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REPORT OF **THE SECRETARY-GENERAL** ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 ~~June-30~~ November 1990)

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
INTRODUCTION *	1
I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS	2 - 6
II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES	7 - 8
III. FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS . . .	9 - 35
A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the <u>status quo</u>	- 22
B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions .	23 - 35
IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS *	36
V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS	37 - 39
VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	40
VII. OBSERVATIONS	41 - 47
Annex. Deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, November 1990	

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June 1990 to 30 November 1990 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 657 (1990) of 15 June 1990, the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 30 November 1990.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and to return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 657 (1990). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, para. 7, and footnote 37).

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1990:

Military personnel

Austria	HQ UNFICYP	12	
	Infantry battalion	388	
	Military Police Company	<u>10</u>	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	Le 12e Régiment blindé du Canada	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military Police Company	<u>11</u>	575

Military personnel

Denmark	H Q UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 54	323	
	Military Police Company	<u>13</u>	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military Police Company .	<u>3</u>	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military Police Company	<u>2</u>	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military Police Company	3	
	HQ SWEDCIVPOL	<u>1</u>	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force Scout Car Squadron,		
	C Squadron, 13/18 Hussars	107	
	22 AD Regiment, Royal Artillery	320	
	HQ UNFICYP Support Regiment		
	(Engineers, signals, army		
	aviation flight transport,		
	medical centre, ordnance		
workshops)	284		
Military Police	<u>9</u>	<u>745</u>	
		<u>2 094</u>	

Civilian Police

Australia	20	
Sweden	<u>18</u>	38
		<u>2 132</u>

4. In November 1990, I decided to send a review team to Cyprus to examine, in close co-operation with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, the organization and operations of UNFICYP. In particular, it was asked to co-aidbr the continued relevance of the functions entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council in resolution 164 (1964) and subsequent resolutions, to consider possible changes in the Force's method of operations, such as the use of military observers, and to consider the possibility of reducing the Force's strength and making other economies. The team was in Cyprus from 11 to 21 November 1990. Its report is being issued for the information of the members of the Security Council in document S/21982.

5. UNFICYP suffered six fatal casualties, five due to traffic accidents and one due to other reasons, bringing the total of casualties to 158 since the inception of the Force in 1964.

6. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major-General Clive Milner.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

7. UNFICYP maintained liaison and co-operation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1964 (see document S/15812, para. 14) continued to be applied. Despite considerable efforts with all concerned, it has not been possible for UNFICYP to increase its freedom of movement in the northern part of the island.

8. During the period under review, UNFICYP vehicles were on a number of occasions delayed when entering the United Nations buffer zone. UNFICYP patrols were interfered with by troops of both sides in areas of the buffer zone where they do not frequently operate. For example, on 14 June, two UNFICYP soldiers were detained by Turkish forces while conducting a routine investigation. On 19 October 1990, a United Nations patrol conducting an investigation into a cease-fire violation was stopped in the buffer zone by the National Guard. Such incidents strained relations with both sides and UNFICYP protested these incidents, reiterating its right to access and activity in all parts of the buffer zone.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

9. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkias enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

10. UNFICYP kept the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 148 observation posts, 52 of which are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols were also employed especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices were used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

.. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations buffer zone and is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise armaments in the buffer zone, resupply observation posts and react promptly to accidents. British Engineers maintain these tracks in a workable condition but with considerable effort and difficulty.

.. During the period under review, UNFICYP initiated a mine-clearing project that will cover certain parts of the buffer zone where members of UNFICYP as well as civilians are at risk. The detailed reconnaissance by Canadian Engineers of all known minefields within the buffer zone has been completed, and their report is due shortly.

.. During this period, the number of cease-fire violations increased slightly. The 1989 agreement concerning the unarming of certain positions at Nicosia continued to hold. However, in some parts of Nicosia and its suburbs, the troops of both sides remain in dangerous proximity to each other. This is a matter of considerable concern, and UNFICYP is continuing its efforts to extend the agreement to other areas in and adjacent to Nicosia, although it is experiencing difficulties at the present time in achieving this objective.

.. There were 23 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish forces aircraft and 12 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 11 overflights from the north and 16 from the south by civilian aircraft. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further nine overflights.

.. As stated in my previous report (S/21340, para. 14) tension rose on the island following the arrest of five young Greek Cypriots by the Turkish Cypriot Police in February 1990 after they crossed the cease-fire lines (the last two were released from detention during the current reporting period). Following these incidents, the Ledra Palace crossing point was closed to tourists by the Greek Cypriot side and the Turkish Cypriot side suspended all meetings between Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace. This has hampered still further the very limited contacts between the two sides.

.. The National Guard's construction programme to improve their defensive positions all along its cease-fire line was a contentious issue and increased tension throughout the period under review. The Turkish forces made strong representations to UNFICYP demanding that the work be stopped. They considered many of the positions to be new, provocative and a change to the status quo. UNFICYP itself expressed reservations about some of the construction and complained about the unwillingness of the National Guard to discuss the issue or advise UNFICYP beforehand of upcoming work. This programme is continuing and the National Guard continues to state that all the works are in its area of control and in no way violate the status quo.

.. On 19 July 1990, the Government of Turkey transferred the responsibility for the security of the fenced area of Varosha to the Turkish Cypriot security forces. This change caused an increase in political tension. It is appropriate to recall my report to the Security Council of 29 May 1987, in which I stated that "I have reiterated on several occasions to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities that

the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey **responsible** for maintaining the **status quo** in the fenced area of Varosha" (S/18880, para. 28). UNFICYP continues to maintain this position.

18. Near Kokkiaa and Famagusta, violations continued of the seaward extension of the buffer zone known as the "maritime security line", established by UNFICYP as practical **measure for security** purposes (S/17657, para. 19). On 19 June 1990, the Turkish **forces** fired warning shots at Greek Cypriot fishing boats in the area of Kokkiaa. UNFICYP continues to report each crossing of the line to the **authorities** concerned and warns both sides of the dangers involved and of the need to show restraint.

19. During the period under review, a **number** of demonstrations and rallies took place on the Greek Cypriot side, the **majority** of which were **centered** at Nicosia. **For** the most part they were peaceful and orderly and well policed by the Cypriot Police (CTPOL), which continued to take action to prevent entrance into the **buffer zone**. As a result there was little confrontation with UNFICYP.

20. On 24 September 1990, as a result of the Turkish **forces** continuing to use a **track** in the buffer zone north of Selemaai, UNFICYP established a standing patrol in the **area**. The Turkish forces reacted by removing the United Nations barrels and signs, **replacing** them with their own and posting sentries on the track. The National Guard protested strongly about this incursion into the buffer zone. Following **negotiations** with both sides, UNFICYP **re-established the status quo** and at present maintains a standing patrol in the area.

21. Both **sides** again conveyed to me their concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. In this connection, I wish to recall my report of 2 December 1986 (S/18491, para. 22) and of 29 May 1987 (S/18880, paras. 21-23). I remain very concerned about the **strength** and **development** of the military **forces** on both sides. This situation raises the level of tension and increases the possible risks of serious incidents.

22. The **Government** of Cyprus has again complained to the United Nations about reported destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage located in the northern part of the island. Desecration of the **churches** of Ayios Pheon at Rizokarpaso, of Saint Theresa near Yialousa, of Saint Irene at Ayia Eiriai, of Saint Barbara at Vatyli. of the church of Davlos village, looting of the churches of the Archangel Michael and of Saint George at Patriki, the demolition of the church of Panayia Avghasida near the village of Aloa and extensive damage of the mosaic pavements of the Basilica of Soli were listed in the representation by the Government of Cyprus. On my instruction, UNFICYP has raised **these matters** with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

23. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP has facilitated economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular, UNFICYP continued to encourage

farming and **also facilitated** commercial beekeeping in the buffer zone. In an area of the buffer zone north of **Mammari Village**, the Turkish forces have attempted to prevent Greek **Cypriots** from farming north of the Ovgos riverbed. This is contrary to an **agreement reached** between the Turkish forces and UNFICYP in October 1988, under which farming activity in the buffer zone is permitted up to **400 metres** from the Turkish forces cease-fire line. UNFICYP continues to apply the **provisions** of this agreement.

24. UNFICYP has continued to assist both communities **on matters** related to the supply of electricity and water **from** one part of the island to the other. Following a very dry winter, the island experienced severe water shortages during the **summer**. Nicosia was subjected to **water** rationing for considerable periods, and UNFICYP was particularly active in maintaining liaison and mutual trust between **both** sides. The **most** worrying aspect for the **future** is the suspected penetration of sea water in a number of boreholes in the Morphou aquifer in the north-west of the island. This aquifer provides water for both the northern and the southern parts of Nicosia. To date, however, UNFICYP **has** been unable to gain access to **the** aquifer to carry out an **independent assessment**.

25. **During** this period, the Turkish Cypriot authorities began **work** on the preparation of a site **for** the construction of a dam on the **Xeros** river north of the buffer zone. The dam will trap water from the Xeros river which flows from the Greek Cypriot side. It is intended that this water will **be** used for irrigation purposes in the Lefka area and that any excess water **will be** directed to Morphou to recharge the aquifer there. The Greek Cypriot authorities have indicated that they **have** completed a feasibility study concerning the building of a dam upstream on the same river on the southern side of the buffer zone. Should these projects proceed **in** their present **form**, the possibility of **serious** problems between the two sides could arise.

26. The 1990 anti-mosquito programme in the buffer zone continued under UNFICYP supervision. The current programme is scheduled to **be** completed on 20 December 1990.

27. The number of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is now **597**, of whom 593 live in the Karpas peninsula and **the** remaining 4 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to discharge humanitarian functions for these **Greek** Cypriots and delivered 403 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross. **UNFICYP** continued **to** carry out arrangements for the delivery of mail and Red Cross **messages** across the cease-fire lines. It also delivered social welfare and pension benefits to **Greek** Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus. **UNFICYP** personnel **continued** to interview, in private, Greek Cypriots who applied **for** permanent transfer to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Three such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated temporary **visits** by **Greek** Cypriots to the southern part of the island, 571 of which took place during the reporting period. The Greek Cypriot primary school in Rizokarpaso now has 28 pupils and the **one** in Ayia Trias now has 10. **In** August, 15 Greek Cypriot school children, who were spending school holidays with their parents in the **Karpas** area, were forced by the Turkish Cypriot Police to leave their homes and go south.

This was contrary to previous practice whereby such school children were allowed **spend** up to 30 days on summer holidays with their parents in the Karpas. **Followi** a week of negotiations between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriot authorities, **the** children were allowed to return.

26. In line with the Vienna III agreement concerning the support provided by **UNFICYP** to the **Greek** Cypriot population living in the northern part of the island the Liaison Post at Leonarisso was reopened in May 1990 and manned by **SWEDCIVPOL** in conjunction with AUSCON personnel. The Turkish Cypriot authorities, however, objected to the presence of **SWEDCIVPOL** in the Karpas and also insisted that they should not accompany the resupply convoys to **the** area. In October 1990 one member of AUSCON was detained by the Turkish Cypriot Police after leaving the Liaison Post to respond to a complaint by a Greek Cypriot woman living in the Karpas that several members of the Turkish **Cypriot** Police had entered and searched her home. **UNFICYP** is **pursuing** its efforts to carry out its responsibilities in that area.

29. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. It also helped them to maintain contact with their relatives in the **northern** part and arranged 20 family reunions involving 130 persons at the Ledra Palace Hotel. UNFICYP enjoys freedom of movement for these visits in the southern **part** of the island except for the Limassol area where the Cypriot Police insists on **accompanying all** **UNFICYP** patrols. UNFICYP continued to distribute pension benefits to Turkish Cypriots living in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

30. The **number** of Maronites living in the northern part **of** the island is now 261. **UNFICYP** continued to assist in arranging frequent contact between Maronites living on the two sides of the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP also delivered to them 126 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided **by** the Cyprus Government.

31. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation, to civilian members of both communities. When the need arose UNFICYP escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the southern part of the island and regularly delivered medicines to Turkish Cypriots in the north.

32. **UNFICYP** continued its efforts to foster relations in the mixed village of **Pyla** situated in the buffer zone. The **Greek** Cypriot Police control point outside the buffer **zone**, has severely disrupted the economic life **of** the village, giving rise to discontent **among** its population. In addition, the allocation, by the Greek **Cypriot authorities**, of Government land in the village for building purposes to **Greek** Cypriots only is a cause of considerable resentment among the Turkish Cypriots. UNFICYP continues to monitor this issue and to **work** towards an acceptable solution.

33. The project to refurbish Roccas Bastion and Paphos Gate, two very sensitive posts **of** the Venetian city walls at Nicosia, was started on 20 August 1990. Greek Cypriot workers cleaned half **of Roccas** Bastion and Turkish Cypriot workers completed the cleaning of the other half. The co-operation **between** the authorities of both sides and UNFICYP on this project was exemplary. The willingness of the workers to carry out the project together was **particularly** noteworthy and shows what can be done if there is the necessary will.

34. The United Nations Civilian Police (**UNCIVPOL**) maintained close co-operation and liaison with the Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot Police ~~on matters~~ having ~~intercommunal~~ aspects. In conjunction with **UNFICYP** line units, they contributed to ~~the maintenance~~ of law and order and assisted in investigations, in ~~the~~ control of civilians in the buffer zone and in humanitarian activities.

35. UNFICYP co-operated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner ~~for Refugees (UNHCR)~~, as co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus, and the United Nations Development Programme (**UNDP**), in particular to facilitate projects involving both communities. **UNHCR** supported such projects concerning sewerage, medical care and rehabilitation of the ~~handicapped~~. **UNDP** continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued projects ~~with~~ the Food and Agriculture **Organization** of the United Nations (**FAO**) for the control of newborn animal diseases, with the International ~~Labour~~ Organisation (**ILO**) for the development of handicrafts and with the World ~~Health Organization~~ (**WHO**) for ~~the~~ prevention and control of the acquired ~~immunodeficiency~~ syndrome (**AIDS**).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

36. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons held five sessions, comprising 19 meetings of which 10 were attended ~~by the three members~~ and ~~their~~ assistants and 9 which ~~were~~ attended by the three ~~members~~ alone. The ~~committee~~ continued its discussions on reports by ~~both~~ sides and its investigation ~~in~~ the field on the cases that have been submitted to it so far. During the period ~~under review~~, the Committee on Missing Persons also considered the submission by ~~both~~ sides of all cases of missing persons.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

37. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP, ~~for~~ the period of ~~six~~ months beyond 15 December 1990, should the Security Council decide to ~~extend~~ ~~the~~ mandate of the **Force** and assuming continuation of its existing ~~strength~~ and ~~responsibilities~~, is estimated at 615.4 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Operational costs incurred by the United Nations

Movement of contingents	290
Operational expenses	1 720
Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	746
Rations	965
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel	3 229
Miscellaneous and contingencies	<u>250</u>
Total	<u>7 200</u>

/...

IX. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents

Pay, allowances and transport	7 400
Contingent-owned equipment	700
Death and disability	<u>100</u>
Total II	<u>8 200</u>
Grand total (I and II)	<u>15 400</u>

The projected increase in the costs to the United Nations is mainly the result of projected exchange rate fluctuations.

38. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e. regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

39. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force that is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, as at 30 November 1990, only \$4.1 million have been received, against anticipated expenditures of some \$13.8 million for the mandate period that is about to end. On average, the contributions received per mandate period approximate to 59 per cent of the costs of the Force to the United Nations. As a result, the reimbursement of claims from the troop-contributing countries has been made only to December 1980. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be \$171.6 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

40. I informed the Security Council about developments relating to my mission of good offices in my report of 7 November 1990 (S/21932). On 9 November 1990, the President of the Council issued a statement on behalf of its members in which the members of the Council, inter alia, request me to report by 15 February 1991 on the outcome of my effort to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall agreement and to provide the Council with my assessment of the situation at that time (S/21934).

VII. OBSERVATIONS

41. During the past six months, UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions in an exemplary manner, often under difficult circumstances.

42. In the light of the prevailing circumstances, I have no doubt that the continued presence of the Force in the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned, and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.


43. In making this recommendation, I must **again** stress that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis. which **imposes** a most unfair burden on the **troop-contributing countries**. I fully share their **Governments'** **concern** at: this **situation**. As I have suggested on a number of occasions, the best way to finance UNFICYP on a more equitable basis **would** be for the United Nations share of the **costs** of the Force to be financed from **assessed** contributions.

44. As reported in paragraph 4 above, in **November** I dispatched a Secretariat review team to examine the operations and **organization** of UNFICYP. The team concluded (see S/21982) that (a) the current functions of UNFICYP remain valid: (b) the **status quo** and the prevention of a recurrence of fighting are not self-sustaining and therefore the continued deployment of UNFICYP **all** along the buffer **zone** remains necessary: (c) the number of on-line troops cannot be **further** reduced without impairing the effectiveness of the Force; and (d) the cost-cutting measures carried out over the past 10 years **have** exhausted **most possibilities** for further reductions. The team considered the possibility of converting UNFICYP wholly or in part into an observer mission, but concluded that the prevailing situation on the ground did not make this a viable **option**. **Because of** the lack of agreement between **UNFICYP** and the two sides on the complete delineation of the cease-fire lines, **as** recorded by UNFICYP, and the lack of **agreement** on the use and control of the buffer zone, UNFICYP **must** retain both a reactive and a preventive capability. The team **also** examined the possibility of reducing the number of infantry battalions from four to three **without** reducing the current level of on-line personnel. The team concluded that this would be feasible **and that** it would permit a better ratio of line troops to support troops, resulting in an overall reduction of **some** 200 all ranks. The team **underlined** that continued reliance on voluntary contributions to finance the portion of the costs for **which** the United Nations is responsible would jeopardize the future of UNFICYP. It **also** expressed the view that the changed organization that it recommended could be implemented only if the method of **financing** was changed to assessed contributions.

45. **The** team's findings and recommendations **seem** to me to be sound, and I intend to discuss their implementation with the Governments **that** contribute troops to UNFICYP.

46. I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Governments **contributing** troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United **Nations**. I also wish to express my gratitude to the **Governments** that have contributed towards the financing of the Force.

47. In concluding, I wish to pay tribute to my Special **Representative**, Mr. **Oscar Camili6n**, to the **Force** Commander, Major General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP who have **continued** to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the **Security Council**.



انتشار قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلام في تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر 1990
— 一九九〇年十一月联合国部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF NOVEMBER 1990
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1990
ДНСПЛОАЦИЯ ВСООНН НА НОЯБРЬ 1990
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN NOVEMBRE DE 1990

خطوط وقف إطلاق النار للجيش التركي 土耳其部队停火线	خطوط وقف إطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي 塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线	حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلام في قبرص 联合国部队行动分界线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces	Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard	UNFICYP operational boundaries
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques	Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote	Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Линии прекращения огня турецких войск	Линии прекращения огня Национального гарда Кипра	Операционные рубежи ВСООНН
líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas	líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre	límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza

1 NOV 2020 REV 23 UNITED NATIONS
TIMOR 1990
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations