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Letter dated 9 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 8 April 1991 addressed to you by His Excellency Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKŞIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 8 April 1991 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith notes containing excerpts from the book entitled Cyprus: My Deposition (vol. III) by Mr. Glafkos Clerides (see appendix), the prominent Greek Cypriot politician and leader of the Greek Cypriot political party DISI, highlighting the root causes of the Cyprus question.

Mr. Clerides's first-hand account of the course of events as someone who has been involved in the Greek Cypriot campaign to unite Cyprus with Greece from the beginning is a belated yet revealing testimony to many fundamental points that the Turkish Cypriot side has tried to get across all along: that the ultimate aim of the Greek Cypriot side in deliberately destroying the constitutional partnership State and in trying to suppress the Turkish Cypriots by force of arms during this period was to annex the island to Greece (Enosis) and to relegate the Turkish Cypriots to a mere minority in a "Greek Cyprus".

The book also underscores the uncompromising attitude of the Greek Cypriot side throughout the early negotiating phase between 1968-1974 and Archbishop Makarios's rejection of any agreement that would close the door to Enosis. It is significant to note that the same attitude still prevails today, blocking all efforts to reach a negotiated settlement based on the equal political status and participation of the two peoples within a bi-zonal federal settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 649 (1990).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its appendix were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX

Notes on the Cyprus issue, with extracts from the
book entitled Cyprus: My Deposition (vol. III),
by Glafkos Clerides

Partnership status - political equality

Greece had reached a broad agreement with Turkey on the solution of the Cyprus problem based on an independent, bi-communal, unitary state, in which the two communities would enjoy a partnership status (as in the 1960 constitution) and Enosis and partition would be barred by constitution and treaty provisions. Makarios, who opposed such a solution, was an obstacle ...

"The first force was the military Government of Greece, which had reached a broad agreement with Turkey on the solution of the Cyprus problem, based on an independent bicomunal unitary state, in which the two communities would enjoy a partnership status, and Enosis and Partition would be barred by constitutional and treaty provisions. Makarios, who opposed such a solution, was an obstacle and had to be removed from the office of President of the Republic. The other force was Grivas, his supporters and certain Greek colonels, who, though they supported the military Government of Greece, disagreed with its policy regarding the Cyprus problem and supported the policy declared by Grivas, i.e., self-determination, Enosis, which was not considered by Makarios a feasible solution." (p. 271)

"(b) The Greek Cypriots by the term unitary state meant control by the Greek Cypriot majority of all the organs of the state in which all political decisions were taken for the Government of the island. In other words, the Greek Cypriot objective was to establish and secure the political and economic control of the island for the Greek Cypriot majority.

"(c) The Turkish objective was to maintain the Turkish Cypriot community as a separate entity with separate rights in the independent state of Cyprus." (p. 276)

"Furthermore, had a federal solution been accepted, Cyprus would not be a Greek Cypriot island with a Turkish minority enjoying minority rights, but a federal state consisting of two cantons, one Greek Cypriot and the other Turkish Cypriot, which would have equal rights within the federal structure regarding the powers and functions of their respective separate administrations." (p. 296)

"Statement by Mr. Rauf R. Denktash at the Inaugural Session of the broadened Intercommunal Talks on 8 June 1972

"The area in which Cyprus is located is highly sensitive; the inseparable ties of the two communities with their respective motherlands are too strong to be denied; the fact that whatever happens between the two communities is inevitably reflected in Ankara and Athens cannot be disregarded. We, therefore, as the two national communities in Cyprus; the co-founders of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus; the partners in the administrative set up of the Cyprus State have a duty not only to our respective communities and to Cyprus as a whole, but also an international duty of maintaining the peace in this delicate area in the knowledge that, by so doing, we help our respective motherlands to normalize their political relations. Cyprus should be (and can be) made a bridge of Greco-Turkish friendship and co-operation. Our role to this end can be most significant.

"We want peace and justice in the light of established rights and political status.

"We need full security of life and property.

"We want our independence (of which we are the co-founders) to be satisfactorily guaranteed against those who may wish to destroy it in the future." (p. 188)

"Report on the meeting between the President of the House of Representatives, Mr. Glafkos Clerides and the Ambassador of West Germany, Mr. Török

"Answering my question of what was the nature of the solution of the Cyprus problem that Greece and Turkey had agreed on, Mr. Török said he had no further information apart from that he had given me in the past and that he continues to believe that the Greco-Turkish Agreement is based on the principle of recognizing a guaranteed independence, as provided by the Zurich Agreements, partnership of the two communities and recognition of separate local government administration." (pp. 141 and 142)

"The Presidency of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Nicosia, 9 August 1971, No: 104171

"... For us, the retention of this balance which gave the Cyprus State its Cypriot character by providing for the co-operation in partnership of the two ethnic communities is, and has always been, very important, because without this balance the Cyprus State becomes, not a Cypriot State as it should be, but a Greek Cypriot State with the door wide open to Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece)

"... In addition, we feel that if we do not establish such a system of inter-communal balance the outcome of our concessions will be the establishment of a Greek Cypriot Republic and not a Cypriot Republic of inter-communal partnership, which was the sole objective of our talks." (pp. 108 and 109)

"Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept which, in their opinion, the Zurich Agreement created between the two communities. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle and for that principle both sides were prepared to go on arguing and even, if need be, to fight, rather than compromise.

"The same principle is still in conflict, even today, though a federal solution has been accepted - and though a federation is nothing more than a constitutional partnership of the component states, provinces or cantons which make up the federation." (p. 105)

"Generally speaking all the advice given in the Greek Note was sound. It did not derogate from the concept of a unitary state, it did not contain any notions of concealed federalism, and my evaluation was that it would have led to a solution of the constitutional issue, but of course it would not have reduced the Turkish community to the status of a minority. It would, however, have produced the amendments of all those provisions which Makarios declared in 1963 as unworkable and for which he had proposed amendments. 'Mother's' good advice, however, was not followed. The inexperienced Greek Cypriot leadership not only rejected, without much difficulty, the more mature advice of the 'mother', but also accused her of having conspired with Turkey, behind the 'daughter's' back, to sell her down the river." (p. 76)

"Instead of that the Turkish side appears to return to the principle of the bicomunal character of the Cyprus state, as it was founded by the Zurich Agreements, but accepts deep amendments in order to make the constitution workable, in exchange for satisfactory entrenchment of communal rights. These communal rights consist basically in the powers of Article 87 of the Zurich Constitution and in securing autonomy in local administration, which would permit the survival and development of the Turkish community. The Turkish demands, examined in their totality, are a long way from the powers and functions of a federal state.

"Thus, in as much as Turkish policy today supports the solution of a bicomunal state at the talks, it approaches Greek policy of a unitary state with bicomunal participation. The remaining differences are not in the ration of the participation of each community in the functions of the state, which is accepted to be the ration of the population, but in the appearance of the state. The tendency of Turkish policy is to move away as little as possible from the status of 'partnership' established by the Zurich Agreements, and to insist on the presentation of the

Turkish community as equal partners with the Greek, by preserving certain provisions of the Zurich Constitution, not of substance, but of symbolic character." (p. 239)

"The aim of the Greek Cypriot Constitutional policy in the talks was a moderate modification of the Plaza plan, which provided limited participation of the Turks in the organs of the independent state of Cyprus, always on a minority basis. This policy also did not succeed, because the Turkish side, though more flexible, remained unretreating on the issue of accepting a minority status for the Turkish Cypriots." (p. 237)

"(a) Creation and development of the constitutional problem.

"The constitutional crisis of the year 1963 disrupted the constitutional order, the continuity, and the partnership status of the two communities, which was created by the Zurich Agreements.

"Because of the disruption of constitutional order, a peculiar situation was created, by virtue of which the state authority, on the one hand, became under the absolute control of the Greeks, and though the Government was recognized internationally, yet internally Turkish enclaves were created within the territory of the Republic in which at first, an elementary organization for the purpose of governing the Turkish Cypriots was established, the main characteristic of which was the confusion of military and political powers and functions, and the prevailing of military power.

"After the crisis of 1967 (Kophinou Crisis), the above disruption of constitutional order became more clear and showed tendencies of permanency. Thus in December 1967, the elementary military-political organization of the Turks in the enclaves developed into a 'Temporary Administration' on the basis of a character, and at the same time the political and military authorities were separated.

"In the years that followed, a steady, stage by stage development is noted in the Turkish Administration, with the separation in its legislative, executive and judicial powers. An administrative organization is created, as well as police force and an army. The increase of the financial resources of the Turkish Cypriots through economic aid from Turkey permitted the functioning of their administration on a more permanent basis, a fact which they made clear, by remaining their 'Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration' to 'Turkish Cypriot Administration'. Thus there exist today in Cyprus two poles of power on a separate geographical basis, i.e. the Government of the Cyprus Republic, controlling the largest section of the territory of the state and internationally recognized, and the Turkish Cypriot Administration, which controls a very limited area and is not internationally recognized, but has already taken almost all the characteristics of a small state.

"From the above the conclusion can be drawn that our top priority and target must be the dissolution of the Turkish enclaves for the sake of securing the unity of the island." (pp. 236-237)

"The Turks, forced by the crisis events, followed a policy of self-segregation and a proportion of them withdrew to several enclaves scattered within the territory of the Republic, where they set up their own organization outside the provisions of the constitution. The Greeks, on their part, ignoring the constitutional limitations, took over the entire machinery of the state, the function of which, in view of the societal needs, had to continue.

"This crisis lingered on at the stage of a protracted confrontation with sporadic incidents of violence varying in magnitude and significance. Communication between the two communities was reduced to a minimum, and this, combined with crisis language, rekindled mutual fears and suspicions." (p. 220)

Why no solution

"It is a fact of history, which cannot be denied, that the uncompromising attitude of Makarios on the issue of local government prevented a solution of the Cyprus problem in December 1972.

"The uncompromising attitude of Makarios persisted despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had accepted all the 13 points proposed by him for constitutional amendments in 1963, and even went beyond them. Makarios would not yield further on the issue of local government despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had (a) abandoned its demand for the grouping of villages in order to form separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas of local government; (b) accepted that the House of Representatives would enact legislation on local government matters, and the Communal Chambers would only enact regulations on the basis and within the limits of laws enacted by the House of Representatives; (c) accepted that administrative control would be exercised on behalf of the Government by a civil servant and a final agreement had been reached on the powers and functions to be exercised by the local government authorities.

"Makarios's fatal decision to refuse to authorize me to proceed to reach agreement on the above lines, a decision he took against the advice of the Greek Government, that of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio Tafall, and my own advice, resulted in the increase of tension between himself and the Greek Government. At the same time, it strengthened the view in the United States Government and in certain Western Governments, which was carefully and systematically cultivated by Turkey, that Makarios was not interested in reaching an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem, but was aiming at neutralizing the

resistance of the Turkish community through economic pressure, in order to impose on it the solution he had in mind." (pp. 204-206)

"The decision of Makarios of 12 December 1972 not to compromise, after the concessions the Turkish side had made, sealed his fate and that of Cyprus. The die was cast and the worst followed." (p. 206)

"(c) Agreed amendments to make the constitution more workable were possible. The Turkish side would accept to give up some of the constitutional rights it derived from the Zurich Agreements in return for the Greek side accepting separate autonomy of the communities in local government. The adjustment of communal rights must preserve the partnership principle of the two communities and the unitary character of the Republic.

"Makarios, however, was an obstacle in proceeding to achieve a solution on the above lines. Despite pressure for the Greek Government, which included threats to take 'harsh' measures against him, he continued to oppose autonomy in local government. Further, he insisted that those rights which created the partnership principle of the two communities should be abolished." (p. 126)

Makarios on Enosis

In his letter dated 4 May 1972 Makarios wrote to Grivas:

"We defend ourselves and refuse to accept a solution which will fetter our national future. Enosis is a purpose of life and a compass for national orientation. Enosis, however, is not achievable if in the first instance, the danger of an undesirable solution is not made distant or removed. I would not hesitate to change the policy according to your proposal if the Greek Government agreed. It is possible that it will be said that there were instances of disagreement with the Greek Government regarding the policy to be followed and the handling of the Cyprus problem. A disagreement with the Greek Government is possible on any other proposed policy, except Enosis. A struggle for Enosis without the participation of Greece would possibly lead to unpleasant results. On the policy of direct Enosis we must walk side by side with Greece." (p. 148)

"(6) The Greek Cypriots are part of the Greek nation. This must not be forgotten as it must not be forgotten that the national centre is and remains Athens." (p. 128)

"I returned to Cyprus and reported to Makarios on my talks in Athens. I asked Makarios if, after the assurances given by Papadopoulos, he would agree for Article 185 of the 1960 Constitution, which prohibited both Enosis and Partition, to be incorporated in the new Constitution. He raised his arms, which were resting on his desk and said: 'You see,

/...

Glafkos, these hands, they can cut them off, but I will not sign again any Constitution excluding Enosis.'" (p. 270)

Article 185 of the 1960 Constitution reads:

1. The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible.
2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded.

But Makarios "would not consent to have Article 185 incorporated into the new Constitution, without a prior agreement between Greece and Turkey refusing to accept either Enosis or partition". (p. 270)

Extracts from the answers Archbishop Makarios gave to questions put to him by the correspondent of the Athens newspaper Acropolis:

"I cannot say that I am nationally satisfied with the development and course of the Cyprus question so far. I would be nationally satisfied, and so would all Greeks, only if the Cyprus problem were solved through union of Cyprus with Greece. However, I do not think that the prospects of the immediate future are leading to this direction ... I would not disagree with Grivas, if, firmly adhering to Enosis, he rejected any other solution of the Cyprus question. I am not in disagreement with the national target he is aiming at. I disagree with the manner and methods he is using which, I believe, place the target at a greater distance ..."

Asked whether he would be prepared to renounce Enosis for good and hold a referendum with the object of excluding Enosis, Archbishop Makarios stated:

"Enosis, regardless of whether it can be realized or not, will always be the national aspiration of the Greek Cypriots and a spiritual creed which cannot be renounced either through a referendum or in any other way." (p. 266)

No law and order - no effective Government - no State

"In fairness it must be stated that the internal political conflict had developed to such a bitter extent that persons opposing Makarios, as well as their sons and daughters, even though not actively engaged in illegal activities against the Government, were excluded from the Civil Service, the Educational Service, the semi-Government organizations and the Police. If they did hold posts in any of these services their promotion and transfers suffered. In fact they were discriminated against for their political views. The only outlet for persons opposing Makarios or for their sons was to secure an officer's commission in the National Guard." (p. 316)

"Equally the rifles with which the National Guard was equipped were bolt-action, of the World War I era, the anti-aircraft weapons were totally obsolete and the same applied to the anti-tank weapons. The refusal of the Government to equip the National Guard properly was based on the evaluation that the Government faced a more imminent danger from the National Guard than from the Turks, particularly since the intercommunal talks were continuing, progress was being made towards a solution, and Turkey was not likely to attempt an invasion during the continuation of the talks." (p. 319)

"He was sworn in as President at 3 p.m. on 15 July, but of course not in accordance with the constitutional provision, which provided that the elected president appears, within a fixed time of his election, before the House of Representatives and gives the affirmation of adherence to the Constitution and the laws of the state. Constitutionally, Mr. Sampson does not exist as a president of the Republic of Cyprus. He was neither elected, nor did he take office as provided by the Constitution, which stipulates that the term of office of President runs from the time he makes the prescribed affirmation before the House." (p. 341)

"Masked armed men appeared threatening supporters of Makarios and others threatening those who supported Grivas. The police was both unwilling and unable to maintain law and order as understood and practised in civilized democratic societies." (p. 274)

"The edition of 6 February 1973 of the Turkish Cypriot 'Special News Bulletin', which was published in English, contained an interview Rauf Denktash had given to 'Bonkurt' (a Turkish daily) the previous week:

"... This is perhaps the most interesting part in Mr. Vassiliades' statement ... He agrees that Makarios, too, has the same formula and view. This is important because it reveals once again the leading actor and the theme of the tragedy which has been enacted since 1960.

"Q: Mr. Vassiliades says that there is no State, that it has broken up.

"A: It is correct that the State has broken up as a result of the 1963 onslaught. Instead of the constitutional State composed of Turkish and Greek wings, now there are the de facto Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations.

"The Enosis formula of Mr. Vassiliades, is the formula applied by Makarios in 1968, and this is the outcome. But they are still of the same mind.

"Q: According to Mr. Vassiliades, Cyprus is once again passing through a period which prevailed prior to 16 August 1960. Do you share this view?

"A: Yes, but there are a few differences. The Turkish community sitting at the negotiating table today has a status entrenched in international agreements, and a nine year old glorious struggle of resistance. In 1960, Turkey's rights and prerogatives over Cyprus were unknown, today these are known. In 1960 what Turkey could do to protect our rights, lives and honour was an unknown factor interpreted in favour of the Greeks. Today their real value is clear. In the 1960 period, there was a world which believed that the rights and powers demanded by us were excessive; now, there is a world which has seen and realized what has befallen us even with these rights and powers. In 1960 there was a conviction that the Greeks did not want enosis; whereas now there is no one who is not conversant with the acrobatics of the Greek Cypriots' 'Enosis-Independence' policy." (pp. 257 and 258)

"Unfortunately, it is one of the failings of the Greek race that when there is violent internal conflict and strife, immense hatred is generated and directed by the warring sides against each other, of such an extent that all outside dangers threatening the nation are forgotten, ignored or lost sight of. Anger and hatred cloud or totally prevent all logical thinking.

"Makarios proceeded with his accusations against the Greek government regarding the Greek intervention in Cyprus, its effect on constitutional order, on the independence of Cyprus, and on the safety of the Turkish community." (p. 350)

"No" to federalism: why?

"Finally the idea of a separate Turkish Cypriot administration created the picture in the mind of the Greek Cypriots, that not only the Government of Cyprus, i.e. Makarios, had failed to reduce the excessive rights granted by the Zurich and London Agreements to the Turkish minority, but that they were forced to increase them. Furthermore, had a federal solution been accepted, Cyprus would not be a Greek Cypriot island with a Turkish minority enjoying minority rights, but a federal state consisting of two cantons, one Greek Cypriot and the other Turkish Cypriot, which would have equal rights within the federal structure regarding the powers and functions of their respective administrations." (p. 296)

"Mr. Kyprianou stated: 'I wish again to call on the Greek Cypriot people to be calmly on alert in order to prevent a nationally unacceptable solution. By this I mean either concealed or unconcealed

federation, or condominium, double Enosis, or partition or a return to the Zurich Agreements' ..." (p. 367)

Turks "yes" to federalism

"The visit of Mr. Denktash after the formation of the new government has been very useful for us. We had the opportunity to get information from him on every aspect of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish government will exert every effort to secure a peaceful and lasting solution to the problem within the framework of an independent and federal state. On this issue there is no reason for people of goodwill to have any suspicion about our intentions." (p. 295)

Turkish position - Greek position

"(b) The Greek Cypriots by the term unitary state meant control by the Greek Cypriot majority of all the organs of the state in which all political decisions were taken for the Government of the island. In other words, the Greek Cypriot objective was to establish and secure the political and economic control of the island for the Greek Cypriot majority.

"(c) The Turkish objective was to maintain the Turkish Cypriot Community as a separate entity with separate rights in the independent state of Cyprus." (p. 276)

"The Turkish side had made clear its position from the start, both direct to Athens and at the talks, that a solution could only be arrived at, if at the end, Enosis and Partition were barred by constitutional and treaty provisions." (p. 264)

"(c) Turkey would insist, once a solution was found, on the reaffirmation, both by constitutional provisions and by treaty articles, on the exclusion of Enosis and Partition." (p. 248)

"Any objective analyst would have to admit that the Greek side gave the Turkish side all the excuses it needed in order to demand iron-cast guarantees against Enosis. He would also have to admit that Turkey exhibited every willingness to accept the same guarantees against Partition. Since, however, the official policy of the Governments of Greece and Cyprus was that both accepted an independent Cyprus and wished to make its Constitution more workable, the refusal by the Governments of Greece and Cyprus to reaffirm the provisions of the Zurich-London Agreements regarding Enosis and Partition, and the intra-Greek Cypriot violent conflict regarding the demand for immediate enosis, placed the Turkish side in an advantageous position both at the negotiating table, and outside, particularly with regard to international credibility." (p. 214)

"The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Gunesh, made a statement after Grivas' death regarding the policy of his Government on the Cyprus problem. The two main points of that statement were that the question of barring Enosis had not been satisfactorily resolved, because even after the death of Grivas, the cause of Enosis had not been abandoned, clearly implying that more effective external and internal guarantees were needed and that internal autonomy should reach the level of federation." (p. 367)
