

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.346
11 March 1986

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. C. Clerckx

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BELAID Mr. M. TEFIANI
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M. CAMPORA Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R.A. ROWE
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. C. CLERCKX Mr. P. NIEUVENHUYS Mr. J.C. de BISSCHOP
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. V. BOJLOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. R. DEYANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TIN TUN U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT Daw AYE AYE MU
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.A. BEESLEY Mr. R.J. ROCHON Mr. A. DESPRES
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN Jiadong Mr. HU Xiaodi Mr. SUO Kaiming Mr. SHA Zukang Ms. WANG Jiyun Mr. YANG Minglang Mr. TAN Han Mr. LIU Zhongren
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA Ms. A.M. LUETTGEN DE LECHUGA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA Mr. B. BEDNAR
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. F. YOHANNES
<u>France:</u>	Mr. J. JESSEL Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. H. PETERS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. WISNAMOERTI
Mr. A.M. FACHIR
Mr. R.I. HENIE
Mr. HARYOMATARAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
Mr. E. SIVIERO
Mr. R. DICARLO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. AFANDE
Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD
Mr. G. GONGOR

Morocco:

Mr. E.G. BENHIMA
Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. M.S. BENRYANE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. Van SCHAIK
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. B.A. ADEYEMI
Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:Peru:

Mr. J.G. TERRONES

Poland:

Mr. J. RYCHLAK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. VOICU
Mr. G. CHIRILA

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. D.A. SLINN
Mr. J.A. GRAINGER

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. R. LEVINA
Mr. J. GRANGER

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of
the Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 346th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with our programme of work, we shall continue today the consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, any member wishing to do so may, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

As agreed at the last plenary meeting, I also intend to convene an informal meeting immediately after the conclusion of the list of speakers to consider requests for participation by non-member States in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. The draft decisions on these requests were distributed by the secretariat at the beginning of this plenary meeting. If necessary, we may also consider other organizational matters, and then we shall resume the plenary meeting to formalize any decision we may have reached during the informal meeting.

I have on my list of speakers the representatives of Mexico and Canada, and I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I shall make use of rule 30 of the rules of procedure to which you have just referred and principally devote my statement today to introducing document CD/676 and its annex.

A little over one year ago, on 28 January 1985, the Heads of State or Government of six countries, on four different continents -- Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden and Andreas Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece -- signed, in the capital city of India, the transcendental international instrument known as the New Delhi Declaration.

In it, the high dignitaries stressed the satisfaction with which they had noted the agreement reached at Geneva on January 1985 between the United States and the Soviet Union for the conduct of bilateral negotiations with the expressly declared aim of "preventing the armaments race and putting an end to that race on Earth" in such a way as finally to achieve "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere".

In order to highlight the universal importance of this agreement has and the interest with which the course of the negotiations will be followed -- negotiations in which, as the United Nations has been declaring year after year, not only the national interests of the negotiating States but also "the vital interests of all the peoples of the world" are at stake -- the authors of the New Delhi Declaration affirmed with commendable frankness:

"We expect the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to implement, in good faith, their undertaking and their negotiations to produce, at an early date, significant results. We will follow their work closely and we expect that they will keep the international community informed of its progress. We stress that the agenda for and the outcome of these negotiations is a matter of concern for all nations and all people."

At the end of last year another heartening event occurred -- the holding of a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the two super-Powers, which, as is known, took place at Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985. In accordance with

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the summary given in the Joint Declaration issued at the end of that meeting, the two Parties managed to reach agreement on various points, among which the following warrant specific mention:

Mindful of the special responsibility which falls on the United States and the Soviet Union for the maintenance of peace, they agreed "that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", they emphasized "the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional", and proclaimed that they "will not seek to achieve military superiority".

In regard to the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, both leaders agreed "to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint United States-Soviet Agreement of 8 January 1985", they called for "early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the United States and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon".

The aforementioned Joint Declaration also includes a paragraph worded as follows:

"The USSR and the United States reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty."

The two documents to which I have just referred -- the bilateral communiqué of 8 January and the Joint Declaration of 21 November -- undoubtedly contain valuable conclusions and attractive statements of good intentions. The same positive evaluation can be made of the proposal advanced by General Secretary Gorbachev in his important statement of 15 January. He proposed a 15-year process, in three stages, which would culminate by the end of this century with the total elimination of nuclear weapons and whose verification would be carried out "both with the help of national technical means and through the carrying out of on-site inspections". Mention should also be made in this connection of the proposal transmitted by the President of the United States to the Soviet leader, in the second half of February, relating to a start to execution of the plan which envisages a 50 per cent reduction in the offensive nuclear forces of both sides and the negotiation of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind in this regard that, as expressed by the signatories to the New Delhi Declaration in the joint message addressed barely 10 days ago, on 28 February, to the leaders of the two super-Powers, "no concrete measures have as yet been agreed upon which would help to 'prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth'". This is the more regrettable if account is taken of what is stated, in the following terms, in the same Joint Message -- which has been distributed here today as document CD/676:

"This is a task of the utmost urgency for the future of humanity and the very survival of our planet is at stake. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there can be no security for the world. We all live confronting the awful possibility of our extinction in a nuclear holocaust, whether

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by accident or design. This is why we feel it is incumbent on us to do all that we can to avert this threat, and to build a new concept of global security without nuclear weapons."

The authors of the Joint Message, whose significance, as I see it, is in inverse ratio to its brevity, after stressing that the new summit meeting, which is expected to take place during the second half of this year, will constitute a "crucial opportunity" for the two participants to come to an agreement on "concrete steps to halt the nuclear arms race", express their conviction about the need to adopt confidence building measures, beginning with one which, despite its modesty, or perhaps precisely because of it, may prove to be of incalculable efficacy. The adoption of that measure is suggested in the message in the following terms:

"We urge you not to authorize any nuclear test in the coming months before the summit. We are convinced that this would be seen, in the rest of the world, as a signal that the two of you at that meeting are prepared to draw practical conclusions from your joint statement in Geneva that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'.

We reiterate our offer to assist in verifying any halt in nuclear testing, to remove doubts about compliance and possible violations. Such assistance could include on-site inspection as well as monitoring activities both on your territories and in our own countries."

As can be seen, the message could not be more practical and at the same time simpler to carry out. Its acceptance by those to whom it is addressed would be facilitated if they ponder the contents of its final paragraph, which is phrased as follows:

"You have a major responsibility for ensuring our common survival. People the world over will support every step that you take to bring us nearer the goal of freeing the Earth from the threat of nuclear war."

The Joint Message to which I have just referred was approved, as far as Olof Palme is concerned, a few hours before the world learned with stupefaction, indignation and sorrow of his assassination. It is for that reason that I wish to end this brief statement by endorsing what Maj Britt Theorin said to us here last week on behalf of Sweden:

"There is no better way to honour the memory of Olof Palme than to transcend the border between words and deeds. There is no better way to honour the memory of Olof Palme than for the leaders of the nuclear Powers to act:

to act to achieve a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to act to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, and to act to eliminate nuclear arms."

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): May I express my personal and official congratulations to you, Ambassador Clerckx, as our President during the month of March. I would also like to join other delegations in expressing our appreciation to you and to Ambassador Butler, in his absence, for the skilful way in which you have each conducted our deliberations thus far. Like many who have spoken before me, I wish also to extend my most sincere condolences to the Swedish delegation and through them to the family of

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Prime Minister Olof Palme. We have listened with care and attention to the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Mexico and we understand that one of the last official acts of Mr. Palme was to sign the document introduced today so eloquently by the distinguished representative of Mexico. Ambassador García Robles' credentials are, of course, impeccable as the one to introduce such a document signed by great statesmen.

The senseless assassination of one of the great leaders of our time, a man who contributed so much to the cause of peace, justice and human rights, constitutes a great loss for all of us, which must serve to reinforce our determination to redouble our efforts to reach the objectives we have set for ourselves in the Conference on Disarmament.

I wish to comment very briefly today on three of our most important agenda items: item 4: chemical weapons; item 5: prevention of an arms race in outer space; and item 1: nuclear test ban.

It will be recalled that I presented the Canadian position on substantive aspects of each of these items in my plenary statement of 4 February 1986. Today I wish to address the kind of concrete action which the Conference on Disarmament could, and in our view should, take on each of these items, taking into account that on each subject the Conference is at a different stage of consideration, deliberation or negotiation.

On item 4, chemical weapons, it is quite clear that the Conference is more advanced in its work on the comprehensive convention on chemical weapons than on any other item on its agenda. Thus, it is encouraging, albeit not surprising, that we have been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on which the Conference had agreed at the end of our last session. This should, nevertheless, not be grounds for special satisfaction on our part. When we began this session over a month ago there was a heightened sense of expectation about the prospects for progress in these negotiations. Recent reports of renewed chemical-weapons use, which have led the United Nations Secretary-General to initiate an investigation, should have reinforced our concern to make early and urgent progress.

In my statement of 4 February, we gave notice of our intention to submit documents intended to advance the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical-weapons treaty. I wish now to inform the Conference that the Canadian document entitled Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons has been submitted today to the secretariat for distribution to delegations. As I pointed out earlier, this working document identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats to help ensure that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing, objective and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise, but also recognizes and benefits from important contributions by several other countries involved in extensive research in this area, particularly Sweden, Norway and Finland.

As stated in the introduction to the document, "such a handbook is both useful today in the context of the existing authority of the Secretary-General under resolution 37/98 D or under the Charter of the United Nations, and it should also be of use in the future in the context of a verification régime that would be part of a future chemical weapons convention as it is currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament." The Handbook, as some delegations are aware, has already been submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York.

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It should be noted that this handbook does not deal with the procedures and criteria leading up to the initiation of an investigation. This issue is still very much a subject for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. The focus of this study is on what investigators should know and do when called upon to implement a decision to conduct an investigation, including the procedures that might be followed and the equipment that might be needed.

A technical working paper dealing with the identification of chemical substances will soon also be tabled in the appropriate Working Group by the Canadian delegation. That paper proposes a method for identifying chemical substances based on Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, which could be of considerable utility in reducing ambiguity in the identification process and in helping to simplify and standardize eventual data flows relating to the implementation of the convention, taking full advantage of computerized methods now available to search chemical literature.

In addition, as mentioned in my earlier statement, we will also be distributing an indexed compendium of all chemical weapons documentation for the period 1983 to 1985 to assist delegations in their work.

In this context I would like to commend the delegation of Pakistan for the serious efforts it has made in addressing in a recent working paper, the first one tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year, some of the central issues in a future chemical weapons convention. We have noted in particular the statement in the paper that chemical weapons use should be treated as a most serious breach of a future convention. The Canadian Government shares this view.

Turning now to item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, this is a question on which we have not yet advanced our work nearly as far as we have in the chemical weapons negotiations, namely the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We have already made known our views in our statement of 4 February that we should reach agreement quickly on the renewal of last year's mandate. I do not propose to reiterate our views on that issue. I wish merely to announce that the Canadian delegation has given to the secretariat, for distribution to all delegations, a compendium of the 1985 documentation of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. It is our view that an analysis of that documentation will make clear not only that we have already done considerable useful work in the Conference in elucidating the complexities raised by that question, but that considerable work remains to be done in analysing the legal régime and identifying any existing lacunae. Delegations need to address the issues embodied in the compendium. If some delegations disagree with some aspects of the Canadian or British working papers on the legal régime tabled during our last session, then let us hear from them, preferably in the form of working papers. This only underlines the importance as we see it of earliest possible agreement on a renewed mandate so we can devote our full efforts to concrete, substantive work. In the meantime, all of us should be preparing for such work.

The third, and perhaps the most important, issue I wish to address is that of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The extensive number of statements during recent weeks have shown that most delegations share our view as to the importance of this issue. Yet, it has not been possible to establish a subsidiary body which would allow concrete work to be done, particularly on such issues as scope, verification and compliance. Several substantive papers have been tabled on various aspects of a CTB, but we have not yet even

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begun to discuss them thoroughly. One of the most important aspects raised in statements and working papers on this question relates to seismic verification. Much common ground exists in this area, developed through the intensive work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts over the years. I wish now to announce that the Canadian delegation is today making available directly to other delegations a brochure recently published by the Department of External Affairs of Canada on seismic verification. Although produced mainly with the Canadian public in mind, this document is the product of extensive research, is based entirely on scientific advice, and is intended to provide useful clarification of some of the issues relating to seismic verification.

Our purpose in distributing this brochure is a simple one. The achievement of a CTB is a fundamental Canadian objective. Canada has played a particularly prominent role on verification, a central issue in which seismic technology is a key. Since 1976 Canadian scientists have participated in the work of the international group of seismic experts in the Conference on Disarmament studying technical aspects of a world-wide exchange of seismic data. Indeed the Canadian participants will again be tabling a working paper during the current session of the GSE.

The most recent activity of the GSE was the conduct and evaluation of a large-scale technical test involving 31 States. This work is the object of an extensive report being prepared for the Conference on Disarmament. The test has indicated that a number of technical issues require further consideration by the GSE. Canada strongly supports the continuation of this work. The brochure gives some indication of the value and importance of this work, and the need to continue it.

In this context I should like also to make known to the Conference on Disarmament that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced on 7 February that the Government of Canada has agreed to provide \$3.2 million during the period 1986-1989 to upgrade the Canadian Yellowknife seismic array as a major Canadian contribution to monitoring an eventual comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location to monitor global seismic events, including underground nuclear tests. Updating and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, which consists of a series of short-period and long-period seismometers, will enable Canada to contribute to an international system which would constitute an essential monitoring element of a negotiated CTB, utilizing the best technology available. Canada will be using the Yellowknife development to assist the GSE in coming to standards and specifications of seismograph stations that will contribute to seismic verification of a CTB.

Mr. President, we are attempting to show by action rather than rhetoric that we mean what we say on verification and regard it not as an obstacle, but as part of the solution.

We hope that an analysis of the three papers I have referred to -- each of which differs considerably from the others -- will provide concrete evidence of some of the possibilities of making progress in the Conference, whatever the stage of our deliberations or of our negotiations.

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It is our hope that delegations could usefully take the opportunity to review the documents which we and others have submitted. However, we continue to strongly support our collective continuing efforts to reach agreement on the mandates for outer space and a nuclear-test ban, and would be very troubled if our efforts were unsuccessful in either case. Indeed, effective use of the Canadian papers and those tabled by other delegations can only be made if subsidiary bodies are established to study and discuss them. We suggest also that it would be useful if delegations who have not yet submitted working documents but have the capacity to produce such papers were to give consideration to so doing.

These contributions to the work of the Conference on Disarmament just described have been produced at some cost to Canada but, bearing in mind recent statements by Secretary-General Komatina on financial considerations, at very little cost to the secretariat of the Conference, and we hope others will take similar steps bearing his comments in mind.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. There are no more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): From the discussions of the Conference, my delegation has drawn the conclusion that there is a broad understanding concerning the importance and urgency to start the work of an ad hoc committee on item 1, nuclear test ban. This was even underlined again by the two statements we have heard this morning. In this connection, I would be very grateful if you could inform us about your plans with regard to the continuation of intensive consultations on that extremely significant subject.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and wish to answer him immediately. I had intended to make some comments on the progress of our work during the informal meeting, but since the question has been raised in plenary I shall use the occasion to do so now.

The fact of the matter is that, after a month and a half of plenary meetings, our Conference has yet to settle a number of major issues relating to our organization of work. A number of working bodies remain to be set up so that we can begin our work in accordance with the programme of work which we have set ourselves. It is not healthy for our Conference for these issues to get bogged down. I would therefore appeal to the Conference for new steps to be taken in this connection. As far as I am concerned, I have reviewed matters, from which it appears that delegations and groups are standing by their positions, but at the same time there appears to be a desire for general flexibility. That desire for flexibility should augur favourably for further work and the manner in which the pending issues can be resolved, and in any case I believe it allows me to address an appeal to the Conference for us not to go on marking time. For my part, I am at the disposal of any delegation which so desires for any talks or contacts on a strictly bilateral level. Furthermore, I shall maintain close and regular contacts with the Group Co-ordinators during the co-ordinating meetings on Wednesday afternoons so as to be in a position to note the slightest progress made by delegations or groups. Finally, I shall commence consultations with the Co-ordinators for

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items as soon as I have been informed by groups or even by a delegation of any initiative which would allow the President to tackle issues substantively. That is how I believe the President can contribute to overcoming the problems still outstanding. And I repeat, they should be resolved as rapidly as possible, and that is why I have made this appeal to the Conference for initiatives to be taken.

Does any other member wish to take the floor? If that is not the case, I suggest that the plenary meeting be suspended and an informal meeting be held in a few minutes time to consider the requests of non-member States concerning their participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. The meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and reconvened at 12 noon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 346th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Following our exchange of views in our informal meeting, we have now to take decisions on the requests by non-member States of the Conference wishing to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. We have received requests from the following States: Norway, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland and Spain. We shall take up these requests one by one in the order in which they were received by the secretariat. I submit to the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.222 1/ concerning the request received from Norway. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I submit to the Conference for decision document CD/WP.223 2/ concerning the request received from Finland. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

1/ In response to the request of Norway (CD/655) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

2/ In response to the request of Finland (CD/656) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I submit to the Conference on Disarmament document CD/WP.224 3/ concerning the request for participation by Portugal. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I submit document CD/WP.225, 4/ concerning the request for participation by Greece. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I submit to the Conference document CD/WP.226, 5/ request for participation by Turkey. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I submit to the Conference for decision document CD/WP.227, 6/ request for participation by Switzerland. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

3/ In response to the request of Portugal (CD/657) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

4/ In response to the request of Greece (CD/658) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

5/ In response to the request of Turkey (CD/659) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

6/ In response to the request of Switzerland (CD/663) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Finally, I submit document CD/WP.228, 7/ request for participation by Spain. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have no more business and I therefore intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 March at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

7/ In response to the request of Spain (CD/665) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1986 in the subsidiary body established under item 7 of its agenda.