 February and is entitled "President's non-paper: Item 5". It was examined by all groups.

One group stated that despite the fact that it would have preferred a full negotiating mandate, it was prepared to start work on the basis of the President's non-paper. A group reiterated its view that no change to the 1985 mandate was required, and that work could proceed on last year's mandate. Another group reiterated its position that work in 1986 on the basis of the 1985 mandate would not be acceptable. It would, however, be

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prepared to continue to consult on this item, including on the basis of the President's non-paper. It requested that this view be conveyed to next month's President and that further work proceed to advance this issue. A fourth group stated that it continued to be flexible on the mandate, although it would prefer that it reflect paragraph 9 of resolution 40/87. It would be prepared to consider any other reasonable suggestion.

On item 6 of the agenda, "effective international arrangements to ensure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", the 1985 Report of the Conference on Disarmament recommended that the Conference keep this item under "active consideration", as was done during the 1985 session.

Some delegations expressed the view that there was no point in resuming such discussion unless the position of the nuclear-weapon States had changed or developed in any way on this question. There was a proposal that the President consult with the nuclear-weapon States on their position and that he report to plenary on the outcome of his discussions. The President undertook some limited consultations with nuclear-weapon States. These consultations, which were not completed, suggested to him however, that the position of nuclear-weapon States that prevailed last year had not changed. It was clear that the position of nuclear-weapon States is seen to be of considerable importance in the consideration of this item by the Conference.

I might also add the point here that it was specifically requested that the results of the consultations to date on this item be recorded by the President in the plenary session of the Conference, and I take it that what I have said on this item now constitutes that report.

On item 7, "new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", this item will be considered in a few minutes' time at an informal plenary meeting.

There were two other issues that were to be the subject of informal consultations, one was the question of the expansion of membership of the Conference on Disarmament. I felt it important throughout the first month of the Conference to give primary attention to the listed agenda items of the Conference and on one occasion when I suggested taking cognizance of some other issues it was made plain in the Conference that the first concentration of attention should be upon the listed agenda items of the Conference. Under these circumstances, as President, I did not enter into a structured form of consultation on the issue of expansion of membership of the Conference, but, I can say this, it was made plain to me by a number of delegations that the issue of the expansion of the Conference remains an important one and one which it is believed should be resolved as soon as possible. I would hope that delegations, led by my successor Ambassador Clerckx, will take up this matter with all due despatch.

Another issue was that of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. When I had the honour to deliver here the statement of my Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden, at the opening session of the Conference, I made it clear that Australia was concerned about the improved and effective functioning and would be pursuing consultations on that subject. For the reason I have mentioned, consultations on that subject were not structured in February, attention was given instead to formal agenda items. I want to say that it remains the intention of my delegation, bearing in mind the issues of

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cost, to put, presumably at our expense, an informal paper to this Conference shortly, in the name of Australia, making some suggestions for common consideration in the area of improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

I hope that the report I have given has been useful. I explained at the beginning, I have given it in the light of our view of the requirements of the Presidency to serve the Conference. I hope in particular that Ambassador Clerckx will be assisted by the report that has been given in advancing the work of the Conference next month.

It remains for me now to express the deep gratitude that I feel and I know that each member of my delegation feels for the spirit and fact of co-operation that has been shown to the President, and within the Conference as a whole during the month of February. Thank you.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? The distinguished representative of Brazil.

Mr. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): I have sought the floor to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 but before I do so, and in view of the fact that the leader of my delegation Ambassador De Souza e Silva was not able to be present in Geneva during the month of February, may I be allowed to express, on this last day of your Presidency, the satisfaction of the delegation of Brazil to have worked under your guidance, as well as our appreciation for the dedication and competence that you have displayed in the fulfilment of your duties.

Mr. President, with regard to the declaration you have just made on the outcome of your consultations on item 1 of the agenda, nuclear-test ban, the Group of 21 wishes to make the following statements for the record:

first, the Group of 21 regrets that throughout the consultations the attitude of nine delegations of the Group of Western States remained unchanged with respect to their previous stand on the matter,

second, the Group of 21 finds this situation even more disappointing in the light of the fact that itself, the Group of Socialist States and China have all displayed flexible attitudes in that regard,

third, the Group of 21 wishes to reiterate its willingness to pursue urgent consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1, with a view to finding a solution acceptable to all,

fourth, should inflexibility continue in the consultation process, the Group of 21 would request that the matter be ultimately referred to the Plenary of the Conference for a decision.

This is the end of the declaration of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement and for the generous remarks he addressed to the President.

I give the floor now to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me first of all to thank you very much for the report on the laudable activities you have undertaken with a view to establishing subsidiary organs of the Conference. In my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries on item 1 of our agenda, I would like to make the following comments.

The consultations on item 1, which you guided so determinedly, showed that nearly all delegations attach special importance to the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. To commence practical work and draw up a comprehensive test-ban treaty is more than ever before an urgent necessity. Our Group believes that the draft mandate formulated in CD/522/Rev.1 would best serve this purpose. Being sincerely interested in overcoming obstacles, however, the countries of my Group have displayed a high degree of flexibility in order to reach a consensus on a mandate. This was the very reason why they indicated during yesterday's consultation that the Group could accept the mandate contained in the President's paper of 21 February provided that the other Groups would also accept it. By comparing this draft mandate with that in CD/522/Rev.1, everybody will recognize the lengths to which my Group is ready to go in an effort to start meaningful work.

I understand that delegations of the Group of 21 are also favourably disposed towards the President's paper under consideration, notwithstanding the fact that it would constitute a departure from their well-founded position.

What is regrettable, though, is the Western Group's negative response to the paper in question. The explanation given is totally unsatisfactory. To reply to an unprecedented effort of flexibility on the part of the majority of delegations in a multilateral process by a repetition of positions is out of tune with the assertions of goodwill we have heard from the delegations concerned.

Despite this situation, my Group feels that we should not relent in our endeavour to get work on a CTB started and continue consultations to this end. I trust the delegations in question will understand that a constructive spirit and readiness for concessions cannot be a one-way street, and will rethink their approach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for his generous remarks.

If there is no other delegation that wishes to speak, I would now propose to move to the informal meeting of the plenary which was scheduled this morning. There has been a request for a slightly longer recess than the customary five minutes, in order to hold some consultations. I would propose now to suspend this plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament for ten minutes. This meeting is now suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and reconvened at 5.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 343rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

A draft decision has been prepared by the secretariat on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. That draft decision is contained in document CD/WP.221, dated 26 February 1986. I had hoped that we would be in a position to adopt the decision on the question of

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the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. I understand that the group most directly concerned has selected its candidate and that following the completion of further necessary consultations, the Conference should be in a position to appoint the Chairman at its next meeting, on Tuesday, 4 March. If there is no objection I would consider that the Conference is prepared to adopt the draft decision appearing in document CD/WP.221, dated 26 February. Is there any comment or objection? The distinguished representative of Morocco.

Mr. HILALE (Morocco) (translated from French): On behalf of the Group of 21 we wish to stress that the Group of 21 joined in a consensus with the other groups under your Presidency, on three points, namely the principle of the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, on its mandate, which must be identical to last year's, and thirdly on its chairmanship, the person put forward by the group concerned. We consider that from the moment the consensus has been broken, it is necessary to wait until all its components have been put together again in order to take a suitable decision on this subject.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation is, of course, imbued with respect for the decisions delegations take in respect of such organizational matters but it is also somewhat disturbed by the apparent linkages created here between various organizational questions: on the one hand, the establishment of a subsidiary working body, on the other hand an, in principle, separate decision on the nomination of the Chairman of such a body. My delegation has come to this plenary ready to give its assent to both draft decisions, the establishment of the group, and the election of the Chairman, which we had envisaged and consulted about to some extent.

It would have done so mindful of the separate nature of these two decisions. I regret that both these decisions cannot be taken today. I also regret that artificial linkages are created. Linkages are detrimental to our work because they prevent us from looking at each element of the decision to be taken on its merits.

Mr. HILALE (Morocco) (translated from French): Following the statement by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, I feel obliged to point out on behalf of the Group of 21 that we never intended to make any linkage between the question of the mandate and the question of its chairmanship. I also wish to recall that yesterday there was consensus on the three points we discussed, and we must therefore say that we are surprised, because from the moment there was a consensus there should be another consensus to break it: but in fact, that consensus was broken unilaterally. We are not responsible for the present situation. Furthermore, I remember that when the discussion of the question had been completed, you asked all the participants in the consultations whether they were in agreement on the three aspects of the question under discussion, and they all said that they were. You therefore instructed Ambassador Berasategui of the secretariat to prepare the necessary documents for the decision to be taken on the whole set of points, for the information of those who had not taken part in the consultations.

What is most surprising to us is that now a distinction is beginning to be made with what was done in previous years, because in the past the decision has been taken both on the mandate and on the chairmanship. That was the case for Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and also for yourself, Mr. President.

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A second point concerns making savings, and my delegation has just listened with great interest to what Ambassador Komatina said on the financial difficulties of the United Nations and on how to find a solution to them. He told us that a page of documentation of the United Nations cost \$580. In that case, it would be a contribution to the United Nations budget austerity to save \$580 by trying to put all the decisions on the three points together in a single document. Now, for example, it has just been proposed that we should adopt a decision on the mandate; if we did so, we would indirectly be worsening the United Nations budget situation by adopting another decision, to be set forth in another document, which could have been combined in this single document. I would therefore make an appeal for the secretariat to be able to take these aspects into account as well, that is to say, to be able to make the best possible use of the pages we have and, if possible, combine decisions in the same document. Having said this, we wish to specify on behalf of the Group of 21 that as far as we are concerned there is no question of linkage, but there is a question of logic: there was a consensus which has been broken, and it is now necessary to continue the consultations so that a new consensus can be found. We hope that next Tuesday we will be able to reach such a consensus.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco. I think it might be helpful if I say that in the informal consultations yesterday it is true that, as President, I put it to the group that there was a consensus on these matters. I did so in good faith, in the belief that that was the fact. It would appear that the information I had was inadequate, for which I apologise to the Conference. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? As that is not the case, it is clear to the President that there is no consensus at this stage, on the draft decision contained in CD/WP.221. If there is no further comment I would propose to turn to the last subject today, which is the informal paper which has been circulated by the secretariat today, at my request. It is the timetable dated 27 February for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary, if there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided

The PRESIDENT: If there is no further comment or contribution I would now propose to adjourn this meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 4 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.