

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 1 August 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. Cámpora

(Argentina)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BELAID
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M.A. CAMPORA Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN Mr. G. PARINI Mr. P. VALLE
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R. ROWE Ms. J. COURTNEY Ms. T. SHAND
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J. RAEYMAECKERS Mr. Ph. NIEUWENHUYS
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. K. STANKOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. A. DESPRES Mr. E. MORRIS Mr. R. VANIER
<u>China:</u>	Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. LIU ZHONGREN Mr. LIN CHENG Mr. XIA YISHAN Ms. ZHOU YUNHUA Mr. JIANG ZHENXI Mr. LI BENSONG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. J.L. GARCIA

<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. S. ALFARARGI Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. F. YOHANNES
<u>France:</u>	Mr. J. JESSEL
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. H. ROSE Mr. W. KRUTZSCH Mr. D. FELSKÉ
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. H. WEGENER Mr. F. ELBE Mr. W. GERMANN
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. F. GAJDA Mr. T. TOTH
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO Mr. A. AKBAR Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI Mr. S. DARMOSUTANTO Mr. F. QASIM
<u>Islamic Republic of Iran:</u>	
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI Mr. M. PAVESE
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. SATO Mr. K. KUDO
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILAIE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. V.C. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ  
Mr. Z. AKRAM

Peru:Poland:

Mr. J. RYCHLAK  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. V. FAUR  
Mr. S. POP  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. Y. NAZARKIN  
Mr. V.A. LEPLINSKY  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ  
Mr. R. LEVINE  
Mr. D. DORN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. J. GRANGER  
Mr. A. LEIBOWITZ

Venezuela:

Mrs. M. RAUSCHER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERRASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 326th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should now like to make my opening statement. On assuming the Presidency, I have the high honour of transmitting to you the message of the President of Argentina, Dr. Raul Alfonsín, which I shall read out:

"The delegations which comprise the Disarmament Conference are aware of the personal attention which I give to the important issues which you are considering. The meetings we six Heads of State have held are a sufficient sign of the great concern aroused in us by the gigantic scale reached in the build-up of weapons capable of extinguishing mankind.

"The aim of my Government is to give expression to its policy through deeds which confirm our intentions rather than through words alone. This applies to our conduct both in internal affairs and in the field of foreign policy. In simple terms, we propose to preach by example rather than with words.

"Our actions in government contribute to peace and international co-operation because we neither believe nor accept that the threat or use of force should be an instrument of policy. This attitude does not imply the renunciation of principles or any lessening of our determination to protect legitimate national interests. Above all, our position is the expression of a stubborn faith in the capacity of man to settle disputes by peaceful means, through dialogue and negotiation, because nothing is lost from peace while everything can be forfeited as a result of war and violence.

"The Argentine Government is fully aware of its responsibility for the promotion of peace and co-operation in the region to which it belongs and, in that connection, has assumed international obligations and proposes to continue to persevere in the future to promote the peaceful settlement of all disputes to which it may be a party or in which its moral support or diplomatic action may be required.

"Reaching beyond the dramatic crises of its history, the Argentine people has always believed that peace is a supreme virtue, that its preservation begins in the hearts of men and extends through respect for human rights and the objective of bringing about a just society, without privilege. Internal peace, peace within the nation, within every nation, must be the presumption on which peace in the world is founded.

"We believe that all peoples share this altruism. Nevertheless, in the real world we are faced with an unstable situation in which power relationships show a dangerous tendency to prevail. The search by States for military superiority will always be transient and will fluctuate as a consequence of scientific and technological progress whose boundless wizardry holds out the temptation to divert towards a search for supremacy the fruits of human intelligence which should more naturally be devoted to the welfare of mankind.

(The President)

"This ambivalence of science, in that it can serve both peaceful and military purposes, has become especially clear to world public opinion in the fields of nuclear and space technology. How infinite and inexhaustible a source of benefit for mankind, but at the same time how terrifying a prospect these technologies can be, depending on whether their application is peaceful or military.

"The Joint Declaration by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, dated 8 January last, created a hope which should not be allowed to disappear. At the time we welcomed it with optimism and today we express the hope that this hope will be born anew from the sceptical invective in which it is presently shrouded.

"The Argentine people have, to the extent possible, made a considerable effort to attain higher levels of achievement in the scientific field. So far as concerns the nuclear issue, which so legitimately concerns the Conference on Disarmament, my country will be a civil nuclear State, in accordance with the will of the Argentine people as expressed in the national elections when it approved a platform to the effect that the use of nuclear energy must serve exclusively peaceful ends. We have also reduced military expenditures substantially in order to demonstrate clearly the civil character of the Argentine Republic.

"Military expenditures throughout the world, particularly those of the Great Powers, are today the cause of dread and horror both to plain people and to intellectuals everywhere. It is incredible, simply because it cannot be believed, that expenditures on armaments can reach figures of so many digits while poverty and hunger reign throughout vast areas of the Earth. This situation represents perhaps the most dehumanizing contradiction of our civilization and serves at the same time to highlight the exceptional and unique importance of the Conference on Disarmament, which is following a difficult and labyrinthine road towards a noble goal which, we regret to say, is still distant."

This concludes the message of the President of the Republic. We hope that it will help to emphasize the great importance which the Argentine Government attaches to the work which is being done here in order to achieve a world in which the scourge of war will cease to be a constant nightmare of mankind.

I should now like to pay tribute to the work of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Bachir Ould-Rouis, who guided our work during the month of July in an excellent manner. I should like to convey to him, through his delegation, our sincere congratulations on the diligent work he carried out as President of the Conference. I must also say that I regret that he has left us, and wish him every success in his new and important duties. I am quite sure that the special relationship which currently exists between his country and my own will be reflected in my personal links with his successor.

(The President)

I should like to express a special thanks for the kind words of welcome addressed to me by many delegations as the new representative of Argentina. I also wish to greet very warmly the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, as well as all members of the secretariat. I hope that I may rely on the invaluable assistance they can give me in discharging in an appropriate manner the responsibilities I am taking on today.

The Conference has an important task to fulfil during the month of August, namely, to harvest the fruits of the work it has carried out throughout the year. Most of the representatives present here will recall their opening statements of February and March when the current session began. At that time a promising and encouraging spirit prevailed. I am not sure, but it may be possible for that spirit to be revived in this final stage so that the Conference can submit to the next General Assembly a report whose contents will help to strengthen the faith that was placed in it when it was established.

I hope that this year will not be remembered as an exception to the rule in the proverb that was quoted in this Conference at the beginning of 1985: "A year's prospects depend on the spring".

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today the consideration of agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may refer to any other matter relating to the work of the Conference.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Lowitz.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, my delegation welcomes you to the Conference on Disarmament, and congratulates you on taking the chair for the month of August, always an important time in the work of the Conference. Having assumed the chair in February as a newcomer, I have a special appreciation for the tasks you face, and I pledge my delegation's full support and co-operation. We also express our appreciation for Ambassador Ould-Rouis's dedicated efforts as President for July, and extend our best wishes as he departs to take up new responsibilities.

Today I want to speak briefly on issues related to agenda item 1, that of a nuclear test ban. At the last plenary meeting, the Conference adopted the recommendation, made by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in its progress report on its twentieth session, to meet for two weeks next March. The United States is pleased that the GSE will be able to meet for this duration. The United States members of the GSE inform me that preparation of the report on last fall's technical test has been delayed because a short period of only one week was available to them during this session. A session of the normal two-week length should allow the GSE to complete its report to us.



(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

My delegation was also pleased to note in the progress report the citation of the extensive participation by States and seismic stations in the technical test -- 36 States and 76 stations. This is an impressive count, and reflects the widely-shared view of the great usefulness of the work of the GSE for verification of compliance with a future nuclear test ban.

In view of the value of their work, it is important that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts continue to enjoy the strong support of all delegations represented here. That this is the case for my delegation goes without saying. We eagerly await the GSE's report, and we look forward to their future efforts to develop further the best possible ways to collect, analyse and exchange data to detect and identify seismic events on a global basis.

My delegation wishes to record again its appreciation for the outstanding contributions of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden, the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, and the Co-ordinator of the technical test, Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia. It is due to their dedication, patience, and persistence, and to that of their scientific colleagues, that the work of the GSE has advanced successfully to its present stage.

If one devotes but a little time to investigating the work of the Group of scientific experts, one conclusion quickly emerges: the work of the GSE is far from being completed. It cannot be fairly said that a global network for the exchange of seismic data is in place, is operational, or that this network answers all questions and meets all needs of prospective parties to a future comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Even a relatively brief test of an experimental global system, such as the 1984 technical test, generated very large quantities of data, raised many questions and has provided many important lessons for the future. The GSE is now devoting its considerable talents to digesting and understanding these matters, but without prejudging their conclusions, my delegation is convinced that much productive work yet remains.

Accordingly, my delegation stresses again that we look to the further work of the GSE, as well as other efforts, to resolve problems in the vital area of verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban.

A related effort should certainly be the resumption of a detailed and substantive examination of these issues, as well as of other nuclear test ban issues, in an ad hoc committee under agenda item one.

The distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, spoke on 25 July for a group of Western States in introducing a work programme illustrating how an ad hoc committee could proceed, under the mandate proposed by Western delegations in CD/521. My delegation fully supports Ambassador Butler's statement, and the programme of work he introduced. This

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programme of work, CD/621, which also enjoys the sponsorship of Norway, clearly indicates that practical efforts are possible in the Conference on Disarmament on specific issues related to a nuclear test ban, including slope, verification and compliance, and that it is not western delegations that are blocking such practical work.

Moreover, the Conference has before it new Working Papers introduced by Norway, CD/599, by the United Kingdom, CD/610, and by the Federal Republic of Germany, CD/612. These documents are substantive, detailed, and significant. They contain an abundance of material which should be thoroughly assessed by the Conference. Getting down to work on these and other contributions in an ad hoc committee is a more useful and practical way to proceed on a nuclear test ban than restricting our work only to plenary sessions.

My delegation stands prepared to undertake practical work towards this objective, which we all share. Where we differ is on priorities and immediate possibilities. In these circumstances, my delegation continues to be disappointed by the delegations which state their devotion to the same objective but then nonetheless block any possibility of progress toward that objective.

In this regard, I listened with attention to the statement of the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, at our last plenary session. Although Ambassador Turbanski said many things I would dispute, he also made an observation with which I can largely agree. In speaking of early efforts toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, Ambassador Turbanski said that "we should preserve our adherence to this ultimate goal and we should strive to relate and subordinate to it all our endeavours aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. It is not, we believe, a design for self-deception, if only we proceed steadily from one measure to another, probing all possible uses, trying to engage the nuclear and non-nuclear States alike, gradually paving the way to a more secure world."

The United States agrees that we should proceed steadily from measure to measure. And it is no secret that we accord the highest priority to obtaining direct and deep reductions in the offensive nuclear weapons arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. Nor is it any secret that we view such reductions as the surest and quickest way to improving strategic stability.

My delegation has taken due note of the announcement, read to us on 30 July by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, concerning a suspension of nuclear explosions by the USSR beginning on 6 August. We may wish to return to this subject at a later time, but we are, of course, aware of the historical significance of the chosen date, as well as our historical experience with previous moratoriums

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and subsequent large-scale Soviet testing efforts. Historically, the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it has no reluctance for nuclear testing, and that it will conduct such tests whenever it considers it in its national interest to do so. We have serious doubts, therefore, that such moratoriums are a sound basis for a genuine agreement on verifiable testing limitations, that they would limit further growth in nuclear arsenals, or that they would contribute significantly to the stability and confidence that sustains disarmament negotiations.

The United States position on a complete cessation of nuclear explosions remains as I have stated it in this body as recently as 27 June. And while the United States believes that the most direct path to the elimination of nuclear weapons is through equitable and verifiable reductions, it also believes that verifiable limitations on nuclear explosions can play a useful, though more modest, role.

In this connection, I draw the attention of my colleagues to the announcement made on 29 July in Washington of the new United States proposal designed to improve confidence in monitoring capability and compliance with nuclear testing limitations. This proposal goes beyond the offer made by President Reagan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly last 24 September, when he called on the Soviet Union to exchange experts at each other's nuclear test sites to measure test yields directly. The latest United States proposal contains a new, substantial and concrete element: an unconditional invitation to the Soviet Union for its experts to visit a United States test site, and to bring any equipment they deem necessary to carry out the direct yield measurement of a test.

Although the proposal was made without any conditions, it is our hope that such a practical step will be one of the "measures" of which Ambassador Turbanski spoke, and that it will stimulate a process which will enable the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the basis for the verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, your head of State, President Alfonsín, has entrusted you with an important message to the Conference. May I assure you that my delegation will study it with the attention that it deserves. May I, at the same time, welcome you in our midst as the representative of Argentina, and congratulate you on your ascension to the Presidency. The best wishes of my delegation accompany you, both for your term of office and for your term as head of your delegation.

Three weeks ago, on 11 July, my delegation tabled a Working Paper, CD/612, in which it proposed to establish a global seismic network on a continuous basis, and to improve the capabilities of this network while it is being operated, in a learning-by-doing process. The intention in undertaking this project is to set up a working global monitoring and verification system for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban based on seismic technology and to do this already before the conclusion of a CTB treaty. It is a realistic assumption that the physical installation of a global seismic monitoring and verification system, that is, the qualitative upgrading as well as the geographical expansion of the network and the establishment of a global data communication system, will take time, somewhere in the order of several years. Given this time frame, my delegation is of the view that the period between now and the conclusion of a test-ban treaty should not be wasted, but used for the establishment of such a system which will have to be set up in any case in order to verify compliance with a CTB treaty. I would therefore like to emphasize that our proposed project is intended to be a parallel and complementary action to the work of a CTB ad hoc committee of this Conference.

Working Paper CD/612 provided a detailed description of the institutional arrangements for a seismic monitoring and verification system and an outline of the measures that need to be taken.

Today, I am introducing a study, which is before you as document CD/624, that elaborates in a detailed manner on these scientific and technical aspects of the proposed project.

The study analyses the requirements and conditions under which the verification capability of a global seismic network, that is, to detect, locate and identify explosions, can be progressively increased and describes the measures which should be taken to achieve the desired improvements.

The study concludes that a global seismic monitoring system which would operate in the teleseismic range could be brought to a standard of performance which would allow for detection and identification of explosions down to a body-wave magnitude 4.0. This measurement is approximately equivalent to an explosion yield of 5 to 10 kt in dry unconsolidated rock or to a yield of about 1 kt for explosions in wet hard rock.

A special section of the study is devoted to the possibility of setting up explosions in large underground cavities which would result in a significant muffling or even a complete decoupling of the generated seismic signals from the geological environment of the explosion. This would open up the possibility of evading detection and identification of text explosions. The capabilities of a

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global network, operating in the teleseismic range would in this case not be sufficient. An appropriate number of additional regional or in-country networks would be required which could significantly improve the capability to detect and identify explosions and which would make successful evasion by cavity-decoupling a rather difficult and risky undertaking.

One has, however, to conclude from the study that a number of serious uncertainties remain at this juncture in the area of low yield explosions, in particular in connection with cavity-decoupling techniques which require further scientific investigation. Efforts are already in process to cope with these rather intricate problems. As an example I would like to point to current studies of the significance of high-frequency signals for the detection of explosions in underground cavities.

The preparation and introduction to this Conference of Working Paper CD/612 and the present scientific study express the importance which the Federal Government attaches to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Our proposal to establish a global seismic monitoring and verification system which should be progressively improved while in operation is a serious one and should not be dismissed as yet another interesting idea which is best dealt with by preserving it in the files of delegations. We are determined to find ways and means to put our proposed project into operation. In this vein we are asking delegations to seek a dialogue with us, to express their views and to join us in a pragmatic approach to the issues related to a comprehensive test ban.

The natural place to engage in such an exercise is a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament. However, to the great disappointment of my delegation, this Conference has so far not been able to agree on a mandate for a CTB ad hoc committee. We are seriously concerned about the stagnation of the mandate issue and we grow increasingly impatient with the all-or-nothing attitude of some delegations in this Conference which in effect results in a waste of time which should better be used for the solution to outstanding problems related to a CTB.

My delegation is among those which tabled a programme of work for a CTB committee on 25 July. This draft programme demonstrates the wide range of issues and the practical work that could and should be pursued under the proposed Western mandate in CD/521. Even in the absence of a formal subsidiary body, Western delegations have continued their efforts to contribute to the identification and better understanding of the remaining problems related to the scope, institutional organization, and verification of a comprehensive test ban. Several Western delegations have tabled substantive working papers. Norway invited delegations to a workshop during which in a very pragmatic, effective, and comprehensive manner the state of the art and the limits of verification by seismic means were presented. May I seize this opportunity to thank the Norwegian Government again for the excellent execution and the host of valuable information obtained in the course of this workshop.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

We hope that the present stalemate on the question of a CTB mandate can still be overcome during this session. In the meantime, however, our efforts related to a comprehensive test ban should not stand still. The establishment and continuous operation of a global seismic monitoring and verification system can be and should be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament now. Let me repeat: we expect delegations to respond to our proposed project; we expect them to join us in a fruitful exchange of ideas and the commitment to practical work on the setting up of such a seismic monitoring and verification network.

The Working Paper which I have tabled today is technical in nature; and, indeed, the proposal in its entirety relates to a technical support system for a future comprehensive test ban. This, however, must not becloud the fact that we are dealing with a highly political subject matter and that the initiative of my delegation is intended to be a political one. In my statement of 11 July, I gave the reasons why my Government wants the early conclusion of a CTBT, and outlined the circumstances under which such a treaty should come about. We look at it as an important milestone in the larger process of nuclear disarmament. Accomplishments of such significance cannot be reached by mere declaratory activities, by short-term proposals without any real military significance, proposals that are mainly -- and obviously -- designed to evoke applause from the gallery. Whoever wants a durable serious solution to the testing issues, must acknowledge their complexity. My delegation has always been of the view that the price for progress in disarmament is serious, intensive work with the participation of all concerned. The most important unsolved problem of efforts to reach a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the question of verification. An increasingly satisfactory solution to this issue is the key to a durable prohibition -- or even limitation -- of testing. This insight should also provide the yardstick for measuring the worth of the two important proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union on testing of which we have been apprized at the beginning of this week. The merit of the United States proposal -- an invitation allowing precise measurements and calibration of instruments on-site -- is that it can contribute to giving a new impetus to the verification debate. On the other hand we regret that the short-term moratorium proposal of the Soviet Union does not address the verification problem at all. This limits its contribution to a durable solution of the problems on hand.

At the end of my technical presentation I wanted to indicate the larger political perspective in which our proposal has to be seen. On this political level, it is easy to see that the testing issues are an important element in the military relationship between East and West. But the East-West relationship is not only characterized by military factors, it has an overriding political component, and this political component has been the subject matter of the Ministerial meeting in Helsinki on the occasion of which high-ranking representatives of the 35 participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have taken stock of the Helsinki process after the first 10 years of its operation. Despite the existing differences of opinion between the spokesmen of East and West, as they have emerged at the Helsinki meeting, it is noteworthy -- and noteworthy also for the work of our Conference -- that all participants have expressed their determination to improve the relationship between the two major alliance systems.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Foreign Minister Genscher, in his speech, has summed up the work of the anniversary Conference by characterizing it as search for the possibilities of a new phase of a realistic policy of détente. The fact that such conciliatory perspectives have been discussed in earnest at the Helsinki Conference, in a favourable climate, and in anticipation of the Summit Meeting of the leaders of the two Great Powers should give us encouragement for the fulfilment of our task. For the more concrete subject on which I have spoken -- the issues of nuclear testing and beyond that, nuclear disarmament -- the frank and useful exchange of views at Helsinki and the heightened level of trust that may flow therefrom may also imply a perspective of future progress.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, as well as for the interest he expressed in the message of the President of Argentina.

There are no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I have been informed that the consultations relating to the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been successful. May I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting at this stage in our work, and convene in five minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference to consider this question. If I hear no objection I shall take it that we may proceed in that manner.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): After we have concluded the consideration of this matter at the informal meeting we shall resume the plenary meeting to formalize any agreement reached during the informal meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and reconvened at 11.55 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 326th plenary meeting is resumed.

I submit to the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.183, 1/ entitled "Draft decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on effective

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1/ "The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish for the remainder of its 1985 session an ad hoc committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The ad hoc committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1985 session."

(The President)

international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", which was circulated today by the secretariat. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should now like to refer to the question of the appointment of a chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. As I observed at the informal meeting, I take it that there is consensus on the appointment of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. If my understanding is correct, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to his appointment.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): May I convey to Ambassador Ahmad, through his representative at this meeting, my congratulations and the congratulations of all members of the Conference on his appointment. I wish him success in his important work, which I am sure he will accomplish with the efficiency he has always shown in the Conference.

I now wish to refer to another matter. The secretariat has circulated today a time-table of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. The time-table was prepared after consultations with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. In this connection I have been informed that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 6 will be holding consultations next week and does not intend to convene a meeting of the subsidiary body. As usual, the time-table is indicative and may be changed if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): With regard to the time-table I wish to point out that during the informal meeting to be held on Tuesday morning we shall consider requests by non-member States to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee which was re-established today on agenda item 6.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 6 August, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon