

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.323
23 July 1985
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 July 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis

(Algeria)

GE.85-62915

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS

Mr. L. MOUSSAOUI

Mr. A. BELAID

Mr. M. ZIGHED

Argentina:

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. G. PARINI

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Miss J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J. RAEYMAECKERS

Mr. Ph. NIEUWENHUYS

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. N. MIKHAILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U MYA THAN

U HLA MYINT

Canada:

Mr. R. ROCHON

Mr. R. VANIER

Mr. R. SUTHERLAND

Mr. A. MORRISON

Mr. A. CRAWFORD

China:

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIU ZHONGREN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU
Mr. XIA YISHAN
Mr. JIANG ZHENXI
Mr. LI BENSONG
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Mr. J.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. VEJVODA
Mr. J. HAJGAR

Egypt:

Mr. M. BADR

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL
Mr. M. RENIE
Mr. B. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. D. FELSKÉ
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. L. MULLER

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. W. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Ms. R. TANZIL
Mr. HARYOMATHRAM
Mr. A. AKBAR
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI
Mr. T. OKADA

Kenya:

Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. A. BELLOUKI

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. O.O. GEORGE
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. Z. AKRAM
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES
Mr. J. RUBIO CORREO

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. V. FAUR

Mr. S. POP

Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS

Mr. L.E. WINGREN

Mrs. E. BONNIER

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. O. DAHLMAN

Mr. R. ANGSTROM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.I. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. V.A. LEPLINSKY

Mr. S.V. KOBYSH

Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. R.J.S. EDIS

Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ

Mr. T. BARTHELEMY

Mr. R. LEVINE

Ms. M. WINSTON

Mr. P. GARDNER

Mr. D. DORN

Mr. P. LEMBESIS

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 323rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference today pursues its consideration of agenda item 4, chemical weapons. However, any member wishing to do so may, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference.

I should also like to recall that, in accordance with the agreement we reached at the last informal meeting, the Conference will continue today to consider in an informal meeting the question of the report to the General Assembly on the consideration of new measures in the field of disarmament to avoid an arms race on the sea bed and ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof. We shall continue our work in an informal meeting immediately following this plenary meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, Spain, Brazil, Canada and Bulgaria.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will also submit the Ad Hoc Group's progress report which has been circulated in document CD/616. I hope that delegations wishing to submit comments on the report will do so without delay, as we have to adopt the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 concerning the dates for the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group scheduled for 10 to 21 March 1986 in Geneva. I intend to bring this recommendation to the attention of the Conference at our plenary meeting on Tuesday 30 July.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Lowitz.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, we are entering the last weeks of the chemical weapons negotiations during this session, and I believe it is important at this time for my delegation to make a brief intervention on this question. The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, in his address to the Conference on Disarmament in February, reaffirmed the primary importance the United States places on these negotiations. The first priority of the United States remains the prompt negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Unfortunately, thus far this year we have made little concrete progress toward that goal.

In adopting a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament has recognized the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This mandate is a concrete expression of the universal revulsion for these terrible weapons, and of the strong desire on the part of peoples around the world to be rid of them forever. The United States fully supports this objective and is committed to making every effort to conclude our negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

My Government is particularly concerned about the lack of progress in these negotiations in view of the continuing spread of chemical weapons to States that had not previously possessed them. This proliferation not only threatens stability

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in key areas of the world, but also makes the completion of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention more difficult to achieve. The more States that have such weapons, we fear, the more difficult it will be to achieve world-wide agreement to ban them totally.

A second factor lending urgency to our task is the spreading use of chemical weapons. The United States has taken the lead in condemning chemical weapons use wherever it has occurred -- in south-east Asia, Afghanistan and, most recently, against Iran. Despite the preponderance of evidence presented concerning these instances of use, many nations have questioned the reliability of such evidence without seeking to examine the facts closely, and, unfortunately, few have been impelled to condemn either the use of chemical weapons or the tortoise-like pace of the negotiations here in the Conference.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical weapons constitutes an undertaking of vital importance for humanity. It embodies the mutual commitment of nations to refrain from using chemical weapons. It is, accordingly, all the more regrettable that this agreement has recently been honoured in the breach. Moreover, the Geneva Protocol does not prevent the acquisition, production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. In terms of international law, it is not illegal to acquire chemical weapons. To combat most effectively the further spread of chemical weapons, and to preclude the possibility of their use, we must make their acquisition and retention illegal. The definitive way to accomplish this objective is through a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This is a key factor in the desire of the United States to conclude such a convention here at the Conference on Disarmament without delay.

The lamentable situation with regard to the use of chemical weapons also underlines the need for the convention to contain a mechanism rapidly and unequivocally to determine the facts whenever and wherever a violation is suspected. Unfortunately, the delegation of the Soviet Union has repeatedly refused to address the general wish of other delegations for reliable verification of provisions in the chemical weapons ban, and it has repeatedly criticized as "not serious" the detailed United States proposals for verification of compliance. It has not, however, been forthcoming with concrete alternatives that address the need to establish mutual confidence that States are, in fact, in compliance with the convention. My delegation encourages all delegations to make specific and concrete proposals, so that we may have a firm and rational basis for resolving our different views. The United States draft convention in CD/500 is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, but its provisions do respond to the need for reliable verification. We are prepared to consider any alternatives that provide for an equal or greater degree of effectiveness. We cannot accept less.

The United States delegation has made more than a few efforts to stimulate the negotiating process. Most recently, in our intervention on 28 March, we set forth three proposals to accelerate the work of the Committee.

The first was to put this work on a more rational basis by scheduling a negotiating session in the autumn. As I said then, if there is no negotiating session, there can be no progress between August and February. I can add that it

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appears to my delegation that those who have hesitated in approving an extended schedule for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons are precisely those who could be most threatened by the further spread and use of chemical weapons, and are among those who should be most interested in completing the negotiations as soon as possible.

Our second suggestion was that the Committee should focus on issues that would be key to progress. The Committee is attempting to address the declaration of chemical weapons stocks in Working Group "B", and although some progress has been made, we have not yet resolved the important issue of the timing of declarations. On the equally important issue of chemical weapons production facilities, progress has been stalled because in Working Group "A", inexplicably, the group of socialist States has refused even to agree that the definition of a chemical weapons production facility would include facilities devoted solely to making chemicals which were used solely for chemical weapons. The issue of ensuring that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production is likewise bogged down in Working Group "A".

In Working Group "C", we look forward to an examination of the issue of challenge inspection. This is certainly one of the key issues of the negotiations, and we should give it the full discussion it deserves. A discussion of the principles underlying the important concept of challenge inspection and of the necessity for States rapidly to satisfy concerns about compliance with the convention is a clear necessity to further our negotiations.

My last suggestion for accelerating work was related to delegations' willingness to negotiate. I note with sadness that the delegation of the Soviet Union has remained virtually silent in many of the sessions of the Working Groups. This silence has done nothing to further our progress, and it raises serious questions whether the Soviet Union, despite its claims, is interested in a chemical weapons convention. In addition, while it criticizes our verification proposals, the Soviet delegation has not introduced a concrete proposal on this subject in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons since the United States tabled its draft convention last year.

As I said in beginning my statement, the priority United States objective is the negotiation of an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons without further delay. Unfortunately, however, in addition to the difficulties we have experienced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, there may be external obstacles to our negotiations. The current imbalance in chemical weapons capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union may well be such an obstacle.

The long discussions that have occurred in our Executive branch and in the Congress of the United States over the past five years are ample evidence of my Government's reluctance to resume production of chemical weapons. But during the past sixteen years -- during, that is, a 16-year unilateral moratorium on United States chemical weapons production -- the Soviet Union has continued to produce its own chemical weapons and to expand the chemical weapons potential of its large deployed chemical warfare forces.

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This year's debate in the United States Congress once again underscores that it is the clear preference of the Administration, the Congress and the American people to ban rather than to build chemical weapons. If we can achieve a convention here promptly, the United States will build no binary chemical weapons. And, in any event, the United States binary programme is not an obstacle to concluding our negotiations.

Let me further illustrate this point. In the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 18 July, an attempt is made to explore alleged differences in the positions of the United States and the USSR on the treatment of binary chemical weapons in the convention. The simple fact is that the Soviet Union and the United States have expressed essential agreement on how to treat these weapons in the convention. The Soviet Union seeks to destroy them along with super-toxic lethal weapons. So does the United States. The Soviet Union would unequivocally ban the production of the key precursors of binary weapons as it would super-toxic lethal weapons. So would the United States. There is no essential disagreement. By portraying an area of essential agreement as one of disagreement, however, the Soviet statement appears to sow confusion regarding a problem already solved. In our view, it would be better to work together to solve our remaining problems rather than trying to create new ones.

The 18 July statement of the Soviet delegation contained other unfounded allegations and inflammatory assertions to which my delegation has already responded. I regret that it was necessary to do so, and I firmly hope that future statements by the Soviet Union and its socialist colleagues will not require further interventions by my delegation.

In spite of the meagre results achieved so far this year, there remains sufficient time for constructive work during the remaining weeks of this session. I urge all delegations to join in serious negotiations. Let us together find ways to bring our work closer to a successful conclusion.

In this regard, the Conference should adopt a single text for negotiating the chemical weapons convention. There is a good foundation for this work in the form of the annex to the 1984 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/539. Such a negotiating text, which would encapsulate agreements already reached, would ensure that such progress as we make is carried forward to future negotiating sessions.

We have a unique opportunity at this point in history, the opportunity to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth. History will not judge us kindly if we fail to seize that opportunity. The United States delegation is committed to the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons convention and is prepared to demonstrate its commitment. We hope that other delegations are prepared to join us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 289th plenary meeting, I give the floor to the representative of Spain, Ambassador Lacleta.

Mr. LACLETA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, this being the first time that I have the honour of addressing this Conference, I should like to wish you every success during the period of your mandate, and also during that of your successors. This year we are celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and of the creation of the United Nations, and in this Conference the 40-month cycle which brings round the distinguished representative of Algeria to the Presidency again has just been completed. On my own behalf and in the name of my Government I offer my best wishes that in the new cycle you are now beginning, the Conference may continue to advance with determination and without discouragement towards the achievement of its goals.

On this first occasion on which I take the floor, I should also like to greet the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Berasategui, the members of the secretariat and the distinguished delegations present here.

All the items on the agenda of this Conference are of great importance, not only for the maintenance of international peace and security but also, in some instances, at least, for the very existence of mankind.

I should like to refer in particular to what my Government, notwithstanding the major importance of the other items on the agenda, regards as the main item on the agenda of the Conference. In our opinion, the issue of a nuclear-test ban is the item with the highest priority, not only in the order of our agenda and not only in time but also in the sphere of ideas. This is simply because an effective nuclear-test ban would immediately have positive consequences on other items, for example, items 2, 3, 5 and 8.

An effective ban (and when we say effective we mean verifiable) would be a giant forwards step towards the elimination of the danger of a qualitative escalation of nuclear weapons, and naturally, it should not produce a quantitative escalation under any circumstances since we all know, and it has been repeated ad nauseam, that the destructive power of existing nuclear devices is more than sufficient for the total destruction of mankind.

In the opinion of the Spanish Government, a nuclear-test ban, that is to say, a ban on nuclear test explosions, should not be limited to the testing of nuclear weapons, but should cover all types of nuclear explosions, basically for two reasons. One is that we consider that the continuation of tests including nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes, would leave the door open for their immediate use for military purposes, and the other is that it would make the problem of verification even more difficult.

In order for a nuclear-test ban to be efficient and reliable, efficient and reliable verification is also required. Treaties banning the use of an arm are one thing; when they are violated it is quite evident. Treaties aimed at banning tests on certain weapons or types of weapon are a very different thing. Even leaving aside the terrible specialized nature of atomic weapons, treaties banning tests and also treaties to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling or development of certain weapons, require particularly reliable verification systems because one cannot wait for an armed conflict to occur to check that the treaty is being observed or rather, was being observed.

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In a nuclear-test ban, therefore, the provisions concerning verification are as important as, or even more important than the actual substantive provisions of the ban. If a future agreement in this regard (and we do not lose hope that such an agreement will be achieved) is to be observed, a complete and efficient verification system is required which will be accepted without reservations by all parties.

My delegation is therefore following the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts with interest and expectation in the hope that the necessary bases can be found for setting up a system which will meet these conditions. Allow me in referring to this issue to congratulate the Government of Norway for the very interesting workshop which was held in Oslo in early June. The information obtained during those days has been extremely useful.

In my delegation's opinion the necessary requirement for the reliability of a detection system is not so much that the future system should have the full co-operation in good faith of all the parties concerned and that the observatories of all parties should contribute fully at all times. We think that it is still more important that the system, i.e., the network of monitoring stations, should be capable of detecting possible banned tests, even without the collaboration of the alleged offender.

We think that it would be too much to envisage a system in which an alleged offender would have to furnish the data obtained by its observatories which might reveal a violation of the ban in its territory. It is, however, necessary for the system to be able to provide sufficient indications of a violation without the offender's co-operation so that the verification machinery can be set in motion, including, where necessary, on-site inspections.

For these reasons my delegation has welcomed with great interest the report on the work of the Ad Hoc Group contained in document CD/585 and impatiently awaits the conclusion of the work on the analysis and assessment of the results of the technical test carried out from 15 October to 14 December 1984.

During the last United Nations General Assembly, the Spanish delegation was among the sponsors of resolution 39/53. We regret that to date the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to set up an ad hoc committee to study this vital issue. As observers we cannot but feel concerned at the difficulties that the Conference encounters in reaching an agreement on the mandate of this committee and we sometimes wonder if this difficulty is not a purely semantic one. As we have already said, the ban cannot be divorced from verification, since they interact on a completely reciprocal basis, and we think that an ad hoc committee could now at last begin the work required for an active consideration of both issues, thus going beyond the confines of statements heard at plenary meetings of the Conference.

With reference to item 2 of the agenda of the Conference I would limit myself to recalling what I said a few moments ago, that the best contribution which could be made to the cessation of the nuclear arms race would precisely be to accept a ban on nuclear tests, which are the decisive factor in the qualitative improvement race. That, of course, does not resolve the quantitative problem. We take it that this is the substance of agenda item 2,

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which in our opinion incorporates the idea of maintaining the same level of security for all at a lower level of armaments. This is not, of course, the ultimate aspiration of the Conference but it should indicate a tendency and a way towards a goal at which we should aim, utopian though it may be.

Item 3 of the Conference agenda refers in particular to the prevention of nuclear war, which is undoubtedly an important issue. It is a fact that fear of nuclear war is one of the anxiety factors to which mankind is subjected in our times. We think, however, that the importance of the agenda item is reduced in so far as it is restricted to appropriate measures to avoid the accidental initiation of a nuclear exchange. In our opinion, the addition of the phrase "including all related matters" is what opens up the tremendous scope of the item.

I should explain that unless there is an accident (the results of which would, of course, be as catastrophic as those of a war), we do not think that it is probable that a nuclear war will start as such. A more likely possibility is that a conventional conflict will escalate. The mere prevention of nuclear war, therefore, would not be realistic; the prevention of a conflict cannot be divided according to whether it may go nuclear or remain conventional. We must in broader terms envisage the prevention of all conflicts. Naturally, this may exceed the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament, and also affect issues relating to observance of the Charter of the United Nations and particularly the obligation for all Members to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

What we can do in this forum is to take the matter back to its origins and stress that in order to avoid or at least limit the danger of a nuclear attack, with the almost inevitable nuclear response, it is necessary to reduce the temptation also to initiate hostilities with conventional weapons. We are concerned by any attitude aimed at producing or maintaining any kind of superiority in conventional weapons which could lead to the temptation to initiate conventional hostilities in the hope of an easy or rapid victory. Our conclusion would be that in order to prevent a nuclear war, the most important step must be to ensure a reduction with balanced results, I repeat, balanced results, of the level of conventional weapons.

For these reasons we would welcome the promotion in this forum of conventional disarmament initiatives at all levels -- world, regional or subregional and even bilateral. In this, we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, have a good opportunity of setting an example, without limiting ourselves to waiting patiently for the Great Powers to solve the problem of nuclear weapons.

For these reasons we see in this item a clear link with the item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and I should like to say that we wish Ambassador García Robles, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the programme, success in his untiring efforts.

I shall now refer to the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We welcome the fact that continuity in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has been maintained and wish its Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, every success. As is logical, the work of the Committee reveals new problems but also gives some idea of solutions, although on occasion it appears to follow a spiral if not actually a circular course, when issues which appeared to have been resolved surface again in the working groups. Overall, however, we think the Committee will make progress, albeit slowly.

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I should like to state now that we welcome the formula contained in the annex to document CD/CW/WP.107 of 22 April, aimed at guaranteeing the compatibility of the future convention with the 1925 Protocol and we have the pleasure of congratulating the Chairman of the Consultative Group on this formula.

At the beginning of this statement I mentioned the specific problems arising from agreements of the type of the future convention on the prohibition, not only of the use, like the 1925 Protocol, but also of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. While in accepting that Protocol States were able to formulate appropriate reservations and even announce that they were prepared to take reprisals if attacked with chemical weapons, in our opinion that possibility has no place in the future convention. In our future convention the possibility of reprisals should not even be mentioned for the simple reason that they would not be possible, at least for States which observed the convention to the full and in good faith; once the period -- perhaps 10 years -- set for the destruction of stockpiles of weapons had elapsed, they would not be in a position to take reprisals. Furthermore, what possible reprisals could there be if any of the parties to the Convention, violating its obligations, should renew its research, manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons? Would that induce other parties to the convention also to carry out those activities in reprisal? In any case it could not mean mere reprisals but the total destruction of the convention since the latter cannot be broken down into a large number of bilateral relationships.

That was why we said that the possibility of reprisals should not be mentioned because it would simply not be possible. In this type of agreement, once again verification should deprive reprisals of any meaning. That is why simple verification systems are not possible. The certainty that nobody is developing, stockpiling or manufacturing chemical weapons or certain chemical substances is much more difficult to verify than the mere non-use of such weapons. That certainty is, however, vital for the convention to have the desired effects. If verification shows that someone is violating the convention, the first response cannot be a reprisal. The offender must be discovered in time. If, by misfortune, that should not be possible, the convention would lose all its force, and, call it reprisals or denunciation, by the application of well-known rules of treaty law, the convention would have ceased to exist.

Of course, if conventions of this type do exist, like the 1972 Convention prohibiting biological weapons, which lack an efficient verification system and seem to have operated satisfactorily because there have been no reports of violation, in actual fact it is because we do not know whether this apparent state may not just be an illusion. We do not know, and we would have to wait for the violation of the prohibition on the use of such weapons which would certainly leave the party which had observed the Convention in good faith in a very difficult situation without any possibility of defence or response.

This is why my Government considers the issues of verification, where difficulties continue to exist, to be of such importance in our future convention; we hope that the recent proposals contained in document CD/575 can provide a basis for progress in the sphere of verification of non-production, and we hope to see proposals on verification of destruction of existing weapons and on the necessary declarations, particularly with regard to the

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location of arsenals. It should be possible to ensure that within a reasonable period existing weapons can be placed under international control in depots devoted exclusively to that purpose, during the period necessary for their complete destruction, we think that it will be possible in this way to avoid the difficulty which some States understandably experience with regard to proposals which involve a need to declare the location of depots or stockpiles belonging to their armed forces which also contain other types of weapons, while at the same time the danger of their use during the destruction period would be eliminated thanks to this international control.

With regard to the definition of chemical weapons and of the chemical agents which should be prohibited and placed on the appropriate list, for the purposes both of destruction and of non-manufacture in the future (except for protective purposes in a single facility), our delegation considers that the treaty should only contain an express prohibition concerning single-purpose agents. The list of such agents should be adopted, and possibly updated, by all parties by consensus. We would reiterate that it should be the single-purpose criterion which is basically used for the list.

Other agents, on whose inclusion in the above-mentioned list there was no consensus, could be prohibited by applying the general-purpose criterion to them, and they would appear on another list. Their production for permitted purposes, other than for protection, would not be restricted to a single facility nor their quantity to one metric tonne, but their production would have to be subject to very strict on-site inspection.

I should like to add here that in our opinion such an inspection would necessarily require appropriate institutional organization; in this sphere we largely agree with the substance of document CD/589, recently submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom.

For other agents, both supertoxic lethal agents and precursors (key or otherwise) which are indisputably dual-purpose, constructive solutions have been proposed. To conclude my reference to lists of agents, I should like to add that in any case these lists must be open-ended and we believe that there is already some degree of consensus to the effect that they could be updated by the Consultative Committee of the organization to be set up, and that, of course, the fact that an agent was not included in the list would not alone automatically mean that its production must be unconditionally legalized.

For the identification of the chemical agents to be included in those lists and for the consideration of the numerous technical problems which emerge at each stage of our work, we think that it might be very useful for a group of chemical and military experts to hold meetings, as already suggested by the representative of Japan in his statement of 11 April last. We would add that those meetings could be periodic and should report to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on their results.

As for the Executive Council of the future organization to be set up, we think that it should be constituted according to criteria of equitable geographical and political distribution. We also believe that all States which have made a positive declaration of production of chemical agents (not necessarily chemical weapons) appearing in the above-mentioned lists should be represented in it.

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Apart from the foregoing, although it is certainly related to the issue of the declaration of stocks and destruction of chemical weapons, I should like to add that our delegation considers that a special treatment for binary weapons does not seem to be justified. We believe that the agents used to manufacture them should be subject to the arrangements that apply to them as chemical agents, and the weapons subject to that laid down for weapons.

We are anxiously awaiting urgent discussion of the problem of the time-periods for the destruction of weapons and facilities and their order, a problem which seems to be fraught with difficulties. The proposals made so far do not seem satisfactory to us, particularly where time-periods are concerned. As for the order of destruction, I should like to note that the greatest urgency should be apportioned on the basis of how operational the stocks are, leaving the oldest and already obsolete stocks to the last. The proportional and balanced destruction of the toxicity capability proposed by the People's Republic of China (CD/605), would only be acceptable if all the States had the same initial stock of declared chemical weapons. Otherwise, the relative military advantage revealed at the initial moment of declaration would be maintained. This means that the establishment of international control over stocks and facilities as soon as possible after the entry into force of the convention is very important. Thus the problem of time-periods would become less important.

Before concluding, I should like to mention the satisfaction of the Spanish Government at the fact that it has been possible to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to concern itself with agenda item 5. My Government fully shares the concern expressed by many other delegates at the danger that the arms race may spread to outer space. Our satisfaction at the initiation of negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and our desire for a fruitful outcome of the negotiations is enhanced by the possibility that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters, may have begun to consider these issues in accordance with a mandate accepted by all the participating States.

Lastly, I should like to congratulate Ambassador Butler of Australia on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to study issues concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons. In this connection I shall merely point out that in our opinion the prohibition of new weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations are different issues, although there is no reason why they cannot be treated together as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee suggested at the start of the work in which we wish him every success.

We also wish success to you, Mr. President, to your successors and the Conference. Our co-operation in the Conference is limited for the moment to that of an observer delegation. You all know that we would like to see an increase in the level of our participation, and we do not fear the greater responsibility; it is perhaps excessively easy and convenient to ask for greater efforts when -- if you will allow me a peculiarly Spanish metaphor from bull-fighting -- we are watching the bull-fight from behind the barrier. We are doing so, however, with the impatience of a spectator who would like to leap into the arena. From our observers' bench we reiterate our best wishes for your success and for that of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, today I would like to make a few comments on item 4 of our agenda, chemical weapons. As we approach the close of the 1985 session, it becomes increasingly apparent that the expected progress towards the drafting of a Convention will not be achieved this year, despite the efforts of Chairman Turbanski and of Mr. Poptchev, Mrs. Bonnier, Mr. Elbe and Mr. Wisnomoerti, the Chairmen of the three Working Groups and of the consultations on use.

This situation is especially disappointing for the members of the Group of 21. Contrary to what recent statements in this Chamber would have us believe, the history of multilateral efforts to achieve the prohibition of chemical weapons can be traced back to the mid-sixties, in one of the predecessor bodies to this Conference. The countries not belonging to military alliances have always been in the forefront of those efforts, as a direct result of which it became possible to conclude the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

The members of that group of countries continued to press for the multilateral negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons since the inception of the former Committee on Disarmament. In 1979, the Group of 21 proposed the establishment of a subsidiary body with a negotiating mandate, against tenacious objections that were only lifted in 1982, for reasons linked to the peculiar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Perhaps as a consequence of that situation, the negotiations in this Conference have not proceeded with the desired consistency and speed. The two super-Powers, which possess the largest arsenals of chemical weapons, seem to attach greater importance to the public relations effect of our multilateral endeavours than to the achievement of progress towards a convention. While one super-Power, the United States, apparently tailors its own proposals to the perceived objective of proving its stated opinions about the nature of the rival's society, the Soviet Union seizes every opportunity afforded by the open character of the debate on national defence going on in the other super-Power to justify its views about the adversary's intentions.

These counterproductive attitudes are generated by and feed on the mistrust and rivalry which have characterized the relationship between them in matters pertaining to the field of disarmament. The only exception may be found, of course, when there is a coincidence of their interests in order to preserve and reserve for themselves certain privileges, as is the case of their close co-operation to prevent developing countries from mastering so-called "sensitive" technologies in the nuclear field.

Despite all the difficulties, work has at least proceeded diligently in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary organs. My delegation hopes it will be still possible to include some generally agreed draft formulations in the report that must be adopted in August by the Conference, which should contain the basis for the resumption of work at the 1986 session. It is important, in this context, that such formulations be achieved as a result of the participation of all delegations, within the institutional framework provided by the Conference. While the normal activity of selective consultations with interested parties by the elected officers is necessary and legitimate, one should guard against a too broad interpretation which would generate awkward situations. No delegation has any mandate or proxy to negotiate in the name of any other, or at least this is the case as far as my delegation is concerned.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

The action and proposals of Brazil on the prohibition of chemical weapons stems from our basic concerns with regard to the future convention. First, we support the mandate received from the General Assembly in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the instrument should aim at the prohibition of production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and at their destruction, as well as the prohibition of their use. Brazil does not possess chemical weapons, and we consider the existing arsenals as a threat to international peace and security. Not only do such arsenals endanger individual nations, which may become victims of mass destruction, but they also constitute an incentive to the proliferation of chemical weapons. Thus, we attach primary importance to the obligation of their destruction, in a treaty which will bring about the elimination of the threat they pose. Second, as a developing country, Brazil strives for economic and social progress, and in that effort the development of our chemical industry plays a crucial role. We do not believe that the future convention, deriving as it does from a specific concern in the field of disarmament, should in any way attempt to regulate civil chemical industry. Therefore, the constraints it must impose on certain activities directly connected with a chemical weapons capability should not be of such a magnitude that it would interfere with legitimate civilian needs.

In short, the final text of the convention should strike an adequate and workable balance between two important concerns: the destruction of existing arsenals and the prevention of their future emergence, as well as the need to promote the wider and non-discriminatory utilization of scientific achievements in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. With those basic concerns in mind, let me now briefly discuss some of the issues currently under consideration in each of the four subsidiary organs of the Ad Hoc Committee.

My delegation favours a short, simple formulation on the prohibition of use. Document CD/CW/WP/107, presented by Mr. Wisnomoerti at the close of the first part of the session, provided a good basis for the discussions of the past weeks. The text contained in the annex of that document reflects a considerable measure of understanding on the relationship between the 1925 Protocol and the prohibition of use to appear in the Convention. We would not, however, favour the maintenance of the proposed third operative paragraph, since it is difficult to conceive that a State would remain committed by provisions of an instrument from which it has withdrawn. Subject to the understanding recorded in the footnote of that annex, regarding the definition of chemical weapon, the remainder of the text could in our view be accepted with a few minor drafting improvements.

During the second part of the session, work centred on the prohibition of use of herbicides. Brazil did not wish to question the inclusion in the Convention of provisions to that effect, since the matter seems to be of considerable concern to several other delegations. We do recognize the importance of an eventual prohibition of herbicides as a method of warfare. If it is the general understanding that this issue should be addressed in the framework of the convention, we would urge that herbicides are not assimilated to chemical weapons, be it in their definition, in their purpose or in possible restrictions to be imposed on their use. We welcome, in this connection, Working Paper CD/118, introduced by the delegation of Pakistan. By the same token, we think that the protraction of the debate on herbicides would hinder the work on the main subject matter of the convention, which is and should continue to be the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

The issues discussed in Working Group A also touch directly on the basic concerns of Brazil, which I mentioned at the start of my remarks. From the approach of my Government, to the effect that the convention is not meant to regulate the activities of civil chemical industry, but only to prohibit chemical weapons, it follows that all peaceful activities are by definition permitted under the instrument. Accordingly, it would be advisable, in the view of my delegation, to replace the expression "permitted purposes", wherever it occurs, by the expression "purposes not prohibited by this Convention", with the necessary adaptation of pertinent language. That would, for instance, be the case of Section VI of the current structure of the Convention, dealing with "permitted activities".

In fact, as it appears from the relevant documents, that section deals with the restrictions to be imposed on certain categories of chemical products, and should be titled accordingly. The caput of the relevant article must therefore reflect, as it does in document CD/539, the recognition of the right of each State Party to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use any chemical for purposes not specifically prohibited by the Convention, subject to the restrictions, or rather, the régime, spelled out in the several paragraphs dealing with different categories of chemicals. Such chemicals should, in our view, be listed by category in a systematic manner, particularly those super-toxic lethal chemicals that have no civilian application and other single-purpose compounds, which would thus be distinguished from dual-purpose chemicals. Such lists might be periodically reviewed by the competent organs created by the convention so as to ensure the inclusion of any new compounds of the same kind. This proceeding would seem to be preferable to a classification exclusively based on the notion of risk, since this involves a subjective element difficult to ascertain; it would, furthermore, effectively complement the general purpose criterion and its companion criterion of toxicity.

We regret that the controversy of a confrontational nature over components of binary weapons has prevented Working Group A from achieving progress in its deliberations on several issues before it.

My delegation attaches particular importance to the questions under examination in Working Group B. The complete and effective elimination of existing arsenals of chemical weapons by those few countries that possess them constitutes, in fact, the necessary and liminar counterpart of the prohibitions and restrictions on their legitimate activities to be accepted by those which have chosen not to develop or possess such weapons. In that respect, my delegation generally supports the conclusions and suggestions presented by the Chairman of Working Group B in document CD/WP.108.

In the course of the second part of the session, a considerable amount of work was undertaken on detailed aspects of the declaration of possession of chemical weapons and on the practical implementation of their destruction. We await the report to be presented by the Chairman of Working Group B on those matters, so that the many valuable ideas and suggestions that we expect to be contained therein can be properly studied with a view to the continuation of the work at the 1986 session of the conference.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

I would also wish to put on record our support for the approach taken by the Chairman of Working Group C in document CD/WP.106, on which the discussion has focused. On the question of national implementation measures, my delegation would prefer the shorter formulation contained in that document, but in deference to the concerns expressed by others we would accept the result of the discussion of the past few weeks in the Working Group as reflecting a general understanding on this matter. On another topic of that document, I would reiterate our view that the question of the so-called "national technical means" need not be addressed by the Convention.

The deliberations in Working Group C also contributed to further refinement of the text of the current article VIII on the Consultative Committee. Our main suggestions on that subject, which seem to be acceptable to many, consist in the inclusion of the promotion of international co-operation for peaceful purposes among the general functions of the Consultative Committee and the slight enlargement of the membership of the Executive Committee so as to ensure the adequate balance supported by all. In this connection, we are confident that it will also be possible to arrive at a provision on membership that would make due allowance for specific situations and interests without blessing or sanctioning discrimination among sovereign States.

Finally, the present formulation for the article on consultation, co-operation and fact-finding, as it appears in document CD/WP.106, seems to us an adequate expression of a compromise solution to the many complex differences of opinion that have been raised by other proposals. My delegation would hope that such maximalist proposals will eventually be dropped in favour of a reasonable compromise.

At the start of the 1985 session, we had hoped that the questions I touched upon above would have been generally solved by now. It is regrettable that the negotiations on chemical weapons in this multilateral forum are now dangerously close to becoming yet another casualty of the confrontation between the super-Powers. This has already been the sad fate of several items on the agenda of this Conference. Let us strive to prevent it from happening to the once promising prospects of achieving the total elimination of chemical weapons.

Mr. ROCHON (Canada): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor this morning to comment briefly on the progress which this Conference has made in implementing the mandate which we have undertaken regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We all recognize at first hand the variety of problems we seem destined to face in this Conference in re-establishing ad hoc committees to deal with issues of long standing. These problems are, of course, very evident in the case of outer space, which is new to our agenda. I would therefore like to express the appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt for the adept manner in which he has overcome these difficulties. In particular the work programme for which he deserves full credit is simple and direct. In addition we have been encouraged by the results of the Ad Hoc Committee's first week of substantive meetings and look forward to continued progress.

(Mr. Rochon, Canada)

This week, the Ad Hoc Committee has begun its review of existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We do not share the view of some delegations that such a review is an unnecessary or unproductive exercise. On the contrary, we see it as one of the essential steps to the fulfilment of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Not only will it help underline the full scope of the questions involved, but more importantly it will help to ensure that what we do here will be in conformity with, and not at cross purposes to, existing treaties and international law. In the final analysis time spent now in this activity should speed up rather than delay the successful results of our deliberations.

Yesterday, our delegation circulated in the Ad Hoc Committee an advance copy of an official document of the Conference, CD/618, entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space". This Working Paper which is intended to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in advancing its work has been submitted to the secretariat for translation and reproduction and will shortly be officially distributed to all delegations. In essence it is a distillation of a study undertaken by the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University in Montreal, at the invitation of Canada's Department of External Affairs, as part of a deliberate programme by the Government of Canada to include non-governmental organizations, where possible, in the arms control and disarmament process.

The Working Paper identifies more than 20 international agreements, including the United Nations Charter itself, which are of significance to the process in which we are now engaged. The paper does not put forth nor represent a Canadian Government position on any issue. Rather it seeks to provide a broad interpretation of a variety of views in a balanced, non-provocative manner, so as to provide a useful data base for the benefit of each member of this Conference.

The Working Paper highlights a number of areas in international outer space law which are deserving of our attention. During the period between the end of our present deliberations and the commencement of our activities in 1986, my Government will be making full use of this survey when reviewing Canadian policy relevant to arms control and outer space and to the work and the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is our hope that this Canadian Working Paper will similarly constitute a reference point for other governments in their own review of the subject matter.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Because I am speaking for the first time I should like to congratulate you most cordially, Mr. President, on your high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you success in the discharge of your responsible functions. My delegation is particularly pleased to work under your able guidance as a representative

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

of friendly Algeria who has given proof frequently of his country's attachment to the cause of disarmament. May I assure you that in the Bulgarian delegation you will find an energetic supporter for the implementation of your task. May I also convey my delegation's gratitude to the representative of Zaire for his active work as President for the month of June. I am happy also to congratulate the new Ambassador of France, Mr. Jessel, on his appointment as his country's representative to our Conference. I look forward to a constructive relationship between our two delegations. Hardly had the news reached us of the departure of that long-standing and respected member of our community, Ambassador Carasales, to whom I wish the best of luck in his new appointment, than we learned that you, Mr. President, and the representative of Belgium are to take your leave from Geneva too. While regretting that we will not be able to work longer together, may I wish you, Mr. President, and Ambassador Depasse, many rewarding results in your new appointments.

Right from the beginning of the current session one of the items of immediate practical importance has been considered to be the chemical weapons ban — given the advanced stage of the negotiations and the clearly-worded mandate, which envisages formulating a draft convention. Under the able and consistent guidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, the negotiations gained in depth. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Turbanski on the occasion of his country's National Day, 22 July, which he also spent working on various problems of the negotiations on chemical weapons.

On a number of areas of the convention a good basis was set up for finding mutually acceptable solutions. I have in mind the meaningful negotiations that took place on many important aspects of the "Permitted Activities"; the further progress made in regard to the issue of diversion of chemical-weapon stocks; the consideration of the function and role of the national body for implementation and control. It is noteworthy that the discussion in the three Working Groups throughout the spring part of the session and until recently was marked by a business-like spirit and the extremist positions, it seems, yielded to the tendency for a more sensible and balanced approach.

From the point of view of these positive trends in the negotiations, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria cannot but point out, with regret, the United States' decision to give the green light to large-scale production of binary chemical weapons. This decision creates a new, complex situation at our multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons — both from a political and diplomatic point of view, and because of the obstacles and complexities of a military and a technological character resulting from this new weapon. The socialist countries have been repeatedly warning that the introduction of binary chemical weapons

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in the United States arsenal — the initial arrangements for which were made recently — would put the world in jeopardy because it would start an arms race in a new, particularly dangerous and costly direction.

The Bulgarian delegation is especially preoccupied with the intention to deploy the binary weapons on the territory of the United States' West European allies, thus bringing new dangers to the densely populated areas of the European continent. In this connection I should like to recall the topical importance of the proposal, put forth by the Warsaw Treaty Member States, to declare Europe a chemical-~~weapon~~-free zone.

This proposal should be viewed in its proper perspective, i.e. as an important disarmament measure, though of regional dimension. Such a measure would by no means diminish the significance of, or interfere with, the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament but would rather complement them and strengthen the European security as a whole.

We also welcome the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany to consider and develop the idea to establish a zone free of chemical weapons on the territory of three Central European States.

The implications stemming from the United States decision to authorize the production of binary weapons will have yet to be assessed in full, for it will, undoubtedly, have further repercussions on the nature and pace of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and indeed on all efforts aimed at banning and eliminating the chemical weapons. It is obvious that many important areas in the draft convention are complicated by the binary problem. I, therefore, reserve the right to speak again and in more detail, if necessary, on the problems recently created at the negotiations.

In the meantime, no efforts should be spared in the search for advancing the negotiations. Above all, it is necessary to arrive as soon as possible at a complete and satisfactory solution to the problem of binary and multi-component weapons. Such a solution ought to comprise: a sufficiently reliable approach for identifying the key components of that type of weapon; an agreement on a régime ensuring their non-production anywhere; and the adoption of such a schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons which would envisage their elimination in a priority order, if they should appear in the arsenals.

A comprehensive solution is also required for the issue of measures to be applied towards the chemical industry with the aim of ensuring non-production of chemical weapons in general. A final agreement is feasible following a consensus on the approaches for identification of the various categories of chemicals and on the role of the so-called

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

"single small-scale facility". In the long run the only method in this regard is that of agreeing on balanced and realistic arrangements for data reporting and verification.

In my delegation's view, it would be unrealistic and incorrect to bind down a considerable part of the chemical industries of tens of countries around the world — once the convention enters into force and for untold number of years thereafter — with some kind of continuous, obtrusive international control, of the kind some delegations suggest.

A calm, sensible and realistic approach on the problem of verification as a whole should prevail. A positive fact is already at hand — the emerging understanding on the question of the role and functions of the national body for implementation and control of the convention.

My delegation has been upholding the view that the role of continuous and uninterrupted national control for compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention would be of particular importance and that it should be supplemented by international control measures.

It is not my intention to go now into the details of the various subject matters of the convention. At the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its respective subsidiary bodies my delegation has had an ample opportunity to do so. Before I conclude, however, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for the analytical and well-founded speech of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan, on the present state of affairs at the negotiations on chemical weapons, delivered on 18 July. We are also heartened by the fact that the delegation of the Soviet Union, whose expertise and constructive contribution have positively affected the negotiations on many occasions, is once again offering its readiness to participate actively in fresh efforts to draft provisions of the Convention.

My delegation supports such an approach and for its part will do its best in assisting, together with all delegations, the process of developing and drafting the text of the Convention.

It was my intention to touch upon another extremely important question of our agenda, the question of the prevention of nuclear war. The Bulgarian delegation, together with the overwhelming majority of States, shares the view and is firmly convinced that the prevention of a nuclear war is the number-one global problem and that it should occupy a central place in the work of our Conference. But bearing in mind the willingness of some delegations to have a special plenary meeting on this issue very soon, my delegation will return to it at the appropriate moment.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Ad Hoc Group's progress report contained in document CD/616.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events): Mr. President, I appreciate this opportunity to address this distinguished Conference to report to you on the results of the recent work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and to introduce to you document CD/616 containing a progress report of our latest meeting.

The Group met last week from 15 to 19 July and experts and representatives from 22 countries attended the session.

In my intervention here on 4 April this year, I had the pleasure of giving you a preliminary report on the technical test, which our Group conducted during a two-month period in the autumn of 1984.

As you may recall, one objective of the technical test was to test procedures for extracting level-I data at seismological stations. Those of you who participated in the recent workshop in Norway now have first-hand experience on how this may be carried out at a modern seismic array station. The further objectives of our technical test were to test procedures for regular use of WMO/GTS for the exchange of seismic messages and procedures to be used at International Data Centres.

Last time I could report that the test was successfully conducted and that the collection and compilation of the large amount of information generated during the test had started.

Since then considerable efforts have been made at seismological stations and laboratories and at Experimental International Data Centres to further analyse and study the large amount of data that was collected during the test and to evaluate the results and experiences obtained. Many people around the world have been involved in this work. Most of the basic material that is needed for an overall evaluation of the technical test is now also available and compiled. The large material collected during the test might prove valuable also for future more detailed national scientific investigations.

The co-ordinator of the technical test, Dr. Peter McGregor, Australia, and the Convenors and Co-convenors of our study groups have made great efforts in collecting, compiling and evaluating the large material. They have also assisted the Ad Hoc Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal, in working out the preliminary draft of a report on the test. This draft has been the basis for the

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific
Experts to Consider International Co-operative
Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

Ad Hoc Group's discussion last week. The dedicated efforts of all involved in the evaluation of the test, both within the Ad Hoc Group of Experts and at institutions around the world should be greatly appreciated. During the evaluation of the test, as during all other phases of the technical test, the Ad Hoc Group has enjoyed excellent co-operation with the WMO. I will in this context also recall the most co-operative and constructive spirit that has been shown among all experts in the Ad Hoc Group throughout our formal meetings as well as in the frequent informal contacts that have been established to conduct our work. We also greatly appreciate the eminent services provided by the secretariat and we are impressed by the way it handles our very technical material.

During last week's meeting the Ad Hoc Group discussed the factual results of the test as contained in a preliminary report. In my view there are now only few marginal questions that remain to be clarified as to the factual description of the test and its results, given the level of details needed for the Ad Hoc Group's overall evaluation of the test. The remaining uncertainties are not likely to affect the overall conclusions.

Coming back to some of the examples I gave last April to illustrate the size of the technical test we have now found that 76 seismological stations in 36 countries contributed data to the test. However, for organizational and technical reasons, all of these countries did not provide and receive data for the entire time period. I could also mention that almost 5,000 messages were exchanged and that the variation from one day to another was quite substantial. The number of messages received daily at Experimental International Data Centres ranged for example from 2 to 212. It has also now been established that in all 953 seismic events were observed and located during the test.

The Ad Hoc Group also discussed how the obtained results related to the original objectives of the test as stated in document CD/534. The Ad Hoc Group agreed that the objectives of the technical test were successfully fulfilled and further that the test has provided extremely valuable experience and technical information which was previously unavailable, on the actual topics to be tested.

This, I think, most important conclusion of the Ad Hoc Group, means that the technical test was successfully conducted in accordance with the plans established for the test. It also means that the test provided valuable experience and technical information on the various procedures to be used for the extraction of level-I data at seismological stations, for the exchange of seismic and bulletin data over the WMO/GTS and for the work at International Data Centres. The fact that this experience and information simply was not available before the technical test means that a lot of knowledge of vital importance for developing procedures for the exchange and analysis of seismic data can be obtained only through technical tests.

What now remains to be done is to make an assessment of the various procedures earlier proposed by the Ad Hoc Group in the light of the experience gained from this test and try to find out which procedures worked well, and quite a lot certainly did, and which procedures might need to be refined and improved. Areas where uncertainties still prevail might also be identified.

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

This work is still in front of us and has to be carried out before we deliver our report to the Conference. Although a lot of work thus still remains to be done the Ad Hoc Group envisages submitting its report on the technical test to the Conference during the first part of 1986. To meet this objective the Ad Hoc Group has discussed and agreed on an internal schedule for its work, a schedule, I must admit that puts a considerable burden on our scientific secretary, Dr. Ringdal, and which would mean that the draft of the report should be completed and distributed to the members of the Ad Hoc Group by 1 December 1985.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 10 to 21 March 1986, in Geneva.

This concludes my brief introduction of the progress report (CD/616) of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and I will try to answer any questions that distinguished members of the Conference might have.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for introducing the report.

There are no more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I should like to recall that in an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting the Conference will continue the consideration of the question of the report to the General Assembly on the consideration of new measures in the disarmament field to avoid an arms race on the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

The secretariat informs me that we already have eight speakers on the list for the next plenary meeting on Thursday, 25 July. Since the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Thursday afternoon, I therefore suggest that the plenary meeting next Thursday should begin at 10.00 a.m. sharp. I hope that I may rely on the co-operation of all delegations so that we can begin at 10.00 a.m. sharp and hear the complete list of speakers. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Conference approves of my suggestion.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 25 July at 10.00 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.